Article
Основные показатели экономической динамики фирмы в современных условиях финансового рынка
Вектор науки Тольяттинского государственного университета. Серия: Экономика и управление. 2013. № 2(13). С. 13-20.
Бородин А. И., Ефимов Г. А.
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