Был ли Платон платоником: как следует понимать платоновские идеи?

Вестник Русской христианской гуманитарной академии. 2014.

Katrechko S. L.

In my article (talk), based on dialogue ‘Parmenides’, I argue that Plato is not a Platonist, because he does not postulate an independent existence of the "World of Forms". However, he argues that the forms are necessary for our cognition of things. Therefore, we should not reject the existence of Plato’s Forms, but to clarify their epistemic and ontological status. From epistemic point of view, Platonic theory of knowledge is similar to Kantian theory of a priori (transcendentalism). In ontological sense Plato’s Forms should be understood as not special intelligible things (objects), but as the properties [of things] and Plato postulated ‘partaking’ things to some Forms: every thing exist as a particular set of properties (attributes, qualities) and a totality of them (pre)determines this thing (thereby, the properties are ‘primary’ and the things are ‘secondary’). Thus, Plato’s ontology in contrast to the substantial ‘ontology of things’ (Democritus, Aristotle) can be considered as the alternative predicative ‘ontology of properties’.

Keywords: вещь, property, thing, Platonism, платонизм, свойство, the ontology of properties vs. the ontology of things, онтология свойств vs. вещная онтология