

million Euro on development of the institutes of humanitarian aid for the needs of refugees, the displaced and the indigent.⁴

The Thessaloniki summit of the EU with five Western Balkan states in June 2003 became a powerful impulse towards the development of regional cooperation especially the relations between Serbia and Montenegro and neighboring countries and toward institutional reforms. It confirmed the necessity to follow all the points of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) by all candidate states and approved the plan of their transformation in the Euro Integration process through the "European Integration Partnership" or "Agenda for the Western Balkans".⁵ Despite the fact that the internal political situation in Serbia and Montenegro was acute and there were conflicts between different fractions of democrats, the resolutions of the Thessaloniki summit of the EU became a long-term guideline in politics not only for Zoran Živković's caretaker government but also for Serbian and Montenegrin leaders. European integration became the matter of rivalry of different parties and political leaders, in which each of them was eager to represent himself as the most ardent "Europeist".

By 2005 Serbia and Montenegro fulfilled the requirements provided by the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), worked out in the EU summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003. As it was noted earlier in the Thessaloniki summit 3, the EU offered the states of Western Balkans a document about the European partnership as a principal strategy of the EU towards the potential candidate countries for membership in the EU. According to the resolutions of the Thessaloniki summit the government of the republic of Serbia accepted the Action Plan to bring the laws to conformity with acts of the EU in June 2003. This plan determined the list of 52 laws that first had to be brought to conformity with normative acts

⁴European Commission. Directorate-General for economic and financial affairs. Occasional papers. N° 5, January 2004. The Western Balkans in transition / by Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance)⁵EU's relations with South Eastern Europe (Western Balkans)/the Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkan (www.eu.int)

⁵EU's relations with South Eastern Europe (Western Balkans)/the Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkan (www.eu.int)

⁶Serbia and Montenegro. Stabilization and Association report 2004 by commission of European communities. Official site of the EU. (<http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy.htm>)

of the EU⁷. It was the beginning of the process of bringing national legislation into conformity with the legal foundations of the EU.

In January 2003 the FRY created the European Integration Council, which was a central governmental body designed to deal with the problems associated with EU integration.⁸ However, this body was inefficient. The so-called "Forum 5+2" played a more significant role. It united two republican ministers of finance, three ministers of international economic relations and two executives of central banks.

The most efficient administrative body for training personnel, coordinating projects and implementing acts related to EU integration was the Office for Joining the EU by the Government of Serbia (Office for Joining the EU), established on 8 March 2004.⁹ On 22 April 2004 the government of Serbia approved the report on European cooperation and the necessity to adopt the plan for realization of priorities of the European partnership¹⁰. The report was prepared by the Office for Joining the EU. On these grounds, the Council of EU Ministers adopted the Council Decision 2008/213/EC¹¹, described as the "Resolution about principles, priorities and conditions laid in the Agreement of European partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo, in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 from the 10th July, 1999".¹² One of the most important statements of the European partnership was the direct relation of EU financial support to Serbia's real progress in fulfillment of Copenhagen criteria.

The Office for Joining the EU together with the Serbian Parliament's Committee for Joining the EU and a non-governmental organization, the European Movement in Serbia, formed a

⁷Канцеларија за придруживање Европској унији. Информација о активностима Канцеларије 2004 (<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?id=114>)

⁸European Commission. Directorate-General for economic and financial affairs. Occasional papers. N° 5, January 2004. The Western Balkans in transition / by Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance)

⁹Канцеларија за придруживање Европској унији. Канцеларија

(<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?id=39/>)

¹⁰Канцеларија за придруживање Европској унији. Европско партнерство

(<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?id=48/>)

¹¹http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/western_balkans/r18015_en.htm

¹²ibid.

to restore and reinforce the European security system. The plan was fulfilled by means of approval of the "Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe"¹ in 1999. Concerning Serbia, it was possible to speak about the beginning of the large-scale cooperation after the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic's authoritarian regime in October 2000 and the holding of presidential elections, the winner of which was the candidate from the democratic opposition, Vojislav Kostunica.

Straight after the recognition of Kostunica's triumph in the presidential elections, the EU lifted most of the sanctions which had been imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) before and at the time of the conflict in Kosovo and decided to spread the measures for liberalization of trade with states of the Western Balkans (zero import tariffs) and also headed for the integration of former Yugoslav states into its organizations. This fact is considered to be especially important as the possibility of stabilizing the economic situation in Serbia and Montenegro and its neighbouring countries depends to a large extent upon the fulfillment of international long-term development programs.

The evidence of the legitimization of new "democratic" Yugoslavia was the participation of representatives of Belgrade in the summit of leaders of all states of the region, for the first time in the last 10 years. At the end of October 2000, in Skopje, Macedonia, the Summit of Balkan states was opened, at which bilateral meetings of the president of Yugoslavia with leaders of Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Greece, Macedonia, Rumania, Turkey and Croatia took place. In the course of the conference the FRY officially joined the Stability Pact for the states of South Eastern Europe.²

Straight political dialog between the EU, its member states and the FRY was established only in 2001 when the United Consultative Workgroup (UCW) was founded for the purpose of evaluation of conditions in different spheres, first of all in the sphere of economy, civil rights and national minorities' rights, justice and home affairs. Until the middle of 2002 five

¹ This Pact was adopted in 1999 as a strategy of complex stabilization for South Eastern Europe. It was supported by 38 states, including EU, USA, Russia.

² Самошкин В. СРЮ присоединилась к пакту стабильности, Европа осталась довольна балканским саммитом // Независимая газета. № 205. 28.10. 2000.

meetings of UCW were held, in which a number of guidelines about the priority of reforms in Serbia were worked out. After the fifth meeting of the group a long pause was made in the dialog with the EU. The pause was caused by the process of constitutional transformation of the FRY into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.

After the establishment of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in February, 2003, the interests of Serbia and Montenegro in the process of joining the EU were coordinated in the mixed workgroup of the EU and the two members of the State Union. On the ground of these consultations the European Commission (EC) published the annual report about promotion of the stability and joining process.³

In the report of the EC about the process of modernization in the FRY in 2001-2002 and in Serbia and Montenegro in 2003 it was noted that the state government held the exchange rate policy rather constructively having provided stabilization of dinar (official currency of the state) and limited the growth of the foreign debt. Structural reforms, particularly the measures for changes of tax policy, establishment of Value Added Tax (VAT) and constructively policy in the sphere of privatization were regarded as positive. It was mentioned in the report that by 2002 and the beginning of 2003, the government in Serbia had already prepared bills of amendments to the law of privatization, a new law of bankruptcy and also laws of enterprise, competition, registration of companies, etc. However, due to the long parliamentary crisis in Serbia, laws were passed just in February, 2003, while the law of investments was passed only in August, 2003.

In turn during 2000-2003 the EU rendered nearly 800 million Euro financial support to Serbia and Montenegro mainly on financial stability, health system reform, restoration of the energy sector, infrastructure and transport, development of enterprises and also 130

³ Канцеларија за придруживање Европској унији. Историјат сарадње
(<http://www.leio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=50>)

million Euro on development of the institutes of humanitarian aid for the needs of refugees, the displaced and the indigent.⁴

The Thessaloniki summit of the EU with five Western Balkan states in June 2003 became a powerful impulse towards the development of regional cooperation especially the relations between Serbia and Montenegro and neighboring countries and toward institutional reforms. It confirmed the necessity to follow all the points of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) by all candidate states and approved the plan of their transformation in the Euro Integration process through the "European Integration Partnership" or "Agenda for the Western Balkans".⁵ Despite the fact that the internal political situation in Serbia and Montenegro was acute and there were conflicts between different fractions of democrats, the resolutions of the Thessaloniki summit of the EU became a long-term guideline in politics not only for Zoran Zivkovic's caretaker government but also for Serbian and Montenegrin leaders. European integration became the matter of rivalry of different parties and political leaders, in which each of them was eager to represent himself as the most ardent "Europeist".

By 2005 Serbia and Montenegro fulfilled the requirements provided by the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), worked out in the EU summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003.⁶ As it was noted earlier in the Thessaloniki summit 3, the EU offered the states of Western Balkans a document about the European partnership as a principal strategy of the EU towards the potential candidate countries for membership in the EU. According to the resolutions of the Thessaloniki summit the government of the republic of Serbia accepted the Action Plan to bring the laws to conformity with acts of the EU in June 2003. This plan determined the list of 52 laws that first had to be brought to conformity with normative acts

⁴European Commission, Directorate-General for economic and financial affairs. Occasional papers. N° 5, January 2004. The Western Balkans in transition / by Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance)⁵EU's relations with South Eastern Europe (Western Balkans) the Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkan (www.eu.int)

⁵EU's relations with South Eastern Europe (Western Balkans) the Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkan (www.eu.int)

⁶Serbia and Montenegro. Stabilization and Association report 2004 by commission of European communities Official site of the EU. (<http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy.htm>)

of the EU⁷. It was the beginning of the process of bringing national legislation into conformity with the legal foundations of the EU.

In January 2003 the FRY created the European Integration Council, which was a central governmental body designed to deal with the problems associated with EU integration.⁸ However, this body was inefficient. The so-called "Forum 5+2" played a more significant role. It united two republican ministers of finance, three ministers of international economic relations and two executives of central banks.

The most efficient administrative body for training personnel, coordinating projects and implementing acts related to EU integration was the Office for Joining the EU by the Government of Serbia (Office for Joining the EU), established on 8 March 2004.⁹ On 22 April 2004 the government of Serbia approved the report on European cooperation and the necessity to adopt the plan for realization of priorities of the European partnership¹⁰. The report was prepared by the Office for Joining the EU. On these grounds, the Council of EU Ministers adopted the Council Decision 2008/213/EC¹¹, described as the "Resolution about principles, priorities and conditions laid in the Agreement of European partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo, in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 from the 10th July, 1999".¹² One of the most important statements of the European partnership was the direct relation of EU financial support to Serbia's real progress in fulfillment of Copenhagen criteria.

The Office for Joining the EU together with the Serbian Parliament's Committee for Joining the EU and a non-governmental organization, the European Movement in Serbia, formed a

⁷ Канцеларија за придруживање Европској унији. Информација о активностима Канцеларије 2004 (<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=114>)

⁸European Commission, Directorate-General for economic and financial affairs. Occasional papers. N° 5, January 2004. The Western Balkans in transition / by Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance)

⁹ Канцеларија за придруживање Европској унији. Канцеларија (<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=39/>)

¹⁰ Канцеларија за придруживање Европској унији. Европско партнерство (<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=48/>)

¹¹http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/western_balkans/r18015_en.htm

¹² Ibid.

Ministers in Maastricht on the 11 October 2004 to launch a policy of a "double channel" with Serbia and Montenegro. In accordance with Chris Patten's statement,¹⁹ it meant that the EU would pursue an integration policy with Serbia and Montenegro separately; however it did not indicate the refusal of the EU to recognize preservation of the State Union.

Setting priorities of the foreign policy of Serbia and Montenegro in his interview for "Politics" newspaper at the beginning of January 2005, the minister of foreign affairs of the State Union, Vuk Drashkovic, emphasized the State Union's priorities: cooperation with the Hague Tribunal as a condition for joining the EU and joining the North Atlantic integration, realization of the Security Council Resolution 1244 about Kosovo, adaptation of the social and political system to European standards, development of strategic cooperation with the USA and the Russian Federation and also the development of cooperation with neighbours and countries of the region.²⁰ Special emphasis was laid on the necessity to complete the process of extradition of the accused Serbs to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Such statements adequately reflected the dynamics of changes in political moods of people of Serbia and Montenegro: the results of study of public opinion carried out by the Center of Political Studies and Public Opinion of the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade in the middle of December 2004 indicated the growth of confidence towards the EU in Serbia (in the fifth position after the Orthodox Church, the army, the president of Serbia and the educational system) and in Montenegro (on the fourth after the Church, the government and the army).²¹

At the same time the activity of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro for the preparation for signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in the spring of 2005 was regarded in Brussels as dynamic and consecutive. The EU expansion commissioner, a Norwegian diplomat Oli Rehn, visited Serbia and Montenegro with a group of official representatives of the EU and on his returning to Strasburg he said that Serbia and Montenegro had received a high appraisal in the Report on the preparation for closing a deal

¹⁹ Commissioner Patten announces launch of Feasibility Report on Serbia and Montenegro / IP/04/1202 - Brussels, 11 October 2004 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/index.htm)

²⁰ Политика. Београд, 09. 01. 2005.

²¹ Политика. Београд, 17. 01. 2005.

about stabilization and joining the EU, (Report)²² prepared by the Delegation of the European commission in Belgrade with assistance of a workgroup from Brussels.²³

Approval of the Report became an important step in the preparation for the EU Council of Ministers' meeting in Brussels on 25 April.²⁴ At the meeting in Brussels the Council of Ministers highly appreciated institutional reforms in Serbia and Montenegro and expressed the willingness to start direct negotiations about signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement in the autumn of 2005. At the meeting of the Council of Ministers a high appraisal was given to the measures of both governments in search for the formula of preservation of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as measures of the government of Serbia in determination of status of Kosovo in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 1244 from 10 July 1999.²⁵ In addition, it was mentioned that cooperation of Serbia and Montenegro with the Hague Tribunal developed successfully:²⁶ within ten months ten new accused were extradited to the Hague Tribunal (altogether two former presidents of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, three heads of the Headquarters and more than 100 high-ranking officers were extradited, although the general Ratko Mladic was still wanted.)

After the European Commission came to a positive conclusion about the possibility of joining the EU by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro on 13 April 2005, there began an active preparation for the negotiations about drawing up the corresponding agreement, which were supposed to start by the fifth anniversary of the democratic changes in Serbia.

However, by the spring of 2006 the situation in relations between Serbia and Montenegro changed drastically: the first issue of the agenda was not the problems of institutional transformation, but the most serious questions in relation to stability and prospects of development of the state: the problem of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and the

²² Kancelarija za pridruzivanje EU. Najnovije26 04 2005 (<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=10>)

²³ Kancelarija za pridruzivanje EU (<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/upload/documents/FeasibilityStudy.zip>)

²⁴ Vreme. Beograd, N 745, 14. 04. 2005.

²⁵ Vreme. Beograd, N 747, 28. 04. 2005.

²⁶ Kancelarija za pridruzivanje EU. Najnovije26 04 2005 (<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=10>)

2. Internal Political Struggle in Serbia from 2006 to 2008

Three factors—the break off in negotiations about signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement at the beginning of May 2006, the decision by western partners to use coercive methods of pressure concerning the extradition of Mladic to the Hague Tribunal and the determination of the status of Kosovo—caused another political crisis in Serbia which lasted till the spring of 2008. In the situation when the breakup of the unsteady coalition between President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica became an accomplished fact and the process of reforms of the legal system and military and policing branch of the government stopped, the EU found that the question of Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadjic's extradition was the most effective and sophisticated way to put the pressure on Belgrade.

An important means to exert the influence on the alignment of political forces in Serbia and on the correlation of forces inside the governing democratic coalition after the fall of S. Milosevic's regime was the question about the cooperation with the ICTY. The question about Serbia's cooperation with the ICTY after the democratic opposition had come to power became not only the constant topic for negotiations between The Hague and Belgrade but also the precondition for rendering financial support from western countries and negotiations about its integrations into the EU. However the first success in this process—the extradition of the former president of the FRY, S. Milosevic, in June 2001—caused a split in the democratic coalition and an acute political crisis in Serbia. Therefore during the period when governments of DP were in power (2001-2003),²⁸ and in the first period of being in power of V. Kostunica's coalition cabinet in 2004 through the beginning of 2006, members of the EU, especially France and Great Britain, to some extent held back the activity of the chief prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla del Ponte's, in her search for Serbian politicians and military men accused of war crimes.²⁹

²⁸Ref. ДельПонтеК. Охота: яввоенные преступники / Карл дельПонте, Чак Судетич; [пер. сангл. Т.О. Новиковой, С. Артемова]. М.: Эксмо, 2008. pp. 148-204; 232-290.

²⁹Ibid. pp. 499-543.

These EU members were afraid of destabilizing the domestic state of things in Serbia and of the final breakup of liberal-conservative coalition, which, in their opinion opened the way for power of V. Kostunica's populist union and for V. Sheshel's radicals. At the same time one could notice certain progress in the process of cooperation with the ICTY: in accordance with the principle of "freewill cooperation" a group of Serbian political and military men accused of war crimes appeared in the Hague in January and February 2005. Twelve of them surrendered to the Tribunal voluntarily. The financial problems with the ICTY were regulated and businesslike cooperation between the Chancery of the Prosecutor General of the Hague Tribunal and the Special Court on War Crimes in Serbia was set. On a guarantee by the government of Serbia six individuals who were accused of war crimes but who had voluntarily surrendered to the Tribunal voluntarily were temporarily released from imprisonment until the beginning of the legal proceedings. It was not by accident that the level of cooperation with the ICTY received a high appraisal in the Report on the readiness to signing of the Agreement on stabilization and joining and in reality they began on the 7th November, 2005.³⁰ However in spring of 2006 the issue of R. Mladic and R. Karadjic's extradition became a method to put the pressure on Belgrade. So the sophisticated tactics of the so-called "international community" and especially the European Union for the purpose of changing the correlation of political forces in Serbia in favour of supporters of European integration had an intermediate result: on 12 December 2006 the Parliament of Serbia made a decision about holding snap parliament elections on 20 January 2007.

Another problem which was not less important—the question about the final status of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija—took the center of attention of the new democratic authorities of Serbia in the first days after their election victory in October 2000. The situation in Kosovo was partly stabilized within the territory of the autonomous province as a result of the control which was instituted over Kosovo by the UNO mission in temporary administration of Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR, but the crisis in Kosovo spread to its neighbouring provinces of Serbia and Macedonia. By efforts of the Coordination Center on Kosovo and Metohija and leaders of the FRY, together with leaders of KFOR and

³⁰Orlović S. Parties and the party system of Serbia and European Integrations / Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Volume 10, Number 2, August 2008. (<http://www.politikolog.com/sr/node/85/>)

the UNMIK, the conflict was localized at the beginning of March 2001: Albanian gunmen from the so-called Army of Liberation of Preshevo, Bujanovac and Medvedji were marched off from Preshev valley and military units of the Army of Yugoslavia set control on the administrative boarder between Kosovo and Serbia and on Kosovo sector of the Macedonian-Yugoslav boarder.³¹

The Coordination Center on Kosovo and Metohija, which was headed by Nebojsa Covic from January 2001 through May 2005, managed to set an effective dialog with the representatives of international forces in Kosovo and with the Contact Group³² and to start a complicated process of searching for a compromise on the basis of their formula "first standards – then status".³³

However the deadlock in the process of inner-Kosovo settlement favoured the fact that by the beginning of 2003 Belgrade came to a conclusion that the struggle for "standards" and the creation of a multiethnic Kosovo had failed and then it was necessary to come straight to the determination of the final status of Kosovo in a direct dialog with Washington, Moscow and Brussels on the basis of its partition.³⁴The document called "Strategy for Kosovo and Metohija"³⁵ was passed at the end of December 2002 by the FRY government. The document implied constitutionalization of the Serbian community in the administrative system of Kosovo and Metohija in the so-called Dayton variant on the basis of the formula – "more than an autonomy, less than a republic".

The new alignment of forces in Belgrade set after Z. Djindjic's murder on 12 March 2003 had an effect on the course of negotiations and on the living conditions of the population of Kosovo. The breakup of the DOS coalition resulted in escalation of internecine strife between supporters of different Serbian parties in Serbian enclaves of the province. As a

³¹Orlović S. Parties and the party system of Serbia and European Integrations / *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Volume 10, Number 2, August 2008. (<http://www.politikolog.com/sr/node/85/>).

³²Contact group – is an expert commission on Kosovo and Metohija question, consisted of Russia, USA and EU.

³³On the course of negotiations about the regulation of the problem of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija Ref.: Човић, Н. На тешком путу. Београд: Чикоја штампа, 2004.

³⁴Чосић, Д. Косово. Београд, 2004. С. 190-192; Зоран Дјинђић о Косову. Београд, 2003. С. 12-17.

³⁵Зоран Дјинђић о Косову. Београд, 2003. С. 12-17.

result gradual change of leaders of public associations and municipalities in Serbian enclaves happened in 2004-2006.³⁶The internecine race for power between supporters of different Serbian parties in Serbian enclaves of the province led to the loss of initiative in the negotiation process by Belgrade. It allowed the international community, first of all, the USA, the EU and the UN to take the initiative in working out the final status of Kosovo. The abject failure of the policy "first standards – then status" gave an opportunity to the UN General Secretary Kofi Annan and to the UN Security Council to make a decision about the beginning of direct negotiations about the future status of Kosovo³⁷ and to appoint Marti Ahtisaari as the UN General Secretary's Special Envoy on these negotiations in November 2005.³⁸ The further round of negotiations on the status of Kosovo under M. Ahtisaari's auspices, which had begun in February 2006³⁹, became a preparation for the declaration of independence of Kosovo. It was reflected in the so-called "M. Ahtisaari Plan" which was published in January 2007. The deadlock in the negotiations about the status of Kosovo in the autumn of 2006 provoked another political crisis in Serbia. So after the negotiations on the signing of the SAA between the EU and Serbia at the beginning of May 2006 had broken off, the negotiation process in Vienna reached a deadlock and the position of western partners of Belgrade and the threat of postponing the SAA became a tool for putting pressure on the political circles of Belgrade. Despite the fact that the new Constitution of Serbia adopted in October 2006 proclaimed that "the province of Kosovo and Metohija was a constituent of the territory of Serbia" tension in relations of B. Tadic and V. Kostunica's supporters reached its peak. The holding of snap elections became inevitable.

At the same time the European Union tended to combine measures of pressure with delicate inclusion of political parties into the integration process using methods of the so-called "Europeanization". From this point of view the process of their inclusion into the system of

³⁶См.: Церовица Ј., Радомировић Б. Нема неприкосновеног лидера // Политика, 02. 03 2008. // (<http://www.politika.co.yu/rubrike/Tema-nedelje/Srpska-politicka-elita/Nema-neprikosnovenog-lidera.sr.html>)

³⁷The General Secretary's letter from 31 October 2005 to the Chairman of the Security Council // (<http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2005/708&Lang=R>)

³⁸Павловић М., Марковић П. Ј. Косово и Метохија: прошлост, памћење, стварност. 1. изд. Нови Сад: Препород ММ, 2006. С. 551.

³⁹Ref.: Никифоров К. Косово: де-юре и де-факто // (<http://www.regnum.ru/http://www.regnum.ru/news/745273.html/>)

international party associations, especially into the European party federations (EFPs or Europarties) affiliated with the EU was an important method. In the mid-2000s a number of parties of Serbia became members of EFPs. Among other influential parties the DP was accepted as an observer into the Party of European Socialists – the federation of social-democratic, socialist and labour parties of the EU (December, 2006). The DPS and G17 were accepted as associate members into the European People's Party – the federation of conservative, Christian-democratic and people's parties of the EU (June, 2006). This type of membership did not correlate with the programs of these Serbian parties or with the methods of getting the electoral space. At the same time, their relations with the EFPs gave the DP, DPS and G17 privileged positions compared to their rivals in terms of establishing European legitimacy and increasing future opportunities for lobbying for their own political interests. But first of all it signaled their perception as political forces which bear or share European values and ideals. For Serbian parties the Europarties represent a mighty mechanism of standardization of programs and values. Speaking about political programs, one can distinguish certain changes in some parties. The influence of membership in the Party of European Socialists was felt in case of DP. It started the process of reorientation from the party of social center to the social-democratic party.

From its establishment, the DP positioned itself as “a modern party of the social center” (program of the DP from the election campaign of 1992). The program of 1997 gives more specific definition of the DP as a party of center. In the program, adopted in May, 2001 the party de-emphasized its centrist position and in October, 2001 the centrist positioning of the party was eliminated. After joining the Party of European Socialists, the DP turned to social democracy in the election program of 2007.⁴⁰ In turn the DPS shifted to the side of harmonization with European People's Parties. It can be characterized as a social-nationalistic one while the G17 plus and the Liberal Democratic Party are closer to liberal parties and the Democratic Party of Serbia, the Serbian Movement of Renewal are closer to conservative ones.

⁴⁰Orlović S. Evropeizacija partija u Srbiji. (<http://www.politikolog.com/evropeizacija.pdf/>)

Not less important than the Europeanization of the party system was the adoption of special quotas in the Parliament for the parties of national minorities by the Parliament of Serbia. On the one hand it favoured the fragmentation of the party system as a result of the growth of a number of such parties in Vojvodina, Sandjak and Serbian enclaves of Kosovo. On the other hand it made some of them not only parliamentary parties, but also the members of the coalition government. The EU insistence played an important role in the adaptation of Serbia to the European standards. The EU insisted that the number of women in voting lists had to be not less than 30%. It facilitated the gradual transformation of the party elite's mentality and the fact that the process of European integration led to consolidation of some and weakening of other parties, for instance left radical ones.

The parliamentary elections of 21 January 2007 were held in the atmosphere of rivalry not between the parties of ruling democratic coalition and parties of “old regime” but inside the democratic camp. In general, the political stage of Serbia was again fragmented: nearly 30 parties, including six parties of national minorities took part in the elections.⁴¹ The camp of the former reformative forces was split: from 16 parties and election blocks, 13 represented a wide spectrum of liberal-democratic forces, parties of national minorities and charismatic leaders, who this time were opposed to the radicals, socialists and, to some extent, Kostunica's party.

Parliamentary elections of 2007 in Serbia attracted special attention of political and social circles in the neighbouring Balkan states, the EU and the USA. The former prime minister of FRG, Gerhard Schroeder, the prime minister of Bulgaria and the leader of the Bulgarian socialistic party, Sergey Stanishev (who acted for Socialist International and the supreme council of the BSP), the Rumanian president Trajan Basesku and the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs of Greece visited Belgrade the day before the elections. They all tried to provide support to Tadic's party.⁴²

⁴¹Orlović S. Parties and the party system of Serbia and European Integrations / Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Volume 10, Number 2, August 2008. (<http://www.politikolog.com/sr/node/85/>)

⁴²Ulunyan A. Elections in Serbia: to spite Europe and neighbours // PROGNOSIS.ru / Geopolitics 22.1.2007. (http://www.prognosis.ru/news/geopolitic/2007/1/22/vybory_serbi.html/)

As a result, the Radical Party of Serbia got the plurality of votes in the Parliament of Serbia (28.50% and 81 seats out of 250), then with a short lag came B. Tadic's Democratic Party (22.7% and 64 seats) and a block consisting of V. Kostunica's of Democratic Party of Serbia and V. Ilic's New Serbia (16.55% and 47 seats). The influence of the Socialistic Party of Serbia reduced (6,4% and 16 seats). It got the electoral qualification but was outrun by M. Dinkic's party G17-plus (8,2% and 19 seats). A great surprise of this campaign was the success of radically-liberal and "pro-European" coalition of the Party of Socialists of Serbia, the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Civil Partnership headed by C. Jovanovic (5.31% and 15 seats). Finally, it was significant that such charismatic leaders as V. Draskovic, N. Covic and B. Karic left the political stage as their voting lists could not overcome the electoral qualifications.⁴³ They were confronted with the dilemma: to marginalize or to become loyal supporters of B. Tadic's.

The election campaign showed that although the DPS had managed to preserve itself as a necessary partner in any of the possible government coalitions, its influence and electoral opportunities had decreased significantly; from the very beginning it was not clear with whom the DPS was going to form a government coalition after the election. Despite this, it was not clear with what candidate for the position of a prime minister it was going to form a coalition cabinet. If we take into account the fact that the attempt to nominate V. Kostunica to this position cost the party several percents of vote: the election coalition the DPS – NS headed by V. Kostunica got 666.889 votes, while the DP with B. Djelic as a candidate to the position of the prime minister 915.014. According to a political scientist S. Orlovic, it demonstrated changes in the mood of electorate and the fact that not only a personality but a program of a party and the team which represents the program play a more important role in the parliamentary elections as opposed to the presidential elections⁴⁴.

⁴³См.: ИЗВЕШТАЈ О УКУПНИМ РЕЗУЛТАТИМА ИЗБОРА ЗА НАРОДНЕ ПОСЛАНИКЕ НАРОДНЕ СКУПШТИНЕ РЕПУБЛИКЕ СРБИЈЕ, 9. фебруара 2007. године // (<http://www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu/cirilica/propisi/lzbori210107.htm/>)

⁴⁴Орловић С. Коалици(тац)ија // (<http://www.politikolog.com/koalicitacija.pdf/>)

The parliament elections in January 2007 could not overcome the crisis of power: the process of formation of the government lasted four months and finished on 15 May 2007 just half an hour before the expiration of time. It finished with formation of another coalition cabinet under Kostunica. The coalition showed the readiness for a compromise as out of 250 seats in the parliament, the DP got 13, a block formed of the DPS and "New Serbia" (leader – the minister of infrastructure Velimir Ilic) – 8 seats, and the party "Group 17 Plus" – 4 seats. An important concession to reformation forces was the appointment of one of Z. Djindjic's team-mates, Bozidar Djelic, to the position of the vice-premier in integration processes. The principle of work of the coalition government was based on five arrangements worked out during the negotiations about its formation. They were reservation of Kosovo as a part of Serbia, struggle against organized crime and corruption, strengthening of social and financial policy and cooperation of Serbia with the Hague Tribunal. At the same time the type of formation of the government reminded observers of the process of feudal division of certain functions and financial spheres of influence.

On the first sight the new government reproduced the coalition government of DOS after the October victory, 2000, when the balance of right and left parties was restored. But at the same time according to S. Orlovic, the compromise meant temporary truce, a so-called "minimal victory" at which the parties which form the government got the minimal majority in the parliament. However, the prime minister "reigns but does not rule" as in reality ministers, who are representatives of other parties, fulfill their party interests and in accordance with "the stringent law of proportionality" they reallocate spheres of influence in economics, state institutions, the diplomatic sphere and military and policing branches of the government in their favour (despite of real control under the Security and Information Agency)⁴⁵. In fact two centers of power were again formed in Serbia: one under the Prime Minister V. Kostunica's (the DPS – NS) and the other under President B. Tadic's (the DS). The G 17 Plus party under Dinkic played the role of a mediator in this fragile balance of forces.

⁴⁵Орловић С. Једна влада а два господара // (<http://www.politikolog.com/Једна-влада-а-два-господара.pdf/>)

At the same time such a polarized pluralism which began to form in the party system of Serbia in the spring of 2007 responded less and less to the moods of Serbian population. The results of a public opinion poll about the attitude towards the EU⁴⁶ carried out by the Belgrade office of the Medium Gallop Group showed this clearly. The interviewed had to answer the question which of 4 suggested positions towards Europe is closer to yours position. As a result four main groups of population were singled out, in accordance with their view on the EU:

1. "Euroenthusiasts" who state that "Europe is really close to me and I think that we had to do our best to become member, to meet all the conditions." Twenty-two percent of the interviewed shared this view.

2. "Eurorealists" who say, "I can't say that Europe is close to me, but I think that the integration into the EU is necessary and we should work on it." Thirty-five percent of the interviewed think so.

3. "Euroskeptics" who say, "I doubt if the intentions of Europe and the West are good and I think that we should join them slowly and carefully." Twenty-nine percent share this position.

4. "Europhobes" who say, "Integration into Europe would mean domination of European and other forces over our nation; Serbia does not belong to that world and therefore it should share traditional values and should not allow itself to join wild nations." Thirteen percent of the interviewed share this position⁴⁷.

If we compare the viewpoint on the EU with the support of different parties we will see that the voters for G17 and President B. Tadic's DP are pro-Europeans. Forty-four percent of voters for G17 Plus are Euroenthusiasts and 42% are Eurorealists; DP voters share the same point of view with 37% of them being Euroenthusiasts and 42% Eurorealists. The DPS voters (Kostunica) are 51% Eurorealists, 24% Euroskeptics and 17% Euroenthusiasts.

⁴⁶ Cm.: Orlović S. Europeanization and Democratization of Parties and Party System of Serbia. (<http://www.politikolog.com/sr/node/33/>)

⁴⁷ Ibid

Voters of the SPS are inclined anti-European. There are no Euroenthusiasts among them, but 47% are Euroskeptics, 41% Europhobes and 12% Eurorealists.

More than half of voters share pro-democratic views, despite being socialists and radicals. Pro-democratic views are often shared by voters of the DP (85%), the DPS (74%), small parties (69%), and rarely by those who does not belong to any party or who belong to the SRP (30%) and the SPS (total 18%). Voters of the SPS (68%) and the SRP (44%) tend to like the expression "in some cases the undemocratic government is better than the democratic one."⁴⁸ This all leads to a conclusion that if Serbia of Milosevic's times distanced itself from Europe, then the post-Milosevic Serbia after 2000 regard the return to Europe as the only possible way for its development, a view supported by three-fourths of its citizens.⁴⁹

The balance inside the second coalition government of V. Kostunica who wanted to oust his main rival B. Tadic's DP from the political stage could not last long. The year 2007 was marked by constant rivalry of two centers of power, which led to the current alignment of political forces decided as a result of the presidential run-off in January and the beginning of February 2008 and as a result of snap parliamentary elections on 11 May 2008, which in turn were held in the atmosphere of a new acute political crisis caused by Kosovo's declaration of independence on 17 February 2008.

In these conditions B. Tadic managed to pursue a politically astute course: for a long time he did not take the functions of a public politician, performing only the representative functions determined for the president by the Constitution. He did not speed up the process of removing V. Kostunica's cabinet, shifting all the political difficulties of the time onto V. Kostunica: the problems of Kosovo's declaration of independence, the Hague Tribunal, the "divorce" with Montenegro and financial problems. "All these "hot potatoes" were in hands

⁴⁸ Ibid
⁴⁹ Orlović S. Europeanization and Democratization of Parties and Party System of Serbia. (<http://www.politikolog.com/sr/node/33/>)

of V. Kostunica and his government" according to D. Vukadinovic.⁵⁰ B. Tadic managed to lead negotiations about adoption of the new Constitution of Serbia in the autumn of 2007. The holding of the presidential elections in January 2008 was the indispensable condition for adoption of the Constitution. It should be with the preamble which confirmed the sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo and Metohija in negotiations of democrats with V. Kostunica's "populists" and T. Nikolic's radicals. B. Tadic won again in the bargaining with a principle, "We give you the preamble about Kosovo, you give us popular vote for a president with little privilege⁵¹." He not only won at the presidential elections but also managed to assure the real constitutional transformation of the parliament-government system into a half-presidential system. This happened in spring, 2008.

In January and the beginning of February 2008, two rounds of snap elections were held in which Tadic won with incidental advantage, and the representative of the SRP, T. Nikolic, won second place as he got just 200.000 votes less. Kostunica was the real loser who could not support his partner in the government coalition and decided to support the losing candidate, the leader of the New Serbia—Ilic. The crisis continued with a resignation of Kostunica's cabinet on 11 March 2008. It had become incapable because it could not solve the conflict of Kosovo's declaration of independence and the signing of the SAA. Thus 11 May 2008 was appointed as a day for holding new snap parliamentary elections.

Before the elections the majority of foreign and Serbian political scientists thought that their results would be the same as those of 21 January 2007 if the Radical Party of Serbia (V. Sesel's party) got the majority of votes and B. Tadic's democrats would try to reach compromise with V. Kostunica's populists.

At the same time the results of various public opinion polls in the spring of 2008 demonstrated serious shifts in voters' moods. Researchers of public opinion about the attitude towards the EU, carried out by the Office for joining the EU by the government of Serbia demonstrated that the attitude towards the process of European integration was quite

⁵⁰Vukadinović Đ. Iz ličnog ugla – Kratak pregled raspadanja (4): Od Barbike do Borisa Groznog // (<http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=835265>)

⁵¹Ibid

positive. The comparative analysis of voters' opinions at the probable referendum on joining the EU from September, 2002 till December, 2008 shows that the number of supporters of joining had never been less than 60%. It is worth mentioning that the joining course had the biggest support in December 2003, when the Radical Party got the majority of votes at the elections and in May 2008, when the pro-European forces won the parliamentary elections with a support of 67%.⁵² As an incentive for joining, people mentioned "the way to a better future for the young" (51%), "more opportunities to get a job" (43%) and "the opportunity to move around the EU freely" (41%). It is significant that only 28% count on the process of joining as on the factor of inner transformation of the country and only 20% are afraid of a loss of their own cultural identity. It indicates that in most cases the pragmatic interests in getting specific preferences from the EU is the incentive for joining. Half of the interviewed (62%) regard the policy of constantly new humiliating conditions for Serbia's accession—for instance the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal (86%)—as the reason for slowing down the process.⁵³ In such conditions the supporters of pro-European orientation, members of Tadic's "For European Serbia" election block could eliminate not only the specific "alternative"—the "West or Kosovo"—but also achieve the maximum use of those advantages which joining of the EU promised to paternalistic social strata. In many ways unexpected victory of the coalition "for European Serbia" at the parliamentary elections on 11 May 2008 and then the formation of the coalition government of democrats with socialists and their partners in the election block in the reality was a result of fundamental shifts in the moods of Serbian society in favour of pro-European choice as well as the tactically aware course of the Democratic Party. It managed to deprive its rivals of the "Kosovo card", insisting not to recognize the independence of Kosovo and assuring the majority of voters that it is more effective to defend the territorial integrity of Serbia from inside rather than outside the EU. Tadic could not only sign the SAA on 28 April, 2008, but he also managed to achieve the approval of the oil-and-gas agreement with Russia in Moscow on 25 January, 2008⁵⁴ by the government just two days before the elections. By

⁵²Европска оријентација грађана Србије: трендови / Представљање резултата истраживања јавног мишња (децембар 2008. године године) // (http://web.uzzpro.gov.rs/kzreu/razno/javno_mnenje_0812.pdf)

⁵³Европска оријентација грађана Србије: трендови / Представљање резултата истраживања јавног мишња (децембар 2008. године године) // (http://web.uzzpro.gov.rs/kzreu/razno/javno_mnenje_0812.pdf)

⁵⁴Doig A. Serbia: in line to the 15th July // Russian Journal, 22.05.2008 // (http://www.russ.ru/layout/reakcii/serbiya_dorhin_do_15_julya)

this he managed to smooth the primordial conflict of Serbian mind—either with the West or with Russia. As opposed to this traditional choice a new formula was found “both with the West and with Russia”. To a large extent the balanced policy of Russian leaders in the question of the status of Kosovo favoured it. The leaders of the Russian Federation could build pragmatic relations based mainly on economic partnership, including the sphere of energetic security. At the same time during the end of domestic political crisis Moscow deliberately distanced itself from intervention into the domestic political struggle.

3. Political transformations in Serbia in 2008 and forming of current political scene

The new coalition government of Serbia was formed after marathon negotiations in the middle of July, 2008 and to a large extent was the continuation of unpredictable results of the parliament elections. It was formed by two coalitions – “for European Serbia”(the DP of the incumbent president Boris Tadic, Mladjan Dinkic’s party “G17+”, Vuk Draskovic’s Serbian Movement of Renovation”) and SPS – PUPS-US(Ivica Dacic’s Socialistic Party of Serbia, Jovan Krkobabic’s Party of Pensioners and Dragan Markovic-Palma’s “the United Serbia”. Despite of it there were representatives of the parties of national minorities (Serbia is a multinational state). This political-ideological configuration was principally new for Serbia. And it was not done just for the sake of consolidation of power and the opportunity to adopt the policy of ideologically different and rival political forces. It refers to the political cooperation of the recently implacable enemies: during the whole period of his governing the founder of the SPS and the president of Serbia and Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic did his best to suppress the Democratic Party. Eventually in October, 2000 he was thrown down by the leader of democrats Zoran Djindjic, who later sent Milosevic to the International Tribunal in the Hague. Till the announcement of the results of 11 May’ elections no one could imagine and the DP and the DPS could cooperate. However the political reality forced both parties and their supporters to form a coalition.

Forming of a coalition government was a complicated project from the point of view of political technologies: one had not only win the coalition of the SPS to its side and solve

principal problems of relations between two main partners but also to respect the pride of other members of the coalition and provide vitality and capacity for work. At that time the coalition of the SPS was negotiating about forming of right-nationalistic coalition with Tomislav Nikolic’s radicals and with the Democratic party of the former Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. As a result the number of minister portfolio was extended to 27. So they managed to get the governmental majority in Serbian parliament (Serbia – is a parliamentary republic), which equals to 128 votes out of 250.

Nationalists and counter reformates (Kostunica’s radicals and democrats) were in opposition. The Liberal-democratic party of Cedomir Jovanovic which can be regarded as a more radical supporter of the course to “European Serbia” declared that it would support some decisions and laws of the government during the vote⁵⁵.

The parliament elections in May, 2008 and forming of M. Cvetkovic’s coalition government actually finished the epoch in transformation of the political and party system of Serbia. The process of polarization and fragmentation of the political scene typical for the period of the 1990th and the beginning of the 2000th was changed by the new period. The particular feature of the new period was the concentration of political parties and the forming of centrist parliamentary-governmental coalitions. Judging by its type the party system of Serbia approximates to the system of the limited pluralism system.

Emergence of a principally new government coalition with the assistance of the Socialistic party of Serbia indicates not only its inner transformation but also the result of the reinforcement of the tendency to the national reconciliation and consolidation. The process of political consolidation became evident not only in formation of bigger election blocks but also in formation of more articulate social-liberal coalition by the government. At the same time consolidation of the political scene and the ability of the former party of “old regime”

⁵⁵ Романенко С. Последний шанс реформаторов // Polit. ru. 12 07 2008 // (<http://www.polit.ru/author/2008/07/10/serb.html/>)

to form a coalition with parties of "Euroreformates" testifies that a consensus based on two different and at the same time interconnected elements have been found.

REFERENCES:

- Commissioner Patten announces launch of Feasibility Report on Serbia and Montenegro / IP/04/1202 - Brussels, 11 October 2004
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/index.htm)
- Dugin A. Serbia: to live to the 15th July // Russian Journal, 22.05.2008/
(http://www.russ.ru/layout/reakcii/serbiya_do_zhit_do_15_iyunya)
- EU's relations with South Eastern Europe (Western Balkans)/the Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkan (www.eu.int)
- European Commission. Directorate-General for economic and financial affairs. Occasional papers. N° 5, January 2004. The Western Balkans in transition / by Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance)¹
- Orlović S. Europeanization and Democratization of Parties and Party System of Serbia.
(<http://www.politikolog.com/sr/node/33/>)
- Orlović S. Parties and the party system of Serbia and European Integrations / Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Volume 10, Number 2, August 2008 // <http://www.politikolog.com/sr/node/85>
- Serbia and Montenegro. Stabilization and Association report 2004 by commission of European communities Official site of the EU.
(<http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy.htm>)
- The General Secretary's letter from 31 October 2005 to the Chairman of the Security Council
(<http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2005/708&Lang=R>)
- Ulunyan A. Elections in Serbia : to spite Europe and neighbours // PROGNOISIS.ru / Geopolitics 22.1.2007.
(http://www.prognosis.ru/news/geopolitic/2007/1/22/vybory_serbii.html/)
- Vreme. Beograd, N 745. 14. 04. 2005.
- Vreme. Beograd, N 747. 28. 04. 2005.

- Vukadinović Đ. Iz ličnog ugla – Kratak pregled raspadanja (4): Od Barbike do Borisa Groznog // (<http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=835265>)
- ДельПонтеК. Охота: живоеннепреступници / КарладельПонте, ЧакСудетич; [пер. сангл. Т.О. Новиковой, С. Артемова]. М.: Эксмо, 2008.
- ЕвропскаоријентацијаграђанаСрбије: трендови
Представљањерезултатаистраживањајавногмњења (децембар 2008. године године) // (http://web.uzzpro.gov.rs/kzpeu/razno/javno_mnenje_0812.pdf/)
- ЗоранДжинджићоКосову. Београд, 2003. С. 12-17.
- ИЗВЕШТАЈОУКУПНИМРЕЗУЛТАТИМАИЗБОРАЗНАРОДНЕПОСЛАНИКЕНАР
ОДНЕСКУПШТИНЕРЕПУБЛИКЕСРБИЈЕ. 9. фебруара 2007. године(<http://www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu/cirilica/propisi/Izbori210107.htm/>)
- КанцеларијазапродруживањеЕвропскојунији(<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=50>)
- НикифоровК. Косово: де-юреиде-факто.(<http://www.regnum.ru/http://www.regnum.ru/news/745273.html/>)
- Орловић С. Европеизација партија у Србији.(<http://www.politikolog.com/evropeizacija.pdf/>)
- Орловић С. Једна влада а два господара // (<http://www.politikolog.com/Једна-влада-а-два-господара.pdf/>)
- Орловић С. Коалици(таци)ја // (<http://www.politikolog.com/koalicitacija.pdf/>)
- Павловић М., Марковић П. Ј. Косово и Метохија: прошлост, памћење, стварност. I. изд. Нови Сад: Препород ММ, 2006. С. 551.
- Политика. Београд, 17. 01. 2005.
- Политика. Београд. 09. 01. 2005.
- Прохоров А. Балканские грезы//Европа №40, июнь, 2004(www.defrus.cec.eu.int/em/44/eu01_40.htm)
- Романенко С. Последний шанс реформаторов // Polit. ru. 12 07 2008(<http://www.polit.ru/author/2008/07/10/serb.html/>)
- Самошкин В. СРЈО присоединилась к пакту стабильности, Европа осталась довольна балканским саммитом // Независимая газета. № 205. 28.10. 2000
- Церовина Ј., Радомировић Б. Нема неприкосновеног лидера // Политика, 02. 03 2008.

<http://www.politika.co.yu/rubrike/Tema-nedelje/Srpska-politicka-elita/Nema-neprikosновенog-lidera.sr.html>

- Човић, Н. На тешком путу. Београд: Чигоја штампа, 2004.
- Човић, Д. Косово. Београд, 2004. С. 190-192; Зоран Джинджић о Косову. Београд, 2003. С. 12-17.
- ШемятенковВ. Европейская интеграция. – М., 2003. р. 309.