Firm Dynamics in Melitz-Type Models
Based on the well-known model of monopolistic competition by Melitz with a finite number of firms, we built a number of dynamic models, designed to clarify the dynamic behavior of the original construction. Two variants of the formal Melitz dynamic model are presented, with the quasi-steady state found in one of them. Also, the models with the creation of new firms at the cost of labor
and product are presented. We found that in the latter, under certain conditions on the parameters of the economy there is superexponential growth. We calculate the equilibrium states of the models and compare them.
In this paper we consider games with preference relations. The cooperative aspect of a game is connected with its coalitions. The main optimality concepts for such games are concepts of equilibrium and acceptance. We introduce a notion of coalition homomorphism for cooperative games with preference relations and study a problem concerning connections between equilibrium points (acceptable outcomes) of games which are in a homomorphic relation. The main results of our work are connected with finding of covariant and contravariant homomorphisms.
«Менеджерлерге арнал#ан экономика» кітабы о9ырманды зама-
науи 9о#амда аса 9ажетті болып табылатын ?рі экономикалы9 ойлауды
9алыптастыру#а ы9пал ететін микро ж?не макроэкономика моделдеріні/
негізгі M#ым-тOсініктерімен таныстырады. Атал#ан о9улы9ты/ ерекшелігі,
мMнда теориялы9 моделдер мен тMжырымдарды/ практикалы9 9ызмет ба-
рысында пайдаланылуына басты назар аударылады. Экономист-аналитик-
терге, сарапшылар#а арнал#ан экономикалы9 теория бойынша д?стOрлі
о9улы9тардан айырмашылы#ы, «Менеджерлерге арнал#ан экономика» биз-
нес 9Mрылымдарда 9ызмет ететін немесе осы салада жMмыс жасауды жоспар-
лап жOрген практик мамандар#а арнал#ан. Кітапта іс жOзінде 9ызмет ат9арып
жат9ан нары9тар мен компанияларды/ на9ты мысалдары, тапсырмалар
(жауаптары берілген) ж?не кейстер келтірілген.
О9улы9, е/ біріншіден, «Мастер делового администрирования — Master
of Business Administration (MBA)» білім беру ба#дарламасы бойынша 9осымша
к?сіби білім алушылар#а арнал#ан. Сонымен 9атар экономика саласына
9ызы#ушылы9 танытатын 9алы/ кHпшілік 9ауым#а — студенттерге, экономика
п?ніні/ о9ытушыларына, жо#ар#ы ж?не орта буын менеджерлеріне арнал#ан.
A contract theory model is studied in which objective functions of a regulator and of two types of firms include ecological variables. It is shown that the choice of a way of functioning of the regulating mechanism (separating or pooling) depends both on political conditions (what kind of regulator defines the mechanism and the contracts) and on economic conditions: a difference between ''dirty'' and ''green'' firms in their efficiency and a degree of their prevalence in the economy. Under a small difference in values of parameter characterizing the types of firms it is shown that if, what seems to be typical for many developing and transition economies, the use of ''dirty'' technologies increases the rentability of the firms and the fraction of ''dirty'' firms in the economy is high then the pooling (non-market, in some sense) mechanism is chosen more often. Under conditions which seem to be typical for industrial countries, where ''green'' firms are relatively efficient, a separating (more market) mechanism can be expected more often.
This article analyzes a sequential search model where firms face identical but stochastic production costs, the realizations of which are unknown to consumers. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying a reservation price property and provide a sufficient condition for such an equilibrium to exist. We show that (i) firms set on average higher prices and make larger profits compared to the scenario where consumers observe production costs, (ii) expected prices and consumer welfare can be non-monotonic in the number of firms, and (iii) the impact of production cost uncertainty vanishes as the number of firms becomes very large.
The concept of economic equilibrium under uncertainty is applied to a model of insurance market where, in distinction to the classic Borch's model of a reinsurance market, risk exchanges are allowed between the insurer and each insured only, not among insureds themselves. Conditions characterizing an equilibrium are found. A variant of the conditions, based on the Pareto optimality notion and involving risk aversion functions of the agents, is derived. An existence theorem is proved. Computation of the market premiums and optimal indemnities is illustrated by an example with exponential utility functions.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.