Правоведы и философы: Радбрух и Дворкин
Many different kinds of professionals work with law, but often they seek to use law for particular governmental or private purposes. Otherwise they focus on some specific areas or aspects of its creation, interpretation or application; or they study it for its interest judged by criteria that are given by fields of scholarly practice outside it. Is there a special significance for a role exclusively concerned with analysing, protecting and enhancing the general well-being or worth of law as a practical idea? This paper argues that such a role is important. Comparing Gustav Radbruch’s and Ronald Dworkin’s approaches to law, it asks how this role can be specified and how a professional responsibility for discharging it may be envisaged. Many professionals concerned with law adopt such a role incidentally or intermittently, but it needs more prominence and clear demarcation. The paper suggests that it can be seen as the specialised role of the jurist, treated as a particular kind of legal professional. The term ‘jurist’ would then have not just an honorific connotation. It would indicate a Weberian ‘pure’ type that may approximate some current understandings of juristic practice. But it would also identify a normative ideal – something intrinsically valuable. Seen in this way the jurist is one who assumes a certain unique responsibility for law.