

This article was downloaded by: [217.197.14.34]

On: 21 October 2013, At: 06:53

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Defense & Security Analysis

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdan20>

Russian military reform: institutional, political and security implications

Andrei Makarychev^a & Alexander Sergunin^b

^a Center for EU-Russia Studies, University of Tartu, Lossi 36-327, 51003, Tartu, Estonia

^b St. Petersburg State University and Higher School of Economics, 7-9, Universitetskaya nab, St. Petersburg 193034, Russia

Published online: 18 Oct 2013.

To cite this article: Andrei Makarychev & Alexander Sergunin , Defense & Security Analysis (2013): Russian military reform: institutional, political and security implications, Defense & Security Analysis, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2013.842711

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2013.842711>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

Russian military reform: institutional, political and security implications

Andrei Makarychev^a and Alexander Sergunin^{b*}

^aCenter for EU-Russia Studies, University of Tartu, Lossi 36-327, 51003, Tartu, Estonia; ^bSt. Petersburg State University and Higher School of Economics, 7-9, Universitetskaya nab, St. Petersburg 193034, Russia

This critical comment examines the incentives, major priorities, difficulties and first results of the Russian military reform that is being implemented since 2008. The authors conclude that despite numerous drawbacks and barriers to the reformist efforts certain successes can be identified. Particularly, there is a clear shift from the old-fashioned, Soviet-type army to a more compact, mobile, better equipped and combat-ready armed forces that are capable to cope with today's challenges to Russian national security.

Keywords: Russia; military reform; armed forces; defense industrial complex

Introduction

The Russian military reform is a contentious issue in research literature. Some scholars believe that Moscow has failed to reform both the armed forces and its defense industrial complex (DIC) to make them more efficient and adequate to the challenges of the post-Cold war era.¹ Others tend to consider the ex-Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov's reforms as a "step in a positive direction"² or even as a success story³ (although with some deficiencies such as rampant corruption in the Russian military structures, which finally caused Serdyukov's resignation). One group of experts ascertains that there was a significant progress in developing a Western-like type of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia;⁴ while others deny this and argue that all changes were of a purely cosmetic nature.⁵ Some analysts believe that the Russian defense sector is doomed to the oscillation between "restoring something like the Soviet mobilization system" and "throwing further subsidies at an already hopeless sector."⁶ There are few works that try to provide a balanced perspective on the Russian military reform.⁷

Being aware of the variety of these views, the authors would like to develop some arguments and challenge others. The main objective of this comment is to examine how deeply the ongoing military reform affected the army, DIC and society and whether it has really transformed Russian military-political institutions in terms of making them both democratic and efficient.

Sources of Russian military reform

The authors agree with those analysts who believe that the ongoing Russian military reform is generated – among other factors – by the radical change of Moscow's threat perception and abandonment of the Soviet-type global ambitions.⁸ The Russian national security and military doctrines now define both national interests and security threats in a quite realistic way.⁹ They are

*Corresponding author. Email: sergunin60@mail.ru

based on the assumption that there are no major external threats to Russia's security and that internal sources of threats should be given more attention. Logically, Russian security concerns have shifted from the "hard" to "soft" security domain.¹⁰ It is understandable that this change in the Russian threat perceptions has inevitably entailed the need for a more compact and mobile army to be better designed for fighting local and regional rather than large-scale wars.

However, the authors disagree with the point that Russia's future strategic role will be reduced to a purely regional one and that Moscow will be mostly concentrated on countering the so-called southern threats (separatism in Northern Caucasus, "revisionist" Georgia, Islamic extremism in Central Asia, etc.).¹¹ Russia cannot be only a "normal" regional power because it possesses a huge nuclear arsenal, it is engaged in a dialog with the USA, NATO, and EU on global issues such as arms control, local conflict management and resolution (including peace-keeping operations in various parts of the world), fighting international terrorism, organized crime, and piracy, as well as developing a rather aggressive arms export policy around the globe. For this reason, the future Russian armed forces are expected to cope with both regional (not only "southern" but also Western/NATO) and global threats but in a non-aggressive (defensive) manner (how many experts rightly put it).

Economic considerations were the second main factor to launch the Russian military reform. In economic terms, Russia nowadays cannot afford having an oversized military machine inherited from the Soviet time. The need to adjust the armed forces to the Russian economic capabilities was realized even in the Yeltsin time, and became a *leitmotif* of all the reformist efforts made by Moscow in the military sector over the last 15 to 20 years.

One more factor that caused the military reform was a low combat-readiness of the Russian armed forces. According to some accounts, less than 13% of the total number of units were combat-ready. In the Army, this figure was 17%: despite the existence of a total of 203 ground divisions, it was estimated that only 90,000 troops were actually combat effective.¹² In the Air Force, it was no more than 7% of units (and none in the Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops) were combat-ready. The Navy had more or less satisfactory performance (70%). Only the Strategic Missile Forces and the Airborne Forces were 100% ready for combat operations.¹³

The Russian armed forces were poorly equipped with modern weaponry. In 1992–2008, there were no significant arms acquisitions for the general-purpose forces. According to some estimates, 60–70% of the Russian tanks and armored vehicles broke down over the course of the South Ossetian conflict of 2008.¹⁴ Prior to the reform, the Air Force was also in a difficult situation, where up to 55% of the total military equipment was out of commission.¹⁵ To effectively fight even in local conflicts such as Chechnya or South Ossetia, the Russian military badly needed more sophisticated and technologically advanced weapons. The combination of low combat-readiness and the lack of modern weaponry resulted in a poor performance of the Russian Army in both the Chechen wars and the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008.¹⁶

The dire demographic situation in Russia created a huge manning problem for the Russian Army and necessitated the reform as well. According to demographic experts, Russia has entered the so-called demographic valley – the consequence of a sharp decline in the birth-rate during the crisis years of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The number of conscripts during this period can fall to 300,000 per year. This can make impossible to maintain even a one million-strength Army which is indicated by Russian strategists as an optimal one. In practical terms, it means that the ratio between the conscripts and contract soldiers should be changed very quickly in favor of the latter, much quicker than it was initially planned.

The above-mentioned factors made a long-delayed Russian military reform essential for the Medvedev-Russian tandem by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Russian military reform: main landmarks

The authors are in agreement with those experts who believe that under Anatoly Serdyukov, the first really civilian Defense Minister, the Russian armed forces had undergone the most serious structural changes in the post-Soviet era.¹⁷ At the same time, they would like to define more precisely the Serdyukov military reform’s objectives. In contrast to the Yeltsin (and partially Putin-1) administrations who tried simply to downsize the huge Soviet-born military monster, the current Russian leadership (starting from the Medvedev and continued by the Putin-2 teams) intends to create a principally new army. The Kremlin aims at making the armed forces adequate to, on the one hand, the nature of domestic and external threats to Russia’s military security and, on the other, Russia’s economic, technical, demographic, and intellectual capabilities. The priority is to develop the armed forces and other services designed to deter aggression, as well as mobile elements, which can be quickly delivered and deployed in the required area(s) and carry out mobile operations in any region where the security of Russia might be threatened. The core idea of the Russian military reform is the transformation of the Armed Forces from a conventional mobilization army to a permanently combat-ready force.

In structural terms, the Russian military reform has the following priorities.

Force reduction

The armed forces were reduced from 1.2 in 2008 (when the reform started) to 1 million by 2012. Originally it was decided to have one million troops by 2016, but Serdyukov proposed to implement this plan ahead of schedule. The most painful reductions concern the officer corps that was reduced by 185,000 by 2012. Some officer positions such as ensigns (Army) and warrant officers (Navy) were, in fact, abolished. Part of these military positions will be replaced by civilian positions – physicians, journalists, lawyers, and others. Another part ought to be substituted with sergeants. The ratio between senior and junior officers’ positions will also be changed in favor of the latter (see Table 1). Serious reductions were planned in the central apparatus of the armed forces – from 22,000 to 8500 positions. It also concerns the General Staff departments to be reduced by half.

Some of these hasty decisions were overturned. For example, according to some accounts, even under Serdyukov, 70,000 officers were returned back to the military service to make the army more manageable.¹⁸

Table 1. Planned reductions of the military personnel, 2008–2012.

Category	01.09.2008	Reduction by 2012	Change (%)
General	1107	866	-22
Colonel	15,365	3114	-80
Lieutenant-Colonel	19,300	7500	-61
Major	99,550	30,000	-70
Captain	90,000	40,000	-56
First Lieutenant	30,000	35,000	+17
Lieutenant	20,000	26,000	+30
Total, officers	365,000	142,000	-61
Ensign (Army)	90,000	0	-100
Warrant Officer (Navy)	50,000	0	-100

Notes: Reorganization of the land forces (Army) by: (a) abolishing the old military structures such as armies, divisions, and regiments; (b) replacing them by brigades; (c) eliminating the non-combat (“cadre-strength”) units with a minimal/reduced manpower, and (d) making all army units “troops of permanent readiness” (combat units).

Downloaded by [217.197.14.34] at 06:53 21 October 2013

Military-administrative reform

The central command bodies of the three armed services (Army, Air Force, and Navy) have been reorganized and streamlined. Six military districts (Moscow, Leningrad, Volga-Urals, Northern Caucasus, Siberian, and Far Eastern) shrank to four (similar to the NATO/US strategic commands) – Western, Eastern, Southern, and Central. According to the current Russian military thinking, these four commands should correspond to the major strategic areas that could be potential theaters of military operations.

Complicated four-echelon management system

The military district-army-division-regiment, that was inherited from the Soviet period was replaced by a three-echelon system (military district (strategic command)-operative command-brigade). The new management system was again borrowed from the NATO/US experience.

This structural reform has inevitably entailed the reduction of the general number of units in the Russian armed forces (see [Table 2](#)).

- Similar reorganization of the Air Force by replacing armies, corps, divisions, and regiments by air force bases and Air Defense Force brigades.
- Reorganization of the Army Reserve, including its training system.

Reform of the military education system

Sixty-five military higher education institutions that existed by 2008 (15 military academies, four military universities, 46 military schools and military institutes) were merged into 10 military academies and universities, with a renovated system of training and research centers to be created. The new centers will be established on a territorial basis rather than on the service principle.

Expanding civilian control over the armed forces

Under Serdyukov, only 2 of 10 deputy ministers were on the active military service, other deputies had a civilian background. Moreover, the civilian component of the supply and logistic system of the armed forces (the so-called out-sourcing system) was strengthened.

Development of the social dimensions of the armed forces

The Kremlin promised to take care of housing for active duty and retired servicemen. According to the then prime minister Putin, about 130,000 officers (and their families) still had problems with housing by the end of 2011. In early November 2011 (just one month before the parliamentary

Table 2. The number of military units in the Russian armed forces.

Military service	2008	2012	Change (%)
Land Forces	1890	172	-90
Air Force	340	180	-48
Navy	240	123	-49
Strategic Rocket Forces	12	8	-33
Space Forces	7	6	-15
Airborne Forces	6	5	-17

elections) the then President Medvedev signed a law to increase salaries for servicemen by two to three times and military pensions by 50%. It was promised to make the military service for conscripts “more humane,” including permission to use cell phones, introduction of the five-day work week, expansion of contacts with civil society institutions, etc. The military doctrine of 2010 called for “boosting the prestige of military service” and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) launched some programs to better prepare potential conscripts for military service.

The Army still has a bad reputation within the society. The MoD failed in its attempts to make conscription attractive for youngsters, whose parents prefer to pay bribes rather than send their children to the military service. Legislative proposals of some members of the ruling United Russia party to introduce military service to female citizens who did not give birth to a child at the age under 20 certainly do not enhance the public image of the Russian armed forces.

Rearming the Russian military

The Serdyukov reform paid much more attention to the economic aspects of the military reform than their predecessors. The Russian military-political leadership recognized that without a solid economic basis the Russian armed forces would be unable to successfully complete the modernization process and ensure its sustainable development in the foreseeable future.¹⁹

More specifically, the military-economic strategy has focused on four main priorities:

- equipping the Army with modern weapons;
- maintaining and developing material/resource basis of the armed services;
- reinvigorating the DIC, and
- securing and expanding of the country’s mobilization capacities.

As far as the re-arming of the military with modern weaponry is concerned, the State Program of Armament for 2007–2015 (SPA-2015) was adopted by the Putin administration. The new program (for 2011–2020 – SPA-2020), worth 19 trillion rubles (\$613 billion), was issued by the Medvedev administration even before the completion of the previous one. In the course of the 2012 presidential campaign, Vladimir Putin told that Russia intends to spend some 23 trillion rubles to rearm the military over the next decade.²⁰ The SPA-2015 envisioned raising the number of modern weapons and equipment to 80–100% of the total by 2020. However, later (in SPA-2020) this figure was lowered to 70%.

Given the lack of financial and material resources, the Russian strategic planners aim at re-equipping, first of all, the most important components of the armed services – nuclear strategic forces, conventional rapid reaction forces, commandos (*spetznaz*), and anti-terrorist units. The following priorities were set up:

- to create multifunctional (multirole) weapon systems;
- to develop new models of high-precision weapon systems;
- to enhance information warfare capabilities;
- to improve the quality of information communication systems on the basis of the up-to-date technologies; and
- to upgrade C³ (command, control, communications) systems at the strategic, operational-strategic, operational, operational-tactical, and tactical levels.

In 2009–2011, the governmental arms procurement program faced a serious crisis and was in fact stalled because of either the inability of the Russian defense industry to produce modern weaponry (due to the lack of the skilled labor force and modern technologies) or the MoD’s

unwillingness to buy outdated armaments. For example, the MoD decided to buy the French *Mistral* because it was unsatisfied with a too high price that the Russian DIC offered for the building of a new helicopter carrier. As a result of the “price conflict” between the MoD and the DIC, the state arms procurement orders were not fully implemented in 2009–2011. This triggered political rifts between Defense Minister Anatoly Sergiukov and such top-level officials as Vice Premier Dmitry Rogozin, First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Ivanov, and the Head of “Rosoboronexport” company, Sergey Chemezov.

The inability of the Russian DIC to equip the armed forces with modern and reliable weaponry at a reasonable price urged the need for its long-delayed reform. However, the reformist programs suggested by the Medvedev and Putin-2 administrations were ambiguous. On the one hand, the Kremlin aimed at modernization of the DIC on the basis of the principle of self-reliance, i.e. new weaponry should be developed with the use of home-born technologies and assembly parts. On the other hand, the Russian government encourages the DIC to develop military-technical cooperation with foreign partners that are ahead of Russia in military R&D. For example, Russia plans not only to buy *Mistrals*, but also to continue acquisitions of Israeli drones, French avionics for the Su aircraft, foreign-made guns for the *spetznaz*, and some Western electronic components to modernize T-90 tanks.

The Kremlin pledged for financially supporting the DIC. According to the SPA-2015, the state ought to fund 80% project costs, while a defense industrial company’s share must be only 20%. However, under the SPA-2020, the ratio has been changed from 80:20 to 60:40, which put most of the DIC enterprises in a rather difficult situation. In addition, there are numerous delays (from the MoD side) both in signing contracts with companies and money transfers to them, which created additional hindrances to a successful implementation of projects. In mid-December 2011, Serdyukov had to replace its deputy who was in charge of the state defense order, anticipating speeding up the signing of contracts with arms producers and fight corruption in the procurement mechanism.

Criticism of the Russian military reform

The reformist efforts of Serdyukov’s team were heavily criticized – publicly by the political opposition, and tacitly within the government itself, included the armed forces. However, the opponents of the reform are non-monolithic and should be differentiated by their ideology and motivation.

The Communists (Gennady Ziuganov) and Nationalists (Leonid Ivashov) blamed the Serdyukov policies for the lack of professionalism, which, in their eyes, was conducive to destroying the armed forces by the “ill-advised” and “chaotic” reform. They found the “business-like” or “commercial” approach unacceptable, and undermining the traditions of military education and training.

The liberals were discontent with the organization of the civilian control over the military. They pointed out that civilians were brought only to the top of the military managerial hierarchy, while the rest of the personnel were recruited from the professional military. Under the new Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, the ratio between civilian and military top managers has again shifted in favor of the latter (7 of 10 Deputies of the Defense Ministry are either active or retired military and security officers).²¹ The liberals also believed that the level of the Defense Ministry’s cooperation with civil society institutions was insufficient. Moreover, they stressed that the increase in the military’s salaries was a purely populist measure undertaken by the Medvedev–Putin tandem on the eve of the parliamentary and presidential elections. Alexei Kudrin, the liberal-minded Finance Minister, has even resigned in a protest against the substantial increase in military spending (amidst the global economic crisis).

The transformation from divisions (that were the key element of the Soviet/Russian armed forces) to brigades is also a subject of heavy critique from many Russian military analysts. This group of experts believes that this transition will dramatically weaken the armed forces and make it impossible to wage a large-scale war against a “strong enemy.” As a result, Russia will be able to fight only in limited military conflicts, like the “five-day war” with Georgia in August 2008. Moreover, as these experts underline, in the long term such a transformation will negatively affect Russian generals’ professionalism, because only after having the experience as a division commander can a general obtain real operational and strategic skill.

The Serdyukov team was also strongly lambasted for its reform of the Russian *spetznaz* (special forces – commandos). By the Defense Minister’s decree, the *spetznaz* was transferred from the General Staff’s Main Directorate of Intelligence Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye to the Army (land forces) and a number of the *spetznaz* brigades were cut from nine to six. The Russian military experts deem that these changes have negatively affected *spetznaz*’s military preparedness and – in more general terms – Russia’s defense capabilities because these elite troops became an instrument of only one of the services (Army) with quite short-sighted interests and vision rather than an efficient tool of the armed forces on the whole.

Serdyukov’s emphasis on arms import instead of buying home-produced weaponry has been a subject of severe criticism from the Russian DIC. As a reaction to this criticism Shoigu decided to stop further acquisition of French *Mistrals* and Italian *Iveco* armed vehicles, the most odious Serdyukov’s arms import projects.²² It was proclaimed that the Russian DIC enterprises will get state orders to develop analogous weapon systems.

Within the government itself Serdyukov was often an object of displeasure. This, he famously – and in a rather tough way – reacted to the then President Medvedev to fire someone who would be found responsible for procrastination with the new scheme of financing military cantonments. Serdyukov’s phrase “You better fire me” was widely interpreted as hinting to Medvedev’s lack of resources to change Defense Minister without Vladimir Putin’s consent. However, personal loyalty to Vladimir Putin did not indulge Serdyukov in November 2012 when he lost his job.

Political repercussions

The unexpected resignation of Anatoly Serdyukov, one of the closest confidants of President Putin since early 2000s, not only revealed all of the fragility of the Russian military. It was also widely considered as an indication of major crisis in Russian government at large. The symptoms of crisis are multiple.

Most important is that this was the first case of a rather scandalous dismissal of a high-ranking official on corruption grounds that were impossible to hide. Evidently, Serdyukov could have been replaced more routinely, with a regular reshuffle of the government as soon as Medvedev took over the post of prime minister half a year earlier. The very fact that Putin took this decision abruptly betrays both his disbelief in the most loyal elites, and the growing costs for visible instability within the ruling group.

The Serdyukov affair is one of those situations in which Putin had to find a delicate balance between two imperfect options. On the one hand, he had to implicitly to meet demands of a group of influential people (Dmitry Rogozin, Igor Sechin and Igor Ivanov) who were unhappy with Serdyukov’s reforms and were lobbying against him. On the other hand, Putin himself was eager to publicly show that in his third presidential term no one is immune at the very top of the power vertical. In both cases, Putin’s reputational losses outweighed possible gains: most of the comments either described his administrative power as gradually weakening due to pressure from influential groups, or alluded to the growing feelings of insecurity within the ruling clan, which can probably prompt elite’s eventual consolidation around a different leader.

Public disclosure of the scale of corruption within the Defense Ministry was undoubtedly a huge blow against Putin's reputation as the Commander-in-Chief. In fact, Putin had to implicitly acknowledge that critics of Serdyukov were right. In the meantime, Putin's indirect sympathies to the already ousted ex-Minister of Defense only underscored the ambiguity of the middle-of-the-road position taken by the President. As a result, not many experts believe that a full-fledged investigation against Serdyukov's role in *Oboronservis* and his other wrongdoings will be sanctioned by the Kremlin.

The appointment of Sergey Shoigu, who less than a year ago was fired from the Ministry of Emergency Situations and then placed to govern the Moscow oblast, only sustains the arguments of the many critics of the Putin regime. In fact, the removal of Shoigu from his previous job, which he started only six months ago, testifies to the lack of reliable professional cadres among in Putin's associates.

Conclusions

The vicissitudes of Russian military reform clearly demonstrate the failure of the Putin regime to put in practice a workable system of governance able to properly reform the army. Obstacles to this are multiple. Four of them seem to be of primordial significance.

The first hindrance is the constant power struggle inside the government, with different power brokers clashing with each other for money and influence. In fact, Serdyukov as Defense Minister was engaged in endless conflicts with other high-ranking officials – former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, former President Dmitry Medvedev, vice premier Dmitry Rogozin, the then governor of the Moscow oblast (and Serdyukov's successor) Sergey Shoigu, etc. This perpetual conflict – an over-pricing mechanism in the defense sector, the transfer of non-military assets to civilian agencies, etc. – betrays the lack of efficient governance system, which is exacerbated by a clan-like structure of the Russian government in general and its military-related sectors in particular.

The second obstacle is the systemic corruption that permeates all spheres of the army – from conscription to procurement of armaments. Secrecy and lack of transparency undoubtedly makes corruption in the military endemic, as exemplified by the ongoing trial against the *Oboronservis*, which prompted Serdyukov's resignation.

Third, the lack of sufficient number of high-level professionals and managers in the defense sector is another huge problem. Old cadres are gradually out of their jobs, while the military enterprises failed to create sufficient material and other incentives for a young generation of technical specialists.

A fourth – and related – unresolved issue is the state of Russian defense industry that faces difficulties in producing high-quality military equipment for a reasonable price. It is likely that Russia will face the perspective of purchasing some weaponry abroad, which will certainly unleash displeasure from Russian DIC.

The new Defense Minister has already decried Serdyukov's legacy in the Defense Ministry. With the decreasing efficiency and growing legitimacy problems of the Putin regime, this may signify a new turn in the power struggle within the elite, with Sergey Shoigu as one of key players. At the same time, Shoigu has no intention (and permission from the highest political authority) to stop fully the Russian military reform. As some experts believe, his efforts will likely be concentrated on stopping some most odious Serdyukov's projects (such as massive arms import programs or radical cuts in the officer corps and military higher education system) rather than on a complete reverse of the main reformist achievements.²³ Regardless the above obstacles Russia will keep going toward an army of a "new type."

Notes

1. Vladimir Baranets, 'Reforma Armii po-Serdyukovski: Peredelka Vmesto Perekraski' (Army Reform According to Serdyukov: Remaking Instead of Repainting), *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, February 16, 2010 (in Russian), <http://www.kp.ru/daily/24442/607873/> (accessed September 28, 2013); Stephen Blank, 'Russia's Geo-economic Future; The Security Implications of Russia's Political and Economic Structure', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 24, no. 3 (2011): 351–95; C.V. Pallin, *Russian Military Reform: A Failed Exercise in Defense Decision Making* (New York: Routledge, 2009).
2. G.P. Lannon, 'Russia's New Look Army Reforms and Russian Foreign Policy', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 24, no. 1 (2011): 26–54.
3. C.K. Bartles, 'Defense Reforms of Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 24, no. 1 (2011): 55–80; Dmitry Gorenburg, 'Is Shoigu Reversing Serdyukov's Military Reform?', Valdai International Discussion Club's website, February 12, 2013, <http://valdaiclub.com/blog/DGorenburg/> (accessed April 12, 2013); D.R. Herspring and R.N. McDermott, 'Serdyukov Promotes Systemic Russian Military Reform', *Orbis* 54, no. 2 (2010): 298–305.
4. Lannon, 'Russia's New Look Army'.
5. Blank, 'Russia's Geo-economic Future', 387; Zoltan Barany, 'Civil-Military Relations and Institutional Decay: Explaining Russian Military Politics', *Europe-Asian Studies* 60, no. 4 (2008): 581–604; Andrei Illarionov, 'The *Siloviki* in Charge', *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 2 (2009): 69–72.
6. Blank, 'Russia's Geo-economic Future', 383.
7. Mikhail Barabanov (Ed.), *Russia's New Army* (Moscow: Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2011); Mikhail Barabanov, Konstantin Makienko and Ruslan Pukhov, *Military Reform: Toward a New Look on the Russian Army* (Moscow: The Valdai Discussion Club, 2012), http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/Military_reform_eng.pdf (accessed April 12, 2013); R.N. McDermott, *The Reform of Russia's Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges and Policy Implications* (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2011); Alexander Sergunin, 'On the Russian Military Reform: A Rejoinder', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 25, no. 2 (2012): 251–6.
8. Barabanov, Makienko, and Pukhov, *Military Reform*, 9–11; Lannon, 'Russia's New Look Army'.
9. *Strategia Natsionalnoi Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda* (National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020), <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html> (accessed January 15, 2013); Dmitry Medvedev, *Voennaya Doctrina Rossiyskoi Federatsii* (The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), 2010, http://президент.рф/ref_notes/461 (accessed January 15, 2013).
10. Alexander Sergunin, 'International Relations Discussions in Post-Communist Russia', *Communism and Post-Communism Studies* 37 (2004): 19–35.
11. Lannon, 'Russia's New Look Army', 29–30, 32, 50–2.
12. R. Thornton, *Military Modernization and the Russian Ground Forces* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 14–15, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1071> (accessed April 14, 2013).
13. Barabanov, Makienko, Pukhov, *Military Reform*, 5.
14. Ariel Cohen and R.E. Hamilton, *The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 34, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1069> (accessed April 2013).
15. Barabanov, Makienko, Pukhov, *Military Reform*, 5.
16. Cohen and Hamilton, *Russian Military*.
17. Barabanov, Makienko, Pukhov, *Military Reform*, 9–11; Gorenburg, 'Is Shoigu Reversing Serdyukov's Military Reform?'; Lannon, 'Russia's New Look Army'.
18. Maria Tsybul'skaya and Alexei Arbatov, Shoigu budet ispravlyat' oshibki Serdyukova (Shoigu will correct Serdyukov's mistakes), November 14, 2012, <http://www.carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=50051>.
19. Vladimir Putin, 'Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia', *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, February 20, 2012, <http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html>.
20. Ibid.
21. Russian Ministry of Defense' website, <http://structure.mil.ru/management/deputy.htm> (accessed April 17, 2013).
22. Ivan Safronov and Yelena Kiseleva, Shoigu Otkazalsya ot Planov Serdyukova po Zakupke Bronevikov Iveco (Shoigu Cancelled Serdyukov's Plans on the Iveco Armed Vehicles Acquisitions), *Kommersant*, January 24, 2013, <http://news.mail.ru/politics/11718770> (accessed January 24, 2013).
23. Gorenburg, 'Is Shoigu Reversing Serdyukov's Military Reform?'