The Ways of Byzantine Philosophy

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Contents

Hierarchies of Beings in the Patristic Thought: Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius the Areopagite

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The purpose of this article is to trace how the topic of the hierarchy of natural beings was dealt with in the Patristic thought. This first part of the study will review the doctrine of natural beings in Gregory of Nyssa. Then we will move on to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite whose understanding of hierarchy is substantially different than that of Gregory of Nyssa.

The Strategies of Building Hierarchies in Gregory of Nyssa

Gregory of Nyssa developed the doctrine on the fundamental division (διαίρεσις) of beings into classes. In his earlier works, *On the Making of Man 8,* and *On the Soul and Resurrection* (PG 46, 60AB), Gregory of Nyssa developed the doctrine on the order of beings according to the ascending ladder of vitality and spoke about the division, according to which the existing beings (τὰ ὄντα) were divided into intellectual beings (τὸ νοητόν) and corporeal beings (τὸ σωματικόν). Gregory left the question concerning the division of intellectual beings for another occasion and in these treatises spoke only about the division of corporeal beings.

He stated that *corporeal beings* (σωματικόν) were divided into *living beings* (ζωτικόν) and beings devoid of life; *living beings* were divided into those which possessed sensation, i. e. *sensible* (αἰσθητικόν) (= *animate* (ἔμψυχον)[1]) beings, and those devoid of sensation; beings with *sensation* were divided into *rational* (λογικόν) and irrational beings. According to Gregory, such a division of natural beings was not arbitrary, but corresponded to the order of creation described in Genesis.

Later in his fundamental treatise devoted to the refutation of Eunomius, Gregory of Nyssa also made the distinction within the intelligent realm and

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1. At the passage directly describing the hierarchy, Gregory mentions *sensible* beings, but in close proximity he speaks about *animate* beings. It follows from the *De opificio hominis* 8, PG 44, 145.18–23 and 148.17–18 that the level of the *animate* follows the *living* and precedes the *rational*; therefore it is the same as the *sensible*.

spoke about the division of beings into three natures: first, intellectual, un-created nature (the nature of God), second, intellectual, created nature (an-gels and human souls) which participated in the first nature in accordance with the goodness of will exposed by the individuals belonging to that nature, and, thirdly, sensible (τὸ αἰσθητόν) created nature.[2]

According to David Balás, "being" (= "the existing") is the summit of the hierarchy of divisions in Gregory of Nyssa.[3] However, I think that we should distinguish between the two strategies of building such a hierarchy which were used by Gregory of Nyssa. According to the first strategy which was built upon the principle of division into genera and species,[4] indeed, "the ex-isting" was the summit – or its basis (depending on the direction from which it is viewed) – in the hierarchy of divisions. "The existing" embraced the in-tellectual uncreated and the created. According to the alternative strategy which Gregory of Nyssa developed in his *Contra Eunomium* and which he ap-plied along with the first strategy,[5] the uncreated intellectual being, the higher nature (ἡ ὑψηλὴ φύσις),[6] common for the hypostases of the Trinity,[7] was the summit of the hierarchy, giving existence to the created beings.[8] The intellectual created beings long for it as for a source of goodness and parti-cipate in it according to the goodness of their will.[9]

It seems that according to the first strategy, inasmuch as existing be-ings[10] are divided into rational and corporeal, and rational beings are divided into uncreated and created, we should speak only about the epistemological

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2. Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.270–277, 1.1.295 (ed. Jaeger: *Gregorii Nysseni opera* (1960–1990), ed. W. Jaeger. Vol. 1–10. Leiden: Contra Eunomium Libri: I et II, vol. 1, 1960; III, vol. 2, 1960). In another passage Gregory of Nyssa spoke about the division of beings into the uncreated and created, and about the division of the created beings into the supramundane beings and sensible beings; *Contra Eunomium* 4.100–101 (ed. Jaeger).

3. D. Balás, *Μετουσία Θεοῦ. Man's Participation in God's Perfections according to St. Gregory of Nyssa*, Rome 1966, 34.

4. That is in accordance with the principle according to which the lower level of the hierarchy is related to the higher as a species to genus or as an individual to species.

5. Gregory of Nyssa employed both strategies simultaneously in his *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.270–277. The strategy of the division of beings was also formulated in *De opificio hominis* 8, PG 44, 145.10–11 and in the *Oratio catechetica magna* 6: 9–14 (ed. Srawley: *Gregory of Nyssa, The catechetical oration*, Ed. J. Srawley, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1903).

6. Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.274.3–4 (ed. Jaeger).

7. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.274.1–275.1 and 1.1.277.8–13 (ed. Jaeger).

8. Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.271.7–272.1 (ed. Jaeger); cf. *Dialogus de anima et resur-rectione*, PG 46, 72D–73A.

9. Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.274.2–275.1 (ed. Jaeger).

10. That is, being, understood in the sense of "all that exists." In this regard, Gregory shows the influence of Stoic philosophy, where *being-existing* is also on the top or in the basis of the hierarchy of genera-species divisions (see: *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, ed. J. von Arnim. Vol. 2. Leipzig: Teubner, 1903 (SVF) II 182) and at the same time it also does not claim any ontological primacy. The link between the concept of "the existing" in Gregory and the Stoic context is confirmed by the usage of the term: in both cases it used the phrase τῶν ὄντων (see in the Stoics: SVF II 182, in Gregory: *De opificio hominis* 8, PG 44, 145.10, *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.270.1, 1.1.295.1 (ed. Jaeger), *Oratio catechetica magna* 6.10 (ed. Srawley)) what is understood in the sense of "[...] out of everything that exists," and in both cases this

nature of the genera-species hierarchy in Gregory (that is, the preceding links of hierarchy in no way, besides for a mind, are higher then the following ones[11]).

Gregory's development of this strategy of genera-species divisions in respect to corporeal beings, which is, in fact, the natural order of beings in his system, implies the ontological, and not just the epistemological nature of the hierarchy of corporeal beings.

The second strategy involved a hierarchy that did not correspond to divisions on the basis of genera and species (that is, the lower hierarchical level did not correspond to the higher level as a species to genus or as an individual to species), but was a hierarchy in the ontological sense with the principal source of being as its hierarchical summit (the uncreated nature) giving existence to other kinds of beings, located in the descending order with respect to the degree of closeness to it and of the capacity to participate in it (created intellectual and created sensible natures).

Thus, we can speak of two versions of hierarchy in Gregory of Nyssa. In one case, the *uncreated intellectual* divine nature is located on the summit of the hierarchy, bestowing existence upon the underlying *intellectual* and *sensible created* natures. In another case, the *existing* forms the basis of hierarchy, and it is divided into the *intellectual* and the *corporeal* levels. In turn, the level of the *corporeal* is divided into *living beings* and beings devoid of life; the level of *living* is divided into *sensible* beings and beings *deprived of senses*; the level of *sensible* is divided into *irrational* beings and *rational* beings which form the summit of this version of hierarchy in the ontological sense. The first version implies the direction of the upward movement along the hierarchy, understood in the ontological sense, from sensible created beings to the divine nature. The second version entails the increase of the hierarchy from the existing to the rational; the criterion of directionality of the increase here is the measure of complexity and ontological superiority (which refers to the levels posterior to the corporeal level, since precedence of levels of the *existing* and the *intellectual* in respect to the following levels, as I have mentioned, cannot claim the ontological status).

As I have shown in another study,[12] the strategy of Gregory of Nyssa, putting "the existing" on the summit (basis) of the hierarchy, traces back to so-called "Tree of Porphyry," combining Stoic, Platonic and Aristotelian

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"existing" is divided into corporeal and incorporeal beings (ἀσώματα among the Stoics, and νοητόν in Gregory), although Gregory certainly understood the nature of this incorporeal in a completely different way than the Stoic philosophers.

11. It follows from the general basic principles of Christian theology that nothing can be above the uncreated.

12. D. Biriukov, "'Ascent of Nature from the Lower to the Perfect': Synthesis of Biblical and Logical-Philosophical Descriptions of the Order of Natural Beings in the *De opificio hominis* 8 by Gregory of Nyssa", in: B. Lourié, P. Allen, V. Baranov, eds., *Scrinium: Revue de patrologie, d'hagiographie critique et d'histoire ecclésiastique*, vol. 11: *Patrologia Pacifica Quarta* (2015) [in print].

philosophical lines. I should remind that the Tree of Porphyry is of the hierarchy of genera and species: *substance* (οὐσία) – *body* (σῶμα) – *animate body* (ἔμψυχον σῶμα) – *living being* (ζῷον) (*sensible*[13]) – *rational living being* (ζῷον λογικόν) – *human being* (ἄνθρωπος) – *individual human being*.[14]

In constructing his genera-species hierarchy (if we imagine it linearly) of the *existing* (ὄντα) – *corporeal* (σωματικόν) – *living* (ζωτικόν) – *sensible/animate* (αἰσθητικόν/ἔμψυχον) – *rational* (λογικόν), Gregory generally follows the sequence of levels corresponding to Porphyry's Tree, but introduces certain modifications. In particular, two levels – *living beings* and *animate beings* – in the genera-species structures of Gregory and Porphyry are in the opposite order: in Gregory *living beings* precede *animate beings* (= *sensible*), while in Porphyry *animate* precede *living*.

The context of the *De opificio hominis* 8, where Gregory attempted to synthesize Biblical-cosmological, anthropological, logical, and natural-philosophical conceptual frameworks may help us to reveal the reasons for Gregory's change in the order of genera-species hierarchy as it appears in Porphyry's Tree. The reason why Gregory changed the order of the genera-species hierarchy, present in the Tree of Porphyry, must have been related to Gregory's desire to reconcile the logical and philosophical structure of division, conventional for its time, with the Biblical account, that is, with how the Bible described the order of creating natural beings, and with the logic of this order. Indeed, the Biblical text says that the world of plants was created prior to the world of animals.[15] This determined the structure of division of beings in Gregory, according to which living beings precede animate beings. For this reason Gregory diverged from the order of the hierarchy of beings appearing in the Tree of Porphyry.[16]

Next we should turn to the question of how the hierarchy of beings was understood by Dionysius the Areopagite.

This paradigm is radically different from that of Gregory of Nyssa. The hierarchy, built up by Gregory, does not imply transcendental principles corresponding to the links of hierarchy and participated in by them, while Dionysius, on the basis of the philosophy of Proclus, developed his doctrine of hierarchy involving such principles.

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13. See *Isagoge* 10: 3–9, 14–18 (ed. Busse: *Porphyrii isagoge et in Aristotelis categorias commentarium*, ed. A. Busse. Berlin, 1887 (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 4.1)).

14. *Isagoge* 4: 15–27 (Busse).

15. Cf. Gen. 1:11 and 1:20.

16. In more detail about thus topic see D. Biriukov, "'Ascent of Nature from the Lower to the Perfect'..." .

The Dissimilarity in the Structure of the Hierarchies in Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius the Areopagite in Connection with the Philosophical Paradigms of Participation in a Substance in Patristic Thought

This difference can be correlated with the rethinking of the concept of participation in a substance, and, in particular, participation in the divine substance in Patristic thought due to the change in the underlying philosophical understanding of the very notion of participation. Below, a short excursion into this subject will be provided.[17]

I will use the expression, "Platonic paradigm of participation" for such a view when the participating entity is understood as being different from the participated entity according to nature (substance), and the expression *by participation* is understood as the opposition to what is *by being* or *by nature* (by possession of nature). For example, a thing, which is not the One, *participates* in It, and therefore is not It as such.[18] In the most general sense, *participation* in this paradigm points to the fact that a certain thing possesses a certain property to a lesser extent than does the embodiment of this property. The "Aristotelian paradigm of participation," opposite to the Platonic, is Aristotle's understanding of participation expressing a logical relationship between the genera-species predicables of varying degrees of generality: less general participates in more general, while the latter does not participate in the former (an individual participates in species and genus; species participates in genus, but not vice versa).[19] Thus *by participation* in the Aristotelian paradigm means the same as *by nature* (substance) or *by being* since in this paradigm the nature of an individual is the species and genus which it belongs to or participates in. Moreover, unlike Platonic language which, when it comes to participation, speaks about a greater or lesser degree of participation, Aristotelian language cannot speak about varying degrees of participation.

The Early Christian authors were inspired to actively use the Platonic paradigm of participation by the well-known passage from the *Second Epistle of Peter*, which stated that Christians would become the partakers of the divine nature (θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως) (2 Pet. 1, 3–4). Accordingly, the topic of participation in the divine substance (nature), as implicitly or explicitly

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17. Speaking below of the paradigms of participation in Patristics, I am working from the platform of my article: Д. Бирюков, "Тема причастности Богу в святоотеческой традиции и у Никифора Григоры" [D. Biriukov, "The topic of participation in God in the Patristic thought and in Nicephorus Gregoras"], in: Георгий Факрасис, *Диспут свт. Григория Паламы с Григорой философом. Философские и богословские аспекты паламитских споров.* Пер. с древнегреч. Д. А. Поспелова, отв. ред. Д. С. Бирюков (Москва, 2009) [*Georgy Fakrasis, Disputation of St Gregory Palamas with Nicephorus Gregoras, a Philosopher. Philosophical and Theological Aspects of the Palamite controversy*, trans. D. Pospelov, ed. D. Biriukov, Moscow 2009], 113–173.

18. Cf. Plato, *Parmenides* 158a.

19. Aristotle, *Topica* 121a10–15, 122b20–22.

opposite of possessing it,[20] with more or less obvious philosophical connotations and usually with the allusion to 2 Pet. 1, 3–4 was used in the early Byzantine literature by Athanasius of Alexandria,[21] Gregory of Nyssa,[22] Cyril of Alexandria, Macarius the Great[23] and other authors. In Middle Byzantine literature, this topic was dealt with by John of Damascus, who summarized all possible paradigms of participation for his time – Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neoplatonic,[24] as well as by Symeon the New Theologian.[25] This trend of Patristic literature argued that holy people participate in the divine nature (they partake in the divine substance, but do not possess it as hypostases of the Trinity do), while the created world as a whole, according to Gregory of Nyssa,[26] cannot be considered as participating in it.

This paradigm of participation fell into the background in Byzantine Patristic literature in connection with the new philosophical language which appeared in the *Corpus Areopagiticum*. Those notions which earlier Patristic

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20. About the opposition *by participation* and *by nature* in Athanasius of Alexandria and the Cappadocians see D. Balás, Μετουσία Θεοῦ..., 11–12, 60–62. Cf. Idem, "Participation", *The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa*, edited by L. Francisco Mateo-Seco and G. Maspero, Leiden, Boston: Brill 2010, 583.

21. For example, *Epistle 1 to Serapion*, PG 26, 585BC.

22. *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.274.1–4 (ed. Jaeger).

23. The last two authors very often devoted their attention to this subject; each of them has dozens of pertinent passages.

24. For example, see the Platonic paradigm in the *Orationes de imaginibus tres* 3.33 (on partaking in the divine substance by the saints) and the *De fidei orthodoxa* 4 XIII (86): 2–14 (ed. Kotter: *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos (1969-1988)*, hrsg. B. Kotter. 5 Bände. Berlin. (Maßgebliche kritische Gesamtausgabe)); see the Aristotelian paradigm in the *De duabus in Christo voluntatibus* 7; see the Neoplatonic paradigm in *Ibid.*, 11: 9–10 (ed. Kotter) (where John of Damascus, contradicting the *Orationes de imaginibus tres* 3.33, speaks about impossibility of partaking in the divine substance) and in the *De fidei orthodoxa* 7 (51).

25. *Ethical Discourses* 1.3.82–86 (Syméon le Nouveau Théologien, *Traités théologiques et éthiques*, introd., texte crit., trad. fr. et notes par J. Darrouzès. T. 1, Paris 1967, 202); Hymns 7.30–36; 50.153–154, 200–202 (Symeon der Neue Theologe, *Hymnen*, prolegomena und krit. text, besorgt A. von Kambyles, Berlin, 1976, 71; 401; 402–403) etc. See: D. Biriukov, "On the Topic of Participation in the Divine Essence according to St Symeon the New Theologian in the Patristic Context," in: B. Lourié, P. Allen, V. Baranov, eds., *Scrinium: Revue de patrologie, d'hagiographie critique et d'histoire ecclésiastique*, vol. 11: *Patrologia Pacifica Quarta* (2015) [in print]. It is also worth noting that in this version of the theological language, the discourses of participation and knowledge are not similar: the divine substance is participated, however it is unknowable (at least in this life; Gregory of Nazianzus (*Or.* 28.17) admitted the possibility of the comprehension of the divine essence in a future age). In this regard, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the pre-Areopagite paradigm of theological language and the Palamite one, regarding the concept of "essence-energy": i.e. the Cappadocian Fathers opposed knowability of the divine energies to unknowability of the divine substance, although they do not do so in terms of participability and unparticipability as it was in theological language of Gregory Palamas. This discrepancy between the two discourses in the Cappadocian Fathers – the discourse of participation to the divine substance and that of knowledge of the substance – is not often recognized by the scholars. This is the case, for example, of the study by David Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom*, Cambridge 2004, 172–178.

26. *Contra Eunomium* 3.3.7.1–8.6 (ed. Jaeger).

authors expressed through the opposition of *by being* (*by nature*) – *by participation*, started to be expressed in the Dionysian philosophical and theological framework by the conceptual triad of *non-participated – participated – participating*[27] (the Neoplatonic paradigm of participation) developed by Proclus and adopted by the author of the *Corpus Areopagiticum*. This paradigm of participation included some aspects of both Platonic and Aristotelian paradigms: the Aristotelian paradigm functioned as a background, in opposition to which the notion of non-participated was elaborated, while the Platonic paradigm manifested itself in relation to the *participated* and the *participating*.

In the process of transferring this triad into Christian theological thought, the Areopagite distinguished in the divinity the *participated* (μετεχόμενον) which he associated with the divine processions and powers, and *non-participated* (ἀμέθεκτος) – the supra-substantial divinity of God.[28] The author of the *scholia* to the *Corpus Areopagiticum* interpreted this in such a way that while divinity could be participated according to its processions and energies, God could not be participated according to His nature.[29] Moreover, this paradigm assumes that He is completely unparticipated for all created beings including saintly people. The topic of the ultimate impossibility of participating in God according to substance (nature) and of the opportunity to participate in God according to energies is exhaustively developed in the writings of Maximus the Confessor (possibly the author of the *scholia* to the *Corpus Areopagiticum* mentioned above).[30] In this way the Aristotelian paradigm became partially borrowed in the understanding that to *participate* in substance meant to possess the substance or to be something according to substance. Thereby, the discourse of the participation of saints (as well as of any created beings) in the divine substance, which was used in the preceding Patristic literature, including Gregory of Nyssa, became forbidden (since in this paradigm the participation of saints in the divine substance would imply for them becoming God according to substance).

After Maximus, the Neoplatonic participation paradigm which implied the complete impossibility of participating in God according to substance, for a time fell out of use, but reemerged among Orthodox theologians after

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27. This triad might have been introduced into the philosophical language by Iamblichus; see the testimony of Proclus in his *Commentary on the Timaeus* II, 105.16–28; 313.19–24.
28. *De divinis nominibus* (hereafter *DN*) 2.5; 11.6.
29. PG 4, 221C, 404AB, 404D. It is known that the author of a number of scholia to the Areopagite was John Scythopolis, while the author of some other scholia was Maximus the Confessor. From the index compiled by B. Suchla and quoted in the book Rorem, Lamoreaux 1998, 264–277, it follows that none of these scholia are available in the Syriac translation of the scholia. However it is believed that exactly scholia included into the Syriac translation where written by John Scythopolis. Taking into account that the theme of the impossibility of participating in God according to substance is found in the writings of Maximus the Confessor (see the next notice), we can suppose that the author of the scholia is Maximus.
30. Maximus the Confessor, *Quaestiones et dubia* 173.1–7 (ed. Declerck: Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones et Dubia, ed. J. H. Declerck, Corpus Christianorum, series Graeca 10), Brepols, Turnhout 1982; *Capita theologica et oeconomica,* PG 90, 1180C–1181A.

the rediscovery of the theological heritage of Maximus the Confessor at the end of the lifetime of Nicetas Stethatos, that is, in the last quarter of the eleventh century. Further this paradigm was taken over by Gregory Palamas; eventually in the course of the Palamite controversy the idea of possibility of participation of created beings in the divine substance was rejected in the *Tomos* of the Council of the Church of Constantinople in 1351[31] and anathematized in a special supplement to the *Synodikon of Orthodoxy*.[32]

Gregory of Nyssa used both Platonic and Aristotelian paradigms of participation in his writings. The Aristotelian participation paradigm was used by Gregory when he argued that all people equally partook in the human nature.[33] Gregory used the Platonic participation paradigm in the framework of hierarchy where participation of *intellectual created beings* took place in the *uncreated intellectual being* – or divine substance – according to the goodness of will as participation in the highest level of hierarchy. However, in Dionysius the Areopagite, who borrowed the Neoplatonic paradigm of participation, as well as subsequently in Maximus the Confessor and Gregory Palamas, such a Platonic paradigm of participation became impossible in its application to the divine substance. According to the philosophical paradigm of participation shared by these authors, participation in the divine substance would imply its assimilation, which was prohibited overall in the Patristic theological thought. In fact, the idea of assimilating the divine substance by created beings was "blocked" in this case through the introduction of the concept of non-participation into theological discourse.

Therefore, the authors who adopted the Neoplatonic paradigm of participation in their theological language and whose theological systems implied the utter non-participation in God (non-participation in the divine substance) naturally developed the doctrine of hierarchy entailing participation of created beings, not in the divine substance, but in the higher transcendental principles – processions of God, His qualities, or energies, as it can be found in Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory Palamas, respectively.

Natural and Individual Participation in the Godhead according to Dionysius the Areopagite

The doctrine of the hierarchy of beings which exists in the *Corpus Areopagiticum* is generally associated with the theme of participation in the Godhead. Dionysius speaks about dual participation in God. On the one hand, all beings participate in God *naturally* – by virtue of possessing existence and in accordance with the nature of each being (which will be discussed in more

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31. 396–397 (ed. Καρμίρη: I. Καρμίρη, *Τὰ δογματικὰ καὶ συμβολικὰ μνημεῖα*, T. I. Ἀθήνα 1952).

32. *Synodicon of Orthodoxy* 85.628–633 (J. Gouillard "Le Synodikon de l'Orthodoxie. Édition et commentaire," *Travaux et Mémoires* 2 (1967) 1–316).

33. *Contra Eunomium* 1.1.173.2–175.1 (ed. Jaeger).

detail below). Such a participation is static, and within this paradigm there is no being deprived of participation in the First Cause. On the other hand, Dionysius speaks about the way of individual participation in God (for rational beings), and about the ability to participate in the Divine Goodness for an individual being, which can either be fulfilled or not. In the latter case, Dionysius characterizes a being as not participating in Goodness (*DN* IV, 4: 147.15–148.2 (here and below ed. Suchla[34])). Thus, one of the participation paradigms used by the Areopagite corresponded to natural participation and implied the participation of created beings in God as a given reality. In this paradigm we cannot speak about non-participation of beings in the Godhead in any respect. Another paradigm corresponded to the individual way of participation and implied participation as a condition which may (or may not) become a reality. The latter paradigm presupposed both participation and non-participation of a (rational) individual being in God, if the being chooses to close itself to divine gifts. According to the Areopagite, in both cases beings participate in the divinity in its entirety: God on His part gives Himself entirely, whereas created beings participate in the divinity proportionately to their capacity, both in the ability to receive as defined by their nature, and in terms of individual openness to participating in the divine gifts (for rational beings) (*DN* II, 5: 129.4–6). Later, a similar dual paradigm of the participation of created beings in the divine would be used by Maximus the Confessor and Gregory Palamas.

The Participated and the Participating in Dionysius the Areopagite

Thus, Dionysius the Areopagite developed his theory of processions and principles which are participated in by the created beings in the context of the natural participation of created beings in the divinity. In *On the Divine Names* V, 1 Dionysius speaks about such names of God as *Goodness*, *Being*, *Life*, and *Wisdom* as concerning the order of the divine processions, outspreading on the corresponding realities in the created world and surpassing them.[35] *Goodness* extends on *being* and *non-being*; *Being* extends on *beings*; *Life* on *living beings*, while *Wisdom* extends on *intellectual beings* (angelic powers), *rational beings*, and *sensible beings*. These good processions do not constitute multiple

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34. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, *De divinis nominibus*, ed. B. R. Suchla, Patristische Texte und Studien 33, Berlin: De Gruyter 1990.

35. It should be noted that the theological language of Dionysius speaks of divine names in a way that, on the one hand, the names explain the divine processions, while, on the other hand, identifying those names with the processions. Dionysius says in *DN* V, 1 that the names *Goodness*, *Being* and *Life* do not simply apply to non-beings, beings, and living beings, but also *exceed* them (181.1–6). Evidently, the reference that the divine names related to the processions exceed the corresponding realities of the created beings, indicates that Dionysius here identified the divine name and the procession.

principles, but all belong to the One God. At the same time according to Dionysius those beings which are the subjects of the processions and which participate in them, form a hierarchy: *living beings* (τὰ ζῶντα) are above *beings* (τὰ ὄντα); *sensible beings* (τὰ αἰσθητικά) are above *living beings*; *rational beings* (τὰ λογικά) are above *sensible beings*, and *intellects* (τὰ νοερά) are above *rational beings*.[36] Dionysius noted that intellectual beings were the closest to God as having the largest number of natural perfections.[37] This very principle underlying the hierarchy of participating in Dionysius is associated with the concept of conformity or proportionality in the outpouring of divine gifts on the participating beings (see *DN* I, 2–3; IV, 1, 33) both in their natural and individual aspects.

Dionysius speaks of *Goodness*, *Being*, *Life*, and *Wisdom* using not only the terminology of "processions." In relation to these names he also mentions two types of specific realities – *self-supra-substantial* and *self-participating* principles. As a rule, scholars have focused their attention on the Dionysian doctrine of *Goodness*, *Being*, *Life*, and *Wisdom* as the processions of the divine without going into great detail concerning the doctrine of these principles in the *Corpus Dionysiacum*. We should try to understand what Dionysius writes about them.

In *DN* V, 2 Dionysius speaks about self-supra-substantial *Goodness*, *Being*, *Life*, and *Wisdom* pertaining to self-supra-substantial divinity; they are above all goodness, being, life, and wisdom. The principles, as it seems, can be identified with supra-substantial Principle and supra-divine Life which Dionysius mentions in *DN* XI, 6. Yet, in order to standardize our terminological usage, we will refer to these kinds of principles as *self-supra-substantial* principles.

These entities differ from other higher entities established by God. The latter principles, like all beings, constitute the gift and the outpouring of self-supra-substantial *Goodness* (*DN* V, 6) and include the principles (ἀρχαί) with the prefix "self-" (αὐτο-): *Self-Being*, *Self-Life*, *Self-Wisdom*, *Self-Similarity of the*

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36. "Yet someone might say, 'Wherefore is Being expands beyond Life and Life beyond Wisdom, when living things are above beings, and sensible things above living ones, and rational things above these, and the intellects are above the rational things and are more around God and closer to him? For, those which participate in God's greater gifts are the higher and surpass the rest. If the intellects are understood that way that they were without being and without life, the saying would be sound. But since the divine intellects are above other beings, and live in a manner surpassing other living things, and think and know in a manner beyond sense and reason, and in a manner beyond all existent things participate in the Beautiful and Good, they are nearer to the Good, participating in it in an eminent way, and receiving from it more and greater gifts; likewise rational things excel sensitive ones, having more by the eminence of reason, and the latter [excel other living things] by sensation, and [living things excel mere beings] by life" (*DN* V, 3: 182.1–14). I have made use of the translations of E. Perl, *Theophany: the Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite*, New York 2007, 69–70 and C. E. Rolt, *Dionysius the Areopagite: On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology*, transl. by C. E. Rolt, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, Grand Rapids, London: SPCK 1920, 133–134. Cf. *DN* II, 7: 131.7–13; IV, 4: 148: 12–18.

37. *DN* V, 3, 182.3–4.

Divinity, Self-Unity, Self-Order (V, 5, cf. XI, 6), *Self-Goodness* (II, 1; XI, 6), *Self-Eternity* (V, 9), *Self-Equality* (IX, 10; XI, 6), *Self-Peace* (XI, 2; XI, 6), *Self-Divinity* (XI, 6), *Self-Beauty* (XI, 6), and *Self-Holiness* (XII, 1).[38] Dionysius indicates that all existing things, including the principles with the prefix "self-" come from self-supra-substantial *Goodness*, and gives two examples: the first concerns the relation of the number one to other numbers (all numbers are merged in number one, and the more the number is removed from the one, the more it is divided) and the second example deals with a multitude of lines passing through the center of a circle (the farther from the center, the more their divergence is) (V, 6).

Dionysius speaks about the principles with the prefix "self-" as about realities which, being the gift and the outpouring of the non-participated God are participated in by beings, making beings to be and to become called beings, living beings, deified beings, etc. (XI, 6).

Self-Being is the highest principle among the principles with the prefix "self-"; it is participated in by other principles with the prefix "self-," which are called "self-participating" (αὐτομέτοχαι) by Dionysius. These principles are simultaneously participating and participated: they participate in *Self-Being* and are participated in by beings in accordance with qualities corresponding to these names (while some beings may simultaneously participate in several principles (V, 5: 184.11–12, cf. XII, 4: 225.17ff.). The beings, participating in the self-participating principles, through them also participate in *Self-Being* (V, 5).

Although Dionysius the Areopagite called self-participating higher realities *principles* (ἀρχαί) (V, 5), he rejected the possibility of understanding them as creating substances or causes (αἰτίαι) of beings (XI, 6),[39] since the Cause (αἰτία) of beings and their principle is only the supra-substantial divinity in the modes of self-supra-substantiality (self-supra-substantial *Goodness, Substance, Life,* and *Wisdom*) (V, 6; XI, 6). Despite the fact that Dionysius mentions a variety of such modes, the divinity in these modes is one and the same Cause of beings; it is not many causes, and it would be wrong to understand the self-supra-substantial *Goodness, Substance, Life, and Wisdom* as separate causes of beings (V, 2). We may say that according to Dionysius the realities of the self-supra-substantial represent a single Cause and Principle while there is a whole variety of principles with the prefix "self-" (*Self-Being, Self-Life, Self-Wisdom*, etc.) (cf. V, 5–6).

Dionysius says that God can be called both the basis of, for example, *Self-Life* or *Self-Power*, or simply may be called *Self-Life* or *Self-Power* in the proper

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38. Speaking of these principles, Dionysius also mentions that *Self-Life* comes from divine *Life* (VI, 1), that God as Power dwells above *Self-Power* (VIII, 2) and is the basis of *Self-Similarity* (IX, 6), *Self-Equality* (IX, 10), and *Self-Peace* (XI, 2).
39. Dionysius probably argues here against Proclus' doctrine of hennads interpreted in the sense of hypostatized principles.

sense of the terms. In the first case, it is said about God as about supra-substantially exceeding all beings and "first beings" (τὰ πρώτως ὄντα) (evidently, under the "first beings" Dionysius here means the principles with the prefix "self-"); in the second case He is named according to the names of beings and first beings[40] as their Cause (XI, 6: 221.13–222.2).

The relationship between the divine processions on the one hand, and the self-supra-substantial realities and principles with the prefix "self-" on the other, are not entirely clear, but it seems that self-supra-substantial realities and principles with the prefix "self-," while differing from each other (the former are the cause and the source of existence for the latter) and not being identical to divine processions, represent different aspects of the processions.[41]

Divine Names in Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonic Tetrad

Among all divine names as Dionysius describes them we can distinguish the first four: *Goodness*, *Being* (τὸ ὄν) [= τὸ εἶναι = ἡ οὐσία], *Life*, and *Wisdom*. Dionysius writes about these names as related simultaneously to divine procession, to self-supra-substantial realities, and to the principles of beings with the prefix "self-." This sequence of names was borrowed by Dionysius from the Neoplatonic tradition, which elaborated the doctrine of the triad *Being*,

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40. It is this language of speaking about the supra-being on the basis of being, which in my opinion may explain the words of Dionysius in the XI, 6: 222.13ff. that *Self-Being*, *Self-Life*, and *Self-Divinity* are spoken about the divine, supra-primary, and supra-substantial Principle and Cause, while earlier (XI, 6: 222.6ff.) Dionysius rejected the notion that *Self-Being* was the divine Cause for all beings, and *Self-Life* was the Cause of all living beings, and said that it was the supra-divine *Life* that was cause of both *Self-Life* and all living beings.

41. It may be noted here that Eric Perl, in fact, identified divine processions in Dionysius with the principles with the prefix "self-" without mentioning it and without posing a question concerning the complexity and originality of the Dionysian doctrine of divine names and their denotations. In my opinion, this position somewhat distorts the doctrine of Dionysius in the form it was presented by Perl. Thus Perl developed the argument about the tetrad of processions *Goodness*, *Being*, *Life*, and *Wisdom* from *DN* V, 1 and went on to *DN* XI, 6. On the basis of the latter passage he pointed out that according to Dionysius divine processions were not mediating creative substances and hypostases (E. Perl, *Theophany…*, 66–67). However, in XI, 6 Dionysius precisely speaks about the principles with the prefix "self-" and not about divine processions in general. Dionysius' purpose, among other things, was to claim that those principles were not the creative causes of beings, whereas the supra-substantial principle and the supra-divine *Life* were the Cause and Principle of all *being* and *life* (XI, 6: 222.3–223.3). It seems that the Dionysian distinction between the concept of "cause" (αἰτία), attributable only to self-supra-substantial (or divine) entities, but not to the entities with the prefix "self-," and the notion of "principle" (ἀρχή), attributable to both of those, is relevant here; see above, the text around note 37). Thus, in my opinion, it is not correct to identify Dionysian divine processions and the principles with the prefix "self-" without specifying details and context, as it was done by Perl, since not everything that Dionysius attributed to the principles with the prefix "self-," he applied to divine processions in general.

Life, and *Mind*.[42] Using this Neoplatonic triad, Dionysius replaced *Mind* with *Wisdom*, wishing, as scholars pointed out, to bring this language closer to the Biblical.[43]

In the Platonic tradition, the triad of *Being*, *Life*, and *Mind* went back at least to Plotinus, who taught about the One as the source of *Being* (τὸ ὄν), *Life*, and *Mind*.[44] Later Neoplatonists, Proclus and Syrianus, also placed *Being*, *Life*, and *Mind* underneath the One, linking the triad to the noetic realm. S. Klitenic Wear and J. Dillon argue that only Porphyry, out of all Neoplatonists, placed the triad at the level of the One, and in this respect we have a crossing point of Porphyry and Dionysius who also considered the triad to correspond to the highest reality.[45]

However it is unlikely that Dionysius built on Porphyry in speaking about the divine names of *Goodness*, *Being*, *Life*, and *Mind*; Proclus was the most likely source. As P. Sherwood noted,[46] in this regard Dionysius relied on the 101st and 102nd theorems of the *Elements of Theology* by Proclus, which referred to the triad of *Being*, *Life*, and *Mind*. One can also notice that in the 8th theorem of this treatise and further on Proclus spoke of *Goodness* as the highest principle. The dependence of Dionysius on Proclus in this respect also follows from the philosophical background of the Dionysian doctrine concerning the tetrad of *Goodness*, *Being*, *Life*, and *Wisdom* in *DN* V, 1–2, analyzed, among other scholars, by E. Perl.[47]

The Hierarchy of Beings in Dionysius the Areopagite

It follows from the above that we may confidently speak about the hierarchy of created beings or hierarchy of participating in Dionysius the Areopagite. This is the following hierarchy (from the lowest level in the ontological sense as well as in relation to the measure of complexity): *being – living being – sensible being – rational being – intellectual being* (V, 3, see the relevant quote in

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42. However, P. Rorem indicated that there was also a Biblical background in relation to these divine names; P. Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius. A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence*, Oxford 1993, 153–155; cf. P. Rorem, "The Biblical Allusions and Overlooked Quotations in the Pseudo-Dionysian Corpus," *Studia Patristica* 23 (1989) 64.
43. Cf. S. Klitenic Wear, J. Dillon, *Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist tradition: Despoiling the Hellenes*, Ashgate Studies in Philosophy and Theology in Late Antiquity, Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate 2007, 24, n. 31; 26; E. Perl, *Theophany...*, 129.
44. Plotinus, *Enneades* I 8, 2; see Ch. Schäfer, *The Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite. An Introduction to the Structure and the Content of the Treatise On the Divine Names*, Leiden, Boston: Brill 2006, 86. S. Klitenic Wear and J. Dillon mistakenly indicate *Enneades* I 6, 7 in that respect; S. Klitenic Wear, J. Dillon, *Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition...*, 24.
45. S. Klitenic Wear, J. Dillon, *Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition...*, 25–26.
46. P. Sherwood, "Introduction," in: St. Maximus the Confessor, *The Ascetic Life. The Four Centuries on Charity,* Trans. and annot. by P. Sherwood, O.S.B., Ancient Christian Writers, S.T.D. Paulist Press 1955, 40–41.
47. E. Perl, *Theophany...*, 68–69.

note 34). This hierarchy corresponds to the order in the degree of expanding of the processions of God in the triad of *Being*, *Life*, and *Wisdom*, borrowed from the Neoplatonists, where the three levels in the hierarchy of participating – *intellectual*, *rational*, and *sensible* – correspond to Wisdom. The structure of the hierarchy of participating is such that the more complex species which the being belongs to, the greater amount of transcendent entities the being participates in. This implied the inclusion of each preceding level by the subsequent level, and meant that possession of each subsequent perfection or natural capacity entailed the possession of all preceding capacities, as well as the corresponding participations (although it is still not entirely clear how this worked in the case of angelic powers, corresponding to the level of the intellectual – the highest level of the Dionysian hierarchy, since the nature of angels obviously did not include the preceding perfections in the hierarchy[48]).

Although the order of the participated divine names-processions was borrowed by Dionysius from Proclus, the Dionysian hierarchy of participating is not in fact close to the hierarchy of participating in Proclus, which had the following form: *living beings – vegetative beings – soulless bodies – matter*.[49] Thus, while relying on Proclus in respect to his doctrine of the participated divine names-processions, *Goodness-Being-Life-Wisdom*, Dionysius did not follow Proclus as far as his doctrine on *what* exactly participates in those processions was concerned.

It should be noted that Dionysius does not show a clear correspondence between the stages in the divine processions and the levels in participation hierarchy. As I have mentioned, the whole three levels of hierarchy that participate in Wisdom – *intellectual*, *rational*, and *sensible* – unexpectedly appear here.

However, is there a correspondence between the participating and the participated in the hierarchical structure? Does the hierarchy of participating beings correspond to a parallel hierarchy of participated beings in terms of participated divine processions? In my opinion, the answer to this question should be negative.

The processions-names *Goodness*, *Being*, *Life*, and *Wisdom* from *DN* V, 1–2, which are participated in by the hierarchically organized created beings do not form a hierarchy, but rather in the words of Eric Perl, "are simply more or less universal modes of the same divine presence,"[50] representing different

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48. It should be noted that, unlike Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa placed the perfection, corresponding to the angelic powers (as well as to the highest ability of the human beings), *intellectual created being*, outside the hierarchy of natural beings. Thus, such a perplexity does not arise in respect to Gregory's doctrine of hierarchies.

49. *Platonic Theology* III, 6. In general see the list in E. R. Dodds, "Commentary," in: *Proclus, The Elements of Theology*. A revised text with transl., introd. and comm. by E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1963, 232–233.

50. E. Perl, *Theophany...*, 70.

limits, upon which the divinity expands itself (ἐκτείνω). That means, as it follows from the V, 3, that *Wisdom* includes *Life*, *Being*, and *Goodness*; *Life* includes *Being* and *Goodness*, etc.[51] Ch. Schäfer called this principle the "Russian-doll-principle."[52] Obviously, the same principle holds true in regard to the entities participating in those processions: *intellectual beings* contain the perfections of *rational*, *sensible*, *living*, and *existing* beings; *rational beings* contain the perfections of *sensible*, *living*, and *existing beings*, etc.

We may speak about the elements referring to a hierarchy of the principles with the prefix "self-," which Dionysius also speaks of as participated entities (see above). Dionysius mentions the deified being, the living being, the unified being, the similar being, and the ordered being as entities participating in those principles (V, 5: 184.8–16; XI, 6: 222.17–223.1), but he assumes that beings with qualities corresponding to the names of the principles participate in each of them. This is why these principles (with the exception of *Self-Being*) are called "self-participating," being both participate (in *Self-Being* and through it in the self-supra-substantial *Goodness*) and are participated in (by the relevant types of participating beings). The element of hierarchical structuring in respect to these principles consists in their participation in *Self-Being* as a "senior principle" (V, 5: 184.8–16). However, Dionysius does not seem to give reason to think that self-participating principles in his system form some kind of hierarchy among themselves apart from the fact that each of them participates in *Self-Being*.

Thus, if we take a closer look at the examples which Dionysius provides in speaking about the origin of all beings, including the principles with the prefix "self-," out of *self-supra-substantial Goodness*, namely, the example of many lines passing through the center of circle and the example of the relationship of one to other numbers (V, 6, supra), we may see that the first example does not imply any hierarchy, while the second example may imply it. However, one example is not sufficient to make any conclusions about the hierarchical structure among the principles with the prefix "self-" in Dionysius, moreover, the first example does not support the hierarchical structure at all. Furthermore, in addition to *Self-Being*, *Self-Life*, and *Self-Wisdom*, such principles include, for example, *Self-Similarity, Self-Unity, Self-Order*, etc., and the possible structure of hierarchy between them, unlike among the first ones, is unclear.[53]

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51. Cf. E. Perl, *Theophany...*, 69–70. It should be noted that Klitenic Wear and Dillon claim that in the Dionysian triad *Being* is above *Wisdom* and *Life*, and that *Life* and *Wisdom* participate in *Being*: "Regarding Being, Dionysius places this name above Life and Wisdom so that Life and Wisdom participate in Being;" S. Klitenic Wear, J. Dillon, *Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition...*, 26. Unfortunately, the authors do not indicate the source for this claim in the text of Dionysius. However, this statement is valid only for the principles with the prefix "self-" (V, 5, see above), but not for all processions as such.

52. Ch. Schäfer, *The Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite...*, 87.

53. One might add that even the "Russian-doll-principle," entailing the inclusion of the lesser extended principles by the longer extended principles with certainty refers only to the di-

The Hierarchies in Dionysius the Areopagite and Gregory of Nyssa: Resume

Thus, we can identify four elements concerning the subject of participation in the system of Dionysius, defined by the Neoplatonic paradigm which involved such aspects of participation as the *non-participated*, the *participated*, and the *participating.* The four elements include, firstly, the *non-participated* – the supra-substantial divinity of God; secondly, the *participated* – divine processions and self-supra-substantial principles; thirdly, the *participated* and *participating* – the principles with the prefix "self-," and, fourthly, the *participating* – the created beings in their individual and natural aspects, and, in particular, the hierarchy of beings.

Unlike Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius did not use either the Aristotelian paradigm of participation according to substance, that is, when the language of participation is used for saying that some individual being belongs to some species, or species to genus, or the Platonic paradigm of participation according to substance, implying the opposition *by participation* (corresponding to the possession of a certain property) and *by being* (corresponding to what this property objectified). Instead of using those paradigms, Dionysius uses the combined Neoplatonic paradigm of participation, which implied a distinction between the *non-participated* and *participated* in the divinity. This fact defines the general concept of the hierarchy of beings in Dionysius in the sense that it is exactly the hierarchy of the *participating.*

Thus, Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius diverge in the very understanding of the hierarchy of beings, since in Gregory this hierarchy did not imply any transcendental principles with respect to the types of created beings in which these types participate, while in Dionysius the hierarchy entailed the existence of such principles or some universals-prior-to-beings. The triad of the divine processions *Being*, *Life*, and *Wisdom* claims this role in Dionysius. Even though this triad represented a unified Cause of beings, it constituted a sequence of links differing in the degree of the expansion of the divinity. In addition, the principles with the prefix "self-" – *Self-Being*, *Self-Life* and *Self-Wisdom*, representing some aspects of the divine processions – also claim this role, for in the system of Dionysius they also are participated in. Moreover, as far as we may understand Dionysius, these principles are distinct realities, since Dionysius speaks of a multitude of such principles (V, 5).

We may also point to certain common features in the hierarchies of beings by Gregory and Dionysius. There is a definite similarity in the sequence of levels in the hierarchies. Keeping in mind this similarity, we may suggest the dependence of Dionysius on Gregory in some respect.

Thus the Dionysian hierarchy of participating beings is the following: *beings* (τὰ ὄντα) – *living beings* (τὰ ζῶντα) – *sensible beings* (τὰ αἰσθητικά) – *rational*

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vine processions (discussed in *DN* V, 1–2), but not to the principles with the prefix "self-," and we cannot make any definitive conclusions concerning their subordination to this principle in Dionysius.

beings (τὰ λογικά) – *intellectual beings* (τὰ νοερά). In Gregory, if we take his hierarchy with the basis/summit as *being* and present the genera-species divisions in a linear way, we will have the following sequence of links: *existing = beings* (τὰ ὄντα) – *corporeal* (σωματικόν) – *living* (ζωτικόν) – *sensible/animate* (αἰσθητικόν/ἔμψυχον) – *rational* (λογικόν).

In Gregory, the hierarchy with *being* at its basis is the hierarchy of genera and species. In Dionysius, the hierarchy of the participating beings (as well as relationship between the divine processions) according to its structure is also similar to the genera-species hierarchy.[54] This follows from the understanding of the hierarchy, in which each successive level contains all the preceding levels, that is, from the "Russian-doll-principle."

Further, the level of the corporeal is missing in the hierarchy of Dionysius compared with Gregory,[55] while the level of intellectual is missing in the hierarchy of Gregory compared to that of Dionysius.[56] At the same time the hierarchies of Gregory and Dionysius show similarity with respect to the sequence of levels *beings – living beings – sensible beings – rational beings.*

Interestingly, the hierarchy of the participating beings according to nature in Dionysius contains the level of *sensible beings.* Its presence, as it was mentioned above, is quite unexpected, because it does not match *Wisdom* – the procession of the divinity in which it participates, and in general it falls out of the Dionysian order of divine processions (*Being, Life, Wisdom*) which are participated in by the levels of hierarchy. This level is missing in Proclus' hierarchy of the participated entities. It should also be noted that in the Dionysian hierarchy the level of the *sensible* is located in the same place where it was in the hierarchy established by Gregory of Nyssa – between *living beings* and *rational beings.* Thus, taking into account the general similarity in terms of the sequence of levels in the hierarchies of Gregory and Dionysius, we may assume that the appearance of such a level in the hierarchy of the naturally participating beings in Dionysius was caused by his reworking of the hierarchy of beings, provided by Gregory of Nyssa. If this is the case, Dionysius might have borrowed the level of the *sensible* from Gregory's hierarchy, installing it in the appropriate place of his own hierarchical structure.

As I have mentioned, the presence of the level of *sensible beings* in the place where it was located in the hierarchy of Gregory of Nyssa, that is, between *living beings* and *rational beings,* is related to the fact that in the course of developing his hierarchy, Gregory had in mind the Biblical and cosmogonic order of natural beings (as it is mentioned in Gen. 1:11 and 20), and

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54. The difference from the genera-species structure in this case is only that the hierarchical language in Dionysius does not imply the links representing privative elements, symmetrical to the main links of the hierarchy (non-intellectual, non-rational, non-sensible, etc.), as is the case in Gregory's hierarchical structure.

55. As a matter of fact, this link is present in the hierarchy of participating according to Proclus, who, as we have seen, in many ways influenced the doctrine of Dionysius.

56. Sf. note 48 and the text around it.

on this basis changed the order of levels in the hierarchy compared to the Tree of Porphyry, which he generally followed.

Thus the Biblical trend in terms of the order of natural beings through Gregory of Nyssa penetrated the Dionysian discourse and through it penetrated the corresponding doctrines of the subsequent authors, which I intend to discuss in the second part of this study.[57]

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57. D. Biriukov, "Hierarchies of Beings in the Patristic Thought: Maximus the Confessor, John of Damascus and the Palamite literature," in: B. Lourié, N. Seleznyov, eds., *Scrinium: Revue de patrologie, d'hagiographie critique et d'histoire ecclésiastique*, vol. 10: *Syrians and the Others: Cultures of the Christian Orient in the Middle Ages* (2014) 281–304.

a draft for a new book on St. Theodore the Studite: *St. Theodore the Studite and the Philosophy of Images.*

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