Международная группа экономистов рассматривает факторы, влияющие на поведение вкладчиков в России после кризиса 1998 года, опираясь на два в значительной степени неиспользованных источников данных: данные Сбербанка и результаты опроса домохозяйств в ноябре 1998 г. После рассмотрения эволюции рынка вкладов физических лиц в 1990-х годах, они исследуют региональные различия в масштабах оттока средств вкладчиков Сбербанка в период с августа по октябрь 1998 года, а также выявляют характеристики вкладчиков, закрывающих вклады (или пытающихся сделать это). Более серьезные набеги вкладчиков Сбербанка имели место в более богатых и промышленно развитых регионах, с более молодым и менее образованным населением, находящихся ближе к Москве, а также в регионах с большей свободой средств массовой информации. Последующий анализ результатов опроса домохозяйств выявил интересные межрегиональные различия во влиянии их социально-экономических характеристик (в особенности образования) на склонность к закрытию вкладов во всех российских банках во время кризиса 1998 года.
Russia has tried to use economic incentives and shared historical and cultural legacies to entice post-Soviet states to join its regional integration efforts. The Ukraine crisis exposed the weaknesses of this strategy, forcing Russia to fall back on coercive means to keep Kiev from moving closer to the West. Having realized the limits of its economic and soft power, will Russia now try to coerce post-Soviet states back into its sphere of influence? Fears of such an outcome overestimate Russia’s ability to use coercion and underestimate post-Soviet states capacity to resist. Rather than emerging as a regional bully, Russia is trying to push Eurasian integration forward by becoming a regional security provider. The article relates these efforts to the larger literature on regional integration and security hierarchies – bridging the two bodies of theory by arguing that regional leaders can use the provision of security to promote economic integration. Despite initial signs of success, we believe that the new strategy will ultimately fail. Eurasian integration will continue to stagnate as long as Russia’s economic and soft power remain weak because Russia will be unable to address the economic and social problems that are at the root of the region’s security problems.
How does the degree of centralization and decentralization of political control affect economic performance? To investigate this question, we gather and analyze a comprehensive original data-set measuring the performance, career paths, and incentives of regional officials in China and Russia during the last 15 years. Both China and Russia combine centralized personnel selection with substantial administrative autonomy for regional officials, but differ substantially with respect to the economic outcomes produced by their bureaucratic systems. We find that in contrast to China, regional leaders in Russia are unlikely to be promoted for economic or social performance, have a lower turnover, are almost never transferred from one region to another, have less experience in executive positions, are more likely to come from the region they govern than their Chinese counterparts, and are not encouraged to show initiative in economic affairs and engage in economic policy experimentation.
The social origin of elites is important as it, first, affects the political decision-making, and second, is an indicator of social mobility important for the stability of a political system. However, how does the consolidation of an authoritarian regime affect the composition of elites in terms of their social origin? This study investigates this question looking at a sample of Russian regional governors in the period of 1992–2016. We document a gradual decrease of the share of governors from peasants’ and workers’ families, which is most likely related to abandoning the Soviet elite recruitment practices. At the same time, the main beneficiaries of the change (outside the ethnic regions) are not the most privileged groups (children of high-ranked bureaucrats and politicians) but rather offspring of intelligentsia (doctors, teachers and engineers). Interestingly, the military social origin became more important prior to Putin’s presidency, during the era when Russian politics was more competitive and pluralist.
This paper debates the relationships between transition and urbanization by problematizing the operation of transition on three inter-related levels. Firstly, at the level of ideology, it is important to rehearse the understanding of transition from that of merely area-based reforms and rather understand it as a totalizing project of planetary reach, which completes the subjugation of the whole world to capitalism and crowns neoliberalism as the only global order. Secondly, at the level of practice, it is important to properly account for the spatializing effects of that ideology – which is not simply “domesticated” by local practices, but itself mediates the subsumption of pre-existing practices by capital, thus alienating them from their history. Thirdly, at the level of the urban: while urban change is usually portrayed merely as a projection of societal relations, the urban is actually the central stage where ideology mixes with the everyday, through which the societal change is mediated; new meanings, social relations, and class divisions are construed; and through which ideological transition achieves its practical completeness. What combines these three levels is the notion of urbanization of transition, which articulates the centrality of the urban in the spectacular post-socialist experience.