Pro-Putin rallies before the 2012 presidential elections became campaign venues in which the Kremlin used political symbols—woven into a narrative of nationalism and tradition—to define and activate core voters across the Russian Federation.
Russia’s interventions in Ukraine and Syria are designed to force the U.S. to accept a new “grand bargain” about the future of world order. Drawing on bargaining theory, the article argues that any such bargain suffers from acute commitment problems. Russia cannot convince the U.S. that there are limits to its revisionism, while the U.S. is unable to reassure Russia that it won’t renege on any agreements as Russian power declines. President Donald Trump has hinted at détente. But as long as these underlying commitment problems remain unresolved, the two sides will continue their slide towards a new Cold War.
Historical institutionalism has demonstrated the value of close analysis of policymaking to explain institutional change. In particular, scholars have distinguished four different patterns of institutional change: drift, conversion, layering, and displacement. To date, most of this literature has been based on studies of developed democracies. This paper uses a case comparison of pension reform in the two postcommunist giants, Russia and China, to analyze the analogous processes of agenda-setting, bargaining, choice, and policy implementation in bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. While policymaking in both countries takes place almost entirely within the state bureaucracy, in China, state political authority is much more decentralized than in Russia. I argue that this difference helps to account for the characteristic difference in the patterns of policy change that we observe in the two cases: periodic abrupt reversals in Russia vs. incrementalism and layering in China.
Explanations for the sharp difference in the economic growth performance of Russia and China under economic reform vary widely. Some observers emphasize the differences in the choice of initial reform strategy, others the inherited institutional environment for economic activity. There is a debate over which institutional characteristics are conducive to good growth performance: decentralization and competition among local governments or centralization of control over performance targets. Yet there has been little systematic empirical effort of the Russian and Chinese cases to test the implications of these theories for the behavior of firms. This paper uses data from surveys of firms conducted by the World Bank in 2012 to analyze differences in business-government relations in Russia and China. The findings support theories that differences in levels of administrative decentralization and local government competition help account for differences in business-government relations in the two countries and the more dynamic business environment overall in China.
В статье дается анализ деятельности Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности, применяются различные теоретические подходы для выявления критериев оценки эффективности деятельности организации.