Эффекты освобождения от ответственности для участников коррупционных сделок
The idea of ligalization of bribe giving for certain types of bribes was expressed by K. Basu in 2011 and got a name Basu proposal. In this paper we discuss effects that can be caused by the direct implementation of this proposal. Our game-theoretic model shows that while legalisation of certain bribe-giving occurances can lead to some positive consequences, it is not always a good idea to return bribe to the bribe-giver as suggested by Basu. The chance to get the paid bribe back increases the amount of bribes that end up in corrupt officials' pockets.
The author offers an analysis of the Russian market theses services.
The publication includes articles related to International scientific and practical conference dedicated to the interaction of the ruling elite and the systemic opposition in modern Russia and abroad, which was held in the Volga Institute of Management named after PA Stolypin (Saratov), 5-6 September 2012
The chapter is devoted to basic priniples of the Rssian criminal law. It is specifically mentioned the history of the principles and its current reflection in the Russian Criminal Code of 1996. The author discusses the structure of crime and the punishments inflicted upon its commission.
In this study, for the first time in Russian practice from a large amount of empirical data on state contracts for procurement of goods, works and services, made a major budgetary organization during 2008-2010., Examines factors affecting the decline in trading, delays in supplies, as well as problems in the performance of obligations under the contracts. The analysis showed that a reduction prices at the auctions directly dependent on the number of applications accepted for review by the competitive commissions. Falling prices are more frequent in the procurement of goods and experimental trust (compared to the benefits of the inspection), as well as a state contract for works. However, the prices are much less likely to have been lowered in auctions (compared to purchasing through quotations and tenders). Delays in supplies occurred in 27% of patients and were more frequent in the procurement of experimental benefits, and were characterized for major purchases and state contracts executed during the I-III quarters of the year. More serious problems in the performance of obligations, full fraught with supply disruptions, have characterized the state contracts, culminating in the IV quarter. The overall risk supply disruptions were reported only 5% of purchases at competitive procedures, but on the contracts accounted for nearly half of all purchases of the budget organization in 2008-2010. Based on the analysis in the formulation of recommendations to improve the system of public procurement.
This article is devoted to the Digest of the Laws of the Russian Empire – an embodiment of the operative legal system in late imperial Russia. Even though the Digest contained the law in force, and thus should be studied as a crucial source on Russian (legal) history, its meaning has been often overlooked. The reason for that is a remarkable difference between the original texts of laws adopted by the legislator, and their published form in the Digest. This difference came from the necessary editing procedures when every new piece of legislation was included in the existing system of the Digest. This strange feature of legal procedure when two different versions of a particular law – the original one and the one codified in the Digest – both remained in force should be considered as a part of official autocratic legality in late imperial Russia. Even though it may seem inefficient and irrational, the practice of obligatory codification of laws in the Digest existed for a rather long time – from 1835 until 1917. My research aims to find possible explanations for the Digest’s prolonged existence in the context of political and legal culture of late imperial Russia. What did Russian ‘official legality’ actually mean on the levels of theory and action?
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.