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MODERN AUTHORITARIANISM AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

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MODERN AUTHORITARIANISM AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

This article analyses the ideologies of authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes. The analysis is carried out in three clusters: “rudimentary” authoritarian regimes, post-colonial dictatorships, neo-authoritarian regimes. The first cluster is subdivided into two subgroups: authoritarian monarchies and “communist regimes”. The regimes in the third cluster are also subdivided into two subgroups: post-Soviet regimes and neo-authoritarian regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In an age of the decline of ideologies on a global scale, authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes, as before, need political ideologies to legitimise their power. However in the contemporary epoch which sets authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes new and much more complicated challenges, these regimes are forced to use more flexibility ideologies in order to adapt to the rapidly changing world. Ideologies of such regimes lose their former integrity and become “multi-layer”, eclectic. “Non-ideological” elements such as corruption have become a part of the ideologies of neo-authoritarian regimes. But herewith priority of the state as the highest value remains “the bearing structure” of the political ideologies of all authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes. Despite the official protection of human rights and liberties by neo-authoritarian regimes, this occupies a secondary and subordinate place in the ideological hierarchy and political practice of these regimes.

Key words: authoritarianism, neo-authoritarianism, political ideologies, values, personified regimes, democracy, human rights and liberties, triad “state–society–individual”.

JEL classification: Z

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Introduction

In the first half of the 20th century the influence of political ideology both on the internal political processes of numerous countries and on their international relations reached its peak.

Today there are multiple definitions both for “ideology” in its general scientific sense, and for “political ideology” with differences in meaning, but none of them are universally accepted.

In the most common sense, in Russian language ideology is defined as “a mindset and a system of views and ideas” (Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian language, 2001) and accordingly this system can be either widespread, held by a certain social group or an individual. It may be either public or latent. In this context, political ideology is seen as a system of political views, ideas and directives, including those of the public authorities.

To make the notion of political ideology instrumental, it is best to conceptualize it as a structural and functional phenomenon which determines political decisions and actions and having certain functions in the processes of interactions aimed at acquiring, holding and using public authority. Utilizing this approach, political ideology can be defined as a “systematized and conceptualized set of ideas and directives used for the identification and self-organization of certain groups in the space of authority, the articulation and representation of their interests, relevant changes in state policy based on collective views of the past, present and future development of society” (Soloviov, 2007: 347).

“Groups in the space of authority” may be either ruling or oppositional social groups or their coalitions, or the ruling political actors and their clients. Low-profile, intentionally concealed sets of views, ideas and directives about public authority, i.e. latent political ideology, may be used for self-identification, self-organization and the intra-group articulation of the interests of ruling groups. A different publically promoted political ideology, differentiated for internal and international political representation, may be used for the public articulation and representation of the interests of ruling or oppositional groups, the motivation for policy or its change.

The following functions of public political ideology, formed by representatives of professional and ruling groups specializing in ideological issues as an element of the informational and communicational support of political processes, can be distinguished: the reflection and representation of group interests; provision for or support of the political course pursued by the ruling social group, political power or party; boosting the support of the ruling social group, political power, party or the submission to the ideas and aims of numerous social classes by utilizing propaganda or agitation; confrontation with and struggle against other ideologies, doctrines and aims.

It was due to the ontological confrontational nature of public ideology, among other factors, that in the first half of the 20th century many people fell victims of totalitarian ideologies both in the process of the establishment of totalitarian regimes in a number of countries, and in the course of the Second World War.

In the first half of the 20th century in the majority of democratic countries even rival non-totalitarian ideologies were based on varying systems of values and had different plans for the future of society. For example in European states, the political ideals of social-democrats were different from the goals proclaimed by liberal, conservative, catholic or agrarian parties. The electorate of the parties of that time was usually limited to support of one or several classes or social groups, which also promoted the conflictive character of politics.

The tragic events of the Second World War led humanity to an understanding of its need for a common axiological and legal framework, ensuring the peaceful coexistence of countries and peoples. This resulted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and declared by resolution 217A(III) of the UN General Assembly on 10 December, 1948. At the voting, only 8 of 58 UN states abstained and none voted against it (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2007). This declaration, despite not being legally binding, fundamentally determined that the main universally adopted social value is the human being, his/her dignity and inalienable rights, the recognition of which, according to the preamble of the declaration, is “the basis of freedom, justice and universal peace”.

The adoption of human rights and freedoms as a system of universal values by sovereign countries constituting the UN arguably served as the starting point of the process usually defined as deideologization – the elimination of the influence of ideology on mass political conscience and social processes (Pogorely & Philipov & Fecenko, 2010), which lead to the beginning of “post-ideological era” (Zinoviev, 2003: 178) or, to be more precise, “the era of the downfall of classical political ideologies” (Halapsis, 2010).

The theoretical interpretation of this process in political science is in the form of the thesis that “ideology has come to an end”. According to Soloviov, “in the 1950s and 60s, Aaron, Shills and a bit later Bell and Lipset raised the question of “the end of ideology”...[which] mainly stemmed from criticism of totalitarianism, primarily Stalinism, as the form of authority which turned ideology from a political factor into the primary foundation for the whole system of political power...” (Soloviov, 2007: 348).

In 1989 the “end of ideology” thesis in a different interpretation was reflected in an article by Fukuyama, “The end of history?”, which contained the following assumption: “What we are experiencing now is probably not only the end of the Cold War or yet another period of post-war history, but also the end of history as it is, the end of the ideological evolution of

mankind and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of government” (Fukuyama, 1990). Fukuyama probably meant by “the end of the ideological evolution of mankind” that the basic social values of liberalism – the human being, human rights and freedoms, besides becoming the formally universal value of the modern world, has become, to a certain extent, a part of reality for most modern countries as the basis of their system of adopted ideas and values (Nisnevich, 2011).

The institution of human rights and freedoms was formally legalized in December 1966 in international pacts on civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights. In that period, not a single one of 122 states constituting the UN voted against those pacts, which came into effect nine years later in March 1976. Currently these pacts have been ratified and observed by 186 and 164 respectively of the 193 sovereign states with UN membership (The international pact on civil and political rights; The international pact on economic, social and cultural rights).

Although the vast majority (no less than 85%) of UN countries have legally recognized human rights and freedoms through participation in these international pacts, the real situation looks different. According to Freedom House, in 2014 only 88 sovereign countries could be considered free, i.e. properly observing political rights and civil liberties, and only 123 states were considered to be electoral democracies, i.e. fulfilling the minimum requirements for democracy – free and fair elections (Freedom House, 2015).

It is true to say that countries pursuing the path of democratic development or having adopted this path, if they have not completely lost all ideology in the above sense, they have surely ended the confrontation of ideologies. Even determined opponents of the “end of ideology” thesis admit significant transformations in the “sphere of the ideology of western countries” according to terminology of Zinoviev (2003: 178) or the “ideological space” according to Zhizhek (1999: 93).

Changes in political systems and social structures in developed democratic countries after the Second World War and the consolidation of democratic regimes have gradually lead to more common political views of rival parties. For example, the influential social-democratic parties in Western Europe have abandoned the idea of socialism and have adopted the ideological concept of the development of liberal capitalism. The ties of parties with the traditional electorate have become weaker, and in pursuit of votes they have begun to court all social and professional groups. Under such conditions, social and class differences between parties have gradually become blurred, and the claims of political ideologies promoted by certain political parties to the position of a universal future projection of their countries have inevitably become irrelevant. With time, the functions of ideologies and party programs have diminished so much that they

have become a kind of political marker helping parties to mobilize their supporters in pre-election periods.

The basic values of modern democratic states are determined not by a certain ideological structure shaped by the ruling political party or coalition, but by the majority of society and the non-fringe political powers which recognize the observation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms as the first and foremost responsibility of the state. Nowadays, unlike the old-time uncompromising fighting and confrontations of political ideologies, political projects and programs for the development of society and state compete on a unified platform of basic ideas and values.

However in the modern world, besides countries ruled by democratic regimes, including those meeting only the minimal requirements for democracy, there are quite a few countries governed by non-democratic, authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes (Nisnevich, 2016). For these regimes, although, to a much lower extent and in softer forms of appearance, political ideology has retained its value as an instrument used “to support the social supremacy and the self-legitimization of the regime” (Soloviov, 2007: 351) and to rally and mobilize the masses in pursuit of its certain interests and goals.

For modern authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes, the “end of ideology” apparently has not come yet, an analysis of the political ideologies of such regimes seems to be a timely and significant research task. The methodology for this task includes the use of comparative-historical method (Encyclopedia of epistemology and philosophy of science, 2009) together with the political and legal analytical method (Nisnevich, 2011) and the processing of factual information by comparing, crosschecking and fusing information from various sources. Scientific publications and internet sites (Geveling, 2001; Karosers & Oren, 2015; Gabriel, 2009; Goemans & Gleditsch & Chiozza, 2009) have been used as sources of factual information on constitutional, legal, political, historical and other characteristics of the countries and regimes investigated.

“Rudimentary” authoritarian regimes and their political ideologies

The first subgroup of “rudimentary” authoritarian regimes consists of 11 authoritarian monarchies among 43 UN countries with monarchical rule, including the Westminster model (Big legal dictionary, 2007). The main features of these monarchies are demonstrated in Table 1.

Table 1

No	Constitutional name	Type of monarchy	Beginning of the regime	Religion*	Region	Notes
1	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	absolute theocratic	1932	Islam	Middle East	
2	State of Kuwait	absolute	1961	Islam	Middle East	Emirate
3	Sultanate of Oman	absolute	1970	Islam	Middle East	
4	State of Qatar	absolute	1971	Islam	Middle East	Emirate
5	United Arab Emirates (UAE)	absolute federative	1971	Islam	Middle East	seven emirates – absolute monarchies supreme body of power – High council of emirs
6	State of Brunei Darussalam	absolute theocratic	1984	Islam	South-East Asia	Sultanate
7	Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	constitutional dualistic	1946	Islam	Middle East	
8	Kingdom of Bahrain	constitutional dualistic	1971	Islam	Middle East	kingdom since 2002, former emirate
9	Kingdom of Swaziland	constitutional dualistic	1968	none	South Africa	
10	Kingdom of Morocco	constitutional parliamentary	1956	Islam	North Africa	
11	Federation of Malaysia	constitutional parliamentary federative theocratic	1963 (without Singapore 1965)	Islam	South-East Asia	13 states and 2 federal territories 9 states are monarchies High leader is elected by the Council of rulers

Note: state religion as defined in the Constitution

Out of the eleven countries still ruled by authoritarian monarchs, eight are Arabic states, seven of which are located next to each other in the Middle East, and Morocco lies in the area of North Africa which is traditionally referred to as Maghreb. Two monarchies – Brunei and Malaysia – are situated in South-East Asia, while Swaziland is the only monarchy located in South Africa.

Six of the authoritarian monarchies are absolute, including two theocratic ones – Saudi Arabia and Brunei, and one federative – UAE. Out of five constitutional monarchies, three are dualistic and two – Morocco and Malaysia – are parliamentary, the latter being also both a federative and theocratic monarchy. Malaysia, where the real power is concentrated not in the hands of the High leader (one of the nine monarchs), but the head of the Federative government, is by common opinion slowly drifting towards electoral democracy.

The ideological component of the remaining authoritative monarchies is determined by a combination of the state religion – Islam – and the monarchism it promotes. The only exception is Swaziland which has no official state religion with the majority of the population (82.7%)

being Christian. In this state the authority of the monarch stems from patriarchal and tribal structures and the traditions of the local authoritarian society.

The combination of Islam and a monarchic ideology determines the basic values shared by the rulers and their subjects. This combination serves as the key factor which unites and mobilizes subjects in support of the reigning dynasty. In Malaysia and Brunei this combo is backed by Malay nationalism, though its interpretation is different in these two countries. In Malaysia nationalism is used to promote the consolidation of the local multi-racial, poly-ethnic and multi-confessional society. In Brunei it is an important ideological structure which justifies the existence of this small Malay state on the huge Kalimantan island.

The ideological triad “state–society–individual”, the hierarchic structure of which is instrumental for the evaluation of various political approaches and ideologies. In authoritarian monarchies there are two mutually associated peaks. One peak represents the monarchic state, while the other is the society in form of religious communion. The only exception is Swaziland which has only one peak of ideological triad – the state. People and their rights and freedoms play a subordinate role under authoritarian monarchies. This being said, it is worth noting that the constitutions of such absolute and constitutional authoritarian monarchies as Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman, instead of a section describing the human and civil rights and freedoms, have a whole section on the rights and, specifically, the responsibilities of their citizens.

The second subgroup – “communist rudiments” – includes four states governed by authoritarian communist regimes and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), ruled by the last remaining totalitarian communist regime in the world. It is more precise to call it a “nationalist-communist regime”. The main features of these countries are outlined in Table 2.

Table 2

No	Constitutional name	Type of regime	Beginning of the regime	Rulers	Region
1	Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR)	corporate	1975	People's revolutionary party of Laos	South-East Asia
2	Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)	corporate	1976	Communist party of Vietnam	South-East Asia
3	People's Republic of China (PRC)	corporate	1949	Communist party of China	East Asia
4	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)	personalistic dynastic,	1948	Kim family Labor party of Korea	East Asia
5	Republic of Cuba	personalistic	1959	Castro brothers Communist party of Cuba	Caribbean

“Communist rudiments” where the form of government is a soviet republic (Big legal dictionary, 2003) have primarily remained in Asia: two south-eastern and two in the far east, while the Republic of Cuba is located in Central America on a cognominal island in the Caribbean Sea.

Authoritarian communist regimes formed as the result of transformations of initial totalitarian communist regimes into “softer” authoritarian forms, which are designated as post-totalitarian regimes according to the Lenz-Stephan classification (Linz & Stepan, 1996). In most cases in the process of such transformation, communist ideology is “reduced” both for rulers and their subjects. The final goal of this “reduction” is for the party establishment to retain the power in changed societies.

The final stage of such “reduction” played a significant role in the crisis and later downfall of the communist regime in USSR. Yakovlev, Ex-secretary and ex-member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU, described it as follows: “Political life in the country became so dogmatic, that even some phrases attributed to Marx and Lenin were regarded as revisionist and suspicious. The level of vigilance raised by the risk of losing power, was far beyond common sense. However, hardly anyone was seriously interested in Marxist-Leninist theory anymore. Maybe just a small number of people who worked in scientific and educational institutions and made their living by studying it. They had to write clichéd articles and to prepare lectures and seminars accordingly” (Yakovlev, 2003: 367).

In the triad “state–society–individual”, reduced communist ideology proclaims the priority of society in form of a new community. This was called “the Soviet people” in USSR. But politics is absolutely dominated by an omnipresent state – a “cue ball” according to Huntington – the rulers of which must be obeyed without question and their activities must be totally approved and universally supported.

In DPRK, however, as a result of the transformations, communist ideology hardened. This started in 1955 when the founder of the country, Kim Il Sung, proclaimed his idea of “Juche” to oppose Marxist ideas brought from USSR and China. It is an ideology of “originality” or “relying only on the country’s own strengths” (Balkansky, 2011: 144). According to Juche, the top of hierarchy is occupied by the decision-making leader, followed by the party which transfers these decisions to the masses, which in turn carry out their leader’s will. One of the primary highlights of Juche ideology is the idea of the key role of the leader in the life of the country (Balkansky, 2011: 181-182). DPRK has actively tried to popularize Juche ideology in third world countries.

At the beginning of the 21st century the Juche ideology was backed by the “songun” doctrine which justified turning DPRK into a solid military camp (which it had always been) and

gave the army a special role in its political system. This pointed at an evolution in communist ideology in DPRK. After abandoning failed attempts to represent Juche as one of the competing global communist doctrines in the years of Kim Il Sung's reign, DPRK leaders reduced communist ideology to playing an exclusively defensive role, justifying the need to protect the system from outside world and assure their population of the uniqueness of its way of development.

In China, Vietnam and to a smaller extent in Laos (due to its significant underdevelopment) communist ideology has been used for almost 30 years for their transfer towards market economies and bureaucratic capitalism.

Due to the peculiarities of far eastern societies, communist ideology initially served as an ideology of progress aimed at eliminating the huge underdevelopment of those countries and mobilizing their societies for the transition from agrarian to modern and urban. This lasted approximately until the 1970s, when it became apparent that capitalistic South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong created much more efficient development models in the Far East than the communist regimes of China, DPRK and Vietnam. The reigning communist parties of these countries reacted differently to these challenges. In DPRK the authorities decided to maintain the existing order and communist ideology, which has gradually become used exclusively as a means of defence.

In China and Vietnam, which at the end of 1970s and middle of 1980s respectively began their transition to market economies, the role of communist ideology as the ideology of progress partially remained at the early stages of the reorganization of their social and economic structures. The accent though was now made on "raising the quality of life of the working class". In this period the communist parties of China and Vietnam, having proclaimed the development of socialism with national peculiarities as their aims, gave themselves the credit for the significant growth of material wealth of their nations in the course of on-going economic reforms. However, as their countries were constructing the new social and political reality of state capitalism, which had nothing to do with 20th century socialism with its social guarantees and the dominance of state property, the roles of communist ideologies in China and Vietnam changed. Modernist ambitions became widespread among the burgeoning class of national entrepreneurs and experts whose areas of work were connected with the new economic order. Controlling people's desire for further development was no longer seen as the exclusive domain of communist parties. In these conditions communist ideology became defensive, used to maintain the authority of communist parties and the privileges of the members of the establishment, who had accumulated significant wealth in the previous decades due to the development of state businesses and corruption. At the same time, the communist ideology in

China and Vietnam retains its function of determining the imperative of morals – the code of social behaviour. This closely resembles the “Moral Code of the Builder of Communism” adopted at the 22nd CPSU congress under Khrushchev. In modern China, for example, the role of the moral regulator of people’s behaviour was attributed to the “system of the core values of socialism” (Lomanov, 2015). According to the requirements set by the highest members of the communist party of China, these values had a strict “top-down” hierarchy – from state to society and then to the individual. According to Lomanov (2015), the wealth and strength of the state, not personal freedom, play a primary role in them. So, even in a modernizing and dynamically developing China, state values still play the same essential role in the official communist ideology as in earlier forms of communist authoritarianism.

Unlike China, Vietnam and Laos, Cuba is only beginning its economic reforms. Accordingly, the future of the communist ideology in this country is as yet unclear. For Cuba, in the first years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, this ideology was practically a kind of left-oriented nationalism utilized to persuade and mobilize the population to rally against a foreign enemy, the USA. It is possible that in the near future the role of the communist ideology in the country will be reduced to simply justify the claims of the current party establishment for power and the acquisition of property in an already renewed capitalist state.

Postcolonial dictatorships and their political ideologies

The main features of the 18 post-colonial dictatorships are presented in Table 3.

Table 3

No.	Constitutional name	Form of government	Type of dictatorship	Beginning of the regime	Rulers	Region
1	Gabonese Republic	presidential republic	personalistic dynastic	1967 El Hadge Omar Bingo Ondimba (1967-2009)	president son Ali ben Bingo Ondimba since 2009	West Africa
2	Togolese Republic	semi-presidential republic	personalistic dynastic	1967 military coup Gnassingbe Eyadema (1967-2005)	president son For Essozimna Gnassingbe since 2005	West Africa
3	Republic of the Congo	presidential republic	personalistic	1979 military coup (1977)	president Deni Sassu-Ngesso	West Africa
4	Republic of Equatorial Guinea	presidential republic	personalistic	1979 military coup	president Teoboro Mbasogo	West Africa
5	Republic of Cameroon	semi-presidential republic	personalistic	1982 forced resignation	president Paul Beya	West Africa

6	Guinea Republic	presidential republic	corporate	1984 military coup	military junta	West Africa
7	Democratic Republic of the Congo	semi-presidential republic	personalistic dynastic	1997 coup d'etat Loran-Desire Kabila (1997 - 2001)	president son Joseph Kabila since 2001	West Africa
8	Republic of Djibouti	presidential republic	personalistic dynastic	1977 Hassan Guled Antidon (1977-1999)	president nephew Ismail Helle since 1999	East Africa
9	Republic of Uganda	presidential republic	personalistic	1986 military coup	president Yoveri Moseveni	East Africa
10	Eritrea	parliamentary republic	personalistic	1993 independence war against Ethiopia	president Isayas Afework	East Africa
11	Republic of Angola	presidential republic	personalistic	1975 civil war	president Jose Eduardo dos Santos since 1979	South Africa
12	Zimbabwe	presidential republic	personalistic	1980 guerilla war against segregation	president Robert Mugabe	South Africa
13	Republic of the Sudan	presidential republic	personalistic	1989 military coup	president Omar Hassan al Bashir	North Africa
14	Democratic People's Republic of Algeria	semi-presidential republic	personalistic	1999 military coup (1992)	president Abdel Asis Butaflica	North Africa
15	Republic of Chad	semi-presidential republic	personalistic	1990 military coup	president Idris Debi	Central Africa
16	Rwandese Republic	semi-presidential republic	personalistic	2000 military invasion	president Paul Kagame	Central Africa
17	Republic of the Union of Myanmar	parliamentary republic	corporate	1988 military coup	military junta	South-East Asia
18	Kingdom of Cambodia	constitutional parliamentary monarchy	personalistic	1998 coup d'etat	prime minister Hong Tseng	South-East Asia

The vast majority of postcolonial dictatorships are in Africa: eight in the west, three in the east, two in North and South Africa respectively and one in Central Africa. Only two postcolonial dictatorships, Myanmar and Cambodia, are in South-East Asia and both are special cases.

In November 2015, Myanmar held its first fair parliamentary election according to foreign observers. The election was won by an opposition party called “The National league for democracy” lead by the 1991 Nobel peace prize laureate Awn San Suu Kyi. Unlike the election in 2011, the parliamentary election of 2015 can be seen as a possible beginning of a transition of

real power from the military junta, which has been reigning over Myanmar for over 25 years, to civilian politicians, and a sign of real movement of the country towards democracy. However, this will only become clear after 2-3 election cycles. Currently the real power is still in the hands of military leaders, and it is not quite clear whether they are ready for radical changes or will try to negotiate an intermediate stage, sharing power equally between them and democratically elected politicians. Even the election of Thin Cho, candidate from the “National league for democracy”, as the president of Myanmar in March 2016, which made him the first civilian president in the history of the country, has not significantly changed the situation. If there is a rapid process of democratization, there is also the risk of the separation of several fringe territories from Myanmar, populated by national minorities, who have fought against the government of the country for a long time. All this makes the immediate future of Myanmar uncertain.

Cambodia is the only postcolonial dictatorship which, since 1993, has been a constitutional parliamentary monarchy. However, the regime is led not by the king, whose role is merely symbolic, but by the prime minister Hong Tseng, former high leader of the pro-communist People’s Revolutionary Party which ruled over Cambodia in the years of Vietnamese occupation (1979-1989). He has become the sole actual ruler of Cambodia since 1998 when Prince Norodom Ranarit was removed from the office of first prime minister (since 1993 Hong Tseng had been the second prime minister), stripped of authority and put under house arrest. Earlier Hong Tseng had been the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1985-1989) and the State of Cambodia (1989-1993).

Among the 16 African postcolonial dictatorships, 9 are presidential republics, and 6 are parliamentary-presidential republics, only Eritrea is a parliamentary republic. This being said, one can assume that the priority form of government for African dictatorships is the one dominated by presidential power.

In 15 of the African dictatorships, the ruling regimes are personalistic. In Gabon, Togo, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Djibouti the current personalistic regimes have already become dynastic in character. Only in Guinea, ruled by a military junta, does the regime remain corporate.

The personalistic perception of political power has deep roots within the political culture of the peoples of tropical Africa. This stems from traditional ideas about the power of tribal leaders, religious in nature and unlimited by any terms. These ideas have been transmitted into political power and transformed into the idea of a lifetime presidency (Vacunta, 2006: 35). This is the main reason why African nations are so content about the long-term reign of their

dictators. Within such a tribalized system of views there is no place for the understanding of the importance of strong opposing forces within society.

It seems ultimately important that the vast majority, namely 13 of the current African dictatorships were established through military action (military coup, military invasion, civil or guerrilla war).

Although El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, the father of President Ali ben Bingo Ondimba who has ruled Gabon since 2009, came to power in 1967 after the natural death of his predecessor, earlier in 1964 there had been a military coup in Gabon which was subdued by French troops. conversely, in Djibouti the military conflict based on ethnic tensions between the tribes of Afar and Isa began after the uncle of the current president Ismail Halle (who has ruled since 1999) was elected in 1977. The conflict lasted until 2001. Although there were no open military conflicts in Cameroon, Paul Biya, the president since 1982, came to power after his predecessor had been forced to resign by France, so in essence, this was a military coup.

It is characteristic of African postcolonial dictatorships to be ideologically diverse, in other words, different countries use different publically declared ideologies. Various factors influence the choice of ideology, but primarily it depends on the origin of the regime. This means that all regimes that have seized power after civil war or military conflicts with neighbouring countries are eager to present themselves in some way as the protectors of the unity, territorial integrity and independence of their countries, as guardians against the recurrence of tribal or ethnic wars. Dictators are eager to present peace as their personal achievement and persuade people that the only alternative to their rule is chaos and defeat.

It seems that a ruler having acquired power after military struggle, especially after a long-lasting one, coup or rebellion, and having become a dictator, is absolutely convinced of his right to economic and social dominance, and is ready to utilize the principle that “the end justifies the means” to secure and solidify it. This determines the dictator’s basic system of views and ideas, the personal ideology of the solitary political actor. This ideology determines the political decisions and actions of the dictator, who utilizes all kinds of violence including the physical elimination of undesirables and all kinds of corruption—not only for personal gain, but also to “feed” his attendants to buy their loyalty.

One may assume that such the personal ideology of the ruler determines the fact that postcolonial dictatorships are the regimes that exercise the most violence, outside the totalitarian DPRK. This thesis is illustrated in Fig. 1 using the dynamics of the average extrajudicial killing index (EKI) values for various subgroups of authoritarian regimes, determined according to the Chingranelli-Richards database of human rights (CIRI Human Rights Data Project). Note that *lower* the value for the index, the *higher* the level of violence. Specifically, the EKI index, now

discontinued, takes the value of 0 if extrajudicial killings were frequent (over 50 times per year), 1 if they took place, but were rare (1 to 49 times) and 2 if there were none at all. Although there are some doubts about the data provided by this database, it can still be used as an illustrative example.




Fig.1 Extrajudicial killing index

However, the personal ideology of the rulers of postcolonial dictatorships is definitely unsuitable for social consumption or the rallying and mobilization of the masses in support of the regimes. These aims require a publically articulated ideology that puts the state at the head of the ideological triad and instils obedience to it into society as a whole and into each individual person.

The ideological diversity of modern African dictatorships also means that some of them use ideologies that seem completely divorced from the African political context. For example, the former Marxist “Popular movement for liberation of Angola – labor party” (MPLA), whose leader, José Eduardo dos Santos has ruled the country since 1979, after abandoning the soviet model proclaimed itself to be a social-democratic party and even joined the Socialist International. However, the formal acceptance of a multiparty system and ideological pluralism did not lead to the end of dictatorship, which has not changed much since the times when it was within the sphere of influence of USSR and was a “socialist oriented country”. Another formerly

Marxist-Leninist authoritarian regime, the Republic of Congo, followed the example of Angola in many ways. Other authoritarian regimes that have abandoned their former “socialist orientation” are characterised by their ideas of militarism and anti-separatism (Equatorial Guinea) or the defence of political stability against external and internal enemies (Algeria).

In the recent times, some African dictators have been turning back to pan-Africanism which was popular as an anticolonial ideology in the middle of the 20th century. However, today the idea to protect Africa from foreign interference and influence is becoming popular again, with the dictators fearing prosecution by the International Criminal Court for their crimes (Wamwere, 2015). Among them are Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Paul Kagame (Rwanda), and Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe). Such prosecutions have already occurred (the International tribunal for Rwanda was created to investigate the genocide of the Tutsi people in the country; the order issued by the International Criminal Court in the Hague for the arrest of Omar al Bashir, the president of Sudan, accused of civilian murders; Hissen Habre, former dictator of Chad, was sentenced to life imprisonment by the court of Senegal for mass repressions).

The ideologies of some dictatorships are characteristic for their eclectic fusion of completely different ideological doctrines. For example, the regime of President Kagame, besides the ideas of securitism and patriotism typical for African dictatorships, associates itself with a modernist policy which has boosted economic growth and reduced corruption levels, and pan-Africanism. However, appealing to development as a value is uncommon for postcolonial African dictatorships. Ideologically they usually utilise ideas of saving the country and protecting it from external pressure. These are typical authoritarians trying to keep their status quo.

The state is also the top of the “state–society–individual” triad in postcolonial dictatorships, serving as the ultimate “protector and guardian” of the regime.

Neo-authoritarian regimes and their political ideologies

The group of states ruled by so called authoritarian-kleptocratic or neo-authoritarian regimes can be divided into two subgroups.

The first subgroup is comprised of 9 states that were part of the former USSR. Their ruling regimes can be characterized as post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes. The main features of these states are demonstrated in Table 4.

Table 4

No	Constitutional name	Form of government	Type of regime	Beginning of the regime	Rulers	Region
1	Republic of Belarus	semi-presidential republic	personalistic	1994	president Alexander Lukashenko	Eastern Europe
2	Republic of Kazakhstan	semi-presidential republic	personalistic	1991	president Nursultan Nazarbaev	Eastern Europe — Asia
3	Russian Federation	semi-presidential republic	corporate personified	2000	political-economic groups president Vladimir Putin since 2000	Eastern Europe — Asia
4	Republic of Azerbaijan	presidential republic	personalistic dynastic	1993 president Geidar Aliev (1993-2003)	president son Ilham Aliev since 2003	Western Asia Caucasus
5	Republic of Armenia	semi-presidential republic	corporate	1991	political-economic groups	Western Asia Trans-Caucasian region
6	Republic of Kirghizia	since 2010 parliamentary before 2010 presidential republic	corporate	1991	patrimonial clans	Central Asia
7	Republic of Tadjikistan	presidential republic	personalistic	1994	president Emomali Rahmon	Central Asia
8	Turkmenistan	presidential republic	personalistic	1991 president Saparmurat Niyazov (1991-2006)	president-successor Gurbanguli Berdimuhamedo v since 2007	Central Asia
9	Republic of Uzbekistan	semi-presidential republic	personalistic	1991	president Islam Karimov	Central Asia

The form of government in these countries is a presidential-parliamentary republic in five cases and presidential republic in three cases. Kyrgyzstan is the only parliamentary republic, but it was presidential prior to 2010. Armenia, which is currently a presidential-parliamentary republic, had a national referendum in December 2015 and has adopted constitutional reform which will turn the country into a parliamentary state. This means it is possible that there will be another parliamentary republic on ex-soviet territory in the near future.

However even considering this possibility, it is clear that for post-soviet neo-authoritarian states, as for African dictatorships, absolute priority is given to forms of government with dominating presidential authority.

Six post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes are personalistic. The regime in Azerbaijan has already become dynastic, and after death of Heydar Aliyev who had ruled the country for ten years, the presidency was passed to his son Ilham Aliyev, while Turkmenistan demonstrated political continuity when it chose the successor for president Saparmurat Niyazov, who died after ruling for fifteen years. Three regimes, Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, are corporate in character, ruled by political-economic groups in the first two cases—these regimes can also be described as oligarchic—while in Kyrgyzstan power belongs to patrimonial clans. In Russia the regime led by President Vladimir Putin is highly personified.

The key characteristic of post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes is that without regard to their personalistic or corporate character, the social groups or their leaders running these regimes are representatives and/or direct descendants of the party and administrative establishment that ruled the USSR.

At the same time, these post-soviet establishments are significantly different from soviet elite in numerous ways including their values and ideologies (Nisnevich, 2015). While the soviet establishment was still trying to hide its money-focused ambitions, which were most apparent in the era of “developed socialism”, under the fig-leaf of their devotion to Marxist-Leninist ideology – the fact demonstrated by the quote of Yakovlev above, the post-soviet establishment has rejected this ideological umbrella.

The Soviet establishment played the role of “local bandit”, which “is infinitely interested in its controlled territory and accordingly secures domestic order and provides other social benefits” (Olsen, 2012: 39). Living behind the “iron curtain” which prevented the members of the Soviet elite from moving to western countries, the elite, having monopolized power and control over property, had to take a certain social responsibility for their citizens. It was also imposed on them by communist ideology, which limited their drive for material wealth.

Basic value for the post-soviet establishment and its ideology is the acquisition of material wealth and social supremacy by utilizing state power. But the essence and institutional mechanism of corruption in the public sphere is the unjustified use of various resources of power not for state functions and social development, but to gain some illegal advantage, personal or group benefits, either material or otherwise (Nisnevich, 2012: 109). And in this context the ideological justification of corruption, which can be called the ideology of corruption, serves as the personal ideology of social groups that rule post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes. In the 1990s the post-soviet establishment cunningly used the moment of transition to a market economy, completely abandoning their social responsibility upon the pretext that under the new conditions “every person must make one’s own living”.

The policy of integrating post-soviet states into the global economy provided vast possibilities for the new establishment to transmit pillaged values into stable and flourishing western countries. In relation to this, the attitude of these people to their own country is like the attitude of a “travelling bandit” (Olsen, 2012: 33), who inherently cannot have any ideology besides personal gain.

However, the ideology of corruption as the ideology of the ruling post-soviet establishments obviously cannot be made public and clearly cannot be used to rally the masses. The ideology of a national state, which is most suitable for these needs and natural for ex-soviet republics, is used as an instrument of support for the ruling regimes in all post-soviet countries except Russia. Such ideology becomes nationalistic to different extents in different countries. In Russia the regime actively promotes the idea of renaissance (“getting up from our knees”) and a return to the position of a great power, which has to struggle against the resistance of imaginary “external enemies”. The regime is balancing between an imperial ideology and an ideology of supremacism with certain orthodox Christian flavour.

All post-soviet states, despite their neo-authoritarian tendencies, recognize both international pacts on human rights; human rights and freedoms are stated as basic values in their constitutions.

All in all, post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes are characterised by their three-layer ideologies: the ideology of corruption as a latent ideological and axiological basis for the functioning of the post-soviet establishment; the state ideology with a certain shade of nationalism for public use in internal politics, aimed at rallying and mobilizing the masses in support of the existing regime; and the ideology declared in the international political environment for use in foreign politics, imitating devotion to the ideas of human rights and freedoms. For the public, the top of ideological pyramid is de facto occupied by the national state, which requires all efforts to defend its sovereignty.

On the level of public propaganda the ideology of corruption is often translated as “survival skills”, dividing modern society into “users” (successful people) and “losers” (unable to live “the right way” and suffering because of that). This is why the struggle against corruption is also ideological in essence, has a certain ideological value and, as noted by Panfilova, “The struggle against corruption, against the dishonesty of civil servants is increasingly changing from the routine activity of some governmental bodies to a demand for a change of values. Even for a revolution of values. In numerous countries people can no longer stand living alongside those who violate basic moral imperatives and, being in authority, impose their ideas on others, on the whole society” (RBC, 2016).

Among the ruling layers of society the ideology of corruption is becoming popular in form of their perception of power as a chance to change the country into a business project allowing it to gain vast, enormous profits. Through this ideological construct, the neo-authoritarian state became defined as a “state-corporation” in the literature (Fursov, 2006).

The second subgroup of states governed by neo-authoritarian regimes includes 10 countries. Their key features are demonstrated in Table 5.

Table 5

No	Constitutional name	Form of government	Type of regime	Beginning of the regime	Rulers	Region
1	Republic of Burundi	presidential republic	personalistic	2005 after civil war	president Piere Nkurunziza	East Africa
2	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	parliamentary republic	personalistic	1991 downfall of Mengistu regime since 1991 president since 1995 prime minister Meles Zenaui (1991-2012)	prime minister, successor Hailemariam Desalen since 2012	East Africa
3	Republic of the Gambia	presidential republic	personalistic	1996 military coup in 1994	president Yaya Jammeh	West Africa
4	Federal Republic of Nigeria	presidential republic	corporate	1998 fourth republic	political-economic groups	West Africa
5	Mozambique	presidential republic	corporate	1992 after civil war	FRELIMO party	South Africa
6	Islamic Republic of Mauritania	presidential republic	corporate	1991 civil rule after military coup in 1984	military groups	North Africa
7	Republic of Nicaragua	presidential republic	personalistic	2006	president Daniel Ortega	Central America
8	Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	presidential republic	personalistic	1998 President Hugo Chavez (1998-2013)	President, successor Nicolas Maduro since 2013	South America
9	Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka	presidential republic	corporate	1972 until 2009 civil war	family clans	South Asia
10	Islamic Republic of Iran	theocratic presidential republic	corporate personified	1979 islamic revolution ayatollah Ruhollah Hoymeni (1979-1989)	groups of religious leaders ayatollah Ali Hamenei since 1989	Middle East

Just like the subgroup of colonial dictatorships, most of these countries are situated in Africa: 2 in the east, 1 in the west and 1 each in central and north Africa. Two states are in Latin America, 1 in South Asia and 1 in the Middle East.

All of these countries except for Ethiopia, which is a parliamentary republic, are presidential republics.

Iran is a special case: despite being presidential, it is not the president who is the head of the state, but according to constitution it is the imam (rahbar), the religious “state leader”, who is appointed by “publically elected experts” (par. 107 in the Iranian constitution). According to the constitution, “The Islamic Republic of Iran is governed by legislative, executive, and legal authorities which remain under absolute authority of the imam” (par. 57). This being said, Iran combines theocracy, where state power belongs to a religious institute, and a presidential republic. Despite that, in times of the first leader of the country, Ayatollah Hoymeni (1979-1989), who is mentioned in the constitution as “the great leader of the world Islamic revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, great ayatollah imam” (par. 107), the regime was expressively personalistic. Since 1989 during the reign of his successor, Ayatollah Hamenei, the regime became corporate, dominated by various groups of religious leaders who chose Hamenei as the leader of the country as a compromise.

In Iran, the basic values shared between the rulers and their subjects, are determined by a combination of Islam and the ideology of the preservation and development of the national state populated by numerous peoples and ethnic groups. The state of Iran in form of a shah monarchy had existed for over 2500 years until it was destroyed by the 1979 revolution. The democratic republic which existed for a short time after the downfall of the shah, could not retain its power. Under these conditions the new elite which came to power after the revolution chose an Islamic republic as the only form that they considered able to maintain the integrity of the multicultural, polyethnic and multiconfessional state of Iran. This is why for the current regime the ideological triad has two interconnected peaks, just like in authoritarian monarchies. One peak represents the state in the form of the national Islamic state, and the other is society in the form of the Islamic religious communion. Iran recognizes both international pacts on human rights and freedoms and its constitution contains a relevant section, which has the rather peculiar name the “Rights of people”.

According to the nongovernmental agency Transparency International (Corruption Perceptions Index) and The World Bank (The Worldwide Governance Indicators), the values of the Corruption Perceptions Index and Corruption Control Index show that Iran has very high corruption levels; corruption in the public sphere of this state is systematic and has infected all levels of public authorities starting with the heads of the government.

The following features are characteristic of neo-authoritarian regimes existing in the 6 African states, and Sri Lanka, which are similar in their main parameters (see Table 5).

First, these regimes were established either after military coups to overthrow more violent dictatorships, or after internal military conflicts including those with foreign interference.

Second, these states, except for Burundi, had periods when they were to some extent under the influence of Marxist ideology. In Ethiopia and Mozambique, Marxist ideology was abandoned by the rulers, a decision much influenced by the downfall of the USSR. In Gambia and Sri Lanka, which formally remain socialist-oriented, as suggested by the official names of these countries, there were foiled military coups plotted by radical followers of Marxist ideology. In Mauritania, the current regime is still engaged in a military conflict with military and political separatist organization called POLYSARIO which calls itself a socialist movement.

Third, all these states have faced significant problems preserving the unity and stability of the state, since the beginning of their independence and up to the present day. According to the 2015 data, except for Mozambique (86.9) the values of indexes of inconsistency (fragility) of these states (the Fragile States Index) exceed 90, which is the lower border of the danger zone.

For the leaders of these regimes, no matter whether the regime is personalistic (3 African regimes) or corporate (3 African regimes and Sri Lanka), like the post-soviet establishment, the personal ideology is material gain and social supremacy achieved by utilizing state authority, in other words, the ideology of corruption. This is seen in the fact that after the analysis of corruption practices in the countries of West Africa, primarily Nigeria, Geveling introduced the term “kleptocracy” for such political regimes. He determined kleptocracy as the “reign of thieves”, which he defines as a “form of the organization of power based on corruption and relevant social and political groups, the members of which seriously violate social convention by utilizing their authority (usually state and political) for quick material gain and the consolidation of their positions within the society” (Geveling, 2001: 10).

In these countries, the ideology of consolidating the integrity of the country and national sovereignty is used as a public political ideology to rally the masses in support of the ruling regimes. Considering the way they came to power, one can assume that within the framework of such an ideology the regimes have not only abandoned socialism, but also utilize criticism of socialist development, Marxist ideology and radical nationalism.

The regimes of Nicaragua and Venezuela are significantly different from other states in the second subgroup of neo-authoritarian regimes in terms of their coming to power and ideological preferences for rallying the masses.

First, at the initial stages of their formation their leaders became presidents elected after free and fair democratic elections, namely Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998 and Daniel Ortega

in Nicaragua in 2006. Further presidential and parliamentary elections in these countries were no longer free and fair according to the nongovernment organization Freedom House.

2006 was the second “call to power” for Ortega. He had been among the leaders of the Sandinist revolution that had overthrown dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979. Then Ortega led the State junta for national reconstruction, which began to build socialism in Nicaragua from 1980. In 1982 the Ortega administration imposed a state of emergency in the country, which lasted until 1988. In 1984 he was elected president in elections which were not accepted by the opposition. Then he lost the presidential elections three times, in 1990, 1996 and 2001, and from 1990 till 2006 the country was democratic. In 2011 Ortega won his third presidential election, to which he was admitted by the Constitutional court, which changed the constitution to allow the incumbent president to stand in elections for the third time running.

Chavez was elected as the president of Venezuela four times in 1998, 2000, 2006 and 2012, much because in 1999 he had changed the constitution to prolong presidential term to six years, and made it possible for the incumbent president to be re-elected for a subsequent term. After the death of Chavez, his political successor Nicolas Maduro became president in 2013. On December, 6 2015 Venezuela had parliamentary elections, won by opposition “Round table of Democratic unity” getting 99 seats out of 167 in the single-chamber National Assembly. This may be the beginning of the end for the left-oriented regime of Chavez-Maduro which has reigned over the country for 17 years.

Second, in both Nicaragua and Venezuela, the neo-authoritarian regimes and their leaders are supported by the dominant ruling parties with left-oriented ideologies.

In Nicaragua, the Sandinist National Liberation Front has been such supporting party since the Sandinist revolution. It began as a Marxist party, but has since adopted an ideology of left-oriented traditionalism.

In Venezuela, Chavez began his political career as the leader of a large coalition of left parties, but in 2007, after the Bolivarian revolution he created his own “United Socialist Party of Venezuela” with an ideology of Boliviarism. Boliviarism whose main ideologist was Chavez himself, is a special kind of socialist teaching with its main accent on left radicalism rather than national patriotism (Kusakina, 2008).

This being said, both the left traditionalism of Ortega and Boliviarism of Chavez are institutionally oriented in the construction of a national socialist state with a so-called socialist democratic form of government.

Third, for both Venezuela and Nicaragua according to Transparency international and the World Bank, the values of Corruption Perceptions Index and Corruption Control Index demonstrate that these countries, like all other countries of the second subgroup, have extremely

high corruption levels, meaning that corruption in the public sphere of these countries has become systematic and has infected all levels of public authority starting with the leaders of the state. The system of views and ideas justifying it has become the personal ideology of the reigning social groups and their leaders. This is seen in the fact that the neo-authoritarian regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua are mainly maintained due to political corruption. For example, Chavez secured his power in 1999 by changing the constitution. To prolong the presidency of Ortega, at his request the constitutional court made amendments to the constitution in 2011, making it possible for the incumbent president to be immediately re-elected for a subsequent term. Public accusations of corruption played a significant role in Ortega's defeat in the presidential elections of 1996 and 2001.

Together with the leaders of the neo-authoritarian regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua, the leaders of the current regimes in Bolivia and Ecuador, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa, being part of the so-called "left turn" in Latin America, are also regarded as "radicals" (Bukova, 2011). However, according to Freedom House, the regimes in Bolivia and Ecuador are currently electoral democracies (Freedom House), because the elections there are free and fair, thus the countries fulfil the minimum requirements to be regarded as democratic. However, the second binary order of polyarchy according to Dahl (Nisnevich, 2012), namely turnover of officials according to election results is currently maintained neither in Bolivia, nor in Ecuador. Morales was elected as the president in 2005, 2009 and 2014 and Correa was elected in 2006, 2009 and 2013.

This means that these countries are forming the kind of regime described by Karosers as regimes of "dominant authority", under which the "long-term retention of power by a single political group usually results in massive corruption and crony capitalism" (Karosers, 2003). This means that Bolivia and Ecuador are forming neo-authoritarian regimes similar to those in Venezuela and Nicaragua, and if they persevere, they will sooner or later deform the institute of free and fair elections to retain power.

All countries currently run by neo-authoritarian regimes in the second subgroup have recognized international pacts on human rights with the exception of Mozambique which has not joined the pact on economic, social and cultural rights.

All in all, the neo-authoritarian regimes of the second subgroup, are characterized by similar three-layer ideologies to the post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes outlined above.

Conclusion

Modern authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes show a wide range of ideologies. However, the classic ideologies, either defensive, declaring the need to defend the country's

independence and sovereignty from various internal and external threats, or, ideologies of development and modernization in their pure form are becoming increasingly rare. There are two fundamental reasons for this.

The first is the global trend for the grip of ideology on politics to be weakening which also affects third world countries, where authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes are most common. Only rudimentary communist regimes are strongly ideological, because ideology is the main way to justify the monopolization of power by communist parties. However, even in these countries the traditional versions of communist ideology are undergoing significant transformations now that the international socialist system has fallen apart.

Second, the modern epoch, which is increasingly called “post-Fordist” (Ilchenko & Martyanova, 2015), requires ever greater flexibility and adaptability from any political systems due to constantly changing internal and external political conditions. This means new challenges for authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes. In order to survive, they have to sever their close ties to one ideology and demonstrate an ideologically eclectic and multi-layered strategy, sometimes even seeming to be “omnivorous”. In this ideological cocktail, the drive of certain authoritarian regimes to present the ideology of their thriving corruption as a new ideology, justifying the authority of “successful people” and a kind of new meritocracy, is becoming increasingly clear. Such phenomena are most common in countries with stagnating economies, when external or internal threats to the existing government systems are weak or absent.

However, despite their diversity and eagerness to adopt modifications, ideologies of all authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes have retained their traditional distinctive features. For them, the main value is still the state, while the human being, human rights and freedoms are at the bottom of the hierarchy of values.

A vivid example, demonstrating the crucial distinction between basic values—human rights and freedoms for democratic political regimes, and the state for authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes—can be found in the speeches of US President Barack Obama, and Russian president Putin at the 70th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly September 28, 2015 (Speeches of the world leaders at the 70th session of UN General Assembly).

The public part of the ideas and values of authoritarian and neo-authoritarian states is determined by the fact that only the ideology of etatism allows the construction of an ideological justification for the need to maintain and universally support such regimes. Etatism views the state as the result and aim of social development (Big encyclopaedic dictionary, 2003: 1247) and as the only way to ensure the integrity of the national state and protect it from external enemies by manipulating the notions of the “state” and “legitimate power”.

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