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Найдены 2 публикации
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Статья
Gromova E., Marova E., Gromov D. Journal of Dynamics & Games. 2020. Vol. 7. No. 2. P. 105-122.
Добавлено: 31 октября 2020
Статья
Korolev A. V., Ougolnitsky G. Journal of Dynamics & Games. 2020. Vol. 7. No. 2. P. 141-162.

We consider difference and differential Stackelberg game theoretic models with several followers of opinion control in marketing networks. It is assumed that in the stage of analysis of the network its opinion leaders have already been found and are the only objects of control. The leading player determines the marketing budgets of the followers by resource allocation. In the basic version of the models both the leader and the followers maximize the summary opinions of the network agents. In the second version the leader has a target value of the summary opinion. In all four models we have found the Stackelberg equilibrium and the respective payoffs of the players analytically. It is shown that the hierarchical control system is ideally compatible in all cases.

Добавлено: 2 июля 2020