

*EDITORIAL COUNCIL*

**V. MAKAROV**  
*Chairman*  
*Academician of RAS*

**A. GUSEYNOV**  
*Editor-in-Chief*  
*Academician of RAS*

**A. GRIGORYEV**  
*Deputy Editor-in-Chief*

*MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL*

L. ABALKIN, *Academician*  
A. DEREVYANKO, *Academician*  
T. ZASLAVSKAYA, *Academician*  
V. LEKTORSKY, *Academician*  
A. NEKIPELOV, *Academician*  
G. OSIPOV, *Academician*

V. STEPIN, *Academician*  
V. TISHKOV, *Academician*  
Zh. TOSHCHENKO, *Corr. Mem., RAS*  
A. DMITRIYEV, *Corr. Mem., RAS*  
I. BORISOVA, *Executive Secretary*

Managing Editor: Oleg Levin; Production Manager: Len Hoffman



*SOCIAL SCIENCES* (ISSN 0134-5486) is a quarterly publication of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). The articles selected by the Editorial Council are chosen from books and journals originally prepared in the Russian language by authors from 30 institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Statements of fact and opinion appearing in the journal are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the Editorial Council.

*Reprint permission:* Editorial Council. Address: 26, Maronovsky pereulok, Moscow, 119991 GSP-1, Russia.

*SOCIAL SCIENCES* (ISSN 0134-5486) is published quarterly by East View Information Services: 10601 Wayzata Blvd., Minneapolis, MN 55305, USA. Vol. 45, No. 3, 2014. Postmaster: Send address changes to East View Information Services: 10601 Wayzata Blvd., Minneapolis, MN 55305, USA.

*Orders* are accepted by East View Information Services. Phone: (952) 252-1201; Toll-free: (800) 477-1005; Fax: (952) 252-1201; E-mail: [periodicals@eastview.com](mailto:periodicals@eastview.com) as well as by all major subscription agencies.

*Subscriptions:* Individuals, \$61.00 per year; institutions, \$435.00 per year.

*Back issues:* Please send your inquiries to East View Information Services. *Electronic subscriptions:* individuals, \$61.00/year; institutions, \$435.00/year.

*SOCIAL SCIENCES* is indexed by *PAIS International Information Service*, *American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies (ABSEES)*, *International Bibliography of Periodical Literature*, *International Bibliography of the Social Sciences*, *Sociological Abstracts*, *Social Planning Policy & Development Abstracts*, *Linguistic & Language Behaviour Abstracts*, and *UnCover*. It is abstracted by the *Journal of Economic Literature*. It is listed in the *Ulrich's International Periodical Directory*.

Copyright © *The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)*, *RAS Presidium*, 2014.

**FOUNDED IN 1970**

# SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOLUME 45

NUMBER 3, 2014

## CONTENTS

*In This Issue* 1

### ECONOMICS

---

**Rent-Seeking Russia** *M. Levin,  
G. Satarov* 3

**Transformation Chances in Russia and  
the North—Wallis—Weingast Concept.  
Doorstep Transition Conditions for Society** *N. Pliskevich* 20

### HISTORY

---

**The Russian Tricolor: Myths and Historical Reality** *N. Soboleva* 38

### PHILOLOGY

---

**Mikhail Prishvin and Gabriel Marcel** *V. Vizgin* 50

### POLITICAL SCIENCE

---

**Resources of Influence in World Politics** *M. Lebedeva* 55

### PHILOSOPHY

---

**What Is Analytic Philosophy?  
(A Historical Perspective)** *V. Shokhin* 65

### PSYCHOLOGY

---

**Essay on Boris Ananyev's Theory  
of Individual Psychic Development** *N. Loginova* 80

## SOCIOLOGY

---

- The Phenomenon of Poverty in Modern Russia**      *N. Tikhonova*      95

## BOOK REVIEWS

---

### I. Economics

---

- B. Shpotov. *American Business and the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s: Labyrinths of Economic Cooperation***      *V. Zhuravlyova*      112

### II. History

---

- I. Filatova, A. Davidson. *Russia and South Africa: Building Bridges***      *A. Voyevodsky*      117

### III. Philology

---

- A. Penkovsky. *Studies of the Poetic Language of the Pushkin Era***      *A. Skvortsov*      121

- Yu. Dvoryashin (Ed.), *The Sholokhov Encyclopedia***      *P. Glushakov*      125

### IV. Political Science/Sociology

---

- I. Yakovenko. *Understanding Russia: Civilizational Analysis***      *S. Magaril*      129

### V. Political Science

---

- V. Ledyayev. *Sociology of Power. Theory and Empirical Studies of Power in Urban Communities***      *L. Fadeyeva*      136

### VI. Psychology

---

- D. Bogoyavlenskaya, I. Susokolova. *Psychometric Interpretation of Creativity. Scientific Contribution by Joy Paul Guilford***      *V. Mazilov,  
Yu. Slepko*      140

## ACADEMIC LIFE

---

- Academic Journals**      144

## In This Issue:

**M. Levin, G. Satarov:** “Rent-seeking behavior undermines the incentives for economic agents to innovate. First, agents have to bear the expenses of overcoming administrative barriers erected by government agencies. Second, in an economy with widespread rent-seeking behavior, business loans are more expensive. And third, long-term investment in innovation loses its attractiveness. All these factors have a negative effect on innovation activity and economic growth.”

**N. Pliskevich:** “...The current Russian elite is thus far dominated by those who seek to maintain the ‘power—property’ system, or LAOs (Limited Access Order), even if the price to be paid is degradation of the national economy. As is evident from the practices typical of the ‘fat’ 2000s, the mobilization development principles characteristic of this system (currently expressed in the budget funding of some or other megaprojects) have not only failed to promote any significant technological breakthroughs but also produced paltry results in the area of infrastructure development, etc.”

**N. Soboleva:** “Even though the white-blue-red tricolor (unlike the black-yellow-white flag) lacked the official status of the state flag, there was a tendency in Russian society in the early 20th century to view it as the national flag. It was regarded as such even by the Bolsheviks. Yakov Sverdlov, for one, stressed in 1918 that Russia’s national flag ‘was still the tricolor.’”

**V. Vizgin:** “Marcel is a philosopher of reflexion and his philosophical method is ‘second reflexion’ (*la reflexion seconde*). Prishvin is not a philosopher, but with a little bit of a stretch he can be regarded as a Russian Marcel, *Marcel without ‘second reflexion.’* For the Russian writer the memory of his sensitive heart replaces philosophical reflexion. A magic fairytale is the core and nucleus of Prishvin’s worldview. The paradise of childhood, the paradise of ‘the whole life,’ so to speak, were things that he experienced with extraordinary depth, leaving a trail that prompted him to reproduce them verbally and made him a major writer.”

**M. Lebedeva:** “Along with other trends in world politics we witness a fragmentation of the resource potential, its redistribution from leading states... to other states and nonstate actors. The resource potential is divided into individual components. New forms and methods of its use are developing and... new resource centers will continue to appear.”

**V. Shokhin:** “...The phenomenon of analytic philosophy could perhaps best be defined not as a school, a tradition or a current in philosophy, but a *format* of

intercultural philosophical practice, as research-through-controversy dealing with concepts and propositions within the broadest range exercised according to a *program* of dialectics (in the Platonian, not Hegelian meaning). This format and the corresponding program can be designated as the classical paradigm of philosophizing... going back to the sources of philosophy as such.”

**N. Loginova:** “Addressing in his studies the root issues of psychological knowledge, Boris Ananyev built a theory of anthropological psychology crowned with a system of views on individual mental (psychic) development... this article purports to reveal its main provisions and characteristic features and present it as a coherent substantive-logical system, highlighting its relevance to psychological science and related areas of the science of man.”

**N. Tikhonova :** “It has become a commonplace that poverty is regarded in Russian culture as almost a virtue while asceticism, which has its roots in Orthodoxy, is part of the warp and woof of the Russian people’s culture and life ideal. But is this the case today when rampant propaganda of consumerism is pouring from television screens day and night drumming it into people’s heads that the value of every individual is determined by the brands and the number of the individual’s material possessions?”

## Rent-Seeking Russia<sup>1</sup>

*Mark LEVIN,  
Georgy SATAROV*

The modern Russian economy is at a critical stage in its development, which started about 25 years ago as a transition “from plan to market.” This stage is characterized by a sharp increase in rent-seeking behavior, a change in its structure, the creation of informal institutions ensuring this evolution, and the transformation of state institutions into defenders of the universality of rent-seeking practices. The main characters, or actors (and possibly in fact only performing agents) pursue their own interests, which are often far from those declared at the time of the establishment of the respective institutions or those they claim to pursue in making certain decisions (as assumed in “public choice” concepts).<sup>2</sup>

A significant role here is played by the existence of numerous and diverse rents, and the fight for them is of considerable importance to the economic and political life of modern Russia. In this paper, we give a schematic description of the rent-seeking nature of the Russian economic system.

Let us say from the outset that “rent-seeking” (in the part in which it is contrary to “lawful” activity) often takes the form of corrupt behavior, which has unfortunately become a characteristic systemic feature of modern Russia. Here we will only take a brief look at corruption because Russian corruption has been described in numerous works (see, for example, Levin and Satarov<sup>3</sup>). But we will make a detailed study of the system relationships between corruption and rent-seeking, and also of the relationship between the economy and the political administrative system dominated by rent-seeking. For this purpose, we will describe different types of rent and various rent-seeking behaviors so as to present a picture of rents and rent-seeking in Russia in their interconnection. Hopefully, the development and investigation of appropriate mathematical models based on this scheme will be a subject of further studies. One of the forms of

---

**M. Levin**, D. Sc. (Econ.), professor, head of the Microeconomic Analysis Department at the National Research University—Higher School of Economics (HSE), Moscow; professor, head of the Microeconomics Department at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA); **G. Satarov**, Cand. Sc. (Tech.), professor at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), president of the Information Science for Democracy Foundation (INDEM), Moscow. This article was published in Russian in the journal *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 1, 2014.

rent-seeking behavior is lobbying, whose specific features in Russia deserve a separate study.

### Basic Concepts and Literature Review

The established term “rent-seeking,” variously translated into Russian as *rentooriyentirovannoye povedeniye* (rent-oriented behavior), *borba za rentu* (fight/competition for rent) or *poisk renty* (quest for rent), became widespread due to the works of Gordon Tullock, Anne O. Krueger and others, who have created a kind of informal school. This school successfully operates in public sector economics, institutional economics and, of course, in the area of public choice theory.<sup>4</sup>

In this article, we will consider rent as potential surplus income or excess return (“prize”) above the minimum income (return) necessary to motivate an agent to do the work specified by the principal or to induce the principal (the owner) to make some efforts to implement a particular policy, conduct business, enter a market, etc. Such a definition is free from the confusion associated with the origin or use of rent which links rent only to personal gain.<sup>5</sup> Our definition of rent includes both business and public activities. Finally, it emphasizes that rent is, first of all, an opportunity. It is close to the definition of Milgrom and Roberts<sup>6</sup> and is applicable to situations where the actor’s behavior is described by traditional models which maximize utility defined in any way. In addition, we will consider rent-seeking as behavior involving a quest for rent, and competition for it, an attempt to appropriate it.<sup>7</sup>

It is convenient to think that rent is always a kind of “opportunity” for rent-seeking behavior that appears under certain conditions. It is not always and not in all conditions that rent causes rent-seeking behavior, but the latter exists only in the presence of rent, actual or potential (emerging under certain circumstances).

Rent-seeking behavior can be characteristic of both individuals and social groups (in particular, as a type of behavior dominant for them). One can also speak of the rent-seeking behavior of entire societies, specifying where and when this type of behavior becomes dominant. In this article, we look at Russia as an example of a rent-seeking society.

There are quite a few studies on rent-seeking behavior in Russia (see, for example, note<sup>8</sup>). We will only mention some of them most relevant to our study. An article by Lomov<sup>9</sup> describes how rent-seeking behavior influences the state and shows that rent is costly for society (see also note<sup>10</sup>) because the technology of rent-seeking is often characterized by increasing returns to scale. Rent-seeking behavior is self-propagating: if one firm achieves success in the market through such behavior, other firms will imitate it so that the damage from rent-seeking behavior will increase. Moreover, the more organizations are involved in rent-seeking, the less is the probability (in the event of corruption) of punishment for each organization, which leads to additional investments in rent-seeking.

Rent-seeking behavior undermines the incentives for economic agents to innovate.

- First, agents have to bear the expenses of overcoming administrative barriers erected by government agencies.
- Second, in an economy with widespread rent-seeking behavior, business loans are more expensive.
- And third, long-term investment in innovation loses its attractiveness.

All these factors have a negative effect on innovation activity and economic growth.

An article by Sergey Yatsky<sup>11</sup> discusses the economic and political aspects of rent-seeking. The author analyzes Russia's basic problems: its having reached the limit of an export-oriented economy; the need to maintain a favorable investment climate so as to attract long-term investments; and the need to pursue a policy of import substitution in strategic industries. He describes the Russian economy as a "rent-based" one and warns of the possibility of the country's falling into a "resource trap" and eventually turning into a peripheral economy. For Arbakhan Magomedov and Ruslan Nikerov,<sup>12</sup> rent-seeking means that political and economic actors make "excessive" efforts to divide the existing "resource pie" instead of making the necessary investments and thus reduce the productive efforts to create value added and new knowledge.

Yuliya Fyodorova<sup>13</sup> lists the following consequences of rent-seeking behavior for the production of public goods: impossibility of assessing the actual demand for public goods, which results in irrational decisions on the volume of their production; absence of a market adjustment of resource allocation, which leads to an inadequate composition of public goods produced; absence of valid criteria for evaluating the performance of state organizations and insufficient competition. All of this lowers the quality of public goods. Andrey Zaoztrovsev<sup>14</sup> analyzes a number of concepts related to the protection of property rights. In particular, he cites a study by Tambovtsev describing the relationship between natural resource rent and government failure to protect property rights: poor protection of property rights has negative consequences for economic growth and leads to the state's inability to perform its functions.

Natural resource rent in Russia is defined as the revenue received from the sale of a resource minus the cost of producing it.<sup>15</sup> In particular, the authors present estimates of oil and gas rents: in the past few decades, these rents peaked twice: in 1981 (to more than \$250 billion or over 40% of GDP) and in 2005 (over 25% of GDP). In their opinion, rent can be divided into five categories: after-tax profits (net profits of the company), excess cost of extraction, price subsidies, formal taxes, and informal taxes. According to Vadim Radaev,<sup>16</sup> the main agent of rent extortion in Russia was the bureaucracy, a fact which was recognized by 87% of CEOs.

An interesting study by Simon Kordonsky<sup>17</sup> considers market economies and resource economies. Describing the transformation of the economic system,

he notes that a market economy as a social structure consists of classes, and pricing is its basic adjustment mechanism for establishing equilibrium. The resource economy typical of the USSR was inhabited by “estates” (social classes): titled (government officials, the military) and untitled (doctors, teachers). Estates differ not only in terms of payment for work or the amount of goods that constitute their legitimate “estate” rent, but also in terms of their ability to allocate resources. In an estate-based society, resource allocation is the very essence of power.

After the collapse of the USSR, there was an opportunity for a transition from the resource economy to a market economy, but what we saw was only a change of form. “The metamorphoses undergone by entrepreneurs are very telling... They are not civil servants because they operate according to the logic of the market instead of resource logic, i.e., they actually produce resources instead of ensuring their collection, protection and allocation... Their aim is their own benefit.”<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, it is difficult to do business without representatives of the state. That is why the right of civil servants to “estate” rent had to be acknowledged. In other words, business people had to pay an “estate” (social class) tax that did not go into the state budget but lined the pockets of the very estate (sic!) that limited business opportunities as the manager of public resources. “A special kind of resource was the right to violence, of which the state was nearly deprived by racketeers in the early 1990s. The victory over the alternative agent of violence sharply increased the rate of “estate” tax collected by government law enforcement agencies.”<sup>19</sup> The role of civil servants also changed: they became the owners of public property and active raiders of other people’s property.

Today, the focus in rent-seeking seems to be shifting to a fight for resources and redistribution of property in them. The first method of redistribution is playing word games: the current administrative competition for resources takes place under the banner of fighting corruption and abuse of power. “Growing accusations of corruption and abuse of power are a sign of an increasing shortage of resources and the critical state of the estate order, which usually refrains from using this weapon for fear of a ‘war of all against all.’”<sup>20</sup> The second method of redistribution is inventing “new threats” which are then addressed by allocating funds.

Studies demonstrating the historical continuity of institutional design in Russia, which has regularly created and continues to create favorable conditions for rent-seeking behavior (this institutional model is known in the literature as the “Muscovite model”) are also important for the purposes of this article. An analysis of economic regulatory institutions starting from the reign of Tsar Ivan IV to the present day leads to a conclusion about persistent path dependence in Russian history.<sup>21</sup> It is noted that institutions are oriented towards distribution and not towards development. Some authors also study the strategy of rent allocation (“rent granting”) as an integral part of rent-seeking behavior.<sup>22</sup> This strategy also has a long-standing and persistent historical tradition. It has resulted in an illusion of development. An informal political institution such as a mecha-

nism ensuring continuity of power in Russia in the 2000s is also characterized by historical continuity and is associated with rent-seeking.<sup>23,24</sup> These studies are interesting in that they establish a connection between Russia's history and its current state.

### **Types of Rent and Rent-Seeking Behavior**

Various types of rent can be distinguished by source (origin). In this article, we examine sources of rent that are rarely discussed in the economic literature or are left out of consideration altogether. Rents not relevant to this study are not discussed. For example, we do not consider Schumpeterian rent, which can temporarily arise during the period of monopolistic use of innovative technologies or information before their diffusion to other producers. Nor do we consider "monitoring rent," which is essentially a special case of Schumpeterian rent for principals seeking to reduce the information asymmetry. So, let us consider the following types of rent which are of particular importance to modern Russia.

- *Natural resource rent.* This term is usually taken to mean the availability of minerals and other natural resources (such as water), but it can also refer to an advantageous geographical location or climate. Territory (land) as such can also be a source of rent. Rent can be extracted, for example, from control over trade routes due to geographical location.
- *Monopoly rent.* As a rule, this term refers to an opportunity to set artificially high, premium prices in a monopolistically controlled market. But other types of monopoly, such as political monopoly, are just as important.
- *Political rent.* Under certain additional circumstances, political rent makes it possible to create conditions for the extraction of other types of rent by establishing the necessary rules of the game, breaking existing rules with impunity or allocating informal rights to violate rules ("for my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law").
- *Administrative rent.* Such rent arises in any social structures described by the principal—agent model in connection with the information asymmetry effect, which provides opportunities for opportunistic behavior exploiting this effect.
- *Transitional rent.* This kind of rent arises in the process of modernization (transformation) of various institutions due to the emergence of social groups which receive exclusive benefits from the intermediate state of the institution between the old and new models. For example, a temporary conflict between old and new norms or the uncertainty of the legal situation that arises during transition can be exploited by agents for their own purposes since they can interpret the contradictions or uncertainties as they see fit.

Apart from this classification of rents by origin, rents can also be divided into natural and artificial. Natural rents arise without the actors' conscious efforts either because they have a natural origin or because they are unintended consequences of their actions. Artificial rent arises as a result of the actors' purposeful efforts to create it (either individual or collective). In fact, rent creation is part of rent-seeking behavior (see, for example, note<sup>25</sup>).

It is also convenient to divide rents into intermediate and final. *Intermediate* rents create conditions for generating and using other rents. *Final* rents generate the appropriation of tangible or intangible assets which can circulate in conventional open markets as "prizes."

Let us now consider the main forms of rent-seeking behavior.

- *Opportunistic (situational) behavior*: This implies taking advantage of an unexpected and accidental opportunity to extract rent. Based on their own system of criteria in a certain situation, actors evaluate such an opportunity as the best one for them compared to all other opportunities.
- *Purposeful behavior*: In this case, the actor deliberately engages in rent-seeking behavior, regarding it *a priori* as the most advantageous behavior in most situations. This is the actor's personal life strategy.
- *Systemic behavior*: In this case, purposeful rent-seeking behavior is typical of a large number of actors. Such behavior is seen by them as natural and generally accepted within the system of informal institutions that is dominant in society.

To the three types of rent-seeking behavior examined by Arye L. Hillman, considering Russia's specific features, we will add another one: *rent creation*. By this we mean an effort to increase the opportunities for already existing rent, so taking into account the possible division of rents into natural and artificial. Thus, we will consider four forms of rent-seeking behavior: quest for rent, fight for rent, competition for rent, appropriation of rent, and creation (expansion) of rent.

Opportunistic (situational) rent-seeking behavior is mainly aimed at the appropriation of final rents. Purposeful rent-seekers do not hesitate to use intermediate rents so as to enhance their opportunities and increase the rewards of their strategy. Systemic behavior is characterized by extended creation of artificial rents, including intermediate ones.

In our opinion, these types of behavior form a coherent system. An individual's successful experience of opportunistic rent-seeking behavior leads to a propensity for constant use of such behavior, which then turns into a conscious strategy of purposeful rent-seeking behavior. The "rewards" reaped from such behavior, generally understood to be illegal and/or morally unacceptable, stimulate the establishment of informal institutions to support rent-seeking and ensure its expansion. This is expressed in a search for others of one's kind and in their self-organization; in the use of formal institutions, for example, through the adoption of laws that support rents and provide more opportunities for them; and in the establishment of systems for protecting rents and exploiting them with the

use of funds illegally obtained from legal institutions. When such a system of informal institutions dominates, there emerges a system which can be called a “rent-seeking society.”

### **Rents and Rent-Seeking Behavior in Russia**

Russia is a country with huge natural resource endowments. This circumstance has determined the country’s development throughout its entire history, including the last 30 years. It was precisely the drop in hydrocarbon prices in the late 1970s that had an adverse effect on the fate of the USSR. In 1985, an increase in the costs associated with the construction of new oil wells and with maintaining production from the still functioning wells led to a drop in oil production in the USSR by 12 million tons. At the same time, the slow decline in the real price of oil was followed by a price crash. In 1985-1986, the prices of resources that determined the Soviet Union’s budget, its foreign trade balance, the stability of its consumer market, and its ability to purchase significant amounts of grain, to service its foreign debt and to finance its army and military-industrial complex fell to a fraction of their former levels.<sup>26</sup> This led to a crisis of the economic system and then to the breakup of the USSR.

Up to the mid-1980s, the USSR was characterized by pervasive systemic rent-seeking behavior based on maintenance and exploitation of political and administrative rents. These rents were virtually indistinguishable because the Soviet bureaucracy pivoted on a monopolistic ruling party which was simultaneously the only quasipolitical actor. In everyday language, this phenomenon was known as “privileges.” By the end of the 1980s, “fighting privileges” became one of the main themes of political struggle. For example, it was a major theme of the three election campaigns of Boris Yeltsin, which finally brought him to the post of president of Russia.

The collapse of the USSR and the formation of a new Russian state destroyed the various networks for exploiting both these rents. The planned distribution economy was disintegrating and a market economy was emerging in its place. The combined effect of these circumstances led to the domination of opportunistic rent-seeking behavior starting from the early 1990s. Weak law enforcement institutions resulted in a rapid transition from opportunistic to purposeful rent-seeking behavior, which systematically developed into corrupt behavior. At a time when civil society was weak and, not least importantly, when a significant part of the population was concerned with its own survival, favorable conditions were created for the emergence of various hotbeds of systemic rent-seeking behavior.

The specific features of the tenure of Vladimir Putin, which began at the turn of the millennium, are also due to changes in oil and gas prices. But this time the trend was directly opposite: as can be seen from Table 1, prices rose very quickly. The role of oil and gas exports in modern Russia’s economy and budget is evident from Table 2.

Table 1

**Global Crude Oil Prices in 1986-2005**  
(US\$ per barrel, in constant prices of 2000, \$)

Year	Average price	Year	Average price
1986	19.9	1996	21.7
1987	24.9	1997	20.2
1988	19.5	1998	13.6
1989	22.8	1999	18.4
1990	28.2	2000	28.2
1991	22.9	2001	23.8
1992	22.0	2002	24.0
1993	19.0	2003	27.3
1994	17.7	2004	34.6
1995	18.7	2005	47.6

*Source:* International Financial Statistics 2004, International Monetary Fund (quoted in Gaidar, 2006).

Natural resource rent in today's Russia is not just a possibility but is turning into a tangible reality due to political rent. This relationship did not emerge at once. At the beginning of Putin's first presidency, a strategy of bureaucratic modernization was chosen for the country. The plan was to take a liberal stride forward based on a set of institutional reforms that were outlined back in the days of President Yeltsin, coupled with a temporary limitation of democracy. As a result, restrictions were imposed on federalism, separation of powers, political competition and freedom of speech; at the same time, uncontrolled monopoly power was placed in the hands of a small group of bureaucrats consisting of a mix of secret service members, technocrats from the business community and government officials involved in business. The formation of this political system took place at a time when the public and the elites were weary of revolution while civil society was weak.

In 2000-2002, there was a liberalization of land ownership and taxation, and other measures were carried out. But that was also when oil and gas prices began to rise. In a situation of monopolized political power, the ruling coalition could not resist the temptation of rent-seeking, which promised quick and huge personal "rewards" incomparable to the possible gains from continued systematic liberalization of the economy. The expansion of rent-seeking behavior was accompanied by an increase in overall corruption and in the share of direct corruption in its various forms. In 2001-2005, the bureaucracy's annual income from business corruption increased nearly tenfold (adjusted for inflation).<sup>28</sup> This went hand in hand with a general and full-scale fusion (interpenetration) of government and business, a transfer of public funds into private hands, and private

Table 2

**Contribution of Natural Resource Rent to Fiscal Revenues  
(% of GDP)**

Year	Oil and Gas Fiscal Revenues (% of GDP)	Total Fiscal Revenues (% of GDP)	Share of Natural Resource Rent in Total Fiscal Revenues (%)
1999	2.3	33.8	6.8
2000	3.5	37.3	9.3
2001	4.4	37.5	11.9
2002	5.2	37.2	14.0
2003	5.5	36.6	15.0
2004	6.7	37.0	18.1
2005	10.2	39.7	25.6
2006	11.1	39.5	28.2
2007	8.9	40.2	22.1
2008	10.8	39.2	27.6
2009	7.8	35.0	22.3
2010	8.5	35.5	23.9
2011	10.3	38.2	27.1

*Source:* Yevsey Gurvich<sup>27</sup> (with amendments kindly provided by the author for this publication).

appropriation of state-owned property on the scale of entire industries controlled by the state. As a result of sociocultural changes, the society and government came to be dominated by systems of relations geared to maintain and maximize rent-seeking and corruption.<sup>29</sup>


The following diagram shows how the four types of rent interact in modern Russia. Let us once again briefly describe the mechanism of their interaction based on a combination of several circumstances.

- First, the availability of natural resources, including oil and gas.
- Second, the creation of a regime of uncontrolled monopoly power of the bureaucracy.
- Third, rising oil and gas prices. And fourth, the fact that Russia is going through a transition period.

The first three circumstances generate natural resource and political rents, producing three effects: an increase in rent-seeking behavior, a fusion of government and business, and an increase in corruption. All these factors create and expand the scope of administrative rent and transitional rent (the latter is due to the operation of the fourth of the above-listed factor conditions). These two rents serve to

strengthen political rent, on the one hand, and to increase corruption, rent-seeking behavior and the fusion of government and business, on the other. Thus, we obtain a kind of positive feedback amplifier, which produces two effects. The first effect is that rents are becoming the dominant source of wealth in the country, and rent-seeking is becoming the dominant behavioral strategy (this is exactly what we meant by the title of this article). The second effect relates to the possibility of long-term operation of such an amplifier. We will consider it below.

The diagram does not include monopoly rent because its influence in modern Russia is somewhat less pronounced compared to other rents. Monopoly rent is partially present in political rent. It is also partially absorbed by administrative rent in combination with the fusion of government and business, which automatically creates a total government monopoly on any profitable business (but in this case it is difficult to talk about traditional monopoly rent).



**Fig. 1. Interaction of Rents in Modern Russia**

As already noted, a system of monopoly power of the bureaucracy began to be built during Putin's first presidency. For this purpose, the authorities used the idea of a "power vertical," both institutionally and from a propaganda perspective. By way of propaganda, the "power vertical" was presented as a reliable alternative to "the wild 1990s," "the chaos of the Yeltsin years" and other myths created by the new authorities. Both the idea of the new presidency and the

myths about an evil past were based on public and elite weariness of the revolutionary period and the weakness of government associated with it. Post-revolutionary periods are usually marked by a return to the idea of a strong state, and this is what happened in Russia by the end of the 1990s, providing the basis for the idea of a “power vertical.”

Institutionally, the “power vertical” was an informal institution of the bureaucracy built on a system of vertical relations close to traditional patron—client relations of the feudal type. These relations were at first ensured by previous corporate connections or *zemlyachestvo* ties (relationships between people from the same region). They implied bottom-up loyalty and subordination and top-down protection together with authorized access to some resources, at first only those related to state power. At the same time, this meant that from the earliest stages of Putin’s rent-seeking Russia, the open access regime<sup>30</sup> taking shape in the 1990s began to turn into a limited access regime, primarily in the area of political competition. In the “power vertical” system being created, the patron determined the circle of clients to be granted the right of access to political and administrative positions. In a parallel and related process, control was established over information resources. At the federal level, this control mainly extended to mass media with large audiences. At the regional level, with the exception of several regions, such control over the media was almost total.

Within the “power vertical,” access to rent was allocated through mechanisms similar to those described by Kordonsky.<sup>31</sup> An important example here is the abolition of gubernatorial elections in Russian regions by the federal authorities. This took place in September 2004 after the tragic seizure of a school in Beslan by terrorists, which led, contrary to the Constitution, to the abolition of gubernatorial elections and their replacement with appointment from above. In this way, the federal authorities sharply increased their political rent, while the procedure for the appointment of governors became an instrument for allocating administrative rent. It is appropriate to mention that these actions by the authorities cannot be interpreted as the creation of new political rent and that it would be more correct to speak of an improvement of the old rent. Before the abolition of gubernatorial elections, the federal authorities rigged such elections in a cumbersome way and without much legal risk, thus using their political rent to allocate administrative rent. When these elections were abolished, it became easier to allocate administrative rent, and such activities were in accordance with the new law. Moreover, one of its provisions empowered the president to remove a governor from office at any time due to a “loss of confidence.” Thus, the post of governor became a resource that was rented out in an arbitrary manner and passed from one occupant to another.

The monopoly power of the bureaucracy, which generated rent-seeking and rapid growth of corruption in a favorable stimulating environment, just as inevitably led to the general establishment of administrative rent at all levels and in all branches of government, including local self-government. All of this strengthened and expanded the potential for transitional rent together with a fight to maintain it. This became possible because rent-seeking behavior was primar-

ily concentrated in the ruling bureaucracy, which had all possible resources at its disposal, including control over law enforcement institutions. These resources were brought into play to maintain the state of transition in the areas of law, political competition and the economy, which ensured an uninterrupted supply of transitional rent.

According to the RF Constitution, nature management, including the exploitation of natural resources, is under the joint jurisdiction of the federal and regional authorities. In order to exercise joint jurisdiction, the federal government and regional executive bodies concluded “agreements on the delimitation between jurisdiction and authority.” Such agreements were primarily signed with regions rich in mineral resources and included, among other things, mutually agreed distribution proportions for natural resource rent, with the Federation always receiving a significantly larger share. When in the early 2000s oil prices began to rise (see Table 1), the federal authorities decided to use these agreements to strengthen their control over natural resources to the detriment of the regions. This was expressed in an increase in the share of natural resource rent appropriated by the federal authorities (Table 3), which by 2005 had risen to almost 100%. This redistribution was in line with the logic of building a “vertical,” which, as noted above, was becoming a tool for redistributing access to rent so that strategic control over it was in the hands of the top levels of government.

*Table 3*

**Share of Natural Resource Rent in the Oil and Gas Sector (%)**

	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>
Share	86	82	89	90	94
<i>Source:</i> Computations by Ye. Gurvich kindly provided by him for this article.					

The “power vertical” as an informal institution is in total and irreconcilable institutional conflict with the constitutional principles of modern Russia: separation of powers, federalism, separation of local self-government from the federal authorities, and constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens. That is why the RF Constitution inevitably turns into an obstacle for the new system of centralized power.

Societal contradictions are even deeper. Modern democratic institutions are well-adapted to serve a social order dominated by horizontal social relations. The “power vertical” implies the domination of vertical relations. Such things as competition, cooperation and horizontal trust—the entire societal foundation of a free democratic society—are contraindicated to it. That is why the “power vertical” destroys not only constitutional institutions, but also the new social order that was spontaneously but steadily taking shape in Russia from the late 1980s in place of the old totalitarian order.

As already noted, the “power vertical” as an instrument of monopoly and centralized government was designed to implement a certain modernization pro-

gram. The motto of the governing elite of the time, often proclaimed publicly, went as follows: “We know what to do. Just don’t stand in our way.” This period, which lasted about two years, was characterized by intensive construction of a framework for political rent. Opportunistic rent-seeking, which was traditional for Yeltsin’s Russia, was supplemented with purposeful rent-seeking. Corruption began to grow rapidly, spawning new forms of corrupt behavior. In the 1990s, corruption was a form of informal (“shadow”) administrative and political services, whereas in the early 2000s such services began to be replaced by outright bribery. A new kind of bribe appeared: a bribe “for the right to exist,” which meant regular payments simply for the right to continue one’s business.

Quite soon it became clear that the new model of government was ineffective for addressing the tasks of modernization. At the same time, it turned out that uncontrolled governance was very convenient for rent extraction, which became relevant with the rapid increase in natural resource rent. The strategy of the new elite began to change. The reforms were being replaced with imitation, while the main efforts were directed towards expansion and exploitation of rent together with the construction of a system of safe and perpetual opportunities for such exploitation. All of this was inevitably accompanied by growing corruption as the simplest form of exploitation of administrative rent.

The fact that such a turning point had been reached was publicly acknowledged in 2003 by the case against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, followed by the liquidation of Yukos, one of Russia’s most efficient oil companies. Then came a surging wave of takeovers of Russian businesses by people in power at all levels and throughout the country. Where property was not seized, it was taken under control. By that time, oil prices were rising sharply.

All these circumstances reproduced a unique situation characteristic of the Soviet system of power, when political power was dissolved in bureaucratic power, forming a monopoly symbiosis. Unprecedented natural resource rent appeared in the country, and this rent could be expanded and exploited without hindrance due to the monopoly on political and administrative rents. As a result, systemic rent-seeking behavior was firmly established in Russia by the mid-2000s, soon turning the country into a rent-seeking society.

\* \* \*

By the mid-2000s, the informal institution built in Russia and known as the “power vertical” appeared to be unshakable and long-lasting. The intermediate rents it has created and protected together with the unprecedented gains (rewards) from final rents and enormous income from corruption have led to a number of large-scale consequences.

- *First.* The statistics given above point to the emergence of an economy with distorted incentives and a lopsided structure characterized by a huge “bias” towards the exploitation of natural resources while other industries related to manufacturing remain depressed.

- *Second.* Numerous forms of corruption produced by political and administrative rents sharply increase the risks of any independent business unless it is affiliated with the “power vertical.” Today, this has led to a massive flight of capital and business from Russia. This is naturally combined with a sharp deterioration of the investment climate in the country.
- *Third.* The huge gains from final rents have manifested themselves in a rapid increase in the number of dollar billionaires,<sup>32</sup> most of whom are engaged in the exploitation of natural resource rent under the protection of the “power vertical” or are a part of it.
- *Fourth.* Political and administrative monopoly rent has served to maintain and expand transitional rent. It has also manifested itself in both constant manipulation of the rules of the game and in keeping property rights insecure and uncertain, which creates ideal conditions for constant pressure on business.
- *Fifth.* By the mid 2000s, a consensus was reached on an informal “social contract” between the population and the elites, which can be outlined as follows: the population does not interfere in the affairs of the elites while the latter share a part of the final rent with the population, so ensuring a steady rise in living standards. At the same time, it is not taken into account that this growth is not accompanied by an improvement in the quality of the economy such as an increase in labor productivity.
- *Sixth.* Under the impact of these factors, the population has adopted rent-seeking as a life strategy. These attitudes are reflected in the choice of profession by young people observed by sociologists in recent years. The most popular professions are those which give direct access to rent.

In a poll held in 2009 by the Public Opinion Foundation (a Russian sociological research center), respondents were asked to answer the following question: “Which companies, firms or organizations would you describe as your ‘dream employer’?” In the 16 to 26 age group, the first place went to state-owned Gazprom (22%), the second to the Russian Presidential Administration (12%), and the third to work in the police, an organization known for large-scale corruption (11%).<sup>33</sup> This is paralleled by a steady and growing brain drain of young and creative people in search of non-rent-seeking ways of self-realization.
- *Seventh.* The positive feedback amplifier described above is in operation: an increase in rent creates new rent. Thus, all the negative effects of rent-seeking multiply without an end.
- *Eighth.* Russia is characterized by the following features of systemic rent-seeking behavior. Government agencies are involved in maintaining and expanding political-administrative rent. This primarily applies to agencies in charge of law enforcement. The same function is also performed by quasipolitical institutions such as parties, which are granted access to the political market in a centralized way. In exchange for a readiness to

support the created system, they obtain access to rent, naturally, in varying degrees. Maximum access is granted to the party of the monopoly majority. Both government agencies, whatever the branch of power they belong to, and parties given access to rent are built into the informal structure of the “power vertical.” In fact, the “power vertical” is an informal institution that makes it possible to maintain and expand political-administrative rent. Within the framework of this institution, top-down authorization is given for access to all kinds of rent while part of the gains from final rent keeps flowing from bottom to top. Rent-seeking behavior of every kind is closely intertwined with corruption. This results in the appearance of nontraditional rewards from final rents. Rewards in the form of control over someone else’s business or its direct seizure are particularly widespread. Both of these involve corruption schemes based on the exploitation of political-administrative rent.

All of the above gives a clear picture of a rent-seeking society and the state, of the rent-seeking Russia. Such a society evidently has no reliable long-term prospect of development. In the future, it will take a great deal of effort to dismantle the societal architecture of this rent-seeking society in order to change the situation.

---

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> This paper was prepared with the support of a grant from the HSE Faculty of Economics for 2013.
- <sup>2</sup> D. C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- <sup>3</sup> M. Levin, G. Satarov, “Russian Corruption,” M. Alekseyev, S. Weber (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy*, New York, 2013.
- <sup>4</sup> D. C. North, op. cit; R. D. Congleton, A. L. Hillman, K. A. Konrad (eds.), *40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking*, vol. 1-2, Heidelberg etc., 2008.
- <sup>5</sup> A. Hillman, *Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government*, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- <sup>6</sup> P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, *Economics, Organization and Management*, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 1992.
- <sup>7</sup> Yu. Fyodorova, “Production of Public Goods Under Conditions of Rent-Seeking Behavior of Economic Agents,” *Vestnik Saratovskogo gosudarstvennogo sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo universiteta*, No. 5, 2008, pp. 22-25; A. Hillman, A. Schnytzer, “Illegal Economic Activities and Purges in a Soviet-type Economy: A Rent-Seeking Perspective,” *International Review of Law and Economics*, vol. 6, 1986, No. 1, pp. 87-99; A. Hillman, E. Katz, “Hierarchical Structure and the Social Costs of Bribes and Transfers,” *Journal of Public Economics*, vol. 34, 1987, No. 2, pp. 129-142; A. Hillman, J. Riley, “Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers,” *Economics and Politics*, vol. 1, 1989, No. 1, pp. 17-39.
- <sup>8</sup> C. G. Gaddy, B. W. Ickes, “Resource Rents and the Russian Economy,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, vol. 46, No. 8, pp. 559-583; B. J. Han, “The Dynamics of State

- Power and Economic Reform in Russia,” Center for International Studies, Seoul National University, 2005; A. Zaoztrovsev, “The Concept of ‘Rent Extraction’: Economic Theory of Political Extortion and Russian Practice,” *Izvestiya Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta ekonomiki i finansov*, No. 3, 2000, pp. 48–63.
- 9 V. Lomov, “The Influence of Rent-Seeking Behavior on the Development of the National Economy,” *Vestnik Saratovskogo gosudarstvennogo sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo universiteta*, No. 4, pp. 16-21.
  - 10 K. M. Murphy, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny, “Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?” *American Economic Review*, 1993, vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 409-414.
  - 11 S. Yatsky, “The Rent-oriented Economy: the Political-Economic Aspect,” *Vestnik Yugorskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, No. 4, 2011, pp. 148-155.
  - 12 A. Magomedov, R. Nikerov, “Russian Oil and Rent-Seeking: Towards Understanding the Nature of Political Incentives of the Russian Authorities,” *Izvestiya Saratovskogo universiteta. New series*, vol. 10, No. 1, 2010, pp. 105-108.
  - 13 Yu. Fyodorova, “Production of Public Goods Under Conditions of Rent-Seeking Behavior of Economic Agents,” *Vestnik Saratovskogo gosudarstvennogo sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo universiteta*, No. 5, 2008, pp. 22-25.
  - 14 A. Zaoztrovsev, “The Concept of ‘Rent Extraction’: Economic Theory of Political Extortion and Russian Practice,” *Izvestiya Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta ekonomiki i finansov*, No. 3, 2000, pp. 48-63; A. Zaoztrovsev, “Oil, Rent-seeking and Property Rights (Overview of the Conceptions),” N. Dobronravin, O. Margania (eds.), *Oil, Gas and Modernization*, St. Petersburg, 2008 (in Russian).
  - 15 C. Gaddy, B. Ickes, “Resource Rents and the Russian Economy,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, vol. 46, No. 8, 2005, pp. 559-583.
  - 16 V. Radayev, *Formation of New Russian Markets: Transaction Costs, Forms of Control and Business Ethics*, Moscow, 1998 (in Russian).
  - 17 S. Kordonsky, *Social Class Structure of Post-Soviet Russia*, Moscow, 2008 (in Russian).
  - 18 S. Barsukova, “The Resource Economy and Social Class Rents: The Approach of S. Kordonsky,” *Ekonomicheskaya sotsiologiya*, vol. 12, No. 4, 2011, pp. 119.
  - 19 Ibid.
  - 20 S. Barsukova, *ibid.*, p. 121.
  - 21 J. T. Kotilaine, *A Muscovite Economic Model*, Washington, DC: National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2004.
  - 22 S. Rosefielde, “Illusion of Transition: Russia’s Muscovite Future,” *Eastern Economic Journal*, vol. 31, No. 2, 2005, pp. 285-299.
  - 23 S. Blank, “The Putin Succession and Its Implications for Russian Politics,” 2008, Institute for Security and Development Policy, (Feb. 19, 2008), available at [http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2008\\_blank\\_the\\_putin-succession-and-its-implications.pdf](http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2008_blank_the_putin-succession-and-its-implications.pdf).
  - 24 For a detailed study of historical continuity see: S. Hedlund, “Vladimir the Great, Grand Prince of Muscovy: Resurrecting the Russian Service State,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 58, No. 5, 2006, pp. 775-801. The book’s author regards rent-seeking as an important factor in Russian history.
  - 25 E. Appelbaum, E. Katz, “Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking,” *Economic Journal*, vol. 97, No. 387, 1987, pp. 685-699.

- 
- 26 Ye. Gaidar, *Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia*, Moscow, 2006 (in Russian).
- 27 Ye. Gurchich, "Natural Rent in the Russian Oil and Gas Sector," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 11, 2010, pp. 4-24.
- 28 For details of the dynamics of corruption in Russia in the early 2000s see: G. Satarov (ed.), *Russian Corruption: Level, Structure, Dynamics. Sociological Analysis*, Moscow, 2013 (in Russian).
- 29 M. Levin, G. Satarov, op. cit.
- 30 D. C. North, J. J. Wallis, B. R. Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*, New York, 2009.
- 31 S. Kordonsky, op. cit.
- 32 From 1997 to 2008, the number of Russian businessmen in the Forbes list of the world's wealthiest people increased from 6 to 87 ([www.forbes.ru/node/46228/slideshow/1](http://www.forbes.ru/node/46228/slideshow/1)).
- 33 <http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d39rabotod.pdf>.

*Translated by Irina Borisova*

## **Transformation Chances in Russia and the North—Wallis—Weingast Concept. Doorstep Transition Conditions for Society**

*Natalya PLISKEVICH*

Douglas North and his colleagues<sup>1</sup> analyze the conditions for transiting to open access orders (OAO) in a situation where a dominant elite actually leads the whole of society. This elite has realized the importance and advantage of doorstep (threshold) conditions that enable this transition and is ready to extend new public regulation orders even to nonelite groups, opening, in particular, new vertical mobility opportunities for talented members of the lower classes, although this is not new: real vertical mobility capacity exists in limited access orders (LAO) as well. But where existing dominant elite essentially fails to become the vanguard of society, lags in its development, is unaware of existing new needs and unwilling to waive its privileges or go against its selfish interests, society can pressure it “from below” and force the elites that are either in power or are ready to step in following a revolution to accept the “doorstep conditions” necessary for transiting to OAOs.

But what demands should a population applying “pressure from below” make on the dominant elite in particular and the social system generally to promote the movement towards OAOs? How is the “power—property” system’s stability (or that of LAOs) becoming disrupted and a country making an attempt (successful or otherwise is another matter) to break loose? It appears that in this case we cannot be confined to the political sphere and democratization agenda alone. The spectrum of desired changes must be much wider and include the basics of socioeconomic reform as well as sociocultural components in society’s life.

I think the stability of both the “power—property” system and the opposing private ownership market democratic system, or the OAOs, is based on a harmonious interaction of a totality of components, each of which can be represented as a vector reflecting a resultant magnitude of the influence exerted by the two poles of its opposites (See also: <sup>2</sup>). The main opposites are as follows:

---

N. Pliskevich, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost (ONS)* journal, senior research fellow, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences. This article was first published in Russian in *ONS*, No. 5, 2013.

“distribution—exchange” (and its derivative, “paternalism—individualism”), “dictatorship—democracy,” “the law—custom based on the submission to a powerful individual,” as well as a vector reflecting the level of social tensions and people’s awareness of the causes of their plight and the way to redress it. The direction of each of the vectors depends on what pole of an opposite a society is gravitates to, and its value (magnitude), on the extent to which one trend prevails over the other. If a society is split practically down the middle in relation to some or other opposite, the vector that symbolizes it tends to zero. As is obvious, the poles of the suggested opposites gravitate to the two different socioeconomic systems: “power—property” and market democracy (or LAO and OAO, respectively).

These vectors can be placed in a system of coordinates, where economics and politics on the vertical axis can be represented as an alternative to monopoly and competition and the sociocultural aspect on the horizontal axis, as an opposition of traditional and liberal values. Of course, this scheme (like any attempt at a schematic simplification of complex social processes) is highly conditional. But for all its schematicism, it reveals certain trends. It is not accidental after all that we have some pithy metaphors like “a vector of change” or “a development vector.” Besides, the suggested set of vectors in its totality embraces not only the relevant objective processes but also their subjective perception and indirectly takes into account the complex of values and aspirations predominant in a society at a development stage under review. I think that this set of vectors, along with its system of coordinates and their configurations at this or that historical stage, can help to find a clue to the national specific formula of modernization that was mentioned, among others, by Aleksandr Auzan (See: <sup>3</sup>). The vectors’ characteristics may be made to include requirements for successful modernization processes implying a regard for a country’s social and cultural capital, the structure of its values, and the specific features of formal and informal institutions, because the gravitation to some or other poles of the opposites is due to relevant sociocultural value preferences. But it is not ruled out that the suggested construct may be amended with a set of other vectors specifying some or other sociocultural features that influence the modernization process. For example, we can use in this system of coordinates Ronald Inglehart’s “survival values—self-expression values” opposites. Basically, the magnitude of each of the vectors can be calculated as a result of a certain set of indexes. This would make it possible to provide a more precise picture for this or that period. Here I will confine myself to describing the general trends that the suggested structure allows to reveal.

The suggested system of coordinates makes it possible to identify four quadrants, two of which correspond to the two opposing socioeconomic systems. One, located in the right-hand upper corner, corresponds to the “power—property” system (LAOs). The other, located in the opposite left-hand lower corner, corresponds to the private ownership market democratic system (OAOs). The other two quadrants can be defined as “mutation zones,” or transition processes whereby one system is transformed into another. If a society is unanimous in

accepting societies of this or that type, then all the vectors will be located in a relevant quadrant and the resultant vector will be stable (corresponding figures can be found at<sup>4</sup>).

A graphic example in this sense is the Soviet system in the 1930s—1950s. The contemporary “power—property” system proved unshakable. Later, however, processes came under way, which eroded the existing consensus. The very attempts to reform the Soviet economy (starting from Aleksey Kosygin’s reforms in the 1960s) bore witness to the fact that its fundamental principle—the all-out government distribution—came under critical analysis. The idea to revive the Soviet model by infusing a measure of market relations meant that exchanging work results was increasingly imperative. This means that the initially less significant “distribution—exchange” resultant vector changed its direction by the late 1980s, with exchange requirements prevailing over those of distribution. This was expressed by society being increasingly conscious of the need to transition to the market.<sup>5</sup>

The same happened to the social tensions vector. By the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of openness (*glasnost*) revealed to many both the inefficiency of the Soviet economic model and injustice of the existing redistribution processes. In this situation, the majority of the population linked their far from easy circumstances to the Soviet system’s defects and saw a way out as lying through the change of the socioeconomic model. This conclusion was naturally suggested by the very structure of the Soviet economic model with its unprecedented slant towards the production of the means of production, or more precisely towards the system of arms industries, to the detriment of consumer production, generating, on the one hand, growing consumer shortages, and, on the other hand, an annually expanding money supply on private accounts that lacked commodity coverage. The cry for better quality of life and increased consumption became predominant, particularly after people learned the truth about the living standards in the West. To quote Vladimir Ilyin, “the engine of the anti-communist revolutions was a massive yen for modernization, which different strata of people formulated as enjoying the same standard of living ‘as in the West.’ But for some this meant the standard of living of the ruling West European elite, while for others the standard of poor, old and unemployment allowances, etc.”<sup>6</sup>

Where the “dictatorship—democracy” vector is concerned, we can sooner speak about its contraction in line with a considerable increase in importance of the democratic principles. At the same time, the buildup of chaos and uncertainty inevitably accompanying the breakup of the socioeconomic model, when the old institutions no longer functioned, while the new ones were yet to be created, led to a situation, where the requirement for “order” was growing as intensively as that for democracy. Given practical inactivity of government institutions, this requirement increasingly took on the form of demands for a “strong hand” and an urge for a leader capable of restoring “order.” The very direction of this vector, therefore, can, in all likelihood, be regarded as unchanged, although it contracted to almost a zero by comparison with the previous period.

The same can be said for the vector symbolizing “the law—custom based on the submission to a powerful individual” opposite. Given system change uncertainty, weakness of the legislation base and even weaker law enforcement, the focus in real life and in the majority’s perceptions is on being incorporated into social networks capable of offering protection either in line with long-lived customs or new power centers.

Thus, we can say that the configuration of the main vectors changed by the early 1990s. Two of them still maintained the former direction, albeit in a dramatically reduced size, while two others changed direction, as a consequence of which was a changed direction of the resultant vector: it went beyond the “power—property” quadrant (LAOs) finding itself in the mutation zone. In principle, this enabled a gradual emergence from the “power—property” system (LAOs). As is well-known, however, this country *de facto* renounced this path, preferring to reinstitutionalize the old system and undergoing essentially the same evolution as the one that Shmuel Eisenstadt speculated about back in the 1960s (See: 7).

This turnabout fits in well with the suggested scheme. First, the social tensions vector regained its usual position. Aggravated by powerful structural deformities in the economy that had been created in the previous epoch, hardships brought by the reforms, particularly at the initial stage, led people to think that the newly emerged hardships were caused by the reforms and the reform methods rather than the deformities. Superimposed upon the objective difficulties were sharp criticisms leveled at the reformers by both ideological opponents of the reforms and their potential supporters, who, however, had their own vision of the transformations, which differed from what was being implemented in practice.

Besides—and this is possibly the most important thing—, the reformers failed to take into account that the Soviet-type “power—property” system was not confined to planning in the economy and authoritarianism in politics. It was a much more complex affair. Its most important component was the entire life support system that came into being after the industrialization and dramatically increased everyone’s dependence on wages as the only source of livelihood and on the government as the holder of monopoly on employment. Aimed at the maximum possible redistribution of resources in favor of selected ideological and political priorities, this construction was based on the “low-wage system,” which generally made it possible to minimize labor maintenance expenditures. The system included four components: wages proper; countrywide forms of social support, which provided the financing for education, healthcare, much of the housing and utilities investment, transport, etc.; agency (departmental) support funds (agency medical services, agency-owned sanatoria, holiday-homes, childcare institutions, housing, etc.); subsidies for agricultural products that made it possible to maintain low food prices (for more detail, see: 8).

On the whole, this system enabled the majority to enjoy a stable, if low, standard of living and offered publicly acceptable social guarantees. In addition, it

was rather flexible. In case of problems in some of its components, the overall stability was balanced off by shifting the onus to other components. For example, when it became clear in the 1960s that the food prices could no longer be maintained at the former level, the hike was balanced off by pay rises, mostly in the form of “material incentives” provided in the context of the “Kosygin reform.” The defects of the national social institutions were compensated by the development of agency-owned social networks, primarily in the ideologically and economically prioritized spheres. This model collapsed at the start of the market reforms in the 1990s, which were designed to put an end to the Soviet “power—property” system. The blow fell on all of its four components, but no compensatory mechanism was suggested.

A surge in inflation that came into the open from its latent stage (deficits) following price liberalization immediately depreciated the ruble savings that otherwise could have served as a “safety cushion” at least for some time. True, the amount of savings owned by the majority was not very large. But, of course, there were groups with much-higher-than-average earnings, which could have saved a lot of cash. Excluding shadow dealers, I am referring primarily to those who spent years working in the forbidding climate of the North, arms industry employees, the scientific and cultural elites, etc. On the average, however, the savings indices were not so significant. In 1987, for example, when the economy was not yet fed with as much junk money (which increased dramatically both the deficit and open inflation) as it was between 1988 and 1991, the *Sberbank* opened 187,500,000 accounts (including 106,300,000 in the RSFSR) averaging 1,424 rubles, or no more than seven monthly paychecks which in that year amounted to 202.9 rubles.<sup>9</sup>

The attempts to reform the social policy on the basis of standards accepted in the advanced countries ran into an insoluble problem. With the “low-wage system” still in operation, the number of social support applicants proved so immense that the government was unable to ensure the proper functioning of the social institutions. Inherited from the past, the claims involving partial compensation of housing and utilities bills and fares, on the one hand, calls for huge expenditures, while, on the other hand, these allocations, being spread among numerous beneficiaries, are incapable of effecting a qualitative change in the situation. Moreover, any attempts to reduce this spending and the number of recipients are a painful shock for the population. For example, the coming into force in 2005 of a benefit monetization law caused unrest that was mostly focused on such a seemingly insignificant problem as depriving the pensioners of the right to free travel by municipal transport. But it turned out that the expense was unacceptable for this category, given the general level of pensions.

Hardships generated by the reforms led to a revision of attitudes to the “distribution—exchange” opposite as well, the more so that yet another related opposite, “paternalism—individualism,” which, however, has more to do with value preferences, was superimposed upon its assessment by the population. Superimposed upon the general complexity of transforming the “power—property” system (LAOs) were the specific features of the postsocialist situation. The

transformations took place against the background of the move to dismantle the institution of “public (government) ownership” inherent in the old system. But this ownership was neither public, nor government in the generally accepted sense of the word. The real owner of this property was the “party-state,” CPSU (for more detail, see:<sup>10</sup>). In a situation where the Communist Party was first weakened and then eliminated altogether, the country’s huge assets became ownerless, with a considerable part of the old elite as well as the more active members of most different population groups taking advantage of the opportunities opened by the privatization policy. In most cases, the new owners proved inefficient,<sup>11</sup> while the employees found themselves victims of the existing situation, because for the majority of them their wages were the only source of livelihood. All of this led to an upsurge of negative attitudes to the reforms and a buildup of paternalist moods, the more so that the individual initiative was progressively restricted. It was a conscious policy for the new owners, who regarded a large workforce, even one clearly exceeding the production needs, as a convenient bargaining chip in haggling with the authorities for benefits, orders, and the like. As shown by Levada Center polls, this even resulted in a slight increase in, rather than diminution of the paternalist moods during the reform period (See: Table 1). Moreover, in the 2000s, when the economic situation substantially improved, these moods continued to grow.

*Table 1*

**Answers to the Question:  
“Can or Cannot the Majority of People in Russia Survive without Constant Care  
and Protection on the Part of the State?” (%)**

<b>Years</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
The majority of people will be able to survive without government care	21	17	21	15	15	15	19	20
The majority will not be able to survive without government care	62	72	74	81	80	77	75	75
Hard to say	17	11	5	4	5	8	6	4
<i>Source.</i> <sup>12</sup>								

As a result of the paternalist moods and the general functioning of the economy geared not so much to production as to the redistribution of rent incomes derived primarily from energy sales, the preferences in the “distribution—exchange” opposite became reoriented again. The real economic practice made the distribution-related strategies more rational and therefore preferable. (It is indicative that Viktor Polterovich dedicated one of his articles to what he called a permanent redistribution society.<sup>13</sup>) For this reason, the “distribution—exchange” vector changed its direction again.

Overall, the above processes induced the general resultant vector to emerge from the mutation zone and return to the “power—property” (LAOs) zone. The only thing that happened was the reinstitutionalization of the “power—property” system (LAOs), as described by both Eisenstadt and D. North and his colleagues. We can also say that an attempt to emerge from the “power—property” system, which is motivated mostly by socioeconomic considerations, proves highly erratic. Faced with difficulties inevitable in the course of an economic and political overhaul, a population that has accepted change solely for socioeconomic reasons would quickly become disappointed and urge a return to a situation that seems better, albeit not comfortable, when compared with the difficulties and uncertainty of the reform processes.

This state could be overcome solely with reliance on the set of society’s sociocultural traditions, which is not only unopposed to, but, on the contrary, supports the reform impulses (see, for example,<sup>14</sup>), as well as on the ideological and political motives of importance for the majority. For example, the idea of liberation from the USSR’s diktat helped the Central and East European countries and the Baltic states to weather the hardships of the first reform years as well as to put up with financial austerity and the painful structural reform in the economy. Lacking these unifying motives, the whole of society witnesses an increasing political polarization both among the mass of the population and within the elites, and this makes politicians curtail the reforms. Timothy Frye, who had analyzed the course of reforms in 25 postsocialist countries, came to the conclusion that they were mostly hampered by the high level of political polarization.<sup>15</sup> Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov, for their part, state that in these situations politicians “are encouraged to more or less curtail the reforms by either slowing down the economic and institutional reforms or conducting inconsistent reforms that benefit producers at the expense of population groups dependent on state support.”<sup>16</sup> This goes to say that for transformations to be successful, the whole of society should become firmly convinced that it needs not only economic but also more sweeping sociocultural and ideological-political changes as well as less polarization in society and within the elites.

The question that has to be answered is whether it is possible, proceeding from the terms of the suggested construction, to stabilize society’s attitude for radical change in a different configuration of vectors. I believe that in this regard we should focus on “the law—custom based on the submission to a powerful individual” vector. In essence, a shift of emphasis in society’s demands towards “the law” pole is related to society’s value foundations and corresponds to the first “doorstep condition” for transiting to OAOs, formulated by North—Wallis—Weingast for the elites.<sup>17</sup> A public-elite consensus on the primacy of law as an immutable principle of conflict resolution regardless of the sides’ status is of more importance in a postmodernization society than in societies that remain on a lower level of development and are, accordingly, more prone to being influenced by the traditionalist archaism. In this context, it is not only the elite (if it is, indeed, the elite) that can (and must) act as an educator of the masses and teach them by its example what to do. The public, too, realizing the importance

for its own survival of the impersonal principle of equality of all before the law, can use the mechanisms at its disposal to pressurize the elites and urge the creation of relevant institutions and supervision mechanisms to control the implementation of this principle.

But for this pressure to be productive society must nurture real requirements for a rule-of-law state unburdened with informal relations that in real practice induce problem resolution within the framework of habitual customs and procedures. What, in this sense, is the situation in present-day Russian society? On the one hand, it is widely believed that the entire legal system and primarily the judiciary is in crisis and used for political purposes and to bless illegal takeovers in the economic sector, which is the chief obstacle to the country's economic, social and political development. However, according to lawyers, the current Russian authorities "either through folly or intentionally did and continue to do all they can to make Russia linger as long as possible in the transitional labyrinths on its way to a rule-of-law state, this time as a totalitarian state relying on the 'hands-on' management of the economy and society, using violence as its main tool, and representing the interests of the corrupt establishment and business community that derives rents from power, rather than those of the *socium*."<sup>18</sup>

The formally proclaimed principles of the rule-of-law state are flouted both at the legislative level, where laws are approved that open the way to arbitrariness, and at the law enforcement level: "The current limited access orders are characterized by the fact that, existing as they do in the modern world (legal) environment, they have to formally proclaim the supremacy of law, but the implementation of this principle in these social orders is blocked by different methods. As a result, the social forces or personalities, whose actions are perceived by the authorities as an attempt to materialize the proclaimed (if 'dead') rights, which make it possible to replace the ruling elite, are exposed to criminal persecution and confiscation of property (if property in question is 'worth being confiscated')."<sup>19</sup>

Generally, it can be asserted that the current Russian elite is thus far dominated by those who seek to maintain the "power—property" system, or LAOs, even if the price to be paid is degradation of the national economy. As is evident from the practices typical of the "fat" 2000s, the mobilization development principles characteristic of this system (currently expressed in the budget funding of some or other megaprojects) have not only failed to promote any significant technological breakthroughs but also produced paltry results in the area of infrastructure development, etc., by comparison with the magnitude of investment (suffice it to recall the scandals associated with the funding for the APEC Leaders' Week, the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, GLONASS, and others). At the same time, rampant corruption and enrichment of client businesses are a widely recognized fact.

Members of the elite who are conscious of the perilous nature of the current official course, are as yet too weak to turn the tide. Their position might be strengthened by more pressure "from below," or a change in the direction of "the law—custom based on the submission to a powerful individual" vector in public

needs and real behavior of the majority. So far, however, for all the critical attitudes to the authorities, the situation in this sphere is controversial. Sociological polls show that the idea of “living by the law” is popular in society. According to a Levada Center poll (August 2012), 55% of respondents believed that the national authority should be based on respect for the Constitution; 30%, on “submission to public control and strict compliance with the laws”; while only 18% and 7%, respectively, held that the authorities were really abiding by these principles. In December 2012, there were 55% of those who thought it necessary to put the authorities under public control (35% claimed that it was more important to “strengthen the authority), but only 33% agreed that it made sense for the citizens to apply to the judiciary in order to solve their problems.<sup>20</sup> (Interestingly, there were just 21% of respondents with the same views in 2008; by the end of 2010, this indicator reached 41%, but slightly declined later.<sup>21</sup>) These data show that “living by the law” is not yet so popular to become a “material force.” These views are voiced at best by slightly more than a half of those polled.

This corroborates the conclusions of Natalya Tikhonova, who regards the standard value principles of modern Russian society as a variety of the “power—property” model, albeit one that has reached the stage of decay. According to her studies, there is more societal demand for “the law” (“written law”) as a new social regulator replacing the “tradition” (a “custom” reflecting the dependence on what slot parties to a dispute fill in the status hierarchy). Generally, Russians *“remain in their mass supportive of the ‘consensus’ model of orderliness implying, first, that the norms of the law are mandatory for all and that only in this case they are ready to comply with them, and, second, that these norms have been morally legitimized, which means that they tally with their views on social justice.”*<sup>22</sup>

At the same time, both the public and the elites are increasingly aware of the dangers involved in spurning the law. In May 2013, Levada Center held a poll on what Russians feared most of all, coming to the conclusion that this was the fear “of official arbitrariness and lawlessness.” According to Aleksey Levinson, “There are steadily 50% more people worried by this than those who are not. The maximum anxiety in this context is displayed by people positioned in proximity to the authorities, who are in power themselves, albeit to an insignificant extent. Next in line are security, defense and law enforcement officers (*siloviki*) who are afraid of ‘a toughening of the political regime’ much more than others. Along with senior officials, many of them (almost 25%) fear a ‘relapse into massive reprisals.’ Presumably, both categories are apprehensive because they know the trend of events better than anyone else. They realize that they have been involved in arbitrariness ... and prevailing iniquity gives them every reason to fear that later on they will for their part fall victim to arbitrariness.”<sup>23</sup>

A no less important reply is that to the question about how Russians themselves are ready to obey laws under the existing circumstances. Tatyana Zaslavskaya and Marina Shabanova have analyzed levels of legal consciousness characterizing *MBA* program students of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the RF President, considered an

“advanced” group of Russian businessmen in terms of their attitude to modernization. The researchers traced the dynamics of ratios between the “law-abiding,” i.e., those who believe that laws, even if imperfect, should be obeyed because disobedience will prove a costlier asset; the “violators” confident that doing business by lawful methods alone is impossible; and the “relativists,” who play it by the ear and allow of sidestepping the law for the good of the cause (See: Table 2). These data are of interest because the majority of those polled (the “violators” and the “relativists”) have openly declared their non-compliance with the law. Moreover, the share of law abiding individuals is less in the younger generation of businessmen (under 30 years) than in the older groups (32% vs. 41-60%).<sup>24</sup>

*Table 2*

**Specific Features of Legal Consciousness  
in Business Community (%)**

<b>Years</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2010</b>
“Law-abiders”	28	35	41	38
“Relativists”	47	50	38	39
“Violators”	25	15	21	23
<i>Source.</i> <sup>25</sup>				

Thus, data provided by different researchers indicate that the Russian public, for all its displeasure with official arbitrariness, is yet to form the true demand for reforming the formal and—particularly—informal relationships on the basis of strict conformity to the law. Much in this regard depends on the authorities that seek to keep the principles of interaction with the public within the existing customary framework. But a rejection of the current orders is growing as well. For this reason, “the law—custom based on the submission to a powerful individual” vector can be defined as still tending towards the “custom” pole and yet nearing the zero mark. This means that the resultant of public aspirations is approaching zero.

In effect, this is a sign that the Russian public is at a point of bifurcation and that any event with wide-ranging public repercussions is capable of leading the socium out of its state of equilibrium. If this includes a swing in public preferences towards formulating a clear demand for conformity to the law and strict sanctions for neglect of law, including law enforcement and judiciary arbitrariness, this will mean materialization of one of the *doorstep conditions* necessary for a society transiting to the OAOs or commencing a mutation of the “power—property” system.

I think that in this process it is the direction of “the law—custom based on the submission to a powerful individual” vector that is of key importance as being crucial to qualitative transformations in the institutional system. In this case, the doorstep condition for the whole of society supports the doorstep con-

dition for the elite, as formulated by D. North and his colleagues. This merger of aspirations can provide certain insurance against yet another failure of modernization efforts. But it appears that the reversal of just one vector is not enough. At least one more vector should change direction and desirably build up a potential for deep-going institutional change.

Can this be a vector equal in effect to the “democracy—dictatorship” opposite? Here we face a difficult situation. On the one hand, transiting to democratic principles is a crucial component of the OAOs and relates to the doorstep conditions for the elites (North *et al.*). But on the other hand, the world abounds in states that are democratic in form but authoritarian or even dictatorial in essence. Therefore, it is important in this case that people have the right perception of the essence of the democratic processes rather than confine themselves to an indifferent recognition of their form. From this point of view, we cannot say that Russians are any closer to realizing the essence of democracy. Even though a stable majority acknowledge that Russia needs democracy (according to Levada Center’s 2005-2012 polls, their number varies stably between 55 and 67%, which compares with 16-27% of those who believe that democracy is not for Russia), the main problem is what people imply by democracy, and in this respect the results are not so rosy. Only between 18 and 27% are sure that we need the same kind of democracy as in Europe and the USA; 10-20% favor the USSR’s model; 3-10% say that Russia needs no democracy at all; and between 38 and 49% are of the opinion that this country needs a special type of democracy of its own that conforms to its specificity and national traditions.<sup>26</sup>

Given the indifference of the popular majority, the authorities can well pass off some pseudodemocratic constructs like “managed” or “sovereign” democracy as varieties of true democracy. N. Tikhonova writes that “since for Russians freedom still means ‘being free from’ (that is, from society, superiors, *socium*’s demands, etc., as distinct from ‘being free to’ defend one’s interests in pursuance of lawful rights and freedoms, a model accepted in modernized societies.—*N.P.*), many instrumental values of democracy are perceived as relatively unimportant. In their eyes, the key attributes of democracy are equality of all before the law (53%), the independent judiciary (43%), freedom of the press (43%), free elections (40%), and being free to express one’s political views (36%). As for multiplicity of parties, political opposition, and other elements of democracy as its main attributes, these were named by less than 20% of respondents in 2010.”<sup>27</sup> Characteristically, the opposition’s objectives are interpreted quite specifically as well. Russians believe that they consist in seeing to it that the authorities honor public interests the right way and in helping them along in this important matter. Power struggles are *not* for the opposition.

The realities of life dictate that the majority should acquiesce in the existing “mellow authoritarian” order and its pseudodemocratic forms as the rational model of behavior. Moreover, the growing difficulties in running an increasingly complex society are perceived by many as an onset of chaos that seems hard to be mastered on the basis of democratic procedures. Under these circumstances, a rational option appears to be the “ridding of the political system of

excessive democracy” as a structural condition for survival of democracy as such.<sup>28</sup> This fear of chaos, represented as being endemic in democratic freedom, is successfully exploited by supporters of authoritarianism, something that also makes the “dictatorship—democracy” vector point away from democracy.

But an awareness of the importance of the democratic society’s system is eroding the existing orders that currently find themselves in a state of highly unstable equilibrium. Some or other specific events are capable of tipping the balance to either side. Much depends on the extent to which true democratic standards and values take root in society and how real the grassroots demand for true democracy proves to be. So far, their real evolution has been blocked by the authorities, who simultaneously exploit democratic rhetoric, thereby freezing the state of uncertainty.

It is also in the interests of the ruling elites to keep the “distribution—exchange” vector pointing to the “distribution” pole. At the start of the reforms, with the market tendency prevailing, people displayed initiative launching businesses, mostly small ventures. Even though they were forced into it by the difficult economic situation rather than a calling or an internal need, it was these businessmen who saved both themselves and the country in 1992 and 1993. After that, however, a new institutionalization of the “power-property” system set in, tending to monopolize all types of activities and bureaucratize economic relations. As a result, private enterprise and its relations of free exchange began to contract again.

Bureaucrats demanding a share of benefits as payment for their involvement in control functions increasingly take center stage in economic relations. Given the rising importance of government investment in most different projects, the economic activities become more and more dependent on what is known as “budget financial flows” (and just “financial flows” as a natural rent redistribution method). This is pushing to the fore relations of distribution and corruption that they naturally generate. “Russian corruption is specific in that it is an umbrella name for corrupt behavior of people with identical social status and rent redistribution within patron-client networks which are the basis of the natural state (limited access state). Under these circumstances, the fight against the patron-client networks, which, on the one hand, are part of the government machine, and, on the other hand, are part of civil society, can be nothing other than a fight *between* patron-client networks. *There are just no other political and economic entities in Russia.*”<sup>29</sup>

Focused on redistribution through both formal (taxes and charges for “social responsibility of business”) and informal channels rather than on an equitable exchange of products, the existing economic practices are depressing the economic activity. Small and medium-sized businesses are first to decay as less immune to official high-handedness. For example, according to *Global Entrepreneurship Monitoring. Russia 2012*, only 2.2% of Russians were planning to start a business from scratch in 2012. This is the lowest indicator among countries conducting relevant studies and the lowest one in Russia since 2006. Along with the active entrepreneurs, the share of those willing to open a business is

3.8% (other BRICS countries average 21% and East Europe, 24%). Business ombudsman Boris Titov has described the situation as worrisome, mentioning massive cancellations of private business registrations in 2013 on account of a twofold increase in social contributions.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, oriented to a predominance of redistributive processes with their inevitable by-product, corruption, the government policy keeps the “distribution—exchange” vector pointed to the “distribution” pole, i.e., in the “power—property” zone (LAOs). The same is true of the related “paternalism—individualism” vector. Playing down private activity, primarily self-organization which is restricted where it does come to the surface (for example, the growing volunteer movement, all sorts of NGOs, and the like) *de facto* means encouraging paternalism, although it is increasingly difficult for the government to honor its commitments.

Generally, this society of “freezing” policy has succeeded in keeping the said vectors in a situation which is convenient for the authorities. But the general dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs, primarily rampant corruption, can give an impetus to yet another reversal of the poles of the said opposition. This outburst may well be complemented with the social tensions vector (linked to views on causes of widespread people’s destitution) changing its direction. For the time being, it is maintained in its present position by the deep-rooted and propaganda-fanned conviction that the problems are due to the “wrong” reforms in the “raucous 1990s.” After all, the 2000s were marked by a real improvement in the living standards, although most people would not pause to consider the extents to which this process was influenced by the growing energy prices, the results of the reforms implemented in the 1990s, or the economic policy in the 2000s, particularly the latter half of the first decade and the early 2010s.<sup>31</sup>

*Table 3*

**Disadvantaged Population Groups  
in Russia between 2002 and 2007**  
(%; the entire disadvantaged population  
in each year—100%)

Years`	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Gainfully employed population	61.2	60.5	60.2	60.2	60.5	61.1
Employed in the economic sector	58.7	58.2	58.1	58.4	58.7	59.4
Including working pensioners	2.8	3.0	3.3	3.5	3.8	4.1
Unemployed	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.7
Economically inactive population	38.8	39.5	39.8	39.8	39.5	38.9
Including unemployed pensioners	16.1	16.2	15.7	15.0	15.1	15.1
<i>Source.</i> <sup>32</sup>						

The current relative prosperity is clearly precarious and enjoyed by far from all people. Levada Center, which has been registering family prosperity testimonies for two decades, states that the share of those with enough money for clothing and food grew by 3 to 4 percentage points to 49% in 2012, presumably as a result of pre-election social policies; the share of those who could afford consumer durables but shirked at expensive purchases also grew (to 19%). But the proportion of people for whom buying clothes was a problem was still high (22%), while those short of money even for food constituted a stable 9% for several years.

Importantly, a person with a job in Russia, as distinct from advanced countries, is not guaranteed against poverty, which is also a consequence of the “low wages system,” an institutional trap inherited from the Soviet period, from which Russia is still unable to emerge. Table 3 shows that the proportion of gainfully employed population, including people with jobs in the economic sector, among the poor remained practically unchanged during the years of stable economic growth. This warrants the conclusion that in present-day Russia, “paid work is no insurance against poverty. A case in point is households made up of working-age singletons, 68.7% of which fall into the category of low-income employees.”<sup>33</sup> As a result, the nature of jobs and wages offered on the labor market is such as to serve as no safeguard against poverty or social exclusion, despite an extremely low level of unemployment registered throughout the period of reforms. And this “*implies a low level of interest in getting a job as a means for dealing with one’s problems and a method of successful integration in society.*”<sup>34</sup>

Hypothetically, any complication in the economy against this background can cause a rapid rise in social tensions. True, there are most different alternate versions as to who the popular consciousness may blame for the deterioration and, accordingly, how the social tensions vector might be redirected.

More likely than not, however, the redirection will not promote processes of transition to OAOs. Instead the inversion mechanisms described by Aleksandr Akhizezer are more likely to come into play. Among other things, he wrote immediately after the 1991 events that the reforms were not evidence of a transition to liberalism but rather that of the continuing cyclic dynamics of vacillations between the authoritarian and *veche* (popular assembly) ideals.<sup>35</sup> Under these circumstances, deterioration in living standards is unlikely to prod the elites into trying to modernize society and transit to OAOs. It will sooner lead to a new attempt at “an inversion breakthrough to some utopian state.” The more so that “it is impossible to manage modernization effectively in a ‘frozen society,’ as it is impossible to simultaneously ensure society’s change and its immutability.”<sup>36</sup> If the current Russian elites hope to maintain “stability” primarily by “freezing” the situation with the help of paternalist support for certain strata of the population, they should keep in mind that the reaction to the weakening of this support is, as a rule, irrational, oriented to illusory aims and directed against the erstwhile benefactors of the disappointed masses. This reaction is not connected with the wish to change the predominant orders, but it is still dangerous for the powers that be.

We should not forget in this context that, as Natalya Zubarevich put it, there are “four Russias”<sup>37</sup> with different living standards, socioeconomic opportunities, development potentials, etc., coexisting within today’s Russia and that the “freezing” efforts are focused primarily on Russia #3 and Russia #4, although it is there that we observe the most difficult socioeconomic situation. But “any economic modernization inevitably leads to a buildup of territorial *economic* contrasts, because the scale of financial aid to peripheral territories... from the federal and regional budgets will become more limited, while their objective development opportunities will prove more modest than in big cities.”<sup>38</sup> Therefore, the “four Russias” are likely to display different degrees of dissatisfaction as well. The same applies to perceptions about causes of difficulties and the nature of difficulties as such, something that complicates identification of the value and resultant direction of the all-Russia’s social tensions vector. At the same time, we may assume that in the “first Russia” the said vectors will be more vigorously inclined towards a change in LAOs.

But, as demonstrated by the developments in the early 1990s, the economically orientated vectors are generally unstable and the likelihood of yet another modernization failure is sufficiently high if reformers rely solely on these vectors. So, we should hardly hope for invigoration of reforms under pressure “from below” in case of a socioeconomic decline as a consequence, for example, of falling oil prices. A more likely prod “from below” is one related to the value-oriented vectors, involving consistent demands to comply with the legislation and truly democratic principles. Moreover, the awareness of the need for qualitative changes should reach as high a pitch as to force both the elites and the whole of society to take real action. Moreover, these processes correspond to the doorstep conditions for the elites identified by D. North and his colleagues. According to Boris Dubin, “modernization is impossible in a society of *onlookers*, whereas a society of *participants* must somehow be formed, and this is the main task.”<sup>39</sup>

Cooperation between the ruling elite and the whole of society seems to be of crucial importance for the success of the general progress of the *socium* towards OAOs. In this case, transition-prone portion of the elite will get a powerful ally in the person of proactive groups of society advancing similar demands, while attempts to “freeze” the situation by opponents of change will be less effective. This, in turn, will influence the resultant value and direction of the “distribution—exchange” vectors and the related “paternalism—individualism” vector.

Thus, the steady transition of “the law—custom based on the submission to a powerful individual” and “dictatorship—democracy” vectors to “the law” and “democracy” poles can be regarded as the *doorstep condition* for a society that has started a transition from the “power—property” system and limited access orders to the open access orders and the private enterprise—market democratic system. If it is supported by relevant changes in other vectors, the resultant vector will hopefully take a stable position in the mutation zone. And this opens the way to OAOs and mature statehood.

NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> D. North, J. Wallis, B. Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*, New York, 2009, (Russian translation, Moscow, 2011); D. North, J. Wallis, S. Webb, B. Weingast, *In the Shadow of Violence: The Problem of Development for Limited Access Order Societies*, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- <sup>2</sup> N. Pliskevich, “Power—Property” Mutations: Problems and Prospects, Moscow, 2007 (in Russian).
- <sup>3</sup> A. Auzan, “Modernization As a Problem: Looking for a National Formula,” *Zhurnal Novoy Ekonomicheskoy Assotsiatsii*, No. 7, 2010; A. Auzan, K. Kelimbetov, “The Sociocultural Formula of Economic Modernization,” *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 5, 2012; A. Auzan, K. Kelimbetov, “The Sociocultural Formula of Economic Modernization,” *Developing Human Capital: A New Social Policy. A Collection of Scientific Articles*, Moscow, 2013 (in Russian).
- <sup>4</sup> <http://www.kapital-rus.ru/articles/237229/>
- <sup>5</sup> The sociological polls in 1990 and 1991 registered that a steady majority (from two-thirds to three-quarters of those polled) favored a transition from the planned economy to the market. At the same time, as steady a majority were unwilling to accept the inevitable concomitant hardships and problems, being totally opposed to unemployment, price hikes, etc. Later these moods could not but affect the 1992 market reforms and the majority attitudes thereto.
- <sup>6</sup> O. Shkaratan, V. Ilyin, *Social Stratification in Russia and East Europe: A Comparative Analysis*, Moscow, 2006, p. 263 (in Russian).
- <sup>7</sup> S. Eizenshtadt, “Failures of Modernization,” *Neprikosnovenny zapas*, No. 6, 2010 (in Russian).
- <sup>8</sup> N. Pliskevich, “Low Wage System: An Institutional Trap,” *Social Policy in the Context of the ‘Normative Theory of the State,’* Moscow, 2009 (in Russian); N. Pliskevich, “‘Low Wage System:’ Institutional Trap of the Postsocialist Economy,” *Zhurnal Novoy Ekonomicheskoy Assotsiatsii*, No. 5, 2010.
- <sup>9</sup> *National Economy in 1987. A Statistical Yearbook*, Moscow, 1988, pp. 406, 390 (in Russian).
- <sup>10</sup> N. Pliskevich, “‘Power—Property’ in Modern Russia: Origin and Prospects,” *Mir Rossii*, No. 3, 2006.
- <sup>11</sup> The ideologists of privatization had no illusions in this sense either; they believed that these owners would soon be ruined and their property would be appropriated by efficient owners. In reality, however, the new owners compensated their inefficiency by their old connections with government, law enforcement and other agencies. This made it possible to shift the inefficiency costs to the government on the pretext of the employees needing social support or some other sociopolitical aspects related to the operation of a business, particularly a giant enterprise or a local economic mainstay.
- <sup>12</sup> *Public Opinion—2012. Yearbook*, Moscow, 2012, p. 40 (in Russian).
- <sup>13</sup> V. Polterovich, “A Permanent Redistribution Society,” *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost (ONS)*, No. 5, 2005.
- <sup>14</sup> A. Gofman, “What Legacy We Are Not Renouncing: Sociocultural Traditions and Innovations in Russia at the Turn of the 21st Century,” *Traditions and Innovations in Modern*

- Russia. A Sociological Analysis of Interaction and Dynamics*, Moscow, 2008 (in Russian).
- 15 T. Frye, *Building States and Markets After Communism: The Perils of Polarized Democracy*, Cambridge, 2010.
- 16 I. Busygina, M. Filippov, *Political Modernization of the State in Russia: The Need, Vectors, Costs, Risks*, Moscow, 2012, p. 162 (in Russian).
- 17 D. North, J. Wallis, B. Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*.
- 18 Ye. Novikova, "Supremacy of Law As a Challenge of the Times," *Supremacy of Law As an Economic Factor*, Moscow, 2013, pp. 223-224 (in Russian).
- 19 A. Fedotov, "Supremacy of Law: Problems of Interpretation," *Supremacy of Law As an Economic Factor*, Moscow, 2013, p. 268 (in Russian).
- 20 *Public Opinion—2012*, pp. 33, 38, 39.
- 21 *Public Opinion—2011. A Yearbook*, Moscow, 2011, p. 40 (in Russian).
- 22 N. Tikhonova, "Dynamics of Russian Society's Normative Value System (1995-2010)," *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost (ONS)*, No. 4, 2011, p. 8 (in Russian).
- 23 A. Levinson, "Almost More Fearsome than War," *Vedomosti*, June 11, 2013, p. 7.
- 24 T. Zaslavskaya, M. Shabanova, "Successful Economic Actors As a Potential Modernization Community. Article 1. Social Features and Interactions in a Problem Institutional Environment," *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost (ONS)*, No. 4, 2012, p. 14.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 *Public Opinion—2012*, p. 25.
- 27 *Where Is Cultural Crisis Leading? Record of Interdisciplinary Dialogues*, Moscow, 2011, p. 312 (in Russian).
- 28 D. Zolo, *Democracy and Complexity: A Realist Approach*, New York, 1992.
- 29 P. Orekhovsky, "The Right to Challenge: Patron-Client Networks and Corruption," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 11, 2012, pp. 115-116.
- 30 *Vedomosti*, April 22, 2013.
- 31 *Public Opinion—2012*, p. 49.
- 32 *Social Support: Lessons of Crises and Modernization Vectors*, Moscow, 2010, p. 181 (in Russian).
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 N. Tikhonova, *The Urban Poverty Phenomenon in Modern Russia*, Moscow, 2003, p. 140 (in Russian).
- 35 A. Akhiezer, *Russia: Critique of Historical Experience Record (Russia's Sociocultural Dynamics). Vol. 1, From Past to Future*, Novosibirsk, 1997, p. 783 (in Russian).
- 36 A. Akhiezer, *Works*, Moscow, 2006, p. 75 (in Russian).
- 37 Russia Number One: Russia of cities with 500,000—1,000,000 plus residents; Number Two: cities with 50,000—250,000 residents; Number Three: small towns, settlements and rural areas; Number Four: underdeveloped republics of Northern Caucasus and

Southern Siberia with specific features of their own regardless of the size of populated localities.

- 38 N. Zubarevich, “Social Differentiation of Regions and Cities,” *Pro et contra*, No. 4-5, 2012, p. 151.
- 39 “Cultural Factors of Modernization Policy or Russia’s Cultural Specifics: *pro et contra* Modernization (Discussion Club Contents),” *Mir Rossii*, No. 3, 2012, p. 46.

*Translated by Aram Yavrumyan*

## The Russian Tricolor: Myths and Historical Reality

*Nadezhda SOBOLEVA*

The white-blue-red striped flag is an emblematic symbol of the Russian Federation familiar to the world at large. But its history is still obscure for the majority of people within Russia itself. Open to various, occasionally mythological, interpretations, its color gamut gives rise to particularly numerous debates. There is no official “explanation” of the colors of the state flag, a symbol of the Russian Federation’s sovereignty, as confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Law, which the State Duma approved on December 8, 2000. Neither is there a description of the colors in President Boris Yeltsin’s 1994 Executive Order *On the Day of the State Flag of the Russian Federation*, issued in connection with the institution of a public holiday in honor of the State Flag, which is celebrated on August 22. Its preamble underscores the flag’s historic importance: “In connection with the reinstatement, on August 22, 1991, of the historic Russian tricolored flag, covered with the glory of many generations of Russians, and in order to inculcate a respectful attitude to the state symbols in the present and future generations of citizens of Russia...”<sup>1</sup>

The flag of the above mentioned executive order is certainly historic. But was it a state flag duly formalized in this status?

Let us turn to history. Conducted by Bernhardt von Koehne, head of the just established Heraldry Department of the Senate, the mid-19th-century reforms of the Russian state coats of arms included, among other things, a program to create the state flag. The effort to streamline the imperial heraldic attributes was mostly due to the need to strengthen the foundations of monarchy in Russia. No matter how liberal and humane Alexander II seemed to be, he was a monarch and the son of his father, Nicholas I, under whom the State Anthem, “God, Save the Tsar!”, was introduced, and who repeatedly expressed his displeasure at the scantiness of monarchic symbols in the town arms.

Alexander II approved the State Flag on June 11, 1858. *The Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire* says this: “Approved by H.I.M.: Description of the pattern and disposition of the Empire’s armorial colors on banners, flags and other objects used for ornaments on solemn occasions. The disposition of these colors is horizontal, the upper stripe is black, the middle stripe is yellow

---

**N. Soboleva**, D. Sc. (History), leading research fellow, Institute of Russian History, RAS. This article was first published in Russian in *Voprosy istorii*, No. 11, 2013.

(or golden), and the lower stripe is white (or silver). The first stripes correspond to the black State Eagle on the yellow or golden ground, and the cockade of these two colors was founded by Emperor Paul I, while the flags and other ornaments in these colors had been used during the reign of Empress Anna Ioannovna. The lower stripe (white or silver) corresponds to the cockade of Peter the Great and Empress Catherine II. Emperor Alexander I, for his part, combined, after the capture of Paris in 1814, the regular armorial cockade with Peter the Great's ancient cockade which corresponds to the white or silver horseman (St. George) on the Moscow Coat of Arms."<sup>2</sup>

The patriotic press used high-flown language to describe how the monarch "created" the Russian State Flag. A prominent apologist of monarchy, Yevstafy Voronets, later wrote: "Conformably to the highly significant state importance of the Russian Coat of Arms, its manifestation was legitimized by the glorious Liberator Tsar, Emperor Alexander II, and all the citizens of the Russian state in unanimity with the Tsar. It was in the years of Russia's radiant revival after the severe Sevastopol defeat, in the years of the high surge of Russian popular spirit that our Liberator Tsar, Emperor Alexander II, for the nationwide manifestation of the Russian Coat of Arms in its simplified symbolic form, issued a law in 1858, which laid it down that all 'the banners, flags and other objects used for ornaments on solemn occasions should be of the Armorial Colors of the Russian Empire.'"<sup>3</sup>

After the publication of the decree, the black-yellow-white flag came to be known as the Armorial National Flag, while "*God, Save the Tsar!*" was known as "the Russian folk song." Active supporters of the Russian autocracy believed that there could be no state flag other than that legitimized by the Emperor, for the people and the authority should be one.

At the same time, the white-blue-red cloth was increasingly often held out as the Russian National Flag. These flags adorned Paris during the visit of the Russian Emperor, who came to sign peace after the Crimean campaign in 1856. The French newspapers styled it precisely as the Russian National Flag.<sup>4</sup> The white-blue-red flags increasingly often appeared on streets of Russian cities, at least in the two capitals: they surrounded the monument to Aleksandr Pushkin during the celebrations of his birthday in 1880 and the monument to the Russian grenadiers who died at Plevna. During the last decade of the 19th century, the white-blue-red flag was displayed at fairs and other popular festivals as well as on buildings, for which purpose special staff sockets were made. It could also be seen in the army during the Russo-Japanese war.

However, the coexistence of the two flags was not so obvious before the 1870s, because it was not customary to bedeck buildings with flags (buildings were decorated with carpets that hung from balconies, garlands and other attributes). But eventually the progressive public reacted to this duplicity of the state flag. For example, Honorary Member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences and author of the *Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language* Vladimir Dahl started asking questions about the color of the Russian State Flag. He wrote: "All nations of Europe know their colors, suits and paints—we do not know and confuse them, raising flags of different color out of place. We do not

have a National Color; the army's color is green and scarlet; the official color is military, St. George's: white, yellow, black (silver, gold, niello) and the same color is on signs (cockades); our banners and fortress flags are multicolored; our navy ensign is white with St. Andrew's cross; the commercial flags are striped white-blue-red affairs. But what colors should be raised or worn on one's person, what colors should adorn buildings, etc. during peaceful national solemnities?"<sup>5</sup>

The white-blue-red flag caught the attention of Emperor Alexander III, who signed laws on the Grand, Medium and Small Coat of Arms of the Russian Empire in 1882 and 1883. In 1883, plans were made to celebrate the Monarch's coronation, but "there were doubts... as to what flags could be allowed as ornaments in the capital during the period of Holy Coronation celebrations. The doubts emerged because Paragraph 8 of the Rules Approved by H.I.M. on the Procedure for Celebrating the Holy Coronation Day said merely that residents were allowed to decorate houses with flags but it did not specify precisely with what flags. Therefore, a wish was announced to the Minister of the Interior Count Dmitry Tolstoy 'to see... the national flags in the Russian capital.'"

On April 28, 1883, Alexander III issued the following legislative order: "The police shall see to it that solely the Russian flag consisting of the three stripes—the upper white stripe, the middle blue stripe, and the lower red stripe—should be used on solemn occasions, when it is deemed possible to allow the decoration of buildings with flags; the use of foreign flags shall only be allowed with regard to buildings occupied by embassies and consulates of foreign powers."<sup>6</sup>

As we can see, this order says nothing about legalizing the white-blue-red cloth, which is described as preeminently Russian national flag. Later, however, a document was found in the papers of the Special Conference on Russian National Colors, which more or less specified the emperor's order on the white-blue-red flag. It transpired that Alexander II had sanctioned the use of the black-yellow-white flag "upon a verbal report by Imperial Court Minister Count Vladimir Adlerberg without any further directives regarding other flags." Alexander III's choice of the National Flag is a different matter. "The Conference learned from the written Most Devoted Report found in the brief that the Minister of the Interior State Secretary Count Tolstoy had presented two flags to be approved by H.I.M.—black-orange-white and white-blue-red—the former as the national and the latter as the commercial flag, and that His Majesty the Emperor had chosen the latter, naming it as exclusively Russian and thereby seemed to solve definitively the problem of our state national flag." Count Tolstoy signed this document and wrote the following endorsement: "His Majesty the Emperor ordered to have everywhere in the empire one uniform flag consisting of the white, blue and red colors."<sup>7</sup>

Even before, the white-blue-red flag was accepted by public consciousness as a Russian national symbol. One magazine, for example, carried designs for a national flag. It was suggested that it should sport the colors of the peasant Sunday coat: a blue ground crossed by a narrow red band. Special Conference papers show that much attention was paid to manifestations of peasant life and Russian nature. It was noted specifically that "the Great Russian peasant wears a red or blue shirt

in the field and even on holiday, while the Small Russian and the White Russian wear a white shirt; Russian peasant women also don red or blue *sarafans*.” It was stressed that the Russian language had many proverbs, definitions and sayings featuring the red color, but proverbs also “demonstrated some respect for the white color.” According to members of the Special Conference, the popular uses of these colors were evidence that “it is necessary to use the white, blue and red colors for the emblematic portrayal of the outward appearance of Russia.”<sup>8</sup>

However, there were more scientific arguments as well, pointing to the historic accomplishments of Peter the Great, which had resulted in the appearance of the white-blue-red flag.

Judging by available publications, this fact was emphasized by members of the second Special Conference on the Russian National Flag, although even the first Special Conference in 1896 was insisting on a general line with regard to the colors of the national flag. Chaired by Adjutant General Constantine Possiet, the conference was mostly attended by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of the Navy, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Justice.

Some participants made preliminary research into the history of flags in general and Russian flags in particular. Upon analyzing the historical data, the conferees came to the conclusion that there were no particular national colors: “...colors differed widely on cockades, coats of arms and flags, and easily alternated. There were no colors of preference, nor ones that would have officially state significance. Therefore, there can be no question of a four-century-long existence of any colors as Russian state colors, as claimed by some authors of pamphlets and newspaper articles, who are out to prove the historic importance of the black, orange and white colors.”<sup>9</sup>

After resolutely rejecting the black-yellow-white colors for the Russian national flag, the participants opted for Peter I’s white-blue-red banner. The resolution they approved said: “The Conference has come to the unanimous conviction that the white-blue-red flag has the right to be called the Russian or national flag and its colors—white, blue and red—to be referred to as the state colors; the black-orange-white flag, in its part, has for this neither heraldic, nor historical grounds. The white-blue-red flag should be one for the whole Empire not excluding Finland.”<sup>10</sup>

On April 29, 1896, Nicholas II endorsed a report submitted by Gen. Adm. Grand Duke Aleksey Aleksandrovich, which contained the findings of the Special Conference on the Colors of Flags Used in Russia, and ordered to proclaim that the white-blue-red flag should be honored in all cases as the national flag and that other flags should not be accepted. The next day, the Military Department issued a directive of its own, ordering “to sell the former flags for the benefit of the Treasury where they are stored.”<sup>11</sup>

However, the public opinion, namely press publications, was not so unanimous. The monarchists were firmly in favor of the black-yellow-white flag, in which they saw a safeguard against impending revolutionary chaos and advertised this flag in every way: “The meaning of this flag here in Russia was and

will ever be: 'For the Tsar and Fatherland!' (Another source said: 'For Faith, Tsar and Fatherland!')."<sup>12</sup>

Some supporters of the white-blue-red flag in the early 20th century also sought to explain its color symbolism by ecclesiastical allusions, moral categories, etc., while disregarding the logic of its origination in Russia, invoked by the participants in the Special Conference. For example, Aleksandr Uspensky claimed in his book that the blue and the white had been chosen by the Russian Orthodox Church, while the blue was believed to be the color of Mother of God. The white was popularly attributed to Faith, Tsar and Fatherland. In the 17th and 18th centuries, according to Russian "everyday" perceptions, the red symbolized valor, war, protection of faith and poor people, heroism, magnanimity, blood, self-sacrifice, fire, and mortal combat. The blue symbolized Heaven, chastity, fidelity, spirituality, and faith. The white symbolized "imperishable perfection," peace, purity, truth, nobleness, perfection and innocence.<sup>13</sup>

The *Rodina* for 1990 carried David Ruskin's article "The Russian Flag," which included images of the above flags with the following captions: "The State Flag (1858-1883)" under the black-yellow-white flag, and "The State Flag of the Russian Empire (1883-1917)" under the white-blue-red flag.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the author (or editor) established certain historical continuity with regard to the Russian State Flag. But had this been the case, Nicholas II would have hardly convened the Special Conference again and assigned it the same agenda of "clarifying in a comprehensive and possibly definitive way the issue of the state Russian national colors." The conference opened in May 1910 at the Ministry of Justice under Deputy Minister Aleksandr Veryovkin. The event was attended not only by Ministry of Justice officials, as in the former case, but also by specialists in heraldry, numismatics and archives, Armory Chamber custodians Yury Arsenyev and Vladimir Trutovskiy, expert on Russian archives Dmitry Samokvasov, and flag expert Pyotr Belavenets. Participants suggested different versions of the Russian national flag (such as a white cloth with the black two-headed eagle). To prove the white-blue-red flag's preeminence over all others, Belavenets had brought from Archangel the original Petrine flag. The following is his description of that rarity: "The flag is made of a special flag fabric (*vlagdock*.—*Dutch*), which is used for flagmaking even today. Its cloth, a square with the sides measuring 6 *arshines* (4.26 meters) each, has three horizontal stripes: white upper stripe, blue middle stripe, and red lower stripe. The stripes are of equal width. A yellow eagle of the same fabric is sewn upon the flag over all the three stripes. A red escutcheon with St. George the Dragon-Slayer emblem is painted in red oil pigment on its breast. White St. George is astride a white horse and slaying a green dragon with a golden lance; the twist of the figure is 'ecclesiastical,' to wit, to the right side of the escutcheon."<sup>15</sup>

Belavenets had the Petrine flag restored and placed in a St. Petersburg museum. He wrote this in the Special Conference's final act: "The ensign on the *Oryol* (the first Russian tall ship.—*Ed.*) was made of the red, white and blue colors, with an eagle, possibly yellow, sewn upon them. In 1693, the triple-stripe ensign with the yellow eagle was used on men-of-war in the White Sea. During the cap-

ture of Azov in 1695, ships flew the flags similar to the third flag in Carl Allard's book ('the third flag is a square cloth with a straight blue cross; the first and the fourth quarters are white, the second and the third quarters are red'<sup>16</sup>), featuring the same white, blue and red colors. During the Kerch campaign in 1699, ships had triple-stripe white-blue-red flags without an eagle...'<sup>17</sup>

There were writers before Belavenets, who described both the *Oryol's* flags and ensigns of other Russian ships built in Holland and Russia in the late 17th century. For example, the *Inventory Books of Russian Ships* published by Sergey Yelagin made several mentions of the white-blue-red colors of ships' ensigns in 1698 and 1699: "The flag needed for navigation is white-blue-red;" the ship received "white, blue and red worsted for flags."<sup>18</sup>

Unlike the first Special Conference that voted for the white-blue-red flag almost unanimously, the second Special Conference was not so unanimous in the matter of the state flag. An active participant in the Conference, Belavenets reported the following in 1915: The participants were divided, with the majority being in favor of introducing as the general flag "a new flag matching the coat of arms," but "upside down, that is, a white-yellow-black flag." However, Belavenets himself and a number of conferees that sided with him were emphatically insisting on the white-blue-red flag. The resultant decision "was not honored with a final endorsement by H.I.M." Preparations for World War I and its outbreak suspended the "choosing" of "the state colors and the national flag." A circular letter issued by the Ministry of the Interior in 1914 prescribed using during rallies a flag that demonstrated what was, in fact, a nonexistent unity of the Russian society and the monarchy, the Tsar and the people. This flag was a combination of two flags: the white-blue-red cloth had in the upper right-hand angle near the staff a yellow square with a black two-headed eagle.

Even though the white-blue-red flag (unlike the black-yellow-white flag) did not possess the official status as the State Russian Flag, the Russian public evolved a tradition, by the early 20th century, to regard the white-blue-red flag as the national (Russian) flag.

In April 1917, a meeting of the Provisional Government's Legal Conference on Using the State Coat of Arms and the National Flag came to the conclusion that the white-blue-red flag should be preserved and regarded as the Russian national flag because it featured no monarchic emblems. The Legal Conference ruled to submit this decision to "the judgment of the Provisional Government."<sup>19</sup> (As is common knowledge, the Provisional Government approved only its seal.)

The Bolsheviks were also concerned with the problem of Russia's national flag. Yakov Sverdlov told a meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on April 8, 1918: "Up till now, the national flag is still the tricolor, although no one is using it; but now that we have to send our ambassadors abroad, for example, to Vienna, Germany, or other (countries), the Russian embassy should fly a national flag, and it cannot be hung without us deciding so."<sup>20</sup>

As a result, they passed the Decree on the Flag of the Russian Republic, endorsing as such the wartime red banner described as both the national and the state official flag.

Thus, it was scientifically established by the early 20th century that the white-blue-red flag had emerged as the ships' ensign in the 1670s—1690s and the *Oryol* was, in all evidence, its source. Besides, there was yet another story about Peter I's white-blue-red flag being influenced by the Dutch red-white-blue flag. This was also mentioned by participants in the first Special Conference and some participants in the second Special Conference. Specifically, Belavenets said that "the Dutch artist, by virtue of his patriotic feeling, could have modeled the *Oryol's* ensign on the Dutch flag."<sup>21</sup>

US historian Robert K. Massie later described Peter I's reaction to a 44-cannon Dutch-built frigate brought from Holland on his orders: when the ship weighed anchor in Archangel, there was a huge Dutch red-white-blue flag waving in the wind on its aft end. Peter immediately decided that his navy's flag should be similar to the Dutch flag. This is why he chose the Dutch flag—three wide horizontal stripes: the upper red stripe, the middle white stripe, and the lower blue stripe—as his model and simply reversed the place of colors. The white color on the Russian flag moved to the upper position, followed by the blue and the red.<sup>22</sup>

It should be mentioned, however, that Peter I, who was carried away by the naval affairs, shipbuilding and rearmament of the Russian army, first saw the sea and foreign ships—English, Dutch, German and others—during his visit to Archangel in 1693. Each of these ships flew the flag of her country, home port or commercial company. These were bright multicolored flags with different stripes or crosses in color, with stripes positioned in various combinations. The Russian monarch created ship flags in keeping with the standards of his time. Contemporary engravings depicting the siege and capture of Azov in the late 17th century testify that Russian ships flew multicolored "cross" and "striped" flags similar to those that adorned European ships.<sup>23</sup>

Neither Belavenets, nor his supporters were under a delusion regarding the functional qualities of the white-blue-red flag. They believed that both the tricolor and "the standard in the image of St. Andrew's cross" were "needed for the navy" and did not aspire to the status of the state and national symbol. Moreover, Peter I himself did not want it that way as he introduced the flags. By contrast, defenders of the black-yellow-white flag viewed it as an ancient Russian symbol that had legitimately filled the state niche. Yevstafy Voronets, a loyal subject of Kharkov, who pinned much hope on the triumph of the monarchy and the black-yellow-white flag as its symbol, welcomed the discussions at the Second Special Conference, claiming that they (the discussions) were a source of joyful hope "for an early restoration in the public practice of the use of the ancient legitimate symbol of the great world self-existent Russian empire. It is high time all Russian people recalled the true origin and the great significance of this black-yellow-white state distinctive Russian symbol of ours that has been torn from the Russian people by the rabid cosmopolitans."<sup>24</sup>

During the Great Patriotic War, there was a resurgence of interpretations as regards the "national Russian colors," a circumstance that can be well explained by an upsurge of patriotic feeling in the country. Nikolay Semenovitch, author of

*A History of the Russian Naval Ensign* published in Leningrad in 1946, effectively rejects the “Dutch” version as, in all evidence, “cosmopolitan.” In analyzing the colors of one of Peter I’s cross ensigns, he offers the following considerations: “The cross is blue because St. George’s mantle in the Moscow urban coat of arms is blue; the ensign’s grounds (first and third, second and fourth quarters) are white and red, because the ground of the coat of arms is red, while St. George’s horse is white.”<sup>25</sup>

However, the color gamut of the Moscow coat of arms that was mentioned by Semenovich could not have influenced the Petrine ensign. Archival data, titular books, books of standard heraldry, etc. make it possible to trace the heraldic “coloration” of many municipal coats of arms, including Moscow’s. It was the Heraldic Chamber established by Peter I in 1722 that pioneered the colors for municipal coats of arms. Originally, St. George’s mantle on the Moscow coat of arms was gold, although the horse was indeed painted white. It was only in late 18th century that the mantle was officially termed “blue.” Therefore, it is simply unscientific to talk about “Russia’s long-lived color (white-blue-red.—K.S.) tradition,” which Peter I allegedly exploited.

We should hardly treat the white-blue-red color gamut as a “Russian national phenomenon”<sup>26</sup> or proceed from this factor in explaining the colors of the Russian flag. The white-blue-red colors are characteristic, for example, of the US flag, the flags of many other countries in North, South and Central America, as well as of many states in Asia and even Africa, let alone Europe, it is evident, specifically, from the perfectly made map “Coats of Arms and Flags of World States.”<sup>27</sup>

It is common knowledge that the Pan-Slav Movement, which emerged in Europe in the 19th century, an epoch that saw the crystallization of political symbols as a special category of signs, “usurped” the white-blue-red colors of flags.<sup>28</sup> Some countries retain these colors to this day (Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, and the Czech Republic). True, in the Modern Times and the contemporary period, however, practically no one resorts to interpreting the widespread colors of the Middle Ages. There is ample information on this score in many modern encyclopedias, reference books and dictionaries of symbols and emblems.<sup>29</sup> It is stressed that the medieval color symbolism was gradually forgotten in the 20th century, although a certain “color codification” (white, black, red, purple, blue, yellow and green) “demonstrates the ancient symbolic power” over the modern man as well.<sup>30</sup>

Political scientists believe that national flags and emblems are the most well-known collective identity symbols “which serve to convey patriotism and unity of citizens of countries they epitomize”<sup>31</sup> and help to focus the opinion on both state symbols as a whole and national flags in particular. In many countries they are national holies.

A case in point is the US national flag and the importance it commands in American society as a “non-verbal ideal symbol” related to the concept of “political culture.”<sup>32</sup> It was George Washington who is believed to have described the flag in these words: “We take the star from Heaven, the red from our mother

country, separating it by white stripes, thus showing that we have separated from her, and the white stripes shall go down to posterity representing liberty.”<sup>33</sup>

Inherent in the interpretation of the U.S. flag, the meaning of “republicanism” was extended to its three colors—the blue, the red, and the white—which were perceived as the republican colors; researchers believe that in this interpretation the US state flag influenced the flags of different countries of the world.<sup>34</sup>

As far as the Russian flag is concerned, it is often referred to, in line with what historians said before the 1917 revolution, as “commercial” and as such is opposed to both the St. Andrew ensign and the Soviet red flag, even though there are both pictorial and written testimonies by contemporaries of those times of its use in hostilities during, for example, the Northern war.

Not accidentally, a white-blue-red striped flag with a golden two-headed eagle in the middle, measuring about 6 square meters, was a trophy in Stockholm, Sweden, as far back as the early 20th century, along with other military flags captured from the Russians as a result of the battle of Narva, which Peter I lost in 1700. Judging by contemporary engravings, men-of-war, such as the *Predestination*, were decorated with striped tricolors,<sup>35</sup> while navy pennants on ships and galleys kept the white-blue-red colors throughout the 18th century. Indicatively, a table of ensigns (*Demonstration of Navy Flags*),<sup>36</sup> which was published in Kiev in 1709 and edited by the Tsar, who also supplied his commentaries, featured a caption—“The flag usually carried by merchantmen and other Russian ships”—under the white-blue-red tricolor.

An entry made by Danish plenipotentiary minister Just Juel on May 1, 1710, said: “All other ordinary ships... assigned to leave for Vyborg with food products, guns and ammunition fly white-blue-red tricolors...”<sup>37</sup>

The modern reader knows little about the extensive use during the epoch of Petrine reforms and military victories of the white-blue-red flag, which, incidentally, could have been seen used by military forces even in the course of the Russo-Japanese war. The reader would not analyze hard-of-access books on vexillology published before the 1917 revolution. This being so, he, more likely than not, accepted the superficial version that the white-blue red flag had been originally intended for commercial uses and, in general, had been borrowed from Holland, as certain defenders of the “native” black-yellow-white flag insisted.<sup>38</sup> Echos of this characterization of the Russian Federation’s state flag can be heard in current pseudopatriotic rhetoric to this day.

Certain Western sociologists and political scientists regard the white-blue-red tricolor as a “Western invention” as well. Paul Kolstoe, among others, interprets the Russian Federation’s tricolor as a “pro-Western” rather than “pro-Tsarist” flag.<sup>39</sup>

However, they fail to take into account the fact that since the last quarter of the 19th century the Russian emperors, while using the black-yellow-white flag in various ceremonies, still recognized the white-blue-red tricolor as the national and Russian flag. It was positioned in public consciousness as a popular symbol.

A large number of flags with new democratic emblems sprang up in the period between the two Russian revolutions (1905-1917).<sup>40</sup> But the new banners

failed to oust the white-blue-red flag which was carried during patriotic rallies and “liberty holidays.”<sup>41</sup>

Even though the white-blue-red tricolor (unlike the black-yellow-white flag) lacked the official status of the state flag, there was a tendency Russian society in the early 20th century to view it as the national flag. It was regarded as such even by the Bolsheviks. Yakov Sverdlov, for one, stressed in 1918 that Russia’s national flag “was still the tricolor.”

In this quality it stuck in the minds of a certain part of Russians, primarily those who left Russia after 1917. Some researchers ascribe to the tricolor the functions of military flag in the Civil War.

There is an opinion in historiography that it was the white-blue-red flag that symbolized the beginning of the White Movement in Russia, because the First Kuban (“Ice”) Campaign, which was spearheaded by the Shock Kornilov Regiment under Gen. Lavr Kornilov, proceeded under a white-blue-red flag carrying the inscription “Fatherland” on its cloth. It is believed that the tricolor as the symbol of the White Movement was opposed to the red flag during the Civil War.

A number of studies call into question the status of the white-blue-red flag as a military sanctity of the White Movement. For example, a prominent expert on flags and symbols of the February revolution and Civil War, Pavel Kornakov, writes this: “Characteristically, the white-blue-red flag in itself was almost out of use as the basis for the combat flag (we know that only some units of the North-Western Army had white-blue-red combat flags); there were isolated cases of its use in Southern Russia. It was introduced in the Armed Forces of Southern Russia as a mandatory element of flags for armored trains and was the general main symbol of the fight for Russia.”<sup>42</sup> A distinguishing symbol of the Volunteer Army was a tricolored shevron with “the national colors—white, blue and red,” which was sewn on the left sleeve of the uniform. As the emblem of the Volunteer Army, it was also featured on military equipment—armored trains, aircraft, etc.

Regrettably, the myth of the white-blue-red tricolor and its significance for the “Vlasov army” during the 1941-1945 war, a myth oriented to inadequate historical knowledge of Russian society, is widespread in print publications. This mythmaking does more harm than good, although, admittedly, some myths are based on quite concrete facts. However, these facts are, more often than not, a far cry from their subsequent interpretations.

No matter what passions rage in connection with the white-blue-red Russian flag, we must not forget that these colors are an important element of the Russian navy’s history and the recognition of Russia’s grandeur by many countries. This flag was a gift from the great monarch, Peter I, whose works are regarded by all Russians wherever they are as a feat of valor.

---

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> “Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation of August 20, 1994,” *Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation*, No. 1714, 1994.
- <sup>2</sup> *Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire*, Second Collection, vol. XXXIII, St. Petersburg, 1860, Section Three, Appendix No. 33289 (in Russian).

- 3 Ye. Voronets, *The Four Hundredth Anniversary of the Russian State Coat of Arms*, Kharkov, 1898, p. 46 (in Russian).
- 4 P. Belavenets, "Modification of the Russian State Coat of Arms in the Imperial Period," *Vestnik Imperatorskogo Obshchestva revniteley istorii*, Petrograd, 1915, Issue II, p. 80 (in Russian).
- 5 V. Dahl, *Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language*, vol. IV, Moscow, 1991, p. 535 (in Russian).
- 6 Quoted from: P. Belavenets, op. cit., p. 81; N. Nikolayev, *The National Flag. A Historical Essay on the Regalia and Insignia of the Russian Army*, vol. II, St. Petersburg, 1899, p. 5 (in Russian).
- 7 *His Imperial Majesty's Special Conference under the Ministry of Justice. Deliberations*, Journal No. 3, p. 25 (in Russian).
- 8 Ibid., Journal No. 4, pp. 32-33.
- 9 Ibid., Journal No. 1, pp. 8-9.
- 10 Ibid., "Report by Gen. Adm. Grand Duke Aleksey Aleksandrovich," p. 34 (in Russian).
- 11 N. Nikolayev, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
- 12 V. Belinsky, "Reforming the Russian National Flag," *Sankt-Peterburgskiyе vedomosti*, 1911, No. 286 (in Russian); Idem, "The Russian National Color," *Birzhevyе vedomosti*, 1912, No. 12717 (in Russian).
- 13 A. Uspensky, *A Tale of the Beginning of Signs and Flags or Pennants*, Moscow, 1904, p. 13 (in Russian).
- 14 D. Ruskin, "The Russian Flag," *Rodina*, 1990, No. 3, p. 43 (in Russian).
- 15 Quoted from: V. Belinsky, "The Russian National Flag and Its Reform," *Zhurnal Ministerstva Yustitsiyi*, 1910, No. 9, p. 143.
- 16 C. Alard, *A Book on Flags*, St. Petersburg, 1911, pp. 53-54 (in Russian).
- 17 "His Imperial Majesty's Special Conference under the Ministry of Justice to Clarify the Issue of the Russian State National Colors," *Appendix to the Protocol of the Special Conference Meeting of March 12, 1911*, St. Petersburg, 1911, pp. 7-8 (in Russian).
- 18 S. Yelagin, *A History of the Russian Navy. The Azov Period. Appendix*, St. Petersburg, 1864, Part 1, pp. 127, 293, and others (in Russian).
- 19 G. Villenbakhov, *The Coat of Arms and the Flag of Russia*, St. Petersburg, 2004, pp. 40, 42 (in Russian).
- 20 Ya. Sverdlov, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, Moscow, 1959, p. 188 (in Russian).
- 21 P. Belavenets, *Materials on the History of the Russian Navy*, Moscow—Leningrad, 1940, p. 46 (in Russian).
- 22 See: R. Massie, *Peter the Great: His Life and World*, Knopf, New York, 1981.
- 23 M. Alekseyeva, *An Engraving from the Petrine Period*, Leningrad, 1990, p. 21 (in Russian); V. Makarov, *Russian Temporal Engraving of the First Quarter of the 18th Century*, Leningrad, 1973, p. 218 (in Russian).
- 24 Ye. Voronets, *The Wherefrom and the Meaning of the Black, Yellow and White Colors of the Russian State Symbols*, Kharkov, 1912, p. 4 (in Russian).

- 25 Quoted from: A. Degtyarev, *A History of the Russian Flag*, Moscow, 2000, p. 57 (in Russian).
- 26 Ibid., p. 56.
- 27 *Coats of Arms and Flags of World States. An Illustrated Map*, Moscow, 2008 (in Russian).
- 28 A. Rabbow, *Lexikon politischer Symbole*, München, 1970, pp. 182-184.
- 29 G. Bidermann, *An Encyclopedia of Symbols*, Moscow, 1995, pp. 290-291 (in Russian); D. Tresidder, *A Dictionary of Symbols*, Moscow, 2001, pp. 400-401 (in Russian).
- 30 K. Gibson, *Symbols, Signs, Emblems and Myths in Material and Spiritual Culture*.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 V. Legoyda, *Symbols and Rituals in the US Political Processes: Traditions and Modernity (A Phenomenon of Civic Religion)*, Cand. Sc. Thesis, hand-written, Moscow, 2000, p. 135 (in Russian).
- 33 [http://www.flaginstitute.org/pdfs/Whitney Smith.pdf](http://www.flaginstitute.org/pdfs/Whitney%20Smith.pdf)
- 34 There were tricolors even before the US flag. The earliest exemplar is the 16th-century flag of the Netherlands with horizontal orange, white and blue stripes. In the 1530s, the orange stripe was replaced with a red one. The best-known tricolor is the French flag with vertical stripes that originated during the French revolution in 1789. At first, the stripes were white-blue-red, but in 1794 the order changed to red-white-blue and symbolized "liberty, equality and fraternity." (W. Smith, O. Neubecker, *Wappen und Flaggen aller Nationen*, Blattenberg, 1981, pp. 87, 151, 253-254).
- 35 N. Pavlenko, *Peter the Great*, Moscow, 1990 (in Russian).
- 36 *Description of the Ensigns. Kiev Sheets (Flag, or Banner, Raised on the Prow, and Jack on the Stern Bowsprit) of All the States of the Universe. Engraved in Kiev in 1709, Unsigned, 1709* (in Russian).
- 37 *Memoirs of Just Jule, the Danish Minister to Peter the Great (1709-1711)*, Moscow, 1900, p. 189 (in Russian).
- 38 See, for example: *The Russian National Flag and its Reform*, p. 151. "One ought to come to the undoubted conclusion that the Russian national color should be identical with the color of the State Coat of Arms and the Imperial Standard, which have appropriated the black enamel and the yellow metal, and that the white-blue-red colors have nothing or little in common with them as having been brought from the West, and, therefore, as new are foreign to Old Russia..." But we can also quote an opposite view offered by a flag expert, Belavenets: "The white-blue-red tricolor was a common national flag since Peter's first days... the white-blue-red colors... are more Russian than the black and the yellow that were borrowed from the German Order..." (P. Belavenets, "Introduction," C. Alard, *A Book on Flags*, pp. XXXI-XXXII (in Russian).
- 39 P. Kolsto, "Nationale Symbole in neuen Staaten," *Osteuropa*, 53 Jg., 2003, No. 7, p. 1009.
- 40 P. Kornakov, *Analyzing Vexillological Material: Symbols and Rituals of the 1917 Revolution. Anatomy of the 1917 Revolution in Russia: Masses, Parties, Authorities*, St. Petersburg, 1994, 356-365 (in Russian).
- 41 B. Kolonitsky, *Symbols of Power and Power Struggles*, St. Petersburg, 2002, pp. 95-99 (in Russian).
- 42 P. Kornakov, "Paints of War," *Rodina*, 1990, No. 10, pp. 26-27 (in Russian).

## Mikhail Prishvin and Gabriel Marcel

*Viktor VIZGIN*

Mikhail Prishvin and Gabriel Marcel belong to different intellectual and cultural traditions. But there is much that their work has in common.<sup>1</sup> Prishvin writes about death as a radical metamorphosis: “In the light of death everything changes, and it is this change that parts one from the living.”<sup>2</sup> Being is possessed by the spirit of metamorphosis, therefore death is within its power. This is essentially what Marcel says about death, for example, in a striking and memorable scene that concludes his book *Thou Shall Not Die*.<sup>3</sup>

Personality is “the engine of our common soul” (Prishvin): “The content of culture is presented to us in personal experience that renders it qualitative value.”<sup>4</sup> Prishvin summoned up the courage to turn away “from the humankind (*chelovechiny*) surrounding him” to nonhuman life of the forest in a bid to preserve his individuality. In this way he saved for us his soul which, by the Grace of God, encompassed the soul of the world.

Gabriel Marcel wrote a book *Les hommes contre l’humain* (1951), which could be translated in Prishvin’s language as “People against Humankind,” that is, “against Humanity,” or against the *abstract man* (similarly to the notorious “horseship” in textbook renderings of Plato). The French philosopher and the Russian writer share the rejection of “the spirit of abstractness.”

“A major writer is one who succeeds in uplifting the spirit of society, cheerful, joyous, and bringing confidence that life is worth living.”<sup>5</sup> The spirit of joy and happiness for all was ever present in Prishvin’s soul. He saw his mission as a writer as being a guide to happiness for other people, happiness that does not exist without the ability to wonder and to dream. He believed that the way out of the selfish valleys of literary—and any other—individualism was offered by a *fairytale*, as the childhood of a creative soul. In this way he also extends a hand to the French philosopher, who overcame metaphysical individualism with inherent hidden despair (he called it “monadism”) by his philosophy of hope and creative fidelity.

The main thing is to find oneself. But how to do it if all around you say: “It’s me and not you.” You search yourself in the world. You search yourself even if only as a model for building your self. But even so everyone will tell you: “Go away. It’s I and not you.” Prishvin finds a way out of this conundrum in that the first sight can see how “I” and “you” combine, being *initially* one. The “first con-

---

V. Vizgin, D. Sc. (Philosophy), senior research fellow, RAS Institute of Philosophy. The article was first published in Russian in the journal *Chelovek*, No. 1, 2014.

temptation,” the “first vision” is dormant in our soul. It is like Marcel’s “blinded intuition” (*l’intuition aveuglée*), Prishvin describes this philosophical oxymoron as insight that overcomes individualism, “as kindred attention,” “expansion of the soul.” What should be the conditions of our life for such expansion of the soul to occur? This is the overriding question for the social philosophy of culture. In expansion of the soul the riddle of “I” is resolved through our acquisition of our “I” as “we.”

Another theme that brings together the Russian writer and the French philosopher is that of gift. Prishvin, within the Russian language tradition, juxtaposes *labor* and *gift*: what is attained by labor is difficult, but some things are just given as a donation. “In the history of human culture, he writes, all labor vanishes without a trace and only there remains what has been vouchsafed as a *gift*.”<sup>6</sup>

The theme of gift was suggested to Prishvin by the extraordinary creative productivity of such artists as Repin and Surikov. How did they manage to produce so much? His answer: they were not working, they were not laboring, it all came to them as a gift, emerged from a gift. When a person and a gift blend, we speak about gifted people, talents by the Grace of God. The ability to have gifts makes man similar to the Creator. A gift is a category of Divine life as love. It resides in man in the shape of gift that materializes as a genius or talent.

With Marcel the category of gift is not so much aesthetic as metaphysically ethical (if this can be said of him for he has never been an ethical moralist in the disciplinary sense of the word): to give, to bestow, to receive as a gift, in Russian this suggests to receive something for nothing. With the French thinker everything suggests that the gift belongs to the sphere of being and not possession. One may perhaps say that a gift is a being-related aspect of existence.

So, with Marcel we see that religious faith and existential metaphysics converge. The presence of religious foundations is more tangible in Russian culture than in the Western tradition. In Western culture we see the development of metaphysical thought that seeks to supplant the religious spirit. But in both cases the *pleromatic* nature of the gift is present.

Marcel wrote about *pleroma* as Divine generosity and the fullness of eternal life. In particular, he spoke about Divine magnanimity as the basis of causality. We find a similar motive in Prishvin when he presents his classification of movements. It is worth having a second look at. Here he becomes a philosopher, distinguishing as he does movements “out of emptiness” or “away from emptiness” and movements “due to ripeness and abundance.”<sup>7</sup> “Ripeness,” “abundance,” infinite creative power makes one think of the principle of fullness that in the Western tradition was written about by Arthur O. Lovejoy.<sup>8</sup> Prishvin lends this theme a bit of his characteristic organic coloring.<sup>9</sup> With Marcel it is not noticeable. But the theme of *pleroma* is important for him and he links it with the religious Christian dimension. Prishvin pursues that theme in a similar way although he does not explicitly invoke religion.

Let us take a closer look at Prishvin’s classification of movements. Our movements are seldom movements from fullness. One can say that it only happens when God’s spark lights up our somnolent souls. It happens at rare creative

moments in life. More frequently we move because of “emptiness”: following the pattern of meeting our daily needs, because we feel wretched, or offended, because we feel that our life is barren, out of boredom, habit, for exercise, etc. Prishvin’s classification is based on the metaphysical dichotomy between the *creative* (from God the Creator) and *creature* (God’s creature). The creative invariably is the result of “ripeness and fullness” that we can attain because we have been created in God’s image and likeness. All that characterizes us as creatures, as mortals comes from “lack of fullness” and “emptiness.” Prishvin’s thinking is distilled in the following phrase: “*Man’s life is not empty if a fairytale has touched his heart.*”<sup>10</sup> Where Marcel speaks of “mystery” the Russian writer, who adored the forest, speaks of a “fairytale.”

Marcel is a philosopher of reflexion and his philosophical method is “second reflexion (*la reflexion seconde*). Prishvin is not a philosopher, but with a little bit of a stretch he can be regarded as a Russian Marcel, *Marcel without “second reflexion.”* For the Russian writer the memory of his sensitive heart replaces philosophical reflexion. A magic fairytale is the core and nucleus of Prishvin’s worldview. The paradise of childhood, the paradise of “the whole life,” so to speak, were things that he experienced with extraordinary vividness and depth, leaving a trail that prompted him to reproduce them verbally and made him a major writer. He spotted the signs of paradise as *pleroma* everywhere in life. Prishvin believed that if the world is seen as dull and barren of the colors of a fairytale, of mystery and discovery, the reason lies not in the world but only in the “subject”, in the “I.” In other words, he as a writer had a presumption of *paradisaic ontology*. I see there a connection with the theme of Sophia, but without any risky theological innovations associated with it.

I would permit myself to relate a personal experience and a thought that it suggested to me. I spent several summer vacations in *Driandia* on Valday (a fairytale land invented by Prishvin). I was not just surrounded by the fairytale kingdom, (“*Berendeyevo tsarstvo*”) it penetrated my heart and mind that went out to that kingdom as if they had long resided there. So the fairytale was not something that tired parents were reading to their child again and again while not believing in it, but a reality that I lived fully and creatively. I would describe those crucial years of my life as *the gift of Valday*.

The day was drawing to a close, the setting sun cast its rays on the lake along whose bank I was walking towards the village and hit the grassy hillside. On the top of the hill a girl clad in red was herding a few goats. On the hillside loomed the village with its grey roofs and large barns. The blue sky was like a dome over the sun-drenched grass. Light came not only from above, from the sky, but also from below, from the very earth so that it did not look like earth at all. A soft shimmering of the grass and the flowers cast a spell: it seemed that my soul was dissolved in the world soul, in the *pleroma* of light. The peaceful idyllic, blissful picture came across as a panorama of *the world soul* of which *the girl in red* was the focal point.

Decades passed. When today I hear about Sophia as God’s Wisdom, and still more the bookish talk of sophiology, I shrink from the academic scholasticism of

these words: I am not convinced that those who utter these words have personal experience of sophianic nature of the creation (*sofiynost*) of the world. One can use borrowed words to speak infinitely about God, but if you have not personally encountered Him in your own life, what is the worth of these words? Words may lead to God but much more easily lead away from Him. The same is true of the *sofiynost* of the world. The theological status of Sophia is a special theme for professionals and connoisseurs. For the rest there remains the simple but overwhelming question: what does Sophia mean to you personally? Have you met her in your own experience?

To this I can only give one answer: yes, I have met Sophia personally, she came to me on a July evening on a hillside near a village in Valday in the guise of a girl in red.

Now back to my reflections on the link between the *sofiynost* of the world with paradise ontology or rather with Being as paradise. Prishvin had the capacity to find images of paradise every day, and not only in the woods. If, as happened but rarely, he failed to find it, he thought it was his own fault. The world was anyway a paradise, simply he could sometimes not discern it owing to his own weakness.

“I write despite all the insults from the virgin soil of my soul”<sup>11</sup>: this could only be written by someone who refreshed his sense of paradise in his soul which resides there initially, innately. That the soul *cannot be insulted* brings it into a paradisiacal and therefore a really creative state. Prishvin says that an artist produces from the “uninsultable part of the human essence,”<sup>12</sup> or the soul *without preventing it from oozing poetry*. I have added the italics which Prishvin does not have, but in my view these words explain his thought, his feeling of life, his understanding of what is poetry, creativity, and culture that is lasting (“the secret of my longevity in literature is that I write only about what I have experienced myself”<sup>13</sup>).

“If one divides the human essence into levels, the top level is the ‘uninsultable’ man and the bottom levels are the humiliated and the insulted.” It is remarkable that Prishvin first saw the multistoreyed structure of the forest and studied it together with his son Petya. He transferred the forest structure that he felt so keenly to man. This is his method that replaces philosophical reflexion with its specialized terminology. The Russian writer creates a *biometaphoric anthropology*. Prishvin understands human essence through images of nature. Nature is man in his other worldly being: in a pristine paradisiacal state that can generate productive metaphors. If you want to understand what man is like, try to understand “with kindred attention” the forest, the animals, the unity of the world as “an organic whole.”

I do not know whether Prishvin read Nikolai Lossky’s book *The World As an Organic Whole*,<sup>14</sup> published in 1915, but he uses that expression.<sup>15</sup> Of course he could have thus described his perception of the world without Lossky, acting on his own in the process of cognition. The Russian writer builds his anthropology and ontology on the soil of Russian literature. Prishvin says that “Rozanov grew out of Russian culture (above all literature) freely and joyfully like a

flower.”<sup>16</sup> He himself grew up in the same way from the same black soil, in the direct and figurative sense. Therefore his anthropological terminology is built on juxtaposition of words: insultedness—noninsultedness, nonhumiliation—humiliation, etc.

---

NOTES

- 1 The journal *Chelovek* repeatedly turned to the problem of comparing the views of Mikhail Prishvin and the concepts of Western intellectuals. See for example, A. Podoksenov, “Mikhail Prishvin and Friedrich Nietzsche,” *Chelovek*, No. 5, 2008.
- 2 M. Prishvin, *Diaries 1936-1937*, Moscow, 2011, p. 636 (in Russian).
- 3 G. Marcel, *Tu ne mourras pas*, textes choisis et présentés par Anne Marcel, préface du P. Xavier Tilliette, éditions Arfuyen, 2005; (G. Marcel, *Thou Shall Not Die*. Compiled by Anne Marcel. Katharine Rose Hanley, trans., South Bank, 2009).
- 4 M. Prishvin, *Diaries 1936-1937*, p. 467.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 469.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 480.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 610.
- 8 A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of The History of An Idea*, Cambridge, Mass., 1936
- 9 If we assume that the most important worldview opposition is the opposition of the organic and the mechanical, Prishvin, like Rozanov, is a prominent representative of the organic school. In the West organicism is more mechanistic, less articulated artistically than in Russian culture.
- 10 M. Prishvin, *Diaries 1936-1937*, p. 614. (Italics is mine—*V.V.*)
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 673.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 667.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 677.
- 14 N. Lossky, “The World as an Organic Whole,” *Problems of Philosophy and Psychology*, Moscow, 1915 (in Russian).
- 15 M. Prishvin, *Diaries 1936-1937*, p. 682. There is no mention of the name of that Russian philosopher in the *Diaries*.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 705.

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

## Resources of Influence in World Politics

*Marina LEBEDEVA*

Supreme power does not exist at the supranational level. That is why resources are particularly important for projecting political influence in the world arena. Consequently, one has to analyze the resources in order to understand how such influence is projected.

Surprisingly, resources in world politics have not received the attention they merit. More precisely, individual resources are of course being studied, especially when it comes to energy, natural resources or military capability. However, resources on the whole, their combination and use by various actors—the states and nonstate participants—have not been in the focus of international affairs experts.

At the same time, the issue of resources prompts a host of questions. For example, why is it that in the modern world those who are strong and have considerable military capability are not always the winners while those who are weak can inflict considerable damage on others? Is the set of means to project influence in the international arena constant or not? What makes one really strong in the world?

What is the strength of the weak acting in the world arena? The number of questions can be multiplied, and yet there are practically no comprehensive studies of the impact of resources in world politics. Among the few such studies the works of Joseph Nye<sup>1</sup> stand out. He identified “soft” and “hard power” and then “smart power” as a skillful combination of the first two. But of course they do not exhaust the problem of resources in world politics.

The most common approach to the study of political resources is to classify them, identify the sets of individual types of resources, for example energy, information, science and technology. This approach rests on two problems. First, the list of actual resources (one can fragment various types of resources ad infinitum) and the grounds for their classification can be multiplied, and secondly (and most importantly) it is unclear why this or that type of resource suddenly moves center stage to acquire particular significance? In other words, what are the regularities in the development of resources?

---

**M. Lebedeva**, D. Sc. (Political Science), professor, head of the World Political Processes Chair, *MGIMO* University, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The article was first published in Russian in the journal *Politicheskoye issledovaniya (POLIS)*, No. 1, 2014.

Be that as it may, traditionally international scholars single out three major resource areas:

- 1) military-political;
- 2) political-economic;
- 3) sociopolitical and humanitarian.

It stands to reason that these should provide the starting point of analysis in determining the regularities in the development of influence resources.

### **Diffusion and Fragmentation of the Resource Complex**

Until recently the influence resource in world politics was a combination of military-political, economic and ideological potentials of states, above all the leading states. These states determined the vector of world political development with emphasis on building up the military-political resource. As a result scholars quite reasonably concentrated on the study of the leading states that possess the entire complex of the resource potential. The focus of such analysis of course was the military-political resource. The leading states today to a large extent preserve the monopoly of influence, but there are also clear signs that other actors are gaining influence in the modern world, which means that they possess the relevant resources.

There are several reasons behind the diffusion of political influence.

- First, the scientific and technological revolution facilitated access to various types of resources, especially in the sociopolitical and humanitarian areas. Information and communication technologies and social networks made the diffusion of information quick and cheap.
- Second, the resource complex has been fragmented whereas before it was like a conglomerate of military-political, political-economic and sociopolitical resources of the state. The economic resource was the first to become relatively independent. Postwar Germany and Japan are vivid examples of how states whose military-political development is restricted, came to occupy key positions in world politics beginning from the second half of the 20th century precisely due to their economic development, to become members of G8 and G20. Admittedly, their achievements were to a large extent made possible by external protection. But Germany and Japan used it to promote their own development whereas they might have just behaved as parasites.

Another example of the relative independence of the economic resource is the negotiations between the Arab countries and the USA at the height of the energy crisis in the early 1970s. At that time the energy component of the economy acquired a very special value. The OPEC countries did not only occupy the high ground in economic terms (by managing to boost oil prices in the world), but gain political influence by forcing the world's leading state, the USA, to sit

down at the negotiating table. Later, in the 21st century, energy again emerged as an important world policy resource.

Another example of the economy acting as a resource of world political development is the economic spurt of the “Asian tigers” in the second half of the 20th century. These states, having demonstrated rapid and effective growth, gained political influence, at least in their own region. A more recent example is China’s economic leap forward. As a result, as Joseph Nye pointed out, Asia, which in the 1950s was a poor and unattractive region, moved to advanced positions in the 21st century not only in the economy, but also in the film industry and sports,<sup>2</sup> and indeed in politics.

The economic resource is used both as “hard power” (the use of economic sanctions being the most evident example) and as “soft power,” as for example when an economy becomes, on the one hand, attractive for investors and, on the other hand, a model to be emulated.

In recent years the sociopolitical resource has acquired great significance. For example, education more and more often is seen as “soft power.”<sup>3</sup> Some countries, for example, Australia seek, first, to make education the leading source of revenue,<sup>4</sup> and second, to occupy a certain niche in the world economy and later in world politics by training the elite for other countries and thus seeking to determine the paths of world development.

The sociopolitical and humanitarian sphere is very diverse. It includes, for example, strategic culture, the idea that is being actively pursued by the USA and which has recently attracted attention in Russia as well.<sup>5</sup> Strategic culture refers to lasting models of perception and behavior in the world arena. Their adequate and effective use in the world makes it possible to exert political influence on others. Thus, the American mass culture has become an instrument of “soft power” that enables the US to act as world leader.<sup>6</sup> According to Peter Berger and Samuel Huntington, mass culture, along with business culture and the culture of the intellectual elite (Joseph Nye lumps these three groups into one, called “mass culture”) and religious trends constitute ways of the spread of globalization,<sup>7</sup> and consequently the projection of influence.

Arguably, strategic culture manifests itself in the kind of models a state tries to use to influence others. Thus in recent years the USA has increasingly sought to project influence not only through government structures (although they are of course involved in the process) but directly through people as part of “people-to-people” public diplomacy when American citizens interact directly with the citizens of other countries. America reappraised the methods of public diplomacy after the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, which highlighted the need to influence the consciousness of broad social strata outside the country in order to prevent them from supporting terrorist actions.<sup>8</sup>

On the whole it is fair to predict that the significance of the sociopolitical and humanitarian resource will grow. This is not to say that military-political and economic resources are becoming less important. But it looks as if the development of these two areas has reached its limits. Military force is ceasing to play its traditional role that it has played over the centuries because, first, its full-scale

use (involving the use of weapons of mass destruction) may lead to unpredictable consequences as a result of escalation. Second, the development of high-precision weapons does not always guarantee victory when confronted with archaic means of warfare. For example, military exercises conducted in the USA have shown that the use of traditional (conventional) means of warfare sometimes turns out to be more effective.<sup>9</sup> Third, high-precision weapons, especially their development, require huge financial inputs, something that not all states, let alone nonstate actors, can always afford.

A similar problem, connected with costs, arises in the case of the economic resource which also calls for immense inputs. Meanwhile the sociopolitical and humanitarian resources can be relatively cheap and can spread quickly thanks to modern technologies to reach the broad social strata.

Today the resources are rapidly breaking up into different areas. The economic resource is divided into energy and financial resources, the sociopolitical and humanitarian resource falls into such groups as education, information, recreation, tourism, health care (a state or even a single clinic offering a high level of medical service become highly attractive), etc.

The fact of fragmentation of resources in the modern world is reflected in the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation adopted in 2008 and updated in 2013, which says that “along with military might such important factors of the influence of states on international politics as economic, legal, scientific-technological, ecological, demographic and information factors are coming to the fore. The issues of ensuring sustained development, spiritual and intellectual development of the population, enhancing its well-being and increasing investments in man are acquiring ever greater importance.”<sup>10</sup>

### **One Has to Know How to Use a Resource**

Evidently the process of fragmentation of the resource potential will continue (which has prompted some authors to make a list of resources in international relations and world politics) and simultaneously new resource centers—educational, health care, industrial, etc.—will spring up.

What is not seen as a resource today may turn out to be a resource tomorrow. But for that reason any attempts to catalogue the resources at best could refer to the present day. A more productive way appears to be to analyze how resources are used and by what actors and what trends can be observed in this area.

Speaking about the resources of influence, it is necessary to distinguish the resources proper and the way they are used to exert the desired influence. Just like “soft power” is an activity aimed at making something more attractive than something else (dictating, cheating and other methods contradict the very idea of “soft power”) a resource is only a potential of influence. In other words, the existence of resources does not in itself ensure political influence. One has to know how to use the resource skillfully in order to turn it from potential influence into

a real resource of influence. Having said that, the existence of resources of course does give an edge on others in the world arena.

The leading states possess the biggest resources and remain influential players in the world arena. One may argue to what extent this or that state is indeed a world leader, but obviously a leader must, first, possess a sufficient resource of influence and, second, that resource cannot be confined to only one sphere.

In order to be a leader, a state must possess a significant share of political, political-economic, sociopolitical and humanitarian resources. However, today it is practically impossible to be the absolute leader in all the spheres. Even the US cannot be the leader in all the three resource spheres. Joseph Nye notes that the US is predominant in the military sphere. But in the economic sphere other centers of power already exist. There is still greater diversity in the sphere of culture and ideology.

At the same time a state may exert considerable influence in the world not being a leader and not possessing great military-political or economic resources, by just using the sociopolitical and humanitarian resource. Coming up with a new political initiative makes it possible for a state to influence the world. For example, the emergence during the Cold War, of the nonaligned movement, conferred political influence on those who initiated it. And that was in the era of the bipolar world when the military-political resource was at the peak of its development.

The methods of the use of resources by states are also becoming more diversified. While previously they were largely centralized, the situation has changed now. The late 20th—early 21st centuries saw the emergence of a phenomenon that Anne-Marie Slaughter defined as disaggregation. Its essence is that the state forms a range of structures—agencies, departments, ministries, etc.—which interact with their counterparts abroad. For example, one country's ministry of education closely collaborates with the corresponding ministries of other countries. Similar kinds of interaction are emerging between the agriculture ministries, etc. All these links became possible thanks to the modern communication and information technologies. As a result networks of transgovernmental interactions and relations began to be formed. A. M. Slaughter described it as "trans-governmentalism." It makes it possible to implement a policy of "involvement" in the affairs of other countries and thus change them "from within,"<sup>11</sup> i.e., to exert political influence. True, this prompts a series of questions that need further study: to what extent is this process mutual, asymmetric or symmetric, and how it is unfolding in various regions.

Another scholar, Susan Strange, first drew attention to the importance of the sociopolitical resource that is not directly underpinned by military or economic might. She proposed to distinguish the relative might of a state arising from its capacity to directly influence others and structural might, that is, the ability to create norms and rules according to which others act.<sup>12</sup> Possession of structural power makes it possible to influence the external world indirectly. Susan Strange sees the future in the development of structural power. Structural power is largely concentrated in intergovernmental organizations because they develop most of the norms and rules and form new international regimes.

The club formats—G8, G20—have been playing an ever more important role in the world in recent years. Not having rigid organizational structures or military-political or economic levers, they concentrate on structural power.

Obviously political influence can be exerted not only by states and intergovernmental organizations, but also by a large number of nonstate transnational actors (TNA) which makes them actors in world politics. Thomas Risse, a noted scholar, was one of the first to turn to the study of the resources of nonstate actors. He demonstrated that every type of TNA has its own type of influence resource, for example, for the transnational corporations (TNCs) the resource is political-economic.<sup>13</sup> Today, the economy and finance remain the key influence resource of the TNCs in the world. Aleksey Dolinsky and Aleksandr Gabuyev cite numerous examples of business using it today to exert political influence.<sup>14</sup>

It has to be noted that in recent years political influence in the world has been exerted not only by such economic structures as TNCs, but also by small and medium-sized businesses. They project their influence mainly through mass trans-border activities of their companies. Thus in the late 20th century approximately one in every three medium-sized and small businesses in the US and one in every seven businesses in Japan were operating transnationally.<sup>15</sup> They have quite flexible, mainly network structures that adapt themselves well to local conditions.<sup>16</sup>

Nongovernmental organizations, unlike businesses, are more oriented towards sociopolitical and humanitarian resources. Thus many international nongovernmental organizations gain an advantage by possessing “local” information, certain knowledge and skills (notably representatives of the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders have the knowledge and skills in the medical sphere which are extremely important in conflict situations), as well as the trust of the local population. This is something that many scholars have noted.<sup>17</sup>

In turn, the resources of intranational regions and global cities depend in many ways on the fact that their production, education, scientific, financial and other structures and resources scattered all over the world are concentrated on comparatively small territories, in cities and regions. In other words, what is politically important for such entities is not only economic, sociopolitical and humanitarian resources but the fact that they are simultaneously present on a given territory making it possible to control them. As a result, as Saskia Sassen stresses, global cities have proved to be important as an organization, managerial resource in the modern world.<sup>18</sup> Åke E. Andersson and his colleagues have shown that economic specialization as well as internetwork economic hubs open up new opportunities for such territories (regions and cities) providing a “gateway” to the global world.<sup>19</sup> They begin to develop very rapidly and quickly gain political influence: they are active in the world arena, come up with initiatives, interact with regions and cities in other countries. This is a manifestation of the transgovernmental process described by A. M. Slaughter at the level of ministries.

### **Sociopolitical and Humanitarian Resources**

The stratification of the resource potential creates a very interesting phenomenon. On the one hand, all the actors, including states, “specialize” on this

or that resource and on the method of its implementation. On the other hand, they are aware of the danger of losing the sole resource and therefore seek to diversify their resource potential and to exert influence through a variety of forms and mechanisms. As a result, the era when the state concentrated mainly on the military-political resource and the TNCs on the economic resource has become history. In the modern world actors try to do everything at once. That is why the TNCs, for example, are very particular about the image they project, rendering financial assistance to nongovernmental organizations, universities, etc., i.e., along with using their traditional economic resource, they put the stake on projecting their influence through sociopolitical and humanitarian resource.

The Global Compact initiated by the UN is expressly aimed at promoting the social responsibility of business. Business has been involved in social responsibility projects before, but they were confined (most frequently) to one's own company or one's own country. The Global Compact aims to promote the social responsibility of business on a global scale.<sup>20</sup> Apart from ethical and humanitarian motives (which cannot be dismissed) the Global Compact is interesting for business because it enhances its image, i.e., adds to the resource potential.

The forms and methods of obtaining resources and making use of them are also being diversified. For example, the key resource for the media is the sociopolitical and humanitarian resource. But while formerly the media concentrated on developing its network of correspondents (information agencies and leading channels sprouted their correspondents' offices across the world), today along with that form they make active use of citizen journalists (nonprofessionals), reports of eyewitnesses who recorded an event on their mobile phones, opinions of bloggers, commentaries on the registered user sites, etc.

The sociopolitical resource has a huge mobilization potential and some nonstate actors have been capitalizing on that. The movements of antiglobalists and alterglobalists provide examples. But the most spectacular manifestation of the mobilization resource in the activities of nonstate actors was the Arab transformations that began in 2011 through social networks.

The mobilization power of the sociopolitical resource undoubtedly has been used by Al Qaeda. The idea of defeating America and other Western countries, of building a new world according to the principles of radical Islam met with instant and massive response. Even the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack made minimum use of the military-political resource. Al Qaeda's main resource has been and remains the sociopolitical one. That is what makes it so difficult to combat international terrorism: the military-political resource can be of only limited use in it. In the counterterrorist struggle the emphasis should be on the sociopolitical and humanitarian resource.

One more important thing needs to be mentioned. As pointed out above, a resource can be used or it can remain only as a potential. For example, a good education system in the country does not guarantee its use as "soft power" by the state. Certain conditions are needed to demonstrate the attractiveness of higher education in a given country.

At the same time a resource may be used unwittingly. An actor suddenly gains political influence that he did not originally plan. One example is the history of the formation of BRICS. In 2001 Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O'Neill identified a group of rapidly developing economies including Brazil, Russia, China and India. At the time those countries did not see themselves as a group and it was only after 2001 that they began to coordinate their activities. The group is acquiring an organizational and political structure, is conducting meetings and has invited South Africa to join its ranks. It is hard to predict how BRICS will continue to function and in general what its future will be, but the very fact of the influence of a nonstate actor on political processes is there.

- First, a nonstate commercial structure, Goldman Sachs (or its representative, which makes little difference in this case) became a *de facto* political actor by “creating” an association of states. Incidentally, rating agencies can be described as a new and nascent actor in world politics.
- Secondly, it is interesting that in the event a business structure, an information analytical agency, used the sociopolitical and not economic or financial resource.

### Conclusions

The overall situation is as follows: Along with other trends in world politics<sup>21</sup> we witness a fragmentation of the resource potential, its redistribution from leading states (which nevertheless exert decisive political influence in the world) to other states and nonstate actors. The resource potential is divided into individual components. New forms and methods of its use are developing and at the same time new resource centers will continue to appear, centers offering good conditions for education or medical treatment, etc., as well as centers formed by various actors.

If resources become fragmented, structural influence in the world on others increases and new centers spring up would it not result in the rivalry between centers of influence, thus creating new conflicts and confrontations?

In answering that question one has to note the marked trend towards interdependence in world development. The trend arises because the fragmentation of the resource potential does not just create new centers but makes these centers interdependent because no single state (not to speak of nonstate actors) can concentrate all the resources in its hands. Actors (and the centers they form) exchange the products of their activities, become linked and therefore interdependent.

This process has been noted, among others, by Yevgeny Primakov. He writes that “the real picture of today’s world is created by dialectic ties between the emerging multipolarity and interdependence of the emerging centers of the world system. The interdependence of these centers increases due to the need to involve all the world poles to counteract the new threats and challenges, in the

first place, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, international terrorism and regional conflicts.”<sup>22</sup>

Thus the resource is a key component of world politics. Understanding the mechanisms of how a resource is used and by whom, what the trends in the development of resources are will make it possible to assess the influence in the world and identify the trends of the political development of the world.

---

#### NOTES

- 1 J. Nye, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, 2004.
- 2 J. Nye, “Soft Power Matters in Asia,” *The Japan Times*, 05. 12. 2005; [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1486/soft\\_power\\_matters\\_in\\_asia.html](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1486/soft_power_matters_in_asia.html).
- 3 J. Nye, “Soft Power and Higher Education,” <http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/FFP0502S.pdf>; M. Lebedeva, J. Faure, “Higher Education As a Potential of Russia’s *Soft Power*” *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*, 2009, No. 4; Ye. Panova, “Higher Education As a Potential of a State’s Soft Power,” *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*, 2010, No. 2; A. Torkunov, “Education As an Instrument of *Soft Power* in Russia’s Foreign Policy,” *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*, 2012, No. 4.
- 4 S. Marginson, “International Education in Australia: the Long Path Down,” *Mezhdunarodnoye obrazovaniye*, 2011, No. 62 (<http://www.ihe.nkaoko.kz/archive/61/374/>).
- 5 T. Alekseyeva, “Strategic Culture: the Evolution of a Concept,” *Politicheskiye issledovaniya (POLIS)*, 2012, No. 5; M. Rykhtik, “Strategic Culture and a New US National Security Concept,” *Vestnik N. Lobachevsky Nizhny Novgorodsky Universiteta. Serie: International Relations, Political Science, Regional Studies*, 2003, No. 1.
- 6 J. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone*, Oxford, 2002; J. Nye, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*.
- 7 *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*, ed. by P. Berger, S. Huntington, New York, 2002.
- 8 A. Dolinsky, *Modern Mechanisms of Cooperation in the Framework of Public Diplomacy*, Moscow, 2011. (Dissertational Theses) (in Russian).
- 9 For more detail see: V. Kabernik, “Revolution in Military Affairs: Possible Contours of Future Conflicts,” *Metamorphoses of World Politics*, ed. by M. Lebedeva, Moscow, 2012 (in Russian).
- 10 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013. 12. 02 ([http://www.mid.ru/bp\\_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F](http://www.mid.ru/bp_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F)).
- 11 A.-M. Slaughter, *A New World Order*, Princeton, 2004.
- 12 S. Strange, “Toward a Theory of Transnational Empire,” *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*, ed. by E.-O. Czempiel, J.N. Rosenau, Lexington, 1989.
- 13 Th. Risse, “Transnational Actors and World Politics,” *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. by W. Carlsnaes, Th. Risse, B. A. Simmons, London, 2002.
- 14 A. Dolinsky, A. Gabuyev, “Corporate Wars,” *Kommersant vlast*, 13.05.2013, No. 18 (<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2184633?subfolderId=90141>).

- 15 M. Fujita, *The Transnational Activities of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises*, Dordrecht, 1998.
- 16 Ye. Khokhlova, G. Reshetnikov, "Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Influence on World Political Development Trends," *Metamorphoses of World Politics*, ed. by M. Lebedeva, Moscow, 2012.
- 17 A. S. Natsios, "An NGO Perspective," *Peacemaking in International Conflicts: Methods and Techniques*, ed. by I. W. Zartman and J. L. Rasmussen, Washington D.C., 1997.
- 18 S. Sassen, "The State and the Global City," *The Transnational Studies*, ed. by S. Khagram, P. Levitt, New York, 2008.
- 19 *Gateways to the Global Economy*, ed. by Å. E. Andersson, D. E. Andersson, Cheltenham, 2000.
- 20 <http://www.unglobalcompact.org>.
- 21 M. Lebedeva, "World Politics: Development Trends," *Politicheskiye issledovaniya (POLIS)*, 2009, No. 4.
- 22 Ye. Primakov, *A World Without Russia? What Political Myopia Leads to*, Moscow, 2009, p. 24 (in Russian).

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

## What Is Analytic Philosophy? (A Historical Perspective)

*Vladimir SHOKHIN*

### 1

“Philosophical facts” have several dimensions, just like philosophy itself which has been the subject of more definitions (classical and nonclassical) than there have been significant practicing philosophers in history, inasmuch as they characterized differently what they were actually doing at different periods of their work and occasionally within one and the same text.<sup>1</sup>

These facts could be arranged in different ways, but I believe the most relevant stratification is one that makes it possible to distinguish the achievements and results in this or that segment of philosophy and give an insight into the philosophical activity that produces them. The second level of facts is more significant for philosophy than for other areas of knowledge. Indeed, for all the diversity of definitions of philosophy hardly anyone—at least at present—would seriously challenge its definition as theoretical self-reflection of culture. However, philosophy itself is a key constituent of culture and has a peculiar need for self-reflection, or what Friedrich Schlegel (credited with many conceptual innovations) first called “the philosophy of philosophy” in 1800. It is due to this specific interest in itself that philosophy (at least in Europe) experiences a constant need (though varying in time and place) to look at its reflection in its own mirrors, to tweak “the original,” go back to the reflection and so on. It devotes at least as much attention and accordingly time to this occupation than “normal sciences” devote to working on “normal objects” because, as an American philosopher aptly noted half a century ago, the question of what is chemistry (one can substitute biology, physics, astrophysics, etc.) is not “chemical” to anything like the degree to which the issue of the nature of philosophy is philosophical. But what applies to philosophy as a whole applies to varying degrees to its different trends, traditions, schools, etc.

In considering the state of affairs with the “philosophical facts connected with analytical philosophy (hereinafter—APh), I would first of all note the gap

---

**V. Shokhin**, D. Sc. (Philosophy), chief of the Religious Philosophy Sector, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. The article was first published in Russian in the journal *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 11, 2013, and is reproduced here with some changes.

between the facts of the first and second levels: between its empirical achievements and the results of its self-reflection. It looks something like this.

The facts of the first level were recently convincingly described by John Searle, a theorist of philosophy who noted that “without exception, the best philosophy departments in the United States are dominated by analytic philosophy, and among the leading philosophers in the United States, all but a tiny handful would be classified as analytic philosophers. Practitioners of types of philosophizing that are not in the analytic tradition—such as phenomenology, classical pragmatism, existentialism, or Marxism—feel it necessary to define their position in relation to analytic philosophy.”<sup>2</sup> But this is true not only of North America. APH is sometimes defined as the dominant philosophical trend in the USA, Great Britain, Scandinavia, Australia and New Zealand. Yet even that description is somewhat narrow: APH is actively practiced in Holland, is important also in Germany, Latin America and many other countries so that we would not be far wrong if we included it among “world philosophies” (by analogy with world religions). True, Russia is still not among the regions where APH is seriously practiced, but interest in it is certainly there. The rapid increase of APH in world philosophy is not confined to its geographical spread. While in the first half of the 20th century those who are unanimously referred to as analytic philosophers were concerned primarily with the philosophy of language, epistemology and the philosophy of science, after the crisis of neo-positivism analytic philosophers have dominated also in metaphysics (after its “philosophical rehabilitation”), in the philosophy of consciousness, ethics, philosophy of religion (which in this tradition practically corresponds to philosophical theology), the philosophies of politics and education, etc., assimilating even historical and philosophical studies that were largely ignored at the initial stage of APH. Its “confessional color” has also changed dramatically: while at the stage when APH was an island confined to the Vienna Circle those who definitely are referred to as analytic philosophers adopted a firm Positivist position, at present APH is done by naturalists and agnostics, Thomists and Calvinists and representatives of nearly all worldviews.

The situation with APH self-reflection is different. The term *APH*, according to some of its serious historians, was first “explicitly used” by a member of the Vienna Circle, the philosopher and mathematician Gustav Bergmann<sup>3</sup> after he emigrated to America in 1945. This brings out the understandable trend, that is, the fact that APH was first seen as something self-evident or “definable” through several reliable characteristics but in the process of its massive “factual growth” its identity (due to the expansion of its boundaries) became increasingly problematical. One should note yet another cause of that phenomenon: while at the initial stages the representatives of APH saw their activities and their main purpose as a “scientific revolution” in philosophy that need not be overly concerned with “prescientific stages,”<sup>4</sup> subsequently, after many of them turned to the history of philosophy, they have also turned to metaphilosophical reflection seeking to understand their own tradition. But results proved to be not too impressive. Thus Avrum Stroll in his book *Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy* con-

cludes that “it is difficult to give a precise definition of “analytic philosophy” since it is not so much a specific doctrine as a loose concatenation of approaches to problems,”<sup>5</sup> Michael Beaney, an authoritative student of APh, states that the concept is becoming ever more elusive as it comes to include more and more approaches and methods and concludes that it is best to merely recognize a certain genealogy of APh tracing its lineage to Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, George Edward Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and to date the birth of that philosophical phenomenon to the “revolt” of Russell and Moore against British idealism in the early 20th century.<sup>6</sup> An equally prominent historian of APh, Hans-Johann Glock, in a monograph titled *What Is Analytic Philosophy*, after a meticulous classification of the types of definitions of APh in modern historiography, proposes his own definition which is striking in its “minimalism”: “The answer to the title question, then, is that analytic philosophy is a tradition held together *both* by ties of mutual influence *and* by family resemblances.”<sup>7</sup>

However, the “agnostic approach” to the nature of APh was carried to its logical conclusion in a comparatively short book by Aaron Preston, a renowned specialist on APh, with a self-explaining title *Analytic Philosophy: the History of an Illusion*. His idea was that there are no grounds for considering APh to be a concrete philosophical school and what was seen as its identity arose from the self-deception of those who considered themselves to be analytic philosophers, and the author delivers the diagnosis whereby the current crisis of its self-identification, which cannot be gainsaid, makes it incumbent upon APh to clarify and explain its nature and methods once and for all, something that it is unable to do.<sup>8</sup> Not surprisingly, critical reviews have appeared, but there was no shortage of positive reviews either, and these came from very well-known analytic philosophers.

APh is being subjected to yet another test. Although there is no shortage of books describing the contrasting characteristics of APh and the “continental philosophy,” more and more voices are heard reminding readers that the very word combination “analytic philosophy” was first introduced by Edmund Husserl and that Jacques Derrida also liked to call himself an “analytic philosopher.” More importantly, collections of articles have been published which demonstrate the vagueness of what was once considered to be immutable boundaries. That provides a serious argument not only against the “school identity” of APh, but against the claim that it has a pronounced ethos of which its “founding fathers” were so proud in their time.

Obviously, if this trend of “disavowal” of APh holds and increases (which is highly probable because its classical rationality cannot satisfy the postmodern man) it may soon become like a *Titanic*, lavishly equipped with the latest trappings of philosophical scientism, that would sink because there would be no one to scoop up water from its sections (and respond to the salvos of “pirates,” I would add). Then we would indeed have to admit the onset of the “postanalytic era” (a popular current expression) in the history of philosophy.

The allowed space for this publication prevents me from delving into the history of the issue, so I will confine myself to rendering the manifesto of Aaron Preston, which formulated the main points of his “history of an illusion” and

which deserves much attention because of the sheer significance of the historical and philosophical problems raised. I will then provide my criticisms of the manifesto, propose my own historical identification of APh and finally speak in very general terms about a possible definition of its identity and its division into periods.

## 2

Preston's article *The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy* begins with the statement that although the "genre" of APh has been established since the mid-20th century, reflection on its nature and history did not begin until the 1990s with the statement that self-identification of APh was going through stage three, that this and the previous stage falsified the results of a consistent, but erroneous identification made at stage one and that as a result the most reliable conclusion can only be that APh is "something of an illusion."<sup>9</sup> What are these stages and why do they inevitably lead to the above result?

Preston dates the first stage in 1900s—1950s referring to memoirs and discourse of those who created APh. Because there has to be a time lapse between events and interpretation (it is not by chance that Gilbert Ryle said that history begins when memory is exhausted) and this time lapse did not exist then, Preston describes that stage as "protohistorical."<sup>10</sup> He singles out such publications as *Philosophical Analysis* by James Urmson (1956), *English Philosophy Since 1900* by Geoffrey James Warnock (1958), a collection of articles *The Revolution in Philosophy* (1963), including essays by such "analytic luminaries" as Alfred Ayer, Peter Strawson and Gilbert Ryle. The results of this early work of conceptualizing APh which involved its prime "protagonists" is the idea that its essence is relatively "easily understandable," that it crystallized at the turn of the 19th—20th centuries when it broke with the "great tradition" and that the revolution in philosophy created by APh was based primarily on the new method, the method of analyzing language as well as the conviction that language analysis is the only "legitimate" occupation of philosophers. At that stage it was also assumed that the two other important characteristics of APh—its distancing of itself from metaphysics and the history of philosophy—can be put down to the above-mentioned revolutionary approach to the tasks of philosophy and the fact that Moore, Russell and Frege (because Russell used his techniques in mathematical logic) and later Wittgenstein were the main "revolutionaries." Although the authors who wrote about this "revolution" did not shy away from the fact that these four philosophers did not think alike, they considered these differences negligible by comparison with the new philosophical method that united them. Thus Arthur Pap in a monograph *Elements of Analytic Philosophy* (1949) maintained that "unanimous practice of the analytic method as a powerful instrument of criticism" erased these differences through a reinterpretation, that the issue of the *nature* of object *A* should be reformulated as a question of the *meaning* of the term "*A*" or its synonyms.<sup>11</sup>

According to Preston, the second stage of self-awareness of APH occurred in the 1960s—1970s when metaphysics begins to be rehabilitated in the eyes of “analysis philosophers” who in the 1970s—1980s renounced their former “revolutionary” antihistorical attitude, while since the 1990s APH itself becomes an object of historical and philosophical study. The names that stand out are Nicholas Griffin, Ray Monk, Peter Hilton and Michael Beaney. Preston describes that stage in the historiography of APH as “the new wave” in contrast to the previous one he refers to as the “the received view” of APH (which has not receded into the past, but is consciously asserted as “our received view”).<sup>12</sup> The most important discovery of the “new wave” era was that not a single view traditionally associated with APH—including even the “linguistic thesis”—was in practice shared by all analytic philosophers and specifically by them. The emphasis at that stage was not on APH as a monolith, but on divergences within the monolith. Preston draws attention to the discovery that at least one “canonized analytic,” George Moore, expressly rejected the “linguistic interpretation” of his philosophy in 1942, something other “pillars” of APH did not do, they—Wittgenstein, logical positivists and the Oxford “philosophers of ordinary language”—diverged as to what was the “essence of language,” what language was and how it functioned.

Preston refers to the third stage for various reasons, as “analytic history.”<sup>13</sup> The first argument in favor of identifying it is, for some reason, that this history is written by philosophers developing the basic areas of APH such as the philosophy of language, metaphysics and epistemology. Predictably, these “fundamentalists” have a different vision of APH than those of the “second wave” concentrated as they are on traditional analytic philosophers and in fact restoring the “proto-historical” idea that APH was monolithic in its preoccupation with linguistic analysis. A typical representative of that stage is Michael Dummett, who in his *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (1993) restored the “received view.”<sup>14</sup> According to Dummett, belonging to the analytic tradition means adherence to a certain style of philosophizing, and that tradition goes back to Frege’s *The Foundations of Arithmetic* (1882) which in answer to the question of how numbers are given to us (if we have no idea or intuition of their essence) introduced his famous context principle which governs rather the study of language than ideas (so his answer to the question is to investigate how we understand sentences containing “numerical terms”).

Dummett’s conception of APH has become, as Preston put it, “the whipping boy” for second-wave APH historians: in the opinion of R. Monk, even Russell would not have measured up to Dummett’s criteria of an analytical philosopher and P. Hacker questioned the validity of the characteristic of APH with regard to Frege himself.<sup>15</sup> But the historians of the third stage of APH, like those of the second, avoid substantive identifications confining themselves, like the author of a two-volume history of APH, Scott Soames, only to “networking links” between its main representatives and interpreting it merely as “a trail of influence” beginning from Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein. Preston criticizes this ingenuous approach noting for example that in that approach even the mathematician

Giuseppe Peano, from whom Russell borrowed copiously, should then be considered to be an analytic philosopher.

Modern definitions of APh differ from the “original simplicity” of its interpretation and are so numerous as to have inspired H. I. Glock to make a classification of them. He distinguishes several types of definitions, to wit:

- 1) doctrinal definitions (on the basis of the views preached by analytic philosophers);
- 2) substantive (based on what they do);
- 3) methodological (based on the methods they use);
- 4) stylistic (based on the style of their philosophizing);
- 5) genetic (based on who influenced whom); and
- 6) family similarities (“intersecting characteristics,” none of which is necessary or sufficient for identification of APh).<sup>16</sup>

Preston’s “main doctrine” is that only doctrinal parameters can constitute a philosophical school whereas all other definitions are “optional”: “With this in mind, I shall say that a group counts as *philosophical* in the proper, primary, or focal sense if and only if its criterion for membership is acceptance of some set of views on the basis of rational understanding,”<sup>17</sup> or, to put it another way, only doctrines are primary for identifying a philosophical school whereas to think of objects, methods and style of philosophizing, etc. as principles of identity amounts to misunderstanding the nature of the phenomenon of a philosophical school.

Preston cites examples for each type of wrong (nondoctrinal) definitions demonstrating that they “expose themselves.” However, he distinguishes among them the “revisionist” definitions, departing from the “received view” of APh but expanding the boundaries of the analytical tradition which he makes a special target of his critique. For example, L. Jonathan Cohen regards as analytic philosophers those who are interested in the normative problems in connection with reasons and reasoning, but admits that in that case APh can be seen as “a strand in the total history of Western philosophy from Socrates onwards rather than just a modern movement.”<sup>18</sup> Similarly, Dagfinn Føllesdal defines APh as a philosophy based on arguments and validation of propositions (as opposed to the philosophies of Martin Heidegger or Jacques Derrida), and that might in principle include Aristotle, Descartes and “even” Thomas Aquinas.<sup>19</sup> The problem with “revisionists,” according to Preston, is that they proceed from the “received view” of APh and then, looking for its main doctrines and failing to find them, drastically revise the “received view” pretending that they are merely making some adjustments to it. However, they mislead their audience: by shifting the genesis of APh from the early 20th century to earlier stages in the history of philosophy they make it impossible to understand either its “meteoric rise” this century or the fact that being deprived of true philosophical integrity APh acquires a certain unity only from the meta-philosophical point of view which makes it a

“linguistic revolution” in philosophy.<sup>20</sup> (In other words, their fault is that they disguise the illusory nature of APh.)

As a result, we have a triangle of presumptions the first two of which accord with the “received view” and the third with the results of its criticism by the “second wave”:

- (1) APh is a philosophical school;
- (2) APh traces its origins to the early 20th century;
- (3) there is no set of views, doctrines, etc. shared by all the philosophers considered to be analytical and no other than analytical.

Because provision (3) is well-grounded we cannot dismiss it, but the resulting triad of provisions turns out to be inconsistent, therefore if provision (1) is removed we are left with a “nondoctrinal definition” and if (2) is removed we are left with “revisionism.” What remains is an “illusionist interpretation” of APh which in effect negates proposition (1) and also implies a rejection of the “received view” to which, as we have seen above, there is no alternative. “More completely, the illusionist takes current work in the history of analytic philosophy to indicate that the received view was simply a guise that enabled a non-doctrinal and nonphilosophical group of some sort to come to dominate academic philosophy in various geographic regions by masquerading as a philosophical school.”<sup>21</sup> This verdict is leavened with rhetoric: the illusionist agrees with the traditionalist on what *might be* an object considered as APh, but differs from him on the issue of the *existence* of this object and, more importantly, he is closer to the traditionalist than to the “revisionist” and considers being exposed to be fruitful because finding out the reasons for the non-existence of this or that object (in this case APh as a philosophical school) deepens our understanding of that object. Therefore “benighted traditionalism” as a position in interpreting APh performs the function of a ladder (to borrow Wittgenstein’s metaphor) which is used and then pushed away once the destination (in our case an awareness of the illusory nature of a certain object) is reached.<sup>22</sup>

### 3

The importance of Preston’s manifesto is considerable: he has consistently and, one must hand it to him, rather elegantly followed through *one* of the chains of conclusions that can be drawn proceeding on the basis that APh is not constituted by concrete philosophical doctrines and its representatives find it difficult to identify it. However, the metaphor he borrows in reality rather works against him: ladders are usually fixed to walls in order to achieve an intended object, so he betrays his original goal to expose the “nonphilosophical group” which managed to use a certain myth to gain preeminence in the modern philosophical world. Therefore his interest lies more in exposure than in research. It is not very clear how this “nonphilosophical group” managed to cobble together such a

powerful “philosophical empire.” Preston, who here plays the role of a smart boy from the *Emperor’s New Suit* by Hans Christian Andersen, says that he has discussed this aspect of the problem in another publication, but is it proper to deprive the reader of an explanation of the essence of such an important “metaphilosophical paper”?

Preston’s division into periods of interpretations of the APh phenomenon isn’t faultless. It was noted above that a serious discussion of the nature and historical boundaries of APh began in the 1980s—1990s, so the initial stage of self-reflection of APh indeed precedes the above stretch of time. But Preston failed to chronologically distinguish “the second wave,” the third and “the modern state,” and what he means by these three stages has been happening simultaneously from the end of the 20th century. Consider the fact that various views of APh coexist at present: as a philosophical monolith and as “unity in diversity” with the champions of the “narrow” and “broad” approaches to the phenomenon writing about it simultaneously. But in such a case one should say so instead of speaking about “stages” which are practically impossible to distinguish beginning from the 1990s. Otherwise we find Dummett as a representative of the “third stage” is vehemently challenged by the representatives of the “second stage” who should properly be referred to the fourth one.

Preston’s logic reveals an interesting feature: a thing can be considered existing if there is a good definition of it and in the absence of the latter it does not exist. This harks back directly to Sextus Empiricus (the 2nd century AD), who also rejected the existence of the good mainly on the grounds that all the proposed definitions of it were in his opinion unsuccessful or insufficient (Adv. math. XI.35–39). And what if a good definition suddenly comes along? Would it confer the status of existence on an object? However, just as Sextus with regard to the good so Preston with regard to APh proceed from the “presupposition” that cannot be corrected by any “good definitions.”

While Preston bases his verdict about the illusory character of APh by comparing three presumptions (see above) his own conclusion can be presented as the following syllogism:

- (1) all philosophical schools are constituted by a set of doctrines accepted by their followers while all the other characteristics are optional;
- (2) APh does not have a set of doctrines;
- (3) consequently it is not a philosophical school;
- (4) if it is not a school, it is an illusory construct.

Of the above premises (one of which is an interim conclusion) only (2) is true. Indeed, there does not exist a set of universally recognized doctrines in the expanding reality usually referred to as APh, and—precisely owing to its similarity to the “expanding Universe”—it cannot exist. But I believe that this is also true of such philosophical trends as phenomenology (or neophenomenology), philosophical hermeneutics, modern Kantianism, poststructuralism, etc. Does it follow that they too should be seen as phantoms being touted by “nonphilo-

sophical groups”? If so, the whole of modern philosophy would turn out to be “a history of an illusion,” and, therefore, Preston’s “specific discovery” of the virtual nature of APH is nothing exceptional.

Things are far more complicated with the main premise (1). It does not have feet to stand on even if one leaves out all the modern trends of philosophy and confines oneself only with the traditional ones. “Doctrinal unanimity” of course, was an important constituent of a philosophical school, but *only one* and not always the defining ingredient. Ancient and medieval schools—not only in the West but also in the East—were constituted by doctrines, objects, methods and styles (for which Preston has scant regard), but most importantly, by lines of continuity and hierarchies of generated texts which also reflected the same continuity because a large part of them were commentaries by successors on the works of their predecessors.<sup>23</sup> Thus, for example, on the key object of polemics in Greek and Roman philosophy, i.e., the nature of the good and its varieties (see above in connection with Sextus) the Stoics from the outset upheld “exclusivism” (only virtues are good) whereas corporeal advantages (health or beauty) or external advantages (wealth and respect) were dismissed as the “preferred indifferent” (*proegmenon*), while their perpetual opponents, the Peripatetics and Academics, upheld “inclusivism” and adhered to a three-tiered hierarchy of goods (spiritual, corporeal and external). However, already Ariston of Chios (the 3rd century BC), a pupil of the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium, rejected this distinction of goods and the “preferred indifferent” as being shallow and he had many followers, including Posidonius (the 2nd—1st centuries BC) and the famous Seneca (the 1st century AD). Similarly, among their opponents Carneades (the 3rd—2nd centuries BC) considered pleasure to be the supreme good, Atticus (the 2nd century BC) berated (like the Stoics) Aristotle who considered external goods to be ingredients of happiness while Hieronymus of Rhodes (the 3rd century BC) and Staseas of Naples (the 1st century BC) saw happiness as carefree and corporeal pleasure and no one “excommunicated them from the school” on account of this Epicureanism. They did not do so because, in spite of these specific “doctrines,” they stayed within the tradition of their teachers and worked on corresponding school texts. However, the APH also has a canon of authorities and founding fathers in the already repeatedly mentioned names, so he who would theoretically try to represent it as a school could just as well cite “continuity” rather than “doctrines.”

The interim conclusion (3) is logically untenable because as we have just seen it proceeds from the false grand premise (1). But the proposition it contains is not false either as a conclusion or as a fact: APH is too broad a spectrum of “philosophical reality” to be encompassed by the comparatively narrow concept of “school.”

The final conclusion (4) rests on the problematical intermediate conclusion (3) as its prerequisite. But it is a very “strong proposition” in its own right. In fact Preston seeks to confront us with a dilemma: philosophical reality *X* should either be a school or a mirage. The trouble is that any *schools* (be it in philosophy, mathematics, political economy, literary criticism, the game of chess, ball-

room dancing, etc.) can only be schools of *something*, a certain activity or, to use Alasdair MacIntyre's term, practice. Philosophy is also a type of theoretical practice and denying the reality of its genus characteristics recognizing only the species is like claiming that there exist only red, blue, green and other colors denying color as such (it is unclear why we speak about "blue color" and not "blue smell"), which is illogical. This simple idea concerning philosophy had occurred a long time ago to the author of the fundamental Indian political treatise the *Arthaśāstra* (circa the 1st century AD), who provided the first definition of philosophy in that region of the world distinguishing (1) philosophy (*ānvīkṣikī*), literally "investigation", as what "investigates through argumentation" (*hetubhir ānvīkṣyamānā*) and (2) the three main schools—Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata (I.2).

The above definition is directly relevant to the discussion on the nature of APh. First, it shows that a very long time ago and in another part of the world philosophy was already defined not through "doctrines" but through a research practice. Second, what it is defined through pertains to "method" and "style," so rashly neglected by one of the most authoritative modern specialists on APh. Third, the "method" and "style" of philosophizing under discussion come closest precisely to those that many other historians of APh try to use to identify it.

#### 4

"Light from the East" supports the definitions of APh through the peculiarities of its "method" and "style," and there are numerous such definitions in historical studies. Thus, Aloysius Patrick Martinich in *A Companion to Analytic Philosophy* proposed a minimalist interpretation of APh proceeding from the origin of the term itself: it is based more than anything else on "conceptual analysis" as aiming "at breaking down complex concepts into their simpler components."<sup>24</sup> Colin McGinn in his book *The Making of a Philosopher: My Journey through Twentieth-Century Philosophy* wrote in a more florid prose about APh: "This tradition emphasizes clarity, rigor, argument, theory, truth. It is not a tradition that aims primarily for inspiration or consolation or ideology. Nor is it particularly concerned with 'philosophy of life,' though parts of it are. This kind of philosophy is more like science than religion, more like mathematics than poetry—though it is neither science nor mathematics."<sup>25</sup> The above mentioned Scott Soames in his two-volume *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century* conveys the same stylistic spirit of APh: "there is, I think, a widespread presumption within the tradition that it is often possible to make philosophical progress by intensively investigating a small, circumscribed range of philosophical issues while holding broader, systematic questions in abeyance. What distinguishes twentieth-century analytical philosophy from at least some philosophy in other traditions, or at other times, is not a categorical rejection of philosophical systems, but rather the acceptance of a wealth of smaller, more thorough and more rigorous, investigations."<sup>26</sup> In other words, APh is seen above all as a

philosophical technology, which is inherently neutral with regard to doctrines.

One can cite many such definitions and they are important as real self-expression of APH. However, therein yet another feature of real is underestimated, “empirical” analytical philosophizing. If we open the *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology* (2009), edited by Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea, and recently translated into Russian, we are sure to note that practically all entries are considered by the contributors in a polemical context and that the aim of the discourse is equally to define the concept investigated and to gain the upper hand over the opponent investigating the same concept by pointing out the shortcomings of his presented or potential arguments. Thus in the article *Divine Eternity* William Lane Craig verifies and criticizes: the Thomist argument in favor of divine timelessness of God from His simplicity or immutability; argument from divine knowledge of future contingents; argument from special relativity; the arguments of Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann and Brian Leftow from the incompleteness of temporal life. He looks then at arguments for divine temporality to conclude that while the arguments for divine temporality outweigh those of the opponents the latter have a theoretical chance of upholding their position by denying the objective reality of temporal development and temporal facts. Similarly B. Leftow in the article *Omnipotence* offers his final definition of the concept under discussion (overloaded with the symbols of mathematical logic) only after criticizing the conceptions of Thomas Aquinas (modified by Duns Scotus and William of Ockham), and his contemporaries Edward Wierenga, Thomas Flint and Alfred J. Freddoso. But other divine attributes are considered in the same way: in *Omniscience* by Edward Wierenga, *Omnipresence* by Hud Hudson, *Moral Perfection* by Laura Garcia. The discourse is structured in a similar way in the theory of consciousness, including the topic of artificial intelligence, in epistemology, theory of possible worlds and other subject areas of modern APH. That is why the definition of philosophy as “investigation through argumentation,” discovered two millennia ago in a different region of the world, pinpoints the essence of the “practice” of APH.

Could it be the case that the “genus characteristic,” along with the “style characteristics” of APH such as those proposed by Martinich, McGinn, or Soames, reflects the specificities of analytical activities beginning from the early 20th century? By no means. On that point I stand four square with the “revisionists” whom Preston rejects and who extend features of APH to past ages, though I have some reservations. The first is that they were “timid revisionists” looking around them and discovering signs of APH with Descartes, Aristotle and “even” Aquinas, who in fact in his main work demonstrates “chemically pure” analytical practice of investigating concepts through many-sided critique of the propositions they contain of real and virtual participants in their “philosophical dialogue” and differ in the method of philosophizing from modern analysts only by the absence of mathematical symbols and calculus. Secondly, they could hardly imagine the sheer number of representatives of the analytic method (which, as we remember, forms the very “matter” of APH) in the history of European philosophy. The first representative of what Preston called “the nonphilosophy.”

sophical group” who somehow managed to gain preeminence in philosophy (see above) was not even Socrates or an older Sophist but Xenophanes of Colophon (circa 570—after 478 BC), who, according to the yet-to-be-refuted testimony of Pseudo-Aristotle, argued in favor of philosophical *monotheism* through logical refutation of the two main propositions of *polytheists* he himself reconstructed. He repudiated the possibility of genealogy of gods and their multiplicity on the basis of his own characteristic of Deity as a single and immutable Beginning and through the polemical method of *reductio ad absurdum*.<sup>27</sup> Third, “revisionists” perhaps do not even suspect that the philosophical reality they discuss is by no means solely European, but intercultural. In addition to the definition of philosophy in the *Arthaśāstra* India knew at least two more. According to Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (the 4th—5th centuries), the same “philosophy-as-investigation” (*ānvīkṣikī*) is a sequence of three operations: nomination of the objects chosen for investigation, their definition and verification of the results of definition (I.1.1), and according to Rājaśekhara in the *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* (the 10th century) it is constituted by a duel between the proponent and the opponent (I.2). That means that it accepted the investigative, controversy-based nature of philosophy as a norm. As regards philosophical practice, it fully accorded with the nature of such philosophizing, as witnessed by all the three main genres of the texts of classical Indian schools (*darśanas*)—commentaries, treatises and textbooks—and we have these early precedents of “investigation-through-controversy” in the early era of the Indian philosophy, in the Shramanic period (5th century BC). I do not know of a similar definition of philosophical activity in China, but one can safely say that investigation-through-controversy dates back to the initial stage of the native Chinese philosophy, to the work of the “school of names,” one of whose representatives was concerned with the famous problem of whether a white horse is a horse (4th century BC), and was then continued for a time in the school of the Moists.

## 5

The reader will see that Aaron Preston and I draw diametrically opposite conclusions from the limited nature of “received view” of the character of APh. This rejection of the view led him to rejection of APh as philosophical reality, and me to its “globalization” as an intercultural reality going back not to the early 20th century, but to the beginnings of “philosophical practice” in the world. It would not be proper though, to provide the reader with at least a rough definition of this philosophical reality in the main outlines of its division into periods. The phenomenon of analytical philosophy could perhaps best be defined not as a school, a tradition or a current in philosophy, but a *format* of intercultural philosophical practice as research-through-controversy dealing with concepts and propositions within the broadest range exercised according to a *program* of dialectics (in the Platonian, not Hegelian meaning). This format and the corresponding program can be designated as the classical paradigm of philosophizing

(*philosophia perennis*) going back to the sources of philosophy as such (in all the native philosophical areas) and with regard to which APH dating back to the early 20th century can be seen as merely its modern scientist version.

As for division of APH into periods as interpreted in this way based on the stages of its self-reflection (with which this article begins), three main epochs can very roughly be identified:

- 1) the epoch of the practice of analytical philosophy without attempts at self-identification and typologization, but with elements of understanding the nature and varieties of *dialogic philosophical analysis* (from the beginning of philosophy until 1940s);
- 2) the epoch of initial philosophical-analytical *self-consciousness*, with APH interpreted mainly as a philosophical school (1940s—1980s);
- 3) the epoch of extended discussions on the nature and history of APH in the context of *metaphilosophy* (from 1980s to the present time).

Obviously, the proposed working definition and periodization of APH implies a historical-philosophical project of the study of the typology and dynamic of analytical methods and styles in various historical epochs, both in the European philosophical tradition and in the comparative context. There is more need today to study the problem of demarcation, a valid separation of APH from other formats of philosophy that can be seen as “non-classical” (see above) and that are related to what, in the event, is a real conceptual mirage, i.e., “continental philosophy.”<sup>28</sup> There is no doubt however that the proposed “revisionist” treatment of APH that substantially expands the “received” historical range of the concept, will trigger a discussion, which is good because without it there has never been a classical philosophy.

The latter task is relevant not only in the universal, but also in the specifically Russian philosophical context. In Russia there has always been a significant gap between invariably embryonic professional philosophy and a thriving “paraphilosophy” which, within the framework of this or that ideology, seeks not so much to cognize the world and our own cognition as make the world over, in line with Marx’s last thesis on Feuerbach. Within this frame of reference there is a constant need for various forms of “nonclassical philosophy.” At present it is the philosophy of the post-modern type which, on the one hand, is rooted in Marxism and, on the other, is a self-expression not so much of concepts and doctrines as metaphors designed to undermine human rationality by applying methods of “enigmatic rubbish.” In this context, both objects and methods of real philosophy as a theoretical investigative activity are often declared to be outdated, fit only for the study of the past history of classic philosophy. The historical-philosophical reconstruction of APH proposed here provides an argument to show that classical philosophy is not a chronological but rather a transchronological reality as it is as much alive in the 21st century as in the 5th century BC. This is logical because philosophy is equal to itself and there can be no real alternative to it (for example, as a hybrid of postphilosophy and post-fiction-writing

sanctioned by Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty, and in Russia referred to by the term “literary philosophy”) unless of course the end of philosophy as such is to be considered an alternative.

---

NOTES

- 1 This is proved by the mammoth article *Philosophy* in the monumental historical-philosophical lexicon edited by Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, which is the size of a hefty monograph, see: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Bd. 7 (P–Q), Basel, 1989.
- 2 J. Searle, “Contemporary Philosophy in the United States,” *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, ed. by N. Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2003, p. 1.
- 3 G. Bergmann, “A Positivistic Metaphysics of Consciousness,” *Mind*, N.S., 1945, vol. 54, p. 194.
- 4 A typical example is provided by Russel’s famous *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945) in which historical philosophy is partly rejected as “nonscientific” and partly considered only in terms of “scientific revelations.”
- 5 A. Stroll, *Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*, New York, 2000, p. 5.
- 6 M. Beany, “The Analytic Turn in Twentieth-Century Philosophy,” *The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology*, ed. by M. Beany, London, 2007, p. 1.
- 7 H.-J. Glock, *What Is Analytic Philosophy*, Cambridge, 2008, p. 205.
- 8 A. Preston, *Analytic Philosophy: the History of an Illusion*, London—New York, 2007, p. 27.
- 9 A. Preston, “The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy,” *The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, 2005, No. 127, p. 11.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- 14 Preston has every reason to proceed from the introductory pages of Dummett, who indeed asserted that “What distinguishes analytical philosophy, in its diverse manifestation, from other schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so attained” (M. Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, Cambridge, MA, 1993, p. 4).
- 15 A. Preston, “The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy,” p. 17-18.
- 16 See: H.-J. Glock, “Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher?” *Metaphilosophy*, 2004, vol. 35, No. 4.
- 17 A. Preston, “The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy,” p. 21.
- 18 L. J. Cohen, *The Dialogue of Reason: An Analysis of Analytical Philosophy*, Oxford, 1986, p. 49.

- 
- 19 See: D. Føllesdal, "Analytic Philosophy: What Is It and Why Should One Engage in It," *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy*, ed. by H.-J. Glock, Oxford, 1997.
- 20 A. Preston, "The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy," pp. 25-26.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 27.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 27-28.
- 23 Among works in Russian a good idea of what really constituted the school of Plato's Academy is offered by Yury Shichalin's monograph (see: Yu. Shichalin, *The Institutional Aspect of the History of Antique Platonism*, Moscow, 2000), and of the Indian philosophy schools, by V. Shokhin's *Schools of the Indian Philosophy. The Period of Emergence*, Moscow, 2004.
- 24 *A Companion to Analytic Philosophy*, ed. by A. P. Martinich and D. Sosa, Oxford, 2001, p. 1.
- 25 C. McGinn, *The Making of a Philosopher: My Journey through Twentieth-Century Philosophy*, New York, 2002, p. XI.
- 26 S. Soames, *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 1, Princeton, 2003, p. xv.
- 27 See: *Fragments from Early Greek Philosophers*, part 1, ed. and transl. by A. Lebedev, Moscow, 1989, p. 160.
- 28 The concept is fictitious because it is counterposed to methodologically definable APH not as a philosophical but as a geographical reality, and then not a very clear reality because APH too is being pursued on various "continents."

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

## Essay on Boris Ananyev's Theory of Individual Psychic Development<sup>1</sup>

*Natalya LOGINOVA*

Addressing in his studies to the root issues of psychological knowledge, Boris Ananyev (1907-1972) built a theory of anthropological psychology crowned with a system of views on individual mental (psychic) development. The problem of development preoccupied him during the final phase of his career. Ananyev's theory is not something cut and dried, on the contrary, it is an evolving knowledge. One would look in vain in his scientific legacy for a detailed, comprehensive and complete presentation of its content, this despite the fact that Boris Ananyev wrote many articles and several monographs explaining his conceptual system and summing up the results of a body of empirical research. The most impressive monograph was the last one to come out in his lifetime. Entitled *Man As the Subject of Cognition*,<sup>2</sup> it is brimful of ideas but is not sufficiently clear in explaining the system of his views as a whole. The challenge facing the historians of psychology is to recreate Boris Ananyev's theory in its completeness, to determine its place among other theories of individual mental development and assess its development potential in the 21st century.

This article aims to characterize the system of Boris Ananyev's views on the human individual's mental development, a system that evolves into a development theory. Without claiming to provide a complete analysis of the theory this article purports to reveal its main provisions and characteristic features and present it as a coherent substantive-logical system, highlighting its relevance to psychological science and related areas of the science of man. The article has very little to say about the numerous specific studies carried out by Ananyev and his school, their results and conclusions.<sup>3</sup>

### Ontopsychology As a Structural-Genetic Theory

Boris Ananyev's theory, which at the end of his life he called ontopsychology, considers mental development as a component and the pinnacle of the

---

N. Loginova, D. Sc. (Psychology), professor with the Developmental and Differential Psychology Chair at St. Petersburg State University. The article was first published in Russian in *Psikhologicheskoy zhurnal*, No. 2, 2014.

development of the polysystem called “man.” The development of consciousness and the psyche is the consequence of the development of man as a physical creature in the process of its natural and social being. Mental development depends on the multilevel and heterogeneous structure of man, his activity, behavior, social attitudes and diverse relationships with the world and with oneself. Ananyev represents the materialistic anthropological tradition in Russian science of the 19th—early 20th centuries, a tradition that was close to the natural sciences (it boasts such names as Nikolay Chernyshevsky, Ivan Sechenov, Konstantin Ushinsky, Vladimir Bekhterev, Pyotr Lesgaft and Ilya Mechnikov). It should be noted that Ananyev proposed to introduce the anthropological principle into the Marxist psychology that was predominant in his time.<sup>4</sup> On the whole, his psychological theory has an anthropological character and his development theory is aimed at “psychological study of the being of man as an individual and personality.”<sup>5</sup>

Ananyev's theory eschews spectacular theoretical speculations that are popular on the fringes of science being based on vast empirical material obtained during the course of three major research cycles. In the 1930s, following his program, the staff of the Education Laboratory at the Bekhterev Institute of the Brain studied the character development of school students. In the 1950s he presided over a comprehensive study of the development of children within the school education system, a study carried out at the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences' Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad. In the 1960s and 1970s Ananyev embarked on a comprehensive study of adult individuality at Leningrad State University and the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences' Adult Education Institute. Death prevented Boris Ananyev from carrying through the research program to its end. Even so, the results of the comprehensive studies made a substantial contribution to the psychology of the individual, the psychology of development and laid the foundations of experimental psychological acmeology, or the science of maturity.<sup>6</sup>

Boris Ananyev focuses on the psychobiosocial structure of man, the “substratum” of development, which is why his theory is described as structural-genetic. Man as an objective natural and social being, the agent, carrier of the psyche, mediates his development, of which he is an indispensable factor and the systemic foundation. Early in life, mediation is carried out at the level of the individual and later, at the level of the personality. In the process of development consciousness becomes an organ of the personality's conscious activity and a source of self-development during the individual's journey through life.

The fact that the course of development depends on the structure of the personality and individual consciousness characterizes ontopsychology as differential psychology of development. It is a “synthesis of genetic (age-dependent) and differential-psychological (personality-dependent) disciplines that study the development of a human life.”<sup>7</sup> “The processes of growth, maturing and development are increasingly mediated by accumulated life experience and the emerging typological and individual traits. This is particularly characteristic of all the

periods of adulthood the differences between which are “overridden” by the type of individual development and the nature of practical activities.”<sup>8</sup>

The fundamental feature of individual development is its psychobiosocial integrity. Ananyev believed that the idea of development cannot today be represented without a materialist interpretation of the idea of holism. Man’s integrity as psychobiosocial creature is the result of individual development, the transition of the individual from organic to soul-endowed and later spiritual (what Ananyev called psychoideological) level of man’s structure.

A distinctive feature of Ananyev’s theory is that it concentrates on the patterns of the intertwining of the natural and the social across the life span.<sup>9</sup> Ananyev refers to these two sets as the individual’s ontogenesis and the personality’s life path. Man’s ontogenesis can proceed normally only in a sociohistorical environment, as part of the individual’s life journey. The life path in turn depends to a certain degree on the level of ontogenetic development while integral psychosocial novel formations of the personality are ultimately embodied in the individual’s substratum in the shape of new functional organs, dynamic stereotypes, diverse and multilevel links between elements of the brain structure and the organism as a whole.

The psychobiosocial structural integrity of individual development is complemented by temporal integrity, i.e., the interconnection and interdependence of all the phases of life. The human life span is the natural measuring scale in ontopsychology since it integrates all the departments of genetic psychology beginning from birth until old age and death. It comprises the genetic psychology of a child and an adolescent, acmeology and gerontopsychology and in recent decades also prenatal psychology. The idea of a psychology encompassing all ages was put forward in Russia as early as the 1920s by Nikolay Rybnikov, but in practice it was for a long time confined to childhood and adolescence. The need to study the full human life span was stressed in Boris Ananyev’s 1957 article “On the System of Age-Specific Psychology.”<sup>10</sup> Shortly after the article was published he organized (in the 1960s and 1970s) his well-known comprehensive studies in the psychology of adult development.<sup>11</sup> It is notable that in the West empirical studies of mental development comprising all age brackets were unfolding at about the same time.<sup>12</sup>

The integrity of the heterogeneous and multi-level structure requires, according to Ananyev, a comprehensive approach to its study.<sup>13</sup> Ananyev’s ontopsychology is a comprehensive science of mental development that uses all the methods of psychology. In terms of organization one should single out the comprehensive approach, the combination of the method of cross-age and longitudinal approaches, and in empirical terms, psychography as a synthesis of varying-level and heterogeneous data on the structure and development of specific individualities obtained through a host of empirical methods (observational, experimental, psychodiagnostic, praximetric and biographical).

Boris Ananyev assigned ontopsychology to a place among the psychological sciences next to and in connection with evolutionary psychology, on the one hand, and historical psychology, on the other. He saw man as a link in the evo-

lution (individual), an actor in world history (personality), a producer of values (subject) and a repository of an inner world and architect of one's own life path (individuality).

### **The Sources, Drivers and Mechanisms of Development in Ananyev's Theory**

Ananyev's theory offers its own answers to the key questions concerning mental development. Its answer to the question "who (or what) develops" is: man as the carrier or agent ("substratum") of the psyche and the subject of consciousness and activity. The process of individual mental development constitutes the genesis of a system. It sees the transition between levels (and forms) of the polysystem called "man": individual personality individuality.<sup>14</sup> Individuality is the complete structure of man developed to its maximum in each specific case. The aim of development is to become an individuality, to unfold one's abilities and inclinations, the entire hierarchy of needs, to express oneself as a unique representative of the human species.

System genesis is governed by the law of the unity of integration and differentiation of the original "substratum" of development. "On the one hand, development is indeed integration growing in scale and levels, the formation of large "blocks," systems of structures whose synthesis at a certain point during the human life span represents the most general structure of the personality... On the other hand, the development of the personality is about growing differentiation of its psychophysiological functions, processes, states and personal traits commensurate with the progressing integration."<sup>15</sup>

The law of the unity of differentiation and integration applies to all levels of the polysystem "man." According to Ananyev's theory, the integrating elements in the structure of the individual are the sensory organization, innate traits and temperament and in the structure of the personality proper, the character. The structure of a subject is crowned with an ensemble of aptitudes and talent. Finally, there emerges the individuality, i.e., a totally integral system in which the traits of an individual, personality and subject are combined in a certain way. Individuality is a highly organized system. It implies a complete, strong, integral and original character, creative ability integrated in talent, the highest level of self-regulation at the self-consciousness level (including the concept of autobiography which Ananyev described as the subjective idea of the life path). The self-regulation of individuality on the basis of hard-won values, ideals, convictions, life philosophy and the concept of one's own (autobiographical) life path makes the personality original and authentic. Ultimately it renders the personality strength in the face of adversity and makes it highly productive in all forms of life activity and behavior in general.

Integration in the form of individuality engenders new systemic qualities such as harmony of the disparate elements within its structure (Ananyev called it inner compatibility). Systemic effects of individuality undoubtedly include the

creative character of activities and the building of one's biography as the person fulfils his/her inner potential, aspirations and abilities, understanding of one's surrounding environment. In the system (polysystem) of "individuality" consciousness becomes the subjective inner world and operates in a special mode called the mode of experience. Subjective reality becomes the basis of reflexive development of man and an inner condition of the autonomy and sovereignty of the personality.

What are the sources and drivers of mental development? Science does not have a pat answer to that question. The anthropopsychological theory of mental development looks for inner development sources within the very structure of man. Indeed, man has a built-in genetic program that is implemented throughout his life span. It already contains specifically human elements. These include the special structure of the human hand with its diverse functions (in work, communication and cognition). Human perception, the product of the historically formed sensory organization of *Homo Sapiens* is at least as peculiar to man as thinking and speech. Man has an innate need for another person, human communication, while the brain's second signal system underlies the speech faculty. Thus, the genetic program offers the things that are necessary, but not sufficient for an individual to evolve into a personality. Ananyev believed that modern man continues to evolve under the influence of changing social conditions and the artificial environment he himself is creating.<sup>16</sup> He regarded changes in the size of the human body, the structure of human illnesses and the human life span as proof of the continuing evolution of the human race. In his oral pronouncements Ananyev made a bold prediction that man would develop new psychophysiological mechanisms.

"The social determination of man's natural traits forms the basis of man's development,"<sup>17</sup> wrote Ananyev. Along with heredity there exist the social program of individual development and accordingly, its social sources, especially culture. Cultural, i.e., essentially sign determination of mental development has most thoroughly been studied by Lev Vygotsky and his followers. Because a child can access culture only through the mediation of an adult, its development is driven by joint activities, communication and the coexistence of the child and the adult.<sup>18</sup>

In general, the provisions of the cultural-historical theory of development have long been taken on board by the science of psychology. Boris Ananyev had great respect for Lev Vygotsky and his theory and adopted some of his ideas, though sometimes he disagreed with them. A comparison of the views of these two outstanding psychologists merits a special analysis. Here we should merely note that Ananyev, unlike Vygotsky, paid more attention to the natural (more broadly, inner) drivers of development that had to do with the structure of individuality. Besides, his theory concentrates more on the period of adulthood, the acme, or culmination. That is why he attached key significance to work (rather than study or play) activities as the main driver of man's development not only in anthropogenesis, but in individual life as well. Vygotsky's theory links development primarily with interiorization while Ananyev stressed exteriorization whose main channel is labor activity.

Development is driven by the personality's vital activities in general, by work, learning, communication, social behavior and the structuring of its life within historical time and social space, or in the biographical chronotope. Activity actualizes all the mental processes and the corresponding functional mechanisms. The accumulation of microchanges in the processes that support various types of the personality's activity and behavior generates new entities and ultimately forms the character and abilities. Ananyev indicates dialectical transitions from activity to behavior, from abilities to character and vice versa. Indeed, in his work activities man does not merely produce value and objectivizes his abilities, but expresses his personal attitude to work, to oneself, to other people and society in general. Thus, labor is both productive activity and behavior, i.e., an expression of the personality's attitudes. In turn, the character, actualizing the person's attitudes is involved in activities, which is why character traits present themselves as abilities (punctuality, industry and neatness, for example) and abilities may form the basis for character formation (for example, the aspirations and character of a great musician arise from his musical gifts).

As distinct from most scholars, who refer to individual development as "ontogenesis," Boris Ananyev, as mentioned above, identified and distinguished two main forms of man's development, i.e., the ontogenesis of an individual and the life path of the personality (subject) in order to compare them and thus gain an insight into the regularities governing the entire life span. Man's ontogenesis takes place in certain sociohistorical conditions and is modified under their influence during the course of the person's life. At the same time, the personality's (psychosocial) transformations are always linked with individual (psychophysiological) changes, so that the subtlest personality's traits of a subject arise from simplest and individualized functions of the human organism.<sup>19</sup>

Human nature is immanently social, therefore "the measures of sociohistorical determination of individual development" are applicable "to the maturing of man's neuropsychic functions" as well as to the growth of the personality.<sup>20</sup> Natural ontogenesis consists of the processes of maturing, maturity, aging and death. Ananyev's school examines these processes mainly through the psychophysiological functions of the brain. They, especially the sensory functions, provide the material from which man's entire psychic organization is formed. In terms of the process Ananyev believed that sensations were the source of the development of the entire psychic structure. This expressed the materialistic sensualism that characterized his scientific worldview.<sup>21</sup>

Man's life path is "a history of the formation and development of the personality in a specific society, a contemporary of a certain epoch and coeval of a certain generation."<sup>22</sup> The life path is not programmed in the same way as ontogenesis. Initially it is determined by external social or family programs in accordance with the social laws and traditions and the parents' ideas of their child and its future. Beginning from adolescence the life path is increasingly determined by the person himself as the subject of his own life activity.

Ananyev's theory describes the methods of psychic development. As regards the nexus between social and individual determination of development it singles

out socialization and individualization which are implemented through different mechanisms. For socialization learning is critical. Learning in the process of socialization ensures interiorization, i.e., the introduction of society's culture into the structure and consciousness of the personality.

Individualization is a later phase of development which Ananyev described as "building of the self from within." The key means or mechanism of individualization is not learning (interiorization), but creative activity and social behavior (exteriorization). Creative activity is focused mainly in exteriorization, manifestation and fulfillment of one's potential and inclinations, aspirations and meanings.<sup>23</sup>

Both mechanisms (learning and the mechanisms of productive creative activity) require a certain level of development of individual traits, so that maturing, transformations at the age of maturity and aging of general and elementary neurodynamic and neuropsychic (psychophysiological), sexual and general somatic functions are primary, age-related mechanisms proper of individual development. The age evolution of psychophysiological functions involves correlation mechanisms that lend development a certain character of integral transformations. "In the process of individual development, thanks to correlative action of various organs and functional systems there occurs a transfer, a shift of transformations from some functions to others, that is, correlated changes of many types."<sup>24</sup> The development of each function depends on its links with other functions.

In accordance with dialectics, movement is the result of contradictions. Ananyev's anthropological psychology gives pride of place to internal contradictions and internal motive forces hidden in the heterogeneous structure of man. The fundamental contradiction consists in the correlation of the biological (individual) and the social (personality-related) in the overall structure of the individuality. Accordingly, at the level of the psychic process (the psychic "cell") Ananyev identified the contradiction between the psychophysiological functional and socially determined operational mechanisms (components).

Microchanges can be accumulated and generalized in the structure of the personality (individuality) because every mental (psychic) process is like a "cell" of the psychic onto which the main substructures of the individuality (individual, personality, subject) are projected.<sup>25</sup> Ananyev saw the meaning of his scheme of analysis of the structure of processes in that it gave an insight into the pattern of man's individual development, i.e., ontogenesis of the individual and social history of the personality as well as the subject of practical activity.

Indeed, according to Ananyev, the psychophysiological component or mechanism is a function of certain brain structures of man as an individual (that component comprises sensory-perceptive, psychomotor, associative, verbal, mnemonic, attentional and other brain functions). They are all elements of the psychophysiological system called "the individual." These mechanisms are deployed depending on age, as the individual grows, reaches his peak and ages. However, they are genuinely developed in the activities of labor, communication, cognition, play, learning as part of the operational component of the psychic

process whose nature is determined by the accumulation of individual experience, acquisition of cultural norms and patterns of activity and behavior (specifically, techniques of measuring, building, reading, rendering, portrayal as well as communication, civic behavior, etc.). "Inasmuch as perceptive actions use various technical and cultural means (tools and signs that act as amplifiers of functions) these mediated functions are specific to operational perception mechanisms."<sup>26</sup> The above quotation refers to perception, but the analysis scheme is relevant to all the other psychic processes. The operational component correlates with the overall structure of activity and its subject. Changes in that component are eventually accumulated in the subject's body of skills and abilities, which are adding in the new elements to the structure of activity.

The third, motivational, component of the psychic process has to do with its direction, selectivity and intensity (tonus), regulating both the functional and operational mechanisms. It reflects the organic needs of the individual and the needs of the personality. Changes at the level of the psychic process, of what may be called micromotivation level, provide the material for the new formations in the motivation elements of the structure of the individual and the personality. As the personality develops the motivation mechanism is filled with personal content and takes the shape of interests, cognitive, moral and aesthetic needs. All the microchanges at the level of the psychic "cell" are accumulated and generalized in individuality.

In our view, Ananyev's logic concerning dynamic processes in the structure of development is as follows. There is a nexus between elements of the structure. For various reasons (the genetic factor or pedagogical impact; pedagogical assessment, for example, or the perceived exigency of an actual situation) some of the elements become active and their functional level is raised. The change is not isolated. On the contrary, it induces changes in other elements of the individual through correlation links. The correlation links are not accidental, but logical, which is why only certain elements respond to the activation of the inductor. Repeated activation of elements by the inducing element trains and improves them. In real life, activity and behavior a natural selection takes place of those correlation links that yield the most useful result. Correlation links are consolidated through repeated practical actions in the processes of work, communication and cognition. As a result, a new functional organ is formed. Boris Ananyev saw a functional organ as a multilevel system of heterogeneous elements held together by correlation links. These links comprise not only psychophysiological, but also somatic (vegetative, temperature and biochemical) elements. Together, they ensure the energy-intensive information work of the brain and the psychic processes operated in it. Because the mental process unfolds in connection with profound neurobiological and somatic processes, Ananyev considered the mental process as a functional organ relevant to man's vital activity and development.<sup>27</sup>

In the context of individual psychic development Boris Ananyev raised the question of the price of intellectual tension, i.e., the energy the organism expends when under intellectual stress of solving tasks of various degrees of complexity.

Experiments carried out by members of the Ananyev school revealed regularities in energy and information ratios in psychic activity prompting Ananyev's conclusion that in living systems the processing of information depends on energy supply which varies depending on the complexity of the task and the individual characteristics of the subject. For some people the price of intellectual effort is so high as to upset the mechanisms of the functioning of their intellect and personality (for example, loss of intellectual stamina, lowering of motivation and self-esteem, various neurotic reactions) and to impede the process of individual psychic development. The question of the amount of effort and intense activity that is necessary and good for man has been little studied.

In Ananyev's theory the perception of developmental mechanisms has been deepened and generalized in the concept of bilateral organization of the cortex of the cerebral hemispheres. Initially, Ananyev considered the bilateral organization of the brain as a spatial orientation mechanism, and later as a regulator of behavior and organic life activity. In the 1960s Ananyev came to attribute to the bilateral neuropsychological mechanism the role of regulating man's individual development. The empirical indicator of bilateral regulation was the dynamics of the functional asymmetry of the human brain. The transitions of symmetry to asymmetry and vice versa in the functioning of the cortex of the big hemispheres of the brain "are analogous to the changes in the state of equilibrium and imbalance, with functional asymmetry being an analogue of imbalance when a new initially latent element of behavior manifests itself... these mechanisms have special significance for the formation and development of potential personality features (talent, industry, resilience)."<sup>28</sup> The cerebral big hemisphere's cortex accumulates individual experience, including personal existential experience. Ananyev's fellow researchers proved experimentally that functional asymmetry increases in situations of emotional stress and strong intellectual effort (during examination or intelligence tests) which was interpreted as increased role of bilateral neuropsychic mechanism or the so-called "horizontal" regulatory circuit.<sup>29</sup>

### **Key Regularities of Development in Ontopsychology**

Ananyev's theory reveals the regularities of individual psychic development. One of them is the psychohistorical trend of the broadening range of maturity of the modern man due to the "accelerated processes of maturing (general somatic, sexual, neuropsychic) and the slowing down of the processes of aging, especially in the intellectual and personality sphere."<sup>30</sup>

The law of a growing individualization of man means that the significance of individual traits of man increases during the course of individual psychic development as man matures, and especially in the middle and later phases of human life. Age differences increasingly take the back seat compared with individual features, so that adult people differ from one another not so much in terms of age as in terms of their capabilities and character.

In the literature Boris Ananyev has repeatedly been given credit for proving the law of heterochronicity of individual psychic development. This law is the result of the fact that man's structure is heterogeneous. Heterochronicity manifests itself in the discrepancy between the start of ontogenesis and of the life path and their individual moments and phases. There exists an objective sequence in the development of capabilities, interests and needs. At the level of the psychic process, the maturing of the functional component and the formation of the operational and motivational components are not synchronous.

The development of different elements of man's structure is typically uneven. Comprehensive studies of adults carried out under Boris Ananyev's guidance provided empirical proof that in adulthood psychophysiological functions may decrease, increase and remain stable at certain periods. Behind these facts are the processes of construction (emergence), stabilization, involution and restitution (recreation) of functional psychophysiological components of psychic processes and capabilities. This warrants the conclusion that aging takes place gradually and not upfront and that positive psychic neoformations may appear in older age.

One manifestation of man's integrity and at the same time the intertwining of ontogenesis and life path is the two-phase psychophysiological evolution of man first described by Ananyev. Essentially it means that in accordance with the genetic program the psychophysiological function reaches its peak in early adulthood, but a second peak may occur in older age. The second peak is the result not of the maturing of the individual, but of the development of the personality and the subject of activity. That peak attests to the social maturity of the personality and the subject, a master equipped with experience and reaching peak performance even in older age contrary to the ontogenetic involution of functions. This may be the result of an optimal life path, accumulation of positive operational and motivational, basically sociocultural, psychic neoformations.

Boris Ananyev's project of pedagogical anthropology was an annex to his anthropological psychology of development. It gave a new lease of life to the Konstantin Ushinsky tradition. Ananyev believed that "pedagogical anthropology, as distinct from pedagogy as a discipline belonging to the humanities, indeed belonged to the realm of anthropology or anthroponomy as a synthesis of the natural and social sciences of man."<sup>31</sup> Its aim is to understand the laws of the formation of the integral man in order to scientifically guide man's development based on moral humanistic values.

From the viewpoint of pedagogical anthropology pedagogical efforts must be aimed at molding a viable and resilient personality, strengthening its life forces, which means shaping an optimal structure of the personality. In Ananyev's theory this is called individuality. In accordance with the integral nature of individuality education may produce integral effects through the activation in the education process of structurally heterogeneous (varying-level) links between the physical, intellectual and moral aspects of the structure of the personality. Thanks to these links intellectual education brings changes not only to intellectual development, but also to physical and moral development, while

physical education in turn influences intellectual and moral development. The same logic applies to the relationship between moral education and various aspects of development of individuality.

There exists a logical sequence in the effects of education (and self-education). Initially habits and manners are formed as a result of molding, then comes the capacity to learn and to assimilate, and only later new formations in the structure of the personality, abilities and character appear. The deepest changes in the structure of the personality are the most remote and therefore difficult to identify. Only analysis of biographies or prolonged longitudinal studies can reveal the links between the early stages of the life span and the psychological characteristics of an adult or an old person.

Ananyev's pedagogical anthropology urges a careful and judicious approach to the processes of development and warns against rushing these processes. Ananyev discusses and offers his views on the nature of sensitivity as the responsiveness of a developing personality to pedagogical influences: "The changes of the degree of sensitivity, inherent in a developing person, to certain educational influences depends on the profound structural peculiarities of individual development (ontogenesis) of man and the history of his upbringing, education and training that mediate such development."<sup>32</sup>

The principle of harmony with nature adopted in pedagogical anthropology demands that pedagogical influences should be timed for certain periods of sensitivity when natural and cultural sequences of development converge to the optimum degree. That makes education and self-education most effective and most useful for developing abilities and character, for the emergence and strengthening of individuality. Individuality, the highest level of human development, is the goal of anthropological pedagogy.

The practical applications of Ananyev's developmental theory are relevant, above all, to the sphere of education, including adult education. The theory is potentially valuable for the practice of state governance, organization of joint labor activities in industry, in various work collectives at institutions, in the spheres of healthcare and social security. It orients practice toward the needs and abilities of man and promotes his development. This lends a humanistic thrust to Ananyev's anthropo psychological theory, including his ontopsychology.

### **The Current State and Outlook for Ontopsychology**

Ananyev's theory of development and anthropological psychology as a whole authorized by him took some time to sink in to psychologists and specialized in the scholars humanities, but eventually it impacted the entire situation in recent Russian psychology. His works and thoughts take much of the credit for the somewhat belated anthropological pivot that occurred in Russian science in the 1980s and 1990s as the problem of man moved to the focus of scientific research and promoted an interdisciplinary approach to the study of man.

Today Ananyev's theory and his ontopsychology attract interest and are being elaborated in numerous concrete psychological studies in Russia. The trail blazed by Ananyev is followed by Aleksey Bodalyov, Larisa Golovey, Nina Kuzmina, Yelena Rybalko, Yekaterina Stepanova as well as their pupils who study developmental psychology and acmeology. Studies that continue Ananyev's traditions are conducted at the St. Petersburg State University's Department of Psychology which he had created. The books, articles and dissertations written by its members are informed with the spirit of Ananyev's ontopsychology.<sup>33</sup> These studies preserve the commitment to revealing structural changes during the course of development. Earlier, it took the shape of the study of functional development and later the psychology of the personality and its self-consciousness, its inner world. One has to admit, however, that after Ananyev's death there emerged a gap between the mass of empirical material and its theoretical analysis, a gap that stymies further development of the scientific school created by Ananyev.

Let us cite some results of the empirical-theoretical studies carried out by the Ananyev school in the past twenty years. Thus, Yelena Rybalko and her colleagues studied the age-related changes in psychophysiological functions of school students in various age groups. They found that the functions of memory, thinking and attention dipped at the age of 11 and again at the age of 14-15. However, all these changes with children, unlike adults, occur against the background of an overall progressive growth of functions due to the factor of maturing. Academic success of school students is also a factor. With more successful students the leading role of verbal and logical components of memory and thinking tend to increase with age while the less successful ones tend to develop more the nonverbal components and the mnemonic function in general.<sup>34</sup>

Larisa Golovey and her colleagues have studied the development of a subject of professional activities. Marina Petrash in her dissertation compares professional and personal development in four age groups. It turned out that between the ages of 23 and 28 something like a largely sensitive period in the development of the subject of professional activities is observed. The 39 to 49 age is the most important for the development of properties of the personality. Between 50 and 60 professionalism and maturity of the personality acquire added importance as they become the main developmental resources against the background of natural aging of the psychophysiological functions.<sup>35</sup> This result bears out Ananyev's idea of the divergent type of aging and the stabilizing role of the operational and motivational mechanisms of psychic processes acquired during the lifetime.

Viktoriya Manukyan, under the guidance of Larisa Golovey, proceeding from the concept of the subjective picture of the life path proposed by Boris Ananyev, has brought some original biographical methods to the study of adult personality crises. She pinpointed the time when self-consciousness is restructured and the reflective method of development sets in at around the ages of 35-42. She also noted the huge diversity of the way normative crises are experienced whose structure may include various crises traits of various intensity (age, bio-

graphical, traumatic, etc.). The revealed discrepancy between normative and age crises bears witness to the impact of the personality factor and the individualization of development.

In 1998 Larisa Menshikova in her doctoral dissertation developed Ananyev's ideas about individuality. She came up with a model of development of individuality that attributed self-development to the interaction of experiences, personal meanings in man's inner world. Larisa Menshikova and her colleagues drew on the rich empirical material obtained by applying an enriched version of Ananyev's program during many years of a study conducted at a major technological university in Siberia (now Novosibirsk State Technological University) to look at the evolution of students' individualities during the study process. Empirical evidence has shown that the individuality structure is formed through harmonization of various aspects of the personality, including the development of coordination of verbal and nonverbal aspects of the students' intellectual activity, a lowering of the level of anxiety, decreased number of cases of pronounced introversion and diminished proneness to conflict. These new positive changes in the structure of individual development were the results not only of training and education, but of purposive individualized psychological help to students and professors.<sup>36</sup>

Considering the immense creative potential of Boris Ananyev's theory we expect more studies and theoretical conclusions from Russian psychologists that would further develop the outstanding scientist's ideas.

---

#### NOTES

- 1 The article was prepared with financial support of the Russian State Humanities Research Fund (Project No 13-06-00405).
- 2 B. Ananyev. *Man As a Subject of Cognition*, Leningrad, 1968 (in Russian).
- 3 See, for example, L. Golovey, *Psychology of the Making of a Subject of Activity in Youth and Adulthood*, St. Petersburg, 1996. (Diss.); L. Golovey, M. Petrash, "On the Development of the Subject of Activity," *Psychological Problems of Personality Self-Actualization*, issue 11, St. Petersburg, 2007; N. Loginova, *The Experience of the Study of Man: History of the Comprehensive Approach in the Psychological Schools of V. Bekhterev and B. Ananyev*, St. Petersburg, 2005 (all in Russian).
- 4 B. Ananyev, "On the Methods of Modern Psychology," *Psychodiagnostic Methods (in a Comprehensive Longitudinal Study of Students)*, Leningrad, 1976, p. 17 (in Russian).
- 5 B. Ananyev. "On a Certain Ontopsychological Problem," *Problems of Sport Psychology*, Leningrad, 1970, p. 14 (in Russian).
- 6 *The Development of the Psychophysiological Functions of Adults (Early Adulthood)*, ed. by B. Ananyev, Ye. Stepanova, Moscow, 1972; *The Development of Psychophysiological Functions of Adults (Middle Adulthood)*, ed. by B. Ananyev, Ye. Stepanova, Moscow, 1977; Ye. Stepanova, *Adult Psychology: Experimental Acmeology*, St. Petersburg, 2000 (all in Russian).
- 7 B. Ananyev, "On a Certain Ontopsychological Problem," p. 14.
- 8 B. Ananyev, "The System of Age-Specific Psychology," *Voprosy psikhologii*, 1957, No. 5, p. 157.

- 9 B. Ananyev writes: "The study of the complete ontogenetic sequence and the life path of a personality (man's being as an individual and as a personality) can legitimately be seen as a distinct synthetic discipline, the ontopsychology of man" (B. Ananyev, "The Ontopsychology of Man," *Theoretical and Applied Psychology at the Leningrad University*, Leningrad, 1969, p. 45, in Russian).
- 10 B. Ananyev, "The System of Age-Specific Psychology."
- 11 B. Ananyev. "On the Study of Age Specificities of Adults," *The Development of Psychophysiological Functions of Adults (Early Adulthood)*.
- 12 P. Baltes. "All-Age Approach in Developmental Psychology: a Study of the Dynamics of Ups and Downs During the Life Span," *Psikhologicheskii zhurnal*, 1994, No. 1.
- 13 We believe that his research was systemic and comprehensive since it aimed to discover the laws of the development of the system called "individuality" as a heterogeneous entity, in other words, the genesis of a system of a heterogeneous (reflected in the word "comprehensive") entity (reflected in the word "systemic"), see: N. Loginova, *An Experience of the Study of Man: a History of a Comprehensive Approach...*
- 14 B. Ananyev, *Man As an Subject of Cognition*, p. 330.
- 15 B. Ananyev. *On the Problems of Modern Study of Man*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 255-256. It has to be noted that the degree of integration has an optimum of its own when the bonds between the elements of a system are not too rigid so that the number of degrees of freedom of these elements remains undiminished and even multiplies, as Ananyev pointed out. Optimum integration enables a system to be flexible and open to further change.
- 16 B. Ananyev. *Man As an Subject of Cognition*, pp. 57-59.
- 17 B. Ananyev, "Some Issues of the Study of Man," *Man and Society*, Issue 1, Leningrad, 1966, p. 178 (in Russian).
- 18 The concept of *so-bitivye* (literally "co-being" or "co-existence") is being actively promoted in psychological science by Viktor Slobodchikov (V. Slobodchikov, Ye. Isayev, "Anthropological Principle in Developmental Psychology," *Voprosy psikhologii*, 1998, No. 6).
- 19 B. Ananyev, V. Yelmeyev, "Methodological Foundations of Comprehensive Study of Man," *Sociology and Ideology*, Moscow, 1969, p. 231 (in Russian).
- 20 B. Ananyev. "Preface," N. Tikh, *Early Ontogenesis in the Behavior of Primates*, Leningrad, 1966, p. 5 (in Russian).
- 21 Throughout most of his scientific career Ananyev vigorously pursued the study of sensual forms of the psychic and developed a theory of sensations.
- 22 B. Ananyev, *Man As an Subject of Cognition*, pp. 104-105.
- 23 Ananyev believed that "it is impossible to understand interiorization and exteriorization separately without a certain dynamic balance between these two effects" ("On the Psychological Effects of Socialization," *Man and Society*, issue 11, Leningrad, 1971, p. 150, in Russian). Thus, an artist needs to constantly accumulate impressions and hone his skill in order to produce a worthy work of art. Similarly, the perception of art depends on the reader or spectator taking an active attitude. The best reader is someone who has tried his hand at writing and the perceptive viewer has some knowledge and experience of artistic activity. Likewise, a personality performing significant acts draws on the ideals of society, moral norms and values.

- 24 B. Ananyev et al., *Man's Individual Development and Constancy of Perception*. Moscow, 1968, p. 232 (in Russian).
- 25 Boris Ananyev first proposed the idea of the structure of a mental process as a "cell" in 1968 (B. Ananyev et al., *ibid.*).
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- 27 *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
- 28 B. Ananyev, "Bilateral Regulation of Man's Individual Development," *Pitannya psikhologii*, Kiev, 1964, pp. 17, 18, in Ukrainian).
- 29 The "vertical" circuit of neuropsychic regulation is represented by the links between the lower and upper parts of the whole nervous system, including the brain and the spinal cord.
- 30 B. Ananyev, "Structure of the Development of the Psychophysiological Functions of an Adult," *Age-Specific Psychology of Adults*, Leningrad, 1971, issue 1, p. 5.
- 31 B. Ananyev, "Man As an Subject of Education (Perspectives of Pedagogical Anthropology)," B. Ananyev., *Selected Works on Psychology*, St. Petersburg, 2007, vol. 2, p.467.
- 32 B. Ananyev, "An Important Problem of Modern Pedagogical Anthropology (Ontogenetic Properties of Man and Their Interconnection), B. Ananyev, *Selected Works on Psychology*, vol. 2, p. 469 (in Russian).
- 33 See, for example, Ye. Rybalko, *Age-Specific and Differential Psychology*, St. Petersburg, 1990; *The Intellectual Potential of Man: Development Problems*, ed. by A. Krylov, L. Golovey, St. Petersburg, 2003; *Ontopsychology*, ed. by A. Krylov, Ye. Rybalko, St. Petersburg, 2003; L. Golovey, *Psychology of the Making of a Subject of Activity During Youth and Adulthood*; I. Dermanova, N. Chebotareva, "The Structure of Military Servicemen's Coping Behavior; Age Aspect," *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, Series 12, 2008, issue 4*; V. Manukyan, *The Subjective Picture of a Life Path and Adult Age Crises*, St. Petersburg, 2003 (Dissertation) (all in Russian).
- 34 Ye. Rybalko, N. Gerasimova, "Dynamics of Value Orientation Groups of a High School Student and an Adult," *Psychological Problems of Self-Actualization of the Personality*, Issue 4, St. Petersburg, 2000, p. 289.
- 35 L. Golovey, M. Petrash, *op.cit.*
- 36 L. Menshikova, *Psychological Regularities of Individuality Development of University Students*, Novosibirsk, 1998 (Diss.); L. Menshikova, "Applied Value of B. Ananyev's Concept of Individuality," *Psikhologicheskii zhurnal*, 2007, No. 5.

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

## **The Phenomenon of Poverty in Modern Russia**

*Natalya TIKHONOVA*

Russia is a rich country with a poor population. This is as true today as it was a hundred or ten years ago. But this is not to say that the poverty situation in Russia does not change. Today the problem has a different character than even ten years ago, not to speak of the times further back. How has it been changing? Is the poverty situation getting better or worse? How do the Russians perceive their poor? The answers to these and many other questions are provided by the study *Poverty and Inequality in Modern Russia: 10 Years On* carried out by the RAS Institute of Sociology.<sup>1</sup> This article will examine some of these answers.

### **How the Russians Perceive Their Poor and Why**


It has become a commonplace that poverty is regarded in Russian culture as almost a virtue and asceticism, which has its roots in Orthodoxy, is part of the warp and woof of the Russian people's culture and life ideal. But is this the case today when rampant propaganda of consumerism is pouring from television screens day and night drumming it into people's heads that the value of every individual is determined by the brands and the number of the individual's material possessions?

Available data suggest that both points of view are relevant to contemporary Russian society as the attitude to the poor is rapidly changing. So far most Russians tend to feel compassion towards poor people (see Fig. 1). If one counts in those who regard them with pity or respect, one may argue that *the Russians still have a largely positive attitude to the poor*.

At the same time almost half of the population does not feel either compassion or pity, let alone respect for the poor. Indeed, there is a gradual but *clearly traceable worsening of the attitude to the poor* in Russian society. Thus, over the past ten years the number of Russians who feel compassion for the poor has dropped dramatically (by more than 1.5 times) while the share of people whose

---

**N. Tikhonova**, D. Sc. (Sociology), research professor at the National Research Institute of the Higher School of Economics, senior research fellow with the RAS Institute of Sociology. The article was first published in Russian in the journal *Sotsiologicheskkiye issledovaniya (SOTSIS)*, No. 1, 2014.



**Fig. 1. How the Russians Perceive the Poor, %**

attitude towards them is no better and no worse than to anybody else has increased just as dramatically (i.e., by more than 1.5 times). The share of those who regard the poor with indifference has almost trebled during the same period. Thus *poverty per se is less and less seen as grounds for a priori compassion for people in distress.*

*Increasingly, the attitude to the poor in modern Russian society is based not on the fact, but on the nature of the causes of their poverty. Thus, it ceases to be category-based and becomes individual-based, i.e., connected with the life situation of a specific individual.* By the same token our fellow citizens are less and less inclined to think of the poor as a distinct social group that needs to be treated with particular consideration. This means that *helping the poor as a distinct social group is fading out of most people's agendas.*

The tendency to individualize the attitude to the poor and marginalization of the poverty problem in the minds of Russians is due in large measure to the changes in their perception of the causes of poverty and the poor themselves. Speaking about the causes of poverty, falling into poverty due to delays or non-payment of wages has dropped sharply over the past years<sup>2</sup> (see Table 1). While in 2003<sup>3</sup> that particular externality was the undisputed leader in the rating of such causes, today it is in 10th place. The role of insufficient state benefits has also diminished, albeit less so than the previous cause, while the significance of various family problems (death of breadwinner, etc.) and alcohol and drug addiction has increased.

*Thus, in the popular mind the current poverty situation in Russia is linked less to the overall economic situation, like in 2003, than to the behavior of the poor people or the misfortunes that befell their families and have not been adequately compensated for by the state's social policy.*

Table 1

**Dynamics of Russians' Ideas about the Causes of the Poverty  
of the People around Them, 2003/2013, %  
of Those Who Have Poor People in Their Environment<sup>4</sup>  
(up to five answers were allowed, ranged against 2013 data)**

Causes of poverty	2003	2013
Prolonged unemployment	41	41
Sickness, disability	37	40
Alcoholism, drug addiction	<b>35</b>	<b>39</b>
Insufficient state social benefits	<b>38</b>	<b>32</b>
Family problems, misfortunes	<b>25</b>	<b>31</b>
Indolence, inability to adapt to new conditions	22	23
Poor education, low level of skills	23	21
Lack of support on the part of parents, friends and acquaintances	20	20
Wage and pension payment arrears	<b>47</b>	<b>19</b>
Low living standards of parents	20	19
Reluctance to change the habitual way of life	19	18
A large number of dependents living at someone's expense	17	17
Living in a poor region (district, city, locality)	17	17
Simply bad luck	14	13
Being migrants/refugees	5	4

These changes are compatible with the changing profile of the poor that is taking shape in the Russian people's minds. Although 71% of them still think that the poor are no different from the rest of the population in terms of morals and ethics, almost 30% are sure that differences exist, the chief of them being the prevalence of alcoholism and drug abuse among the poor (60%). Other features noted as being characteristic of the poor are rudeness, boorishness, the use of foul language (10%), neglect of their own children and their upbringing (6%), prostitution (4%), etc. Thus, *there is a clear trend of emerging stigmatization of the poor in Russian society, the formation of their image as an underclass that differs from the rest of the population not only in terms of income, but also in terms of their behavior.*

The changes in the way Russians see the causes of poverty and the profile of the poor in public consciousness in modern Russia go a long way to explaining the individualization of the perception of poverty in recent years. Indeed, it is one thing if people fall into poverty due to the death of the breadwinner or a serious illness of a member of the household, while the state ignores the increased risks of poverty and offers practically no help to these categories of people—the majority of Russians still feel compassion and pity for such people. And it is

another thing when poverty is caused by alcoholism and drug abuse, which appear to be the case more and more often. The average Russian is not inclined to sympathize with such people and does not see why his tax money should be used by the budget to help them, poor as they are, because “they will spend all the money on booze anyway.” In that respect *the recently much-touted ideology of better targeting social benefits and using “means tests” as the main criterion for social assistance is in striking contrast with the life experience and views of average Russian citizens.*

### **Who Are the “Income” Poor and How Numerous Are They in Russian Society?**

For the population at large a person is poor if the average monthly income per capita in the household (family) is 8, 848 rubles. According to the survey, almost a quarter of all Russians (23%) have incomes below that level.

What is the arithmetic relationship between the “poverty line” as perceived by the Russians themselves and the incomes of ordinary Russian families? The question is important for determining the methodology of identifying the poor. The survey has revealed that the average person’s per capita income at the start of Q2 of 2013 was 14, 575 rubles. Thus, the poverty line set by Russians is about 60% of the average per capita monthly income nationwide, which is close to the ratio considered optimal in the social policy of developed countries and among poverty specialists. However, if one compares the popularly perceived “poverty line” with the median income distribution, the “poverty line” turns out to be at 74% of the median value. That differs significantly from the standard ratios in developing countries which range from 40% to 60% of the income median.<sup>5</sup> The reason for this paradox is that in Russia the income median is very low: in practice 25-30% of the population is well-to-do, with a further 15-20% well-to-do with reservations. As for the rest, although their incomes have grown in formal terms, in reality their slice of the “national cake” has been shrinking over the

*Table 2*

**Dynamics of the Distribution  
of the Total Incomes of the Population in 1995-2012,  
according to the Federal State Statistical Service  
of the RF<sup>6</sup>**

<b>Monetary incomes by 20% population groups</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2012</b>
Group one (the lowest incomes)	6.1	5.9	5.4	5.2	5.2
Group two	10.8	10.4	10.1	9.8	9.8
Group three	15.2	15.1	15.1	14.8	14.9
Group four	21.6	21.9	22.7	22.5	22.5
Group five (the highest incomes)	46.3	46.7	46.7	47.7	47.6


years (see Table 2). As a result the “normal” ratio of the perception among Russians of the “poverty line” and the average per capita incomes in the country goes hand in hand with an “abnormal” ratio to the income median compared with developed countries. Therefore the monetary version of the relative approach to poverty (that determines the poor based on the ratio of their incomes to the income median of the population) is impossible to use in Russia, at least not in its traditional version.

Thus, *the perceived level of the “poverty line” is quite plausible and can be safely used in assessing and analyzing the poverty situation in the country. This is all the more important because the official poverty line in Russia is lower by a quarter compared with the popularly perceived level.* Thus, as of Q1 of 2013 the average living minimum (LM), according to the Russian Statistical Service (*Rosstat*) was 7,095 rubles a month (7633 rubles for able-bodied workers, 5828 rubles for a pensioner and 6859 rubles for a child). Out of that sum of the LM, 3307 rubles was supposed to be spent on food, 1642 rubles on nonfood items (including medicines) and 1642 rubles on all the services (including housing, utilities and transport), with the rest to be spent on taxes and other mandatory payments and levies.<sup>7</sup> Considering the actual cost of housing and utilities services alone, it is clear that this living minimum is grossly understated. The need to regularly take drugs puts a person, even one with an income higher than the official living minimum, in dire financial straits. So, the ideas of our respondents about the poverty line were on the whole closer to reality, and one has to bear in mind that these ideas are also fairly modest, with 70% setting the poverty line at under 7,000 rubles a month per capita, which is even less than the *Rosstat* data, and only less than a third of all Russians putting it at 8,000-10,000 rubles.

Yet even this latter group can hardly be said to be presenting exaggerated claims. The reason is that these people live in areas where the cost of living is comparatively higher, for the ideas of where the poverty line runs vary greatly depending on the type of community (in megalopolises and villages the line according to the distribution median varies respectively from 10,000 to 7,000 rubles) and the region, the latter factor accounting for a twofold difference of the perceived poverty line, e.g., 5,000 rubles (Voronezh, Chelyabinsk and Rostov Regions) and 10,000 rubles (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk and Khabarovsk regions). This spread reflects the objective fact that the cost of living in Russia varies widely depending on the type of community and geographical region. It has to be noted that in determining the living minimum *Rosstat* ignores community differences while proceeding solely from regional differences and setting the LM for each region separately.

Following *Rosstat* methodology we included among *the income poor* only those respondents in whose households the average per capita incomes were lower than the LM established for the corresponding regions for the corresponding groups of the population. They accounted for 13% of the total number of respondents, which is nearly half of the number suggested by the poverty line perceived by Russians, but is practically the same as *Rosstat* data.<sup>8</sup>

It is interesting that the members of this group attribute their poverty to a somewhat different set of causes than the population at large. True, this holds not so much for the assessment of the causes of poverty of their close ones as of the



**Fig. 2. Perceptions by “Income” Poor of the Causes of the Poverty of the People around Them and the Causes of Their Own Poverty, % of Those Who Have Poor People in Their Surroundings<sup>9</sup> (up to five answers were allowed, ranged for Russians as a whole)**

causes of their own poverty. The three main causes of poverty identified by the poor themselves are insufficient state social benefits, prolonged unemployment and family misfortunes. And they mention far less frequently than the Russians in general such causes of poverty as sloth, a reluctance to change the habitual way of life and alcoholism. Thus, for the most part they do not believe that they are themselves to blame for their poverty, instead they blame the state for failing to give them a job or social benefits that would lift them out of poverty. At the same time the “low-income” poor tend to explain the causes of the poverty of the people around them in a way that is more similar to the perceptions of the Russians who have some poor people among their acquaintances (see Fig. 2).

It has to be added that the “income” poor *in their majority are reluctant to admit that they are below the poverty line although they typically consider themselves to belong to the less well-off and lower social strata*. Thus, among the “income” poor more than half of respondents when asked to assess their social status on a ten-point scale put themselves on the three lowest rungs of the social ladder. This is connected with the above-mentioned change of attitude to the poor in Russian society, it is no accident that three-quarters of those who consider themselves to be poor have said that they have on occasion felt embarrassed and ashamed of being poor. Moreover, a quarter of all the “income” poor have faced discrimination because of their poverty reflected in their appearance (shabby clothes, etc.).

Those who have been in poverty for years are particularly prone to feel ashamed of their poverty and to be discriminated against. The tipping point comes after a person has been in poverty for more than three years, apparently because this is the point at which current expense deficit begins to tell on the person’s appearance. At any rate, among those who admit that they have been below the poverty line for more than three years, practically one half often feel ashamed and embarrassed because of their status and a quarter of them feel embarrassed occasionally. Thus, *with regard to many poor one can speak not simply of the shortage of current incomes but of social exclusion*.

### **Who Are the “Deprivation” Poor and How Many of Them Are There in Russia?**

So far we have been speaking about absolute poverty (“income” poverty). However, experts have long been speaking about yet another type of poverty, called *“deprivation poverty.”* The deprivation approach to poverty has been widespread in sociology outside Russia for about 30 years (its triumphant march began with the works of Peter Townsend in the 1970s.<sup>10</sup> This approach assumes that people are in poverty if they are deprived of the opportunity to maintain a minimally acceptable life style in a given society. Unlike the concept of “living wage” (living minimum, or subsistence minimum) used by economists, this is a genuinely sociological approach. From the sociologist’s and, for that matter, from the layman’s point of view the poor are not so much people whose incomes

fall below a certain standard level, as those who live in poverty because this fact is likely to influence their “social behavior.” The groups of “income” and “deprivation” poor may not coincide for a variety of reasons. Thus, a household that formally lives above the poverty line may have a very low living standard due to the nature of its spending (for example, a sick family member, which requires spending on drugs), the presence of a drug addict or an alcoholic, and such factors that are not taken into account in establishing the living minimum as high cost of living in a certain community, including the greed of local housing and utilities managing companies, and so on.

If one looks at the poverty situation in Russia from that point of view one has to note that *Russians have a deeply embedded idea of what precisely indi-*

Table 3

**Dynamics of the Ideas of Russians As a Whole and of the “Income Poor” about How the Life of Poor Families Differs from That of All the Rest, 2003/2013, % (five answers were allowed, ranged against respondents’ answers in 2013)<sup>11</sup>**

Poverty indicators`	For the entire body, 2003	For entire body, 2013	“Income poor” 2003	“Income poor”, 2013
Nutrition	85	73	88	75
Affordability and quality of clothes and footwear	55	58	52	62
Opportunity to meet primary needs without incurring debts	38	51	37	58
Quality of dwelling	53	47	54	49
Accessibility and standards of healthcare and medicines	52	44	52	45
Opportunities to get a good education, including additional training for children and adults	40	35	33	28
Opportunities for recreation and vacation	33	32	31	32
Opportunities for children to achieve in life what most of their peers achieve	25	29	24	28
Accessibility of cultural life (going to the theater, cinema, clubs, buying books, magazines, etc.)	16	16	16	14
Attitude of the people around them	10	16	11	12
Opportunities to have an interesting job	9	15	10	21
Exposure to physical violence and encroachments on their property	17	10	20	9
Opportunity to be actively involved in public and political life	4	2	3	2


*ates that a person lives in poverty.* The indicators of poverty, in the popular mind, and in the eyes of the poor themselves are poor nutrition, lack of money to buy new clothes and footwear, poor housing conditions, lack of access to quality health care, lack of opportunity to get a good education, inability to meet one's primary needs without incurring debts, lack of recreation opportunities and lack of opportunities for children to achieve what most of their peers achieve (see Table 3).

The picture of poverty indicators is fairly stable, with the exception of the inability to meet one's primary needs without incurring debts, which changed dramatically in the last ten years. A somewhat less noticeable, yet important change, especially for the poor themselves, was registered in the last ten years for such indicators that distinguished the poor from the rest of the population as affordability and quality of clothes and footwear (probably reflecting the discrimination of the poor on account of their appearance, as mentioned above), lack of opportunity to have an interesting job and for children an opportunity to match the achievements of most of their peers. *These are poverty indicators that turn the poor into socially excluded individuals as poverty is gradually turning into exclusion.* It is the aggravation of these problems, considering the limited number of answers offered during the survey, that most probably downgraded the role of accessibility of healthcare and housing quality as signs of poverty. In reality the plight of the poor in that respect has even worsened, both objectively and subjectively.

The existence in the public consciousness of a fairly clear picture of the life of a typical poor person prompted us to isolate from the total body of respondents those whose way of life met the popular idea of poverty. After a preliminary analysis and taking into account the instruments used in the surveys conducted in 2003, 2008<sup>12</sup> and 2013 which provided the empirical basis of the study, we identified 11 types of deprivations awarding points for each of them.<sup>13</sup> Calculations have shown that *39% of the population belonged to the category of "deprivation poor" in 2003, 33% in 2008 and the percentage shrank to 25% in 2013.* The significant drop in the number of deprivation poor is attributable to improved nutrition diet, better affordability to buy new clothes and better access to recreation facilities, the increased number of goods owned even by the poor, the growing use of paid-for social services and significant improvements of living conditions.

It has to be stressed that *those who experience deprivations commonly associated with poverty are by no means always "income poor," i.e., they are not always the same people whose per capita income falls short of the regional living wage.* That the two groups do not coincide is hardly surprising. Differences in the cost of living in different types of communities, the character of spending due to the composition of the family and the health of its members, the availability or otherwise of nonmonetary assistance on the part of relatives, friends and acquaintances often result in families whose incomes are above the living minimum finding themselves in the worst position. Even more interestingly, some of those whose incomes fall below the living minimum, i.e., are "income

poor,” do not belong to the worst-off social strata judging from their life style (see Fig. 3).



**Fig. 3. The Numbers of Absolute and Deprivation Poor 2003/2013, %**

In assessing the data cited in Fig. 3 one also has to bear in mind that “income” poverty over the past ten years has diminished much more than “deprivation” poverty, i.e., from 46 to 13% versus 39 and 25% respectively. That already suggests that the discrepancy between these groups is caused not only by the differences of approach to identifying poverty, but also by the understated living minimum indicators used by *Rosstat* compared with the real situation in modern Russia. As a result the real share of the poor is multiples of the official figure.

### The Problem of Chronic Poverty

In discussing the phenomenon of poverty in modern Russia it is important to stress that *the duration, depth and character of the poverty of tens of millions of poor people vary greatly*. That is why in analyzing poverty we have to be certain as to what kind of poverty we seek to analyze: whether it is *situational*, i.e., when a person falls into poverty due to some externalities and is short of current

income for several months; *floating* poverty when a person is short of resources for a number of years and hovers on the poverty line; *chronic* unrelieved poverty over many years leading to *de facto* exclusion, a change of life style, the social milieu, etc.; or *multigenerational* poverty which is particularly dangerous because it tends to form the underclass, etc.

This lends extra significance to the fact that according to our study 90% of those who have been in poverty for more than 3 years are not only stuck in chronic poverty, but belong simultaneously to the groups of “income” and “deprivation” poor. Moreover, 70% of them admit that they live below the poverty line. *Thus, they form the nucleus of poverty in modern Russia, they have incomes below the living wage, have formed identities characteristic of the poor and suffer from multidimensional deprivation.*

The group of chronic (stagnant) poor differs noticeably in terms of composition from other groups of poor. Thus, practically one half of the group identifying itself as members of “the lower orders” put themselves on the three bottom rungs of the ten-rung social ladder (the share is several times less among the poor who have been in poverty for less than a year, i.e., “situational” poor). If one factors in the educational characteristics of the parents, the share of those coming from families where none of the parents had professional education in this group is more than half (54%) compared with 38% among the “situational” poor.

The danger of chronic poverty lies not only in that it generates intergenerational poverty or that it accumulates an income deficit that makes it more difficult for a household to break out of poverty owing to purely economic causes and objectively tends to perpetuate poverty. At least as dangerous is the fact that the members of that group adopt a way of life which they never hope to be able to change and stop attempting to change their lives, with growing anomie and aggressiveness, the formation of new identities, new matrimonial patterns, etc.<sup>16</sup> Prolonged poverty changes the social circle replacing the former circle with those like oneself (in the survey three-quarters have said that their circle includes three or more poor families, twice as many as among the “situational” poor). This leads to the acquisition of new identities and new behavioral patterns.

### **The Share of Housing and Utilities and Food in the Budget of Russia's Poor**

The study would not be complete without a comparison of the spending of poor households and the rest of the households on food and housing and utilities. (see Table 4).

It will be seen from Table 4 that the high and growing housing and utilities costs on which the poor cannot practically save hits them very hard, with more than 40% of them spending more than a quarter of their modest family budget on housing and utilities rates, twice the share in the nonpoor group. It has to be noted that even among “income poor,” that is, among those who are entitled to be subsidized for utilities services if the latter exceed a certain share of the fam-

ily income,<sup>17</sup> many do not avail themselves of these subsidies, in any case in half of the poor families this spending item is above the legally established cap.

That already sets limits to the quality of nutrition among poor families. *Rosstat* assigns less than 40% of the living minimum for food. However, 30% of the poor spend on food more than 40% and sometimes more than half of their incomes. The share is particularly high among chronically poor. Considering their level of incomes, this means that they spend an average 2,500 rubles on food per person. One can easily imagine the quality of nutrition, especially considering the absence of free meals at work, that one can afford in modern Russia on less than 100 rubles a day.

One has to bear in mind that food is in general a very big spending item in Russian family budgets, *with 17% of Russians spending more than 50% of their total family income on food*. This needs to be stressed because the share of income the households spend on food is a very common method of identifying poor households.<sup>18</sup> Based on that method, the poor should account for at least 17% of the Russian population. But that is the minimum percentage because 5% of Russians spend more than half of their incomes on housing and utilities services, which rules out the possibility of spending half of their income on food, and a further 22% spend more than a quarter of their incomes on housing and utilities which, given low elasticity of transport and some other kinds of spending (winter clothes, footwear, etc.), makes it impossible for them to spend ade-

Table 4

**Self-Assessment by the Poor and Nonpoor of the Part of Family Income Spent on Utilities Services and Food, %**

Share of spending:	Poor:		Nonpoor
	Income poor	Deprivation poor	
<b>Spending on utility services:</b>			
Under 25%	57	59	77
From 25 to 50%	30	29	19
Over 50%	11	10	3
Don't know	2	2	1
<b>Spending on food:</b>			
Under 25%	27	28	41
From 25 to 50%	43	41	45
Over 50%	28	30	14
Don't know	2	1	0
<i>For reference: size of income in groups (in rubles)</i>			
Average per capita	5 639	9 108	16 669
Median	5 500	8 000	15 000

quate amounts on food. Thus, if one includes families that spend not less than 50% of their budgets on food as another indicator identifying the poor, their share would soar to 40% of the population.

True, that figure includes both chronic and situational poor, and it is much less than it was just 10 years ago. And anyway, whether the method of identifying the poor on the basis of the share of spending on food is applicable to Russia is highly debatable. However, even if we settle for the poverty figure of 32% which results from the combination of data on “income” and “deprivation” poor, the poverty situation in Russia is by no means as good as *Rosstat* data suggest. The intergenerational reproduction of poverty and conservation of poverty of “the new poor” warrant the conclusion that while the poverty situation in Russia has improved quantitatively in the last 10 years, qualitatively that situation has at best not improved.

### Conclusions

1. There is a clear trend in modern Russian society of a worsening attitude toward the poor, who are increasingly stigmatized, poverty is more frequently than before associated with alcoholism and other asocial forms of behavior. At the same time most Russians admit that poverty may be caused by circumstances beyond people’s control—illness, death of breadwinner, etc.—which, given inadequate state support, often play a fateful role. In the light of this view of the causes of poverty, the attitude to the poor is becoming individualized, they are less clearly perceived as a single social group. In people’s consciousness, the problem of poverty gives way to a “fragmented” perception of it as a sum of individual cases. As the number of poor in Russia has gone down in recent years and the share of Russians who have poor people in their immediate social circle plummeted from 82% in 2003 to 67% in 2013 the ideology of better targeting social benefits based chiefly on “means tests” criteria, or the degree to meet their primary needs, that has been actively promoted in recent years, is increasingly at odds with the ordinary people’s experience and ideas they have about the priorities of state social policy.
2. Russians have very clear ideas of the poverty line, i.e., the level of incomes that ensures a living minimum. Speaking in terms of per capita monthly income the poverty line in Russia is thought to be a little under 9,000 rubles, i.e., about 60% of the average incomes of the mass of Russians (not counting the richest 5% who are practically not covered by the mass surveys). This ratio is similar to that in other countries where such a ratio is considered normal. At the same time a profound unevenness in income distribution in Russian society, the understatement of the low median incomes makes it impossible to apply to Russia the monetary version of the relative approach to poverty or at least calls for the introduction of a totally different cap when using it (75% of the median).

3. The official poverty line established in Russia (living minimum) is felt by Russians to be 1.25 times too low. But the gap varies by region and type of community reflecting the differences in the cost of living. The use of the official criterion of the living minimum for various groups of the population in various regions yields the same figure of the poor as the *Rosstat* data (13 and 13.8% respectively).
4. Poor Russians today try to understate rather than overstate their poverty, which is in stark contrast to the situation in the 1990s when poverty was caused mainly by economic restructuring and was very widespread. The fact that many poor refuse to think of themselves as poor is a kind of asymmetric response to stigmatization of the poor showing that more and more Russians feel ashamed to be poor. As a result many poor people are unprepared to assume that social role even at the cost of waiving their entitlement to various benefits.
5. The Russians have a clear notion of what exactly constitutes poverty. The characteristic signs of poverty for the majority of people are poor nutrition, lack of opportunity to buy clothes and footwear, poor housing conditions, lack of access to quality health service, lack of opportunities to acquire a good education, to meet their primary needs without incurring debts, to spend their leisure time as they would like to and for children to match the achievements of the majority of their peers. These notions have hardly changed over the last 10 years, which makes it possible to assess poverty in Russia using the deprivation method that is widely used in the world to identify the poor. The use of that method shows that about 25% of the Russian population suffers deprivation. If one includes the population with incomes below the living minimum the share of the poor in modern Russian society approaches one third. This means that in reality poverty is much more widespread in Russia than is generally thought, although it has diminished somewhat since 2003 and even since 2008.
6. The fact that the study has revealed a different number of poor than *Rosstat* data, while the data on “income poor” practically coincide, shows that in calculating the living minimum *Rosstat* has failed to take account of a number of circumstances, from the different cost of living in various communities to the consumer behavior patterns of various age groups. Besides, it is not quite proper to assess living standards solely on the basis of current incomes as the living standards of the poor depend greatly on the accumulated property, resources they can access through various forms of credits or pseudocredits (that basically disguise assistance offered by the people around them), sanctions that may or may not be imposed for default on these credits depending on their source, the health status of household members, the cost of housing and utilities services that differ in various regions and even different housing and utilities management companies, etc.

7. Russian poverty has many faces, is heterogeneous and sensitive to the instruments used to measure it. However, it has a nucleus of chronically poor people half of whom come from the “bottom of the social heap” and half are “new poor” who come from fairly well-to-do social strata. However, their poverty has also acquired a stagnant character leading not only to a growing current income deficit, but to a change of their social circle and mentality. The large-scale reproduction of poverty between generations witnessed in our days does not merely impede the fight against poverty but suggests that an entire culture of poverty is emerging in Russia. This is particularly true of chronically stagnant poor and those representing several generations of the poor.
8. The poverty situation in Russia is a consequence of the structural and institutional constraints that affected low-resource groups of the population in the past decades, to which the recent years have added cultural constraints associated with the new process of stigmatization and discrimination of the poor. When the attitude to the poor stems not from the fact of the plight of a specific individual, but from the causes of poverty, assistance to the poor as a vulnerable social group is fading out of the agenda of the majority of the population and the poor are increasingly perceived as a marginal group not worth their attention. If one considers that circumstance, the foregoing may warrant the conclusion that the process of the poor turning from the lower segment of the Russian society into a socially excluded segment and its marginalization has reached a point of no return.

---

NOTES

- 1 The study was conducted under the guidance of Mikhail Gorshkov and Natalya Tikhonova in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Office in the RF. The survey was carried out according to sample models in March-April 2013 in 22 subnational entities of the Russian Federation representing 11 territorial-economic regions and the city of Moscow. The sample of the national survey representing the population by territorial-economic regions and within them broken down by gender, age and type of community comprised 1,600 persons. An additional sample of members of the poor social strata included 300 respondents. Within the total body of respondents there were 484 persons with incomes below the regional living minimum for the corresponding population groups.
- 2 The form of the questions about the causes of poverty asked the respondents to state the causes of the poverty of the people they knew well—relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, workmates. In effect the respondents were answering these questions as *experts* well versed in the subject of discussion.
- 3 The data used were drawn from the nationwide survey *The Rich and Poor in Modern Russia* (2003) carried out by the RAS Institute of Comprehensive Social Studies (*ICSI RAN*). The sample comprises 2106 persons.
- 4 The figures in boldface type indicate that the difference between 2003 and 2013 exceeded the 3% statistical error margin.

- 5 Developed countries identify the poor by the “relative” (or median) method based on the ratio of the poverty line to the median incomes of the population, a method which is conceptually the monetary version of the deprivation approach to poverty. In Russia they use the “absolute” approach to poverty which establishes the living minimum as the poverty line on the basis of the living minimum determined by experts (calculated from the cost of the “food basket” to which other major spending items, such as “services,” “nonfood items” and the “cost of mandatory charges and levies, are added.)”
- 6 [http://www.gks.ru/free\\_doc/new\\_site/population/urov/urov\\_32g.htm](http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/urov/urov_32g.htm)
- 7 [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04\\_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/142.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/142.htm)
- 8 [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04\\_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/142.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/142.htm)
- 9 The positions in boldface type and the background are those for whose assessment the difference of indicators in the two groups was 5% and more (boldface) and 10% and more (gray background).
- 10 One of his classic works is: P. Townsend, *Poverty in the United Kingdom*, Harmondsworth, 1979.
- 11 The positions in boldface type refer to signs of poverty named by more than half of the members of the corresponding group, and in gray, the signs which changed by more than 3% over 5 years.
- 12 The data of the 2003 national survey The Poor in Modern Russia carried out by the RAS Institute of Sociology were used. The sample comprised 1750 respondents.
- 13 These included: assessment of their own nutrition and clothing opportunities as poor; the total number of consumer durables in the households below the median value for Russians as a whole; the number of consumer durables not older than 7 years in the households below the median value for Russians as a whole; the existence of two or more kinds of indebtedness; inadequate dwelling; having to live in a dormitory, an employer-provided apartment or part of a house; inability to afford paid-for social (educational, medical, recreational) services for themselves or their children over the past three years; absence of any significant improvements in life over the last years; inability to afford any paid recreational activities outside the home (attending sport clubs; going to theaters, concerts and movie theaters; museums, exhibitions; cafes, bars and restaurants; disco bars and night clubs and other recreational events). All those who scored 4 points and more were referred to the category of “deprivation” poor because considering the character of indicators, they betokened multidimensional deprivation.
- 14 [http://www.gks.ru/free\\_doc/new\\_site/population/urov/urov\\_51g.htm](http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/urov/urov_51g.htm)
- 15 [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04\\_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/142.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/142.htm)
- 16 Ye. Slobodenyuk, N. Tikhonova. “Heuristic Potential of the Absolute and Relative Approaches to the Study of Poverty in Russia,” *Sotsiologiya*: 4M, 2011, No. 33; N. Tikhonova, “The Disadvantaged in Modern Russia: Specificities of Living Standard and Life Style,” *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya (SOTSIS)*, 2009, No. 10; N. Tikhonova, “The Lower Class in the Social Structure of Russian Society,” *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya (SOTSIS)*, 2011, No. 5.
- 17 The level of spending on housing and utilities services that makes people eligible for subsidies, differs from region to region, but in any case it may not exceed 22% of the household’s total income. However, by no means all those eligible for housing and utilities subsidies avail themselves of these benefits because of the amount of red tape and the logis-

tical problems involved, especially for rural dwellers who have to make several trips to the regional center during their working hours to complete all the paperwork required and have to renew entitlement documents (usually twice a year).

- 18 The methodology developed by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean is commonly used in poor developing countries.

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

**Б. ШПОТОВ. Американский бизнес и Советский Союз в 1920-е — 1930-е годы. Лабиринты экономического сотрудничества, М., Книжный дом «Либроком», 2013, 320 с.**

**B. SHPOTOV. *American Business and the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s: Labyrinths of Economic Cooperation*, Moscow, Librokom book shop, 2013, 320 pp.**

Boris Shpotov's new monograph is devoted to a cross-cutting theme in the history of Russian-American relations. During the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century the United States engaged in the export of goods, capital, equipment and technologies to the Russian empire, taking a direct part in the process of modernization, which helped bring the two countries closer together and had a tangible impact on the mutual perception process.<sup>1</sup>

The book under review authored by a Russian expert on the American business history shows how Americans taught industrial development lessons to Russians, this time while Soviet Russia was undergoing a large-scale industrialization period. B. Shpotov focuses on the role played by the US technical assistance (paid transfer of technologies and know-how, industrial and energy projects to the USSR ownership, as well as training Soviet engineers and workers) in the construction of the industrial foundations of socialism. Technical assistance along with the procurement of imported equipment replaced the foreign concessions of the NEP ("New Economic Policy") period in order to implement Stalin's forced industrialization program. The author stresses that industrialization would have been impossible without importing equipment and technology, which were not available in Soviet Russia during the NEP time (such, for example, as assembly lines, domestically designed automobiles, sophisticated electrical equipment).

On the basis of archival materials and published sources of American and Russian origin B. Shpotov covers the "American vector" of the Stalinist economic policies. This aspect of the USSR foreign economic relations was hushed up in postwar Soviet historiography on ideological grounds.

---

The review was first published in Russian in the journal *Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya*, No. 6, 2013.

Obsolete statements on implementing industrialization solely “on our own” can still be found in modern works on “the catch-up type of modernization” in the Soviet Union, although in the period discussed the Soviet leaders did not hold back the significance of the outside technical assistance, the press wrote in detail about ties with industrial and construction companies of the United States (p. 305). This monograph demonstrates that, despite the propaganda thesis about “the hostile capitalist encirclement” during the building of socialism, Soviet Russia was not in economic, scientific and technical isolation; without the participation of American firms there would not have appeared, in a matter of a few years, the Dneproges hydroelectric power plant, the Magnitogorsk metallurgical combine, the Nizhny Novgorod automobile plant, the Soviet aviation, petroleum, chemical and electrical engineering industries (pp. 94, 311).

Shpotov’s book presents Soviet-American economic relations not only as a conventional trade in goods, that was documented in the official export/import statistics, but also as a historical example of public-private partnership that went on despite the differences which existed between the two systems (pp. 7-8). American technical assistance included paying for projects, drawings, patents, consulting, expert missions and other intangible services under special agreements. Its importance for the USSR, as the author notes, was determined primarily by new opportunities for increasing the efficiency of production, the implementation of which, in turn, was dependent on the Soviet context, on a range of macro- and microfactors, including government policy, legislation, ideological climate, social psychology, and, finally, “the human factor.”

The book under review consists of a detailed introduction, seven chapters and a conclusion, it contains tables and illustrations.

The first two chapters feature the “investment climate” in Soviet Russia during the period of transition from the NEP to the mobilization pattern of the economy that brought about a change in the direction of foreign economic cooperation: a currency exchange rate unfavorable to foreign investors, delays in the payment of profits, Soviet labor union work and social arrangement demands with no precedent for them in the market-economy countries, excessive government control and a system of business restraints.

The third chapter introduces the reader to the secrets of the US economic success in her global economic leader role. The researcher stresses that Soviet specialists and workers who crossed the ocean saw only the final results of the process. They were required to learn the techniques and methods of production management with the aim to raise the productivity of labor in the USSR while maintaining the foundations of the socialist system. But what worked in America, failed in the Soviet Union due to a lack of qualified personnel, proper labor discipline, lack of needed resources and frequent mistrust in the Americans.

The next three chapters are devoted to the description of the development of the industries that shaped economic progress in the industrial age and that depended almost completely on American technical assistance—the petroleum, automobile, tractor and construction industries (in other industries, technical assistance had a “mixed” character, with German, British, French, Italian,

Swedish firms). The author focuses on the construction of the story is such giants of the era of Soviet industrialization as MMK, Stalingrad Tractor Plant, car factories AMO (ZIS) and Nizhny Novgorod (Gorky), Dneproges and several others. A special place in the pages of this part of the book covers the history of creation of the Soviet school of industrial architecture under the guidance of staff of the Albert Kahn architectural company (USA). These “American lessons” were in demand in the Soviet Union not only in the 1930s but also in the period of the Great Patriotic War, when faced with a complicated task as soon as possible to restore the evacuated industrial plants and build new ones.

In the final chapter of the monograph B. Shpotov goes beyond the traditional business history framework and turns to the study of the cultural dimension of Soviet-American economic cooperation. Based on an analysis of memoirs of Soviet and American participants in the industrialization process and the reports by Americans on their visits to the USSR submitted to the US diplomatic missions, the author examines the mutual perception characteristics taking into consideration of political, socioeconomic, cultural and psychological factors. Of particular interest is, first, the author’s comparative analysis of the Russian and American business styles and work ethics that became the basis of conflicts at the construction sites during the first five-year plan periods (p. 306), and, second, his summarization of the reasons behind the grievances expressed by Americans in the above sources in connection with their jobs in the USSR, as well as their positive and negative judgments on the Soviet system (pp. 284-286).

Boris Shpotov notes certain discrepancies in the estimates of Soviet realities by American observers: the leaders and top managers of American companies who paid short-term visits to the Soviet Union were more positive in their assessments than those who came under individual labor contracts for longer periods and had the opportunity to directly observe the low quality of life and work of Russians and experience at first hand the delights of existence in a shortage economy.

In my opinion, another important observation by the researcher is that the contacts between the American and Soviet specialists were significantly influenced by the difference in the methods of their professional training. Americans were guided by practical experience and relied on ready-made solutions and standards which the Russians did not always trust. They were still following traditions of the old Russian school of engineering, comparable with the German and French ones of the early 20th century that relied on labor-intensive calculations, because the Soviet school of engineering was still in its infancy (pp. 301-302, 308).

As a result of his study, B. Shpotov concludes that the USSR lacked economic conditions necessary for an equally effective application of technologies developed over the ocean in the United States.

The large-scale introduction of innovations saved a lot of time and money for “in-house” inventing, but the process of adapting the borrowed technology was fraught with serious costs: excessive investment in the modernization of some industrial sectors brought about underinvestment in other sectors and their

backlog, and this, in turn, hindered the development of the former; the new industrial giants failed to get enough raw and other materials and components; the imported equipment suffered underutilization of capacity, which reduced the effectiveness of capital investments. An expansion of workforce hiring from among peasants who were often unfamiliar with new machinery reduced output per capita, and heroic labor at a volunteer level covered mainly the sphere of manual labor and attendant jobs.

However, as Shpotov shows, adaptation to the new conditions was in progress, albeit with difficulty. As a result, per totality of general industrial production indices, the Soviet Union came in second after the United States in the 1930s with this “Russian miracle” owing much to industrial espionage and counterfeit replicating of foreign models of machines and mechanisms (pp. 214-216, 296). According to the author, the fact that the Soviet Union was second in the world can be taken for granted (pp. 312, 314), even though the ratio of macro- and microlevel data remains one of the most contentious issues.

Shpotov’s sufficiently innovative research might have scored additional points in its favour by putting the author’s reasoning in a broader context of US—Soviet relations during the period under review, as well as in the overall context of Russian—American relations in general in order to detect long-term trends in their development. These contexts were left almost out of the author’s sight, as evidenced not only by the main text of the book, but also its historiographic review.

We can only regret that the author, while expanding the scope of economic history by examining the process of mutual perception, failed to go beyond the traditional narrative analysis pattern. One can see the fruitfulness of using a more complex sociocultural approach to the chosen period and issues therein, for example, in the monograph penned by American researchers David C. Engerman and David S. Foglesong.<sup>2</sup> In any case, it was worthwhile to refer to these works for characterization of the contexts and clarification of the explicative diagrams. Indeed, Shpotov’s book deals with the economic justification of the peculiar American “crusades” for the provision of Russia with the necessary facilities. It had all begun as far back as the turn from the 19th to the 20th century. It is not accidental that Boris Shpotov himself so actively uses the conceptual marker “the teachers” (Americans)—“the disciples” (Russians).

It is appropriate for future reference to draw attention to the possibility of expanding the visual field by cartoons and posters and the source base as a whole by bringing in cinematic texts. These sources contain a great potential for the study—based on an interdisciplinary approach—of the US business history and the history of economic cooperation between the two countries, including the US technical assistance and its role in building the foundations of socialism.

Shpotov’s new monograph is angled toward historians, teachers and students, as well as all those who are interested in the past, present and future relations between Russia and the United States. In addition, getting to know this content would not be a useless effort for Russia’s present-day statesmen and politicians because their agenda for the post-Soviet Russia development features the

same issue: “How to speed up the economy’s dynamic accelerating run and swing?” The lessons of the 1930s, as well as the lessons of the 1990s, suggest that “a transplant” of imported technologies in the unprepared, raw native soil might result not in the expected synergy effect but in braking effects of different duration actually throughout the economy. A study of mechanisms to overcome them is still an immediate current concern in Russia in the early 21st century.

---

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> For more detail see: I. Kurilla, *The Oversea Partners—America and Russia—in the 1830s through the 1850s*, Volgograd, 2005, pp. 123-202; V. Zhuravlyova, *The Perception of Russia in the USA: Images and Myths. 1881-1914*, Moscow, 2012, pp. 339-352, 921-950 (both books in Russian).
- <sup>2</sup> D. C. Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore. American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development*, Cambridge (Mass.)—London, 2003; D. S. Foglesong, *The American Mission and the “Evil Empire.” The Crusade for a “Free Russia” since 1881*, Cambridge, 2007.

**V. Zhuravlyova**

*Translated by Vadim Polyakov*

**И. ФИЛАТОВА, А. ДАВИДСОН.**

**Россия и Южная Африка: наведение мостов, М.,  
Издательский дом Государственного университета —  
Высшей школы экономики, 2012, 491 с.**

**I. FILATOVA, A. DAVIDSON. *Russia and South Africa:  
Building Bridges*, Moscow, The Publishing House  
of the State University—Higher School of Economics,  
2012, 491 pp.**

About 40 years ago, Russian Africanists had to argue that our country was not only able to make studies of South Africa's history but was actually doing it in a fruitful, high-level research way. Back in 1972 Apollon Davidson wrote: "Our historians have little experience of work in Africa, and as regards the southern part of that continent, they have not yet set foot therein."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, any information about the distant country had to be gained literally bit by bit. And as for the information that was luckily obtained, it was necessary to carefully sift it and shuck off ideological husk or speculations. Only very few Soviet historians had the good fortune to actually meet people from South Africa. But it was precisely at a time when there existed seemingly insurmountable barriers between our countries that real acts of "building bridges" between the Soviet Union and the Republic of South Africa were actually taking place. Just how it was happening is the subject of a new book authored by two famous Russian Africanist historians Apollon Davidson and Irina Filatova. The book under review is a continuation of the monograph published two years earlier—"*Russia and South Africa: Three Centuries of Relations*."<sup>2</sup> In regard to these works, we can rightfully speak not of two separate books, but of an integral research project that was carried out not within the last few years but throughout decades.<sup>3</sup>

The reader may wonder why the second part of this collective work is subtitled "building bridges" whereas the history of relations and contacts between the two countries dates back several centuries. The answer, as the authors show, lies largely in the history of the Republic of South Africa and Russia: in the second half of the 20th century, they had to build their relations on an entirely new basis and under different conditions. These relations were multifaceted: support

---

The review was first published in Russian in the *Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya* journal, No. 5, 2013.

was provided to the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) in their antiapartheid struggle, in mobilizing the international public opinion against the National Party (NP) government of the Republic of South Africa, but also maintaining informal contacts in the field of sales of diamonds on the international market.

The study covers a period from the 1950s to the beginning of the 1990s—a time when the apartheid regime was enforced and retained in South Africa. By that time the Soviet Union had reached the peak of its might and became the chief sponsor and supporter of the anticolonial movements in Asia and Africa. As a result, the relations between the two countries were not just determined by their geographical location in two different hemispheres but they were in fact likened to the two opposite poles of the magnet, representing for each other all that they could not put up with in the world. However, in the course of reading the book one realizes that our countries did not stand so far apart: the communist menace was one of the justifications for preserving the apartheid regime. Official propaganda hailed South Africa as a bastion that deterred “Soviet aggression by all means.” The ANC was branded as an instrument in the hands of the Soviet Union used to undermine the internal situation in the country (pp. 58-59). The authors point out that those views and propaganda of the USSR’s “all-out offensive” doctrine led to the emergence of real paranoia in society and among government officials. South Africa was featured as the main item in the Soviet leadership’s plans for securing world domination.

In the USSR, too, the situation in South Africa was not always adequately assessed. Dominance of ideological rhetoric and the absence of channels of incoming information on the state of things in the South African Republic other than those from the ANC and the South African Communist Party gave rise to a sceptical attitude towards the activities of the liberation movements in a number of representatives of the Soviet political establishment (pp. 89-90, 104). In the international arena Soviet propaganda vigorously denounced the racist regime in South Africa, but inside the country its efforts were ineffective. In the USSR the most incredible rumors proliferated on a bed of roses habitation of the white South Africans that gave rise among our compatriots not to a righteous anger but envy (pp. 135-136). Aid to the liberation movements was perceived with growing scepticism.

The results of the South African and Soviet propaganda efforts were diametrically different: the USSR was obviously winning in the international arena, but its own citizens perceived propaganda hype indifferently, whereas the white population of South Africa firmly believed in the most horrific stories about the USSR (pp. 136-137). But despite the obvious differences and mutual antagonism, on the whole, the Soviet and South African approaches were similar: both sides operated with ideologems rather than actual facts.

The book presents certain facts that are little known to Russian (and not only Russian) readers. Perhaps it is for the first time that Nelson Mandela’s past membership in the SACP is so openly stated—information that was never officially confirmed either in South Africa or Russia. Many veterans of the South African Communist Party talked about it as a fact to the authors of this book. Moreover,

there is reason to believe that Mandela was not just rank and file member of the party, but was a member of its Central Committee (pp. 220-221). Another prominent person, ANC secretary-general Walter Sisulu was also a significant SACP member. However, it is not to be inferred from these facts that the ANC, the SACP and the South African liberation movement in general were under Moscow's total dominance. The USSR has never imposed its will to its South African allies. The relations between them could be identified as those of partnership. "The South Africans decided for themselves how to fight against imperialism in their area" (p. 229). In this respect the authors associate with a famous domestic Africanist historian, Vladimir Shubin.

Much attention in the work under review is paid to the military cooperation of the USSR and the ANC. South Africa was one of the most important "Cold War Fronts." Regional conflicts went beyond local political opposition and interethnic quarrels and became part of the global confrontation between the two superpowers. The National party government considered South Africa to be the vanguard in the fight against the spread of Soviet influence in Africa. Apartheid ideologues sought to attract the sympathy of the West, emphasizing the fact that the white people in South Africa were protecting the ideals and values of Western civilization. With the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in 1975, hostile anticolonial movements found themselves in power in the neighboring countries. The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) had by that time established close contacts with the Soviet Union and its closest allies which provided aid practically almost unconditionally and without any liabilities. Their relationships were based on mutual trust (p. 282).

The war in Angola. Little was known about it in the USSR in Soviet times and little is still known in Russia today. But, as the authors note, that conflict was the only one in which the Russians and South Africans came directly face to face on the battlefield. The USSR and Cuba actually saved from military defeat and collapse the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) led by Agostinho Neto, who came to power in 1975. Angola, as "a frontline state," became the main base for the training of the ANC military wing personnel, the Spear of the Nation, or Umkhonto we Sizwe in Zulu. The Soviet Union provided the pro-Soviet movements with military-technical and financial assistance, and sent thousands of military experts and advisers to them. The Soviet archives, the authors note, are still closed, so even now it is hard to talk about the actual size of that assistance. According to various sources, Angola received between 11 and 12 thousand Soviet army servicemen, of whom, according to the RF Ministry of Defence data, 54 perished (p. 201). Their main adversary was the South African army. Unfortunately, the authors failed to put questions to South African combatants in the war in Angola about their attitude to the Soviet soldiers. Apparently this issue is still too painful for many South African veterans to discuss openly (p. 215).

An important aspect of bilateral relations between the USSR/Russia and South Africa, which is in focus in several voluminous concluding sections of the book, is the development of relations, including the establishment of diplomatic relations, between our countries, in the years of *perestroika*. The late 1980s and early 1990s were among the most controversial periods in the history of the two

countries. V. Shubin, a Russian Africanist historian, for example, believes that changes in the USSR policy in the late 1980s and the country's subsequent break-up played a rather negative role in the negotiations between the ANC and the NP. In his view, the collapse of the Soviet bloc did "harm to the prospects of profound social transformations in South Africa ... and helped to preserve the potential for social explosion."<sup>4</sup> The authors of the book under review express a number of critical comments regarding the changing moods and attitudes in the Soviet press, and on the whole among the general public in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They point out that those changes were characterized "not only by the absence of "a sense of confrontation, but also of a sober-minded analysis of the situation in South Africa" (p. 369). They call it a mistake, in terms of Russia's national interests, the form and the timing of the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Africa (p. 458). Overall, however, I. Filatova and A. Davidson considered the Soviet/Russian policy towards the problem of the South African settlement and the negotiation process between the NP and the ANC as a factor that contributed to the achievement of a peaceful outcome of the internal crisis in the Republic of South Africa, when it threatened to escalate into a full-fledged civil war. And not only between the white and black communities of South Africa, but also between the country's different ethnic communities.

"The duality and contradictory nature of Soviet policy in that transition period proved to be the most effective tactics to maintain and promote the transformation process in South Africa" (p. 386). Maintaining political and socio-economic stability in the country, even with all the costs and excesses, for the past 20 years has largely confirmed this view.

Among the issues considered by the authors are the training of the ANC and SACP executives in the USSR, the perception of the Soviet way of life and of the state by ANC people and South African communists, the secret warfare waged by the South African and Soviet intelligence services and much more.

---

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> A. Davidson, *South Africa. The Emergence of Protest Forces. 1870-1924*, Moscow, 1972, p. 7 (in Russian).
- <sup>2</sup> See: M. Kurbak's review of this book in the journal *Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya*, No. 6, 2010.
- <sup>3</sup> It is appropriate to mention here the following books that covered the history of Russia—South Africa relations in the 18th and 19th centuries: A. Davidson, B. Makrushin, *An Image of a Distant Country*, Moscow, 1975; A. Davidson, B. Makrushin, *The Lure of Far-Away Seas*, Moscow, 1979 (both books in Russian).
- <sup>4</sup> V. Shubin, *The African National Congress in the Years of Underground Armed Struggle*, Moscow, 1999, p. 412 (in Russian).

**A. Voyevodsky**

*Translated by Vadim Polyakov*

**А. ПЕНЬКОВСКИЙ. Исследования  
поэтического языка пушкинской эпохи  
(изд. подготов. А. Белоусова и др.;  
под общей ред. И. Пильщикова),  
М., Знак, 2012, 660 с.**

**A. PENKOVSKY. *Studies of the Poetic Language  
of the Pushkin Era*  
(The Publication prepared by A. Belousova et al.;  
edited by I. Pilshchikov), Moscow,  
Znak Publishers, 2012, 660 pp.**

The name of Aleksandr Penkovsky (1927-2010) became known to the broad humanitarian public after he brought out his first monograph *Nina. The Cultural Myth of the Golden Age of Russian Literature from the Linguistic Angle (1999)*<sup>1</sup> which provoked heated arguments in the professional milieu. The philologist's posthumous book published in accordance with his wishes sums up the results of his many years of scholarly work.

*Studies* contains almost thirty works that give a good idea of A. Penkovsky's diverse and interconnected interests. The volume is divided into three parts in accordance with the themes of the articles: "The Riddles of Pushkin's Text and Vocabulary," "Observations on the Language of the Pushkin Era" and "On the Development of Hidden Semantic Categories of the Russian Language (from Pushkin to the Present Time)." A supplement contains unfinished works. The compilers argue that "...they present unquestionable scientific value owing to the vast body of linguistic material and insightful observations of the linguist. It is ... a thoroughly researched text that clearly gets across the author's message..." (pp. 8-9).

Even the titles of the sections suggest that A. Penkovsky advocated a synthetic philological approach that did not envisage watertight partitions between linguistics and literary scholarship although he was equally proficient in both. Literary fiction and poetry (*belles lettres*) is unthinkable without the language in which it is created, but the peak achievements of the language are to be found in literary fiction. The author of *Studies* always kept in mind this self-evident, but

---

The review was first published in Russian in the journal *Voprosy literatury*, No. 1, 2014.

lately not very popular truth. The scholar's brilliant linguistic background combined with wide erudition and a prodigious research talent brought some outstanding fruit.

In general most of the works contained in the book are extended commentaries on some classical texts by Pushkin, Batyushkov, Baratynsky, Gogol and others. They are based on A. Penkovsky's historical and philological conviction expressed in a preface to a 2005 book whose title coincides with the title of the first section of *Studies*. The scholar notes that the modern reader "is delighted to recognize in Pushkin's (Baratynsky's, Lermontov's, etc.) writings our very own, modern, simple and clear words without being aware that this is in many cases an illusion, self-deception." In reality, the author notes, what is happening is an unconscious translation from another "...if not language, but a state of the language" into modern language with," as it turns out, more or less serious mistakes."<sup>2</sup>

This conviction inspired the author to write *Nina* which is basically an original re-interpretation of *Eugene Onegin*, both the text of the "novel in verse" and, as a consequence, the main character. Because *Nina* played such an important role in A. Penkovsky's scientific career the first section of *Studies* logically includes the works that expound the main ideas of the book (for example, "*On the 'Anti-Poetic Character' of Onegin, or How to Read Pushkin,*" pp. 46-74).

Conceptually, *Nina* turned out to be controversial. One of the monograph's fundamental hypotheses is that the history of the relationship between Onegin and Tatyana was predetermined by the young aristocrat's tragic and devastating entanglement with a beautiful married woman, a *femme fatale*, which had a destructive effect on his relations with people in general and women in particular. Opponents dismissed this version as far-fetched and ill-founded. But there was no denying the fact that the scholar had managed to explain some obscure places in the novel and, equally important, point to places that *appeared* to be simple and straightforward, creating an illusion of understanding of the text.<sup>3</sup>

Regardless of the idea of Onegin's previous secret passion, the scholar's linguistic and cultural view of the Pushkin character challenges the common idea of the character and the meaning of his relationship with Tatyana. Looked at from this new angle, the world-weary *blasé* aristocrat Onegin is perceived as a deeply feeling tragic figure.

Such a change of angle occurred because the philologist, drawing on a wealth of historical and literary materials, provided an authentic interpretation of some lexemes in Russian, especially "boredom" (*skuka*), that recurs in the novel in various forms, an interpretation that breaks new ground in Russian lexicography and Pushkin studies (*On boredom, anguish, yawning and laziness*, pp. 93-154). The author concludes that in the language of Pushkin and his times *skuka* was for the most part synonymous with the concept now denoted by the word *toska* (yearning, grief, *Angst*). Thus, the solution of a minor philological problem had significant cultural consequences.

*Studies*, unlike the controversial *Nina*, is strictly academic in its approach. One can see that Penkovsky brings more to this work than his powerful philological background that enables him to ascend from empirical isolated facts to general

ideas. He made his texts highly readable without compromising the fundamental scholarly component. Hence his trademark method of intriguing the reader.

Most of the articles in the book have a thriller format (see, for example, *On Passion and Passions, or Was Onegin Capable of Love?... When the Spruce-Tree Did not Glide on Light Sails... Polezhayev—Sopikov—Khrapovitsky*). The reader is presented with a well-known text, with the author drawing attention to its linguistic, stylistic and semantic oddities before delving into historical, literary and cultural studies and ending up with an answer, a correct solution that gives a new and often startling and yet convincing insight into the text.

Penkovsky's original scientific style is not the least of the features that lend conviction to his works. His narrative proceeds from oral speech as if he were giving a lecture to an interested audience. His discourse is replete with rhetorical questions, complex and challenging syntactical periods, moderate use of metaphors that balances dry analytical statements, frequent expressive endings of periods and a fine sense of humor that permeates the text.

Among other merits of *Studies* are the general high level of competence, accurate and complete references, recognition of the pioneers who discovered various facts, intolerance of sloppiness, and consistency in seeking to restore historical and scientific justice.

Aleksandr Penkovsky demonstrates intellectual audacity challenging many established opinions. Among the authors of judgments and hypotheses that he convincingly rejects or refutes are such recognized authorities on Pushkin as Vladislav Khodasevich, Vladimir Nabokov, Nikolay Brodsky and Yury Lotman.

The methodological value of *Studies* goes beyond the narrow fields of lexicography or historical-cultural studies. In the first place, it is a good book for a beginning philologist. Whatever the sphere of his interests, a philologist can learn many things here, from specific methods of analysis to the methods of formulating and presenting conclusions.

Grigory Vinokur remarked in his time: "...the act of understanding ... cannot be subjective or objective, but only correct or incorrect."<sup>4</sup> Reading the works of A. Penkovsky brought under the same cover in *Studies* one gets a feeling of accuracy, precision and depth of understanding of classical texts.

To discover links hidden in the text and present them for everyone to see, to reveal the author's hidden strategy, to offer a new and elegant explanation of known facts or, on the contrary, to affirm the author's design in the face of ungrounded opinions about his work—these are, for Penkovsky, the delights of the philologist. The delight from a text is devoid of selfish aspirations, it is available to any inquisitive mind and, potentially, to anyone who is carried away by an artistic phenomenon.<sup>5</sup>

In his book the philologist Aleksandr Penkovsky generously shares his joys with the readers.

---

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> A. Penkovsky, *Nina. The Cultural Myth of the Golden Age of Russian Literature from the Linguistic Angle*. Moscow, 1999; Second amended edition: A. Penkovsky, *Nina. The Cul-*

- tural Myth of the Golden Age of Russian Literature from the Linguistic Angle*, Moscow, 2003 (both in Russian).
- <sup>2</sup> A. Penkovsky, *The Riddles of Pushkin's Text and Vocabulary. An Essay in Philological Hermeneutics*, Moscow, 2005, pp.8-9 (both in Russian).
- <sup>3</sup> About *Nina*, pro and contra, see for example: N. Dzutseva, "What's in a Name?" *Znamya*, No. 2, 2005. A. Balakin, "Nina and Other Things," *Novy mir*, No. 12, 2004.
- <sup>4</sup> G. Vinokur. *Philological Studies: Linguistics and Poetics*, Moscow, 1990, p. 42 (in Russian).
- <sup>5</sup> On the distinction between the semantic fields of "joy" and "pleasure" see: A. Penkovsky. "Joy and Pleasure As Perceived by the Russian Language," A. Penkovsky, *Essays on Russian Semantics*, Moscow, 2004 (in Russian).

**A. Skvortsov**

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

**Ю. ДВОРЯШИН (ред.). Шолоховская энциклопедия, вступ. ст. М. М. Шолохова, М., Синергия, 2012, 1216 с., с илл.**

**Yu. DVORYASHIN (Ed.). *The Sholokhov Encyclopedia*, Introduction by M. Sholokhov, Moscow, SYNERGIA Publishers, 2012, 1216 pp. with illustrations**

A personal encyclopedia, a compendium of knowledge about an outstanding personality, performs a variety of functions: it sums up the study of the subject's life and work becoming a collective monument to human genius; the issue of a personal encyclopedia often arouses interest in an artist, attracting top scholars and bringing back a living image of the personality in question.

Encyclopedias (or encyclopedic dictionaries, for example, the two-volume *Shevchenko Glossary* (1977) or *Francisko Skorina and His Times* (1990), dictionaries devoted to Mikhail Lermontov (1981), Mikhail Lomonosov (1999) and Anton Chekhov (2011) all attempt, using various methodologies, and bringing various degrees of intensity and system to their work, to describe the life and work of a writer in its entirety. The publishers, editors and contributors to *The Sholokhov Encyclopedia* draw on these publications (as well as works on Vasily Rozanov, Aleksandr Ostrovsky and some other personal encyclopedias of recent decades) and on the rich Russian tradition of literary studies.

A look at the history of this encyclopedia would not come amiss. In 2001 a team of researchers at the Gorky Institute of World Literature (RAS *IMLI*) was formed which prepared the initial glossary. In 2006 the Synergia Publishing House, RAS *IMLI*, and Surgut Pedagogical University's Sholokhov Center founded a Sholokhov Encyclopedia public fund which became the coordinating center for the project. A prominent role in promoting the project was played by the publisher Ernest Bessmertnykh and Yury Dvoryashin, (D. Sc.), who became the head of a large team of researchers and later the editor-in-chief of the *Encyclopedia*. The work on the encyclopedia brought together scholars not only from Russia, but also from Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and the USA.

The editors selected materials for the encyclopedia with a view to covering the facts and events related to Sholokhov and his life. General information that

can be found in other reference books and specialized publications is presented in a selective and lapidary form. This is true both of review and personal entries. The entries vary in size from several lines to one signature and more. However, some entries on Sholokhov's public speeches are somewhat terse indicating only the genre and main topic, but not saying enough about the author's position, the main thrust of the text and its purpose. Regrettably, the personal entries contain unjustified duplication of bibliographical material and even quotations. Another shortcoming is the absence of stresses in the entry titles: this is all the more necessary because some of the names of the writer's contemporaries and place names are not very familiar.

The encyclopedia has a reference and search apparatus: a list of abbreviations and symbols, a system of references, auxiliary indices, a bibliography, table of contents and publisher's imprint. The final part contains "A Chronicle of the Life and Work of Mikhail Sholokhov" and an alphabetic index of the characters in all the writer's works with a brief or extended characterization of each. The bibliographical list is at the end of the encyclopedia.

The editorial board identified 12 sections on which systematic work was conducted: Sholokhov's works; biography; his circle, poetics and world view problems; Sholokhov and Russian literature in the 19th—20th centuries; Sholokhov and emigré Russians; Sholokhov and the world literature; historical realities in Sholokhov's works; the language of Sholokhov's works; Sholokhov and art (with subsections on music, fine arts, theater and cinema); places associated with Sholokhov, memorial, literary topography; history of Sholokhov studies.

A novel structural feature of the publication is the combination of the main alphabetic and thematic principles. The alphabetic part has two independent blocks of articles devoted to the novels *And Quiet Flows the Don* and *Virgin Soil Uplifted*. These two works representing the writer's peak achievements may in the future provide the subject matter of a separate encyclopedia (similar to *The Onegin Encyclopedia* or *the Oblomov Encyclopedia* currently being prepared). Each block opens with an extended main article that provides a general idea of the book's system of images, its artistic originality and its place in the Russian and world literary process. The central article is followed by articles devoted to the history of the novel, the sources, prototypes of the characters, toponymy and topography and the publications of the novel.

Theoretical problems which are still relevant and are the subject of scholarly discussion occupy considerable space in the encyclopedia. Some articles are, in terms of their size, content and relevance to Sholokhov studies, pieces of research in their own right thus violating the general pattern of an encyclopedic entry (impartial statement of generally accepted facts without going into the discussion of controversial points); however, in our opinion, a lively, emotionally charged *dialogue with the reader* (in the event, of course, a reader well versed in the subject) indicates that Sholokhov studies are developing in an active and promising way. One would like to note the articles "Plot and Composition," "Sholokhov's Poetics," "The Tragic in Sholokhov's Work," "Philosophical

Aspects of Sholokhov's Aesthetics" and "Sholokhov Studies." These and other entries in the encyclopedia touch upon the still little studied problems of the phenomenology of the writer's work.

Sholokhov's work is part and parcel of the history of Russian literature. The fruitful idea of a *grand dialogue* with Russian classics (both synchronic and diachronic) provides the leitmotif of the articles in the *Sholokhov Encyclopedia* that deal with theoretical and literary history problems. Thus, the study of the style of Sholokhov's prose—a very challenging subject—establishes links both with the preceding stylistic tradition and with contemporary experience. The articles devoted to Sholokhov's poetics ("Chronotope," "Profile of a Character"), his style, the problems of narrative structure ("Plot and Composition") show convincingly how the author avoided banal stylization. Sholokhov entered literature at an early age, skipping as it were the stage of imitation and apprenticeship, but he often played with others' style and artistic means debasing the manner of his predecessors or using it as a jumping off point. Sholokhov achieves deep stylistic generalizations when he introduces recurring images and motives.

Sholokhov's career had all along developed under a close and often jaundiced-eyed scrutiny of literary critics. That is why the encyclopedia (in addition to a substantive body of entries on the perception of the writer's work in and outside Russia) predictably devotes a section to the controversy on the authorship of *And Quiet Flows the Don*. German Yermolayev who wrote this section maintains that a careful analysis of various viewpoints on the authorship leaves no doubt that Sholokhov wrote the novel single-handedly and that those who deny or question Sholokhov's authorship have failed to build a convincing case. It is heartening that on such a complicated issue the *Sholokhov Encyclopedia* offers an impartial review of controversial hypotheses, beginning from the early ones (dating back to 1928) and ending with modern ones (the latest "anti-Sholokhov" publication came out in 2006).

The perusal of the encyclopedia prompts questions about the completeness of the substance of specific articles. One feels that the editors were unwittingly carried away by the search for compromises whereas a figure of the stature of Sholokhov is inevitably controversial and cannot be interpreted in a two-dimensional way. For example, the entries on contemporary writers select mostly pronouncements and characterizations of his work that praise it or sound like an apologia for the author. Meanwhile the evolution of the perception of individual images and the figure of the classic himself is ignored (such changes could be noticed in the attitudes of Fyodor Abramov, Vasily Shukshin and Vasily Belov). For example, we find in Abramov's diaries critical remarks which, while not belittling Sholokhov's achievement, cast important sidelines on his personality and heritage: "Sholokhov is of course a great writer... But what strikes one about Sholokhov is how little he is concerned with moral problems. It may sound odd, but there is very little Russianness in him."<sup>1</sup> Korney Chukovsky made some critical comments on Sholokhov's speeches at writers' congresses and his interviews.<sup>2</sup> However, all these "broadside" are necessary if only because they enliven the context and give a more balanced panorama of views.

The first experience of a *Sholokhov Encyclopedia* is undoubtedly a success: all the entries are marked by a high level of scholarship, are well edited, the publication is provided with thorough references and bibliography and is lavishly illustrated. Yet the publishers themselves admit that the encyclopedia needs some more articles added, some facts and characteristics verified: all these shortcomings will soon be rectified since the second amended and enlarged edition of *The Sholokhov Encyclopedia* is already on the way. This invitation to cooperation (*dialogue with the authors*) is a fine example of Sholokhov studies being advanced by scholars who often belong to different scientific schools and generations.

---

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> F. Abramov, *What, Then, Shall We Do?* (From diaries, notebooks and letters), St. Petersburg, 1995, p. 34 (in Russian).
- <sup>2</sup> K. Chukovsky, *Diary*, vol. 3, *1936-1969*, Moscow, 2011, p. 68ff (in Russian).

**P. Glushakov**

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

**И. ЯКОВЕНКО. Познание России:  
цивилизационный анализ, М., РОССПЭН,  
2012, 671 с.**

**I. YAKOVENKO. *Understanding Russia:  
Civilizational Analysis*, Moscow, ROSSPEN,  
2012, 671 pp.**

This outstanding achievement of Russian sociological and humanitarian thought was written by a man of unrivalled academic and civic courage. Igor Yakovenko knew that he should expect outbursts of conservative and national patriotic ire of at least some of his colleagues and indignation of those who disagree with his firm opposition to the unctuous orthodox apology of authoritarianism national style. It was back in 1811 that Russian historian Nikolay Karamzin wrote that “the tranquility of the sovereign entails the ignorance of his subjects.”

Indeed, any attempt to go back to the sources of perpetual Russian disorder inevitably destroys comfortable complimentary self-conceit (p. 7). Russia’s realities inevitably bring us back to the problem of national perspective, that is, a mid-term plan, a discussion of a possibility of badly needed innovational democratic modernization and possible risks if the powers that be refuse to carry it out. To preserve itself as a subject of world history Russia should immediately move away from maintaining stagnant stability to onward development.

Culture of Russia’s population (people) 80% of which describe themselves as ethnic Russians is one of the monograph’s central points. The very attempt to substantiate this complicated or even contradictory phenomenon and to present it to the reader in a well argued way is praiseworthy. In the case of Igor Yakovenko it is rooted in many years of studies and numerous publications.

When writing about modernization (p. 31) the author points to two levels of Russian culture, the traditional and modernization segments of which are brought together in a complicated, not to say conflicting, interaction. According to sociologists, about 73 to 75% of Russia’s population are consistent traditionalists or people with very similar basic value orientations<sup>1</sup> encouraged by hard-working tale-spinning ideologists, political commentators, teachers and politi-

---

This review first appeared in Russian in the *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya (SOTSIS)* journal, No. 2, 2014.

cians who reproduce archaic conservatism (p. 40) incompatible with the prospects of Russia's development yet dominating in public life and politics.

The carriers of the culture of modernity stand apart by a developed sense of human dignity; reliance on their own material and cultural resources; they want to live in a country ruled by law and a just judiciary for all: they have clear ideas about the desired all-national country's future and feel responsible for this future and, therefore, the future of their children.

The carriers of archaic social consciousness think and feel differently. Being socially helpless they seek support from the state; they want a strong leader to shift the responsibility for Russia and its future on him while seeking what is best described as "false innocence of irresponsibility" (Lev Anninsky).

Soviet power as "the dictatorship of development," proved unable to move society away from the extensive trajectory to intensify sociohistorical process (p. 37); the results are well known. We cannot expect socially responsible policy from the kleptocratic regime impudent enough to speak on behalf of the whole of society, yet mass consciousness needs and reproduces such policy through voting. According to the Levada Center, in 20 years the share of those who believe that "to preserve order power should belong to one person" increased 2.5 times to reach 45 to 50% of the total population.<sup>2</sup> This is what the socially helpless majority expects from state power. In the last ten years "manual control" revealed its inability to realize national development; this means that in the context of globalization of the 21st century this regime has no future.

The above supports the thesis that the archaic type of mentality has exhausted itself and should be adjusted to the dynamically developing world (p. 40). According to the RAS Institute of Sociology the carriers of modernized consciousness are in the minority and are scattered across different social groups hampering their consolidated actions.<sup>3</sup> With a few exceptions, these people have no stable habits of sociopolitical self-organization, therefore, the future of modernization in Russia remains vague.

The rift between the traditional (rooted in archaic) and modernized segments of mass consciousness (p. 120) speaks of a sociocultural split of Russian society and confirms that there are sharp and frequently irreconcilable disagreements over the values, ideals, collective preferences, mass practices, images of the desired future and the roads leading to it. The split which in the 20th century led to the civil war, de-kulakization, famine and state terror is still here, albeit in different forms. In the 21st century it cropped up as the ownership polarization as the unacceptably wide and widening gap between the rich and the poor; considerable socioeconomic unevenness of the regions and the resultant gaps in chances of those who live there; the courts which, with few exceptions, bring in verdicts in favor of governing structures and the powers that be; the centuries-old alienation of common people from authorities; the different and differing ideas of the desired common future of the country, of the poor majority and the rich and dominating groups of high incomes which have already put their ideas about the future in a nutshell as "outside Russia and without Russia"; the widely different levels of political culture of people living in big cities and in the

provincial agrarian periphery; an anomalously high level of mutual mistrust among the Russians; interethnic tensions; smoldering confessional contradictions; the obviously different informal cultural norms of the local people and millions of migrants; Orthodox clericalization encouraged by the authorities in a multiconfessional society.

Reproduction of sociocultural split<sup>4</sup> may revive the mechanism of national self-destruction if the standards of living slide down under pressure of a possible decrease of fuel prices. In the past, they contributed to the Soviet Union's disintegration.

Igor Yakovenko points out that Russia has embarked on the very complicated and contradictory process of modernization of mass consciousness to be completed, the process may require three generations of Russians (p. 41). The question is: Has Russia enough time?

"Can Russia survive without development?" is another question of signal importance (p. 77). Criminalized bureaucratic degeneration is turning Russia into a socially-arranged oligarchy of the Third World type; the author points out that the country is heading toward a dead end of neofeudalism in which the dominant class treats the rest of the nation like cattle to be exploited and bled white; the dominant segment of archaic consciousness is also partly responsible for the current regression (pp. 95-96).

This process is closely connected with the fundamental conclusion made by the author that society cannot "formulate a civilizational quality" with the help of Orthodoxy (pp. 107, 108). The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has done a lot to perpetuate seven centuries of Russia's backwardness as compared with Europe when it comes to university education. The first 250 years of backwardness had been caused by the Tatar-Mongol yoke; the following 450 years of backwardness were caused by the hierarchs of the ROC and the czars who took orders from them. The author has rightly pointed out that "a dull-witted layman and an unsophisticated simpleton is an ideal subject" (p. 146). This explains how for 74 years Soviet power was luring millions by all sorts of ideological utopias: from the world revolution to building socialism, to communism and once more to socialism, this time with a human face. Industrialization and impressive scientific achievements notwithstanding, history rejected these projects as utopian.

Igor Yakovenko has deemed it necessary to warn: Russia should either embrace systemic modernization or disappear as an independent historical subject (p. 117). Christian Orthodoxy can hardly promote rationalization of the relationships between society and power. By the early 20th century Orthodoxy had nine centuries of sermonizing behind it, yet the people did not embrace the humanistic ideal and Christian values: Russians preferred totalitarian dictatorship to Christian democracy. This happened because power insisted on keeping millions of peasants in ignorance. Vasily Klyuchevsky in his time wrote with a great degree of bitterness: "We were instructed not to study the physical and social world but be instructed by God's act." Ivan Pavlov, the first Russian Nobel Prize winner, said that "power had deprived the popular masses of the rule of law and education to keep them in ignorance."

The author points to an acute conflict between archaic culture and rational ideas of the world: "Mass consciousness in Russia has a gigantic potential of ignoring objective reality" (pp. 120-121). By the 1970s the country lost its historic peasantry; its descendants had moved to cities leaving behind a void. Patriarchal consciousness collapsed. What has come to fill this void?

According to sociological polls, three-quarters of the Russian population do not trust each other; 90% are convinced that they have no resources to influence power; 80% believe that they are not responsible for what is going on in the country. This means that the absolute majority is convinced that it cannot shape Russia's future and the future of their children. This is what people, who according to Article 3 of the Constitution of the RF are "the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power" think about power. This is what came out of post-Soviet changes.

In fact, the dominant social type in Russia of the early 21st century is a "little man" who is absolutely powerless in the face of power, who trusts nobody, who is a defenseless and socially isolated person. We cannot expect these people to unite into a civil society; they will survive as a disjointed and loose community. Nikolay Gogol, 19th century Russian classical writer, created a "little man" as a social type. Today, it is reproduced on a mass scale. Why did this tragedy happen and what will happen next?

Why are the socially impotent masses regularly reproduced? In his time Konstantin Kavelin answered this question: "Peoples created for universal historic activity cannot exist without the fundamental features of personality... aware of its endless and indisputable dignity personality is an indispensable condition for the development of people."<sup>5</sup> The history of Russia was little suited for personality formation: Christian humanism was unknown; serfdom which lasted for many centuries was followed by decades of totalitarian-repressive dictatorship; there were no independent and efficient courts determined to protect the legal rights and interests of common people... Is all this conducive to absolute and unshakable dignity; can this dignity resist encroachments of the bureaucratic authoritarian state? The answer is "No."

A large part of the monograph is devoted to the mechanisms of reproduction of traditional consciousness. The author is convinced that they stem from the civilizational conflict between "what is" and "what ought to be" (p. 175). The minds which for many centuries remained under pressure of Christian Orthodoxy divide the world into two value blocks: elevated (what ought to be) and profane (what is). The Russian hierarchy guilty of far from disinterested "idol making" offers the man in the street an image which contradicts human nature; it drives the traditionally minded Russian under the burden of the *a priori* unrealizable Christian absolute. As a social institution the ROC wants all people to remain constantly aware of their sinful nature; it wants this for not far from selfish reasons. The Church is a self-appointed intermediary between God and man; an intermediary which takes money to pray forgiveness for eternal sinners.

The state invariably sides with the Church: it is much easier to manipulate with subjects that are aware of their sins: "The eternal sinner lives at the mercy

of the agents of the state. At any moment a sinner can be accused of violating all sorts of norms. Power magnanimously forgives the 'little man' his sins; the sinner brimming with gratitude is ready to faithfully serve" (pp. 157-159). Service does not presuppose that both sides are equally responsible for what they do; this means that there are no morals, no rights and no justice (pp. 354, 381). Many centuries of "self-denying" service seem to be a source of amorality that has engulfed post-Soviet Russia.

One wonders what happened to the idea "what ought to be" when the utopia of communist ideology had fallen apart? Igor Yakovenko has an answer: "The post-Soviet stage can be summarized as 'death of what ought to be.'" The "ought/is" construct is falling apart in people's minds: Russian society has found itself on the threshold of a new reality. "In the decaying medieval society, however... an inversion of moving away from what ought to be" is unfolding before our eyes (p. 194).

This prompts the subject of corruption which plagues all traditional societies everywhere and to which no cell of social space is immune. The basic premise to eradicate corruption is separation of powers and property (p. 385); the main task is the formation of an independent judicial branch of legislature, which demands rotation of the elites and change of the political regime through a civilized political and legal process. To achieve this goal, we should modernize mass consciousness; upgrade the political culture of millions of Russian citizens and concentrate on creating a new generation of nationally responsible elite.

So far, in Russia medieval relationships are reproduced: power creates property (big property of oligarchs in the first place) by distributing among its cronies the highly profitable assets of previously national public property. Early in the 20th century prominent expert in Old Russian law Prof. Vasily Sergeevich wrote: "Neither in the Moscow Principality nor in the state of Muscovy can we find traces of state (public) property different from the property of a prince. In Moscow all landed properties belonged to the prince, not the state. The Grand Prince disposed of them at will granting estates and patrimonies."<sup>6</sup> Late in the 20th century the Russian sociocultural archetype reproduced the typologically similar social relations. On October 4, 2003, in an interview to *The New York Times* Vladimir Putin said: "We have a category of people who got rich and became billionaires overnight, as we say. They were appointed to be billionaires by the state. It simply distributed state property practically for free." State bureaucracy acts as if it is assured of its immunity and, therefore, has the right to dispose of public property as its private possessions.

There is another side of the problem: the carriers of archaic cultural traits tend to completely associate the state (as a sustainable form of political self-organization of society) with the ruling team which, on average, survives for 20-25 years.<sup>7</sup> This allows even the present ruling regime now in power, to pose as a zealous supporter of the strong state and national interests, to demand loyalty from its subjects and insist on the irremovability of the regime. The same way the politically sustainable regime of Leonid Brezhnev which remained in power for eighteen years insisted on loyalty. In the absence of opposition and protest

movements the ruling team brought the Soviet state to disintegration to the accompaniment of the soothing “thank God, there is no war” coming from all sides. The Soviet people were passively watching how the USSR was going downhill; millions of carriers of traditional consciousness were passively watching how the *nomenklatura* appropriated public property. The epoch of Communist construction which started under the cynical slogan “Loot the looters!” ended with looting the builders of Communism. In the post-Soviet period “the marauding elites” (to borrow an expression from Zhan Toshchenko) go on looting national wealth.<sup>8</sup>

The author has paid considerable attention to the fundamental problem of modernization of Russia. He writes that the qualities of the masses, the larger part of which is not ready—intellectually, psychologically and culturally—to accept reforms constitute the highest obstacle on the road toward modernization. At the same time, in the absence of modernization the threat of disintegration of the country increases, even though only few have realized this so far. Igor Yakovenko is convinced: “Russia will preserve itself only if our society demonstrates a potential of positive self-change” (p. 424).

The macrosocial strategies of the main groups of Russian society, once more designed to disorganize the state which leads consistently to its disintegration, complicate the situation. This is confirmed by the huge scale of corruption in the ranks of administrative-political “elite”; the huge scale of capital outflow; refusal of the wide masses to feel responsible for what is going on in Russia and, therefore, for its future. The multimillion-strong intelligentsia is socially incompetent and has no experience of social or political self-organization. The educated classes proved unable to stem the destructive antisocial reforms and force the ruling class to realize reforms in the interests of Russia. The results of the post-Soviet reforms are clear: we have not arrived at civic consciousness.

The author is convinced that modernization is vitally important for Russia and should be treated as a top priority in the structure of national interests. Modernization, however, is fraught with great and inevitable risks for the ruling class now in power. Suffice it to mention the probable consequences of forming an independent judiciary or, for example, the resubordination of the judicial-investigatory bodies to other ruling clans. The fate of Mikhail Khodorkovsky or Yury Luzhkov is clearly indicative of that. This explains why the rhetoric of modernization in public space was promptly, in a few months, replaced with the idea of another technical and technological industrialization to leave the present social and power relations intact.

The country is sliding into an abyss of hard times to the accompaniment of sugary talk about Russia’s special road toward its bright future which is growing more and more distant. This adds weight to what Vasily Klyuchevsky wrote in his diary in 1911 about the roots of Russia’s never-ending disorder: “Having acquired elements of West European culture the very thin strata of Russian society were protecting them... thus widening the social gap. They were used as an instrument of all sorts of exploitation of the culturally unarmed popular masses; pressed down the level of their public consciousness and fanning social anger.

This prepared them for rioting rather than for freedom. Senseless governance is to blame.”<sup>9</sup> Six years later history confirmed that the great historian was right.

Will Russia of the 21st century lend an ear to what its contemporary warned us about 100 years ago?

---

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> M. Gorshkov, “Citizens of New Russia: On Sustainability and Changeability of National Mentality,” *Russia: Development Trends and Prospects*, Moscow 2005, p. 68 (all the works are in Russian).
- <sup>2</sup> L. Gudkov, B. Dubin, A. Levinson, “Identikit of a Russian Man in the Street,” *Mir Rossii*, No. 2, 2009, p. 30.
- <sup>3</sup> *Is Russian Society Ready for Modernization?* Ed. by M. Gorshkov, R. Krumm, N. Tikhonova, Moscow, 2010, p. 255.
- <sup>4</sup> According to the Levada Center, 42% of Russians believed that the country was moving in the right direction; 39%, in a wrong direction; 19% were undecided. See: *Public Opinion 2008*, Moscow, 2008, p. 177.
- <sup>5</sup> K. Kavelin, *Collected Works*, Moscow, 1969, vol. 2, p. 935.
- <sup>6</sup> V. Sergeyevech, *Old Russian Laws*, St. Petersburg, 1911, pp. 22, 23.
- <sup>7</sup> There were three different political regimes in the Soviet state with very different aims, means of realization of power and the results of governance: Joseph Stalin (who ruled for 29 years), Leonid Brezhnev (18 years) and Mikhail Gorbachev (7 years).
- <sup>8</sup> Zh. Toshchenko, *The Centaur Problem*, Moscow, 2011.
- <sup>9</sup> V. Klyuchevsky, “Aphorisms. 1911,” *From What Russians Thought of Russia*. Ed. by I. Yanin, Kaliningrad, 2002, p. 267.

**S. Magaril**

*Translated by Valentina Levina*

**В. ЛЕДЯЕВ. Социология власти.  
Теория и опыт эмпирического исследования власти  
в городских сообществах, М., Издательский дом  
Высшей школы экономики, 2012, 472 с.**

**V. LEDYAEV. *Sociology of Power. Theory and  
Empirical Studies of Power in Urban Communities,*  
Moscow, Higher School of Economics Publishing  
House, 2012, 472 pp.**

In his monograph Valery Ledyaev has summarized many years of empirical studies of the nature of power in urban communities carried out from the 1920s onwards up to this day and age. This subject makes domination of American cases (the widest range and variety of concepts and approaches of which are presented to the reader) inevitable. The author compares the methods and methodologies adjusted to specific regions to demonstrate that they can be used in other regions and countries.

He introduces the reader to the modern discourse of concepts of power and cognitive models going on in world political science which affects the studies of power in Russia. The European context of this analysis adds topicality to the range of problems discussed.

Valery Ledyaev is convinced that the analytical instruments devised to study the urban level of activity of big groups of people, influential organizations and institutions allow broad theoretical generalizations and make the formula of the basic strategies of power studies more capacious: who rules, where (in which communities), when (under which conditions) and with which results power is realized. This is especially important for Russian political science never satisfied with the available research models and constantly looking for more adequate ones.

The structure of the book under review fully corresponds to the author's intention to bring the reader into the world of traditional explanations of power distribution at the urban level; to describe the cognitive models used in empirical studies; analyze the discussion between the rivaling schools which study power; to place the problems of the use of research models within varied social

and political contexts and to reveal the heuristic potential of the contemporary models of power studies and the way they can be used in political power research in the present-day Russian society.

The first part of the monograph familiarizes the reader with the chronology of studies of power in urban communities. The author traces their development from the earliest stage (the 1920s—1940s) through the classical stage up to the contemporary stage (which began in the 1980s). Valery Ledyaev has built up the logic of scientific and extrascientific (social, political) factors which had an impact on the nature and object of these studies. In the scholarly context the focused analysis of power, the systemic nature of studies, special methods of studies of power and the problem-related area of studies appear to satisfy the needs for a new trend in political science and sociology dealing with the studies of power. A quest for analytical models was closely associated with the normative and value positions of scholars involved. No wonder Valery Ledyaev uses the terms the Cold War, the thaw and fragile *détente* to describe the polemics between the pluralists and elitists, structuralists and Marxists.

The second part deals with an analysis of theoretical and methodological foundations of empirical studies of power in urban communities. The author has described in detail the search for adequate models; assessed its heuristic potential and identified interaction between scholarly and value-oriented approaches. As if a detached observer, the author lets his heroes—students of power in urban communities—speak for themselves; he avoids the temptation reproach them for failures from the present-day position. The polemics between the supporters of different models (elitists and pluralists) and different approaches (reputational and decisional) illustrates how the scholarly thought was developing, creates new variants of scientific communications and styles which add to the variety of contemporary research instrumental.

The third, biggest, part scrutinizes classical and modern studies of power in urban communities. The author discusses the works of Robert and Helen Lynd, Floyd Hunter, Robert Dahl, Robert Prethus, Delbert Miller, John Walton, Terry Clark and Barbara Ferman, the Marxist studies of power of the 1960s—1980s as well as studies of urban regimes in Europe and Russia's cities and regions.

Robert Dahl and his studies of the main subjects of political decision-making and the role of different groups in political processes at the urban level, conducted in New Haven (Connecticut, the USA) occupy a lot of space in all three parts of the monograph. The author writes that Robert Dahl asked the question: Who governs? to answer the central question of democracy: Is political equality possible even if the resources are unequal? His supposition that the model of evolution of the political system in New Haven is applicable to other American cities and the American political system in general proved to be fully justified. Dahl concluded that people in New Haven affected political decision-making by coming to the polls, the results of which were interpreted by leaders as the formulation of priorities. Valery Ledyaev has described this as “optimistic democracy.”

When analyzing the polemics between Dahl and Hunter, the latter siding with the elitist approach to power, the author says that the uncompromising

nature and the diametrically opposite conclusions made by the participants can be explained by different methodological approaches and methods. Floyd Hunter relied on the “reputational” method to conclude that distribution of power in American society was elitist; the decisional method of Robert Dahl led him to pluralistic assessments.

Valery Ledyaeв believes that Robert Dahl not only responded to the challenge of the elitists; he was the first to offer an empirical study of power in an urban community carried out within the pluralist tradition. The polemics between the elitists and pluralists was a core of studies of power in urban communities which, as interpreted by Ledyaeв, became an academic intrigue.

This is especially important for political science in Russia in heuristic respects. The monograph is a master class of sorts which contains a solid empirical basis; clear ideas about the correlation between analytical instruments and the results obtained with their help; shows prospects of further studies and encourages academic activity. I would like to recommend this book to all engaged or planning to become engaged in the analysis gradually becoming more and more popular of urban regimes to avoid farfetched conclusions and carefully correlate the chosen methodological approaches and empirical materials.

An analysis of power in regional communities relies on American cases which can be used as clear examples of research paradigms and scholarly polemics. Valery Ledyaeв has not limited himself to American cases; he has discussed the work of prominent European political scientists and the best known publications by Peter John, Alistair Cole in Leeds, Southampton, in Lille and Rennes who pointed out at the local level that under the impact of globalization the interest was shifted from urban government to urban governance.

The author has paid particular attention to the concept of urban political regimes understood as a coalition of actors which have access to institutional resources and govern the community. He has analyzed the way this concept is applied to empirical studies and explained the different approaches to the problem in the United States, Western Europe and Russia by the specifics of their history, political landscape and design. Valery Ledyaeв has pointed out that not all regions have closely knit coalitions: in some of them they can be described as “emerging regimes” (Alan Harding), “limited regimes” (Marion Orr and Gerry Stoker) or coalitions with special configurations of actors (p. 83). The key roles in nearly all coalitions and at all levels belong to representatives of public power even if in some regions business communities may have a comparable influence. In any case, as long as regional political space on which relatively independent actors operate survives, all variants of the political regimes theory remain relevant.

The author stresses that there may be differences between urban regimes even within one and the same type (democratic) of political system. For example, the correlation between business and public power in urban coalition encouraging economic growth is different in the United States and Western Europe. When the post-communist countries were included in the sphere of studies of urban power it turned out that the urban regimes can be further differentiated. The present monograph’s author has discovered the first studies of urban coali-

tions in China in the works of Jieming Zhu from Singapore. Ledyaeв's interest is not accidental: the Singapore analyst proceeds from the acceptable logic according to which urban coalitions can appear in undemocratic countries provided they encourage business.

The analysis of Russian studies of urban and regional regimes begins with formulation of the questions which seemingly cast doubt on acceptability of the Western instruments in Russia because of its very specific traditions and administrative mechanisms. The author has identified the sum total of factors behind the interest of Russian political scientists in this problem range and the key trends of object-related studies: composition and structure of regional and urban elites (Aleksandr Ponedelkov, Aleksandr Starostin, Oksana Gaman-Golutvina, Olga Kryshтанovskaya, Viktor Mokhov, and others); the relationships between the main actors of regional and urban policies and local political regimes (Natalya Lapina, Alla Chirikova, Natalya Zubarevich, Vladimir Gelman, Sergey Ryzhenkov, and others), political processes in small towns (Oleg Podvintsev, Pyotr Panov, Aleksey Titkov, and others). In Russia's case the specifics of business development and its relations with power was of special importance. Here the author relies on the studies of Alla Chirikova conducted in several Russian regions.

When describing the instruments used by the sociology of power at the city level Valery Ledyaeв has convincingly demonstrated that the models cannot be shifted without adjustments and pointed to their considerable heuristic potential. He has traced a close interaction between empirical studies and theoretical constructs and avoided banality and truisms to fill his monograph with rich scientific and value content.

The monograph offers vast factual material which embraces a wide range of studies of foreign and Russian scholars and his comprehensive and detailed analysis of empirical studies of power in urban communities. The author has formulated topical problems and relied on vast empirical material to endow his monograph with the potential of encouraging further studies and stirring discussions.

**L. Fadeyeva**

*Translated by Valentina Levina*

**Д. БОГОЯВЛЕНСКАЯ, И. СУСОКОЛОВА.**  
**Психометрическая интерпретация творчества.**  
**Научный вклад Дж. Гилфорда, М., МГППУ, 2011, 267 с.**

**D. BOGOYAVLENSKAYA, I. SUSOKOLOVA.**  
***Psychometric Interpretation of Creativity.***  
***Scientific Contribution by Joy Paul Guilford,***  
**Moscow, MGPPU, 2011, 267 pp.**

Philosophy and psychology pay particular attention to creativity, thinking, intelligence, intellect and abilities; an interest in some problems may flare up and disappear for different, academic or nonacademic reasons. The problem which Diana Bogoyavlenskaya and Irina Susokolova analyze in their highly interesting book has always remained within the scope of attention of the humanities. It should be said that development of psychology includes, among other things, development of theoretical, experimental and empirical ideas about the psychology of creativity, understanding of thinking (intelligence) as the highest psychic function and the way man's intellectual abilities affect different sides of his learning and professional activities.

In the mid-19th—early 20th centuries Francis Galton, Alfred Binet, James McKeen Cattell, Charles Spearman, Louis Leon Thurstone, Joy Paul Guilford and others moved differential psychology closer to empirical understanding of human abilities and their place in psychic life. In this way, this branch of psychology has accumulated a vast body of empirical data comparable with the empirical basis of the psychology of sensation, perception and memory, one of the biggest psychological branches. On the one hand, thinking (intelligence) interpreted as a “process of dealing with problems by moving from formulating them to obtaining results”<sup>1</sup> looks fairly straightforward. On the other, creativity interpreted as “the hierarchically structured unity of abilities responsible for the level and quality of process of thinking designed to adjust them to the changing and unknown conditions in sensorimotor, visual, operational-active and logical-theoretical forms”<sup>2</sup> looks vague.

The authors formulated the problem which served as the starting point for the studies of the scientific heritage of Joy Paul Guilford and its history in an abstract written for the *Golden Psyche* Contest (2011): “Topicality and the scientific and practical importance of this book is explained by the absolute neces-

---

The review first appeared in Russian in the *Voprosy psikhologii* journal, No. 6, 2013.

sity to critically analyze the theory of J. P. Guilford which predominates in education and selection of gifted people in our country. The seemingly obvious provisions of his theory, simple tests and social order proved to be a Trojan horse which allowed those who used them to ignore both the inconsistency of the theory and the invalid nature of the diagnostic procedure.”<sup>3</sup> D. Bogoyavlenskaya and I. Susokolova have produced a profound comparative-historic study of Guilford’s theory of creativity, its methodological foundations, development in the 20th century, achievements and failures in understanding the intellect and creativity within the psychometric approach.

The problem field of psychology of creativity and intellect tilled by Guilford is presented in eight chapters of the book under review. The authors trace the specific history of J. P. Guilford’s attempts to resolve the key problem of differentiation between intellectual abilities and creative aptitudes. On the other hand, each chapter presents one of the sections of the psychology of intelligence and creativity in which the authors follow in Guilford’s footsteps to analyze the merits and demerits of the psychometric and factor-analytical studies of intelligence and creativity; his well-known cubic (three-dimensional) model of the intellect’s structure; identification of the components and specific features of creativity; understanding the differences between the divergent and convergent production in thinking and their role in shaping a creative product.

Chapter One *Development of the Testological-Statistical Paradigm* looks into the history of how Francis Galton arrived at the psychometric method of identification of originality, banality and flexibility as aspects of creativity and giftedness. Differential psychology betrayed the main (according to the authors) faults of the psychometric paradigm of creativity studies—reliance on the principles of associative psychology and the theory of probability—at the earliest stage of its development. The following puts the first chapter into a nutshell: “An urgent need to elevate psychology to the rank of an objective science forced the academic community to accept the thesis of evolutionary science that the psychic is nothing more than a response to external impacts at the expense of the idea of autogenesis. The prevailing scheme of experiment as a response to stimuli has deprived the psychometric paradigm of an important possibility to study the subject’s own initiative” (p. 38).

Chapter Two *Psychometric Ideas of Creativity* deals with Guilford’s scientific biography and especially the way his scientific position was shaped by Edward Titchener, who in 1924 supervised Guilford’s postgraduate course at Cornell University. This study proved to be a useful introduction to the “idea of psychometric studies of creativity.” The authors point out that having decided to “measure the maximally large number of empirical interindividual distinctions according to varied psychic manifestations, especially the most complicated of them—intelligence, creativity and personality traits—Guilford practically exhausted the fundamental possibilities of psychometrics” (p. 43).

Chapter Three *Psychometric Studies of the Intellect* describes the wide-scale studies of intellectual abilities J. P. Guilford realized during World War Two working with the Air Force of the United States; it was the logical continuation

of his previous ideas. These and later studies (conducted for twenty years with the US Navy within the Aptitudes Research Project at the University of South California) supplied Guilford with vast empirical material and allowed him to move consistently toward bringing together the maximally large number of characteristics of the intellect and the first tests designed to quantitatively assess the hypothetical characteristics of creativity as opposed to those of the intellect. When dealing with the problem of differentiating between creativity and intellect within the factor model he became convinced that creativity is a specific characteristic of certain types of activity normally described as creative. This contradicted the idea of creativity as a general factor responsible for the creative nature of all types of activity.

Chapter Four *The Structure of Intellect* deals with the first variants of the now well-known three-dimensional model of the intellect which Guilford presented in 1958 at the annual meeting of the Western Department of the US education testing service; the authors have offered their analysis of how Guilford identified creative aptitudes.

The three-dimensional model allowed its author to structuralize the wide range of man's intellectual abilities. This solved the first part of the problem of distinguishing between intelligence and creativity. While looking for creativity components he also studied the ties between creativity and nonintellectual traits of the personality. This is discussed in Chapter Five *Creativity Components* in which the authors point out that Guilford's efforts of the 1930s—1950s to formulate an empirical theory of individuality and to establish a correlation between creativity, intellect and personality traits were not quite successful for the simple reason that the psychometric approach did not allow to reveal the natural unity of the studied variables. The authors of the present book insist that a different procedural-activity paradigm should be used.

Chapter Six *Psychometric Features of Creativity* describes how J. P. Guilford continued looking for the characteristics of creative type of thinking (intelligence) and summarized the results of his years-long studies. The authors point out that he received two contradictory results. On the one hand, he verified three features of creativity-prone type of thinking—flexibility, elaboration and fluency. On the other, he finally concluded that the psychometric approach was fairly limited when it came to the methodology of creativity studies available at his time. The authors of the book under review discuss in detail how Guilford elaborated and used the index of divergent productivity even though he warned against its indiscriminate use as the only exponent of creativity.

Chapter Seven *Psychometric Interpretation of Problem Solving* deals with the history of the factor analysis of intelligence. The authors are especially interested in Guilford's effort to factorize the stages of solution as the stages of the process of thinking. The psychometric approach designed to study intelligence, intellect and creativity could not permit Guilford to go beyond the limits of the experimental pattern which relied on stimuli and responses. This deprived J. P. Guilford of more or less significant results; his study "Structure of the Intellect in Problem Solving," likewise, did not help overcome these limitations.

The concluding chapter *Possibilities and Limitations of Psychometric Paradigm in Creativity Studies* summarizes and assesses Guilford's many years of studies of creative activity and intellect. The authors of the present book conclude that concentration on the psychometric approach deprived Guilford of a chance to resolve the problems which remained in the focus of his attention throughout his life. The results of his scholarly activities proved to be disappointing for him, yet they were fairly encouraging for the future of psychological science: he revealed the limitations and faults of the psychometric paradigm. It should be said, however, that the failures were caused not so much by psychometrics *per se* as by the eclectic nature of the theory: "J. P. Guilford did not hesitate to bring together formalized indicators from all sorts of concepts; he brought together the quantitative assessments of traits which he borrowed from behaviorism and *Gestalt* psychology, and also offered a scheme of formalization of the thinking process" (p. 220). The final chapter does not breed optimism about the future of Guilford's theory; the authors, however, offer different variants of how to approach the problems he had formulated. We expect the authors to specify their variants of cultural-historical and procedural-activity approach to creativity and giftedness, intelligence and intellect in their future works.

Time has come to identify the genre of the reviewed monograph, even though we should have probably started with it. People interested or engaged in comparative historical studies will appreciate this profound effort deeply rooted in the widest possible range of sources. Those who study the history of psychology and the road travelled by differential psychology will find biographical information and facts of J. P. Guilford's scientific creative efforts and development of his scientific school extremely interesting. No reference books or dictionaries (fairly contradictory when dealing with the key concepts of the intellect, creativity, talent, giftedness and abilities) can compete with this book. We fully agree with the authors who offer this book as a textbook for students of all areas of psychology viz., general psychology, psychology of the personality and activity, psychology of aptitudes and abilities, etc. In fact, this book is related to all spheres of contemporary psychological knowledge.

---

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> V. Lektorsky, "Thinking," *Encyclopedia of Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science*, Moscow, 2009, p. 537 (in Russian).
- <sup>2</sup> I. Beskova, I. Kasavin, "Creativity," *ibid.*, p. 954.
- <sup>3</sup> D. Bogoyavlenskaya, I. Susokolova, abstract of the project Psychometric Interpretation of Creativity. Scientific Contribution of J. P. Guilford. See: . (National Psychological Contest "The Golden Psyche", 2011, in Russian).

**V. Mazilov, Yu. Slepko**  
*Translated by Valentina Levina*

## ACADEMIC JOURNALS

Editorial note: We continue to inform you about the contents of the leading RAS journals published in Russian and confirm our readiness to help our readers order translations of any article mentioned below.

### VESTNIK ROSSIYSKOY AKADEMII NAUK (Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences)

#### No. 2, 2014

#### **General Meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences**

On the Project of Federal Law “On the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Reorganization of the State Academies of Sciences and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation.” *Report by Academician V. Fortov, the President of RAS.*

About the Work of the RAS Presidium in the Period between General Meetings of the RAS. *Report by Academician I. Sokolov, the Chief Academic Secretary of the RAS Presidium.*

Speeches of the Participants of the General Meeting, Academicians: *J. Alferov, Yu. Osipov, V. Zakharov, S. Rogov, A. Lisitsyn/Svetlanov, A. Aseyev*, Chairman of the Trade Union of the RAS Workers *V. Kalinushkin*, Chairman of the Council of Young Scientists of RAS *A. Kotelnikov*, Academicians *V. Sergiyenko, S. Stishov, A. Skrinsky*, Foreign Member of RAS *V. Zelman*, Academician *V. Rubakov*, Corresponding Member of RAS *V. Aristov*, Academicians *R. Nigmatulin, A. Khokhlov, N. Dobretsov*, Corresponding Member of RAS *A. Murtazayev*, Academicians *A. Nekipelov, G. Novozhilov, I. Sokolov, B. Kashin, M. Marov, Yu. Israel, Ye. Fedosov, A. Arbatov, V. Fortov.*

On the Project of Federal Law “On the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Reorganization of the State Academies of Sciences and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation.” *Resolution of the General Meeting.*

**Ye. Gordeyev, O. Girina.** Volcanoes Are Hazardous for Aviation.

**V. Levashov.** Sociopolitical Risks for Sustainable Development.

**N. Pechurkin, L. Somova.** The Technogenic Civilization: From Socioeconomic to Environmental Unsustainability.

**V. Martynenko.** Ideological Crisis of Monetary Regulation.

**I. Kuchumov, L. Sakhigareyeva.** Historiography of the Multinational Russian Empire: Contribution by B. Nolde.

**No. 3, 2014**

**A. Kokoshin.** Strategic Nuclear and Conventional Deterrence: Priorities of the Modern Era.

**S. Bogachev, A. Kirichenko.** Space Solar Research Using Methods of Depicting X-Ray Spectroscopy.

**I. Ushakov et al.** The Main Results of Psychophysiological Research in the Experiment “Mars-500.”

**P. Fyodorov, A. Popov.** The Relationship of Indicators of Citing Russian Scientists.

**A. Degermendzhi, A. Tikhomirov.** Creation of Artificial Closed Ecosystems for Terrestrial and Space Applications.

**Yu. Granin.** Globalization and National Forms of Global Strategies.

A Promising Method for Search of Oil and Gas Deposits. *Conversation with Academician A. Tsivadze.*

**Yu. Natochin.** Maximilian Voloshin’s Anticipation, and the Evolution of Homeostasis.

**No. 4, 2014**

**R. Dzarasov.** The Economy of “Imposition of Backwardness.” *The True Reasons of RAS Reforming.*

**A. Alimov, Ye. Balushkina.** A School of Productional Hydrobiology.

**Yu. Tumanov et al.** What Principles Should Underlie New Technological Order?

**A. Volkov, A. Sidorov.** Mineral Wealth of Volcanic Belts of Tethys.

**R. Galiulin, R. Galiulina.** Persistent Pollutants on Land and Sea.

**N. Komkov.** Innovative Development of Russia and the Organization of Science.

**L. Kruglikova.** Protection of the Russian Language and Russian Lexicography.

**A. Salitsky et al.** New Energetics in the Industrial Transformation of Modern China.

**VOPROSY ISTORII**

*(Problems of History)*

**No. 1, 2014**

**I. Rybachyonok.** The Russian Foreign Policy at the Turn of the 20th Century.

**Ye. Shlyapnikova.** Arkady Ivanovich Morkov.

**S. Nefyodov.** The Origins of the Regular State of Peter the Great.

**E. Zadorozhnyuk.** F. Tyutchev and F. Engels on the Fate of the Slavdom.

- O. Kulikova.** Ancient Russia's Relations with the Countries of the Caucasus in the Written Sources of the 9th—10th Centuries.  
**G. Kondratova.** The Rurik Dynasty: The Philosophical and Historical Analysis.  
**M. Yerin.** Harold Winkler and His Views on the Reunification of Germany.  
**O. Serova.** Conclave of 1903 and Russian Diplomacy.  
**K. Stankov.** William Penn, James II Stuart and the Jacobite Movement.

### No. 2, 2014

- M. Babkin.** Probate Law of Monks: Solutions of 1917.  
**Yu. Bezhanidze, A. Firsov.** Aleksandr Petrovich Tolstoy.  
**S. Nefyodov.** The Origins of the Regular State of Peter the Great.  
**I. Suponitskaya.** America's "Sovietization" in the 1920s—1930s.  
**A. Akhmetova.** Legal Regulation of the Indigenous Peoples' Development of the Far East in the 1920s—1930s.  
**I. Popp.** A. K. Anastasyev.  
**V. Puzanov.** Military Service of the Siberian Peasants in the 17th—19th Centuries.  
**S. Artamoshin.** Carl Schmitt.

### No. 3, 2014

- Yu. Pelevin.** Ideological Foundations of the "Land and Freedom" in the 1870s.  
**A. Loshakov.** Count Vladimir Nikolayevich Lambsdorff.  
**Ye. Voyeykov.** Compulsory Labor in the Logging Industry in the Period of Industrialization in the USSR.  
**T. Kobzeva.** Local Self-Administration in the Middle Volga Region after the February Revolution of 1917.  
**V. Yefimova.** V. Filimonov's Activities at the Post of the Governor of Arkhangelsk.  
**A. Sokolov.** Phobias and Politics: The Process of Strafford.  
**Ye. Yudin.** Emperor Nicholas II in the Perception of the Russian Aristocracy. 1894-1914.  
**A. Sushko.** Yakut National Communists and the Formation of the Yakut Autonomous Republic.  
**I. Yesiyeva.** Varzi-Yatchi: How It All Began.  
**Ye. Barinova.** The Ordos Cultural Tradition in Hun-Sarmatian Time.

### No. 4, 2014

- V. Arakcheyev.** Dynamics and Typology of Reforms in Russia in the 16th—17th Centuries.

- Yu. Ivonin.** Francis I Valois.  
**S. Nefyodov.** The Origins of the Regular State of Peter the Great.  
**V. Zverev.** Strengthening the Military Security of the Russian Empire in 1906-1914.  
**N. Khan.** The Muscovite-Lithuanian War at the Turn of the 1360s—1370s.  
**A. Mayorov.** The Formation of the Moldavian State.  
**A. Kostin, V. Yungblyud.** I. and Yugoslav Policy of the USA in 1942-1945.  
**A. Khokhlov.** President Yuan Shikai and His Attempt to Restore the Monarchy in China in 1915.

**NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA**  
*(Modern and Contemporary History)*

**No. 1, 2014**

- To the 100th Anniversary of the Beginning of World War I.  
**B. Khavkin.** The Russian Front of World War I (1914-1918).  
**A. Fomin.** The Establishment of the League of Nations' Mandates System in the Middle East after the First World War. 1920-1924.  
**D. Khazanov.** Strategic Aircraft of Anglo-American Allies in World War II.  
**S. Romanenko.** Soviet Russia and Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: From October 1917 to the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918).  
**T. Troshina** (Arkhangelsk). The Soviet-Polish War and the Destiny of the Red Army Soldiers Interned in Germany in 1920-1921.  
Academician **A. Davidson.** The Academy of Sciences of Madagascar—Connections with Russia.  
**S. Lazarev** (Oryol). Military Campaign of 1813 in Germany.  
**O. Pavlenko.** Russia and Austro-Hungary in the Middle of the 19th and the Beginning of the 20th Centuries: Political Myths of the Imperial Power.  
**A. Boroznyak** (Lipetsk). "Their Fighting, Their Suffering, Their Death Weren't in Vain." Hans Fallada and His Novel *Everyone Dies Alone*.  
**P. Cherkasov.** The Embassy of Louis Napoléon Auguste Lannes, 2nd Duke de Montebello in Russia (1858-1864).  
**V. Kazakov.** D.F. Sarmiento (1811-1888), the President-Reformer of Argentina.  
**N. Korovitsyna.** Processes of Transformation of the Czech Family at the Turn of the 20th—21st Centuries.  
**A. Derbenyov.** The US Oil Policy in Respect to Saudi Arabia and the Anglo-American Oil Agreement 1944.  
**D. Ofitserov-Belsky.** The Soviet-Polish Nonaggression Pact 1932 in the Light of New Sources.  
**V. Zamulin** (Kursk). The Prehistory of Kursk Battle: Could Germany Win in May-June 1943?  
**I. Rozhdestvensky.** The Vendée Uprising As Seen by Deputies of National Convention.

**ROSSIYSKAYA ARKHEOLOGIYA**  
*(Russian Archaeology)*

**No. 2, 2014**

- S. Ivanova.** Balkhan-Carpathian Variant of the Yamnaya Culture-Historical Region.
- O. Bachura.** Seasonal Husbandry Cycle of the Population of the Sintashta Culture of the Southern Trans-Urals.
- L. Yablonsky.** The Equipment of an Early Sarmatian Elite Warrior (On the Materials from Filippovka Burials).
- M. Dobrovolskaya, I. Reshetova.** The Nutrition of the Tradition-Bearers of the Saltovo-Mayaki Archaeological Culture in the Don-Donetsk Interfluves Area Based on the Isotopic Analysis Data.
- L. Nedashkovsky.** The Structure and Internal Relations of the Peripheries of the Golden Horde Cities of the Lower Volga Region.
- A. Kharinsky et al.** Animal Carcasses in Mongolian Graves of the 13th—14th Centuries in the Burial Okoshki I (the South-East Trans-Baikal).
- A. Karpukhin, V. Matskovsky.** An Absolute Generalized Tree-Ring Chronology of the Sheksna and Sukhona River Basins (1085-2009).
- V. Bakhshaliyev.** New Eneolithic Sites on the Territory of Nakhichevan.
- A. Mogilov, S. Didenko.** The 5th Century BC Barrow, Near the Village Turiya, on the Right Bank, Forest-Steppe Region of Dnieper.
- M. Moshkova, M. Treyster.** The Glass Goblet with the Scene of a Gladiators' Battle from the Nomadic Burial of the Barrow Lebedevka V (the Western Kazakhstan).
- V. Berezutsky, P. Zolotaryov.** New Finds of the Champleve Enamel Set in the Middle Don Region.
- V. Sarapulkin.** New Barrows of Mayaki Ancient Settlement.
- S. Vityaz.** Interethnic Contacts in Early Middle Ages in Upper Niemen Region.
- V. Kulakov.** Korallenberge (Chvoynoye). Stratigraphy and Chronology of the Early Middle-Ages Settlement in Kaliningrad Region.
- I. Strikalov, A. Chernetsov.** The Hoard N 17 from Staraya Ryazan.
- Z. Zharnikov et al.** The Results of the Tree-Ring Dating of the Stadukhino Prison.

**ETNOGRAFICHESKOYE OBOZRENIYE**  
*(Ethnographic Review)*

**No. 1, 2014**

***Special Section of the Issue: Youth Subcultures and Practices (Guest Editor—Ye. Omelchenko).***

**Ye. Omelchenko.** From Subcultures to Solidarities and Back to Subcultures? Debates on Terms and the Ethnography of Youth Sociality.

**V. Pisarevskaya.** What Are the Postsubcultural Studies? (An Overview).

- A. Kudryashov.** Subculture and After It: A History of a Fundamental Concept in the Youth Studies.
- A. Zinoviyev.** “Our Gift to This World”: An Analysis of Specificities of Violence in Practices of a St. Petersburg Fighters’ Club.
- D. Litvina.** (Non)Monetary Consumption in the Anti-Capitalist Youth Milieu: An Experience of Field Study of Anarchists.
- Ye. Omelchenko.** Skinhead Identity in a Local Context: Homosociality, Intimacy, and Fighter’s Body.
- G. Shkurina.** The Role of Age Initiation in the Socialization of a Child.
- M. Tendryakova.** Primitive Age Initiations in the Circle of “Eternal” Questions.
- O. Derbisheva-Sutherland.** Ethnocentrism As an Everyday Consciousness Phenomenon: Basic Theoretical-Methodological Approaches to Examining Its Origins, Structure, Forms, and Manifestations.
- I. Zarinov.** Russian Drama Theater in the Ethnonational Context.
- A. Ber-Glinka.** Toward a Typology of Plots of East Slavic Folktales 672 and 673 According to the Aarne-Thompson System.
- A. Ivanov.** Forms of Identity in India: Caste and Jati.
- Ye. Aleksandrenkov.** The First European Account of Beliefs of the Americas’ Natives (“*Relación*” by Ramón Pane).
- S. Kupriyenko, V. Talakh.** The Khipu of Chupachu: The Organization of Labor among the Taxable Population in the Inca Empire.

## No. 2, 2014

- Special Section of the Issue: On Mortally Serious Matters: Anthropology of Death in Contemporary Russia (Guest Editors—A. Sokolova, A. Yudkina).**
- A. Sokolova, A. Yudkina.** The Burial/Funeral Ritual Outside of Traditional Culture: Trends and Dynamics of Transformations in Contemporary Russia.
- Ye. Moiseyeva.** The Commodification of the Funeral, or the History of Formation of the Market of Funeral Services.
- A. Sokolova.** The Commercialization of the Funeral Ritual and New Roles of Local Ritual Specialists.
- I. Razumova.** The Dynamics of Urban Funeral Ritual: Global Social Factors and Local Anthropological Contexts.
- M. Matlin, Ye. Safronov.** Cenotaphs As a Contemporary Form of Objectifying the Memory of the Dead.
- A. Yudkina.** The Memorialization of the Beslan Tragedy.
- A. Khisamutdinov.** Russian Émigré Ethnographers in Manchuria, Their Works and Lives.
- Ye. Batyanova.** The Ethnographer Albert Lipsky in Altay: Pages of Biography.
- O. Lagunova.** A. Krymsky As an Ethnographer of Lebanon.
- Z. Tsallagova.** V. Miller and His Ossetian Studies.
- Z. Mukhina.** Social and Age Groups in the Traditional Russian Peasant Society of the Reform Era: The Gender Aspect.

**O. Titova.** On the Issue of Mythological Characters of the Russians of the Central Chernozem Region (the 19th—Early 20th Centuries).

**V. Konopka.** Caroling During the Harvest (Drawn on Data from the Southwestern Historical-Ethnographic Area of Ukraine).

**T. Krikhtova.** Representation of Ethnicity in Monuments and Related Practices in the Levashovo Memorial Cemetery.

**A. Salmin.** The Ugrian Chapter in the History of the Chuvash.

**A. Belik.** Rethinking the Significance of Altered States of Consciousness (Through the Cases of Psychological Anthropology).

## VOPROSY FILOSOFII

(Problems of Philosophy)

### No. 2, 2014

**V. Kemerov.** The Keys to the Modernity—in the Shifts in Methodology.

**T. Dlugach.** Karl Marx: Yesterday and Today.

**O. Rzayeva.** The End of Metanarratives in the Context of Problems of the Past and the Challenges of the Future.

A Talk with **V. Mezhujev.**

**V. Yemelin, A. Tkhostov.** The Transformation of Natural Geography: Technological and Cognitive Maps.

**L. Kuzmina.** On the Problem of Semiotic Interpretation of the Cave Painting.

**S. Rodin.** Relationships between the Personality and the State in Nara Japan (On the Materials of Traditional Biographies of the Historical Chronicle *Shoku nihongi*).

**A. Meshcheryakov.** Medieval Japan: Pure Land Garden and Garden Paradise.

**V. Finn.** Epistemological Foundations of JSM-Method of Automatic Hypothesis Generation.

**G. Levin.** What Is Probability?

**K. Barsht.** Dual Narrator and Dual Characters in F. Dostoyevsky's "Unclosed" Dialogue (from *The Poor People* to *The Double*).

**A. Gaponenkov.** An Epistolary Dialogue between S. Frank and N. Berdyayev (1923-1947).

From the Correspondence of S. Frank and N. Berdyayev (1923-1926). *Preparation of Publications, Comments by A. Gaponenkov.*

**P. Gaydenko.** Medieval Nominalism and Genesis of Modern European Consciousness.

### No. 3, 2014

**N. Motroshilova.** Post Scriptum to Author's Book *Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt: Being—Time—Love.*

**A. Shestopal.** Russian Philosophy: Modernity and the Classics (Reflections on the Writings of N. Motroshilova).

- A. Rakitov.** On the Systems Integration of Philosophical Knowledge.
- V. Rozin.** Discourse of Social Justice: A Critical Analysis.
- S. Ivanov.** The Universals and Economic Life: the Birth of Capitalism.
- K. Abishev.** Thinking and Being.
- V. Zinchenko.** The Philosophical-Humanitarian Origins of the Psychology of Action.
- Ye. Krotkov.** Diagnostics As a Universal Form of Scientific Knowledge (an Epistemological Analysis).
- V. Kantor.** What Did N. Chernyshevsky's Rational Egoism Mean in a Country Devoted to Communal Principles?
- Ye. Besschetnova.** Aesthetics of N. Chernyshevsky and V. Solovyov As a Road to the Transformation of the World.
- I. Yevlampiyev, P. Kolychev.** Personality and Genesis: Metaphysics of Man in A. Platonov's Prose and Its Origins.
- A. Krotov.** Diderot As a Historian of Philosophy.
- A. Kuznetsov.** Cognitive Investigations and the Problem of Mental Causality.
- M. Sekatskaya.** Functionalism As a Scientific Philosophy of Consciousness: Why Qualia Argument Cannot Be Decisive.
- I. Inishev.** Phenomenological Hermeneutics in Media Theoretical Prospect.
- V. Belov.** Reflections on the Book of L. Stolovich.

## CHELOVEK

*(Human Being)*

### No. 1, 2014

- D. Zamyatin.** Metaphysics of Travel.
- I. Mikhaylov.** Two Models of Globalization.
- A. Golova.** Somebody Chooses Us—We Consume.
- N. Mankovskaya.** The Existential Choice: From A. Camus to M. Houellebecq and more...
- Ye. Rzhevskaya.** "Colors of Georgia Live in His Heart from Birth..." Zurab Tsereteli.
- Nanotechnologies As a Social Project. A Roundtable Discussion.
- A. Voronin.** Contours of Humanitarian Expertise.
- M. Kiselyova.** "The World of Human Things" of Giambattista Vico: Visualization of the Meaning of History in the Baroque Epistemology.
- A. Yeryomenko.** Philosophy of an Event in the Novel of V. Grossman *Life and Fate*.
- M. Frolova.** Erich Fromm's Humanism.
- V. Vizgin.** Mikhail Prishvin and Gabriel Marcel.
- A. Karpov.** Translogic *cogito*: Job and Weber's Puritans.
- Ye. Berkovich.** Heisenberg and the Time.
- S. Schmidt.** High School Humanitarians in the Public Sphere.
- V. Frolov.** Philosophical Anthropology of Russian Cosmism.

**N. Apukhtina, M. Menyaeva.** The Principle of Consent in Philosophy of Russian Cosmists.

**OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI I SOVREMENNOST (ONS)**  
*(Social Sciences Today)*

**No. 2, 2014**

**N. Tikhonova.** Structural Prerequisites and the Main Types of the Russian Poverty.

**A. Shastitko et al.** How to Protect the Results of Intellectual Activity.

**T. Ryabchenko, N. Lebedeva.** The Attitude to Immigration and the Subjective Well-Being of the Accepting Population.

**S. Lurye.** In Search of New Forms of Self-Identification of the Russian Urban Population. (The Methodology of *Grounded Theory* in Practical Study). Article 3. Passive Friendliness.

**V. Kostyuk.** On Liberalism in the Conditions of Misbalance of the Economy and Society.

**P. Tarusin.** Circulation of the Elite: Methods of Studying and Challenges of Practice.

**N. Varlamova.** Comparative Law: Present-Day Methodological Approaches.

**Z. Mirkina.** "I Found Myself in How I Live and How I Love."

**P. Voge.** *Bogopoznaniye* (Knowledge of God) As Self-Knowledge. (Some Traits of Grigory Pomerants' Philosophy).

**Ya. Shemyakin.** Subecumenical World and "Borderland" Civilizations in Comparative Historical Perspective: On the Nature of the Relationship between Language, the Text and the Font. Article I.

**A. Ostrovsky.** Was There a System Crisis in Russia at the Beginning of the 20th Century? (The Critique of B. Mironov's Concept).

**I. Savelyeva.** Interdisciplinary Foundations and Disciplinary Identity of Cultural History.

**N. Rozov.** New Relevance of Philosophy of History and the Problem of Coordination between Descriptions of the Past.

**S. Ikonnikova.** On the Three-Volumes' Edition "Lectures and Reports of Members of the Russian Academy of Sciences" Presented in the St. Petersburg University of Trade Union (1993-2013).

**V. Britkov et al.** Systems Analysis of the Problem of Global Climate.

**POLITICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (POLIS)**  
*(Political Studies)*

**No. 2, 2014**

**R. Sakwa.** Axiological vs. Dialogical Politics in Contemporary Europe.

**M. Strezhneva.** Participation of the European Union in Political Management of Global Finance.

**Yu. Pivovarov.** On the “Sovietic” and the Ways of Its Overcoming (Second Article). What Is to Be Done?

**Ye. Shestopal.** Value Characteristics of the Russian Political Process and the Strategy of the Country’s Development.

**A. Sungurov.** Expert Community, Think Tanks and Power: Experience of Three Regions.

**A. Chirikova et al.** Power in a Small Russian Town: Configuration and Interaction of Major Local Actors.

**I. Busygina, I. Okunev.** Spatial Distribution of Power and Strategies of States or What and How Does Geopolitics Explain?

**I. Fomin.** Possibilities of the Analysis of Representations of State Formations in Political Discourse.

**Pan Dawei.** Which Country Is Easier to Deal With? Orientation of the Residents of Shanghai and St. Petersburg.

**V. Kolosov, A. Sebentsov.** Northern Caucasus in the Russian Geopolitical Discourse.

**I. Kargina.** Religion As an Adaptation Factor for Immigrants: Peculiarities of the US Case.

**A. Panov.** Dmitry Streltsov on Japan’s Modernization in the Globalization Epoch.

**L. Polyakov.** Decline of the Plebiscitary Democracy?

### **No. 3, 2014**

**M. Silantyeva.** New Principles of the “Philosophy of the Frontier” in the Global World: De-Sovereignization or “Post-Sovereignization?”

**A. Neklessa.** Getting over Eurasia (Goeconomic Essay).

**K. Ide.** Negotiations between the USSR/Russia and China on the Settlement of Border Issues.

**N. Simoniya.** New Strategic Factors in the Struggle for Russia’s Modernization.

**Yu. Oganisyan.** New Russia in a Changing World: Sociopolitical Aspect.

**V. Gutorov.** The Origin of the State: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Modern Interpretations.

**M. Ilyin.** “Flaky Pastry” of Politics: Orders, Regimes and Practices.

**L. Grinin, A. Korotayev.** Revolution vs. Democracy (Revolution and Counter-revolution in Egypt).

**A. Lukin.** Chauvinism or Chaos: Russia’s Vicious Choice.

## **GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO**

*(The State and Law)*

### **No. 2, 2014**

**I. Leksin.** Secession of Territorial Entities: Legal Risks and Protection Mechanisms.

- N. Dobrynin, A. Mitin.** The Discourse about the Issues of Efficiency of State Management in Russia.
- A. Gerasimov.** Legal Regulation of Melioration of Lands: Condition, Suggestions for Improvement.
- V. Luneyev.** The Problems of Combating Economic Crime.
- Ye. Ashmarina.** Law of Finance, Money Circulation, Credit, and Banking in the System of Economic Law.
- N. But.** Formation of Legal Policy in the Sphere of Protection of the Freedom of Economic Activity.
- A. Paul.** On the Issue of Budget Law Subject Matter.
- M. Konokhov.** Compulsory State Insurance of Life and Health of Military Personnel As the Institutional Component of Russia in the Format of a Legal, Democratic and Social State.
- S. Troitsky.** International Legal Forms of Cooperation of States in Counteraction to Terrorism.
- V. Lebed (Yefremova).** Legal Regime of Audiovisual and Musical Pieces in France.

### No. 3, 2014

- L. Nudnenko.** To the Question of the Notion and Subjects of Passive Electoral Law.
- A. Panov.** To the Question of Insignificance of Administrative Violations.
- G. Skachkova.** External Labor Migration in Russia: Problems and Perspectives of Legal Regulation.
- A. Zhavora.** The Approach to the Classification of Information Technology Services.
- S. Dubinkina.** Participation of Russia in International Law Regulation of Services Trade within the Customs Union, the Eurasian Economic Community and the Organization of Regional Integration.
- N. Yerpileva, I. Getman-Pavlova.** “Reversible (reverse) Codification” of International Private Law in Rumania.
- V. Savelyev.** Justice (*aequitas*) and Integrity (*bona fides*) in Roman Law, of the Classical Period.
- L. Lukyanchikova.** The Institution of Folk Appeals in Russia: Historical and Legal Aspects.

### No. 4, 2014

- A Roundtable of the Journal “State and Law”** Theoretical Legal Science at the Present Stage.
- N. Krotkova.** Roundtable Discussion of the Book *The General Theory of the State and Law. Academic Course/Resp.* Ed. by M. Marchenko. In 3 vols. Ed. 4-e, revised and augmented. M. Norma: INFRA-M, 2013, 576 p., 816 p., 720 p.

- M. Satolina.** Modern Development Tendencies of the Theory of Law.
- D. Avdeyev.** Balance of Powers of Highest State Authority Organs: The Principle of Separation or Distribution?
- Yu. Dmitriyev.** The Problems of Development of the Russian Constitutional Legal Science.
- I. Bachilo.** On the Inevitable Continuation of the Conversation about Public Services and More General Problems of Organization of State Governance (Concerning the Article I. Bartsits).
- S. Ivanova, V. Savelyev.** Protection of Private Property Rights Pursuant to Paragraph 1 of Article 302 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.
- A. Rarog.** A Prosecution of Errors Is a Duty of Legislator.
- R. Kalamkaryan.** The Involvement of the Russian Federation in the Process of Maintaining International Peace and Security.
- M. Palladina, N. Voronina.** The Origins of the Cooperative Theory, the Emergence of Cooperatives and Development of Cooperative Movement.

**VOPROSY EKONOMIKI**  
(*Problems of Economics*)

**No. 3, 2014**

- G. Idrisov, S. Sinelnikov-Murylev.** Forming Premises of Long-Run Growth: How to Understand Them?
- Yu. Ponomaryov et al.** Exchange Rate Dynamics and Its Effect on Prices in Russia.
- R. Kapelyushnikov.** Labor Productivity *versus* Labor Compensation: Some Simple Arithmetic.
- N. Pavlova, A. Shastitko.** Effects of Hostile Tradition in Antitrust: Active Repentance *versus* Cooperation Agreements?
- M. Shabanova.** Sociostructural Aspects of Socioeconomic Development: The Role of Economic Approach.
- Ye. Malkov.** General Equilibrium Theory in Soviet Economic Science: Bibliometric Analysis.
- O. Mironenko.** The Effects of Employment Protection Legislation on Personnel Policy of Enterprises: A Review of Theoretical Models and Empirical Results.

**No. 4, 2014**

- O. Berezinskaya, A. Vedev.** Investment Process in the Russian Economy: Its Potential and Activation Directions.
- V. Radayev.** Is It Possible to Maintain Russian Textile and Apparel Industry?
- T. Polidi.** Accumulated Deficiency of Housing Investments in Russia: Threats and Prospects.

- D. Lobodanova.** Development Strategies of Old Industrial Cities.  
**R. Menyashev.** Social Capital and the Demand for Regulation in Russia.  
**M. Levin, K. Matrosova.** Economic Models of Environment Monitoring under Imperfect Information and High Costs.  
**G. Kleynner.** The Rhythms of Evolutionary Economics.  
**V. Mayevsky, S. Malkov.** Perspectives of the Macroeconomic Reproduction Theory.

**No. 5, 2014**

- R. Haarstad, R. Selten.** Bounded-Rationality Models: Tasks to Become Intellectually Competitive.  
**V. Crawford.** Bounded Rationality *versus* Optimization-Based Models of Strategic Thinking and Learning in Games.  
**M. Rabin.** Incorporating Limited Rationality into Economic Science.  
**V. Yevstigneyev.** How FX Market Participants Construct Their Subjective Picture of the Future.  
**P. Zakharov.** Changes in the US Banking Sector Architecture As a Result of 2008-2009 Crisis.  
**V. Tambovtsev. I. Rozhdestvenskaya.** Higher Education Reform in Russia: International Experience and Economic Theory.  
**Ye. Basalayeva.** The Possibilities of High School to Make Profit: Managers', Accountants', and Financiers' Point of View.  
**A. Tatarkin et al.** Imperatives of Current Economic Development: World Trends and Russian Reality.  
**T. Kuznetsova.** Vladimir G. Wenger: Scientist and His Time (*The 115th Birth Anniversary*).

**SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (SOTSIS)**  
(*Sociological Studies*)

**No. 1, 2014**

- N. Tikhonova.** Poverty Phenomenon in Contemporary Russia.  
**Yu. Lezhnina.** Sociodemographic Specifics of Poverty in Russian Federation.  
**V. Voronov et al.** Assessing Dynamics of Interregional Differences (European Lessons).  
**B. Podgorny.** Private Investors of the Stock Market on Privatization.  
**S. Kutovaya.** Labor Employment and Self-Determination of the Population in the Jewish Autonomous Region.  
**V. Lukyanov.** A. Lunacharsky's Sociology of Music (Theoretical and Methodological Aspect).  
**L. Petrunina.** Two Faces of a Museum. "Night at the Museum" in the Tretyakov Gallery.

- T. Karakhanova.** Urban Dwellers' Free Time: Past and Present.
- A. Kolganov, A. Buzgalin.** Re-Industrialization As Nostalgia? Theoretical Discourse.
- M. Meerovich.** Housing Policy in the USSR As a Social Governance Method (1917-1941).
- S. Arzhomand.** What Has Happened to the "Comparative" in Comparative and Historical Sociology.
- Reply of **J. Mahoney.** Is the Comparative Sociology within the Framework of the Sections Marginal?
- Reply of **I. Wallerstein.** On the Comparison.
- L. Migliorati, L. Mori.** The Shadow of the Classical Heritage and Its Overcoming. Memory of Resistance Movement and Conflict Potential of Memorial Festivities.

### No. 2, 2014

- A. Yelsukov.** Stigmatization As a Means for Massification of Information.
- M. Sasaki.** Family Socialization and Experiences of Betrayal: A Cross-National Analysis of Trust.
- V. Zakharov et al.** Social Issues of Industrial Units' Transformation.
- A. Grudzinsky, O. Petrova.** Comparative Method for Diagnosing Organizational Culture of Innovative University.
- T. Svadbina et al.** Contemporary Slave-Trade Traffic: Causes, Results, Prevention.
- A. Romanov, S. Frolov.** Rural Development Seen by the Young.
- A. Parshakov.** Ukrainian Language Policies: Between Unitarism and Federalism.
- S. Kharchenko.** Interethnic Relations in Kazakhstan: Historical Heritage and Present-Day State.
- A. Śliz, M. Szczepanski.** Sociological Meaning of Multiculturalism: Is Poland Multicultural?
- A. Frank.** Pierre Bourdieu—The Master.
- A. Malinkin.** Critique of the Western Civilization Foundations in M. Scheler's Sociology.
- N. Golovin.** Sociology of N. Luhmann—A Stage in Development of the General Theory of Social Systems.
- S. Sushchy.** The Literary Community in Contemporary Russian City (the Case of Rostov-Don).
- M. Yelyutina, A. Ivakhnova.** Routine Practices of Using and Utilizing Things.

### No. 3, 2014

- O. Ivanov.** Sociological Explanation: Characteristics of Contemporary Practices.
- N. Zarubina.** Mutual respect in Everyday Life of Russians.

- M. Zafirovsky.** Outside of Rational Choice: Elements of “Traditional (Irrational) Choice Theory.”
- Ya. Nikiforov.** Specifics of N. Chernyshevsky’s Sociological Ideas.
- S. Kudrina.** Value-Related Bases of Emergence of Sociology.
- I. Tsvetkova.** Generational Variations in Patriotic Values Dynamics (the Case of Togliatti City).
- N. Korovitsyna.** Czechs’ Political Consciousness: Change and Stability.
- S. Ilyinykh.** Ideas about Family among Students in Minsk and Novosibirsk.
- N. Bukhalova.** Remarriages of Ageing People.
- V. Smirnov.** Youth Politics: A System Description.
- A. Zhelnina.** “*Polit-Tusovka*” (Political Party)—Alternative Public Space in Youth Politics Realm.
- R. Sharipova.** Self-Identification of Russian and Chinese Students.
- A. Balyshv et al.** Value Orientations of RFBR Experts: A Cognitive Mapping.
- B. Maksimov.** Sociology in Production Sphere: To Be or Not To Be (and How)?
- L. Zubanova.** Events Routine: Chronicle Descriptions of Eyewitnesses of Meteorite Fall in Chelyabinsk.
- A. Kolganov, A. Buzgalin.** Polemical Notes on Purposeful Accentuations in Alternative Socioeconomic Strategy.

## VOSTOK

(*Oriens*)

### No. 1, 2014

- S. Dmitriyev, S. Kuzmin.** The Qing Empire in China: An Anatomy of Historical Myth.
- I. Ladynin.** “Overseer of the *wab*-priests of Sokhmet” Somtutefnakht: A “Collaborationist” or a Victim of Deportation?
- K. Nikolskaya.** Blame of Theft in Ancient India: Some Notes on the Ties of Property and Proprietor.
- A. Krol.** Floating on Mercury in the Moonlight: “Birkat az-Zi’baq” in the Palace of Khumârawaih in al-Qaṭā’i’.
- R. Landa.** Islamism and the “Arab Political Spring.”
- A. Drugov.** Indonesia—the Experience of Transformation.
- R. Sabirov.** The Arrest of the Former President N. Enkhbayar and Atypical Democracy in Mongolia.
- L. Frangulyan.** Ancient Egyptian Rudiments in Coptic Literature.
- Ye. Frolova.** Some Aspects of Describing Language Situation in the Philippines.  
*Discussion:* “Civilizations of the 21st Century: Problems and Perspectives of Development” (the End)
- A. Akimov, A. Yakovlev.** Civilization—A Useful Tool of Social Analysis.
- S. Vorobyova.** Medieval Turkish Ashik Poetry: Practice of Composing and Performance.
- K. Klipka.** Chinese Reconnoitering in the Tomsk Guberniya.

**A. Kirillova.** Several Problems Concerning Finding Equivalents on Topic-Comment Basis in the Sphere of Literary Translation from Japanese into Russian.

**VOPROSY LITERATURY**  
(Problems of Literature)

**No. 1 (January-February), 2014**

**V. Amursky.** “We Were Dying Without Getting Old...” *The Poet V. Korvin-Piotrovsky (1891-1966) against the Background and Being Tortured between the Millstones of His Time.*

**V. Kozlov.** Conflicting Poetics: The One of “Recognition” and The One of “Wandering Words.” *On the Poetical Books of Oleg Dozmorov and Grigory Petukhov.*

**N. Reznichenko.** “Solid Ball in the Blood, Full of Light and Wonder.” *Catalogue of Wonderful Tanks in Poetry of Arseny Tarkovsky.*

**Ye. Shragovits.** New Physics As a Source of Images in O. Mandelshtam’s Cycle *Octave.*

**L. Panova.** A Talk about the Wind: Khlebnikov in Mandelshtam’s Octave “Tell Me, a Draftsman of the Desert...”

**Ye. Abdullayev.** “Make Our Metaphysical Language...” *The History of One of the Pushkin’s Term in the Context of the Literary and Philosophical Discussions of the 1820s.*

**M. Kiselyova.** The Doubles in the Novels of Dostoyevsky and Musil As a Symbol of the Epoch of Decay.

**F. Makarichev.** “Just Like a Comet, Injudicious, Amidst the Planets, Calculated.

**A. Babuk.** “The Myth of Childhood” As the Embodiment of the “Golden Age” in the Works of Dostoyevsky.

**A. Razumov.** The Mystery of Money of Dmitry Karamazov.

**Ye. Ivanova.** The Memoirs of A. Khrabrovitsky: “the Axe in the Hands of Fate.” Once Again about Research Correctness.

**L. Bepalova.** Memories of the Poet Vladimir Kornilov.

**M. Bazanov.** On the History of Discussions in Soviet Science. *Discussion of the Monograph by A. Zimin, “The Word about Igor’s Regiment” (May 4-6, 1964).*

**No. 2 (March-April), 2014**

**I. Vinokurova.** “Here in America I Met the People to Speak of Them Is Not Time Yet...” *Nina Berberova and Robert Oppenheimer.*

**M. Mikheyev.** Platonov and Shalamov: Stylistic Similarities, Existential Differences.

**I. Krizhanovsky.** Mikhail Menshikov and Maksim Gorky: An Indirect Dialogue.

- M. Zolotonosov.** “What the Party Considers to Be the Truth, Is the Truth Indeed.” An Unknown Letter of M. Gorky to S. Kirov.
- V. Kryuchkov.** B. Pilnyak’s Story the *Third Capital* As “the Most Serious and the Most Humorous Thing.”
- Ye. Papkova.** Vsevolod Ivanov’s Siberia.
- N. Zhuravlyova.** “Literary Fun” of Ural Writers in the 1930s.
- V. Polonsky.** Background and Experiences of Symbolist Events Decryption. *Historiosophy of the Slavs in Russian Journalism of the Period of the First World War.*
- K. Barsht.** Echoes of A. Bergson’s Philosophy in Articles of Vyach. Ivanov on F. Dostoyevsky’s Work.
- Ye. Shcheglova.** The Context of the Story.
- O. Kudrin.** A Poet of an Epoch of Poetic Journalism, the Writer of the Era of Fast-Fiction. *On Dmitry Bykov.*
- S. Cherednichenko.** A Collector. *Mikhail Shishkin.*
- I. Belobrovtsheva.** Writing As a Permanent “Stage of Mirror.” *Andrey Ivanov.*
- M. Kuzicheva.** Pushkin and Mozart: Kinship of Poetics.
- S. Korolyova.** “Enlightened Understanding” As a Reward. *Russia in the English Spy Novel of the 20th Century.*
- M. Kharitonov.** Rereading Herman Hesse.
- A. Grigoryan.** Decline of Romanticism: Hesse and Novalis.

**VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA**  
*(Problems of Linguistics)*

**No. 1, 2014**

- Yu. Lander** (Moscow). Typology of Unmarked Clausal Subordination: Relative Constructions.
- J. Schaeken, E. Fortuin, S. Dekker** (Leiden). Epistolary Deixis in Novgorod Birch Bark Letters.
- L. Leisiö** (Tampere). Nominal TAM in Nganasan and Other Northern Samoyedic Languages.
- Ye. Rudnitskaya** (Moscow). The Internal Structure of a Numeral Construction with a Classifier in Korean.
- F. Yeloyeva, Ye. Pereksvalskaya** (St. Petersburg), **Ē. Sausverde** (Vilnius). The Metaphor and the Heuristic Function of Language (Is a Language without Metaphor Possible?).

**No. 2, 2014**

- V. Apresyan** (Moscow). Control and Negation: Semantic Interaction.
- I. Itkin** (Moscow). A Few Remarks on the Imperfect Forms in Tocharian A.

**V. Ivanov** (Moscow). Towards the Classification of Nominal Forms in South-Western Iranian Languages.

**Ye. Šestera** (Novosibirsk). Teleut: Intonation of Declarative and Interrogative Utterances.

**T. Dubrovskaya** (Penza). The Discourse of Court As a Cultural Phenomenon: National Cultural Features in the Speech of Judges (Casw Studies of Court Sessions in Russia, England, and Australia).

**Ye. Berezovich** (Yekaterinburg). Modern Challenges of the Semantic and Motivational Reconstruction of Folk Toponymy.

## Voprosy literaturey (1957 to present) [Issues of Literature] Online

East View has launched a full-scale digitization project to convert the influential, authoritative Russian journal of literary criticism and literature studies: Voprosy literaturey.

Founded after the death and denunciation of Joseph Stalin's rule and the "thaw" in USSR cultural life, the literary energy of Voprosy literaturey continues to this day.

Famous for publishing selections from Russian writers prohibited during the Soviet period, it enjoys much-deserved popularity among Russian intelligentsia. The journal presents articles and round table discussions devoted to the multifaceted issues of development of Russian and world literature. Voprosy literaturey includes previously classified documents from archives and translations from foreign luminaries and major figures of the past.

Voprosy literaturey is a must-read for all researchers interested in Russian literary history – from the past and the present.



10601 Wiyata Blvd.,  
Minneapolis, MN 55305, USA ☎  
Phone: (952) 252-1201  
Toll-free: (800) 477-1005  
Fax: (952) 252-1202  
[www.eastview.com](http://www.eastview.com)

Российская Академия Наук \* Академиздатцентр "Наука"

**Заявка на подписку  
на журнал "Общественные науки"  
на английском языке — "Social Sciences"**

с доставкой по почте через ООО "ИВИС",  
официального распространителя  
East View Information Services, Inc. в Москве,  
на 2014 год

Ф.И.О. (полностью) \_\_\_\_\_

Полный почтовый адрес: \_\_\_\_\_

телефон: \_\_\_\_\_ e-mail: \_\_\_\_\_

Индекс	Наименование журнала	Периодичность на 2014 г.	Кол-во комп- лектов	Итого сумма в рублях
70664	Общественные науки (англ.)	4	1	18.968

Заполните заявку и отправьте письмом в ООО "ИВИС" по адресу: 113149, Москва, Азовская ул. 6/3, или по факсу (495) 318-0881. Информацию о ценах можно узнать в Отделе периодики по телефону: (495) 777-6557.

**ВНИМАНИЕ:** Оплата заказа производится через отделение банка или почтовым переводом только после получения подписчиком счета с банковскими реквизитами от ООО "ИВИС" — официального распространителя изданий Академиздатцентра "Наука".

Претензии по доставке направляйте ООО "ИВИС" по адресу:  
113149, Москва, Азовская ул. 6/3, тел. (495) 777-6557, факс (495) 318-0881.