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Regular version of the site

Article

Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights

Public Choice. 2015. Vol. 162. No. 1. P. 159-182.
Leonid Polishchuk, Georgiy Syunyaev.

We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites' asset ownership could improve property rights protectiion in non-democraices. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites' concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible comitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.