Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst im Lichte gegenwärtiger Ästhetik und Bildtheorie
This article identifies and discusses two basic prerequisites for the fruitful interpretation and reception of Heidegger’s art philosophy. The First is the reconstruction and analysis of the role, which the problematic of art played in the theoretical genesis of so-called “turn” (die „Kehre“, in German) in Heidegger’s philosophical pathway that took place in the 1930s. The second prerequisite is a successful integration of Heidegger’s ideas to the nature of art into the contemporary discussions around the notion of the aesthetic, its changing boundaries and functions. The article focuses on epistemological, spatial, and material aspects of Heidegger’s conception of art, which are especially of interest in the context of contemporary aesthetic theory, whose sphere of competence ranges from the region of art to the variety of aesthetic experiences in everyday life.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
In the book published by the most important archival documents of the State Academy of Artistic Sciences - the central institution of philosophical and aesthetic thought of Moscow during 1920's, related to the activities of Shpet, Kandinsky, A. Losev, Kagan, etc. (from RGALI funds. and other archives of Moscow). The publication outlined the range of ideas GAKhN related literature and polemics with the "formal method", and commented on the manuscript of great polemical article by Boris Gornung about the latest trends in literary studies (1924).
In What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger provocatively says that: “science does not think” (WCT 8). Unfortunately, Heidegger does very little to explain this bold claim, or explicitly articulate what he sees as the unthinking aspects of science. With that said, this essay elucidates Heidegger’s controversial assertion by aligning Heidegger’s distinction between Gestelland Gelassenheitwith Kuhn’s distinction between normal and revolutionary science. Briefly, the idea is that the puzzle-solving of normal science, much like the calculative activity that orders modern technology (Gestell), fails to ask what it means for scientific entities to be. However, theparadigm-testing of revolutionary science represents a releasement (Gelassenheit) from the practices and presuppositions of normal science such that it is able to ask about the beingof scientific entities. In short, revolutionary science thinks about the being of entities in a way that normal science does not.
In order to make the connection between Heidegger and Kuhn clear and thereby explain Heidegger’s claim that “science does not think,” I begin this essay with an account of the distinction Heidegger makes between being and entities. I then spell out this distinction and tentatively explicate the meaning of being via an analysis of Kuhn’s distinction between scientific paradigms and the objects we study through them. The basic thought is that Heidegger’s “being” is akin to Kuhn’s “paradigms” insofar as both tell us what it means for a specific entity or object to be. In Section 2, I explain why science does not think about the being of entities. Specifically, I connect Heidegger’s interpretation of scientific explanation and calculation with Kuhn’s account of puzzle-solving in normal science. I then illustrate why the pursuit of problems related to entities precludes questioning the paradigm that presents us with those entities and also leads to the dangers Heidegger sees in modern technology. In Section 3, I compare Heidegger’s interpretation of our releasement from the calculative activities that characterize technology with Kuhn’s account of the paradigm shifts that typify revolutionary science. In doing so, I note that revolutionary science does think about the being of entities, but in Section 4 I indicate a key difference between Heidegger and Kuhn over the extent to which thinking is either externalor internalto the practices of science. As Heidegger sees it, thinking about the being of entities is achieved through a releasementfrom calculative activities. But for Kuhn it is an intense engagementwith the puzzle-solving of normal science that enables a paradigm shift. This suggests Heidegger might be skeptical about science’s ability to think even in the revolutionary case, whereas Kuhn appears to be optimistic about science’s ability to think, generally. Finally, I show that Heidegger may still have some sympathy for Kuhn’s position insofar as Kuhn’s account of anomalies is consistent with Heidegger’s claim that as the dangers of technology grow the potential for being saved grows as well.
The paper offers a review of positions held by prominent philosophers (Plato, Benjamin, Heidegger, Derrida) regarding the power of art. In spite of the essential differences between their approaches to art those thinkers displayed interest in the same questions and problems. That helps to reassess Plato’s harsh criticism of art, which turns out to be a fairly typical philosophical way of dealing with art. In an imaginary conversation with the contemporary thinkers Plato stands out, as he is aware of mission and influence of art in human life and intends his own philosophy to be politically responsible poetry.
O. A. Zhukova, A. A. Kara-Murza and M. G. Talalay are well known as researchers in the Russian and Italian culture. New work, written in collaboration, is dedicated to Russian writers, philosophers, artists, travelers, who had visited the old Amalfi in southern Italy. The relics of St. Andrew the Apostle are a spiritual treasure of the city for over 800 years.The basis of historical and philosophical program of the book is studies of the intellectual biographies of prominent figures of Russian literature, philosophy and art of the nineteenth and twentieth century. They had inspired by the beauty of Amalfi, embodying it in his works.
This article argues that the origin of the work of art is not some kind of “happening of truth” (Heidegger); rather, it is what the Greeks call “improvisation”—that is, not simply free play, but far more self-schematization.
Traditionally phenomenology was considered as the philosophical movement that pays no attention to the problem of medium understood as the material mediator of thinking process. Admittedly, this media-indifference of phenomenology results from its subjective-idealistic orientation. Acknowledging the truth of this retrospective interpretation the alternative look at the problem of relationship between phenomenology and media studies offered in this article is future-oriented and takes as its starting point the very idea of phenomenality considered as main theme of phenomenological researches. As opposed to plural and particular phenomena, holistic phenomenality allows us to think the object of phenomenological researches as a consistent field of primary appearance which embraces not only the objective structures of phenomenological experience, but also the subjective ones. In this sense primary phenomenality is the primordial medium of any appearance. The visual image (and its experience) is offered as the best model for explication of phenomenality understood in terms of mediality.
This work shows that being must originally be understood as implication. We begin with what Heidegger calls Hegel’s ‘new concept of being’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit: time as history is the essence of being. This concept however, is not univocal—for supersession means destroying-preserving. Hegel shows himself to be the thinker of truth as essentially ambiguous; and the Phenomenology is onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, the history of the being and unity, time and aspect, of the concept’s ambiguity. For Heidegger however, conceptual ambiguity confirms that Hegel’s history of being is stuck in a vulgar interpretation of time; and the Phenomenology can explain neither the origin of this time, nor the necessity of negation for the historical determination of being—for Hegel cannot think the ground of the concept of being, that is, the grounding of the ground. If Heidegger argues however, that the Phenomenology is predetermined by its ancient point of departure, we must go back to the Greeks, back to Aristotle’s original insight (overlooked by the entire history of philosophy as metaphysics): being and unity imply one another—for they are essentially implications. Thus the question of the meaning of being becomes the question of the meaning of implication.
Martin Heidegger is arguably the most influential philosopher of the 20th Century. He was also a card-carrying member of the Nazi Party. Debate over the relation between Heidegger’s thought and his political engagement has raged since Heidegger officially joined the Nazis in 1933. However, the recent publication of Heidegger’s private notebooks offers scholars new and detailed insight into Heidegger’s intellectual development and political commitments in the interwar period. In this essay, I examine Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazis in light of the philosophical account of Western history (Seinsgeschichte) that Heidegger introduces in his 1927 edition of Being and Time, develops in his notebooks and other writings from the 1930s, and finalizes in his lectures on technology in the 1940s. Specifically, I start with a summary of Heidegger’s stated aim in Being and Time, namely, to “raise anew the question of the meaning of being” through a “phenomenological deconstruction of the history of ontology” (BT1/19, 39/63).I then demonstrate that Heidegger’s early enthusiasm for National Socialism was partially based on his belief that the Nazis represented a radical break from the Western tradition that begins with Greek metaphysics and culminates in the environmental degradation and human dislocation in our modern, technologically driven societies. From here, I show that Heidegger came to realize that, far from a break with Western history, National Socialism represented the apotheosis of modern technology. At this point, I also explain how Heidegger’s later critique of technology develops out of his disillusionment with the Nazis, and so amounts to an implicit and occasionally explicit critique of National Socialism. Finally, I object to Heidegger’s philosophical account of the Western tradition by pointing out that his focus on the general trends of history overlooks the concrete suffering of individual human beings, but then I illustrate how this criticism is addressed by one of Heidegger’s most influential students: Emmanuel Levinas.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.