The role of ratailer's performance in optimal wholesale price discount policies
The main goal of this paper is to model the effects of wholesale price control on manufacturer’s profit, taking explicitly into account the retailer’s sales motivation and performance. We consider a stylized distribution channel where a manufacturer sells a single kind of good to a single retailer. Wholesale price discounts are assumed to increase the retailer’s motivation thus improving sales. We study the manufacturer’s profit maximization problem as an optimal control model where the manufacturer’s control is the discount on wholesale price and retailer’s motivation is one of the state variables. In particular in the paper we prove that an increasing discount policy is optimal for the manufacturer when the retailer is not efficient while efficient retailers may require to decrease the trade discounts at the end of the selling period. Computational experiments point out how the discount on wholesale price passed by the retailer to the market (pass-through) influences the optimal profit of the manufacturer.
We formulate the optimal control problem for a class of nonlinear objects that can be represented as objects with linear structure and state-dependent coefficients. We assume that the system is subjected to uncontrollable bounded disturbances. The linear structure of the transformed nonlinear system and the quadratic quality functional let us, in the optimal control synthesis, to pass from Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equations to a state-dependent Riccati Equation. Control of nonlinear uncertain object in the problem of moving along a given trajectory is considered using the theory of differential games. We also give an example that illustrates how theoretical results of this work can be used.
The paper studies a problem of optimal insurer’s choice of a risk-sharing policy in a dynamic risk model, so-called Cramer-Lundberg process, over infinite time interval. Additional constraints are imposed on residual risks of insureds: on mean value or with probability one. An optimal control problem of minimizing a functional of the form of variation coefficient is solved. We show that: in the first case the optimum is achieved at stop loss insurance policies, in the second case the optimal insurance is a combination of stop loss and deductible policies. It is proved that the obtained results can be easily applied to problems with other optimization criteria: maximization of long-run utility and minimization of probability of a deviation from mean trajectory.
The chapter studies a dynamic risk model defined on infinite time interval, where both insurance and per-claim reinsurance policies are chosen by the insurer in order to minimize a functional of the form of variation coefficient under constraints imposed with probability one on insured's and reinsurer's risks. We show that the optimum is achieved at constant policies, the optimal reinsurance is a partial stop loss reinsurance and the optimal insurance is a combination of stop loss and deductible policies. The results are illustrated by a numerical example involving uniformly distributed claim sizes.
Book include abstracts of reports presented at the IX International Conference on Optimization Methods and Applications "Optimization and applications" (OPTIMA-2018) held in Petrovac, Montenegro, October 1 - October 5, 2018.
Proceedings include extended abstracts of reports presented at the III International Conference on Optimization Methods and Applications “Optimization and application” (OPTIMA-2012) held in Costa da Caparica, Portugal, September 23—30, 2012.
Asset liability management has received much attention lately among other financial mathematics problems. Optimal investment with constraints is a distinctive feature of this class of problems. The paper presents solution of the constrained optimal control problem for a specific market model and optimal criterion. The proposed model has correlated dynamics of assets in a general form and allows for a closed form solution of the problem.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.