This paper is dedicated to the characteristics of phenomenon of state identity in the modern Russian society which has been affected for last 20 years by the processes of virtualization, informatization and political transformation. Today, the Russian Federation, like any other state in the world, is closely connected to non-local events and ideas; the " title nation" and " strong state" ideas are routinely confronted by challenges from multiple agents including immigrants, the mass media and especially the Internet. In the present study, empirical findings from several studies developed with methods of visual sociology, expert interviews and public opinion research are used to understand how people in Russia tend to realize their desire to be the unit of the state forming so-called " invisible" state identity, which is not absolutely loyal to the government institutions and is very stable. This type of identity has been formed under alternative institutional logic which isn't preordained by acting of the state but is shaped as well by cultural, social, and cognitive processes in " real" , but especially in " virtual" spaces of communication. And despite " Russia as a state" is still a way of maintaining the symbolic power of political leaders, there are some strong but hidden tendencies forming " Russia as a community of citizens" under the influence of information technologies, global values, norms and outlooks.
Цель статьи - на базе когнитивной теории реконструировать параметры права и справедливости постсоветского периода. Среди них: конфликт права и справедливости в современной российской политической реальности, социальное равенство и новые отношения собственности; национальная идентичность и система правления; форма правления и тип политического режима; легитимность и законность политической трансформации; эффективность права.
This paper considers current contradictions in state–business relations in Russia. On one hand, the Russian political elite needs economic growth to keep social stability in the country and to limit mass protesting in big cities. Economic growth is impossible without investment, which explains Russian leaders’ increased interest in improving Russia’s business climate. On the other hand, influential interest groups (represented first of all by security and law enforcement agencies) try to expand their control on rent sources in the economy. These groups of interests could strengthen their positions due to fear of political protests. This strong conflict among different groups in the Russian elite creates additional uncertainty for investors and the business community, and can lead to economic recession independent of the level of oil prices and dynamics of global markets. Reversing these negative trends in economic development will be possible only with collective actions of different economic and political actors (including technocrats in federal and regional governments, representatives of large and successful middle-sized business and topmanagers of public sector organizations) in the search for pragmatic solutions to the challenges faced by Russian economy and society.
We empirically study the asset side of market discipline in the banking system of the Kyrgyz Republic, examining whether borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates to high-quality banks. Based on dynamic panel models and a dataset with bank information from 23 banks over the period 2010–2012, our findings suggest the presence of market discipline induced by borrowers. In other words, banks with higher capital ratios and liquidity charge higher interest rates on loans. This result has several implications for the banking policy in Kyrgyzstan, where we can recommend to policymakers a disclosure policy following the Third Pillar of Basel III, because not only can the bank's creditors use bank information to penalize the excessive bank risk, but borrowers can also use this information to discipline their banks.