TRUST IN SOCIETY, BUSINESS AND ORGANIZATION

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(October 30–31, 2013, Moscow)

Editors

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THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS

PARENTAL SOCIALIZATION AND EXPERIENCES OF BETRAYAL: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF TRUST

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Numerous trust scholars have pointed out that what is considered trust in one culture may not be so in another and by the same token, what is considered trustworthy in one culture may be considered untrustworthy in another (cf. Dietz, Gillespie & Chao, 2010). Dietz, Gillespie and Chao (2010, p. 23) emphasize that empirical work and consequent theoretical models are sorely needed to attempt to bridge cross-cultural gaps in understanding the dynamics of social trust (also cf. Barber, 1983; Luhmann, 1980). Since then, a number of cross-national studies of trust have been carried out (e. g., Delhey & Newton, 2003; Paxton, 2007; Gheorghiu, Vignoles & Smith, 2009; Sasaki & Marsh, 2012).

The present study addresses the following: (a) how parental socialization on trust/distrust significantly impacts their children's trust/distrust when they become adults, (b) how varying levels of parents keeping promises to their children relates to parental socialization of trust/distrust in childhood, (c) how experiences of betrayal relate to trust in adulthood, and (d) whether experiences of betrayal more significantly impact trust/distrust in adulthood than does parental socialization on trust/distrust. We now turn to a brief discussion of previous work in these areas.

Parental Socialization

Recognizing the parental role in issues related to the socialization of trust arose from the early work of Erikson (1950/1963). Indeed, it can be said that "a conflict of basic trust versus basic mistrust emerges during infancy" (Rotenberg, 1995, p. 714). As Rotenberg further pointed out: "According to Erikson, if parents serve as reliable and nurturing caretakers, their infants will view the world as fair and dependable and therefore adopt a trusting orientation toward people" (1995, p. 714). And the converse of this is presumed to be true. Infants, with their utter dependence upon their caretakers, slowly gain a sense of confidence (or lack thereof) that they will be attended to in a timely and caring fashion. Thus infants come to trust the people (and by inference, the world)

1 The author would like to thank Tatsuzo Suzuki for his helpful comments on a previous draft of this article.

around them. They slowly gain expectations about their caretakers and the outside world. They begin to trust the people around them and by extension the world around them.

Of course, the opposite can be said for those infants not well cared for, and, again by extension, there is a range of caretaker environments which will yield degrees of infant trust (to distrust) of the people and the world around them. At the best end of this range, the infant gains trust, i. e. confidence in the continuing reliability of the infant's environment. The infant's caregivers hence become trustworthy; they become models of trusting behaviors which are imbued into the infant (or not in the case of faulty care-giving environments).

Early infant learning from parents about trust vs mistrust is recognized as a very important part of child development (cf. Barber, 1983; Baier, 1986; Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Rotenberg, 1991; Bernath & Feshbach, 1995; Newton 1997; Uslaner, 2002; Sztompka, 1999; Rotenberg et al., 2004; Bussey, 2010). As Jesuino (2008, p. 186) points out: "…from the very first beginning humans develop a sense of trust vs mistrust conveyed through socialization. Socialization practices, however, are not universal, but always socially and culturally embedded". Aside from the essential nature of parental influence on the socialization process, Merton (1968, p. 212, emphasis added) points out that "the child is exposed to *social prototypes* in the witnessed daily behavior and casual conversations of parents".

All this has been posed as a socialization hypothesis "that postulates, to a large extent, one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's pre-adult years" (Inglehart, 1985, p. 103; also cf. Abramson & Inglehart, 1995, p. 25). And here we must keep in mind that there is presumably some greater or lesser degree of societal and cultural variation in the parental socialization process.

As the infant matures, the development of trust broadens, as the child gains cognitive comprehension of ever more sophisticated nuances associated with the trust–distrust and trust–mistrust dimensions. And here we recognize a key element: balance. As Smetana (2010, p. 223) reminds us: in "Erikson's (1950/1963) developmental theory, developing an appropriate balance of trust vs mistrust in early childhood is one of the normative crises that must be resolved during the lifespan and is central to how later developmental crises, especially the development of identity in adolescence, is resolved".

During the socialization process, children, and adolescents, learn, for instance, about promises. Caregivers may, to a greater or lesser extent, actually begin to teach children explicitly about trust, mistrust, distrust, and trustworthiness (cf. Uslaner, 1999, 2000). All this, in turn, impacts the child's and adolescent's future views of other people.

Parental Promises

Promises kept naturally breed confidence in the trustworthiness and reliability of persons and situations in the future, which forms basic attitudes toward future expectations in general. Parental (or significant others') promises not kept will undermine a child's confidence in the future trustworthiness and reliability of other people and the surrounding world. With this unfolding comprehension of expectations comes emerging knowledge about value, something often seen as children begin to interact with peers. If a child lends something of value to a peer, will it be returned? If a child does something of value for a peer, will something of value be done in return? Is it reasonable, a child may learn, to expect *reciprocity* in such exchanges (i. e. promises kept versus promises not kept)? Do peers "play fair"? Are peers loyal to one another? All these ethical and

moral lessons about promises, too, contribute to the childhood development of socialization about trust (cf. Rotenberg, 2010; also cf. Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Mikulincer, 1998; Miller & Rempel, 2004).

In fact, there is a paucity of empirical research in the area of the socialization of trust as related to promises. Promises, with their inherent element of reciprocity, speak to the reliability of others, to the trustworthiness of others (cf. Bussey, 2010; Randall et al., 2010; Rotenberg, 2010). In a situation where promises are not kept (i. e. trust is *violated*), there is an inherent danger that the child will "withdraw from social contact and fail to attain or achieve, for example, social skills, social support, peer group relationships, close relationships, academic achievement…" (Rotenberg, 2010, p. 13). Such events suggest that the child also would tend to feel less inclined to keep his/her own promises and could feel a sense of betrayal. And promises in particular have a temporal quality in that the results of promises kept or not kept are typically grounded in one's history and directly impact one's future expectations.

Betrayal

Betrayal is the affective state brought on by trust violation. As Weber and Carter (2003, p. 80) put it:

"Trust creates the opportunity for violation. When we trust another, we inherently believe that we are not at risk; however, it is the orientation of selves that create risk, regardless of its acknowledgement by those same selves. At the most basic level, trust that leads to the self-devastation typical of violation is a trust that has failed to recognize its morally dynamic basis. The moral code of the community that binds self to other in trust relationships is the fundamental basis for the experience of violation".

Several scholars have pointed to betrayal as especially difficult to overcome, as carrying much greater weight in terms of influencing the potential for the re-establishment of trust in relationships (cf. Karamer & Cook, 2004; Six, 2005). And of course betrayal has a broader impact on trust in that instances of betrayal, of violations of otherwise trusting relationships, will spill over into one's overall sense of trust about others and the world around them. Violations of trust can be extended, as Jones, Couch and Scott (1997, p. 475) describe: "We conceptualize betrayal as any violation of trust and allegiance as well as other forms of intrigue, treachery, and harm-doing in the context of established and ongoing relationships". Betrayal, too, has a temporal quality in that betrayal in the past can "significantly shape… dispositions toward trust in the present" (Potter 2002, p. 23).

Indeed, the literature on violations of trust or the betrayal of trust is quite limited (cf. Jones, Couch & Scott, 1997; Weber & Carter, 2003). Nonetheless, it can be seen that trust violations carry with them the means to elicit reactions characterized by a sense of betrayal. Such reactions are an extension of the whole of idea of promises not kept and thus have implications for the socialization of trust in general.

Data

The data for the present study were collected based on nationwide attitudinal surveys of social trust conducted among eight nations: the United States, Russia, Finland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Japan, and Taiwan. These eight nations were selected based on their overall trust indices in the World Values Surveys conducted between 1995 and

2009 (see ASEP/JDS 2010 for the survey information on interpersonal trust scores). They form four groups (with the indices shown in parentheses): High Trust: Finland (117.5); Relatively High Trust: Japan (79.6), the U. S. (78.8), Germany (75.8) and Taiwan (70.0); Middle Trust: Russia (55.4) and the Czech Republic (48.8); and Low Trust: Turkey (10.2).

The surveys (financially supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS, #19203026)) were carried out among persons aged twenty years and older between November 2008 and May 2012. The surveys used personal (face-to-face) interviews of subjects obtained utilizing quota sampling and random sampling methods (see Appendix).

The present study addresses parental socialization of trust in childhood (Question 1: "When you were a child, did your parent(s) teach you that you can trust most people, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"); parents' keeping of promises in childhood (Question 2: "When you were a child, would your parent(s) usually keep their promises about what they said they would do for you?"); experiences of betrayal (Question 3: "Have you ever been betrayed by others?); and adult trust (Question 4: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?").

Did individuals in these eight nations interpret these questions in the same way? This, of course, is a crucial issue. The present study, using pretest samples in each nation, utilized the back translation technique to confirm nearly equivocal interpretation of the questions in all eight nations.

Research Findings

The present study addresses the four purposes (*a* through *d*) described at the beginning of this paper. To do so, we depict the relationships among the four questions (except that between Questions 1 and 3, due to lack of relevance) for each of the eight nations. In so doing we can determine the characteristic response patterns for each nation, followed by a determination of the relationships among the four questions (again except that between Questions 1 and 3) using the combined data for all eight nations. This combining approach, using data for nations previously classified at three different levels of trust (high, medium and low), facilitates determination of common characteristics of response patterns toward understanding the common impact of trust on people's lives within the context of a globalizing world, because it is vital to determine if globalization leads to a gradual loss of trust's heretofore unique elements.

Cross-tabulations and correspondence analyses were conducted. The four questions examined by the present study appear in Table 1. Tables 2 through 5 show the cross-tabulations for Questions 1 through 4, respectively, for the eight nations. Table 6 shows the correlations of the four questions for the eight nations combined.

The present study utilized correspondence analysis, which is a statistical technique especially useful for those who collect categorical data; for example, data collected in social surveys. The method is particularly useful in analyzing cross-tabulation data in the form of numerical frequencies, and results in elegant but simple graphic displays in Euclidean space, thereby facilitating holistic understanding of the data (cf. Greenacre & Blasius, 1994). Before performing correspondence analysis, it is necessary to have roughly even sample sizes for all eight nations; consequently the sample size for Russia was weighted at 65%, making that sample 1066 for the present analysis. Also, with a few exceptions, response categories which were chosen by an average of fewer than 10% of the respondents across all eight nations were eliminated from the analysis. The excep-

Table 1
Survey Questions used for the analysis

Q1. When you were a child, did your parent(s) teach you that you can trust most people, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
1. Was taught that most people can be trusted. 2. Can't be too careful. 3. Such things were not taught (volunteered).
Q2. When you were a child, would your parent(s) usually keep their promises about what they said they would do for you?
1. Yes, to a great extent. 2. Yes, to some extent. 3. No more often than yes. 4. No, not at all. 5. Such promises did not exist.
Q3. Have you ever been betrayed by others?
1. Yes. 2. No.
Q4. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
1. Most people can be trusted. 2. Can't be too careful.

tions included response categories which averaged fewer than 10% across all eight nations but which had relatively high response rates among one or more nations (e. g., "No more often than yes" for Question 2 averaged 7.1% across all eight nations, but Taiwan's response rate was 11.5%).

The findings based on the correspondence analysis using each nation's individual data are shown in Figures 1 through 8, and for the eight nations combined in Figure 9. These figures depict the actual numeric positions of the eight nations with reference to the results for Questions 1 through 4. The correlations of the transformed variables for all eight nations individually as well for the eight nations combined are shown in Table 7.

From Figure 1, for the case of the United States, we can see that the X-axis partitions the response categories of the two questions (Questions 1 and 4). Inertia (χ^2/total N) for the X-axis is 0.425 (in other words, the contribution of inertia accounts for 42.5% of the variation in the data; cf. Greenacre & Blasius, 1994) and 0.264 for the Y-axis, indicating that the contribution of the X-axis is significant for this partition. In Figure 1, the positive (right-hand) side of the X-axis is for trust as taught by parents in childhood and trust in adulthood and the negative (left-hand) side of the X-axis is for distrust as taught by parents and distrust in adulthood. This finding indicates there is consistency regarding trust/distrust as taught in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood. Also, the absence of experiences of betrayal and parents keeping promises "to a great extent" in childhood are located on the positive (right-hand) side of the X-axis, and betrayal experiences and parents keeping promises "to some extent" are located on the negative (left-hand) side of the X-axis.

Table 2
Cross-tabulations of Question 1 by eight nations

Nation		Q1: When you were a child, did your parent(s) teach you that you can trust most people, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?			Total
		Most people can be trusted	Can't be too careful	Such things were not taught	
U. S.	Count	510	412	57	979
	%	52.1%	42.1%	5.8%	100.0%
Russia	Count	429	442	126	997
	%	43.0%	44.3%	12.6%	100.0%
Finland	Count	450	342	35	827
	%	54.4%	41.4%	4.2%	100.0%
Germany	Count	353	501	109	963
	%	36.7%	52.0%	11.3%	100.0%
Czech Rep.	Count	317	509	109	935
	%	33.9%	54.4%	11.7%	100.0%
Turkey	count	287	604	81	972
	%	29.5%	62.1%	8.3%	100.0%
Japan	Count	293	387	193	873
	%	33.6%	44.3%	22.1%	100.0%
Taiwan, ROC	Count	235	593	133	961
	%	24.5%	61.7%	13.8%	100.0%
Total	Count	2874	3790	843	7507
	%	38.3%	50.5%	11.2%	100.0%

From Table 7, the correlations of the transformed variables which are significant are between Questions 1 and 2, between Questions 1 and 4, between Questions 2 and 4, and between Questions 3 and 4 and are 0.169, 0.337, 0.093 and 0.183, respectively. Therefore, for the case of the United States the relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood is the strongest, followed by the relationship between experiences of betrayal/absence of betrayal and trust/distrust in adulthood, then followed by the relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood, and finally by the relationship between the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood.

Figure 2 depicts the Russian case, in which we can see that the X-axis partitions the response categories of the two questions (Questions 1 and 4). Inertia (χ^2/total N) for the X-axis is 0.370 and 0.318 for the Y-axis, indicating that the contributions of the X- and Y-axes are similarly significant for these partitions, with the total amount at 69%. In Figure 2, the positive side of the X-axis is for trust as taught by parents in childhood

Table 3
Cross-tabulations of Question 2 by eight nation

Nation		Q2: When you were a child, would your parent(s) usually keep their promises about what they said they would do for you?					Total
		Yes, to a great extent	Yes, to some extent	No more often than yes	No, not at all	Such promises did not exist	
U. S.	Count	548	350	59	21	19	997
	%	55.0%	35.1%	5.9%	2.1%	1.9%	100.0%
Russia	Count	597	276	66	20	57	1016
	%	58.8%	27.2%	6.5%	2.0%	5.65	100.0%
Finland	Count	671	152	35	7	4	869
	%	77.2%	17.5%	4.0%	0.8%	0.5%	100.0%
Germany	Count	334	523	69	11	41	978
	%	34.2%	53.5%	7.1%	1.1%	4.2%	100.0%
Czech Rep.	Count	433	408	79	5	34	959
	%	45.2%	42.5%	8.2%	0.5%	3.5%	100.0%
Turkey	count	534	343	68	35	13	993
	%	53.8%	34.5%	6.8%	3.5%	1.3%	100.0%
Japan	Count	345	463	60	2	30	900
	%	38.3%	51.4%	6.7%	0.2%	3.3%	100.0%
Taiwan, ROC	Count	239	463	111	9	31	965
	%	24.8%	59.6%	11.5%	0.9%	3.2%	100.0%
Total	Count	3701	3090	547	110	229	7677
	%	48.2%	40.3%	7.1%	1.4%	3.0%	100.0%

and trust in adulthood and the negative side of the X-axis is for distrust as taught by parents and distrust in adulthood. This finding indicates there is consistency regarding trust/distrust as taught in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood. Also, the absence of experiences of betrayal and parents keeping promises "to a great extent" during childhood are located on the positive side of the X-axis, and betrayal experiences and parents keeping promises "to some extent" during childhood are located on the negative side of the X-axis. "Such things were not taught" is located far from the X-axis in the upper left quadrant on the distrust side.

The correlations of the transformed variables which are significant are between Questions 1 and 2 and between Questions 1 and 4 are 0.122 and 0.242, respectively (see Table 7). Therefore, for the Russian case, the relationship between trust as taught by parents in childhood and trust in adulthood is the strongest, followed by trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood.

Figure 3 shows the Finnish case, in which we can see that the X-axis partitions the response categories of the two questions (Questions 1 and 4). Inertia (χ^2/total N) for the

Table 4
Cross-tabulations of Question 3 by eight nations

Nation		Q3: Have you ever been betrayed by others?		Total
		Yes	No	
U. S.	Count	772	180	952
	%	81.1%	18.9%	100.0%
Russia	Count	585	336	921
	%	63.5%	36.5%	100.0%
Finland	Count	651	209	860
	%	75.7%	24.3%	100.0%
Germany	Count	503	405	908
	%	55.4%	44.6%	100.0%
Czech Rep.	Count	739	177	916
	%	80.7%	19.3%	100.0%
Turkey	Count	380	590	970
	%	39.2%	60.8%	100.0%
Japan	Count	433	455	888
	%	48.8%	51.2%	100.0%
Taiwan, ROC	Count	488	410	898
	%	54.3%	45.7%	100.0%
Total	Count	4.551	2.762	7.313
	%	62.2%	37.8%	100.0%

X-axis is 0.372 and 0.255 for the Y-axis, indicating that the contribution of the X- and Y-axes are similarly significant for these partitions and that the total amount is 63%. In Figure 3, the positive side of the X-axis is for trust as taught by parents in childhood and trust in adulthood and the negative side the X-axis is for distrust as taught by parents and distrust in adulthood. This finding indicates there is consistency regarding trust/distrust as taught in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood. Also, the absence of experiences of betrayal and parents keeping promises "to a great extent" during childhood are located on the positive side of the X-axis and betrayal experiences and parents keeping promises to "some extent" during childhood are located on the negative side of the X-axis.

From Table 7, the correlations of the transformed variables which are significant are between Questions 1 and 2, between Questions 1 and 4 and between Questions 3 and 4 and are 0.103, 0.319 and 0.086, respectively. Therefore, for the case of Finland the relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood is the strongest, followed by trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood, then followed by the relationship between experiences of betrayal/absence of betrayal and trust/distrust in adulthood.

Figure 4 depicts the German case, in which we can see that the X-axis partitions the response categories of the two questions (Questions 1 and 4). Inertia (χ^2/total N) for the

X-axis is 0.443 and 0.302 for the Y-axis, indicating that the contribution of the X-axis is significant for these partitions and that the total amount is 75%. In Figure 4, the positive side of the X-axis is for trust as taught by parents in childhood and trust in adulthood and the negative side of the X-axis is for distrust as taught by parents in childhood and distrust in adulthood. This finding indicates there is consistency regarding trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood. Also, the absence of experiences of betrayal and parents keeping promises "to a great extent" during childhood are located on the positive side of the X-axis and betrayal experiences and parents keeping promises "to some extent" are located on the negative side of the X-axis. "Such things were not taught" is located far from the X-axis in the upper left quadrant on the distrust side.

The correlations of the transformed variables which are significant are between Questions 1 and 2, between Questions 1 and 4, between Questions 2 and 4, and between Questions 3 and 4 and are 0.285, 0.447, 0.159 and 0.139, respectively (see Table 7). Therefore, for the case of Germany the relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood is the strongest, followed by the relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood, then by the relationship between the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood, and finally followed by the relationship between experiences of betrayal and absence of experiences of betrayal and trust/distrust in adulthood.

Figure 5 depicts the Czech Republic case, in which we can see that the X-axis partitions the response categories of the two questions (Questions 1 and 4). Inertia (χ^2/total N) for the X-axis is 0.401 and 0.305 for the Y-axis, indicating that the contribution



Fig. 1. Results of correspondence analysis with respect to questions 1 through 4, and correlations of transformed variables: United States



Fig. 2. Results of correspondence analysis with respect to questions 1 through 4, and correlations of transformed variables: Russia



Fig. 3. Results of correspondence analysis with respect to questions 1 through 4, and correlations of transformed variables: Finland



Fig. 4. Results of correspondence analysis with respect to questions 1 through 4, and correlations of transformed variables: Germany



Fig. 5. Results of correspondence analysis with respect to questions 1 through 4, and correlations of transformed variables: the Czech Republic



Fig. 6. Results of correspondence analysis with respect to questions 1 through 4, and correlations of transformed variables: Turkey



Fig. 7. Results of correspondence analysis with respect to questions 1 through 4, and correlations of transformed variables: Japan



Fig. 8. Results of correspondence analysis with respect to questions 1 through 4, and correlations of transformed variables: Taiwan



Fig. 8. Results of correspondence analysis with respect to questions 1 through 4, and correlations of transformed variables: eight nations combined

Table 5
Cross-tabulations of Question 4 by eight nations

Nation		Q4: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?		Total
		Most people can be trusted	Can't be too careful	
U.S.	Count	453	527	980
	%	46.2%	53.8%	100.0%
Russia	Count	305	709	1,014
	%	30.1%	69.9%	100.0%
Finland	Count	471	390	861
	%	54.7%	45.3%	100.0%
Germany	Count	355	580	935
	%	38.0%	62.0%	100.0%
Czech Rep.	Count	219	702	921
	%	23.8%	76.2%	100.0%
Turkey	Count	100	880	980
	%	10.2%	89.8%	100.0%
Japan	Count	249	630	879
	%	28.3%	71.7%	100.0%
Taiwan, ROC	Count	210	766	976
	%	21.5%	78.5%	100.0%
Total	Count	2,362	5,184	7,546
	%	31.3%	68.7%	100.0%

of the X-axis is significant for these partitions and that the total amount is 70%. In Figure 5, the positive side of the X-axis is for trust as taught by parents in childhood and trust in adulthood and the negative side of the X-axis is for distrust as taught by parents in childhood and distrust in adulthood. This finding indicates there is consistency regarding trust/distrust as taught in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood. Also, the absence of experiences of betrayal and parents keeping promises "to a great extent" during childhood are located on the positive side of the X-axis and betrayal experiences and parents keeping promises "to some extent" are located on the negative side of the X-axis. "Such things were not taught" is located far from the X-axis in the upper left quadrant on the distrust side.

From Table 7, the correlations of the transformed variables which are significant are between Questions 1 and 2, between Questions 1 and 4, and between Questions 3 and 4 and are 0.108, 0.342 and 0.156, respectively. Therefore, for the case of the Czech Republic, the relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood is the strongest, followed by the relationship between betrayal/absence of betrayal experiences and trust/distrust in adulthood, then followed

Table 6
Cross-tabulations of the four Questions:
eight nations combined

		Most people can be trusted	**Can't be too careful**	**Such things were not taught**	**Total**		
Q1: When you were a child, did your parent(s) teach you that you can trust most people, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	Count	2874	3790	843	7507		
	%	38.3%	50.5%	10.7%	100%		
Q2: When you were a child, would your parent(s) usually keep their promises about what they said they would do for you?		Yes, to a great extent	Yes, to some extent	No more often than yes	No, not at all	Such promises did not exist	Total
	Count	3701	3090	547	110	229	7677
	%	48.2%	40.3%	7.1%	1.4%	3.0%	100%
Q3: Have you ever been betrayed by others?		Yes	No	Total			
	Count	4551	2762	7313			
	%	62.2%	37.8%	100%			
Q4: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?		Most people can be trusted	Can't be too careful	Total			
	Count	2362	5184	7546			
	%	31.3%	68.7%	100%			

Table 7
Correlations of transformed variables
between each question for eight nations

	Q1×Q2	Q1×Q4	Q2×Q4	Q3×Q4
United States	0.169	0.337	0.093	0.183
Russia	0.122	0.242	0.048	0.012
Finland	0.103	0.319	0.044	0.086
Germany	0.285	0.447	0.159	0.139
Czech Republic	0.108	0.342	0.040	0.156
Turkey	0.107	0.253	0.022	0.040
Japan	0.126	0.268	0.025	0.077
Taiwan, ROC	0.160	0.276	0.066	0.111
Eight nations combined	0.142	0.346	0.076	0.039

by trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood.

Figure 6 shows the Turkish case, in which we can see that the X-axis partitions the response categories of the two questions (Questions 1 and 4). Inertia (χ^2/total N) for the X-axis is 0.356 and 0.272 for the Y-axis, indicating that the contribution of the X-axis is significant for these partitions and that the total amount is 62%. In Figure 6, the positive side of the X-axis is for trust as taught by parents in childhood and trust in adulthood and the negative side of the X-axis is for distrust as taught by parents and distrust in adulthood. This finding indicates there is consistency regarding trust/distrust as taught in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood. Also, the absence of experiences of betrayal and parents keeping promises "to a great extent" during childhood are located on the positive side of the X-axis and betrayal experiences and parents keeping promises "to some extent" are located on the negative side of the X-axis.

The correlations of the transformed variables which are significant are between Questions 1 and 2 and between Questions 1 and 4 and are 0.107 and 0.253, respectively (see Table 7). Therefore, for the case of Turkey, the relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood is the strongest, followed by the relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood.

Figure 7 depicts the Japanese case, in which we can see that the X-axis partitions the response categories of the two questions (Questions 1 and 4). Inertia (χ^2/total N) for the X-axis is 0.347 and 0.286 for the Y-axis, indicating that the contribution of the X-axis is significant for these partitions and that the total amount is 63%. In Figure 7, the positive side of the X-axis is for trust as taught by parents in childhood and trust in adulthood and the negative side of the X-axis is for distrust as taught by parents in childhood and distrust in adulthood. This finding indicates there is consistency regarding trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood. Also, the absence of experiences of betrayal and parents keeping promises "to a great extent" during childhood are located on the positive side of the X-axis and betrayal experiences and parents keeping promises "to some extent" are located on the negative side of the X-axis. "Such things were not taught" is located far from the X-axis in the upper left quadrant on the distrust side.

From Table 7, the correlations of the transformed variables which are significant are between Questions 1 and 2 and between Questions 1 and 4 and are 0.126 and 0.268, respectively. Therefore, for the case of Japan, the relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood is the strongest, followed by trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood.

Finally, Figure 8 illustrates the case for Taiwan, in which we can see that the X-axis partitions the response categories of the two questions (Questions 1 and 4). Inertia (χ^2/total N) for the X-axis is 0.360 and 0.317 for the Y-axis, indicating that the contribution of the X-axis is significant for these partitions and that the total amount is 67%. In Figure 8, the positive side of the X-axis is for trust as taught by parents in childhood and trust in adulthood and the negative side of the X-axis is for distrust as taught by parents in childhood and distrust in adulthood. This finding indicates there is consistency regarding trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood. Also, the absence of experiences of betrayal and parents keeping promises "to a great extent" during childhood are located on the positive side of the X-axis and betrayal experiences and parents keeping promises "to some extent" are located on the negative side

of the X-axis. “Such things were not taught” and “No more often than yes” are located far from the X-axis in the upper left quadrant on the distrust side.

From Table 7, the correlations of the transformed variables which are significant are between Questions 1 and 2, between Questions 1 and 4, and between Questions 3 and 4 and are 0.160, 0.276 and 0.111, respectively. Therefore, for the case of Taiwan, the relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood is the strongest, followed by the relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood, then followed by the relationship between the presence or absence of betrayal experiences and trust/distrust in adulthood.

We now turn to analyses of the four purposes of the present study using the combined data for all eight nations. As previously mentioned, for performing correspondence analysis, it is necessary to have roughly even sample sizes for all eight nations. This is also the case for an analysis using combined data. Consequently, the sample size for Russia was weighted at 65%, making that sample 1 066 for the combined analysis.

In this instance, a response category chosen by an average of fewer than 10% of the respondents was eliminated from the analysis (i. e. 7.1% for “No more than yes” for Question 2; shown in Table 6).

Figure 9 illustrates the results of the correspondence analysis using the eight nations’ combined data. We see that the X-axis partitions the response categories of the two questions (Questions 1 and 4). Inertia (χ^2/total N) for the X-axis is 0.388 and 0.293 for the Y-axis, indicating that the contributions of the X- and Y-axes are similarly significant for these partitions, with the total amount at 68%. In Figure 9, the negative side of the X-axis is for distrust as taught by parents in childhood and distrust in adulthood and the positive side of the X-axis is for trust as taught by parents and trust in adulthood. This finding indicates there is consistency regarding trust/distrust as taught in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood. Also, the absence of experiences of betrayal and parents keeping promises “to a great extent” during childhood are located on the positive side of the X-axis, and betrayal experiences and parents keeping promises “to some extent” during childhood are located on the negative side of the X-axis. “Such things were not taught” is located far from the X-axis in the upper left quadrant on the distrust side.

From Table 7, the correlations of the transformed variables which are significant are between Questions 1 and 2, between Questions 1 and 4, and between Question 2 and 4 and are 0.142, 0.346 and 0.076, respectively. Therefore, the relationship between trust as taught by parents in childhood and trust in adulthood is the strongest, followed by that between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood, next followed by that between different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood.

Summary and Conclusions

The findings based on the cross-tabulations and correspondence analyses using each nation’s individual data, addressing the four purposes of the present study presented at the beginning of this paper, revealed that from all the figures for all eight nations, there is a partition (vertical lines partition the trust and distrust clusters) for the X-axis between trust on the right side and distrust on the left side. Also, there is a horizontal line partition for the Y-axis between the presence of experiences of betrayal on one side and their

absence on the other side, and between "Yes, to a great extent" on one side and "Yes, to some extent" on the other side for the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood (except for the Russian and German cases).

This indicates that the X-axis is a dimension of trust and distrust (i. e. parental socialization of trust/distrust in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood) and that the Y-axis is a dimension of experiences (i. e. presence or absence of betrayal experiences and the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood, except for the Russian and German cases). The trust side includes trust as taught by parents in childhood, trust in adulthood, "to a great extent" for parents keeping promises during childhood, and the absence of experiences of betrayal. The distrust side includes distrust as taught by parents in childhood, distrust in adulthood, "to some extent" for parents keeping promises during childhood, and experiences of betrayal.

There is an interesting finding that "such things were not taught" is located on the distrust side for those nations for which the response is more than 10% (i. e. Russia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Taiwan and Japan), which indicates that those who were not taught to be able to trust nor to be too careful in dealing with people during childhood become distrustful in adulthood.

Using each nation's individual data, it was also found, from Table 7, that the correlations of the transformed variables between Question 1 and Question 4 (i. e. between parental socialization of trust/distrust in childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood) are the strongest in all eight nations, among all four relationships of Questions 1 through 4. The average for these correlations is 0.310. Also, the correlations of the transformed variables between Question 1 and Question 2 (i. e. between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood) are the second strongest for six nations (except the United States and the Czech Republic). The average for these correlations is 0.151. For the United States and the Czech Republic they are the third strongest, at 0.169 and 0.108, respectively. Therefore, for all eight nations there is a modest relationship between trust/distrust as taught by parents in childhood and the different levels of parents keeping promises in childhood. In other words, as can be also seen in Figures 1 through 8, parents who teach trust to their children also keep promises to their children to "a great degree" in all eight nations. And in the reverse, parents who teach distrust to their children only keep promises to their children to "some degree" for all eight nations.

From Table 7, the correlations of the transformed variables between Question 3 and 4 (i. e. between the presence or absence of experiences of betrayal and trust or distrust in adulthood) are the second strongest for the United States and the Czech Republic, the third strongest for Finland and Taiwan, and the fourth for Germany. Therefore, for those five nations, the presence or absence of betrayal experiences has modest impacts on distrust or trust in adulthood.

From Table 7, the finding that the correlations of the transformed variables between Question 2 and Question 4 (i. e. between the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood and trust/distrust in adulthood) are significant only for the United States and Germany, which indicates that the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood have modest impacts on trust or distrust in adulthood for both nations.

With regard to the configurations of response patterns for the four questions, the results of the correspondence analysis using the eight nations' combined data, shown in Figure 9, are similar to those using each nation's individual data. The important finding is that the meanings of the X-axis (i. e. the trust dimension) and the Y-axis (i. e. experi-

ences) are consistent for both the results of the analysis using each nation's individual data and that using the eight nations' combined data.

Although, from Table 7, there are modest relationships among some nations (the United States, Finland, Germany, the Czech Republic and Taiwan) between the presence or absence of betrayal experiences and distrust and trust in adulthood using each nation's individual data, this phenomenon vanishes when we analyze the combined data. But to the contrary, using each nation's individual data, there is no significant relationship between the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood and trust or distrust in adulthood for six nations (except the United States and Germany). However, when conducting correspondence analysis using the combined data, a modest relationship (i. e. 0.076) emerges. For comparisons of unique national characteristics and characteristics seen as a whole when combining the data, it is very important to use both individual data and combined data because the combined data contains nations previously classified at different levels of trust (i. e. high, medium and low, per ASEP/JDS (2010)).

In the face of globalization with its oft hypothesized homogenization, it remains to be seen whether the impacts of parental socialization of trust, parents keeping promises during childhood, and the presence or absence of experiences of betrayal on trust/distrust in adulthood will persist, increase, or decrease in these eight nations taken individually and as a whole.

Overall, the present study's findings, using each nation's individual data, as well as the combined data, have shown that: (1) Parental socialization of trust/distrust has the most significant impact on adult trust or distrust, more so than do varying levels of parents keeping promises during childhood and the presence or absence of experiences of betrayal for all eight nations. (2) Varying levels of parents keeping promises during childhood relates to parental socialization of trust/distrust in childhood for all eight nations. (3) The presence or absence of experiences of betrayal relates to adult trust or distrust in the United States, Finland, Germany, the Czech Republic and Taiwan, but the relationship vanishes when using the eight nations' combined data. (4) There is no significant relationship between the different levels of parents keeping promises during childhood and adult trust or distrust for six nations (except the United States and Germany); however, using the combined data, a modest relationship emerges.

As mentioned above, Jesuino (2008, p. 186) stated that "from the very first beginning humans develop a sense of trust versus mistrust conveyed through socialization". And we were reminded that socialization practices are not universal, but always socially and culturally embedded. Nonetheless, the findings of the present study, using each nation's data as well as the eight nations' combined data, reveal that there is a consistently significant impact of parental socialization (Question 1) of trust/distrust on later adult trust/distrust (Question 4). Indeed, this is a common phenomenon among all eight nations individually and as a whole after combining all the data. However, the degree of impact of parental socialization of trust on later adult trust does vary among the eight nations.

Thus the present study for eight nations that manifest three different levels of trust has empirically supported some of the speculations gleaned from the trust literature – such as those of Uslaner (1999, 2000), Jesuino (2008), Rotenberg (2010) and Erikson (1950/1963) – in particular that parental socialization of trust has significant impact on trust in adulthood. The present study also found that in the reverse, parental socialization of distrust has significant impact on distrust in adulthood. Thus, as far as parental socialization of trust is concerned, we might be able to say that "the child is the father of the man" or "as a boy, so the man".

Appendix

For the nationwide surveys conducted for the present study, specific details for each survey are described below. With regard to sampling methods, the surveys adopted the methods most commonly used in each of the eight nations, to facilitate comparison and contrast with other survey results in each respective nation.

Czech Republic
September 2009
Sampling method and sampling points: Quota sampling for 184 sampling points.
Sample size: 981.

Germany
April–May 2009
Sampling method and sampling points: Random sampling based on the ADM–Master Sample (the standard in Germany for professional scientific studies) for 153 sampling points.
Sample size: 1007.

Japan
October 2008
Sampling method and sampling points: Two-stage stratified random sampling for 130 sampling points.
Sample size: 924.

Russia
February 2009
Sampling method and sampling points: Quota sampling for 140 sampling points.
Sample size: 1600.

Taiwan
October–November 2009
Sampling method and sampling points: Quota Sampling for 138 sampling points.
Sample size: 981

Turkey
January–February 2010
Sampling method and sampling points: Quota sampling for 86 sampling points.
Sample size: 1007.

United States
November–December 2008
Sampling method and sampling points: Quota sampling for 100 sampling points.
Sample size: 1008.

Finland
May 2012
Sampling method and sampling points: Quota sampling for 87 sampling points.
Sample size: 881.

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THE SENSE OF TRUST IN JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN CONTEXTS: LIKE AND UNLIKE

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Introduction

Japan and Russia are geographically close neighboring countries, but people of both countries seem not to understand each other properly, probably due to historical, political and cultural differences between these two nations. Having this situation as a background, this paper aims at revealing the Russian and the Japanese contexts of the sense of *social trust* with a hope to reduce the estrangement between two nations.

The method to be used hereby is a quantitative analysis of the Japanese and the Russian data obtained from the International Comparative Survey on Social Trust that was carried out by Masamichi Sasaki with his research group in 2010–2012 (Sasaki, 2012). This survey was conducted in seven countries[1] (later one more country, Finland, was added) by using a common standardized questionnaire.

Japan and Russia are the main nations to be focused in this paper, and USA and Germany will be referred to additionally for displaying the characteristics of Japan and Russia.

The number of samples is 924 from Japan, 1600 from Russia, 1008 from USA, and 1007 from Germany.

Valuables and Analytical Method

Needless to say, social trust is a basis of the social relations. However, its pattern is assumed to differ between specific nations due to their varieties in culture and society. From this viewpoint, the sense of trust will be analyzed in connection with the traits of a given society. What is to be analyzed in this paper consists of "the sense of trust" and "the traits of society" perceived by the respondents, and the relations of both variables.

"The sense of trust" will be observed in three levels: (1) trust inside a primary group, represented by 'friends', (2) trust to general 'others' in society, and (3) trust to the public institution represented by the 'government'. The specific question corresponding to each level of trust is as follows.

1 Czech Republic, Germany, Japan, Russia, Taiwan, Turkey and USA.

1. Trust to friends: "Who among the people listed on the card do you trust or mistrust?" The people on the list are as follows: 'Parents and grand parents', 'Spouse/partner', 'Child or Children', 'Brothers and/or sisters', 'Friends', 'Boyfriend/girlfriend', 'Colleagues at work', 'Relatives' and 'Neighbors'. From those above, 'friends' are to be chosen and the degree of 'trust to friends' will be indicated by a proportion of the answer "I trust".
2. Trust to others: "In general, can you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be careful while dealing with people?" To this question there are four alternative answers: 'Most people can be trusted', 'Must be careful', 'Other' and 'Don't know'. The indicator hereby is the proportion of the answer 'Most people can be trusted'.
3. Trust to the government: "To which degree do you trust each one of the following on the card? Please select one answer for each response category". There are five alternative answers: 'Totally trust', 'Trust some', 'Little mistrust', 'Total mistrust' and 'Don't know'. Hereby 'Government' is chosen from response categories and its indicator is the proportion of the answers 'Totally trust' and 'Trust some'.

Next, "the traits of society" will be hereby analyzed from a viewpoint of the degree of modernity.

According to the sociological paradigm[1], the traits of society and their shift can be illustrated ideal-typically as follows.

The pre-modern society is composed by self-sufficient and small-sized communities in which individuals are integrated homogeneously under a given particular culture. Values and norms that regulate social relations are shared only inside a given community and do not have a universal character. People trust each other intensively inside the community, while they distrust outsiders at all.

In the process of modernization, such a closed circle is being undermined by the socio-economic development of society, and shift to a differentiated open society in which people are liberated from the traditional social bond to be independent existences and associate each other to realize their own particular interests, needs and orientations. What regulates their behavior and attitude is the values and norms universal over different particular social circles. Thus trust is extended to a larger scope of society.

In the above mentioned ideal type, there are two dimensions of social traits: the relational and the normative ones. The relational dimension means a degree of the differentiation of social circles and the civic participation in different association(s). This can be indicated with the membership situations in civic associations. The normative dimension of society implies a degree of the internalization of universal value-norms in people's mind.

The specific questions corresponding to these two dimensions of society are as follows.

1. Relational dimension: "Please look through the following list of voluntary organizations/associations and activities on the card and tell me which you belong to?" There is a list of 13 kinds of voluntary organizations/associations (see Table 3), and additionally one alternative: 'None'. The proportion of those who did not choose 'None' is hereby regarded as the indicator for measuring a degree of people's membership in some voluntary association(s).
2. Value-Normative dimension: "Please specify the degree of your agreement with the following statements". There are five statements in the questionnaire, from which

1 Cf. "From 'mechanical solidarity' to 'organic solidarity'" (Dürkheim, 1893) and "Enlargement of society and development of individuality" (Simmel, 1890).

the following two will be taken up: "If most people could get into a movie without paying and be sure they will not get caught, they would do it" and "Fear of social disgrace or punishment prevents most people from breaking the law instead of conscience". The distribution of the responses to those two is significantly correlated (Pearson's correlation coefficient is 0.211 in Japan and 0.374 in Russia, and the correlation is significant in 1% level in both countries). Hence, the first statement (regarding 'movie') only will be taken up for analysis. Alternative answers to each of the statements are five: 'Strongly agree', 'Mildly agree', 'Mildly disagree', 'Strongly disagree' and 'Don't know'. A degree of universal value-norms observance will be indicated hereby with the proportion of 'Mildly disagree' and 'Strongly disagree' to the statement in the questionnaire.

Japan and Russia Compared to Other Surveyed Countries

To begin with, Let us display a general feature of Japan and Russia in terms of people's sense of trust and their perception of social relations, by comparing to other surveyed countries. See Table 1.

Table 1
Sense of Trust and Traits of Society in Surveyed Countries

	Trust to Friends	Trust to Others	Trust to Government	Universal Norm Observance	Civic Association Membership
USA	68.5	44.9	55.8	23.4	61.6
Japan	48.3	26.9	33.2	79.2	79.3
Taiwan	62.8	20.9	49.6	41.1	43.9
Germany	60.0	35.3	38.5	36.0	47.7
Russia	47.6	28.1	51.7	24.7	47.3
Turkey	38.2	9.9	59.4	21.6	–
Czech Rep.	74.1	22.3	29.5	20.1	–

Note: "Government: 'Totally trust' + 'Trust some'. Observance of Universal Norm: 'Mildly disagree' + 'Strongly disagree' to the statement. Association Membership: % of those who are member(s) of any voluntary association.

Concerning the sense of trust, there is no large difference of between Japan and Russia in terms of the degree of 'Trust to friends' (Japan: 48.3, Russia: 47.6) and 'Trust to others' (Japan: 26.9, Russia 28.1). In this respect both countries are ranked nearly in the middle level among 7 surveyed countries. However, there is a remarkable difference in 'Trust to the government' between these two countries (Japan: 33.2, Russia: 51.7). In this trust Russia belongs to the upper group of countries[1], together with USA.

Regarding to the traits of society, a difference between Japan and Russia is remarkable. As far as 'universal norm observance' is concerned, Japan occupies the highest position among surveyed countries, far above the level of Russia (Japan: 79.2, Russia: 24.7). As for 'association membership' as well, Japan is located at the top, while Russia far lower than it (Japan: 79.3, Russia: 47.3).

1 A preceding international comparative survey also pointed to the high trust to the government in Russia (Anisimov, 2012)

Table 2
Four Countries in the Matrix of Two Social Dimensions

Universal Norm Observance	Civic Association Membership	
	Many	**Few**
High	Japan	Germany
Low	USA	Russia

In order to make the traits of these two countries much clearer, let us add USA and Germany for comparison to Japan and Russia in the matrix of the two axes, to find Japan and Russia standing in the opposite extreme, as seen in Table 2.

For reference, a proportion of the members among respondents in each association is shown in Table 3.

Correlation between Sense of Trust and Perception of Social Traits

Above, the degree of the sense of trust and the perceived social traits in Japan and Russia was observed. Now the connection between those two variables will be analyzed with Pearson's correlation coefficient. See Table 4 and 5.

Table 3
Membership Rate of Respondents in Different Associations

	USA	Japan	Germany	Russia
Neighborhood organization	12.0	55.1	3.8	14.5
Parent–Teacher Association	8.6	12.7	3.6	3.8
Women's Club, Senior's Club, Youth Club	7.4	10.8	5.4	2.2
Firefighters' Association, Voluntary Neighborhood Watch Group	3.3	2.8	4.4	0.5
Farmers' Association, Fishermen's Association, Foresters' Association	2.8	5.3	0.6	1.6
Chamber of Commerce, Professional or Entrepreneurial Association	7.4	6.9	2.7	0.9
Trade Union	7.2	7.4	6.0	7.5
Club for Sports, Recreation, Hobby or Cultural Activities	18.5	29.8	27.0	5.9
Regional Association, Class Reunion Association, Alumni Association	7.5	15.7	1.0	1.1
Religious Organization	30.1	6.7	7.6	1.4
Co-op, Consumer Union	4.0	12.1	1.1	1.5
Political Group, Election Campaign Organization	7.6	4.1	1.6	1.3
Citizen Group or Organization	5.9	2.4	2.9	0.3
Environmental Protection Group	4.5	1.5	2.4	0.9
Others	3.6	1.3	2.5	14.1
Order	2	1	3	

Note: % of the answer: "I belong to" a given organization/association in the list.

Table 4
Correlation between the Sense of Trust and the Traits of Society: Japan

	Trust to Friends	Trust to Others	Trust to Govt.	Univ. Norm Observance	Association Membership
Trust to Friends	–				
Trust to Others	0.082* 0.014	–			
Trust to Government.	0.003 0.927	0.047 0.168	–		
Universal Norm Observance	0.067* 0.045	–0.004 0.900	0.009 0.783	–	
Association Membership	0.022 0.496	0.038 0.260	0.061 0.064	0.034 0.311	–

Note: Upper figure – Pearson's correlation coefficient. Lower figure – significant probability (both sides). ** – significant in 1% level; * – significant in 5% level.

Table 5
Correlation between the Sense of Trust and the Traits of Society: Russia

	Trust in Friends	Trust in Others	Trust in Govt.	Univ. Norm Observance	Association Membership
Trust to Friends					
Trust to Others	0.029 0.262				
Trust to Government	0.049 0.061	0.122** 0.000			
Universal Norm Observance	–0.011 0.685	0.047 0.078	0.014 0.615		
Association Membership	0.027 0.272	–0.006 0.819	0.050 0.053	0.007 0.785	

Note: Upper figure – Pearson's correlation coefficient. Lower figure – significant probability (both sides). ** – significant in 1% level; * – significant in 5% level.

As far as the connection between three levels of trust is observed, in the Japanese case 'trust to friends' and 'trust to others' are significantly correlated but these two levels are not correlated with 'trust to government', while in the Russian case 'trust to friends' is correlated neither with 'trust to others' nor 'trust to government'. Supposedly in Japan a relational border between 'friends' and 'others' is not drawn distinctly in terms of the sense of trust, whereas the government is perceived as far beyond the border. In Russia, however, the relations with friends shape an independent area separate from other social and public areas.

Concerning the traits of society, the degree of association membership, as mentioned before, is high in Japan, while low in Russia. In both countries, however, it does not have any significant correlation with 'trust to friends', 'trust to others' or 'trust to government'. In other words, a larger participation of people in voluntary associations does not mean a higher degree of the sense of trust in both countries. Further, the membership of asso-

Table 6
Correlation between the Sense of Trust and the Traits of Society: USA

	Trust to Friends	Trust to Others	Trust to Govt.	Univ. Norm Observance	Association Membership
Trust to Friends					
Trust to Others	0.189** 0.000				
Trust to Government.	0.070* 0.028	0.139** 0.000			
Universal Norm Observance	0.163** 0.000	0.280** 0.000	0.054 0.094		
Association Membership	0.149** 0.000	0.169** 0.000	0.130** 0.000	0.136** 0.000	

Note: Upper figure – Pearson's correlation coefficient. Lower figure – significant probability (both sides). ** – significant in 1% level; * – significant in 5% level.

ciations is not correlated with the universal norm observance both in Japan and in Russia. We raised the association membership and the universal norm observance as two dimensions of social traits, but they are not related to each other. It is also worthy to note that the universal norm observance, too, does not have any correlation with any level of the sense of trust in Russia, and it is correlated only with 'trust to friends' in Japan. Generally, in both countries, 'the sense of trust' and 'the traits of society' perceived by people are not connected with each other.

Then, how about USA? See Table 6.

Firstly, as seen in Table 6, three levels of trust are significantly correlated with each other. This implies that 'trust to friends', 'trust to others' and 'trust to government' are connected and form one unified complex in the case of USA.

Secondly, 'association membership' and 'universal norm observance' are significantly correlated in USA, unlike the case of Japan and Russia. Moreover, each of these two dimensions of the social traits is correlated significantly with each level of trust, namely 'trust to friends', 'trust to others' and 'trust to government'. In the case of USA, unlike Japan and Russia, a higher degree of social modernity indicated with the two dimensions of social traits is presumably connected with a higher degree of trust in each level.

Summary and Implication

By summarizing the above-mentioned findings, let us figure out some qualitative differences between Japan and Russia with respect to social trust.

In this paper the object of trust were divided into three levels: to friends, to others, and to the government. As far as the trust to friends and the trust to others are concerned, the degree is no remarkable difference between Japan and Russia. In spite of this similarity, however, we have found some significant differences between these countries in terms of the relations between the three levels of trust.

First, the sense of trust to the government is quite high in Russia. This fact has been found also in another socio-psychological survey (Anisimov, 2012), and was interpreted as a historical heritage from Tsarist and then Communist time (Bendix, 1956).

Second, in Japan the trust to friends and the trust to others are correlated significantly, which implies that the relations inside a circle of friends and the relations to others in society are not perceived separately in a rigid way, while in Russia the relations with friends are a closed in-group against the outside world such as other people and the government. This fact might be interpreted from a viewpoint that such an in-group in Russian society has a function of the fortress for the group members to protect themselves against uncertain environments, and therefore "Russian people do not tell a truth at all to those who are not their friends" (Smith, 1976, p. 106 in Japanese edition). But another interpretation might be possible from a linguistic viewpoint, according to which a range of the meaning of a word 'friend' is different between Japanese and Russian. An English word 'friend' is usually translated in to the Japanese word *yuujin* or *tomodachi* which includes more than a few of the members in the secondary group to which he/she belongs. In Russian, however, the meaning of *drug* is much narrower than that of Japanese *yuujin* or *tomodachi*.

Third, the universal value-norms, as one dimension of social traits, is perceived by the Japanese mostly as being observed by people in society, while not so much by the Russians. The universal norms means hereby the norms which should be observed be everybody in a structurally differentiated open society where neither logic nor ethic of a particular segmental partial social system works in a right way. The universal value observance is related the attitudes of persistence in a general principle. Russians, contrasting to Japanese, prefer to take their own action flexibly by case in a given situation, rather than to adhere rigidly to a universal principle (Hakamada, 1993).

Fourth, neither in Japan nor in Russia the universal norm observance shows any significant correlation with the sense of trust (with one exception of the correlation with the trust to friends in Japan). This is clearly different from the case of USA where the universal norm observance is significantly correlated with all levels of the sense of trust.

Fifth, the association membership, hereby as a relational dimension of social traits, is conspicuously large in Japan, contrasting to Russia. This trait of Japanese society may be interpreted from several viewpoints. One viewpoint may focus on the group-minded character of Japanese people who are likely to gather and depend on each other. Another view stresses the social effects of the freedom of association actualized in the democratization of Japan after the World War II. The third view refers to the historical background, according to which voluntary associations spread even during the feudal time in various fields of local life such as cultural, religious, self-administrative, mutual-financing, professional and business-related associations. In short, Japanese people are accustomed of associating themselves to realize their own personal needs and interests. In Russia, during the time of Communism that lasted around 70 years, the function for realization the people's interests and needs was concentrated into the hands of the state, and organizations/associations were the state-made and the party-controlled, while associative activities among citizens were restricted largely. This tradition seems to be succeeded path-dependently up to now, which may be expressed in an inactiveness of the people's participation in civic associations.

In spite of an above-mentioned difference between Japan and Russia, there is a common feature between these countries in terms of the fact that the degree of association membership among citizens is not correlated with the degree of trust in any levels. It might be assumed that the people participating in associative activities would be more socialized enough to have the sense of social trust much more, but the fact found hereby does not support such an assumption both in Japan and in Russia. It is contrasting to

USA where those two key valuables are significantly correlated with each other. Mateju and Vistakova (2006, p. 500) maintain that the freedom of association and the participation of citizens increase the level of social trust, but it does not fit to Japan or Russia, even though it is valid for US society,

In USA, the membership of association is also correlated with the observance of universal norm. The combination of these two dimensions of society may give a base to a high degree of American social modernity. In Japan and Russia, however, these two dimensions are separated from each other and do not have any significant relations to the development of social trust. The US pattern of society and trust has a particular feature noticeably different from both Japan and Russia, which might mean a variety of the features of modernity between the US society on one hand, and the Japanese and the Russian societies on the other. This implies a necessity of understanding the issues of social trust in the particular configuration of culture and society of a given nation.

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TRUST: DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW SOCIAL PARADIGM IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA AND JAPAN

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Introduction

The problem of trust in Russian scientific circles is very urgent in terms of development of theory and practice. Theoretic problem of "trust" is not duly analyzed in sociological and philosophical theory which fact does not allow it to use this concept in social practice. The crisis taking place in modern Western societies as Lacatos points it out, consists in exhausted "positive heuristics" of its development[1] where positive heuristics allows to understand the possibilities of dynamics of society, formations of its scientific and philosophical program, stable development, instrumental[2] creation of social life, formation of necessary mechanisms to overcome risks by society itself and increase in level of trust in social system and interpersonal relations. Positive heuristics (i. e. comprehension of things to be created) increases the level of social trust.

Thus, problems in the development of Russian society are seen in fake breach of system of social trust and "positive heuristics" on the background of growth of negative social, economical and political tendencies which fact requires to thoroughly study methods of trust formation in the process of social, political and economic reforms in the country.

The problem of trust as an element of "positive heuristics" associates with growth of social dynamics. This aspect makes it possible to state that degree and level of stud-

1 To some degree it is due to the lack of theoretic approaches to the analysis of positive perspective development of society.

2 Transfer of manufacturing to the developing countries resulted in the fact that the tools of the social life turned out to be ignored as well as all scientific theories which defined the possibilities of its usage. As a result society comes not only to economic stagnation but to intellectual stagnation as well because adaptation to new tools requires new theories or acceptance of foreign ones which makes this society dependent on other ones. Besides old tools are left behind and are out of udage. See: *Лебединцева Л. А.* Особенности инновационного интеллектуального труда и воспроизводства интеллектуального потенциала: опыт России // Информационное общество. 2012. № 1. С.30–36.

ies of the problem can create a new level of "positive heuristics" while insufficient attention may lead to social disintegration of society into isolated social groups and individuals which is called as a regressive[1] factor in the development of society. In the situation of social chaos the government brings individuals under control using the distribution of resources and forming the passive system of trust. Government uses trust not in a social context but in political sense in order to legitimate its power and making individuals dependent on resources obtained from the government. We should only add that distinction between individuals and groups is created artificially in the process of institutionalization in order to bring to life antagonisms and conflicts (risks) which are to be regulated only by government. In fact the situation characterizes the crisis in society where an individual is not able to develop. We know that a dependent person cannot be sincere in understanding trust. In our opinion the study of trust cannot be correct in a society with individuals strongly dependent upon national resources – resources that the government lacks.[2].

Initially the government is destined to solve outer social risks not domestic ones since the regulation of outer risks unites and strengthens trust in society. Regulation of inner personal risks breaks society apart making it amorphous. We can see fragmentation of society where the system of social trust is weakened and as a result risks increase and dependence of an individual upon government becomes stronger. On the modern stage of development most national states do not perform their functions, i. e. they do not protect national priorities in economics, manufacture (they carry out the economic politics of "free trade" where the basic amount of entrepreneurship belongs to American companies), monetary circulation and cultural development[3]. Decrease in positive dynamics is seen in negative demographic situation in developing countries where the population growth is at the expense of migrants from other countries. In this situation social risks of societies of most countries are at high level which results in decrease of trust.

Due to weakening of trust, split in society occurs in several directions: society vs economics (the rich/the poor; one entrepreneurship against another[4]), society vs state (access to power), society vs ideology (ideology of dependence), society vs science (science detached from society), society vs culture (mass culture), society vs philosophy (common interests are alien to human beings, he can choose among a number of suggested ones but antagonistic to national interests). At the same time there is propaganda of "another" alien culture (mass culture), "another" ideology, "another" economics which is not characteristic of accepting society.[5] Most western societies experience introduction

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1 I. Lakatos believed that regressive program is considered to be when development of theoretic potential lags economic growth.

2 Долг Америки в реальном времени. URL: http://www.abird.ru/articles/USA_debt.

3 *Лебединцева Л. А.* Особенности инновационного интеллектуального труда и воспроизводства интеллектуального потенциала: опыт России // Информационное общество. 2012. № 1. С. 30–36.

4 Entrepreneur networks are a good example of split in society and growth of distrust. Entrepreneurs are obliged to form groups which carry out their own economic politics. Growth of distrust with the desire to hit their goals which do not correlate with interests of society, in other words, when there is deception in their activities, non-economic methods of interest gaining and other negative tendencies. Entrepreneur networks are not the achievement of social development but indication of disintegration in society.

5 Подход к распространению влияния США предложенный З. Бжезинским

of alien "progressive program" which possess heuristics but is antagonistic with national interests of accepting country. In future we should anticipate the problem of "trust to others", initially in theory and later in practice, i. e. whom "another" we should trust".

Similarly, F. Fukuyama raises the problem of trust as socio-economic one and later as a global socio-political problem. The slogan of "trust" can mean the process of merger of economic and political entities of world space.[1] As a result decrease in level of trust in countries and instability (social, political, religious, economic, cultural) in the world are the indispensable element of the process of initial disintegration for further integration of countries into a single conglomerate which is accompanied by transformation of society, economic subordination and cultural standardizing of various societies.

Interest to the problem of social trust is conditioned by the influence of this factor on solidarity, mobility, mutual understanding of societies and social groups which fact rises the efficiency of a given group in social, political and economic spheres. Division into groups occurs as a result of institutional boundaries among the groups, artificial limitation of communication with society and other groups, creation of new culture, rules and norms of communication for them. In such situation trust is limited by a group – entrepreneurship network is created. A single system of trust is divided into a series of broken parts which are under study. In initial stage of our study we can presuppose that the stronger is solidarity in a social group is the higher the level of trust is.

In contemporary Russia the problem of social trust is of great importance due to tough competitive struggle among entrepreneurship networks, defragmentation of a previously united society into isolated institutions, a stronger dependence of Russian companies on foreign partners which may result in further economic lag of the country.

One more reason why the problem of trust is important for the Russian society is the necessity of creation of stability. We should take into account the requirement of "progressive" development of society with "positive heuristics" which is based on methodology and philosophy of national peculiarities.

As is seen the level of theoretical actualization of the category of trust is not clearly defined in science. Its descriptive characteristics should be revised in order to define common social notions according to which the usage of categorical content natural for separate social institutions or groups is considered to be unacceptable.

The role of creation of public ideology in the contemporary stage is performed by scientific schools which reflect the model of their social and intellectual development and administrative management on society through manufacture, educational institutions and mass media. In this case scientific organizations in the form of "paradigm" (T. Kuhn), "research program" (I. Lakatos), "ideal of natural order" (S. Toulmin), "thematic space of science" (J. Hilton), "research tradition" (L. Laudan) are the national models of social organization of science penetrating by means of introduction of their own theories and concepts into the life of society. They arrange social, political and economic structure of society according to their own social pattern and ideology. Consequently, the contradictions which take place among scientific trends are reflected in society which fact results in decrease in level of trust. Gathering supporters around them, scientific communities tear society apart.

A single scientific school can unite a social group the size of which corresponds to the level of trust in this group. As a result scientific paradigms which we can single out

1 In 2007 Fukuyama visited Russia. He delivered a lecture at the Institute of philosophy RAS. His message was to accept American model of legal system as a basis of international law.

in a definite country have become the basis for division or consolidation of society of a given country, growth or weakening of social trust and social dynamics. Thus, studying social organizations, i. e. their level of competition, degree of publicity, their public opinion, degree of integration into administrative structure of society we can define the degree of trust to science in society. In particular, trust to science via indications in the development of manufacture are discerned indirectly because they show the degree of perception and efficiency of definite scientific theories in daily practice through applied tools of social life. According to the concept of "paradigm" we can state that decrease in volume of production in a country leads to decrease of trust to science and its theories being applied in society, politics, culture, economics etc.[1] Break of influence (via manufacture, services or education) of the old paradigm characterizes society as being in the state of "scientific revolution" when the old paradigm is left behind while new one is not yet created.[2] Due to "revolution" the social organization of the old paradigm is found in crisis, the same happening to society.

The problem of "trust" has never been put in this way in modern science which fact is attributed as a drawback of theoretic science. There were only cases of trust study with elements of scientific model: consensus, social organization in science, scientific structure, theoretic beliefs etc.

Trust is studied nowadays by a number of sciences like sociology (rational action, quality of communication), philosophy (religious and moral concept), psychology[3] (motive, social feeling), economics (economic behavior and trust of consumers), culture study (state of culture), political science (legitimacy of power) etc. In sociology the subject under study in terms of trust is mechanism of creation of favorable individual or social perception of external factors, sharing of personal experience, knowledge or ability to a trustee, inducement to expected behavior where trust is the main prerequisite of creation of this action. In other words, since in sociology the subject under study is society in general, then we can analyze trust as a common mechanism which consolidates society into the whole where there is unity in opinions, aims, comprehension and methods of achievement of one's goals. The given methodological aspect in modern science has been without due attention so far.

We believe that the problem of trust nowadays is essential due to two processes: crisis of national "statehood" in European countries and in Russia and globalization which can be determined as the process of unification of economic, informational, political processes as well as inter-mixture of elites. In the first case there is the problem of trust to national power. It has been very actual in recent years due to social movements in various countries (Greece, Spain, France, Germany, Great Britain, here we can also mention "Arab spring" in Northern Africa). In the second case the problem of trust to the USA as

1 Корпоративная культура: проблемы и тенденции развития в мире и в России / Институт социально-политических исследований РАН. М.: Наука, 2011. С. 16.

2 Analysis of results of investigation carried out in Finland and published in a monograph. Secondary analysis of results shows that system of trust is based on the model of intellectual activity integrated into the concept of corporate culture. Loss of this concept leads to decrease in actuality. *Аутио В.* Об изменениях в трастовом капитале (капитале доверия): каково влияние глобализации? // Корпоративная культура: проблемы и тенденции развития в мире и в России / Институт социально-политических исследований РАН. М.: Наука, 2011.

3 *Купрейченко А. Б.* Психология доверия и недоверия. М.: Изд-во «Институт психологии РАН», 2008.

a leader of global unification, to its economic, financial, political and other factors of leadership and legitimacy of its leadership is being positioned.[1]

In the USA and Europe trust as a social problem was first actualized on the background of "revolution of managers" where the owner was fired from managing and he had to trust a manager of his property. The second aspect was under process during the development of the sphere of service industry and marketing activities where trust presupposes communication for products exchange and services.

The problem of trust was studied by foreign as well as Russian scholars of different generations among them are G. Simmel, F. Toennis, E. Durkheim, T. Parsons, P. Blau, E. Giddens, R. Darrendorf, J. Coleman, N. Luhman, A. Seligman, B. Guha-Khaznobis, P. Stompka, F. Fukuyama, R. Kanbur, T. Yamagishi, E. Ostrom, J. Night, M. Grannowetter, J. Buchenen, O. Williamson, S. Barsukov, Y. Veselov, T. Sazlavskaya, S. Kirdin, O. Kuzin, V. Radaev, R. Ryvkina etc.

The main trend in the carried out investigations was trust as condition for development of social system, social group, personality, settlement of conflicts.

One of the most perspective and important contemporary studies is the study of trust carried out under the leadership of professor Masamichi Sasaki on the basis of tools designed for the study of trust in American sociology. In his work "Cross-cultural studies of trust" he summarized his theoretical investigations of trust and results of empirical pilot study. The main conclusion maid by professor Masamichi Sasaki is that it is impossible to study trust by means of common methods which exist in modern sociology. His message is that in the study of trust one must take into consideration national, historical, ideological peculiarities of society and social groups in each country.

Professor Masamichi Sasaki distinguished a number of reasons for decrease in level of trust in societies. Among them is development of consumer society, institutionalization of social groups which led to the division of society into smaller parts and stop of communication among these groups. The importance of trust study according to professor Masamichi Sasaki is function of trust on consolidation of social system.[2] One more function of trust as he puts it, is normalization of "social exchange"[3] in all spheres of social life: economic, scientific, political, philosophical, social, interpersonal etc. At the same time from the point of view of European and American researchers the function of trust is decrease of growing complexities in social systems[4], decrease of risks (transaction costs).

Professor Masamichi Sasaki raises the question of trust as basis of society. Such formulation of the problem proves that neither social organization nor institution can be considered the basis of society as is believed in some sociological theories but trust which is socio-moral indication which characterizes quality of communicative relations in society (among separate individuals, among groups, between an individual and group). From

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1 См.: *Бжезинский З.* Выбор. Мировое господство или глобальное лидерство. М.: Международные отношения 2010; *Бжезинский З.* Еще один шанс. Три президента и кризис американской сверхдержавы. М.: Международные отношения. 2010; *Бжезинский З.* Великая шахматная доска. Господство Америки и его геостратегические императивы. М.: Международные отношения. 2010; *Фукуяма Ф.* Доверие. Социальные добродетели и путь к процветанию. М.: АСТ. 2004

2 Trust: Comparative Perspectives (2012) / Eds Sasaki M., Marsh R. M. Boston: Brill Academic Pub. P. 331.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

out point of view, we cannot speak about strong trust in societies in which the majority of population lives on state allowances since the fact of obtaining of these allowances becomes the purchase of trust. Such kind of society will trust to government on the basis of its dependence on it but not freedom. The given aspect disrupts the main conclusion of European and American theories of trust that in wealthy democratic countries the level of trust is higher than in poor and non-democratic ones[1].

The culturological approach of the study of trust carried out by professor Masamichi Sasaki, as he admits it, cannot be taken as a basis for sociological concept because trust is basis of social development while culture is derivative from society. Thus, trust originated prior to culture. But culturological aspect makes it possible to presume that in various societies there are various factors which are endowed with trust. This fact was found out in a pilot research carried out by professor Masamichi Sasaki. We believe that this difference depends on the structure of interests accepted in society which needs to be confirmed in trust.

Another important argument against cultural concept of trust is the fact that culture according to the concept of institutionalism is a set of rules and norms of social behavior, social values and patterns. It should be also noted that culturological concept does not allow it to define the degree of representativeness of study in case if the basis of socio-intellectual practice of communication are of different grounds (trust, "skepticism"[2] etc.).

Professor Masamichi Sasaki proved the influence of type of society of "individualistic and collectivistic culture" on the level of trust in society[3] which fact has become very significant for the development of sociological theory in Russia. Thus, inappropriate theoretical description of social structure and application of incorrect scientific tools may lead to false results in the research of peculiarities of the social development of society. Japanese researches in the person of professor Masamichi Sasaki on the basis of studies of social trust were first to claim the importance of classification of societies according to the degree of social consolidation in society and its influence on trust and social dynamics. Taking into account these peculiarities we can point out the dependence of trust on type of society which was first proved by cross-cultural pilot investigation[4] carried out under the leadership of professor Masamichi Sasaki.

For further theoretical and empirical investigation of trust professor Masamichi Sasaki distinguished a number of indicators which need to be analyzed in order to study the system of trust in society: ideology, religion, scientific influence, traditions and culture of society etc.

In our opinion modern studies of trust are divided into the following trends:

1) trust in science and education;
2) creation of the system of interests as factors requiring trust;
3) trust as mechanism of formation of stable society (growth or decrease of risk depends on government);
4) creation of system of state and administrative management in society;
5) trust in economics.

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1 Ibid. P. 333.

2 *Мертон Р.* Социальная теория и социальная структура. М.: АСТ–Хранитель, 2006.

3 Trust: Comparative Perspectives (2012) / Eds M. Sasaki, R. M. Marsh. Boston: Brill Academic Pub. P. 334.

4 Ibid.

Let us discuss each trend in details.

1) Trust as factor of development of science is very significant for the development of intellectual activity of contemporary society. Methodologically there are two approaches used in science: "trust" and "scepticism", or "distrust". The given methods of search for solution in fact divides science into two conflicting courses.

Trust can be defined as understanding of correct comprehension of reality and appropriate reaction to the occurring events. This process regards to education, development of intellect and world perception.[1] Philosophy of this lies in the fact that in the search of truth there are three essential aspects: activity, feelings, mind.[2] As is seen, we single out active approach in the study of trust. It should be noted that if trust allows it to search for trust, distrust or skepticism do not result in trust which is very important in understanding the possibilities of the development of modern science.

Due to domination of skepticism and impossibility to reach the truth in human scope in European modern science, various concepts and interpretations of truth from its complete denial in Popper's scientific theory to consensus as a method of "reaching" the truth in L. Laudan's theory are found. Consensus as a principal of "negotiations" about trust proves the contents of the notion of "trust" itself as well as trust to science, results of scientific insights and dominant ideology in a society. Revealed truth does not require to be discussed whether it is true or false. But many of scientific paradigms or traditions and other scientific organizations which do not have a common methodological basis can come to crisis or disappear if new theories which contradict to their own concepts of truth exist. As a result in order to protect such traditions the mechanism of "consensus" was formed. This mechanism cares not for the truth but protects a number of scientific traditions and paradigms from disappearance independent of their actual scientific significance. The solution of this problem seems to be rather complicated since these scientific traditions are connected with national ideology and their crisis would lead to crisis of national self reflection dominant in this society. Although from the point of view I. Lakatos crisis as a past experience must serve as motivation to create new theoretic insights and accumulation of positive socio-intellectual heuristics.

Trust in science is considered to be a connecting tissue which makes it possible to create new knowledge, carry out investigations, create scientific social hierarchy and basing on its stereotype reproduce social and political hierarchy. Simultaneously, trust can be seen as personal and subjective characteristics which possesses moral foundations characterizing an individual's attitude to his life, actions and thoughts.

Science when contacting with society transmits it a part of its characteristics: way of thinking, moral values, principles of activity, knowledge, it also allows society to reach a newer level of comprehension of social as well as natural life. As a result of communications between society and science which are characterized by a high degree of trust the culture of society begins to transform on the basis of scientific knowledge and discoveries. This aspect has not been analyzed thoroughly in science as well as the role of trust in contemporary scientific organization, research activities, relations of society and science, in formation of the subject-matter of the study etc.

As a summary we can notice the insufficiency of studies related to the meaning of "trust" in order to develop scientific and ideological spheres of society which fact can be

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1 См.: *Зиммель Г.* Избранное. Т. 1. Философия культуры. Пер. с нем. М., 1996. С. 161, 182.

2 *Зиммель Г.* Избранное. Т. 1. Философия культуры. Пер. с нем. М., 1996.

considered to be the reason of the contemporary socio-political crisis in a number of European countries as well as in Russia. Trust in science is manifested according to a society which accepts the results of scientific investigations and reproduces them in the context of social life.

2) In contemporary social theory one of the approaches of formation and development is considered to be institutionalism which actually in modern stage is the main trend in the analysis of social processes. Analysis of institutional concepts aimed at studying the foundations of society makes it possible to conclude that the main reason of organization of people into groups are interests while values and culture serve to be the necessary element for consolidation and structuring of a particular group but not formation of the given social layer. A person interested in income serves in a company as well as the other ones who have the same interest but their values and culture send them to different companies and distribute according to the level of their obligations to different positions in an organization. Consequently, in the practice of social analysis having analyzed all possible models of social development we should create a new concept of society on the basis of the system of trust and structure of interests peculiar to the whole society but its separate groups.

The problem of gaining "interests" is manifested not in organization but in the possibility to gain it where the main aspect is trust to opportunity given to a doer to reach his interest. Accordingly we have a picture of the strategy for search and obtaining the interest.

Institution by its structural nature does not presuppose common interest for all social groups involved in it. It regulates behavior of some groups which are filled according to their position, economic, social, political or scientific authority. Lack of structure of interests characterizes institutions as closed public groups where the basis of interactions among groups and institutions are political, legal and economic mechanisms.

In institutional concepts the belonging to an institution is postulated by property qualification, occupation, social role and location. At the same time there are no factors except legal ones which would integrate people into the structure of the whole society of a country or a nation. Identification to one's ethnicity is an essential aspect to obtain one's interest since access is ethnically reproduced degree of trust.

Majority of societies in contemporary world have a clear structure of interests including national philosophy, political, social, economic, group and interpersonal interests. This structure results in creation of social groups which strive for obtaining their interest. These groups can be temporary or permanent depending on the time of possibility of active obtaining of interest. From this point of view society is a social system created as a result of structuring of various interests[1] obtaining of which requires union into a social group or society.

"Interest" to create a group must be confirmed by "trust" in possibility to obtain this interest. Accordingly, "trust" as a social characteristics becomes a basis of any activity as well as intellectual activity in contrast to "scepsis". As is seen in R. Merton's work scientific skepticism leads to conflict in society which breaks it into parts while trust forms and structures society according to the level of interest and trust to the its obtaining.

Trust characterizes possibility to obtain interest where the system of interests penetrates into the whole society actually forming the pyramid of interests including higher or long-term and lower or short-term interests. Efficiency of interest is confirmed by

1 For instance, structuring according to the motivation system of Maslow from lower motivational factors or interests to higher factors etc.

trust to its contents. As a rule, material values accepted in this society, authority, prestigious and other significant material and non-material factors and types of activities serve as basis of interest. Further investigations should help create the structure of interests of the modern Russian society and define the degree of trust in obtaining interests and accordingly its actualization in society.

On the basis of mechanism of trust denoted above we form the system of trust which allows it to create social groups united by common interests with greater degree of trust in obtaining the aims. At the same time interests as well as aims can be log-term or short-term which is defined in the system of trust. Taking into consideration the above mentioned the groups in society are formed for short or long periods and they do not have any barriers but free to welcome new members who are required share to group's interests and level of trust.

Consequently, the low economic activity of citizens is conditioned by low level of trust to the possibility of obtaining the economic result, lack of this interest and "trust" itself in the mechanism of the whole society and its culture (culture of money). Low level of trust to economic activity and economic agents decreases the level of economic development of a country.

3) Problem of trust as a mechanism of formation of stable society is particularly urgent nowadays in Russia. Russian sociologists mark the low level of socio-political and economic trust in Russia due to Western-standard reforms carried out by the government.

If to analyze development of Russia from the point of view of the system of trust beginning from perestroika in the USSR (1986) and reforms in Russia we can see that everything done and introduced was aimed at weakening of the system of trust: perestroika, State Committee of Emergency, collapse of the USSR, crack of ideological system, privatization, disruption of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, inflation, default, undermining the prestige of science and significance of scientific ideas, civil war in Caucasus, reforms in education, reforms in science – all these processes were aimed only at weakening the level of trust in society, decrease in quality of social, political, administrative, scientific and other kinds of communications. On the background of the given processes trust becomes the priority field of study in order to create a stable society.

Russian society is characteristic of social trust which makes traditional social patterns of behavior in society and in group and performance of one's own social status and role more significant. That is why trust is being formed not due to passive expectations of actions made by others for you but according to an active social standpoint of the trustee and the one who is given trust to in case a person sticks to accepted rules and stereotypes of social behavior.

In the social context trust makes it possible to form a single scientific, philosophical, socio-cultural system and thus affects such spheres of social activity as science, culture, education, traditions, stable state legal system, political sphere. In such approach trust is characterized by moral, ideological and cultural indicators and defines the level of openness and confidence of an individual and society in all spheres of social activity. Accordingly, trust is realized as an attribute of stability and quality of social communications. Society at the same time is seen as a system of communications between individuals and social groups realized in social space on the basis of traditions, rules and norms.

4) Formation of the system of state and administrative management in society.

Research problem of trust is the development of society as a single social system which can spontaneously react to all internal as well as external changes. In this respect

trust can be characterized as a precondition of creation of social communications which provide mutual understanding, harmony and consequently the efficiency of interactions between groups in a society.

The existing system of trust and the system of values based on it allows it to create the system which would be able to manage this society and make solutions (political system), economic system, system of social stratification and mechanisms of vertical and horizontal mobility for creation of human resources. When government uses social trust it either gets or not support for all its reforms in society, economics etc.

Trust may be discerned as a resource of society which is a total positive experience of interrelations centered around social communications which can be used by an individual or a group aimed at problem solving. In such interpretation "trust" is seen as a condition for the development of society, culture, science, economics etc.

The tougher is the problem of trust the less diversified are the the agents' aims in economic, political and social spheres. Competitive individualistic societies are characteristic of aims in terms of economics. Collective societies are characterized by a greater number of aims with moral component where government or another authority plays a distributive role. But when these societies are differentiated into competing social groups and their aims are of economic nature, it may lead to tough internal confrontation and split in society. This is characteristic of contemporary Russian society. In this situation any political, legal or administrative regulations turn into the mechanism of consistent breach of the system of trust and split of society which fact is quite obvious nowadays. We should reach "harmony" in society and on the basis of it forming the system of trust, structure the society and its subdivisions. Actually social trust must be directed to realization of favorable socio-administrative climate which may result in growth of the socio-economic development of society.

"Trust" as characteristics of integration of social groups into the social structure, as a factor of acceptance of governmental reforms by society can be traced at public opinion monitoring carried out by Russian Public Opinion Research Center[1] and national census and other centers of opinion polls. They indicate the level of trust but the level of legitimacy and efficiency of political decisions which can be correlated. The majority of researchers notice the consistent decline in the level of trust in society.

5) Problem of trust in economics is most studied in framework of economic theories: concept of game rules, economic behavior, marketing etc. The most significant theories belong to the following scholars: J. Night, M. Grannowetter, J. Buchenen, F. Toennis, N. Luhman, O. Williamson, F. Fukuyama, B. Guha-Khaznobis, R. Kanbur, E. Ostrom, A. Seligman.

Problem of trust in eonomics is studied in the context of corporate management and development of economic activity while actually no aspect of trust is paid attention to in financial system especially if to carry out a public poll in relation to the USA dollar. Increase of the U. S. national debt for 2.5 billion dollars to support the poor allowed it U. S. Federal Reserve System to earn 2.5 billion dollars on the sell of stock of the U. S. national debt.[2]

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1 Результаты опросов общественного мнения: июль–август 2010 // ВЦИОМ: Мониторинг общественного мнения: экономические и социальные перемены. 4 (98). Июль–август 2010.

2 Минфин США обещает избежать дефолта к Новому году. URL: http://www.bfm.ru/news/2012/12/27/minfin-ssha-obeshhaet-izbezhat-defolta-k-novomu-godu.html; Долг Америки в реальном времени. URL: http://www.abird.ru/articles/USA_debt.

Studies of trust in economics are carried out in the framework of institutional concepts: "game rules" and transactional costs where trust decreases the costs on creation and promotion of products; public capital; "radius of trust"[1] according to which a created trustful image in external environment defines the efficiency of economic policy of the country's regions where the borders of favorable environment stand for the "radius of trust".

Analysis of elements of trust in the context of relation to economic is of great significance. Trust is understood as "social capital beyond government regulation" in contradiction to institutions which they understand as "social capital being regulated by government"[2]. Approach to trust as "capital" is not a happy one since it refers not to trust but to loyalty whereas trust cannot be bought.

At the same time "purchase" of loyalty as a factor must be indicated in rules of behavior of institutions of economic agents which refers to legal aspects not sociological ones. Economic agents acquire loyalty of social and political agents and their electorate. Thus, there is mixture of economic interests of agents belonging to various spheres of human activity into a single system directed to mainly external realization[3], i. e. it presupposes external aggressive economic expansion aiming at realization of material interests of leading groups because internal realization leads to internal confrontation and socio-political conflict. The resolution of this conflict occurs beyond the boundaries of society which brought it to life, outside of the USA.

Society divided into institutions is found in a situation of tough competition between institutions and groups which brought them to life. This competition can lead to a tough confrontation. The problem of trust from the point of view of economic investigations is characteristic of the American culture and is not of a polycultural nature. Moreover, for the world community it has negative tendencies the analysis of which in modern science is practically not found. The result of the tough economic politics of the USA, i. e. liberal economics is socio-economic crisis in European countries accompanied by social conflicts and political confrontation.

In the scope of economic studies the question of perception of economically favorable information by an addressee is very significant. In this question the main focus is trust between the source (it may not be necessarily an original source but a n-mediator and accordingly the information may vary dramatically from initial variant) and addressee. The results of these investigations are applied in advertisement, network marketing of products and services.

A number of researchers of the problem of trust single out the following factor: "orientation for another" person and future.[4] However, trust must characterize a person as well: his abilities, activity, a person must correspond to a necessary level of trust where trust as qualitatively moral attribute indicates ability and desire of a person to follow rules of a group in search of his aim.

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1 *Фукуяма Ф.* Великий разрыв / Пер. с англ. под общ. ред. А. В. Александровой. М.: АСТ, 2003. С. 31.

2 *Guha-Khasnobis B., Kanbur R., Ostrom E.* (Eds). Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. P. 90.

3 External realization decreases internal confrontation among various agents of activity.

4 *Луман Н.* Социальные системы. Очерк общей теории. Пер. с нем. И. Д. Газиева / Под ред. Н. А. Головина. СПб.: Наука, 2007; *Теннис Ф.* Общность и общество. Пер. Д. В. Скляднев СПб.: Владимир Даль, 2002; *Селигмен А.* Проблема доверия. М.: Идея-Пресс, 2002.

Table 1
System of trust depending on the weak and strong subjective position
(carried out by authors)

Trust	Active (strong) trust	Passive (weak)
Personality	Trust-active mechanism of social life, interaction of different personalities on the basis of socially significant models of behavior.	Mechanism of expectation of definite actions in relation to one's self.
Group	Trust in group naturally creates it on the basis of common knowledge, patterns of behavior, search for suitable solution to increase positive heuristics.	A group is united artificially on the basis of accepted patterns of culture, technologies of task solution.
Society	Trust as social mechanism is manifested via common culture, language, ideology, social stereotypes of behavior, allowed mechanisms of search for positive solution or positive heuristics.	Society consists of a number of social systems which differs by the level of trust and direction of its manifestation from government. System of trust is likely to be manifested according to the principle of interrelated vessels or gateways where decrease in level of trust in one institution is compensated by its growth in another institution due to positive heuristics brought into it from outside.

The above-mentioned five trends in the study of trust are not the final classification of the problem. They require in each case detailed notions, for instance such notions as "distrust", "scepticism", "confidence" etc.

As a mechanism "trust" is a permanent, active social practice which has its tradition, culture, patterns – it is not an artificially created element of social life. As a socio-moral process trust differs from other social factors by its philosophical, religious, moral and ideological character. So the studies of trust must be carried out taking into account these factors.

The carried out analysis allows it to distinguish between "passive" and "active" natures of trust (Table 1) where trust is manifested as subjective action or expectation of creation of objective reality by the government.

Trust as factor of social space can be seen in two dimensions: personal and social. Social trust is subdivided into two trends: social group and society as a whole where in a strong position in case of realization of the mechanism of trust the agent is ready to solve problems independently or in a group. In a weak position he has to rely on heuristics of "another"; he must trust him in the given situation as he finds himself in a positive heuristics. If the first position originates from trust to one's abilities and environment this positive heuristics is quickly retransmitted and realized with trust. The second position takes its roots from the position of weakness – this kind of trust is initially unhappy one and in fact to some degree it is distrust or scepticism where the presented heuristics is being constantly controlled and criticized.

The singled out attributes of active and passive trust are conditional and require extra investigations and analysis but to some extend they reflect correctly the tendency of passive (weak) trust research in contemporary sociology and ignoring of strong active sides of the given social phenomena.

Table 2
Manifestations of strong and weak points of trust in social systems

Trust polar indications	Life perception, formation of positive heuristics, subjective active activity	Lower level of life perception, dependence on positive heuristics of others, passive expectation
Strong trust	×	
Weak trust		×

Table 3
Trends in trust studies in sociological science

Consistency in trust study	Methodologically correct order of trust study	Methodologically incorrect order of trust study
1	Society	Personality
2	Social groups	Social goups
3	Personality	Society

We can presume that formation of individual trust requires a strong intellectual personality, who is creative, educated, healthy, while weak trust creates an individual dependent on the behavior of others, in other words the government.

In our opinion we should differentiate between methods for the study of trust in social groups dependent on government (allowances, salary, contracts) and trust in groups free from this guardianship since orientation of "dependent groups" to "others" can transform traditional system of trust accepted in a given society into something very different.

Mechanism of trust manifested in society is stronger and more significant in contrast to the system of trust of a single person. Trust in society is considered to be space for realization of individual's personality that is why it is necessary to study trust in society and then deal with personality. But if in the first stage we study trust of a personality then we should answer the following question: who (society or government) creates favorable environment for realization of person's individuality? If it is government (system of allowances) then the question of trust to society has no reason and is meaningless from the point of view of separate individuals especially if society is of individualistic culture. In terms of the second case we do not have a sociological approach in the study of "trust" in society.

It should be noted that "trust" despite its significance for social development has not been duly studied in modern science. Preliminary analysis indicates that "trust" is a basis for development of various social systems, social, international and inter-confessional communications. Mechanism of trust allows it to balance the direction of development of society according to traditions via positive heuristics in obtaining interests.

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DIALECTICS OF SOCIAL TRUST AND DISTRUST[1]

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Introduction

Trust – as the cornerstone of the existence of human society, self-organization and social partnership, mutual aid and cooperation – has been attracting the close attention of researchers for many decades already. Interest in researching social trust is stimulated by changes in the political and socio-economic order of a significant part of the world, crisis processes in the economy, and globalization and anti-globalization tendencies. So far, the "trust deficit" that formed in Russian society toward the middle of the 1990s has been felt in many spheres, especially the economic, political, and social. This phenomenon is an obstacle on the path toward the formation of a full-fledged civil society. An effective society (civil) is a society where civic organizations and the state act as partners, where the functioning of social institutions is the result of the interaction of all interested parties, where the social responsibility of business and any citizen is supported, where an atmosphere of mature relations of trust prevails, not one of blind faith or fear. In this society, partnership relations prevail over paternalistic ones, while a dynamic balance between trust and distrust, based on knowledge and identity, prevails over patriarchal, clan-based, naïve and emotional trust/distrust.

A host of studies in recent years has been devoted to the urgent problems of researching trust, in particular the types and kinds, the dynamics, the social-psychological functions, and the consequences and effects of trust, and its interrelation with the various phenomena in the life activity of an individual and a group (Antonenko, 2004; Veselov, 2004; Dunkin, 2000; Zhuravlev, Sumarokova, 1998; Zhuravleva, 2004; Kupreychenko, 2008, 2011; Minina, 2004; Skripkina, 2000; Sasaki, Davydenko, Latov, Romashkin, 2009; Shihirev, 1998; Schrader, 2004; Bachmann, Zaheer, 2006; Fukuyama, 1995; Hardin, 2004; Kramer, 1999; Luhmann, 1979; Seligman, 1997; Shaw, 1997; Sztompka, 1998; Yamagishi et al., 1998; Yamagishi, Yamagishi, 1994; Yoshino, Rangan, 1995; etc.).

In recent years, researchers have also begun to show an interest in distrust as a relatively independent phenomenon (Eremicheva, Simpura, 1999; Kupreychenko, 2006,

1 The research leading to these results has received funding from the Basic Research Program at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics.

2008; Minina, 2004; Kupreychenko, Tabharova, 2007, 2008; Cook, 1998; Govier, 1994; Hardin, 2004; Kramer, 1999; Lewicki, McAllister, Bies, 1998; Macedo, 2000; Markova, Gillespie, 2007; Mishler, Rose, 1997; Montpetit, 2003; Moody, 2010; Sztompka, 1998; Kramer, Cook, 2004; Worchel 1979; Zadeh, Khoshalhan, 2011; etc.).

Interest in researching distrust stems from the fact that differences, and often contradictions in objectives and values and in the norms and rules of behaviour as well, are characteristic of real social interaction. Not infrequently, interaction takes place in conditions of high uncertainty, in the absence of regimentation and of the possibility of oversight. In such conditions, a balance between the levels of trust and distrust becomes an ever more promising form of mutual relations. Such tendencies in social life determine the high relevance of *joint analysis of trust and distrust* as relatively independent phenomena, fulfilling specific functions in the regulation of the life activity of an individual and a group. It was just this joint analysis that acted as the objective of our research. In the course of a theoretical-empirical analysis, we are going to carry out a demarcation of the signs and the causes of trust and distrust and determine their positive and negative functions, as well as carrying out an analysis of the fundamental reasons for the emergence of ambivalence – i. e. the concurrent existence of trust and distrust of other people, as well as of social institutions.

The positive and negative effects of trust and distrust

The majority of modern-day authors share a point of view about the positive significance of a high level of trust for the interaction of various subjects. To researchers, the "minuses" of distrust are likewise obvious. Distrust not only leads to an increase in transaction costs connected with the need for guarantees and oversight, but likewise restricts communications and complicates the transfer of information, thereby complicating and dragging out decision-making processes.

In the majority of modern-day works on the problem of trust, the advantages of relations of trust are justified and the negative consequences of distrust are noted. However, there exists a series of special studies dedicated to analysing the negative consequences for relations and the efficiency of joint activity that high trust entails, and the positive impact on relations of moderate distrust (Lewicki, McAllister, Bies, 1998; McAllister, 1997, Kramer, Cook, 2004). A series of the works mentioned contains a deep analysis of the researchers' notions about the consequences of an unequivocally high level of trust and the advantages of an optimal correlation between trust and distrust. Basing ourselves on the results of our own empirical research, we shall add to this analysis with notions about the positive role of a balance of trust and distrust in regulating relations.

High and unequivocal trust can lead to a whole series of negative consequences. In the opinion of the majority of authors, the principal minus of relations of trust is *abuse of trust*. This can occur in the form of breach of trust, when a partner's openness and vulnerability are used to gain advantage. In this case, the trust will be irrevocably lost; however, the gain can be extremely significant. It is perfectly likely that the person who has not justified the trust would not have been capable of attaining it by way of negotiations or in the course of honest struggle. Another variant of abuse of trust, one that is not connected with deceit, but is a manipulation, is possible as well. Thus, by threatening a loss of trust, one can attain various concessions and additional benefits from a partner as proofs of friendship and devotion.

It is imperative to likewise note the "minuses" of trust for the person whom others are intending to trust as well. He may not have the desire to act as an object of trust. Firstly, because the trust assumes a responsibility that he is not prepared to take on. Secondly, the reduction in psychological distance does not allow him to maximise his own gain from the interaction. In the event that the person feels himself capable of winning in conditions of rivalry in an absence of trust, i. e. he has, in his own opinion, high chances of success in a competitive situation, then he is more limited in the choice of ways and means of influence in conditions of trust. Inasmuch as, having applied force, cunning, or intimidation in relation to a person who trusts him, he will turn out to be a betrayer, a swindler. But this is unacceptable for the majority of people, who strive to maintain their self-respect. The imposition of trust in order to reduce uncertainty and to ensure one's own security is a manipulative method: "See, *I trust you*, and this means *you have got to*…". It can be said that *the stronger partner loses in conditions of trust*. Therefore, far from everybody is ready to accept a high level of trust imposed by other participants in interaction. If the manipulation of trust is mutual, then such "pseudo-trust" can be a dangerous game. Characteristic of it is the readiness of each party to strike an unexpected blow in the conditions of periodic demonstration of openness that a *game of trust* inevitably assumes. Sooner or later, one of the parties is going to make use of this unprotectedness, and the outcome is going to depend on who manages to be the first to strike the blow.

For the sake of fairness, it is imperative to note that the *game of distrust* as well is fraught with no fewer negative consequences. This game consists of a demonstration of unreadiness to trust a partner who is interested in earning it. The partner is forced to constantly demonstrate his good intentions, reliability, predictability, and so on. At the same time, the position of the initiator of the game of "I do not trust him" is more advantageous – inasmuch as it allows the initiator to be demanding and impatient, as well as not to observe social norms in relation to the partner.

Yet another unpleasant outcome of a high level of trust is, the fact that an *absence of oversight and competition has a relaxing effect on the interacting parties.* A partner's errors and omissions in conditions of excessive trust remain unnoticed, prospective opportunities unrealised, existing potential undiscovered (Lewicki, McAllister, Bies, 1998). In such a manner, too high a level of trust reduces the efficiency of activity, even if the parties have the best of intentions.

When there is a high level of trust, there likewise arise situations when the suspicious behaviour of the other person is brushed aside or interpreted in a positive light. This can serve as a justification of the efforts that have been put into the formation of the trust. We consider that one of the social-psychological functions of trust – the reproduction of social-psychological personal space – can likewise be realised in such a manner. It is imperative to sometimes "close one's eyes" to a partner's unseemly behaviour in order to preserve close relations.

Acting as a defence against such negative consequences of excessive and unequivocal trust are *trust limiters*, as well as a *dynamic balance of trust and distrust.* It is not by chance that the question of analysing the effectiveness, functionality, and usefulness of distrust is raised by a series of researchers. In the majority of works, what is being spoken of is *institutional distrust*, *i. e.* the rules and norms embodied in formal and informal institutional codes (Lewicki, McAllister, Bies, 1998; Luhmann, 1979). These norms limit the free exchange of information and other resources between interacting subjects and prescribe procedures for mutual oversight and reporting, as well as sanctions in the event of violation of these norms.

Depersonalisation of distrust allows a sufficiently high level of trust and morale and a comfortable psychological atmosphere to be maintained in an organisation. This is possible because the carrying out of institutionalised oversight and reporting procedures are not perceived of as suspiciousness and surveillance, but is appraised as the voluntary and valid observance of the norms of corporate culture.

Yet another important advantage of a balance of trust and distrust in relations can be noted. Having become the norm of interaction with associates, an optimal correlation between trust and distrust expands the circle of people, organisations, and social groups with which a subject can enter into contact, and whose assistance he can make use of.

Ambivalence of trust and distrust

Yet another question that elicits the interest of modern-day researchers is analysis of the conditions under which the co-existence of trust and distrust is possible in social relations.

In conditions where complexity, uncertainty, and role conflicts are common, where interpersonal relations are formed gradually and are multi-faceted by nature, there exists a high potential for *one-time intensification of trust and distrust* (Lewicki, McAllister, Bies, 1998).

What is being spoken of is the multi-dimensionality of relations, brought about by a confluence of different spheres of the partners' life activity: civic, business, friendship, family, and so on. Thus, for example, partners in business may be connected by bonds of friendship or kinship; at the same time, they may possess similar or contradictory worldview positions, political convictions, religious conventions, predilections in the area of leisure pursuits, and so on. Their statuses and the social roles they play in each of these spheres of life are going to differ. On the athletic field, the head of an organisation may switch roles with his subordinate – the captain of an amateur team.

We are convinced that trust and distrust can manifest themselves and co-exist in the same aspects of relations between people. In particular, acting as a cause may be the presence of contradictory qualities in the person being appraised. Thus, a partner's high competence (which creates confidence that he will be able to handle a task) may act as a basis for trust in business relations, while other peculiarities of his personality, for example disorganisation (which is going to lead to deadlines not being met) may act as a basis for just as high distrust.

Besides that, it was established in the course of our empirical research that there exist qualities of an individual that may elicit both trust and distrust at the same time. First and foremost, these are such personality traits as: strength, activeness, boldness, and optimism, as well as weakness, difference of interests, hyper-responsibility, and the like. One of the explanations for this may be an assertion about how strength, activeness, boldness, and so on may bring significant benefit in cooperation. These same traits become dangerous if they are possessed by a potential adversary. Analogously, a partner's weakness in interaction reduces trust in him, because it may reflect negatively on the results of the joint activity. At the same time, it likewise holds back distrust, because it is a guarantee of no danger.

The incongruity between the psychological gain from justification of trust and the psychological loss in the event that one's worst fears come to fruition is yet another reason for the ambivalence of trust and distrust. Thus, optimistic expectations about the results of the realisation of a joint business project may be based on a literately worked out business plan (the basis for high trust). In real life, they are accompanied by fears not

only that the project will drag out or will bring less income that expected (low trust), but likewise the fear that compromising information about his personal life will have a negative impact on the company's image (the basis for low trust). One can likewise have a fear that one's partner will turn out to be connected with the criminal world (a basis for high distrust). This threatens heavier consequences – loss of one's business, and perhaps even of one's life.

Yet another reason for ambivalence in the attitude toward one and the same person are connected with the psychological peculiarities of the truster. Thus, cases of the emergence of "multiple reality", connected with a patient's inability to accept that one and the same person can bring pleasure and cause frustration, have been described in clinical practice (Kafka, 1989). In such cases, the images of real people may "bifurcate"; in so doing, one part may elicit positive feelings and the other – negative ones. Sometimes these images may correspond to various sub-personalities of the perceiving person or to his various states. This multiplicity of sub-personalities and psychological spaces both of the subject of trust and of his partner, in our opinion, can also give rise to an ambivalence of trust and distrust in relations.

There exists yet another reason for an intensification of distrust concurrently with a rise in trust. The fact is that with an increase in the partners' openness, the risks connected with it (the possible negative consequences of defrauding the trust) grow. Indeed, the closer that partners in interaction are socially and physically, the more vulnerable they are to one another. A high appraisal of the risks arising as a result of the openness of a subject and a partner in interaction may lead to a rise in distrust. In such relations, distrust, in contrast with trust, often does not have objective foundations, because it is not corroborated by any negative facts. Such unjustified distrust is rather typical of highly significant relations and depends little on evidence of a partner's reliability. As has already been noted above, only guarantees of security will help to reduce distrust.

For example, the following methods are not infrequently used in clan communities: restriction of partners' access to full information about one another ("the less you know, the sounder you sleep"), or, on the contrary, the existence of common secrets ("joined at the hip"). Strict interdependence and mutual responsibility between the partners ("covering each other's backside") also reduces distrust. Only psychological closeness – the existence of a common world-view or system of values, as well as mutual acceptance, respect, and so on – can act as a more reliable guarantee. Truly deep relations are the only restrictor of distrust that is effective in full measure in the most significant spheres of a subject's life activity. A commonality of objectives and interests, a good knowledge of the partner, and confidence in his high morality create the conditions for overcoming ambivalence in relations and forming high trust against a background of low distrust. However, this type of relations of absolute and complete trust is not often encountered in real life, and, besides that, may have not only positive consequences, but negative ones as well, for example in the event of abuse of trust.

The relationship between trust and distrust

Some grounds for distinguishing between their content and origin are proposed in the works of the Russian historian and social psychologist Porshnev (1965, 1972). Understanding trust as a predisposition toward suggestion and dependence on another, Porshnev notes that "dependence" (suggestion) is more primary than the "internal world" of a loner". In his opinion, distrust is an attitude that forms a person's internal world. Psy-

chological independence is achieved by resisting dependence. In such a manner, the ability not to trust, along with the ability to trust is ontogenetically and philogenetically one of the most ancient of formations.

Such a view, in our opinion, is capable of expanding the notions about the formation of basic trust at the early stages of ontogenesis that had been laid down by Erikson and have become traditional (Erikson, 1950). One can express the hypothesis that basic trust (a sense of unity and identity with one's mother, of the comfort and safety of one's surrounding environment) is what a child enters the world with. Continuing Porshnev's analogy, it ought to be assumed that it is more primary than the sense of independence. At the foundation of basic distrust lies the self-preservation instinct, which determines the avoidance of unpleasant factors in the milieu and forms a child's awareness of his boundaries and the need to protect them. Basic distrust – the sense that the surrounding world is not devoid of danger – emerges at the early stages of ontogenesis as a natural consequence of the basic trust with which a child comes into the world.

In such a manner, the skills of trusting and distrusting the world in a certain proportion are formed at the initial stage of the development of the personality. A balanced mix of the ability to be open to the world and be closed, when it is needed – is what, in our opinion, is true autonomy. I.e. precisely that new growth that is formed at the first stage of the psycho-social development of the personality, called "the cornerstone of a personality's viability". Among other elements, a person's autonomy includes the awareness by him of the boundaries of his own "I", his psychological space and the boundaries of the surrounding world. Fears connected with the intrusion of surrounding people inside of these boundaries, as well as fears connected with the violation by the subject of the boundaries of the surrounding world and of other people, is the foundation of distrust. Acting as the foundation of trust are expectations of usefulness (kind and fair treatment) from those to whom the individual opens the boundaries of his own psychological space or those whose boundaries he violates.

Analysis of the origin of trust and distrust brings us directly to an examination of the functions that these phenomena perform in the life of a subject. A separate paragraph in a special work is dedicated to their detailed analysis (Kupreychenko, 2008). But here we shall merely note that trust and distrust fulfil a series of similar functions – they regulate relations with the surrounding world, reproduce a person's social-psychological space, and other things. At the same time, one can identify functions that are specific to trust and distrust. Thanks to trust, a subject enters into interaction with the world, and knows and transforms it and himself. In such a manner, it is precisely trust that creates the conditions for a subject's *interaction* with the surrounding world. But distrust promotes the *isolation and self-preservation* of a subject and his psychological space. In this is manifest its protective function. Consequently, yet another characteristic capable of distinguishing between trust and distrust is "orientation at interaction – orientation at isolation and self-preservation".

In our opinion, trust represents positive expectations far from all the time. When we trust a person, we accept from him not only positive appraisals of our own behaviour, but negative ones too, as well as behaviours that are unpleasant for us, but fair (for example, punishment). Undeserved praise is capable of shaking trust to a greater degree than is an unpleasant but justified reprimand. In its turn, good as well, coming from a person whom we do not trust, becomes a basis for even greater suspicions. Especially if we did nothing to deserve such good treatment. There exist wise maxims that reveal the true significance of this "benefit": "The only free cheese is in a mousetrap", "Beware of Greeks

bearing gifts". In such a manner, one can identify the features that allow trust and distrust to be distinguished more reliably than positive and negative expectations do. Acting as such, in our opinion, are expectation of benefit (a feature of trust), including in the form of admonition, restriction, or punishment and expectation of harm (a feature of distrust), including, also in the form of undeserved reward, flattery, helpfulness, and so on.

It can be seen that there are conative, cognitive, and emotional formations among the principal factors of trust-distrust. This allows for trust and distrust to be regarded as an attitude with its traditional structure that includes the enumerated components.

Trust includes interest in and respect for the object or partner; a notion of the needs that can be satisfied as the result of interaction with him; emotions from anticipating the partner's satisfaction with them and his positive emotional appraisal; relaxation and an unconditional readiness to manifest good will in relation to him, as well as to perform certain actions conducive to successful interaction. In its turn, **distrust** includes the following basic elements: an conscious awareness of risks; a feeling of danger and fear in combination with negative emotional appraisals of the partner and of the possible results of interaction; vigilance and tension, as well as a readiness to cease contact, to respond to aggression, or to manifest anticipatory proactive animosity – to inflict a "preventive strike".

It is important to note that the content and the degree of apprehensions (distrust), as a rule, are not equivalent to the content and the level of hopes (trust). It is known that the satisfaction of winning is always lower than the aggravation of losing. This phenomenon has been sufficiently well researched and can be explained by the fact that we lose something that already belongs to us – something that is "ours", while we acquire something that is not yet included in this understanding. Therefore, quantitatively equivalent acquisitions and losses have different psychological significance. However, yet another important aspect exists in relations of trust and distrust. What we lose, often times, is not even by objective appraisals the equivalent of what we are counting on acquiring as the result of interaction – the item of trust is non-equivalent to the item of distrust.

What has been said can be clarified with the following example. Thus, for many people, the arguments in favour of marriage are expectations of understanding, love, comfort, and so on (a characteristic of high trust). For other people, expectations of the enumerated values in family life are not high, and this does not elicit particular worry in them (medium or low trust). However, if a marriage turns out to be unsuccessful, the losses will turn out to be more significant. Faith in people, hope for the future, a social circle, social status, and material benefits may turn out to have been lost. A subject who gives thought to this far ahead of time experiences high distrust. One who barely thinks about this at all experiences low distrust. These peculiarities of trust and distrust allow one to look in a new way at the problem of the ways and the methods of forming relations of trust. As follows from what has been said, to fight distrust, increasing the weightiness of the advantages and benefits that a subject can acquire as the result of trust (self-disclosure), presents itself as useless. Only some guarantees can reduce distrust (a marriage contract, retaining separate circles of contacts, and so on). In exactly the same way, discounting tickets or enhancing the level of comfort of airliners are not capable of reducing distrust in air transport.

In such a manner, high trust signifies the expectation of a significant benefit; low trust – not-high expectations. High distrust manifests itself in the form of fears of greater losses. Low distrust is characterised by unexpressed apprehensions. In so doing, *acquisitions from justification of trust and losses as the result of confirmation of distrust, in*

the majority of cases, are not equivalent, be it qualitatively, or quantitatively, or, all the more so, psychologically. If expectations of trust do not prove to be true, nothing horrible is going to happen. But if expectations of distrust prove to be true, then, having stepped onto a dangerous partner's own "territory", we may lose something highly significant.

One can imagine the problem of trust-distrust figuratively as "the dilemma of the mouse before the mousetrap". In the event that trust is justified, it gets a piece of cheese, but in the event of confirmation of distrust, it loses its life. Acting as the item of trust is the piece of cheese, the item of distrust (the stake) – life. Increasing the weight of the cheese will elevate trust, but only rust on the mousetrap or something of the kind can reduce distrust.

Empirical research on the factors of trust and distrust

The assumptions voiced above about the relationship of trust and distrust are without a doubt in need of verification. A certain corroboration of them was obtained by us in the course of empirical research into the phenomena of trust and distrust of other people (Kupreychenko, Tabharova, 2007, 2008). 310 people participated in the study. At the first stage, 165 people took part in it – predominantly psychology students getting a first and second higher education aged 20 to 35, (65% women, 35% men). The sample for the second stage of the study – 145 top-tier managers, entrepreneurs, and rank-and-file employees of organisations (43% managers, 57% rank-and-file employees). Of these: 45% men, 55% women.

The gathering of empirical data was carried out in the course of the conducting of focus groups and a survey. Content-analysis, factor analysis, and analysis of differences were used for processing the data. The proprietary questionnaire proposed to appraise the significance for trust and distrust of each descriptor from an expansive list. This list of 97 descriptors had been formed at the first stage of the study. We designated the descriptors that were the most significant from the point of view of our respondents as criteria of trust and distrust.

An asymmetry in the criteria of trust and distrust was established in the course of a frequency analysis. High appraisals of a partner's strength, activeness, boldness, and optimism act as especially significant criteria of trust for the overwhelming number of the participants in the study. But their antonyms (weakness, passivity, timidity, and pessimism) are not criteria of distrust for the majority of the respondents. Along with this, there do exist symmetrical criteria of tryst and distrust: morality–amorality, reliability–unreliability, openness–secretiveness, intellect–stupidity, independence–dependence, no propensity for conflict–propensity for conflict.

The results of the frequency analysis were checked in the course of the factor analysis. Analysed separately were the factor structures of trust and distrust toward three categories of people: a stranger, an acquaintance, and a close person. These results were analysed in special works. Here we shall only pause on an analysis of the factors of trust and distrust in business relations toward close people. On the whole, the factor structures of trust and distrust have much in common. At the same time, a series of factors specific to each of them has been singled out.

The greatest percentage of the variance is explained by the **"Boldness, charm, activeness, strength"** ("Faith in the power of good") factor. The given factor exerts an influence on how significant those indicators of the person being appraised that are basic (common) personality traits – ones of activeness, strength, boldness, and optimism – are

for the forming of trust or distrust. The set of these indicators corresponds to a description of a personality that acts as the embodiment of the "forces of good". From all appearances, the significance of the enumerated indicators as criteria of trust and distrust is determined by the subject's general orientation to trust ("basic trust" or "faith in people"), as well as by other more general factors of a person's attitude toward surrounding people. It is our belief that this factor is connected to a high degree with the individual's motivation (the desire to enter into interaction and the value of a positive outcome to the latter), as well as with the individual's social competence (confidence in his ability to build relations of trust with surrounding people in the presence of good will).

The attitude toward human qualities that are polar in their modality to the variables of the "Faith in the power of good" factor is formed by a separate factor, which characterises an individual's attitude toward weakness and dependence – **"Weakness, passivity and dependence".**

Data about how unity and identity with a partner in interaction is the most significant criterion of trust were corroborated as the result of a frequency analysis. Likewise singled out at the given stage was the **"Presence of spiritual community and similar life position"** factor, which explains the greatest percentage of the variance in relation to acquaintances. Significant factor weights were singled out among the variables reflecting a unity of world-view and behaviour among the interacting subjects. For the category of strangers, characterisation data do not lend themselves to appraisal (and were not appraised by the study participants), but in relations with close people, though, they are especially significant as a criterion of trust for the overwhelming majority of respondents. It is precisely for this reason that the percentage of the explainable variance in the "Presence of a close life position" factor is significantly lower in relation to a close person than to an acquaintance.

It is important to trace just how significant the respondents' attitude is to the absence of unity and the presence of contradictions with the person being appraised. The peculiarities of the attitude toward a person who has interests, life goals, and a perception of the world that are other and contradictory in directionality manifest themselves under the influence of the **"Dissimilarity of interests"** factor on distrust of all three categories of people and on trust of strangers and acquaintances.

For trusting a close person, such a factor as **"Reliability, support, and likeability"** is significant. It is perfectly obvious that help in affairs and in life, responsibility in relationships, and support are important foundations for trusting another person. Correspondingly, the **"Amorality and unreliability"** factor is significant for distrusting a close person.

As to an individual's expectation of confrontation and rivalry on the part of another person, it manifests itself in the **"Competitiveness and animosity"** factor. In such a manner, animosity, competitiveness, and a propensity for conflict intensify an individual's distrust of other people. The influence of this factor on trust is not as univalent for various subjects – there are those for whom these characteristics reduce trust, and there are those who are not sensitive to them.

Of special interest are two more factors: **"External features of an unfortunate person"** and **"External features of a 'outsider' person".** As the frequency analysis showed, our respondents do indeed differ in what significance they ascribe to membership in another social group (ethnic, confessional, economic, demographic, and so on), and likewise to features of social and spiritual misfortune. Those who ascribe much significance to these characteristics as criteria for trust and distrust connect them, as a rule, with the irresponsibility, unfairness, and animosity of the other person, the presence in him of life

goals that are in contradiction with their own. In this is manifested the wary attitude of the given respondents toward an "outsider". We assume that the significance of the given characteristics for making a decision on trust or distrust is determined by the factor of *"basic distrust" – an individual's generally wary attitude toward the world and other people.*

Yet another group of factors – the factors of attitude toward ease and difficulty of communication, as well as difficulty of interaction – is **"Predictability"**, **"Unpredictability"**, and **"Difficulty of communication".** It is not important to the individual what the difficulties that arise in interaction or communication are connected with – whether they are determined by peculiarities of intellect, temperament, or self-regulation, or perhaps by social-group membership, amorality and difference of interests.

The last factor, which has received the name **"Assurance"**, characterises the attitude toward someone who relies upon himself and is a person of principle. The influence of this factor can be traced only in distrust toward a close person. Perhaps this is connected with the fact that close people are the only category we are capable of trusting "blindly", *i. e.* without sufficient grounds and guarantees for this. In connection with this, the risk of deception and disenchantment is great. Only the person's confidence in himself (trust in himself) acts as a guarantee. The peculiarities of the respondents' attitude toward a person who highly trusts himself is what determine, in our opinion, the variance explainable by the given factor.

In such a manner, singled out in the course of the frequency and factor analysis were the principal criteria that comprise the "essence" of trust – reliability, predictability, morality, and so on, which can be considered *direct criteria of trust.* Besides them, there exists a whole series of characteristics that play a significant role in the regulation of relations of trust, but which are *indirect indicators of trust.*

Acting as such indicators first and foremost are: openness, politeness, stability, and so on. It is not by chance that "openness" is interconnected with the principal components of trust – reliability, predictability, and likeability.

The singled out factors of trust can provisionally be divided into two large groups: factors having to do with appraising the positive prospects of a potential interaction as a whole (interestedness in trust, the value of trust, and prediction of the result of trust), as well as factors having to do with predicting the successfulness of building relations of trust (prediction of the possibility and the ease/difficulty of the process of building trust). The latter are subdivided into factors having to do with subjective traits (appraisal of one's own abilities and opportunities to build relations of trust), the partner's traits (his readiness), and, finally, characteristics of the process of inter-personal or inter-group interaction itself (difference of interests and positions, the influence of social stereotypes, and so on). Analogously, factors of distrust too are likewise divided into: factors having to do with appraising the negative consequences of interaction (risks of openness), as well as factors having to do with predicting the successfulness of protection from them (prediction of the possibility and the ease/difficulty of protection). Traits, both of the subject himself and the partner in interaction, and of the conditions and the process of interaction, are likewise significant for distrust.

It is important that some of the singled out factors correspond with the model of basic trust and distrust proposed above. These, in particular, are the factors having to do with faith in the power of good and with the attitude toward a partner's morality and amorality, as well as the factors having to do with a wary attitude toward the external features of an unfortunate person or an "outsider" (an incomprehensible one or an unknown one).

Descriptors of trust and distrust in social institutions

The second stage of our research is an analysis of the descriptors of trust and distrust in social institutions. As noted above, the level of trust and distrust in social institutions is an important indicator of the state of society. Despite the fact that there have been a significant number of contemporary studies on the problem of trust in social institutions, there has been no differentiated analysis of trust and distrust, and the ambivalence toward it has not been researched. The main objective of this stage of our study is to find descriptors of trust and distrust that are universal for various social institutions.

The authors of various studies have used their own conceptual models for the structure of trust. R. B. Shaw highlights the following key imperatives of trust in organizations: the *impact* of activity, *decency* of mutual relations, and *concern* for people (Shaw, 2000). Maintaining the proper trust in organizations requires a balance of these imperatives, even if they are in conflict with one another. R. C. Mayer and J. G. Davis described the three main components of employee trust in their managers: integrity – "the company leaders aim to be fair; benevolence – "the company leaders sincerely aim to understand what workers need"; and *ability* – "the company leaders are good at their jobs" (Mayer, Davis, 1999). These factors are the most significant meaningful components of any type of social trust.

E. M. Whitener et al. highlight five conditions necessary for building trust: 1) consistency and integrity; 2) honesty; 3) distribution and delegation of control; 4) communication (accuracy, ability to explain, openness); and 5) caring and participation (Whitener, 1998). Other researchers studying the conditions under which people are likely to be trusting of their managers showed that the following characteristics are important: honesty, motives, consistency of behavior, openness, integrity, functional competence, interpersonal competence, and judgment (Gabarro, 1978). J. Butler also found that the assessment of working capacity, competency, consistency, lawfulness, honesty, loyalty, openness, full trust, fulfilling promises and sensibility impact employees' judgment of trust in their managers (Butler, 1991). In these approaches, in addition to content foundation of trust (performance, decency, concern), there are formal-dynamic foundations related to the predictable behavior, openness and perceptivity of the object of trust, i. e. factors that facilitate or impede communication, inevitably affecting the formation of trust.

This is supported by research on the influence of non-mandatory implementation of organizational rules and procedures on trust in managers (Brockner et al., 1996, 1997). The rules and procedures are important not only because they convey information about requirements and goals of the organization's activities, but also because the necessary compliance with them is assessed by employees as procedural competency of the management. The data showed that procedures that are fair from the staff's point of view tend to increased trust. Not following the procedure and unfair rules correlate with a low level of trust (Brockner et al., 1996, 1997). The research of economic psychologists highlights that the foundation of law-abiding tax behavior is a function of a perception that the tax authorities are fair (Hartner et al., 2008, 2010). The descriptors of procedural justice for the tax authorities' activities are as follows: tax office decisions are fair; rules and methods used in tax inspections are the same for all taxpayers; decisions made by tax inspectors are fair according to their own line of behavior [return code]; decisions made by the tax office are based mainly on fact, and not opinion; if a decisions made by the tax authorities is inaccurate or unsuccessful, it can be changed. In turn, *interactional justice* is assessed using the following factors: the tax authorities treat me with respect;

tax officers treat me with kindness and respect; tax officers take me seriously; tax officers treat me without prejudice; I receive respectful advice from tax officers.

The above-listed characteristics are similar to the descriptors of trust and form the basis of such components as reliability, unity and predictability, among others. However, these are not sufficient, as they do not account for the complexity of the structure and organization of any social institution. For example, healthcare is made up of several levels, from the highest – the Health Ministry – to the lowest – a specific medical professional. Accordingly, trust and distrust in every level of the hierarchy will be different. Thus, interaction with the social institution and its representatives takes place simultaneously on several levels: interpersonal and inter-group; intra- and inter-organizational; personalized and impersonalized. In addition, trust in institutions is often defined in relation to its legal and regulatory base, its material and technical resources and various types of technology.

Thus, the fact that trust/distrust in social institutions encompasses its relationship with various hierarchical levels and structural blocks must be taken into account:

- A system of rules and regulations for the functioning of the institution.
- Various hierarchical levels within the institution.
- Organizations that carry out the institutions activities.
- Groups of people that create and/or regulate the activities of the institution, and implement and supervise its functioning.
- Material and technical resources and technology of the institution etc.

Each of these structural blocks of any social institutions can be assessed on a five-point scale:

- Reliable, high-quality fulfillment of its function (Reliability)
- Shared goals and values with the subject (Unity).
- Predictable (Predictability).
- Elicits a positive emotion (Affability).
- Understandable benefits of maintaining trust (Calculation).

In the above description of the structural model of trust/distrust, it was noted that is as far as the subject is an active participant in interactions with social institutions, an important component trust/distrust is the *status of the subject of trust and its position in relation to the institution.* It matters whether this subject is an organizer, leader or simple administrator in the institution or a consumer of its services. The activities of the institutions might conflict with the interests of a specific subject and be seen as a threat (real or imaginary). The threat is imaginary when dealing with irrational fears and prejudices, and real when the subject performs an illegal or antisocial behavior. Therefore, the following are indicators of subjective determinants of trust/distrust in social institutions:

- *Inclusion* of the subject in the institution's activities (the level and type of participation in its activities, including professionally, voluntarily, or as an opponent, etc.).
- *Awareness* of the institution's work.
- *Experience interacting* with the institution and *modality of evaluation* of the results.
- Subjective evaluation of the institution's *importance* in the life of the subject (including the positive and negative modality).
- The subject's *perception*, e. g. of its *ability to influence* the institution's activities.

This approach allows for the differentiated study of categories of people that have various relationships with the institution. These can be separated as follows:

- People who are professionally associated with the institution from the consumers of its services.
- People for whom the institution plays an insignificant role in their lives from those whose lives are significantly affected by the institution's activities (positively or negatively).
- People that work directly with the institution from those who know about it second-hand from other people or the media.
- People detached from society from those actively involved in social processes.

It is worth reminding that another component of trust/distrust in social and socio-technical systems is trust/distrust in the *conditions of a system's functioning* (Kupreychenko, 2012a). We have already established the need to consider the influence of environmental conditions on building trust, as favorable and unfavorable conditions have the opposite facts on the state of the subject and its willingness to cooperate and general trust/distrust of the outside world.

All of this complicates the study of trust and distrust in social institutions, as it means a large number of variables need to be measured. Of course, the set of specific indicators for each empirical study is defined by its objectives, and any other characteristics can be omitted. However, excessive simplification inevitably leads to mistakes when interpreting the results.

The novelty of the suggested approach and the methodological instrumentation upon which it is based allows researchers to evaluate the level of trust in an institution. Thus, for each institution, the share of high-trusting and low-trusting, high-distrusting and low-distrusting people can be defined, as well as the ambivalence of respondents. A fundamentally new feature is the possibility for of empirical research to identify the ambivalence of trust and distrust. As noted earlier, any object of trust can pose a certain level of threat that is not directly related to the fulfillment of its functions. In this case, along with trust (positive expectations of the effectiveness of interaction) there is distrust (the threat of unexpected unpleasantness). Focus groups and expert interviews have helped identify the main descriptors of distrust as it relates to interacting with social institutions and their various components.

The research shows that there is a **universal set of predictors of distrust** for a variety of institutions: government authorities, mass media, education, healthcare etc. They are:

- Discrepancy between the rules and regulations of the institution with contemporary demands.
- Inhumane principals of the institutions activities.
- Professional incompetency.
- Low-quality material and technical equipment.
- Inadequate technology (e. g. bureaucratic red tape – several papers and permits; poor organization – queues, stuffiness, lack of waiting areas, inconvenient working hours etc.).
- Slow work of the staff.
- Reluctance of the staff to fulfill their duties (indifference or even refusal to help).
- Concealment by the staff of important information or even providing false information.

- Extortion.
- Physical violence and/or psychological pressure from the institution's staff.
- Invasion of privacy.
- Rudeness, impudence, unfriendliness of the institution's staff.

An analysis shows that some of these characteristics of the activities of an institution's organizations and employees can be classified as *descriptors of low trust* (danger of low-quality results of interaction), while others are *descriptors of distrust* (threat of the infringement of individual rights, causing harm to property, health and dignity).

In practice, it is not only important to establish the level of trust or distrust in social institutions, but also identify ways to build trust. Focus groups and expert surveys were conducted aimed at identifying *measures to increase trust and reduce distrust* in a variety of social institutions. The focus groups named the following **measures to increase trust and overcome distrust** in social institutions:

- Informing citizens of the principals and rules of social institutions and supporting their social significance.
- Giving citizens the ability to influence the activities of social institutions.
- Supporting and promoting a responsible attitude between citizens and the activities of institutions.
- Improving the rules and regulations of institutions.
- Better organizing the staff's work and improving the technology used by the institution.
- Making the work of the staff and the institution more efficient.
- Increasing the level of professionalism of the staff.
- Paying attention to morality of the institution's representatives.
- Strengthening government control over the activities of the staff and the institution.
- Providing security guarantees for the health and personal freedom of citizens.
- Making the activities of the institution and its employees more open and transparent to public organizations and citizens.
- Using an individual approach for every citizen.
- Providing real opportunities to challenge and request a review of decisions made by employees of the institution.
- Building personal experience of cooperation between citizens and the institution.
- Demonstrating a common purpose between the social institution and citizens.
- Building a positive image of social institutions.

The list of proposed ideas includes measures to improve the structure, organization and quality of an institution's activities and its informational support, as well as measures to build a more positive image of it and improve transparency. The importance of any measure varies depending on the group and category of respondents, which makes it possible to develop a set of measures to improve trust that is differentiated for each target group.

The merit of the proposed approach is that it allows us to evaluate not only the formal-dynamic aspect of trust/distrust in social institutions (level, trends etc.), but also its content (components, quality indicators etc.). Our recent studies devoted to a qualitative analysis of trust showed that the variety, diversity and multi-functionality of different types of trust/distrust raise important questions about their modality and qualitative characteristics (Kupreychenko, 2012b). Firstly, what type of trust exactly are we are evaluating with the question about trust in "people in general"? And secondly, what

type of trust or relationship between trust and distrust is optimal for a particular community at its current stage of development, and for modern Russian society in particular? In practical terms, this means that different types of trust a prevalent in different categories of modern Russia's population. Some (business, humanistic, or "mature" – based on experience of interacting in socially conscious groups of citizens) are more progressive than others ("blind" or "clandestine" trust) and are more closely aligned with the expectations and needs of society. Thus, it is important to evaluate not only the level of social trust, but also build a kind of "map" of the prevalence of various types of trust/distrust, i. e. divide the population into various categories based on the "quality" of trust.

Overall, the above approach allows us to assess the level of development of civil society in which the population and the government are partners, the functioning of social institutions is the result of cooperation of all interested parties, and where there is a mature relationship of trust, and not blind faith or fear. Building this type of society should lead to a transition from paternalism to partnership; from passivity to cooperation; from indifference to interest; from ignorance to competence; from unrealistic expectations to a willingness to make a contribution; from disbelief and fear, or blind faith, to genuine trust. The program includes indicators of all of the above-mentioned states of social consciousness. The research reveals an ambivalent attitude toward social institutions in which positive expectations (trust) mix with fears (distrust). The practical significance of the data can be obtained via an analysis of what prevents people from trusting, and what would help build trust and reduce distrust.

Conclusions

1. Trust and distrust are relatively autonomous phenomena that have similar and differing characteristics: signs, conditions, criteria and functions in regulating a subject's life. The main functions of trust are social awareness and exchange. The main functions of distrust are self-preservation and isolation.

   The conditions under which trust and distrust can exist simultaneously in relation to the same object and appear as ambivalence in an evaluation include: first, multi-dimensionality, an associated inclusiveness simultaneously in various aspects of life, as well as the dynamic nature of relationships between people; second, the presence of contradictory qualities in a partner in the interaction; third, contradictory relationships between the subject and several personality traits of the person being assessed (strength, activity, weakness etc.); fourth, a high level of subjectivity in assessing the risks associated with being open and trusting; fifth, various foundations for trust and distrust; and sixth, the plurality of sub-personalities and psychology for the subject of trust and its partner. Moreover, gains from the justification of trust and losses as a result of confirmed distrust, in most cases, are *not equivalent quantitatively, qualitatively, or even psychologically*. Thus, a theoretical analysis of the conditions of the simultaneous presence of trust and distrust confirmed the need to analyze them together, as ambivalence of trust and distrust is characteristic of most types and forms of social relationships.
2. The assumptions about the relationship of trust and distrust in the course of empirical research were confirmed. An asymmetry in the criteria of trust and distrust was established in the course of a frequency analysis. The results of the frequency analysis were checked in the course of the factor analysis. The singled out factors of trust can provisionally be divided into two large groups: factors having to do with

appraising the positive prospects of a potential interaction as a whole (interestedness in trust, the value of trust, and prediction of the result of trust), as well as factors having to do with predicting the successfulness of building relations of trust (prediction of the possibility and the ease/difficulty of the process of building trust). The latter are subdivided into factors having to do with subjective traits (appraisal of one's own abilities and opportunities to build relations of trust), the partner's traits (his readiness), and, finally, characteristics of the process of inter-personal or inter-group interaction itself (difference of interests and positions, the influence of social stereotypes, and so on). Analogously, factors of distrust too are likewise divided into: factors having to do with appraising the negative consequences of interaction (risks of openness), as well as factors having to do with predicting the successfulness of protection from them (prediction of the possibility and the ease/difficulty of protection). Traits, both of the subject himself and the partner in interaction, and of the conditions and the process of interaction, are likewise significant for distrust.

3. A program has been designed to study trust and distrust in social institutions that makes it possible to evaluate the level and relationship of trust/distrust in social institutions among various groups and categories of the population, as well as their dynamics. It also allows us to separate the population into categories by "quality" of trust/distrust (blind or naïve, clandestine, mature etc.). Thus, the tools make it possible to study trust both quantitatively and qualitatively: its types, foundations, factors that hinder its growth and reduce distrust. The research may point to an ambivalence toward social institutions, whereby positive expectations (trust) mix with threats (distrust). Distrust is assessed as agreement with the fact that the system can have certain dangers related directly to the fulfillment of its function. The data should correlate with such characteristics of the subject of trust as *inclusion* in the activities of the institution (level and type of participation in its activities, including professionally or voluntarily), *awareness* of its activities, the *presence of experience* interacting, the *modality for evaluating its results*, a subjective assessment of the *importance of a social institution* (including positive and negative modalities), and the perception of one's own *ability to influence* its activities. Based on the data received, concrete recommendations can be made for developing measures aimed at building mature civic trust among various categories of the population.

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CONCEPT OF TRUST RELATIONSHIPS OF AN INDIVIDUAL

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Introduction

This article describes the main provisions of the author's conception of reliable personality. The essence of the concept is that reliability is regarded as a condition of human interaction with the world, on the one hand, as a condition of subjectivity and identity, on the other. In this context, reliability is interpreted as the ratio of the two-pole setup, which, on one side facing the world, and on the other – in himself. Thus, there are two relatively distinct types of reliability: reliability in the other and reliability in you as a value in its own sovereign entity activity. The level of confidence in itself is always associated with a level of confidence to the other, so that these two types of reliability are only relatively independent value, and there is never one without the other. In this case, credibility appears fundamental to the full mastery of them, is part of the ability to predict the outcome of their life, determine the adequacy of the critical positions in relation to itself, is an indication of the sincerity with oneself, and affects the choice of strategies to achieve compliance with internal personal meaning. In this context, the level of formation credibility is a condition of subjectivity of the individual.

Reliability exists as a personal or a social setting, as attitudes, as attitudinal relation to others and to him/herself. Interaction (harmonious–disharmonious) between personal and social aspects of reliability, emotional, evaluative and behavioral components determines the quality, differentiation of reliability. Thus, an important condition for the occurrence of a certain quality of reliability – is the degree (or measure) of its harmonic components (attitudinal, cognitive, behavioral). Reliability in others is seen as a special case of reliability in the world. Every act of communication is always a certain amount of, or a measure of reliability, without which communication becomes an act of impersonal communication. Going beyond the "best measure" of confidence both in relation to themselves and to others, leads to negative consequences in communication. Genuine personal harmony is the ability to feel this measure and at the same time be open as the world, to yourself, and to others.

Trust as a psychological attitude of a person to various aspects of the world pervades all spheres of human existence, and therefore it is included in the overall process of Human interaction with the World.

In this article, we will focus on trust in social and psychological interaction. It is natural that social and psychological interaction has many contexts and aspects. In this case, for ease of analysis, we will consider interaction in a dyad. Proceeding to the study of trust in interpersonal relationships, we have noticed that in many different in contents interpersonal phenomena trust (or its lack) stands for the background condition of existence of these very phenomena, such as friendship, authority, manipulation, collaboration, hostility etc. This fact can only mean that trust (or its lack) is a phenomenon that performs function of generating a wide variety of relationships between people.

This study led to the conclusion that in order to understand the psychological nature of trust it is only necessary to consider the "individual–individual" relationships as a single system, where every individual has a relatively independent value as an autonomous, sovereign subject of activity, because the "individual–individual" system generates a new ontology.

The inner world of each person is relatively closed, and the transmission of information involves the assessment of its content, as well as certain relation to the content of information transmitted by both participants of communication that is important from a psychological point of view. Therefore, the main point is the time of involvement to the inner world, but not the transmission of information. Analysis of literature indicates that such involvement presupposes voluntary involvement of one individual as a compulsory component of genuine trust and decentration of another on the inner world of the first individual. Forced, not voluntary transmission of information is not the fact of trust, and without decentration there is only the fact of transmission and reception of information, i. e. the act of communication, but not the fact of involvement in the inner world of another person.

These provisions are based on the ideas of M. M. Bakhtin on "non-confluence" of individualities, on "hard outsidedness" in relation to another person. By "outsidedness" in relation to another person, Bakhtin understood not the identification with others, since the identification is creatively nonproductive, but its "image". In this regard, he admitted that "Productivity of an event is not in the confluence of all together, but in the tension of outsidedness and non-confluence, in using your only place outside other people".

In this connection, we give another M. M. Bakhtin's statement on the advantage of "outsidedness" position, which means that "the criterion here is not the accuracy of knowledge but the depth of penetration" (Bakhtin, 1963, p. 409).

We believe that the latter provision is particularly important, because the accuracy of knowledge of the other refers to the cognitive sphere and involves the moment of evaluation but not the decentration. The moment of penetration into the inner world of another person involves psychosocial reflexivity, as penetration into the semantic scope of the individuality of another person, as the moment of reflected subjectivity of another and each other (V. A. Petrovsky).

Thus, we can say that mutual trust of subjects involves relationships that are built on mutual penetration of interacting persons into the senses of each other, which is crucial to the generation of new senses. That is why, according to M. M. Bakhtin, it is "creatively productive", it involves, of course, not the understanding of the transmitted information and its assessment, although these moments are necessary, but the understanding of the semantic sphere of the personality of each other, penetration in the subjective world of each other and relationships to each other based on this. Therefore, we can assume that the terms of genuine mutual trust will be voluntary involvement, decentration and psychosocial mutual reflection that do not lead to confluence but allow creatively solve

the challenges put for interacting individuals and form mutually valuable relationships to each other. Therefore, trust in the relationships involves not so much the knowledge of the other person, as the involvement of the other (or each other) into the inner world in various ways, not only through self-discovery understood as transmission of "confidential" information.

Therefore, in addition to the transmission of "confidential information" or self-disclosure, there may be other forms of trust in communication because as K. A. Abulkhanova-Slavskaya notes in one of her works "trust to the other is the original condition for human communication" (Abulkhanova-Slavskaya, 1981, p. 231). According to B. F. Porshnev, trust is a source of psychological relations between people (Porshnev, 1971). Thus, on the one hand, every act of communication always has a certain amount or a measure of trust, without which normal communication is impossible, since it only broadcasts the content of any text, and on the other hand, trust acts as the original condition for normal interpersonal relationships without which the relationships become counter-suggestive or confrontational.

Thus, relations between people are possible through trust and therefore the relations between people have the main characteristic of the studied phenomenon, which is the condition (or mode) of "individual–individual" interaction. This is trust which is the strategic factor of "we" community. So, here we find a generating effect of interaction, or the effect of a new reality, new ontology in the process of interaction of one person with another. Regardless whether this connection is a joint activity, jointly solved problems, jointly organized leisure or some other situations. Taking into consideration the tradition of Russian social psychology, we can submit that the activity performed together, on the one hand, is impossible without trust, and on the other hand, it helps to establish confidence in the relationships, which was demonstrated by several authors, studying interpersonal relations in groups (A. V. Petrovsky, I. S. Kon, K. E. Danilin etc.). Here it is appropriate to refer to M. Buber, who, considering the sphere of interaction and relations of people, allocates area "between" as a particular ontological reality. According to M. Buber, this area or sphere "is the original category of human reality, though, it is implemented in widely varying degree" (Buber, 1989, p. 94).

Thus, on the one hand, trust as a relatively independent social-psychological phenomenon can be seen and studied as a phenomenon generated, expressed and dynamically changed in the process of interaction between people. On the other hand, trust is an intra-personal phenomenon, which being generated in inter-individual sphere realizes as confidential stage to a particular person, and then, repeatedly "lifts out" to the sphere of interpersonal relationships, performing the connecting function between people. Trust is formed in the structure of interpersonal relations, and it is implemented and modified in the intra-personal sphere. Although, communication, interaction and interpersonal relationships are inextricably linked to each other, it is theoretically possible to separate the concept of trust to communication and interaction, where trust is at the phenomenological level, and trust in the intra-personal (intra-subjective) sphere of man, which is somehow "imposed" outside, performing the relationships between people and on the basis of which it is formed, and the already existing trustful relationships are strengthened or weakened. Trust here acts on its own ontology as an experience of particular relationships as a kind of psychological position (or aim) in relation to the other person. Although these two levels are associated with each other, there is no direct projection between them, because trustworthy relations, trustworthy psychological position is not always congruent between the communication participants, and

it is determined by both subjective and objective circumstances, which will be discussed below.

Here we only mention that it is well-known that a person is always focused on his relation to another person, hoping for symmetry and congruence of his preference, in psychology it has been called "the presumption of reciprocity" (Ya. L. Kolminsky). However, a person hopes for symmetry, which in real life is not always justified, because trustworthy relations are not always congruent, symmetrical between the participants of communication or interaction. A person just assumes that the other feels confidence toward him, or at least he won't let him down, won't betray him, but these assumptions, as it is known, are often denied in the empirical life. In this regard, we figuratively divided the concepts of "I trust" and "trust for me" in order to show that this processes are not always mutual. Besides, the subjects of communication may be aware or not aware of this, and in our opinion, many phenomena are determined by this fact, where trust is a background condition (such phenomena as friendship, credibility, cooperation, manipulation, competition etc.). This incongruence can be determined by both subjective and objective factors, that is, in some cases incongruity is determined by personal reasons of subjective nature, while in other cases by social, psychological or objective circumstances.

Therefore, trust exists as a subjective personal relation to the other or others in the intra-personal (intra-subjective) field and its existence "lifts" outside, creating, modifying the qualitative features of interpersonal relationships. However, since this process is reciprocal, the existing level of trust in the act of interaction itself can be modified, strengthened, weakened or it can totally disappear. In addition, the subjects of interaction may not know about it, or they can interpret it in different ways. Thus, if it is proper to speak of trust as a condition of communication, it should assume the existence of trustworthy relations, which are based on certain motivation of subjects in relation to other people and revealed selectively in relations.

Thus, the relations are formed in the process of communication and interaction (via the "quantity" or projected measure of trust) and the already formed relationships are manifested and changed there.

As our researches show (Skripkina, 2000, 2001), a person entering into communion with other people "filters" information that he addresses to a particular recipient. Therefore, it is correct to speak of the relation of trust as certain willingness (or communication condition) to the manifestation of trust before the act of communication, and the willingness, apparently, is based on past communicative experience with this person, and is determined by social status and social role of the recipient in relation to the communicator and communicator to the recipient. Moreover, the state of readiness features each subject, but this condition may be the same or may be different on the "quantity" or extent of the existing trust. This will largely determine the mutual importance of subjects in relation to each other, as well as the content of confidential information. However, willingness by itself is not enough to show trust, a whole series of conditions for the implementation of this readiness in communication or human interaction is needed.

All this suggests the existence of trustworthy relationships between people, which can be interpreted as the internal state of readiness to express trust (prepare), by at least one of the two interacting agents as internal disposition of personality on people in general (then it looks like credulity) and on a certain range of persons in particular. Thus, if any act of communication or interaction between people always has a certain amount of trust (since trust is a condition for any dialogue), then its quantity or measure is a dynamic characteristic that defines the qualitative aspect of communication or interaction,

and the higher level or measure of trust in communication and interaction is (provided that it is mutual trust), the more pronounced relationships between people are.

Theoretically, we can distinguish at least three parameters that will guarantee symmetry or congruence, i. e. correlation of trust between people. This is mutual significance of the content of information discussed, mutually valuable attitude of people communicating with each other, as well as the alleged similarity of opinions or judgments in relation to the information discussed.

However, the similarity of these parameters by both participants of interaction is only assumed, predicted. In fact, these assumptions may not coincide with reality. Then, there are various "distortions" in interaction that the person may or may not realize. For example, the assumption of valuable relation of subjects of communication to each other can be based on experience of communication, which carries the assumption of reciprocity of subjective worthiness, but can also be specified by social status of each subject of interaction with regard to each other. This is reflected on the content characteristics of confidential information and on the dynamic characteristics of formal trust. We identify measure, selectivity and partiality as formally dynamic characteristics of confidence. It is these characteristics that can explain the differentiation of trust delegated to different people, because normally a person always is aware of who, what and how much he can trust.

In general, various combinations of all the derived parameters of confidentiality result in mismatch (or incongruence) of confidence level of each of the participant of interaction in relation to each other. As we have shown, incongruence of social and psychological relationships can be defined objectively, i. e. from the outside, by the situation or difference in social status of the participants of interaction. However, this does not mean that there is confidence in the relationships. These circumstances are objective grounds for the existence of the phenomena of interpersonal interaction, where trust exists as a necessary background condition. For example, the complete congruence of the selected parameters, in accordance with the model we have constructed, is only possible in friendly, mutually axiological relationships or in the relationships at joint activity. In addition, it is very situational in friendly relations, but mostly this tendency is common to friendly relations. At the bottom of the credibility is also trust, but in this case, the relations are not congruent, in particular, because of the objectively set social and psychological difference in the statuses of interacting agents. From this perspective, we can explain the teacher's authority or the authority of parents. As it has been shown in many studies, other people shall trust the carrier of authority, but that does not mean that he in turn will trust those who delegate trust to him. He can trust them to the extent they trust him as to a credible subject, but he also cannot. According to our assumption, in order not to lose credibility in the eyes of another person, the carrier of authority should trust those who trust him, but in other forms.

Thus, trust may be treated as an internal state of readiness to demonstrate trust, at least one of the two interacting agents, which "is lifted out" to approximately individual space in the process of communication and interaction. Being lifted out to inter-individual space, this state "meets", contacts with state of another member of communication, and while interacting, they together give rise to different phenomena of interpersonal interaction in each case.

Such a disposition towards a certain group of people may not be implemented in the form of self-disclosure, unless there is adequate situation. It will not be implemented if the other person does not have enough significance, worthiness to the subject of

trust, although it is assessed as safe. From these particular perspectives, we can explain the phenomenon of occasional fellow traveler. This "prepare" is realized in full only in the case of the proposed full congruence or reciprocity by all the selected parameters.

It should be emphasized that the basis of trust will also be safety (reliability) of partners to each other. We do not mean damage to each other as a result of trust manifestation. It means first of all damage of psychological nature, emotional, mental, moral or material.

According to our hypothesis, security is provided by subjective, personal level of relationships of people interacting with each other. Relation to the other as to the subject of activity involves positive attitude to personal incompleteness, i. e. predict future behavior as safe to the personality of the one who trusts. That is why trust is always a risk of forecast mistake.

The assumption that one person refers to the other as to the subject, as to the person, and in this sense, as to himself serves as a guarantor of security in establishing trust. In the process of social and psychological interaction, simultaneous appeal of a person to the world and to himself has an important theoretical and methodological importance, because along with value of the other person, every individual has a similar motivation in relation to himself, which is called credibility. Credibility is a relatively independent personal phenomenon associated with person's value to himself, his own subjectivity. Human actions are determined not only by valuable attitude to other people, they are determined by valuable attitude of a person to himself. That presupposes how much a person can rely on himself, can bear responsibility for himself, his life and his behavior. Therefore, credibility acts as a subjective phenomenon of personality.

In general, credibility is manifested in the ability of an individual to "go beyond" himself, his experience, or a particular situation without conflict with himself (his own valuable ideas of himself). Ratio of the degree of "going beyond" the personal experience, content of certain personal meanings and values ensures the integrity, stability of personality, on the one hand, and its self-development and self-fulfillment on the other hand. Therefore, the current level of credibility can be considered as an indicator of the maturity of an individual. Credibility, as well as trust to another may not be the same in all situations of human life. In some situations of life, a person can have formed credibility, but in other situations, this credibility is not formed. Everything depends on how the person rates his own chances, how adequate his self-esteem and level of aspiration are, what is his self-attitude and how are his basic social needs satisfied (need for achievement, need for love and acceptance, need for influence and, finally, for trust). Credibility is only a relative constant. Credibility is one of the person's individual attitudes, directed at him, and it includes a cognitive component (knowledge about himself and his abilities and merits), attitudinal component (self-assessment of possibilities, self-acceptance–non-acceptance, love–hatred to himself), and behavioral component, expressed in human acts, which he allows himself in different situations.

Credibility in a generalized form has many functions in human life, it is a fundamental condition for a person to come over himself, it is a part of ability to predict the results of his own actions, it determines the adequacy of critical positions in relation to himself, it is an indication of the sincerity with himself, it affects the choice of strategies to achieve in compliance with internal personal meanings.

Thus, trust should be seen and studied as a two-pole orientation – relation, associated with the trustworthy relationship of an individual to himself, on the one hand, and to particular aspects or fragments of the world on the other. Only such a vision prism enables to include trust in the process of integral interaction between man and the world,

in a single ontology of man and the world, on the one hand, and to understand the fundamental role of trust in the fundamental effect of interaction of interpersonal relationships of people on the other.

So, as it was already mentioned, the appeal of one person to the world is focused on the subjective world of the other person, on his values and meanings, and the man reflects in each moment in another only that, what is important and situational to him, what is meaningful and valuable. When people interact, there is mutual reflection (understanding) of meanings and values relevant for both, which creates not only commonality, it creates something that is called phenomena of interpersonal interaction in the social psychology – from a sincere genuine dialogue to game interaction and cynical manipulation. Everything depends on the valuable psychological positions held by each of the interacting agent both with respect to each other and in relation to himself. In other words, if, as we have shown, the essence of trust is limited by the experience of actual importance (value) and a priori safety of the proposed object of interaction, the social and psychological interaction tells about the importance of one's own personality, own subjectivity and safety of own activity and the importance of partner's individuality in interaction and the perceived safety of his future activity. The essence of generating synergy of interaction is reduced by various correlations of the mentioned psychological positions of each of the partners, both in relation to him and to the other. This approach allowed us to build models of all types of interpersonal relationships where trust or lack of it is a background condition.

Thus, the experience of actual importance (value) and priori reliability of someone, who is meant to interact, and own subjective importance and safety of trust limit the essence of trust in the relationships of people. The level of correspondence of these inter-positions with each other and with oneself at the interacting agents give rise to different types of relationships and types of communication where trust (or its lack) is a background condition for the corresponding phenomena of interpersonal relations.

They act as a "trigger" for unstable, "flexible" and ever-changing interpersonal relationships, based on certain amount, measure of trust, addressed to oneself and to someone who there is an interaction with.

At the base of generating synergy of interaction, there is a degree of reciprocity of measure of trust in oneself and in another of interacting agents. This vision prism allows us to understand why trust or its absence is in the heart of many types of interpersonal relationships.

Based on a combination of indicators of measure of trust reciprocity and correlation of trust in relation to oneself and to another, six different types of interpersonal trust were identified (Figure 1).

The first type of trust occurs when both interacting subjects equally trust themselves and their partners (the partner is important and potentially reliable, as well as I am important and my own actions are reliable). Interaction based on such relationships contributes to friendship and it is a condition for personal and genuinely dialogic communication.

The second type of trust occurs when each of the interacting subjects trusts only him and does not trust the other. As far as everyone values only himself, the results of this interaction, as a rule, are competition and confrontation. Here it is the lack of trust.

The third type of trust occurs when both partners in cooperation trust each other more than they trust themselves. This type of trust is risky for both and is accompanied by shifting responsibility to each other. Finally, this leads to irresponsibility and unsaturated need for trust.

Table 1
Models of interpersonal relationships phenomena
where trust is a background condition

№	S_1		S_2	Generation effect	Phenomena of interpersonal relationships
1	Credibility = trust to the other	=	Credibility = trust to the other	Dialog, sense generation	Cooperation, collaboration, mutual interaction
2	Credibility > trust to the other	=	Credibility > trust to the other	Game	Competition, confrontation
3	Credibility < trust to the other	=	Credibility < trust to the other	Need for self-disclosure	Risk of self-loss
4	Credibility = trust to the other	= >	Credibility > trust to the other	Manipulation	Extortion
5	Credibility = trust to the other	= <	Credibility < trust to the other	Authority	Influence
6	Credibility > trust to the other	> <	Credibility < trust to the other	Manipulation	Dependence, extortion

The fourth type of trust occurs when one partner of interaction trusts in equal measure to himself and to the partner and the second trusts only himself. This relationships lead to manipulation and extortion on the part of the one who trusts only himself.

The fifth type of trust occurs when one partner in interaction trusts in equal measure to himself and to the partner and the second trusts more to the first than to himself. This combination creates genuine authority of the first partner.

Sixth type of trust occurs when one partner trusts only himself and the other trusts only to the first. This combination of measure of trust creates dependency from the one who trusts only himself, and encourages the use of the other as an instrument.

Of course, this model is only the most common option that allows explaining the generating effect of human interaction. This model can be developed, for example, a lot will depend on whether the subjects of interaction realize the internal position of each other, or what the status of each interacting agent is, etc.

Thus, trust should be seen and studied as a two-pole orientation – relation, associated with the trustworthy relationship of an individual to himself, on the one hand, and to particular aspects or fragments of the world on the other hand. Only such a vision prism enables to include trust in the process of integral interaction between man and the world, in a single ontology of man and the world, only this position allows you to understand the essence of eternal current, extremely dynamic, situationally determined relations between people, based always on trust, or its lack.

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THE DYNAMIC CONTENT OF TRUST

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Introduction

As indicated by E. Erikson, A. Giddens, R. M. Kramer, A. B. Kupreychenko, D. Levis, C. Rogers, T. P. Skripkina, A. J. Weigert, V. P. Zinchenko, and other researchers, the genesis of trust goes back to early childhood. But trust evolves in normal ontogenesis as a selective mental formation, which manifests itself in relation to each significant object as a certain level or a degree of trust (distrust). Thus, in addition to general **basic trust** a person shows selective and specific trust to a particular object. Before the individual is able to express this specific trust in relation to an object, he/she should get some experience with it. Based on this experience as well as with consideration of all his/her own previous experience, the individual will form a certain amount of trust (distrust) in this object. A particular individual does not have trust in general (it would be trust in nothing, objectless trust), but has certain expression of trust to specific objects. General trust is a theoretical construction, a generalization of these specific manifestations of trust. Thus, trust as a real phenomenon in its form of particular trust, is built each time afresh in relation to each new object, with consideration of the **experience** of the individual and his/her basic trust. In other words, ***the experience of trust,* which is integrated in the individual, is one of the factors of shaping *particular trust,* trust in a given case.**

When **particular trust** has reached a significant level, i. e. when it appears to be a stable enough attitude of the subject to the object of trust, it starts playing an important and often defining role in organization of the interaction between the subject and the object (which in turn acts as the subject of interaction). At the least, it appears to be an independent factor of this interaction. Herewith, particular trust (i. e. trust in a particular object, a particular individual) reaches a certain level, which fluctuates around this level in the process of distinct acts of communication and is dependent on the attendant circumstances, mainly on the situational factors of trust. Because of these fluctuations, every time the individual shows **actual trust**, which is different from the general level of particular trust.

Thus, we see a line of interdependence between the four facts: basic trust, the experience of trust, particular trust and actual trust. According to E. Erickson, **basic trust** is formed during the first year of life. It is the foundation of any trust. By the time basic

trust is formed, a functional organ of trust has been formed as well. Trust starts to exist as an independent phenomenon, with no possibility of any new changes happening to it. All the subsequent **experience of trust** is only a differentiation, a specification of basic trust. The experience of trust does not change anything fundamentally; if a certain level of basic trust has been formed, this level becomes a permanent characteristic of the individual and he/she cannot change it: this level accompanies him/her in all circumstances and determines his/her patterns of interaction with the world, his/her existence in the world (basic trust can only be changed in conditions of specially organized psychotherapy). All the particular and actual trust is tied to this level and depends on it.

However, it should not be understood that some individuals constantly trust all the life circumstances and others do not. Even basic trust, which is determined by the circumstances of the first year of a child's life, is a complex, differentiated and selective attitude, i. e. the experience of each individual normally contains different degrees of trust in various social objects. The middle line of this experience in the first year of life is expressed in an integrated form of basic trust, which, on the one hand, is a complex systemic attitude, on the other – a certain level of overall trust.

Thus, we find particular trust, the experience of trust and basic trust, as if they have been put together in the manner of nesting dolls, into actual trust or immediately after it. **It is the mechanism of internal determination of actual trust** by its more general forms (Figure 1). Actual trust is not only the result of the situational factors of trust, but of all types of trust: it manifests itself from and through them. As its base and support, particular trust, the experience of trust and basic trust are present in actual trust. Herewith, if there are no criteria for the formation of actual trust, there appears particular trust; if there are no criteria for the formation of particular trust, there appears the level of trust, which corresponds to the individual's experience of trust; behind which there is basic trust.



Fig. 1. The mechanism of internal determination of trust

If there exists a certain level of trust (or distrust), this certainty of trust builds interaction in accordance with the level of existing trust. A child trusts a mother and does not require verification of her intentions in respect to himself/herself and takes her care and her instructions as proper and positive. A pupil trusts a teacher and does not ask about the correctness of the teacher's knowledge. If a manager trusts his subordinates, he at the same time actually delegates his authority and responsibility to them, which hastens the solution of any problem, because it does not require coordination of each simple task by the manager: the subordinate solves them himself. If a high degree of trust is formed between business partners, it simplifies their work and increases the profits of both, because every concern (distrust) adds the insurance costs against these concerns in one form or another: from collection of information about the other party to engagement of third persons for participating in a transaction. If politicians do not trust each other, then it slows down the process of negotiations, the search for consensus, the decision-making process, it causes the permanent suspicion, etc. When people do not trust the government, then every government proposal is perceived as directed against their interests, although there are no indications that it is true, and this situation is difficult to cure.

Thus, the degree of trust directly determines the quality of the interaction and the result. Moreover, the result of this interaction, in its turn, affects the participants of this interaction. If the interaction between the subject and the object continues, a system of relationships is formed and developed on its base, starting with the current level of trust, but gradually "acquiring" other multiple relations, that may be positive, neutral, or negative, depending on the degree of trust/distrust.

Our empirical studies (Antonenko, 2004, 2006) demonstrate that if relationships of the parties are developing according to the positive scenario, and positive trust (in the narrow sense of the word) is built between them, it causes a whole range of secondary positive relationships: friendship, mutual support, positive recommendations to third parties, exchange of confidential information etc. A negative script is fraught with its own consequences. In the best-case scenario, the reinforced and intensifying mutual distrust of the parties leads to the cessation of contacts, and relationships become "virtual": they exist as a mutual subjective representation of a negative opinion about the other party and not as a real interaction between the parties. In the worst-case scenario, distrust grows into mutual hostility and actions against each other, developing and escalating conflict.

The sequence of relations illustrated above reflects the complex dynamics of the formation and the development of trust. The basis of all displayed particular trust is basic trust and individual experience of trust. It is also determined by subjective, objective, environmental, and situational factors of trust. The emerging attitude will be namely trust (e. g., not gullibility) only in case if it is equivalent and proportionate to the object relation that is predictable and allows the activity be successful. Then the achieved level of trust essentially affects the specifics of the interaction and its result, and forms the relationships of the parties, which in their turn, according to the feedback law, also contribute to the development of trust.

Thus, when trust (some extent of it) is formed in a particular object, it becomes an active agent of the subsequent interaction with this object. Therefore, it determines the interaction between the subject and the object, its characteristics and its result. Relationships between subject and object are formed in a sequence of these interactions. Apparently, trust is a developmental factor of these relationships. At the same time, the level of trust constantly receives reinforcements from all levels of interaction be-



SFT - Subjective factors of trust

OFT– Objective factors of trust

Sactiv– Subject of activity

Strust– Subject of trust

FOT – Functional organ of trust

Fig. 2. The dynamic model of trust

tween the subject and the object. This dynamic is reflected in *the dynamic model of trust* (Figure 2).

It contains the following mechanisms. Joint activity of the subject and the object is considered in the framework of their interaction, with their interaction leading to a particular activity.

Joint activity, on the one hand, creates a certain objective relation; on the other hand, it has a certain result, which reflects its successfulness. This result has an impact on the activity itself (corrects it), on the interaction of the parties (the subject and the object), on the objective relations, on trust, and contributes to the development of relationships. Objective relation is the primary determinant of trust. Trust and relationships affect all the other aspects of the situation within which the interaction and joint activity develop (three short arrows).

The dynamic model of trust is a complete trust model, which reflects all the main structural and dynamic aspects of trust.

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TRUST IN THE TRANSITION IN THE MODERN WORLD

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Introduction

Trust has been for the recent decades in the very focus of social science. Sociologist and psychologists as well as economists and anthropologists contributed to the study of trust as social phenomenon. However, the problem of changing trust in the history of modern societies is as challenging as understudied. In this article I will argue that two types of trust can be found in the history of European societies. The first type deals with closed communities of familistic character, in its nature this type of trust is more close to sphere of feelings than rational construction, I can call it *traditional type of trust*. The second type of trust regulates the impersonal social relations of the contemporary market societies, it has rational structure and can be called *modern type of trust*. In the processes of economic change and market developments the traditional type of trust and morality is disembedding from the everyday social life and is shifting to the periphery of the societal structure (the correspondent processes could be much more easily seen in the sphere of religious life) but nevertheless there is a lot of that type of trust left in the modern societies. The new types of morality and trust are far from being the products of obsolete mentality and reminiscences of the past in the modern societies as it was claimed by F. Fukuyama, instead of it, these new moralities and trust are constantly reproducing in the social interactions and economic transactions. Much more, I can totally agree with N. Luhmann who argued that trust is definitely a modern phenomenon with its own social functions produced by the social structures of market societies.

The process of transformation of trust is definitely not the direct transition from trust in the small communities of familistic type to trust as it is reproduced in the social whole of society. That's why I criticized the concept of "radius of trust" by Fukuyama (the idea of concentric circles of trust embracing for the first family and small social communities and then enlarging to the social groups like nations or societies) arguing that traditional trust of community structure is totally different to the nature of modern societal type of trust (Veselov, 2004: 55). So, the traditional type of trust is not transformed automatically into the modern one, the new type of trust comes together with the generation of the new social classes, market orders and modern structures of mentality. The old and the new types of trust coexist together but step by step the new forms crowd out the old ones.

In this article I plan to look more thoroughly at the process of trust transformation in the transition countries focusing on the Russian economy and society. In the roaring history of XX century two drastic transformation in Russian history can be easily seen: the transition № 1 (1917–1921) and transition № 2 (1986–1991). Both of them played a crucial role in the social, political and economic transformation and changed the nature of trust as well as the moral values in general. My idea is to apply the theoretical models worked out in the sociology of trust to the study of trust transformation in the process of XX century Russian modernization.

The logic and the arguments are as follows:

1. In the beginning of XX century Russia hardly can be called capitalist society, beyond the facade of rapid economic growth and the first spur of industrialization in its nature Russian society was undoubtedly rural society based on traditional values and norms of morality and trust. Moreover, I will reveal the processes of *ruralization* of the urban population and the urban culture in the beginning of XX century and the early years of Soviet era.
2. In the first years of the Soviet power the *anomie* of social norms and values drastically influenced the generation of rational habits of trust but meanwhile the traditional type of trust somehow survived reproduced by the traditional mentality. Traditional type of trust played its crucial role in the process of the development of the totalitarian regime of 1930s. The early Soviet society was definitely the society of highly developed trust, rapidly institutionalized, but actually it was trust of the traditional type survived in the autocracy political environment. At the same time, the social life was split into two spheres – public and private ones. The double standards of trust and truth were established to reproduce then the growing general distrust atmosphere. The next turning point in the history of trust in the XX century Soviet society was the World War II period and the followed liberalization campaign of 1960s. Suddenly the personalized cult of Stalin was ruined destroying the last bastion of the traditional trust based on the charisma of paternalistic leader. In the 60s and 70s the growing general distrust to the Soviet power as well to its institution lessened to the minimum the level of trust to the soviet society. The total distrust to the state and to the Communist power opened the road to the final breakdown of the Soviet regime in the 1990s.
3. During the transition process in the late 1980s and beginning of 1990s for the second time in the history of Russia *anomie* of norms and values has led to the moral chaos and much more growing atmosphere of distrust. The old types of trust to the communist ideology, the soviet power and planned economy were ruined but the new forms of morality and trust were not generated yet. Thus that growing distrust caused the new wave of criminalization in the society as well as in the market economy. Power and enforcement processes were substituting trust.
4. During the 1990s the economic situation however changed, by no means that way was even and smooth but despite of the crisis events and the temporary steps backward in the economic reforms, the market spread and political democratization started up the reproduction processes of broadening trust. The new dynamics of trust in the contemporary society and economy can be traced in our empirical study in the St Petersburg region (the research made by Elena Kapustkina, St Petersburg State University). Actually that processes of trust and morality transformation were slowly going on, more in the latent form, but changes were not so quick as it was expected before.

5. The comparative analysis of trust in post-socialist countries (we can compare our data and implications with the study of trust in Poland made by Piotr Sztompka) gives much more optimistic view on the further developments of trust and morality. We can agree with Sztompka (Sztompka, 2001) arguments that the East-European countries and Russia now demonstrate in the period of transition much higher level of trust if to compare with that of in the Western countries. But of course, there is a strong feeling that a lot has to be done to create a full-fledged culture of trust.

In the first part of this article I'll study the trust transformations in the soviet society trying to overcome the widespread misunderstandings of the nature of trust in that era. In the second part I'll look at the processes of trust transformation during the transition period in 70-s and 80-s focusing on the processes of bureaucratization and the substitution of trust by force.

Misunderstanding trust in the Soviet economy and society

There is a widespread belief in the contemporary sociological literature on trust that Soviet Union, as the clear type of the "empire of evil", was an evident type of low-trust society (or society with generalized distrust). Then the contemporary market reforms renewed the general morality and introduced the high culture of trust. The idea is too good to be true. I argue that the Soviet Union in its better days was a high trust society with dominating traditional trust and familistic moral values. These values were totally ruined during the transition period of the 1980s and 90s. So, the situation with trust in the Soviet society is quite opposite to the *cliche* mentioned above.

My first argument is that the Soviet society can not be treated as a stable structure, as a monolith, or something frozen into ice. The society was rather very much unstable, constantly changing during the whole period of its XX century history: from total *anomie* of social norms and values after the revolutionary period of 1917–1921 to the reproduction of traditional trust in 1920s and early 30s, then from the general distrust and suspicion after the repression of 1930s to the next wave of growing trust in the late 50s after the Stalin's death, and next to total distrust atmosphere in 1970s and final moral catastrophe of late 80s and early 90s. In the same type trust changed its nature in the processes of economic reforms from period of "War Communism" in 1918–1921 to the "NEP" (New Economic Policy), from first five-year plans and industrialization in 30s to post-war reforms in 1947, from early economic and monetary reforms in 60s to economic stagnation period in the late 70s. Thus, the Soviet society and economy were far from being a stable structure, rather it was the society in the move. As well as the nature of trust and distrust were constantly changing.

Let us have a closer look at these writings where the idea of low-trust Soviet society was worked out. According to F. Fukuyama we can divide all modern states due to its level of trust into high-trust societies (well developed economic nations like the USA, Japan, Germany) and low-trust societies (countries like France, Italy, China, post-socialist countries, Russia in their number). This differentiation comes from Fukuyama's concept of trust, he treats it as a premodern cultural phenomenon, a sort of social capital based on the ability to spontaneous association, existing in the modern industrial environment. There are countries that managed to use that social resource coming from the past in the creation of the business organizations, these nations now benefit from that resource of generalized trust, the others are able to use trust as a social capital only in a small communities, this type of trust Fukuyama calls "familistic". Leaving aside the classification

of nations according to the level of trust by Fukuyama (because it's clear that the nature and origins of trust are different in the USA and Japan, or France and China, no matter the level of trust existed) I'll cite only the passages concerning Russian society in his book called "Trust". Russian rural society, argues Fukuyama, "does not have a rich associational life outside the state-run *kolhozi and sovkhozi* (collectivized state farms), and the Russian peasant family is troubled and weak" (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 337). Actually, in the pre-Revolutionary rural society the communities of peasants, so called "mir", constituted the social basis of the rural society, these communities were far from being weak and troubled, even after the Stolypin's reforms started in 1906 when all economic and non-economic possibilities were given to peasants to make them leave the community, nevertheless the majority of rural population (⅔ of all peasants households) preferred to stay in the community, thus Russian rural society has never been of individualistic type. The spontaneous association of rural type were broadly spread based on reciprocal collective actions ranged from random mutual assistance to neighbourhood associations reproducing the highest level of traditional trust. In the beginning of the XX century after the Manifesto of October 17 (1905) there were numerous examples and attempts to create different unions and voluntary associations (Mironov, 1999, p. 342). The rural patriarchal type of large family has never been weak too. Instead of it, the paternalistic mentality was dominating even in urban areas because of the flood of rural migrants to the urban regions (e. g., the relations between the owners of small business in industry or retail trade and their employees copied the patriarchal relations of large rural family).

As concerning contemporary Russia according to Fukuyama it is truly individualistic society with a little capacity for association and hence low level of trust, "both private companies and political parties are weak or non-existent in post communist countries like Russia…" while the strongest organization being criminal gangs (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 357, 28). Barbara A. Misztal repeats the Fukuyama's idea of low-trust Soviet society but from the different theoretical background. In her study "Trust in modern societies" she argues that the disintegration of Soviet system "proved that the weakness of undemocratic states lies in the their lack of trust" (Misztal, 1996, p. 5). But how to explain the highest level of trust to Communist Party and Stalin during the years of repression in 1930s and World War II?

My concept of changing trust and morality in the history of XX century Russia is based on the idea that there are at least two periods of drastic transformations of general social values and trust: the first happened during the revolutionary years (1917–1921), transition № 1, the second we witnessed in the late 80s and early 90s (transition № 2). There is no need to make a general comparative analysis of those transitions, but I focus on the trust transformation processes produced by those transitions. Let us have a more thorough look at the transition № 1.

The Russian empire at the beginning of the XX century considered to be one of the great powers. Mostly because of its huge territory and population: 22 mil. sq. km and 170 mil. people (the nowadays Russian Federation has 17 mil. sq. km and 150 mil. people). In gross economic terms Russia looked not too bad as well, it ranked fifth (now we are sixth economy) in the world industrial production after the US, Germany, Great Britain and France due to its well developed textile industry as well as heavy industry (coal, steel, pigiron). It was second in the petrol production after the US at that time (and unfortunately still is, however following not the U. S. but the Arab oil exporting countries). The emancipation reforms of 1860s and the new economic policy during 80s stimulated the "great spur" of industrial production (so called the first "wave of industrialization",

the second happened in the 1930s), the industrial output increased at an average rate of more than 8 percent, higher than the best rates achieved by the Western countries. Much of the credit for this goes to the railway construction that stimulated the rapid developments of mining and metallurgical centers. The general rates of economic growth were extremely high as well, not less than 7–8% of annual National Income growth during the period 1908–1913. All that made it possible for Marxists (and especially Lenin in his book "The development of capitalism in Russia", 1903) to claim that Russia had already been transformed into a capitalist country open for the socialist experiments.

Unfortunately beneath that industrial facade laid a giant and totally rural country with obsolete mentality and monarchical regime, traditional norms and values, with more than ⅔ of its labor force engaged in agriculture and producing half of the national income. Per capita income was no more than ⅓ that of US or Great Britain. Productivity, especially in agriculture, was extremely low because of the primitive technology used (wooden plugs) and scarcity of capital. Majority of population lived, to say better – survived, in the primitive sphere of basic material needs with minimal relations to the market economy to say nothing about capitalism. The social structure of the society at the end of XIX century can be described as a pyramid: high classes – 3% at the top; small middle classes – 8%; at the bottom – low classes – 89%, (among them: workers – 20%, peasants – 69%).

As usual, the minority of population (not more than 10%) owned the majority of national welfare and resources giving the way to the inequality growth and social contradictions and contributing to the escalation of revolutionary trends happened first in 1905 and then in 1917. According to the Census of 1897 the solid 75% of total population were illiterate, even 55% of urban population were illiterate too but the majority of those who considered to be literate could only read. In the rural areas parents deliberately did not allow their children to go to school more than 2 or 3 years in order not to loose paternalistic control over them and to educate them according to the traditional values and social standards.

As concerning the urbanization process the results were tangible but of dubious character, from 1858 to 1897 the ratio of urban population doubled from 8.2 mil. to 16.8 mil. people, and doubled next to reach its peak 26.3 mil. in 1913, in general terms during the period of 1858–1913 the percentage of urban population increased from 10 to 16% (Ryazanov, 1998, p. 143). It's not too much to compare with that of Great Britain 78% or Germany 56% but for Russia the successes of urbanization were more than evident. But the structure of the urban growth was different because that enormous growth happened much more due to the flood of rural migrants than to the growth of the native urban population. During the period of 1858–1897 the percentage of peasants moving to the urban areas increased from 21% to 43%, in the largest cities that rate of rural migrants was much higher and reached 69–70% in St.Petersburg and Moscow. As concerning the new working class it was mostly (up to 80%) recruited from the rural population. B. Mironov called that interesting processes as "*ruralization of urban population*" (Mironov, 1999, p. 341), leading to the domination of rural mentality, rural living standards and traditions in the urban areas. Going little ahead it worth mention that the ruralization process happened for the second time during the early 30s, after 1929 a flood of rural population moved to the central urban regions to avoid the atrocities of the collectivization policy and followed starvation in many rural areas. So, the rural mentality based on traditionalism and paternalism dominated both in rural and urban areas reproducing correspondent moral values and type of trust.

How to explain the nature of traditionalism and traditional trust in the rural societies? Traditionalism in general is the way how people look at their future – just in the same way like the look at the past. Thus, to make a future in the same way as a past is the working rule of the traditional mentality. For the first, the image of the future is based on the idea that everything belongs to the supernatural forces and depends on the wishes of gods rather than activity of a man. Here comes the form of the passivism (opposite to activism) as the model of the economic and social behavior. Hence trust is placed not in oneself and in the individual activity but rather trust is giving to the external mystical forces. For the second, if the behavior of an individual corresponds to the rules and norms created by that gods (and institutionalized in the communal social norms) the fate is favorable and the future is bright. There is no need to calculate risk and uncertainty or to use rational choice procedures because the fate is predetermined and depends on the balance of goods and evils in your life. What is good and what is bad is prescribed by the religion and by the orthodox moral values. These values are somehow operationalized in the everyday rules of success or happiness in the rural community: to live oneself life according to the traditions and norms established by fathers and grandfathers; not to forget God and try not to be overloaded by too much sins; to have a large family and a lot of children; to live in a consent with neighbors and community and have a respect from them; if possible not to leave your own native places and to die there in peace according to the orthodox traditions in the atmosphere of caring family climate.

Hence, the traditional trust is trust to the past, trust in the established tradition, norms and order, and vice versa – distrust to everything new, trust to the family and community (to social wholes but not to the individuals), trust to the dogmas but not to the rational ideas. The nature of traditionalism is based on the orthodox moral values and communitarian ethics while the traditional trust is based on trust in God (supernatural forces), trust to community (as enlarged family).

Now let us look more closely at trust to power established in rural communities. The rural community "mir" consisted of households, in its turn households were represented by large families. Each large family was ruled in autocracy by the oldest man (on rare occasion by woman) of the family – patriarch or "bolshak" (literally a "big man" in anthropological terms). The family was integrated by the power of that man who was in charge of everything in his household and represented the interests of the family in the larger communities. The power was absolute and unconditional legitimized by the tradition and reproduced by strict reglamentations and control (even physical punishments were widely spread). In the processes of early socialization much more the external power and control matters than the self-regulationism and self-control. The personality of the "big man" or patriarch played a crucial role, and family members trusted not the abstract impersonal or institutionalized power but to the power of that specific person. Thus for rural mentality and traditionalism trust is given not to the institutions but to personalities or institution represented by that persons. Even God to be trusted should be represent in the image of a man with its inherent features and peculiarities, as well as institutions need first to be subjected to the procedure of anthropomorphism (to be created as a human reality) and then to be trusted to. Paternalism was legitimized way of the supremacy and obedience in the families as well in the community and society, hence a person or a figure – landlord or tsar – was of much importance to be trusted to. Therefore, traditional trust is of personal character and based on paternalistic values.

The power of community itself was partly of the same character and partly different. If the family was ruled in autocracy, the community, called "mir", was ruled by the

principles of primitive democracy, based on the egalitarianism in the economic and social life (equal distribution and constant redistribution of community's land, equal distribution of duties between the members of community, equal responsibilities and taxes, etc.). The egalitarianism as a principle coexisted with the reciprocal relationships, mutual help considered to be a must between the members of community. But just in the same manner, like inside families, the power of community in relation to families and individuals was nonetheless absolute and unconditional, it was a sort of "blind" trust to the patriarchs (later in the soviet times represented by charismatic leaders like Lenin or Stalin) and to community as whole. Freedom as a value hardly was in the first rank on the value scale of rural society, freedom viewed as a contradiction to established order, so it can be either freedom or an order, but not two as one. Freedom was associated with the "freedom from" something, but not the "freedom for", an example of that "freedom from": the bold outlaw has nothing left to loose, he is free from societal norms and his fate is predetermined and too well known. The revolution lately considered to be the total, but nevertheless, temporary destruction of an order. Later the order must be re-established and those pleaded guilty would be inevitably exampled. That is why the rank or value of an order taken in the frameworks of traditional mentality is much higher than the value of freedom, that is why trust in order is much higher then trust in freedom. It helps to explain why the majority of population (actually rural population) sacrificed the gained freedoms during the revolution in the favor of values of power and order. In that way, people trusted to the idea of strong autocratic power and the leader who personally embodied and represented that idea.

The labor ethics and moral attitude to wealth in the traditional mentality were far from being sufficient for the needs of growing capitalist economy. In the orthodox tradition the wealth was treated as immoral phenomenon, like an evil, that eclipses the soul of a man from the God, the wealthy man can not hear the God's voice. In the rural areas people still believed that money can bring power and fame but the wealth does not give a life of ease to a man, vice versa it brings more troubles and fears. To be rich or to be poor depends not on your personal activity but on the willing of God so it is necessary patiently accept your own fate. The wealth is immoral in general terms according to the traditional mentality because mostly it comes from and at the expense of others and infringes the principles of justice. The labor ethics of the rural communities is based on the concept of moderate labor, everyone has to work (only physical work – work of a body not of a mind – considered to be a genuine work, e. g. to read a book was not considered to be a work, much more it was treated as leisure) to earn the subsistence. But to overwork considered also to be a sin as soon as it comes from greed and jealousy, and from *superbia*. It is allowed to do the work only if there is a need for it, so peasants (and later working classes, the former rural migrants) worked only in order to satisfy their primitive needs but not to get profit or to accumulate wealth. That is why total yearly working hours of Russian peasants was much less if to compare with their western neighbors. In 1913 Russian peasants had 140 days a year left for days-off and vacations to compare with that of 68 in the USA, if to compare the American slaves and Russian serfs in the beginning of XIX century the latter worked 2.6 times less (1350 hours a year in Russia instead of 3065–3965 hours in the USA) (Mironov, 1999 (2), p. 311).

As concerning the capital assets and land ownership peasants believed that the land belongs to God and everybody has a right to cultivate it. Those who cultivate it have the rights on it, only for those who work the moral rights to own the land are given that is why land naturally belongs to peasants. Thus the land considered not be the object of

legal property rights but the object of labor, the whole land (including that of landlord) as peasants believed in the late X1X century, belongs to the rural communities and should be equally distributed among that communities and among their members. The very complicated mechanism of communal redistribution has been constantly used to ensure the justice in the use of land. Thus trust in equal distribution, and parity in general, constituted then the basic belief in the early Soviet times.

Therefore, private property hardly considered to be the honest acquisition especially if the land ownership issues were considered. The same logic of justice was applied lately by workers to their industrial enterprises, they wholeheartedly believed that the plants and factories belonged to those who work but no to those who manage despite of the legally instituted property rights. The ideas of working councils – "soviets" – at the industrial enterprises in any case were the genuine products of the traditional mentality and trust. The soviets in fact were the products of spontaneous associations of workers and peasants but not the results of the deliberate policy by Bolsheviks. That is why the ideas of the Communist propaganda based on the naive principles of justice and equal distribution corresponded to or even coincided with the traditional values and mentality of rural classes migrated to the urban areas.

As concerning the relations to the other social classes, traditional mentality is based on the idea of hegemony of labor classes. At the beginning peasants considered themselves to be the real core of the society, every other classes live at the expense of agriculture, so peasants truly believed themselves to be the economic center being dissatisfied with the industrial economic policy as well as the remuneration and respect they actually were given at that times. Later the working classes continued that idea of hegemony supported by the official ideology in the soviet times. The danger of hegemony claims was in the division of the society into "we-group" and "they-group" which led after the revolution to the "red" as well as "white" terror based on the total denial of the interest of the other groups and on the physical liquidation of the other classes.

The mentality of rural classes did not allow them to comprehend the modern economic institutions, the majority of population of pre-revolutionary Russia did not accept monetary terms of economy. Only after the 1905 events and Stolypin's reforms peasants began to use credits and loans from banks, however they totally rejected the idea of commercial rate of interest, they could give or take a loan to or from their neighbors but free of charge, without commission because the mutual help valued much more than the interested help. The traditional mentality was based on the concept of fair price and rejected the principles of profit. The market constituted a tangible reality of their economic life nevertheless did not constituted the frameworks of mentality – market mentality. The ideas of competition, of making money, of contracts, of careers were against the tradition. Going little ahead, it is an evident paradox but it was the soviet planned (non market) economy that introduced market mentality and rational calculation into the everyday practice of the people.

Thus the economy as a whole in the beginning of XX century was divided into two sectors: the biggest one was based on traditional economic values and on the community as a basic economic institution; the smallest but most efficient one was based on modern capitalist values and market mentality. Trust of the traditional or familistic type dominated over the modern trust of market societies.

Moving further to the soviet times let us sum up our preliminary arguments on the traditional trust and economic values. Traditional trust in its nature is a sort of habit, non rational attitude to the world and to the other people based on unconditional beliefs. The basic features of the traditional trust are: trust in supernatural forces regulating the

whole life of an individual and society and hence unconditional trust in dogmas no matter of what character and distrust to rational logic (in the early soviet times the religious dogmas were substituted by the communist ones but it did not prevented people from blindly believing them); trust to the past and distrust to the future, everything new (no matter technical innovations or ideas) treated with suspicion and mostly rejected; trust to the community, to the social whole, to collective values and distrust to individuals or individual values (in the soviet times this type of trust expressed itself in the form of trust to the Soviet state and Communist party); trust in order sustained by strong power and distrust to freedom as something breaking down the order, power in its nature is of paternalistic character with personalized trust to the leader (in the early soviet times trust in Tsar was substituted by the trust to the Communist party leaders). In economic sense trust was expressed by trust to external forces or institutions (state and its economic institutions) and distrust to individual activity, trust to traditional techniques of economic activity and distrust to modern, trust to the values of obligatory but non intensive labor and egalitarian distribution, trust in collective economic actions and distrust to personal economic activity.

In the beginning the XX century Russia despite of the economic success in industrialization was still predominantly rural society – society of high trust of traditional character. But the Russian – Japanese war and revolutionary events of 1905, then a successive Stolypin's reforms aimed at the destruction of communitarian economic values, and then the World War I – all these events and processes began to erode the traditional moral values and trust. The economic situation at that times was far from being stable, the enormous overpopulation in the rural areas and the lowest efficiency in agriculture led to the poverty and growing discontent among the peasants. They saw the abundance of landlords land and seek for the easiest way to solve the problem – just to expropriate it. It was a myth because the total area of communities' land was more than in three times larger than the total area of landlords land. The revolution of 1917 proved that idea – it really happened that the expropriation and distribution of landlord's land did not prevented that dangerous process of rural overpopulation. Nevertheless, peasants according to their traditional economic values saw the only one source to increase the economic efficiency – the enlargement of communities land at the expense of landlords and began to act in 1905. These militant actions reciprocally brought a reaction and forced government to use corresponding methods of managing the situations. The claims of rural communities were broadly supported by the workers (actually, a lot of them were recent rural migrants, the ties with the communities were still strong and were of constant character, according to the law of 1861 the worker even if he lived in the city was officially affiliated to the rural family and community even paying taxes over there, visiting his rural relatives during vocations and celebrations). In 1906 Stolypin tried to find out the way how to improve the rural policy and give more land to peasants. The idea was to grant to peasants a legal rights and actual possibilities to get out from the community and start up the agricultural economy based on the individual farmer's households like in the USA. Vast territories in the Siberian regions were given to those who wished to begin a new life on the new land, and until 1914 3.3 mil. people migrated to the Siberia regions while the national budget paying for their traveling expenses and granting them a small loan (150 rubles). But the lack of state support, scarce financial resources and insufficient credits did not allow these new farmers to benefit from the resettlement, approximately half of million came back to their native places (Feydorov, 2001, p. 264). Nevertheless, ¼ of peasants population left the communities mostly to

get the rights of private property on land and to start up their own independent farmer's households, of course, some of them migrated later to the urban areas. Stolypin planned to reconstruct the agriculture and transform the community life as the social basis of peasants' order in the period of not less than 20 years. But the begining of the World War and his tragic death in 1911 (he was assassinated by terrorist during the show in the Kiev's Opera House) stopped that process.

The internal policy during the events of 1905 and especially the fusillade of the peaceful demonstration to Tsar on November 9 undermined partly the trust of labor classes to monarchy and personally to the figure of Nikolai The Second who became more and more unpopular, people just did not want believe him and his government any more. The growth of the trade unionism and working movement contributed to the broadening revolutionary process. The new forms of power as working or peasants councils suddenly came into being. The World War started in 1914 led Russian empire directly to the full-fledged economic, political, social and national crises. During the war ¼ of male population was conscripted and mobilized to the army, the national economy and especially agriculture lacked the working force and hence its productivity decreased (up to 20% of total production of grain, ⅓ of sugar production, the food-cards were introduced everywhere), the needs of the army hardly were satisfied in a full scale and in 1916 tsarist government (not Bolsheviks as widely acknowledged) introduced the compulsory requisitions – the grain in kind be taken from every rural household for the needs of the army. Due to the galloping inflation prices on the basic food-stuffs increased in 4–5 times, in 1915 the fuel crises captured Moscow and St.Petersburg renamed at that time of anti-German hysteria into Petrograd. The war campaign was in general unlucky for Russia – Poland, Lithuania and Western part of Ukraine were lost in warfare, more than 2 mil. people died and much more were wounded. The goals of the war were unclear and uncertain, the most of the soldiers and peasants wondered weather they really needed so much the southern territories to fight for them. Thus the society in a whole, every social classes – working class, soldiers and peasants, political elite and land aristocracy – all of them, no matter upper or lower classes, were disappointed with the tsarist government and its unwise policy. The total distrust to tsar Nikolai personally and to the tsarism as institution laid a foundation of the revolutionary events in 1917 and the first bastion of traditionalism and traditional trust – tsarism – was ruined. The significance of the person of figure however was untouched yet (to be totally destroyed 40 years later in the attacks on the Stalin's cult) but for the first time the innovation – the intention to accept the new, the new order or way of life – took over the tradition. In fact, the Revolution meant the implementation of the traditional value of "freedom from" but not "freedom for" but the process of traditional trust deconstruction has already began.

After the February Revolution of 1917 the Provisional government turned Russia into the rank of the most democratic countries in the world, one part of the traditional trust – trust to tsar – was destroyed but trust to the new forms of power like parliament or local authorities did not came into being yet. From that point the transformation of social morality has began in the peasants world as well. The old traditional norms and communal values began to lose its power but the new ones did not come yet, thus the moral environment of social actions corresponded to the situation E. Durkheim called *anomie*. A lot of people had taken part in the war campaign (not less than 25% of the male population), they learned how to use weapons, they saw the atrocities of the war and they were far from being peaceful. The value of human life drastically decreased, that people were ready to use enforcement in each and every situation. Thus the traditional

trust and morality was displaced by force, solidarity between upper and lower classes was substituted by the growing suspicions and distrust. But nevertheless, trust in God, trust in community, trust in external social power still dominated in the social mind to be totally destroyed after the soviet times.

The Provisional Government did a lot to make situation more stable and certain, but unfortunately, it did not manage to create a high trust atmosphere to its program mostly because of the military policy (refuse to somehow stop the war) and because of growing economic crisis. Actually its inability to work out strong and clear policy led the country to the total catastrophe. That is why it was not a tremendous effort for Bolsheviks to take power in October 1917. The political power was given to the Soviets where Bolsheviks played a key role and immediately the new regime declared peace to soldiers (on the base of pre-war status quo), land to peasants (the private property on the land was declared illegal), freedom to nations (giving them rights for self-determination). The idea was great but nevertheless all mentioned above slogans were only a declarations, meanwhile that sort of policy was supported by the majority of population. The army sincerely supported the cessation of war, majority of soldiers, former peasants, deserted immediately their divisions and moved to their native places in order to take an active part in the redistribution of the land. However, their rush was accompanied by the growth of plunders and the use of force, the moral degradation continued. During the 1918 the big business – large enterprises in the heavy industry – was nationalized giving for workers all possibilities to introduce different forms of control over the production and distribution processes, but workers by themselves had a slightly idea how to organize the technological process and how to manage the enterprise. The efficiency of the production decreased in times so the new government had to send commissars to somehow organize the technological process of production. In the rural areas the power of redistribution took in their hands so called "Combed" – councils of the poorers – these organizations voluntary distributed the land and soon were dismissed even by Bolsheviks because of the unfair and inequity activities (to be revived soon in the collectivization period).

Despite of the measures taken by Bolsheviks, economic crisis was as deep as strong, and soon however the Bolshevik economic program became inevitably the compulsory one. It was called "War Communism" as a peculiar policy to somehow organize the chaos in the economic and social life. According to that policy the exchange, market and money were abandoned as unnecessary elements of the economy. Actually, that measures led to the blossoming black market, to the establishment of informal economics and barter's exchange. The Civil War started in 1918 continued the nightmares of the World War and Revolution, in its nature it was the war of mentalities, between those who looked for the past and those who looked for the future while both parts taking part in the conflict using the immoral methods like "red terror" or "white terror". The majority of rural population was in between those two ideologies, at the beginning period peasants were neutral but as soon as they saw how white army introduced the old regime on the occupied territories the rural population voted for Bolsheviks despite of their cruel methods of economic policy. Peasants believed that somehow their ownership of the land declared by Bolsheviks would be safeguarded and thus supported the Red Army. Furthermore, peasants believed that dictatorship of the proletariat declared by the Bolsheviks is based on the union with peasants and the declared war with bourgeoisie classes is much more on their side. The moral values of the red army and the white army were of the same character, force was used in both camps, hence, the morality of survival substituted the Christian moral values.

The World War, Revolutions and the Civil War changed overwhelmingly the social structure and the moral values of Russian society. From 1914 to 1921 20 mil. people perished, more than 2 mil. emigrated to the foreign countries, 7 mil. children lost their parents and homes. The sweeping changes mostly affected the urban population, there was a large migration of urban population to more rich rural areas (the population of Petrograd decreased twofold), so the new unexpected wave of ruralisation happened, the total number of industrial workers lessened for 5–6 times, in 1921 the number of industrial proletariat did not exceed 1 mil. people. These processes of drastic changes contributed greatly to the transformation of mentality, for the first time in the history of Russia the peasants population, and hence majority of people, voted against the tradition, against the old regime and supported the new power and new regime. Thus the some foundations of traditionalism partly were destroyed partly were reconstructed, people rejected their trust to tsar and their trust to old regime and voted for the new one. However the patriarchal trust to the charismatic leader still dominated, the figure of tsar was substituted first by Lenin, and some years later by Stalin. People trusted not only to their ideas but also to them as founding fathers of the new society, the level of trust to that figure increased and solidarity between labor classes became stronger too. It was a very beginning of the traditional trust transformation into the new forms, then to be totally reconstructed in the late 30-s. But the old forms of trust were more than alive, the rural society was still based on the community basis and paternalism, despite of the new changes the community played in the early period of the Soviet Russia much more important role than in the pre-Revolutionary times. Just before the collectivization in 1927 not less than 90% of the peasants land belonged to the rural communities (Ryazanov, 1998, p. 336). There was a wide and deep gap between peasants and the other population, M. Gorky mentioned in 1922 that rural population did not trust not only those who came form the cities and towns to help but they totally distrusted or treated with suspicion a city as an institution, they considered it to be complicated organization of tricky people living at the expense of peasants and producing a lot of goods completely useless for them.

Nonetheless, peasants trusting Bolsheviks in their political program did not trusted their economic program at all. The compulsory economic program, the destroyed markets and monetary means finally caused the great catastrophe – famine in 1921 when 5 mil. people died. To somehow help that situation Bolsheviks and especially Lenin launched the new economic policy called "NEP" oriented on the restoration of market economy. The special tax in kind – "prodnalog" – replaced the compulsory requisitions allowing peasants to sell their surpluses at free market prices. Peasants believed that policy and as a result in 1926 the total production of crops reached it peak to be comparable with that of in 1914. The work of industrial enterprises became organized with the help of monetary and financial terms. However, Lenin called NEP as a step backward in order to go forward, the commanding heights were in the hands of Bolsheviks, the heavy industry and communications still belonged to the state. During the NEP period not only economic freedoms were given to people, but some features of general democratization were clearly seen. The most important was the broad tendency in the democratization of education. The level of literacy in the tsarist Russia was extremely low but from the early revolutionary period the deconstruction of the traditional mentality expressed in the unexpected interest to education. That all national move was supported by Bolshevik's government, from 1919 the wide range of professional schools for workers and peasants were opened mostly on a part time schedule. By 1930 the level of literacy increased from 33% to 63% according to the statistics (but the notion of literacy in itself was different to

that of in western countries, only reading skills were taken into account to say nothing about writing).

The next phenomenon of the democratization was revealed in the more freedoms given to women, from that time in the Russian history women for the first time have got equal rights to take part in economic activity and earned enough to live independently. Step by step in the urban areas the traditional large families based on paternalism gave their place to the small nuclear families, as a result the number of divorces tripled during 20s.

One of the most interesting as well as understudied was the phenomenon of rapid bureaucratization of economic and social life in 20s, the former workers and peasants, poorly educated, suddenly became the persons who decide, the number of new bureaucrats despite of several official campaigns against the bureaucratization tripled. The new bureaucrats tried to learn the fundamentals of office management but caught only the formal rules of the game, not the nature of bureaucratic procedures, and without correspondent context the general efficiency of bureaucracy was extremely low. The principles of status, hierarchy, subordination, place hunting were learned by heart by those new "managers", not surprisingly their work accompanied by the corruption, heavy drinking and incompetence. Thus the rules of formal rationality were fighting against traditional mentality and trust but rural roots were all too clear in the late 20s.

The NEP period and the correspondent market developments did not turn Russia into the modern industrial nation. The output increased in both industry and agriculture and by 1927 the prewar levels of output had been substantially regained. However, the country was still predominantly rural in its character and mentality. According to the Census of 1926 the population of USSR ranked 148 mil. people, the social structure was represented by following groups: workers – 10.8%, peasants – 73.0%, other classes (petite bourgeoisie, unemployed, craftsmen etc.) – 16.2% (Sokolov, 1999, p. 154). Stalin and his clique clearly saw that the socialist policy would fail if there would be a strong basis of the traditional, and hence non socialist, elements left untouched in the rural country. Those huge masses of population actually were totally independent from the state and could impact somehow the long term policy of communists, for example, there were only 2.5% of communists among rural inhabitants. So to keep things going like this meant a hidden catch to Stalin, a latent danger was very close to the soviet regime.

Thus the concept of industrialization and collectivization came into being to modernize the predominantly rural country. The idea of "socialist industrialization" was based on the development of planned state economy under the strict control by planning commissions, on the technological reconstruction of the heavy industry and forced accumulation of capital for these means. At the same time the policy of market economy restrictions considered to be the part of socialist industrialization policy as well, but actually it stimulated nothing that the shift from the official to black market only. The first five-year plan launched in 1929 declared a goal to turn Russia into the industrial state, it goes without saying that the targets of that plan had not been fulfilled in 4 and a quarter years as it was reported as well as the general industrialization goal was not achieved even until 1945–1950. But the important changes nevertheless took place, the annual growth of Gross Domestic Product exceeded 5%, but industrial rates were even higher – up to 17% and in fact not due to the statistical cosmetics, these rates could be valid because as usual the highest growth rates are to be achieved in the construction period. Beside that the USSR benefit from the Great Depression in the West and new technologies were bought over there at the relatively low prices (one of the most interesting example is the construction of Gorky automobile plant by Ford in Nizhniy Novgorod). In

1933 the government inaugurated the Second five-year plan, the emphasis supposed to be given to the production of consumer goods, but the policy of forced industrialization continued, an extraordinary proportion of the resources was devoted to the capital goods (the average 30% of the National Income and up to 45% in 1932) (Sokolov, 1999, p. 183). Because of the lack of foreign loans the industrialization was held at the expense of the export revenues (timber and grain as the first items) and at the expense production of consumer goods and their consumption. Nevertheless, the enormous amount of the new working places were created especially at the construction sites in the east of the country attracting more and more rural inhabitants.

The forced industrialization program was accompanied by the "collectivization" program, the idea was to establish more larger economic units ("kolhozi") than households to somehow make them to use modern technologies and techniques in agriculture and to put into life a sort of demand to those economic sectors of the heavy industries. But the plot was to change the social structure in the rural areas and make rural population to be more dependent on and engaged in the communist policy. Despite of some positive trends like the state supplied machinery ("MTS") the total output of agricultural production decreased in times under the collectivization era. For the second time in the history of post-revolutionary Russia the poorest strata in the villages and their organizations ("Combed") came into power, the expropriations and requisitions turned into the working tools of that policy. Those not willing to enter the Kolhoz – collective farm – were exiled (about 2 mil. people). Actually it made many rural inhabitants to leave their houses and to move to the urban areas, only in 1931 not less than 4 mil. people left their native places. The former close members of small communities left their natural social environment, moving to the new social spaces. They took from their past a habit of short *distanciation* between an individual and a social whole. Thus, the social patterns of the community were embedded into the social space of the society reproducing too close and immediate ties between society and its members, and hence reproducing a milieu to the autocracy and totalitarism. Finally, in 1939 the share of urban population increased dramatically to 33% with no facilities prepared for that flood of migrants as usual. A majority of rural migrants moved to the most attractive cities like Moscow and Leningrad despite of the different preventive measures like the passport systems and compulsory registrations. In fact peasants had no possibility to move freely inside the country because they just had no possibilities to get passports but the new channels of migration has been invented soon (Red Army or industrial construction sites recruitment or application to educational programs were among them).

In 1932 due to that tragical collectivization policy from 3 to 10 mil. peasants died from the starvation meanwhile the soviet export of grain was constantly rising to get funding for the industrialization programs. So, the first Stalin's assault on the village was more than "successful", the social substance of rural life was destroyed, some people so called "kulak" – the richest and more economically active part of rural population – were exiled, some people moved to the urban areas, those left were built into the new system of agricultural production without correspondent internal stimuli to work efficiently like in the soviet industrial economy. Not surprisingly by 1932 the output of agricultural production decreased rapidly and ranked 73% that of in 1928. Meanwhile the official propaganda declared the mythical success and false achievements. Thus the double standards of truth were introduced, public and private information became totally different. The soviet constitution of 1936 declared all democratic rights for citizens but only insane could claim for that freedoms. Nevertheless the communist propaganda

was quite efficient, mostly people for the first time captured by the sources of mass communications (like newspapers and especially radio) believed in that myths or were ready to believe. Most of the new forming soviet people were ready to accept the new rules of the game and reciprocated the standards established by the Communist power. In that way the trust to power was reproduced and internalized by the population.

In 1934 the leader of the Leningrad communist organization S. Kirov was assassinated by the terrorist. This event triggered the wave of massive repression launched by Stalin. In 1936 131 thousand people were under arrest but in 1937 that figure increased in times – approximately 1 mil. people. The atmosphere of hidden fears and suspicions blossomed in the late 30s fed by the army of NKVD informators contributing to the official terror. The delation and blackmailing were among the strategies of the career making, those place hunters from the new bureaucracy just recruited from workers and peasants used all means in their fighting for the place in "nomenclature" – the list of names to be appointed to the posts. In fact because of massive terror applied to the ruling elite as well to the common people the career opportunities were numerous that is why the large number of young party members were appointed to positions in the economy at the age of 30–33. The more the social trust melted the more institutionalized trust as the public loyalty to power grew. The familistic trust among family members in that atmosphere of public suspicion became increasingly strong but even inside small communities the trust erosion was evident.

Thus terror and fear as well as propaganda (based on the state monopoly on the mass media) were the sources of trust in the 30s substituting traditional trust. The radius of paternalistic trust was broaden, the whole "society-community" was treated by the former rural population as a large family with a father (communist leader) and sons (soviet citizens), with power and obedience, with external and internal enemies of the family to be find out and punished. The autocracy or totalitarism seemed to the majority of that people as something natural and judicial. Much more the social life in 30s copied the social matrix of pre-Revolutionary society, the nature of traditional order kept untouched but the form of traditionalism changed drastically. Even the orthodox church was subordinated to the state somehow supporting the regime. People trusted to that "society-community" and its attributes playing the new rules of the game established by the regime. Stalin deliberately used that new forms of paternalism (in his speech in the very beginning of the World War II he referred to people not officially as "comrades" but as "brothers and sisters") to reproduce his personal cult to make people to trust him as a founding father as well as the protector and judge. Meanwhile power did not trust people, for example, from the very beginning of the war campaign the order was given to the inhabitants of Moscow to pass off their personal radio sets to local authorities to strengthen the informational monopoly of the state.

The begining of changes

During the Great Patriotic War (note the paternalistic tendency even in the official title of the war) the trust of people to power and to Stalin however strengthened for the first. The reason is that suddenly the myth on the external enemy became a truth and people were fighting against the enemies together with government, suddenly the false propaganda changed into truth – the newspapers and the radio were given people more or less truly information concerning warfare, the moral climate changed too, the nation lived as one feeling the common pain and empathy because the tragedy was great – during

the war every family was somehow touched by the events. Nobody doubted in Stalin's iron will and his wish to win the victory in the war.

But situation changed however drastically after the victory in 1945. More than 26 mil. people perished during the period 1941–1945 (while Stalin mentioned only 7 mil.), demographically disparities reminded a total catastrophe – among those 26 mil. the 20 mil. were male population, in 1959 for 1000 women 633 men were left, more than 7 mil. people were to be repatriated from Germany to their native places. Industrial regions laid in ruin, 30% of pre-war national wealth being destroyed, 28 mil. people were left homeless (Hosking, 2000, p. 283). Nevertheless, soviet people survived and passed through all hardships of warfare and post-war period. But the mentality as well as the morality changed drastically too, people who won the war became more independent, during the war they had to make decisions independently, they much more trusted to each other – to the brothers in arms – than to the power to say nothing about NKVD officers, they believed in their personal deeds in the national campaign. Many soldiers for the first time in their lives traveled abroad and witnessed high living standards of the occupied western territories – from Norway to Austria. People were not satisfied with their own life no matter living standards or political freedoms, they were not afraid of criticizing powers and discussing more or less openly the drawbacks of the regime. As soon as the internal and external enemies had been defeated people expected the better life, the move to more liberal society with no constant repression and suspicion left. The former officers of the Red Army considered themselves to be the social elite of the soviet society and distrusted the officers of the NKVD, much more than earlier that former workers and peasants seek for something new searching their own identity.

Thus from that turning point the social solidarity in the soviet society became more organic leading to the transformation of the traditional order and traditional trust, the slow steps of the late modernization were ready to be revealed and consequences were clear. For the first, the Revolution of 1917 changed drastically the nature of trust, second, the Second World War played it crucial role. Not surprisingly after the Stalin's death in 1953 the society as well as communist party leaders accused the totalitarian regime and much more important – Stalin personally. The naive paternalism has vanished and truth about the repression of 30s and the personal role of Stalin became clear, in one moment absolute good turned into absolute evil, the absolute trust turned into absolute distrust. The second bastion of the traditional trust, the trust to charismatic leader, was broken down never again to be revived in the XX century Russian history. The figure of Lenin was still untouched waiting for the total disrobe in the 80s.

So, what forms of traditional trust kept on working? The trust in God transformed into the trust in marxism-leninism (communism as a religion) was partly destroyed, trust in monarchy transformed into trust in charismatic communist leader (Lenin–Stalin) was totally dismantled. The only one part of traditional trust was left, it was trust to the soviet state as a social community – the former trust in rural community "mir". Nevertheless, the successive history of the soviet society from 50s to 80s was a history of growing distrust to the state.

In 1946–1947 due to the obsolete agricultural policy based on the compulsory work in the state running farms not less 2 mil. people died from starvation and 100 mil. were somehow touched by the famine. At the same time the food supply to the occupied eastern part of Berlin was exellent, the food-cards for Germans steadily exceeded the level of 1944 to show the advantages of the soviet power. A the same time Soviet Union exported 2.5 mil. tons of grain to the West. The tax burden in 1950 for rural population

became much heavier, in total the tax level was increased in 2.5 time, in 1952 even the revenues from gathering berries and mushrooms were subjected to the taxation. Much more people preferred to work hard on their small parcels of land or in the gardens, that parcels covered not more than 1% of the total area meanwhile the half of the vegetable production and ⅔ of meat, potatoes and milk production came form that economic activity. The next wave of rural migrants flooded the cities and towns where the living standards hardly were much higher. But the one phenomenon in the rural mentality of that years was quite new – the older people did not wish their children to stay any longer in their native places, they stimulated children to continue education to find the legal and efficient strategy to became urban citizens. As a result only 10% of the school graduates stayed along with their parents in the rural areas contributing to that process of rural depopulation. (The final wave of rural migrants started in 1974 when the peasants at least were given the right to get passports and hence to change free the place of living).

The post-war educational wave was something interesting, to say it was great is to say nothing, the number of students in that times exceeded that of in Europe and Asia taken together, in 1949–1950 the compulsory 7 year secondary education has been introduced. The number of student in the higher education system increased form 1.25 mil. in 1950–1951 to 2.4 mil. in 1960–1961, and next to 3.6 mil. in 1964–1965. The ratio of those in national economy with higher education certificate increased from 1.3% in 1939, to 3.3% in 1959, 6.5% in 1970, 10% in 1979, and with secondary education level correspondingly – 11%, 40%, 58.8%,70.5%. (Hosking, 2000: 390). That flow of educated people totally changed the social structure of the soviet society as well as dominated mentality. The rational thinking laid down by the formal education transformed drastically the traditional attitudes to the identity, to the social community, to the state and powers. According to the Census of 1939 more than half of people reported to trust to God, in the beginning of 60s that number decreased to 10–15% in urban regions and to 20–25% in rural regions according to sociological data (Arkhipova, 2001, p. 210). Trust to the soviet power due to that rational thinking an educatiob began to erode. The first anti-soviet campaigns came from the universities and academician institutes supported by the intellectual elite. The first impulse was given by the Khrushev's speech at the XX Congress of the Communist Party where he criticized the Stalin's cult. The second impulse came from the events in Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia. The clear anti-Stalinist policy of Tito in Yugoslavia started up in 1948 suddenly revealed the alternative ways of socialist policy. The rational attitude to power substituted the blind trust and people tried to find out the alternatives. The young historian Krasnopevtsev from Moscow university, a leader of Comsomol organization disenchanted in the Communist party policy, established a secret association to study the genuine history of Communist Party instead of the false official history, in 1957 the members of that association organized some actions among workers appealing for strikes and trials over those persons in charge of the repression (and Khrushev itself in their number). The same attempts were taken by the young student Trophimov in Leningrad who claimed for the rehabilitation of Bukharin and his policy, accused the soviet occupation of Hungary and appealed for the restoration of genuine role of soviets as working councils at the industrial enterprises. It goes without saying that both of that young revolutionaries were jailed however it clearly symbolized the beginning of the process called later as "desacralisation of power" and new growing distrust policy to the communist regime. It was the first seed of moral fighting with totalitarism continued later by the famous soviet dissidents like academician physicist Andrej Sakharov and writer, former school teacher, Alexander Solzhenitsin.

Khrushev tried to liberalize the society as well as economy, the great success was reached in the social welfare, the military expenditures in the late 50-s were cut drastically, the real income of industrial workers during the decade of 60s increased to 40%, the social security programs were organized, the housing policy took priority, for the first time after 30s the soviet people had a chance to get rid from communal dwellings, the policy of building societies (cooperatives in construction of houses) was officially supported. But in general the economic reforms by Khrushev were not supported by the people and even by his command. He tried to somehow decentralize the economy to make more effective the horizontal ties between enterprises, however the vertical ties were broken down but horizontal did not established yet. The command system in the economy was partly destroyed giving place for creeple marketization of the economy and even planning agents (a peculiar professions like "tolkach" was invented to use connection and corruption to get rent from planning system). Thus market principles ruled even in the planned economy, hence trust to the planning system eroded. In 1954 Khrushev announced the start of "virgin land" program – to cultivate a huge territory of arid land in Kazakhstan and increase the productivity of national agriculture, due to his unwise policy few market elements still left in agriculture were eliminated. He did not wish to listen to those who argued on the inevitable erosion of the soil in such territories, he continued experimenting with non traditional corns like maize and soon all the attempts to somehow push forward agriculture without market failed much more strengthening his personal unpopularity.

After the deposition of Khrushev in 1964 young and active at that time Brezhnev launched a range of economic reforms to give more autonomy to industrial enterprises officially introducing some market elements in the system of national economy planning, according to Kosygin (prime-minister at that time) the profit was declared to be the main indicator in the state planning system in order somehow to get away from planning in kind and shift to monetary means. The idea was to make economic units to be oriented on the market demand and produce only these goods to meet the social needs and then to improve the poor quality of the industrial goods. Nevertheless the productivity was declining and quality did not improved, it became more and more clear that the system should be dismantled and part measures could not change the economic situation. In the early 70s the world oil crisis helped Brezhnev to maintain his economic power but in the 80s the soviet economy came across with full-fledged economic and political crisis. The black market and shadow economy blossomed in the 70s, by the middle 80s more than 15 mil. people were engaged in these activities. The official moral structure of soviet society was completely destroyed, people did not trust official policy, did not trust religion (however some splashes of the growth of the religion values were seen in the 70s and especially late 80s but it did not change the situation in general), did not trust propaganda and state owned sources of information. The last elements of social trust to power were lost in the late 70s that is why the functional substitutes of trust appeared. The first one Sztompka called as "externalization of trust". It means that the local institutions, things, products are considered to be bad (all goods made in the Soviet Union considered to be bad by definition) and all foreign goods are considered to be good. Thus, distance targets of trust – western society and economy, western culture and politics – were idealized. The second functional substitute of trust deals with the "internalization of trust". It means that social trust shifts more or less to the sphere of private from the public one. People can trust only members of their families or their friends or colleagues in the small closed groups. All public sphere was out of reach for

social trust, thus familistic values, and immoral familism, were at the top in the 70s. The immoral familism was reproduced at that time by the corruption from the top to the bottom. Bribes and gifts gave people some sort of personal control over hostile public institutions of state character. Favoritism flourished at that time as well, social norms were replaced by the net of personal relations. The third functional substitute was disactivism or passivism. People did not trust themselves, they just did not believe the possibility to change the situation, they prevented from actions no matter of what character or in what sphere. That is why the strong alcohol consumption increased in times in the 70s stimulating Gorbachev some years later to declare so called anti-alcohol campaign. Thus the social enthusiasm being the essential feature of the soviet society of 30s or post-war period was substituted by the social passivism.

The break up of the moral structure in 70-s led to the growth of the criminal gangs, the only utilitarist motives of the social behavior and monetary means were taken seriously, thus cynicism constituted the basic feature of that society – people were ready to use any type of means to reach their goals. Therefore, soviet society in the 70s were immoral one with the general social distrust atmosphere dominated.

The false official propaganda was disrobed in the time of early Gorbachev's reform, according to the proclaimed "glasnost" policy the state gave up its monopoly on the mass media. As soon as the monopoly on truth was lost the double standards of truth – one for the private use, and the second for the official one – became unnecessary. The first significant steps to the democracy and new morality were made nevertheless leading to the total break up of the soviet state and the power of communist party. During the short-term *coupe d'etat* in August 1991 the majority of people supported market reforms and voted for the new policy of Russia. The history of the soviet union was over, like its predecessor – the Russian Empire – the Soviet Union and its XX century history served as a starting place for the new Russia, more different than ever.

Conclusion

Summing up the ideas of trust and morality transformation in the Soviet history I'll underline in brief the social consequences of the soviet period of the history of Russia and the changing attitudes to trust and morality. The traditional society inherited from prerevolutionary was more or less transformed into the modern one, from rural society with absolute monarchy to the industrial state with rational bureaucracy. Traditional trust based on trust to tsar (being a sort of paternalistic trust) was transformed into impersonal trust to the democratic institutions (presidency, parliament, legal institutions like independent judges and courts). That process is far from being completed (many people still trust not to the institution of presidency but more to this or that figure of president, for example, they trust more to Putin or Medvedev) but the transformation by all means has already began.

The changes in the social and demographical structures of the society are all well clear. The rural society with more than 80% of people engaged in primitive agriculture was transformed into urban industrial society (in 1959 the percentage of rural population was still 52.1% but in 1970 – 43.7%, in 1979 – 37.7%, in 1989 – 34.2% (Statistical yearbook, 1989, p. 18)) The traditional type of large rural family was substituted by nuclear family. As concerning the social structure the proportion of working class increased from 10% to the 80% in 1989, the social mobility increased rapidly especially in 20s and 30s to more be stabilized in 60s and 70s while the education being the most significant channel

of mobility. The tremendous success has been reached during the soviet history in the educational sphere, the illiteracy has been done away with. The secularization process reached its peak during the Soviet period, the social function of orthodox religion and its institutions is even less meaningful to compare with that of western nations. Hence the moral system based on religious values and norms was substituted by the artificial communist morality never taken seriously. Actually, the moral system has been somehow transformed to the universal system of utilitarianism and hedonism especially in late 60s and 70s. The immoral double standards of truth during the era of "glasnost" in late 80s were broken down together with the state monopoly on mass media opening the way to the more or less adequate media based on the principles of pluralism. The traditional mentality has been transformed systematically into the modern rationalized mentality and rational trust. The social mind became open to accept universal modern values and norms thus the way to the market society and correspondent trust and morality has been laid down.

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PROBLEM OF MEASURING SOCIAL TRUST – CAN YOU TRUST MOST PEOPLE?[1]

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Introduction

Throughout the years of researching trust and distrust, various definitions of have emerged for specific structural elements, bases and criteria. Researchers' views differ not just on the content of trust, but also on the class of understanding to which it relates. In various studies trust is viewed in the context of expectations, setting, relationships, conditions, feelings, the process of social exchange and relaying of information and other significant benefits, personal and group property, competency etc. In certain conditions trust or distrust can be viewed through the lens of the public and group mood, climate, social situation and social problem. The presence of some stable characteristics of trust in various historical periods and various societies makes it possible to discuss a *culture of trust* (Veselov, 2004; Selimen, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004; Yamagishi et al., 1998; Yamagishi, Yamagishi, 1994; Yoshino, Rangan, 1995; etc.). The culture of trust is not just the historical setting, norms and values of social interaction; it is also the actively reproducible structure of relationships in societal practices that can consciously plan and regulate (Veselov, 2004, p. 32). Cultures can differ on their definition of trust, the criteria of its formation, its main components (bases), the degree to which it is expressed, and the rules and traditions that regulate trusting relationships. F. Fukuyama, who studied national cultures of trust, splits modern governments into three groups depending on the role that trust plays in their societies (Fukuyama, 2004). The first group with the highest level of social cooperation and trust is comprised of the US, Japan and Germany. F. Fukyuama connects these countries' highly developed economies with the role that trust plays in their economic lives. The second group, characterized by less trust than the first, includes China, Italy and France, where trust is supported by family structures (or something similar). The third group, which has the lowest level of trust, is made up of FSU countries.

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In the traditions of the epigenetic approach of E. Erikson, many authors view a person's trust in the world as the most basic and fundamental social unit of personality – the meta-relationship, which defines further development of all types of personal relationships toward the world, oneself and others (I. V. Antonenko, V. P. Zinchenko, P. Levitsky, D. McAllister and R. Bies, B. F. Porshnev, T. P. Skripkina etc.).

Other authors understand trust as a general relationship with or expectation from the people around, the social systems, or social order (B. Berber, H. Garfinkel, N. Luhmann etc.). According to N. Luhmann, trust is often viewed as a mechanism to reduce insecurity and risk in a complex world (Luhmann, 1979). Positive expectations form the main element of many approaches to understanding the nature of trust (R. Levitsky, D. McAllister and R. Bies, D. Russo and S. Sitkin, G. Homans, L. Hosmer etc.).

Thus the search for the foundation, content and functionality of trust has been going on for decades. During this time, various methodological approaches and assessment techniques have been developed. One of the first tools to appear was the methodology of J. Rotter, M. Rosenberg and others (Rosenberg, 1957, 1991; Rotter, 1967). Rosenberg's methodology, published in 1957, posed what became the most popular question, and one that is still used by the research community today: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?". In particular, this questions is used in the World Value Survey (WVS), a long-term global project that studies values in European countries (the European Values Study, or EVS), which was launched in 1981. This question also appears in research projects as part of a study to monitor the state of civil society that was established in 2006 by the Centre for Studies of Civil Society and Nonprofit Sector (CSCSNS), which in turn is part of the Fundamental Research Program of the National Research University – Higher School of Economics.

In recent years the discussion of how exactly to measure the above-mentioned question of trusting most people has intensified (Belyanin, Zinchenko, 2010; Kertman, 2006; Kozyrev, 2009; Kupreychenko, 2008; Sasaki, Davydenko et al., 2009; Beugelsdijk, 2006; Glaeser et al., 2000).

The search for the answer to this fundamental question is the goal of our research. Contemporary writers sometimes express diametrically opposing views. Some think that question a165 from the WVS assesses trust at the micro level (personalized, interpersonal trust). Others measure it at the macro level (non-personal, institutional trust). It may also estimate the basic trust in the world or the culture of trust in society, which not only reflects the actual state of institutions, but is also rooted in the mentality of various layers and cohorts of society. Putting the question this way determines the need for theoretical analysis of various types of trust and their function in modern society, as well as an analysis of empirical research. This comprehensive analysis can help us understand what type of trust this question assesses, as well as provide data for qualitative analysis of trust in society, and to some extent help predict changes in it.

Functional features of various types of trust

The nature of the origin, basis, criteria and function of trust and distrust is also influenced by human evolution (Veselov 2004a, b; Porshnev, 1965, 1972; Seligman, 2002; Shtompka, 1996; Fukuyama, 2004). Historically, researchers consider the most ancient form of trust as it is known in so-called "traditional societies" to be trust based on an object belonging to social groups, endowed with a special psychological status. In tradi-

tional societies, this is a blood relation. According to A. Seligman, this is "not at all trust, but a certainty in the existence in the well represented (and sanctioned), archetypal role of relationship in nature" (Seligman, 2002, p. 35). In this case, trust fulfills a subordinated function in regulating life-sustaining co-habitation – it preserves and reproduces the existing social structure. This role of trust differs greatly from that in contemporary society, when new systems of social connections and relationships are formed based on trust or distrust of participants in the course of interaction. In traditional societies, a high level of trust in "one's own" comes along with distrust in those from other groups, especially so-called "outsiders" (G. Zimmel). A. Seligman highlights trust as natural sympathy and natural benevolence as qualities of "traditional trust" (Seligman, 2002). He equates this understanding of trust with the emergence of friendship in its modern form.

Seligman believes that over the last two centuries at the center of public opinion and political theory has been the idea of maintaining a society of people based solely on the mutual fulfillment of promises. He connects their origin to the idea of E. Durkheim on the contract basis, i. e. the need for rules to govern markets and manage the execution of contracts (Seligman, 2002, p. 15). Economic and social development of society increased the intensity and frequency of human interaction with those from other social groups. Moreover, interaction became increasingly more impersonal. As Y. V. Veselov notes, trust was transformed from "traditional trust" to a mixed type of trust, and further to "rational" and "modern" trust (Veselov, 2004b, p. 115). Society based on a market economy reproduces new types of moral relationships and trust regulated by impersonal relationships of agents of social and economic communication. This type of relationship is based on a rational perception of the actions of others, as opposed to cultural and deterministic trust in traditional societies (Veselov, 2004a, p. 9). Under modern conditions, the nature of trust itself changes. The relationship of trust becomes first functional, then rational, and then abstract (impersonal). This is what A. Giddens calls trust of "expert systems".

Despite the popularity of models of "rational trust" (based on mutual fulfillment of promises, i. e. exchange) and the great potential of this model to explain economic behavior, we note that this type of trust has much more in common with expectation than with genuine trust, one of the main characteristics of which is that it is unconditional. A. Seligman thinks that the concept of "generalized exchange", which takes the form of trust in the modern era, can help us avoid this contradiction (Seligman, 2002, p. 82). Generalized exchange means that the subject follows societal norms without seeking immediate gratification, while counting on other members of society to behave the same way, and this has a positive impact on the entire society and the subject itself. However, it seems to us that understanding trust as a special form of contract or any form of exchange (personal or impersonal, equal or unequal) takes us away from the understanding of the true nature of trust (or the real core of trust).

This brings us back to the explanation of cooperation and collaboration of people and the existence of some basic social requirements (social instincts, "organic solidarity" in the words of E. Durkheim, "spontaneous sociability" in the words of F. Fukuyama). There are several basic social needs, and needs of the person in society, upon with all other social requirements are built: consistency, community, belonging, respect etc.

Many contemporary researchers focus their attention on the role that trust plays in regulating the consciousness and behavior of a person, group or society Trust and distrust fulfills a wide array of significant positive and negative (destructive) *functions in regulating the life* of society, social groups and people. The positive role in the most gen-

eral sense is that trust or distrust contributes to the integration and harmonization of a person's relationships with him or herself, the people around and the world as a whole, ensures coexistence and interaction with them, regulates interpersonal, intra-group and intergroup relationships. When analyzing the negative (destructive) functions of trust and distrust in regulating life, it must be noted that excessive trust can make a subject less safe, and excessive distrust complicates interaction, knowledge of the world and, as a result, slows the subject's development.

Optimistic expectations of an individual or group for some benefit (most often mutual) as a result of interaction is not something common to all types of trust. Ensuring effective activity and building sustainable positive relationships is the main function of trust between those who are well acquainted and closely interacting subjects. Trust in this case emerges as a result of a shared evaluation of the qualities of partners, first and foremost morality, security, unity and openness. The basis for distrust includes immorality, insecurity, reticence, dependence, conflict etc. These types of personalized relationships can be defined as *actual trust* and *actual distrust*.

However, a personal "win" cannot be the goal of *basic universal* (*generalized, public*) *trust*, which implies *a positive relationship between the subject and others without expectations of comparable reward for oneself, but only for the "good of society"*. Many researchers recognize that public (generalized) trust is supported by behavior that is not connected to expectations of a behavior in response. Thus, it is normal in any society to help the weak, sick, poor etc., without expecting something in return (Seligman, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004).

Thus the main functions of public trust are *ensuring self-organization of society and reproducing the social structure*. This type of trust is the *basis of people living together, which contributes to moral principles and social norms*. Other basic needs, such as self-preservation, independence and protection from undesirable influences, define the existence of *basic universal* (*generalized*) *distrust*. This type of distrust is thus a function of self-preservation, isolation, autonomous development and the existence of both the individual and the group.

A separate publication (Kupreychenko, 2008) provides a more detailed analysis of all types of trust, and the differences in their basis and function. Here, we show that several forms of *institutional trust/distrust* (role, organization, business etc.) perform the same functions as the social categorization overall. In particular, they *organize, regulate and optimize interaction*. Moreover, in regulating complex interpersonal and intergroup relationships to the level of trust/distrust, they *reduce cognitive complexity in a state of uncertainty and ease decision-making,* among other things. *Intuitive trust or distrust* functions in the same way when time is lacking.

Along with the above-mentioned types of trust, we would like to note some rare varieties. For example, so-called *"blind" trust of close relations*, which helps *protect and reproduce of the socio-psychological environment*. Another specific type of relationship is possible – *the unfounded distrust the people who are closest*, for example if the risk in the case of deceit or betrayal is extremely high. This distrust also serves the function of protecting the ego. We noted above the special socio-psychological functions in traditional (clan) trust of the phenomenon of great trust in "us" combined with a distrust of "them". Also interesting is *altruistic trust*, in particular, trust of a strong person in someone weaker – a "helping hand". Distrust is often the result of prejudice and bias against certain people or groups. A level of *humanistic trust* in this case does not have an objective basis (unity, reliability etc.).

An analysis of the variety, diversity and multi-functionality of types of trust/distrust leads us to an unexpected result. What kind of trust do we assess though the question about trust in people in general? Also, what type of trust or balance of trust and distrust is optimal for a certain society at a specific level of development? In practical application, this means the following: what types of trust do various categories of the population of modern Russia possess, which are the most progressive and what dynamic meets the expectations and needs of society? The search for answers to these questions continues in our analysis of the empirical research results[1].

Comparative analysis of social and psychological characteristics of respondents who trust or distrust people

Based on an analysis of data from our survey, we paint a social and psychological portrait of respondents who trust or distrust most people. Around one fifth of respondents (22%) who were asked the question "Do you think most people can be trusted, or would you say that you should be careful in dealing with people?" answered that most people can be trusted. We categorize these respondents as "trusting people". Nearly three and a half times more people answered that "you should be careful in dealing with people" (75%). We categorized them as "distrusting people". About 4% did not answer the question. Interestingly, both groups think that people have become less trusting of one another in recent years (50% of trusting and 75% of distrusting people). A mere 14% and 3%, respectively, said that people are becoming more trusting of one another.

It is worth nothing that during the observation period, in seven waves of monitoring the state of civil society, the share of trusting and distrusting people did not change much, remaining within 18–22% and 75–78%, respectively. The level of social trust has declined from 54% in 1989 (Russian Public Opinion Research Center data) to 18% in 2007 (Public Opinion Foundation data). Thus, the level of social trust in the Soviet Union was 54%, and then it sank to 25% in the 1990s, edged up to 38% in 1991, and then began to decline steadily, remaining under 24% from 1995 (Patrushev, 2007, p. 33).

Finding the ratio of trust in most people and in those close to the respondents personally is important and can help in reaching the goal of our work. There are two separate questions in our survey for this. As can be seen in Table 1, among those who trust people in general, 12% still believe one must be careful with people in their immediate surroundings. Among those who do not trust people in general, 46% trust those in their immediate environment. Therefore, despite similarities in the language of these questions, they assess different types of trust, and analyzing them in tandem highlights some very interesting aspects of people's trust/distrust.

1 This study used a nationwide survey conducted on a representative sample in the monitoring of the state of civil society, which is being conducted by Centre for Studies of Civil Society and Nonprofit Sector in the framework of the Program of Fundamental Research of the National Research University – Higher School of Economics. The sample size was 2,000 respondents, including 43 subjects of the Russian Federation and 105 municipalities (45 rural and 60 urban). The sample is representative of the Russian population aged 18 years and older with the exception of the Chechen Republic. The allowable margin of error is 3.5%. The field research was conducted over November 24–27, 2011, by the All-Russian Public Opinion Foundation. The method of data collection was formalized, private in-home interviews via a specially designed questionnaire. The survey was conducted face to face in the place of residence of the respondents. In answering the questions, the respondents had to choose the most appropriate answer – one or more – from a list. In some cases, the interviewer showed the respondent a card with a list of possible answers.

Table 1
Trust or distrust people (% of the group)

	Most people can be trusted	One should be careful in dealing with people	No answer
Most people around me can be trusted	87	46	56
One should be careful in dealing with the people around me	12	48	28
No answer	1	6	17

The mix of answers to these two key questions puts people into four categories: 1) those who trust people in general, including those in their immediate surroundings; 2) those who trust people in general, but think they should be careful in dealing with people in their immediate surroundings; 3) those who find it necessary to be cautious in dealing with people in general, but trust those in their immediate surroundings; and 4) those who believe that they should be careful in dealing with people in general and those in their immediate surroundings.

However, an analysis of these four categories is not enough to understand the core of what we are studying. Remember, each of these categories encompasses several types of trust. For example, those who trust all people, including those around them, may be naïve, gullible "simpletons", or altruistic, humane and spiritual people who live for the sake of others and the common good.

This leads us to the conclusion that we need a separate analysis of the answers to these two key questions with a detailed look at the social and psychological characteristics of respondents who are trusting and distrusting. Our study identified features of respondents in the trusting and distrusting categories based on **socio-demographic characteristics**.

Trust and education. We noted differences in the distribution of answers based on level of education. Less-educated Russians responded that people could be trusted in general more often (see Table 2). Perhaps these people are included more often in various forms of personal relationships, while those with a higher level of education more frequently function in a system of impersonal, functional relationships.

Table 2
Trust and education (% of the group)

	Overall population	Education				
		Below secondary	Secondary	Basic vocational	Specialized secondary	Higher
Share	*100*	*10*	*26*	*7*	*38*	*20*
Do you think most people can be trusted, or would you say that you should be careful in dealing with people?						
Most people can be trusted	22	27	20	19	21	24
One should be careful in dealing with people	75	69	76	77	76	73
No answer	4	4	4	4	4	3

However, the smallest difference in the results for trusting people in general is between those with the lowest and highest education. The reasons behind their trust may be different, the former possessing a sort of natural trust and the latter being confident in their social competence.

Trust and income. The distribution of results by income shows that the poorest (income of less than 6000 a month) are more inclined toward distrust, while there was no significant difference between the other groups. A similar pattern occurs when looking at respondents' self-assessment of their family's purchasing power: those who do not have enough money for food are more likely to favor caution in dealing with people (88%). The group that is least cautious in dealing with other people (70%) is comprised of people with enough money for clothes, but not enough to buy household appliances. Among those who can afford to buy an automobile, 76% think it best to be careful with other people. Thus, wealth and economic status have a non-linear relationship with trust in people.

Trust and employment. The distribution of data based on type of employment shows that the least trusting people are managers. They more frequently than others believe that one must be careful in dealing with other people (83%). There is little difference between unemployed (77%) and blue-collar workers (78%). More trusting are white-collar workers, technical engineers and specialists. They are more inclined than other groups to trust people in general (25–26%, vs 16–19% for managers, unemployed and blue-collar workers). The most obvious result was that students were least likely to respond that one should be cautious in dealing with others (69%). Their trust is a result of a lack of life experience, as well as a manifestation of a natural stage of personal development – the stage of developing one's own world and being open to everything new and unknown.

Trust and place of residence. Distributing the data by the type of area in which respondents reside shows that people tend to be more trusting of people in general in large cities with population of over 1 mil. people, though people who live in Moscow are the least trusting (see Table 3).

The most open people live in the North-West Federal District, and the least trusting live in the Urals and Far-Eastern federal districts (see Table 4).

Table 3

Trust and place of residence (% of the group)

	Share of population	**Place of residence**					
		Moscow	**City of 1 mil. people or more**	**City of 250k to 1 mil. people**	**City of 50-250k**	**City of less than 50k, town**	**Village**
Share	*100*	*7*	*11*	*16*	*19*	*20*	*27*
Do you think most people can be trusted, or would you say that you should be careful in dealing with people?							
Most people can be trusted	22	18	28	22	22	19	21
One should be careful in dealing with people	75	80	70	75	75	76	75
No answer	4	2	3	3	3	5	5

Table 4
Trust and place of residence (% of the group)

	Population	Federal District						
		Central	North-Western	Southern & North Caucasus	Volga	Urals	Siberian	Far-Eastern
Share	*100*	*27*	*10*	*14*	*21*	*8*	*16*	*5*
Do you think most people can be trusted, or would you say that you should be careful in dealing with people?								
Most people can be trusted	22	26	33	18	21	14	18	11
One should be careful in dealing with people	75	70	63	78	76	82	77	88
No answer	4	4	4	4	3	4	5	1

Trust and nationality. The only statistically significant nationalities represented in the study are Russian and Tatar. Others are represented in insignificant proportions. Thus, we can only say that Tatars are more likely than Russians to believe that most people can be trusted (27% and 21%, respectively).

Thus, the features highlighted by respondents from various regions showed that *socio-economic living conditions, differing business culture and traditions* are significant factors in how trusting people are. The rate of economic development in the region, level of corruption and crime were also important factors. The most developed regions, of course, provide more opportunities for personal development, though they are also fraught with dangers and "traps for simpletons" – operating under these conditions is associated with a large set of risks and greater competition.

Certain *personal qualities* act as important regulators that can neutralize the influence of the environment to some extent. These include religiousness and optimism. The data below support this idea.

Trust and attitude toward religion. Here we found that respondents who were more immersed in religious life are more likely to believe that people can be trusted and least likely to think one should be careful in dealing with others. Among those who think people should be careful in dealing with others, 19% are non-religious. The percentage is larger among those who think one should be cautious with most people and those close to them at 23%. The share of non-religious people is smaller among those who think most people can be trusted (16%) and those who think most people close to them can be trusted (15%).

The level of religiousness or the level of its manifestation in a person's behavior is also a significant factor. When "religious" means that a respondent follows the belief but does not participate in religious services, the share of those that are trusting (35%) is smaller than the share who are distrusting (40%). As a person's religiousness increases, the ratio is reversed. Among those who think most people can be trusted, 34% follow religious beliefs and occasionally or regularly participate in religious services. Among those who think one should be careful in dealing with other people, 25% fit this description. The pattern holds for groups that differ in the degree of trust in personal acquain-

tances. Due to the statistically small size of the group, we do not analyze those who are more involved in church rituals and the parish life, i. e. those who chose the answer "I follow religious beliefs when possible, regularly participate in services and actively take part in the life of the parish (e. g. volunteering or charity activities).

Trust and optimism or pessimism in one's near-term future. This indicator is measured via the question "when you think about your personal near-term future, what feelings do you have – optimism, pessimism or a combination of both equally?" The "optimists" (28%) believe that people can be trusted more so than the "pessimists" (16%), and are less likely to believe caution is required in dealing with other people (68% and 82%, respectively).

Views about how trust between people has changed in recent years also differ between optimists and pessimists. Pessimists more frequently said that people have become less trusting of one another (77%, versus 61% of optimists).

Regarding trust in those in the immediate surroundings, the pattern was the same as for trusting people in general. Optimists (64%) were more likely than pessimists (47%) to trust those around them. Pessimists, conversely, were more likely than optimists to say that one must exercise caution toward those around them (49% and 32%, respectively).

This supports the assumption that there are some personal resources that make people more trusting. This is also in agreement with the above-described data that show that education and the resulting *social competency* that comes with it make people more trusting of others, i. e. it is a resource that contributes to a person's *hardiness and resilience*. Meanwhile, we saw that naiveté, a lack of life experience and a low level of education, life and work in a relatively stable environment, in conditions of low competition also increase trust in people, but for completely different reasons.

Collecting these data helps us define those factors that determine trust in people. However, it is also important to understand how the level of trust defines a respondents' position in society and social activity. For this, we conducted a comparative analysis of respondents on various indicators.

Trust and civic identity. We saw a connection between inclination to trust other people and the civic identity of respondents (see Table 5). Those who strongly feel like they are citizens of the sate more often believe that most people can be trusted. Interestingly, the minimum level of trust in people is seen among those who only somewhat

Table 5

Trust and civic identity (% of group)

	Population	**To what extent do you consider yourself a citizen of the state?**				
		Fully	**Mostly**	**Somewhat**	**Not at all**	**No answer**
Share	*100*	*32*	*41*	*18*	*5*	*4*
Do you think most people can be trusted, or would you say that you should be careful in dealing with people?						
Most people can be trusted	22	28	20	15	20	18
One should be careful in dealing with people	75	68	76	83	78	75
No answer	4	4	4	3	2	7

consider themselves citizens. Those who absolutely do not feel like a citizen were slightly more trusting, in line with those who mostly feel like a citizen.

A similar non-linear dependence is seen when talking about trust in personal acquaintances. Those who fully consider themselves citizens of the state were more likely to trust the people around them. Those who feel somewhat like citizens were most likely to believe that one must be cautious with the people around them (see Table 6). Those who do not consider themselves citizens of the state at all were a bit more trusting and close to those who chose the answer "mostly" feel like a citizen.

There was a somewhat different pattern, nearly linear, in responses about changes in how much people trust one another over the years. Those who feel somewhat like citizens of their government or not at all more frequently think that people have become less trusting of one another (74%) compared with those who completely or mostly feel like citizens (64% and 67%, respectively).

In the first two cases, the nature of the relationship between trust and civic identity, namely that those who express no civic identity either way are the least trusting, might mean that these people are undecided, have an unstable position in society, are only loosely connected to the community, or are "lost". Those who are more certain of their civic position regardless of whether it is positive or negative (acknowledging their citizenship or not) are more confident in themselves and, consequently, are better able to build relationships with the people around them based on trust.

Trust and self-assessment of social activity. People who consider themselves socially active are more likely to believe that most people can be trusted (26%) than those who do not say this about themselves (19%). Conversely, socially active respondents were less likely to recommend caution in dealing with the people in their environment (70% versus 77%).

When asked about changes in the level of trust among people, there was little difference between those who consider themselves socially active and those who do not. But there was a difference in answers to the question about trusting personal acquaintances. Those who consider themselves socially active are more trusting of people they know (59%) than are their inactive counterparts (54%).

Trust and experience volunteering. The results suggest that experience participating in community service, particularly volunteer work, correlates with trust in others. Those who have done some sort of volunteer work to help others in the past year are

Table 6

Trust and civic identity (% of group)

	Population	**To what extent do you consider yourself a citizen of the state?**				
		Fully	**Mostly**	**Somewhat**	**Not at all**	**No answer**
Share	*100*	*32*	*41*	*18*	*5*	*4*
Speaking about people with whom you are personally acquainted, do you think most can be trusted, or should one be careful in dealing with those around them?						
Most can be trusted	55	62	56	43	53	56
One should be careful	39	33	39	51	42	35
No answer	6	5	6	6	5	10

more certain than those who did not that most people can be trusted (24% and 19%, respectively). Fewer volunteers suggest being careful in dealing with other people (72%, versus 77% for non-volunteers).

The pattern holds true for trust toward people in the immediate surroundings. Those who have taken part in community service to help others more frequently said that the people around them can be trusted (58%) than those who did not volunteer (53%).

Trust and inclination to help others. Respondents that said they would not be willing to donate money to help some cause, even when they have the funds available, were more likely than respondents in general to exhibit a low level of trust, even in the people in their immediate environment. More than half of this group (55%) said that one must exercise caution toward the people around them, versus 39% of all respondents. And only 37% said that most of the people around them can be trusted (versus 55% of all people surveyed). This shows that trusting people tend to be more compassionate and socially responsible, especially toward disabled and elderly people. Naturally, those who trust people also stand out for their strong trust in the intermediaries through which they help out, especially charities and social services.

There is an eloquent difference in answers to the following questions: "Would you like to take part in some kind of public organization, civic initiatives or non-profit organizations in the next two to three years? If yes, in which type would you participate?" Those who do not trust people exceed those who do in one indicator – willingness to work for pay – and fall short of trusting people on many others, such as willingness to become a member of an organization, participate in initiatives, work as a volunteer, participate in meetings, conferences or other events without pay, or donate money.

Trust and accepting help from others. The above data on respondents' willingness to help those around them interestingly matches their willingness to accept help in difficult circumstances. Those willing to accept aid from people close to them were much more trusting than those who were unwilling (89% were prepared to rely entirely on relatives and 77% on friends and acquaintances). Of those who do not trust people, 82% would be willing to rely on relatives and 56% on friends and acquaintances. This can be interpreted in two ways – an openness toward and positive expectations of loved ones, or dependence on them and even (in extreme cases) a welfare mentality. We can also assume that non-trusting people are more independent, autonomous, or have more responsibility and bear the main burden of providing for their family and loved ones.

The inclination among trusting people to accept assistance in tough situations also applies to help from strangers who have been in the same situation, help from people at NGOs, initiative groups, volunteers and employees of government institutions and social services.

Trust and consumption style. We based our analysis of trust in people depending on respondents' lifestyle on People-21, a program developed and tested by the Public Opinion Foundation (POF) that shows its discriminative ability in many studies (Petrenko, 2010; Petrenko, Kaplun, 2011). People-21 are individuals who in everyday life have been monitoring the opportunities provided by institutions and applying new social practices. They are a special group of social activists who differ significantly from the rest of Russia's population. They design their future and have shown their ability to consciously accumulate and mobilize social and material resources, and demonstrate independent and social sustainability. The POF's People-21 test was used as a tool for solving the problem of respondents' "heterogeneous" lifestyles. It bases the description of Russians' lifestyles on innovative consumer practices that forms today's Russian society.

These can be goods, services or entertainment that is new to the market (fitness, beauty salons, equities, Internet, smart-phones etc.), or things that were recently unavailable to Russians (e. g. bank services for individuals, like deposits and retail lending).

The program is based on answers to the following: "*Please look at the card and tell me which of the following you have done in the last two or three years*". The choices included the following: 1) take a loan from a bank; 2) buy something on credit; 3) use a computer; 4) use the Internet and email; 5) drive a car; 6) travel abroad; 7) pay for goods and/or services with a bank card; 8) use foreign currency; 9) go to a beauty salon; 10) employ the services of a housekeeper, au pair, nanny, or nurse; 11) fly on an airplane; 12) purchase sporting goods or camping equipment; 13) work out at a fitness center or gym; 14) invest in equities or bonds; 15) have goods delivered to your home; 16) continue your education; 17) use a mobile phone; 18) or use a smart-phone. Those who answered yes to more than five things on the list are considered part of People-21.

Four groups were formed based on answers to these questions: 1) business people; 2) computer fans; 3) borrowers; 4) outsiders:

- Business people – those who answered that they had traveled abroad, plus some other options.
- Computer fans – after removing all business people, those who remained and chose option 3 or 4 (i. e. those who have not traveled abroad but use the internet, plus answered yes to some other activities).
- Borrowers – after removing all business people and computer fans, those who remained and selected option 1 or 2 (i. e. those who have not traveled abroad or used a computer, but have taken credit, and possibly answered yes to some other activities).
- Outsiders – those who have not traveled abroad, do not use the Internet, and do not borrow money from banks.

Using this method of sociography paints a clear picture of four groups that cover three generations. Outsiders are representatives of the older generation that follow the traditional style of consumption. Borrowers are largely middle-aged people that are "migrating" from the traditional to the modern style of consumption. Some modern consumer practices are easy and fun for them, while others are attractive but raise some concerns and some are unacceptable or not fully recognized. Computer fans are from the young generation with a modern consumer style. These are children of the net, web surfers and active bloggers for whom the Internet plays a significant role in their lives. Business people are also part of the young generation with a modern consumption style. Unlike the previous groups, the Internet for them is simply a tool, not a lifestyle; like a credit card or business breakfast.

Business people are the most likely of these groups to say that most people can be trusted (25%), while borrowers are the least likely (18%). The converse is also true – borrowers are more likely to say that one should be careful in dealing with other people (78%) than business people (73%). Borrowers were also more skeptical regarding changes in the extent to which people trust one another over the past few years. They more frequently said that people have become less trusting of one another (73%, versus 68% for business people).

Of course, this kind of typological analysis is simplified, as it is based on a limited number of variables. We attempted to create a typology of citizens based on a broader base using the results explained below.

Social, economic and psychological determinants of trust. Based on a generalization of the above data, we can conclude that the level of trust in other people differs based on the category of the population, though there are some general patterns that can be identified through a comprehensive analysis of social, economic and psychological variables. Table 7 summarizes these variables among trusting and distrusting people. The table only includes those characteristics for which there is a significant difference between trusting and distrusting people, i. e. those that decisively impact our assessment of trust in people in general.

Importantly, not all variables have a linear correlation with trust in people. After analyzing the most common combinations of characteristics presented in the table, we can try to describe several collective images of a trusting and distrusting person.

A distrusting person can be represented by the following characters:

- Resident of Moscow, manager, with a high level of income, non-religious, not willing to accept help from others;
- Resident of a large village, blue-collar worker in the Far-Eastern or Urals federal district, middle aged, migrating from the traditional to the modern style of consumption;

Table 7
Features of social, economic and psychological variables in "trusting" and "distrusting" respondents

	Distrusting	**Trusting**
Education		Lower secondary/higher
Income	Below 6000 rub. per month	
Self-assessment of purchasing power	Not enough for food/ Enough to buy a car	
Employment	Manager/unemployed/blue collar	Students
Residence	City of fewer than 50000, town/ Moscow	City of 1 mil.+
Federal District	Far East and Urals	North-Western
Attitude toward religion		Religious
Optimism/pessimism		Optimistic
Civic identity	Feel somewhat like a citizen	
Self-assessment of social activity		Very socially active
Experience participating in community service		Has experience participating in community service
Willingness to help others	Not willing to contribute or donate, even when they have the necessary funds	
Willingness to accept help from others	Not willing to accept help from others	
Consumer style	Middle-aged, migrating from the traditional to a modern consumption style	Young generation with a modern consumption style

- Unemployed with a pessimistic view of his or her future;
- Person with an unexpressed civic identity, not willing to contribute or donate to those in need, even when he or she has enough money to do so;
- Person with a low level of income, non-religious (possibly homeless or from a marginalized group).

The typical trusting person is:

- Someone with below-secondary education, religious, willing to help others and accept help from others;
- Resident of a city of more than 1 mil. people in the North-West Federal District, with a higher education, socially active;
- Student with an optimistic view of his or her near future, socially active with experience doing community service, a modern consumer.

Of course, there are other possible combinations; we just selected the most recognizable versions with a set of socio-demographic, economic, regional and other factors that correlate with a high or low level of trust in others. An analysis of these hypothetical types also drives home the point that completely different people can show the same level of trust or distrust.

By comparing the various types of distrusting people, we can identify the most characteristic features of trust/distrust and the various categories of citizens. Business leaders' distrust is a product of their professional environment and serves as a protective function, while an unemployed person's distrust reflects his or her general negative attitude toward the world and fear of the future. The distrust of those from closed communities has a natural, historical basis. Marginalized and asocial groups of the population express their hostility toward society and consider its growth an alarming sign.

Various types of trusting people also view the world in different ways. Students do not yet have a basis in reality, as they do not have enough experience with social interaction. This is reflected in an optimistic world-view and openness to the world. This type of trust can be called "advanced". The trust of deeply spiritual people has a religious basis. Meanwhile, the trust of highly educated people and those certain of their civic position can be called "humanistic".

All of the listed types of people will be particularly responsive to changes in society and socio-economic conditions. What for one group of the population might show that people are becoming more trusting, for others is a sign that people are becoming less trusting. This is true for any change, even those that are positive and progressive for society as a whole. For example, rapid economic growth excites the educated youth, while blue-collar workers from large villages and other conservative citizens are wary of it.

Thus, the nature of trust in other people is different for various categories of the population, fulfills different functions in their lives, and is impacted in different ways by changes in society. To some extent, trust can be broken down in to "good" and "bad" types. Of course, this kind of assessment can only be made with a clearly defined system of coordinates, including the goal of the interested parties, their value systems and priorities. Thus, despite the fact that the assessment of credibility in terms of "good" and "bad" is very conditional and relative, the results show that we cannot limit ourselves to a quantitative evaluation of trust without considering the qualitative side.

This leads us to the fully expected result: the index of trust averages the different types of trust and does not evaluate the true picture of the state of civil society, especially in such a large country with such diverse mentalities as Russia. This means we

have to look for other ways to assess social trust. What are the possible solutions to this problem? We think the answer is separate social trust indexes for the most typical categories of citizens. These categories can be defined by the goals of a concrete study and should be based on data on the combination of socio-demographic, economic, regional and personality factors that determine the prevalence of a certain type of trust/distrust: traditional (clan), humanistic, advanced, business etc. The data of our empirical research presents concrete guidelines for categorizing the Russia population based on type of trust. Future research will attempt to separately analyze the index of trust for the most significant and typical population categories.

Conclusions

Our theoretical-empirical study was devoted to the search for an answer to the fundamental question – how can we measure people's trust in one another in general? As part of our empirical research, we compared socio-demographic, economic and psychological characteristics of respondents who were more inclined to trust or distrust people. The results confirmed that socio-economic conditions, various types of business cultures and traditions have a significant influence on trust. A region's level of economic growth, corruption and crime are also important factors. The most developed regions offer more opportunities, though they are also fraught with dangers and "traps for simpletons" – operating under these conditions is associated with a large set of risks and greater competition.

Of course, certain personal qualities act as important regulators that can neutralize the influence of the environment to some extent. These include religiousness and optimism. Higher education and the social competency that comes with it also tend to make people more trusting, i. e. they also contribute to a person's hardiness and resilience. At the same time, naïveté, a lack of life experience and education, a relatively stable work and life environment with little competition and few risks also make people more trusting, but this is a completely different type of trust. Thus, the nature of trust in other people differs depending on the category of the population, fulfills different functions and is impacted in different ways by changes in society.

The indicator of trust in people in general in its traditional understanding averages out the different types of trust and does not allow us to evaluate the true picture of the state of civil society, especially such a large country with such diverse mentalities as Russia. We think this issue can be solved by calculating separate trust indexes for the most typical categories of citizens based on the combination of socio-demographic, economic, regional and personal factors that determine the type of trust/distrust they express: naïve, traditional (clan), humanistic, advanced, business etc. Monitoring trust in this case should include a differentiated evaluation of these types. For example, an increase in business distrust in the most economically active portion of the population might be considered a positive trend for society, while growth in distrust of marginal groups may be negative. Accordingly, there should be differences between population categories and programs for creating the optimal balance of trust-distrust in society.

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TRUST IN ECONOMY, BUSINESS AND ORGANIZATION

TRUST AS AN INDICATOR OF ECONOMIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND BEHAVIOR IN RUSSIA

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Research methodology

The researcher proposed a fundamentally new thesis, which stems from the fact, that genuine picture of trust and its characteristics can be achieved only through sociological analysis of economic, political, moral and other forms of social consciousness and behavior. In contrast to other researches of social opinion this attitude includes not only the study of society consciousness in general, but the expert opinions in comparison to objective (statistical) data, as well as information published in periodical press and materials in academic periodicals. In accordance with this attitude such aspects of social consciousness as knowledge, appraisals, motives, needs, value systems, interests were revealed. During the research of the behavior really performed actions were being captured. In accordance to this purpose, goals and hypothesis of the research were formed.

Comparison of 1986–1990 and 2012 surveys led to certain corrections in research instruments due to the changing political and economic situation in the world. Some of the indicators fell out of date, others were corrected, but significant number of questions remained valid. In the 1986 study 1360 people from 6 regions of the country were interviewed, in 1988–1485 people from 9 regions, in 1990–1525 – factory workers and national economy specialists from 17 regions, in 2012–1201 people in 12 constituent regions.

Economic consciousness during these years was analyzed on various levels of social organization – all-Russian, regional, organizational units level, as well as individual perceptions, which allowed to elicit general, specific and peculiar traits of the trust on these levels.

This methodological requirement led to in the necessity to consider peculiarities of trust in such aspects of a person's life, when one is represented as a citizen (country level), resident (specific territory – region, city, rural area), employee worker, member of a social group or community (labor organization, place of residence or resting-place) and finally as the subject of interpersonal level.

Table 1

1990 and 2012 poll. How do you value current economic situation in Russia? (% of the number of respondents)

1990 Appreciation	%	2012 Appreciation	%
Normal	1	Good	16,6
Complicated	38	There are some difficulties, but not bad	29,5
–		Rather bad than good	35,5
Bad	61	Very bad	10,7
–		Cannot say	7,7

Note: Mark (–) means that this question was lacking.

Trust of an individual as citizen

On this level trust to the economic and political system, social and political institutes is evaluated. Analysis of the information gathered on all Russian level shows that the level of trust to general transformations conducted in the country varies significantly.

Comparison of the 1990 and 2012 data shows that some positive changes in evaluation of political system in the country took place, especially acknowledging the fact, that the economic situation in the country is normal (good). But factor of economic situation

Table 2

Which of these circumstances in to your opinion hinders the economic development in our country? (% of the number of respondents)

Factors	2012	1990
Corruption	48,4	46
Impunity of lawbreakers	36,8	–
Flaws in economic policy	34,9	62
Mismanagement	30,4	–
Administrative arbitrariness of authorities in economic management	24,6	30
Lack of qualified managers	18,7	–
Absence of the conditions for free entrepreneurship	14,2	23
Monopoly of producers of goods and services	10,4	34
Wage-leveling out of employees	7,8	44
Influence of criminal groups on economy	7,4	-
Dependence of economy on political and ideological dogmas	7,3	28
Transformation of production and services into almshouse for idlers	4,8	34
Other	0,7	
Cannot say	3,2	

Note: The sum of the answers doesn't equal 100, because it was possible to choose several options according to the research methodology. The answers are represented in the order of decreasing number of respondents. Mark (–) means that this question was not asked in 1990.

improvement in the country, in our opinion, can be referred to people engaged in private enterprise, commerce and service industry, which developed significantly and mustered successful economic situation. At the same time estimates of unsatisfying condition decreased slightly – to almost 54% in 2012, compared to 61% in 1990.

Analysis of these data allows to try to understand the reasons for such evaluation of economic situation in the country and figure out why trust to one or another institute falls down or varies significantly (Table 2).

Analysis of the data presented in this table indicates that in 1990 mistrust for economic policy of the state took first place, which means that the authorities were made guilty, while in 2012 first place took the evaluation of economic functioning mechanism – corruption, criminal groups in management and trade. It should be mentioned that on the first hand such vice as corruption vary very little from the data of 1990. However, considering that impunity of lawbreakers in the 2012 research is evaluated highly – claimed by almost 35% of respondents, this is nothing else but the same corruption. Such conclusion allows to assert that corruption in its various forms increased twofold according to the public opinion. Administrative arbitrariness, which slightly vary in last 25 years – 30% in 1990 and 24,6% in 2012, continues to annoy people in modern Russia.

Data of another research centers also indicate that there is no high trust to economic changes in the country (Table 3).

These data witness that opinions obtained divide the society into approximately equal groups. It is evident, that respondents, who support official course, are inclined to trust those subjects of changes, who are in control of this course. They can bring convincing arguments in defense of their position judging from their satisfying economic and social position. Thus it is completely understandable why they in any event advocate current course of the political system. This number correlates to some extent with the data of all Russian election, which although shows the approval of 50–60% for United Russia party and its leaders, related to overall electorate (and not only to the number of those appearing at election process) indicates that this approval amounts to 40%.

No less convincing arguments can be brought by those, who reckon that the country goes in the wrong direction. Their real economic and social status demonstrates that they are experiencing significant difficulties and losses while some people have doubts about the perspectives for achieving own welfare. As well as the first group they can bring convincing arguments why the country continues to go in the wrong direction, comparing it with the situation, which directly concerns their everyday life. Apparently they do not trust Russian national institutions and their promises. The number of people voting for oppositional parties is formed exactly by the group mentioned together with those who abstain from the evaluation of the country's path. This also correlates with the data on participation (non-participation) in election campaigns.

Table 3

How do you think, does the country go in the right or wrong direction after August 1991? (% of the number of respondents)

	2003	**2005**	**2007**	**2012, October**
In the right direction	30	25	28	42
In the wrong direction	47	50	37	39
Cannot say	23	25	35	19

Table 4

2012 Poll. How do you evaluate the activity of forthcoming regulatory bodies?
(% of the number of respondents)

Regulatory bodies	Positively	Negatively	Cannot say
President	47,0	26,5	26,5
Federal Government	26,3	38,5	35,2
The State Duma (parliament)	20,3	44,5	35,2
Head (Governor) of your region	38,2	29,9	31,9
Authorities of your city	30,4	39,6	30,0

Table 5

1990 Poll. How do you evaluate efforts to economy improvement on the part of…
(% of the number of respondents)

Regulatory bodies	Positively	Negatively	Cannot say
The CPSU Central Committee	8	38	54
Republican governments	18	27	55
Local bodies	9	36	55
Enterprises administration	19	29	52
Local party bodies	8	40	52

Appraisal of trust to economic changes in the country correlates with the appraisal of trust to main political institutes.

This form of trust can be judged to a certain extent on the basis of the questions aimed at evaluating activities of various authority bodies (Tables 4 and 5).

Despite some peculiarities of question formulations, the very core of the subject remains the same. In general, the evaluation of regulatory bodies in modern Russia is higher than in Soviet Russia. But some factors should be taken into account. The country's economy in Soviet Russia as well as in the whole USSR collapsed due to the deeply wrong economic policy in Perestroika period. Thoughtless reorganizations, resistance towards market relations introduction, hasty decisions, which had damaging influence on enterprises functioning, crude lawmaking such as the Law "About cooperation" led to the sharp downfall in trust to government bodies. Such situation had significant negative effect. But the other fact impresses in this comparison which has an almost 25-year break – there is practically no difference in negative characteristics describing the trust to authorities. On the first hand this phenomenon is hard to explain. The fact remains – despite the so-called democratic reforms and other attempts to give a new image to Russia, the number of people who negatively evaluate not only results of Gorbachev Perestroika, but also the activity of authority bodies in post-Soviet Russia remains virtually the same.

Trust of a person as a resident

A huge, in some cases crucial meaning gains interrelation with the environment where a person lives, works, rests, where he/she has everyday life. In other words a socially spatial location of a person plays significant role. This emerges primarily in evaluation

of urban (rural) condition concerning those changes and processes on this level of social organization, and then in the evaluation of government efforts towards normal functioning establishment for the habitants. Data in this respect are fairly controversial, but can be compared with some degree of authenticity. Comparison of the data from table 5 and 6 (evaluation of local authorities in 2012 and local party bodies which had symbolized regional power in 1990) shows a positive shift. It can be explained by specific situations at the end of 1980s and in the early 2010s. In 1980s the country had went towards its collapse, the situation of critical needs fulfillment had dramatically escalated (lack of goods, unemployment growth, drastic decrease of social support, government disorganization, absence of clear development strategy), which led to refusal of trust. In 2010 people were troubled by certain vital and urgent problems such as situation in housing maintenance and utilities, transport problems, pension schemes.

In the meantime it is astonishing and in some specified sense paradoxical that negative evaluation of local authorities activity in the sphere of welfare securing, attitude towards environmental resources, regulation of economic affairs in the world of work, consumption and exchange did not change. Evaluation of consequences of transition to market relations can be referred exactly to these regional and local structures (Table 6).

Analysis of this data shows that the strengthening of negative evaluation of social consequences of market reforms took place. It fits into the general evaluation of social sphere according to other researches indicating that a decline in social health and well-being occurred. The feeling of social justice violations strengthened. Such evaluation was given not only by the people who are infringed by current changes, but also by people who are well arranged in their lives. Also it should be stated that this feeling of injustice is formed exactly in the sphere, with which he/she has a direct contact and about which he/she can judge by obvious and concrete indicators such as labor compensation, gap in the living standards etc. This is accompanied by characteristics of deviations existing in the city (district) according to people opinion (Table 7).

The data indicate that the number of various legal and moral deviations grew by half or even twice with the exception of speculation which became not so much a deviation from rules as a characteristic of competing activities. In these conditions it can be hardly spoken about trust in social life, because any of mentioned (and not mentioned) negative occurrences have their negative impact on mutual relations between people in this community. These tendencies are rather demonstrational, as the destruction of trust in initial social stage causes, as a consequence, deviations in all other forms of mutual relations of people and official institutions, as well as between people themselves, as they

Table 6

Which consequences caused the transition to market relations?
(% of the number of respondents)

Factors	**1990**	**2012**
Standard of population prosperity was low	33	47,9
Injustice in labor compensation increased	12	45,5
Plunder of natural resources increased	13	54,5
Inflation increased	17	52,9
The number of economic crimes increased	18	56,4
Only wealthy people succeed	27	47,9

Table 7
To which extent are you bothered by following negative events in your city (district)?
(% of the number of respondents)

Deviation	2012 Very and partly bother	1990 Very dangerous
Prostitution	44,9	35
Speculation	46,5	62
Discreditable practices in trade	70,3	55
Bribery	77,8	61
Racket, robbery	68,8	56
Fraud	77,8	40

Note: In 1990 survey the question was asked in a different way: "Which events do you consider dangerous?".

Table 8
If your work with great commitment, will your salary grow?
(% of the number of respondents)

	1990	2012
Yes, significantly	6	17,4
A little	26	24,1
No/Cannot say	68	58,5

become not only regulators of people moral life, but more the object of commerce and the change of gaining income, profit, legal and illegal behavior.

Trust of a person as an employee

On this level of social organization trust is formed in the process of interaction with environment, in other words with the help of those conditions and factors which specify the behavior in certain conditions (Table 8).

Analysis of this position allows to indicate that we observe a clear shift in evaluation of the person's position as a worker, though this shift can not be called determinative. It can be supposed with a higher possibility that the growth of people number positively evaluating the prospect or receiving higher pay for their work took place because of those who were able to work individually or in privately owned organizations.

This indicator is something like the statistical number of employees engaged outside public ownership. At the same time it is evident that shift from public to other forms of ownership didn't bring significant changes – three of five respondents (i. e. approximately 60%) couldn't find their position. This allows to conclude that despite all promises about possibility to link one's your work with income from it, there is no real shift in trust to the situation formed in production and other organizations (Table 9).

Analysis of this table shows that improvement of main indicators, characterizing inner centeredness of organization, took place. That is to say, steadying of worker position differs in a positive way from this characteristic as a citizen and a resident. It can be pos-

Table 9
Question "How do you evaluate….?"

Indicators		Improves	Declines	Cannot say
Labor organization		53,5/20	24,4/22	22,1/58
Sanitary-hygienic conditions	51,0/13	20,2/23	28,8/63	
Discipline at work	53,3/16	23,4/36	23,3/40	
Labor compensation	46,5/25	33,9/25	19,6/50	
Social-psychological climate	41,8/–66	29,6/–15	28,6/19	

Note: In numerator the data of 2012 are given, in denominator – data of 1990. In the poll of 1990 the answer "cannot say" sounds as "doesn't change". In 1990 question "Social-psychological climate" was formulated as "moral support".

Table 10
Do you feel yourself as leader on your working place,
in the department and in the organization in general? We mean the will to take care of equipment, to work effectively, care for performance of your organization
(% of the number of respondents)

Level of working situation	Yes	In a certain degree	No	No answer
On the individual working place	60,1/38	30,5 (–)	9,2/62	0,2 (–)
In the department (division, shop floor etc.)	41,9/16	36,7 (–)	21,0/84	0,4 (–)
In the organization	32,6/10	36,9 (–)	30,1/90	0,4 (–)

Note: In numerator the data of 2012 are given, in denominator – data of 1990. Mark (–) means that this question was not asked in 1990.

sibly explained by the fact that in 1990 the destruction of economic bases became critical: the parameters of working process organization could not be characterized as stability and certainty.

These conclusions are obliquely confirmed by the table 10. The data in this table testifies that independence and responsibility of a worker have grown. From our point of view this is connected to a large extent with the fact, that many respondents who took part in survey are the owners of businesses or are employed in private or joint-stock companies.

Trust on personal level

Trust as a social phenomenon can develop to the fullest extent when it is asserted on a micro level, in a workplace, while on rest, in everyday life in small groups, in the groups of personal, direct contact. But these are not only the relations which depend on personal perception of another people, or liking/disliking those who surround a person and with whom one contacts in everyday life. Social parameters also influence on an interpersonal level, which is confirmed by the 2012 data (Table 11).

It should be mentioned that during this time period a significant fall in trust to social institutes took place while trust to immediate environment grew significantly (Table 12).

Table 11
What defines social standing and profile of a person?
(% of the number of respondents)

Features	**2012**
Possession of capital, money	52,8
Possession of power or access to it	35,1
Social standing	34,6
Personal achievements, training	33,3
Personal traits (intellect, attraction)	19,3
Other	3,1

Table 12
If you happen to be in a difficult situation, to whom will you look for help?
(% of the number of respondents)

To family members	74,2
To friends	49,1
To colleagues	21,1
To organization executives	18,1
To local authorities	8,6
To labor unions	8,2
To political parties	2,1
Other	1,6

Note: The sum of the answers doesn't equal 100, because it was possible to choose several options according to the research methodology. The answers are represented in the order of decreasing number of respondents).

This data dramatically contrast with the data of the late 1990s, when people trusted significantly more organizations executives and looked for help to political parties and labor unions. At that period trust to higher authorities was rather high. The so called "encapsulation" took place, which means trust closure only on personal (kindred) level. It was aided also by the official course towards property individualization, which has its positive and negative consequences.

Conclusions

A comparison of the data of all Russian surveys indicates that there is a contradictory process of economic consciousness and behavior functioning which significantly influences the level of trust to current economic and political system (Table 13).

Analysis of these data indicates that there is a counterintuitive situation influencing peoples' trust. On one hand, trust to main indicators of economic development grew. On the other hand, the evaluation of how these indicators impact the life of people worsened. Especially astonishing is the fact that according to some indicators such as unemploy-

Table 13

Does the transition to market relations conduce positive changes of following economic indicators? (% of the number of respondents)

Indicators	Yes	No	Cannot say
Prestige of honest employment strengthened	30,6 /26	47,0	22,4
Wage-leveling is overcome	32,6/28	44,7	22,7
Natural resources are better used	22,2/14	54,2	23,6
Goods and services became more accessible	65,0/40	25,6	9,4
The ruble strengthened, inflation decreased	26,6/19	53,2	20,2
Tariff rates and prices lowered	13,7/13	75,0	11,3
Speculation and theft are overcome	14,5/19	69,6	15,9
Income control is improved	24,7/9	52,6	22,7
Population welfare is hightened	29,4/19	48,0	22,6

Or otherwise the transition to market relations stipulates following negative consequences? (% to the number of respondents)

Consequences	Yes	No	Cannot say
Injustice in labor compensation strengthened	45,5/12	31,7	22,8
Plunder of natural resources strengthened	54,5/13	21,1	24,4
Many goods became inaccessible for common people	40,6/43	44,8	14,6
Inflation strengthened	52,9/17	23,1	24,0
Tariff rates and prices grew higher	78,1/52	12,1	9,8
Mass unemployment rose	40,7/40	27,8	31,5
The number of economic crises increased	56,4/18	17,6	26,0
Only the wealthy benefited	54,3/27	20,4	25,3
Population welfare lowered	47,9/53	27,7	24,4

Note: In numerator the 2012 data are given, in denominator – data of 1990s. In the 1990 survey only the answer "yes" was available. All the answers in 1990 sounded in a different way hypothetically "What do you expect from market relations development?".

ment and welfare level the evaluation practically did not change during the last quarter of the century. And these are leading indicators of living.

In conclusion resumptive data about how people treat political authority can be brought. This is the core of all political trust in Russian society (Table 13). Exactly this evaluation deforms the process of trust formation, as the people are confirmed that current political authority does not reflect the position of the majority of population and is guided only by interests of two groups – state bureaucracy and wealthy population strata (Table 14).

All this allows to conclude that a controversial character of social trust functioning in Russia expresses a need for significant correctives in economic and state policies.

Table 14

Distribution of the answers to question
"Whose interests according to your opinion expresses and defends Russian state"?
(% of the number of respondents)

	Impover-ished layers	**Middle class**	**Wealthy layer**	**All Russian citizens**	**State bureaucracy**	**Cannot say**
2000	1	8	46	9	44	9
2005	1	8	54	8	52	15
2007	2	10	52	8	51	14
2011	2	11	49	12	42	14

TRUST AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN JAPAN[1]

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Personal Trust and Generalized Trust

Over the past decades, trust has been one of the key issues in social science research. Though there is no single definition, trust can be described as an expectation of others' good will[2] (Barber, 1983; Granville & Paxton, 2007). A vast amount of research has prevailed how trust advocates interpersonal relationships and economic transactions, or makes community effective. In the context of social capital research, trust is regarded as a constituent of social capital, as well as reciprocity norm and voluntary associations, which makes democracy work (e. g., Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000).

Trust is a multidimensional concept and researchers have focused on different aspects of trust according to their point of view. A classic and famous distinction is "personal trust" and "systemic trust" by Luhman (1982). Personal trust is based on characteristics of (or a truster's belief about) a trustee, whereas systemic trust is impersonal trust in social systems, such as a government or a free market. In a similar vein, many researchers have identified "personalized (or knowledge-based) trust" and "generalized trust" (e. g., Stolle, 2002; Uslaner, 2002; Yamagishi, 1998; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Personalized trust, which might alternatively be called "particularized trust", is considered to be based on knowledge acquired through "cooperation experiences and repeated interaction with the immediate circle of cooperators" (Stolle, 2002, p. 398). Generalized trust, on the other hand, is a kind of abstract beliefs on unknown people's cooperation. Generalized trust helps cooperation with strangers, which promotes integration in a modern civilized society.

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1 The data used in this study are part of EUROPEAN AND WORLD VALUES SURVEYS 6th WAVE, Data File 2013-04-08, collected by The European Values Study Foundation (www.europeanvalues.nl) and World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). The Japan data were obtained by WASC project, the head of which is Kenichi Ikeda, supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research in 2010, The Ministry of Education, Culuture, Sports,Science and Technology (MEXT).

2 It should be noted that Yamagishi (1998) claimed distinguishing two aspects of trust, expectation of another's ability and expectation of another's good will. In this paper, same as most research discussing trust, focus on trust as an expectation of another's good will.

In addition to generalized trust and personalized trust, some researchers have mentioned another type of trust, which is called identity-based or category-based trust (Freitag and Bauer, 2013; Kramer, Brewer, Hanna, 1996; Stolle, 2002). Identity-based trust is defined as trust based on a shared group identity, like trusting someone from one's alma mater without knowing him/her. Having conducted multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis, Freitag and Bauer (2013) concluded that identity-based trust should be treated as an independent dimension. The trust items used in their research are the following: trust in most people, friends, neighbors, persons of another nationality, persons of another religion, and persons that the respondent meets for the first time. With these six items, a three-dimensional model of trust showed the best fit for the data across several countries, which consists of particularized trust (trust in friends and neighbors), identity-based trust (trust in persons of another nationality and persons of another religion) and generalized trust (trust in persons the respondent meets for the first time and trust in "most people").

It should be noted here that identity-based trust could be regarded as a concept similar to personalized trust in that it is not a belief about human beings in general but is an attitude towards particular people (cf. Yamagishi, 1998). Thus, in this paper, two types of trust will be mainly discussed: personalized trust and generalized trust. These two types of trust are corresponding to two concepts of social capital: "bonding" social capital and "bridging" social capital (see Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Narayan, 1999; Putnam, 2000).

Bonding social capital is characterized as multi-functional ties among dense personal networks that are mutually close. Bonding social capital provides social supports bases for cooperation but, as a result, could be excluding of outsiders. In contrast, bridging social capital is assumed to encourage new relationships to be built with others of different backgrounds, which would endorse diversity in a society.

Consequently, generalized trust has been the main focus in the context of social capital research. Many researchers have investigated the causal relationships between participation in voluntary associations and generalized trust since Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) emphasized that reciprocal communication in small groups would cultivate trust. For example, using a cross-lagged panel analysis on cross-national data, Paxton (2002) found that the level of democracy and social capital, such as the number of international NGOs and generalized trust, were mutually influenced. At individual level, many studies have reported a weak but positive correlation between trust and participation in voluntary associations (see Bekkers, 2012, for a review). Based on panel data, Bekkers (2012) concluded that trust gets people involved in civic engagements, rejecting the hypothesis that volunteering develops trust. Though there is a controversy over the causal relationships, many researchers have discussed the voluntary associations and generalized trust in the same line.

It should be noted here that some researchers pointed out the heterogeneity of association is important in social capital studies. In her cross-national study, Paxton (2002) found the number of associations that are connected to outside networks influenced the level of democracy positively, whereas the number of closed associations had a negative effect. Similarly, Ikeda and Richey (2012) reported that generalized trust had a positive effect on heterogeneity in formal networks, though it had no influence on activeness in formal networks. These findings suggest that generalized trust facilitates "bridging" social capital.

Personalized trust, on the contrary, has been discussed in relation to "bonding" social capital (e. g., Narayan,1999; Stone and Hughes,2002; Uslaner, 2002). It is not obvious if personalized (or particularized) trust is essentially exclusive. Having investigat-

ed inter-ethnic trust in two regions of Russia, Bahry et al. concluded that in-group trust among ethnic groups itself was not an obstacle of inter-ethnic trust (Bahry, Kosolapov, Kozyreva, and Wilson, 2005). While strong attachment to one's ethnic group norm and having a negative stereotype for another ethnic group had a negative impact on inter-ethnic trust, trust in neighbors or co-workers itself had a positive effect on trust in another ethnic group.

Thus, in this paper, I will examine predictors of generalized trust and personalized trust and their effects on social capital in Japan.

Trust in A Cultural Context

Trust can be considered as a social and cultural system, as well as a personal characteristic. Fukuyama (1995) described Japan, Germany and the United States as "high-trust society", where industrialization had developed non-kinship relationships. In those countries, according to Fukuyama, voluntary associations were developed beyond kinship, which promoted modern industrialization. He also mentioned that France, Italy, China and Korea are "low-trust society", where family values play a key role.

Although Fukuyama's argument is important in that he emphasized the social constraints of trust, his classification of high-trust and low-trust societies might be questioned. Yamagishi (1998, see also Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) pointed out that the level of generalized trust among Japanese people was relatively low and the Japanese way of cooperation was much different from that of Americans. With a large number of experiments, he found that Japanese subjects were less cooperative than American subjects when incentives or sanctions were absent.

To explain the difference in cooperation rate between the US and Japan, Yamagishi proposed the concept of "*anshin* (assurance)" to describe social systems in Japan (Yamagishi, 1998; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). According to Yamagishi, *anshin* (assurance) is an expectation of others' cooperation with closed commitment and should be distinguished from "(generalized) trust". In a closed commitment relationship, cheating someone is very risky because cheaters would be purged from a community. When there is a sanction or an incentive, trusting someone would be much less risky (Hardin, 2002) because it is reasonable to assume that others will not be harmful. Such commitment offers a long-term relationship which reduces uncertainty in transaction. From this point of view, the lifetime employment system, which Fukuyama (1995) mentioned as an example showing a high level of trust in Japan, could be interpreted as a product of the "anshin (assurance)" society. Trust, on the other hand, is to expect others to cooperate when no information about a trustee is available (Yamagishi, 1998; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). An expectation of good will from a stranger – or an expectation that he/she will at least not do any harm – is required to set up a new relationship. Thus, trust matters when the level of uncertainty is high or, in other words, when the social mobility is high and people have open relationships. Under such a situation, trust works to diminish uncertainty in open relationships, as Luhman (1982) defined trust as reducing complexity.

Yamagishi emphasizes that "trust" in Japan has been "anshin (assurance)", indeed. The low level of social mobility in Japan forced people to keep long-term relationships, a situation in which people did not need to interact with strangers. In the light of his arguments, an apparently collectivistic culture in Japan should be regarded as an outcome of the social system, and not as an inherited nature. Industrialization and the economic growth in the 20th century, however, increased the social mobility and the modern Jap-

anese people are struggling to develop general trust. Sakamoto (2010), for example, reported that the level of the generalized trust in Japan increased in the 1980s and 1990s, though it has been declining since the 1990s.

The radius of trust in Japan

How low is trust in Japan then? The WVS asks the most commonly used question to measure generalized trust: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?". In Figure 1, the percentages of "Most people can be trusted" answer in the WVS are shown (the 6th wave in 2010–2012; missing values included). 35.9% of Japanese respondents answered that "Most people can be trusted" and it is the 8th highest among 36 countries. Also, there has not been a drastic change over 30 years in the responses given by the Japanese to this item (Table 1; see also Yoshino, 2011). As far as this question in the WVS is concerned, the level of generalized trust among the Japanese does not seem to be as low as expected[1]. (Another survey data, which will be discussed later, showed a lower level of trust



Fig. 1. Most people can be trusted

Table 1
"Most people can be trusted" in Japan in the WVS: 1981–2010

	1981		1990		1995		2000		2005		2010	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Most people can be trusted	456	37,9	380	37,6	419	39,8	540	39,6	401	36,6	878	35,9
Can't be too careful	643	53,4	531	52,5	571	54,2	714	52,4	625	57	1387	56,8
Don't know	105	8,7	100	9,9	64	6,1	108	7,9	70	6,4	178	7,3
total N	1204	100	1011	100	1054	100	1362	100	1096	100	2443	100

1 According to another national survey in Japan ("Nihonjin no kokuminsei chousa", the Statistical Survey of the Japanese National Character, by The Institute of Statistical Mathematics), though, positive answers to the same question is fewer than in the WVS. In SSJNC, the percentages of "Most people can be trusted" are: 26% (1978), 31% (1983), 38% (1993), 33% (1998), 33% (2003), 30% (2008).

than in the WVS.) The problem, however, is what "most people" was thought to really mean. Did the respondents actually imagine someone they have not met before? Or, did they just think of friends and kin?

Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011) investigated the cultural difference in the radius and the level of trust. They used the 5th wave (the 2005–2007 wave) of the WVS, which included six questions to measure the radius of trust, asking how much trust respondents have in the following people: "your family", "your neighborhood", "people you know personally", "people you meet for the first time", "people of another religion", "people of another nationality". They classified these six items into two categories: in-group trust items (trust in family, neighborhood, and people they know personally) and out-group trust items (trust in people they meet for the first time, people of another religion, and people of another nationality). By examining the difference between in-group trust and out-group trust, they found that the radius of "most people" is narrower in some Asian countries and wider in wealthy countries. Thais, Chinese and South Koreans, for example, had a high level of trust in the narrow trust radiuses, though there are some exceptions, such as the Taiwanese, whose radius of trust is wider. Delhey et al. (2011) did not mention Japan because the radius items were not included in the Japanese questionnaire in the 5th WVS.

How about the radius of trust in Japan, then? The 6th wave of the WVS includes the six items to measure the radius of trust, making it possible to see the state of trust in Japan. The response distribution and correlations between these items are displayed in Table 2 and Table 3. Although most Japanese respondents (81%) put trust in their family and their acquaintances, very few (8.9%) answered that they trust strangers. Moreover, trust in their acquaintances and trust in their neighbors are moderately correlated, while relatively high correlations are observed among trust in strangers, people of another religion, and people of another nationality. Trust in "your family", "your neighborhood" and "people you know personally" is regarded as personalized trust; trust in "people you meet for the first time" is generalized trust and; trust in "people of another religion" and "people of another nationality" is identity-based trust (Freitag & Bauer, 2013). Therefore, it can be said that there is a huge gap in level between personalized

Table 2

Distributions for trust items in Japan in the WVS (in 2010, N=2443)

	Family	**Neighborhood**	**People you know personally**	**People you meet for the first time**	**People of another religion**	**People of another nationality**
Trust completely	72,6	3,8	11,7	0,2	0,3	0,5
Trust somewhat	24,3	52,3	69,3	8,6	9,8	13,1
Do not trust very much	0,9	29,9	13,4	50,0	29,9	32,6
Do not trust at all	0,1	5,0	1,4	22,7	21,3	13,6
Don't know	2,0	9,0	4,2	18,5	38,7	40,2

Note: The questions are as follows: "I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all?".

Table 3
Correlations between trust items in the WVS (in 2010, N=2443)

		Family	Neighborhood	People you know personally	People you meet for the first time	People of another religion	People of another nationality
Your family	Spearman's ρ	1000	0.291**	0.257**	0.074**	0.072**	0046
	N	2394	2213	2333	1983	1491	1455
Your neighborhood	Spearman's ρ	0.291**	1000	0.396**	0.395**	0.279**	0.284**
	N	2213	2222	2193	1903	1444	1419
People you know personally	Spearman's ρ	0.257**	0.396**	1000	0.351**	0.234**	0.320**
	N	2333	2193	2341	1960	1476	1444
People you meet for the first time	Spearman's ρ	0.074**	0.395**	0.351**	1000	0.540**	0.554**
	N	1983	1903	1960	1992	1414	1398
People of another religion	Spearman's ρ	0.072**	0.279**	0.234**	0.540**	1000	0.712**
	N	1491	1444	1476	1414	1498	1328
People of another nationality	Spearman's ρ	0046	0.284**	0.320**	0.554**	0.712**	1000
	N	1455	1419	1444	1398	1328	1461

trust and generalized trust in Japan. Notice that many respondents answered "Don't know" if they trust "people of another religion" (DK=38.7%) and "people of another nationality" (DK=40.2%). It could be explained by the fact that the population of foreign residents is very small in Japan[1] and there is no major religious conflict. Considering the high percentages of "Don't know" answers for these items, only the question asking respondents if they have trust in people they meet for the first time will be used as a generalized trust item in this paper.

To compare the radius of trust between countries, the responses for the personalized trust item (trust in "people you know personally") and the responses for the generalized trust item (trust in "people you meet for the first time") are displayed in Figure 2 (New Zealand is excluded because these questions were not included in their case). Comparing the positive answers (the sum of "Trust completely" and "Trust somewhat") to these two items between 35 countries shows that the biggest gap is observed in Japan. This is partly because of Japanese respondents' tendency to give moderate answers (see Yoshino, 2011) but is not because of the high "Don't know" rate in Japan, for the gap also remained the biggest in Japan even when the "Don't know" answers were excluded. As for other countries, by reference to the 2010–2012 wave, a huge gap (over 60 points) between the level of trust in acquaintances and that in strangers was detected in Cyprus, Malay-

1 In December 2011, the number of registered foreign residents in Japan is 2,078,508, which is 1.63% of total population (source: Ministry of Justice, http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00021.html).



Fig. 2.

sia, Estonia, South Korea, Morocco, Poland, Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The cultural variation in the gap between generalized trust and personalized trust implies that these two concepts might have different sources of and different effects on trust, respectively.

Based on previous findings, this paper will examine what determines personalized and general trust in Japan. Then, effects of personalized and generalized trust on social capital, such as participation in voluntary associations and democratic values, will be investigated. Based on previous findings, it can be predicted that generalized trust would facilitate participation in voluntary associations (Bekkers, 2011) and would have positive effect on the democratic norm (Paxton, 2002). Regarding the effect of personalized trust on social capital, this study will be descriptive, rather than hypothesis-testing. The main interest of this study is how personalized trust and generalized trust work differently in a society where the radius of generalized trust is narrow.

Determinants of Trust

A substantial amount of research has been done to explore determinants of trust. At the national level, Bjørnskov (2006) found that income inequality, ethnic diversity, Post-communism society and large Catholic or Muslim shares of population reduced generalized trust, while monarchy increased it. At the individual level, personal characteristics such as age (e. g., Robinson & Jackson, 2001; Uslaner, 2002; Welch, Sikkink, Loveland, 2007), education (e. g., Huang, van den Brink, Groot, 2011; Uslaner, 2002) religious beliefs (e. g., Bjørnskov, 2006; Welch et al., 2007) and health condition (Tsunoda, Yoshino, Yokoyama, 2008) have been reported as determinants of trust. Furthermore, participation in voluntary associations has been considered to be important, as Putnam (1995, 2000) indicated. The causal relationship between participation in voluntary associations and trust is controversial. Based on the longitudinal research, Beckers (2012) concluded that high trust facilitated volunteering but vice versa was not true. Besides, some researchers argued that demographic and socioeconomic diversity in a network is important in terms of developing trust (Granville & Paxton, 2007; Stolle, 1998).

Based on previous research, determinants of personalized and generalized trust have been compared. The data and variables used in the analyses are as follows.

Data

The World Value Survey (WVS), a major global project for comparative value studies, enables us to compare the state of trust in Japan with that of other countries. This study uses data collected as the sixth wave of WVS, conducted in November 2010 for Japan. The survey was conducted on a representative national sample of 2443 Japanese (age ranging from 18 to 79 years, M=50.74, 51.8% female), using self-administered questionnaires delivered and collected by interviewers.

Dependent variables

To avoid missing observations and to ensure conceptual clarification, two single items were used as dependent variables here: trust in "people you know personally" (personalized trust) and "people you meet for the first time" (generalized trust). Both items apply a 4-point scale, ranging from "Trust completely" to "Do not trust at all" (see Table 1). The scale values were reversed so that high values should mean high trust.

Independent variables

Demographics: The demographics included in the model were gender, age, education, marital status, household income, and employment status. The variables of gender (male=1; female=2), marital status ("Living together as married"=1; other=0), and employment status ("Full time", "Part-time", and "Self-employed"=1; Other=0) were coded into dummy variables. Out of the total Japanese sample, 48.2% were male and 69.4% were living together with their spouse as married. The mean age was 50.74 years (SD=16.30) and the variable age was recoded into dummy variables. As for education, "Completed compulsory education (11.7%; note that elementary school and junior high school are compulsory in Japan)" and "Hold a university-level degree (22.0%)" were coded into dummy variables and were compared with other categories. Likewise, two dummy variables were created from the "Scale of incomes", "Annual household income under 3 000 000 yen" ("Lower step"=1; other=0) and "Income over 10 000 000 yen" ("Ninth step" and "Tenth step"=1; other=0). Out of the Japanese respondents, 17.6% were categorized as "Lower step" and 8.1% were categorized as "Ninth/Tenth step". In addition, a five-point scale variable of "subjective social class" was included into the model. Responses were recoded so that a higher score should indicate "Upper class".

Information source: Putnam (1995) argued that television viewing would deteriorate social trust, while Uslaner (1998) found no effect of television viewing on trust when optimism was controlled. To examine the influence of media exposure on trust, four variables of "information source" were used in the model: Daily newspaper, TV news, Internet, and Talking with friends or colleagues. Each variable was recoded as "Daily"=5, "Weekly"=4, "Monthly"=3, "Less than monthly"=2 or "Never"=1.

Neighborhood: As crime rate is often referred to as one of the measures of social capital, the level of security in the neighborhood was assessed on a four-point scale ("Very secure"=1 "to "Not at all secure"=4).

Subjective status: Trust is considered to be correlated with health condition and efficacy. In Model 2, the following three items were added as dependent variables: Subjective state of health (assessed and recoded as "Poor"=1, ""Fair"=2, "Good"=3 or "Very good"=4; Freedom of choice and control over own life (recoded as "No choice at all"=1 to "A great deal of choice"=10) and; Satisfaction with financial situation of household ("Completely dissatisfied"=1 to "Completely satisfied"=10).

Results

In Table 4 and Table 5, the results of the ordered logistic regression analyses in the prediction of personalized trust and generalized trust are presented. As shown in model 1 in Table 4, females, the more highly educated, those in a higher social class, those who talk with friends frequently and those who live in a secure neighborhood showed higher personalized trust. Overall, significant demographic variables are in accordance with previous research (e. g., Huang, van den Brink, Groot, 2011; Robinson & Jackson, 2001; Uslaner, 2002; Welch, Sikkink, Loveland, 2007). The gender effect might be explained by the fact that the need for affiliation is higher among females than males in most cases (see Duncan and Peterson, 2010, for a review). Regarding effects of talking with friends and neighborhood security, further research is needed to define causal relationships. Experience of communication might develop personalized trust but it is also possible that personalized trust facilitates communication with friends. Living in a secure neighborhood might cultivate trust but also it can be considered that those who trust others tend to feel secured.

"Freedom of choice and control over own life", "Satisfaction with financial situation of household" and internet use in model 2 were also proven to be significant, in addition to the significant variables of model 1. These findings suggest that generalized trust is related to self-efficacy. Trusting someone might endanger a truster, when a trustee is dishonest. In such cases, it is reasonable for people with less resources to be careful in dealing with others.

A similar result was obtained for the predictors of generalized trust, as shown in Table 5. There are differences in that age had a significant effect on generalized trust, whereas gender was significant for personalized trust. The positive effects of education and age on generalized trust suggest that generalized trust is an acquired characteristic rather than a psychological predisposition. Further, note that "Talking with friends or colleagues" had a significant effect only on personalized trust. Personalized trust developed through daily communication with friends does not facilitate generalized trust.

Effects of Generalized Trust on Social Capital

To investigate effects of generalized trust on social capital, two dependent variables were used: participation in formal groups and democratic values. Based on previous research, generalized trust would be much important in developing social capital. In countries where the radius of trust is narrow, such as Japan, personalized trust might have effect on social capital.

Dependent Variables

Participation in formal groups: The WVS includes eleven questions to assess the respondent's affiliation with the following groups: "Church or religious organization", "Sport or recreational organization", "Art, music or educational organization", "Labor union", "Political party", "Environmental organization", "Professional association", "Humanitarian or charitable organization", "Consumer organization", "Self-help group, mutual aid group", and "Other organization". To index the participation in formal groups, the number of groups/organizations that each respondent referred to as "I am an active member" was counted. 71.9% of the Japanese respondents reported no formal group which they have an active membership in. 18.0% of the respondents reported one group, 6.5%

Table 4
Predictors of trust in people you know personally (Ordered Logistic Regression)

	Model 1				Model 2			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	p	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	p
Gender	**0,417**	**(0.106)**	**3,95**	**0,000**	**0,375**	**(0.112)**	**3,34**	**0,001**
Age (ref: over 60)								
Under 29	–0,324	(0.207)	–1,57	0,117	*–0,405*	*(0.222)*	*–1,83*	*0,068*
Age 30s	–0,167	(0.175)	–0,95	0,341	–0,176	(0.187)	–0,94	0,347
Age 40s	0,031	(0.167)	0,19	0,851	0,034	(0.176)	0,19	0,846
Age 50s	–0,016	(0.154)	–0,10	0,919	–0,057	(0.165)	–0,35	0,728
Education (ref: HS graduate)								
Juniorhigh	–0,210	(0.175)	–1,20	0,230	*–0,361*	*(0.192)*	*–1,88*	*0,060*
College	**0,289**	**(0.128)**	**2,25**	**0,024**	*0,231*	*(0.134)*	*1,72*	*0,086*
Mariral status (ref: single)								
Living together as married	0,078	(0.123)	0,63	0,530	0,081	(0.133)	0,61	0,542
Job and income								
Employed or self-employed	0,019	(0.118)	0,16	0,873	0,067	(0.125)	0,53	0,595
Income:lower step (under 3 million yen)	**–0,316**	**(0.142)**	**–2,23**	**0,026**	–0,245	(0.153)	–1,60	0,109
Income: 9th and 10th (over 10 million yen)	–0,006	(0.180)	–0,03	0,975	–0,100	(0.191)	–0,52	0,600
Subjective social class	**0,159**	**(0.065)**	**2,46**	**0,014**	0,059	(0.076)	0,78	0,437
Information source								
Daily newspaper	–0,023	(0.044)	–0,52	0,604	–0,040	(0.047)	–0,86	0,392
TV news	0,144	(0.131)	1,10	0,270	0,174	(0.136)	1,27	0,203
Internet	0,058	(0.036)	1,62	0,106	**0,080**	**(0.038)**	**2,11**	**0,035**
Talk with friends or colleagues	**0,127**	**(0.046)**	**2,75**	**0,006**	**0,120**	**(0.049)**	**2,43**	**0,015**
Neighborhood								
(In)secure in neighborhood	**–0,454**	**(0.094)**	**–4,81**	**0,000**	**–0,439**	**(0.101)**	**–4,36**	**0,000**
Subjective personal status								
State of health (subjective)	–	–	–	–	0,079	(0.068)	1,160	0,247
Freedom of choice and control over own life	–	–	–	–	**0,070**	**(0.029)**	**2,390**	**0,017**
Satisfaction with financial situation of household	–	–	–	–	**0,071**	**(0.028)**	**2,490**	**0,013**
Cutpoint 1	–3,054	(0.749)			–2,282	(0.801)		
Cutpoint 2	–0,439	(0.727)			0,357	(0.779)		
Cutpoint 3	3,472	(0.733)			4,384	(0.789)		
N of obs	2111				1921			
Pseudo ρ^2	0,03				0,04			
Lr χ^2 (17)	101,96				125,19			

Data: World Values Survey, Japan in 2010.

Table 5
Predictors of trust in people you meet for the first time (Ordered Logistic Regression)

	Model 1				Model 2			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	p	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	p
Gender	0,103	(0.102)	1,01	0,314	0,160	(0.108)	1,49	0,137
Age (ref: over 60)								
Under 29	**–0,879**	**(0.200)**	**–4,40**	**0,000**	**–0,942**	**(0.211)**	**–4,47**	**0,000**
Age 30s	**–0,575**	**(0.171)**	**–3,36**	**0,001**	**–0,509**	**(0.181)**	**–2,82**	**0,005**
Age 40s	**–0,424**	**(0.164)**	**–2,59**	**0,010**	**–0,378**	**(0.171)**	**–2,22**	**0,027**
Age 50s	–0,187	(0.153)	–1,22	0,223	–0,132	(0.161)	–0,82	0,410
Education (ref: HS graduate)								
Junior high	**–0,421**	**(0.166)**	**–2,53**	**0,011**	**–0,508**	**(0.182)**	**–2,78**	**0,005**
College	0,177	(0.129)	1,37	0,171	0,182	(0.132)	1,37	0,170
Mariral status (ref: single)								
Living together as married	0,009	(0.120)	0,07	0,942	–0,013	(0.128)	–0,10	0,921
Job and income								
Employed or self-employed	0,062	(0.114)	0,55	0,585	0,045	(0.120)	0,37	0,710
Income: lower step (under 3 million yen)	*–0,257*	*(0.138)*	*–1,86*	*0,062*	–0,241	(0.148)	–1,63	0,102
Income: 9th and 10th (over 10 million yen)	–0,235	(0.185)	–1,27	0,204	–0,277	(0.193)	–1,43	0,151
Subjective social class	**0,161**	**(0.063)**	**2,56**	**0,011**	0,074	(0.074)	1,01	0,313
Information source								
Daily newspaper	–0,035	(0.043)	–0,81	0,416	–0,039	(0.045)	–0,88	0,381
TV news	–0,152	(0.128)	–1,19	0,235	–0,137	(0.135)	–1,01	0,312
Internet	**0,068**	**(0.035)**	**1,96**	**0,050**	0,053	(0.036)	1,45	0,148
Talk with friends or colleagues	0,052	(0.045)	1,16	0,247	0,050	(0.047)	1,05	0,294
Neighborhood								
(In)secure in neighborhood	**–0,303**	**(0.094)**	**–3,22**	**0,001**	**–0,327**	**(0.100)**	**–3,29**	**0,001**
Subjective personal status								
State of health (subjective)	–	–	–	–	–0,049	(0.066)	–0,74	0,458
Freedom of choice and control over own life	–	–	–	–	**0,081**	**(0.028)**	**2,87**	**0,004**
Satisfaction with financial situation of household	–	–	–	–	*0,045*	*(0.027)*	*1,65*	*0,099*
Cutpoint 1	–1,933	0,724			–1,548	0,778		
Cutpoint 2	1,285	0,723			1,648	0,778		
Cutpoint 3	4,919	0,826			5,262	0,875		
N of obs	1801				1642			
Pseudo ρ^2	0,02				0,03			
Lr χ^2 (17)	69,55				83,22			

Data: World Values Survey, Japan in 2010.

Table 6
Principal component analysis of democratic values

	PC1	Communality
People choose their leaders in free elections (V133)	0,742	0,551
Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression (V136)	0,723	0,522
Women have the same rights as men (V139)	0,741	0,549
Importance of democracy (V140)	0,654	0,428
Contribution	51,28%	

reported two, 2.3% reported three, and only 0.5% reported more than three formal groups.

Democratic Values: In the WVS, respondents were asked to assess the importance of democratic values on a ten-point scale. As some of them are values about redistribution rather than about democracy, the following four items were chosen to measure democratic attitudes: "People choose their leaders in free elections", "Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression", "Women have the same rights as men", and "Importance of democracy". As the result of a principal component analysis confirmed that those four items were single-dimensional (Table 6), the principal component score was used as a measure of democratic values.

Independent variables

In addition to the independent variables used in the previous analysis (Table 4 and Table 5), "Trust in people you know personally (personalized trust)" and "Trust in people you meet for the first time (generalized trust)" were included in the model (see Table 1, where the scale values were reversed so that high values should mean high trust). In the regression model for democratic values, "Interest in politics" (1="Not at all interested" to 4="Very interested") and "Self positioning in the political scale (ideology)" (1="Left" to 10="Right") were also added as independent variables.

Results

Determinants of participation in formal groups. To test the effects of generalized and personalized trust on civic engagement, predictors of the number of membership in formal groups were examined. As the dependent variable represents a count data, a Poisson regression analysis was conducted. The result of the Poisson regression analyses with robust errors is shown in Table 7. As predicted, generalized trust had significant positive effect on participation in formal groups, while personalized trust was not significant. The positive effect of generalized trust replicated the findings of previous research (e. g., Bekkers, 2012) and confirms the arguments that generalized trust plays an important role in civic engagement.

The variable of communication with friends was significant in the model, too. There are two possible explanations: activeness in voluntary associations increases communication with other members, or a sociable person tend to participate in group activities and conversation more than an introverted person. Among demographic variables, males, people over 60, and those in a higher social class mentioned the larger number of formal groups. These findings suggest that those who can afford time and money would participate in voluntary associations. As for education, the effect is apparently nonlin-

Table 7
Predictors of the number of the group affiliation (Poisson regression analysis)

	Coef.	Robust SE	z	p
Gender	**–0,273**	**0,103**	**–2,65**	**0,008**
Age (ref: over 60)				
Under 29	**–0,788**	**0,181**	**–4,340**	**0,000**
Age 30s	**–1,007**	**0,159**	**–6,320**	**0,000**
Age 40s	**–0,821**	**0,153**	**–5,360**	**0,000**
Age 50s	**–0,453**	**0,140**	**–3,240**	**0,001**
Education (ref: HS graduate)				
Junior high	**–0,625**	**0,201**	**–3,100**	**0,002**
College	*–0,229*	*0,118*	*–1,930*	*0,053*
Mariral status (ref: single)				
Living together as married	0,132	0,109	1,210	0,225
Job and income				
Employed or self-employed	–0,063	0,103	–0,610	0,543
Income: lower step (under 3 million yen)	0,028	0,188	0,150	0,880
Income: 9th and 10th (over 10 million yen)	–0,213	0,155	–1,370	0,170
Subjective social class	**0,243**	**0,079**	**3,070**	**0,002**
Information source				
Daily newspaper	0,041	0,049	0,840	0,400
TV news	0,153	0,129	1,180	0,237
Internet	*0,057*	*0,031*	*1,850*	*0,065*
Talk with friends or colleagues	**0,250**	**0,047**	**5,280**	**0,000**
Neighborhood				
(In)secure in neighborhood	0,101	0,098	1,030	0,302
Subjective personal status				
State of health (subjective)	*0,111*	*0,061*	*1,830*	*0,068*
Freedom of choice and control over own life	0,048	0,036	1,330	0,183
Satisfaction with financial situation of household	0,030	0,029	1,050	0,295
Trust				
Trust in people you know personally	–0,065	0,108	–0,610	0,545
Trust in people you meet for the first time	**0,360**	**0,096**	**3,730**	**0,000**
Constant	–4,155	0,853	–4,870	0,000
N	1627			
Wald $\chi^2(22)$	218,96			
Log pseudolikelihood	–1461,803			
Pseudo ρ^2	0,098			

Note: The dependent variable is the number of active membership of formal groups.

Table 8
Determinants of democratic values (OLS regression analysis)

	Model 1				Model 2			
	b	SE	Beta	p	B	SE	Beta	p
Gender	0,040	0,058	0,020	0,490	0,084	0,063	0,041	0,187
Age (ref: over 60)								
Under 29	**–0,564**	**0,111**	**–0,192**	**0,000**	**–0,487**	**0,121**	**–0,167**	**0,000**
Age 30s	**–0,271**	**0,094**	**–0,105**	**0,004**	**–0,218**	**0,104**	**–0,081**	**0,036**
Age 40s	**–0,190**	**0,089**	**–0,074**	**0,033**	–0,120	0,096	–0,047	0,210
Age 50s	**–0,177**	**0,085**	**–0,069**	**0,037**	–0,141	0,090	–0,056	0,119
Education (ref: HS graduate)								
Junior high	**–0,339**	**0,104**	**–0,095**	**0,001**	**–0,459**	**0,117**	**–0,122**	**0,000**
College	**0,332**	**0,067**	**0,149**	**0,000**	**0,345**	**0,071**	**0,158**	**0,000**
Mariral status (ref: single)								
Living together as married	0,078	0,069	0,036	0,262	0,043	0,075	0,020	0,571
Job and income								
Employed or self-employed	**–0,147**	**0,065**	**–0,071**	**0,023**	*–0,130*	*0,070*	*–0,063*	*0,064*
Income: lower step (under 3 million yen)	–0,044	0,083	–0,016	0,599	–0,082	0,089	–0,029	0,359
Income: 9th and 10th (over 10 million yen)	0,117	0,096	0,035	0,223	0,088	0,102	0,027	0,387
Subjective social class	*–0,068*	*0,037*	*–0,058*	*0,070*	**–0,102**	**0,040**	**–0,088**	**0,011**
Information source								
Daily newspaper	–0,017	0,025	–0,020	0,497	–0,012	0,027	–0,014	0,667
TV news	**0,200**	**0,073**	**0,077**	**0,006**	**0,176**	**0,074**	**0,071**	**0,018**
Internet	**0,056**	**0,019**	**0,099**	**0,003**	**0,042**	**0,020**	**0,074**	**0,039**
Talk with friends or colleagues	–0,017	0,026	–0,019	0,504	–0,014	0,028	–0,015	0,625
Neighborhood								
(In)secure in neighborhood	**–0,177**	**0,051**	**–0,095**	**0,001**	**–0,142**	**0,055**	**–0,077**	**0,010**
Subjective personal status								
State of health (subjective)	**0,081**	**0,036**	**0,069**	**0,023**	**0,084**	**0,038**	**0,072**	**0,027**
Freedom of choice and control over own life	0,006	0,017	0,011	0,742	0,011	0,018	0,021	0,556
Satisfaction with financial situation of household	0,002	0,015	0,005	0,874	0,003	0,016	0,007	0,827
Trust								
Trust in people you know personally	**0,170**	**0,054**	**0,093**	**0,002**	**0,176**	**0,059**	**0,097**	**0,003**
Trust in people you meet for the first time	*–0,088*	*0,048*	*–0,053*	*0,069*	–0,086	0,053	–0,053	0,101
Ideology	–	–	–	–	*–0,029*	*0,015*	*–0,056*	*0,065*
Interest in politics	–	–	–	–	**0,149**	**0,045**	**0,105**	**0,001**
Constant	–0,991	0,438		0,024	–1,222	0,474		0,01
N of cases	1271				1072			
ρ^2	0,105				0,126			
Adj. ρ^2	0,089				0,106			

Note: The dependent variable is the principal component score of the following four items: "People choose their leaders in free elections", "Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression", "Women have the same rights as men" , and "Importance of democracy".

ear; both the less educated and the more educated were inactive in formal groups. Further investigation is needed to clarify this effect.

Determinants of democratic values. Subsequently, two OLS regression analyses were performed with a principal component score of democratic values as a dependent variable. The independent variables in model 1 are same as the previous analysis (Table 7). "Ideology" and "Interest in politics" and "Self positioning in the political scale (ideology)" were added in model 2.

As shown in Table 8, interestingly, personalized trust had a significant effect on positive attitude to democratic values, even when "ideology" and "interest in politics" were controlled (model 2). The effect of generalized trust, on the other hand, was marginal in the negative direction or not significant. In sum, personalized trust is related to democracy in though, whereas generalized trust is related to democracy in action in Japan. Having conducted a cross-national study, Paxton (2002) reported that generalized trust had a positive effect on democracy represented by Bollen's (1998) democracy score. Further research is required to examine the effects of personalized trust on democracy, but in Japan, reliable relationships with acquaintances might work as a framework of democracy as Yamagishi (1994, 1998) described it as "anshin" society.

As for demographic variables, age, education, social class are significant, same as Table 7. Exposure to traditional mass media (newspaper and TV news) also had positive effect on democratic values. Again, these results indicate that democratic values are acquired beliefs.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to examine the predictors of personalized and generalized trust, and to compare effects of those two types of trust on social capital in Japan. The main findings are as follows: (1) Age and education had positive effect on generalized trust, which indicates that generalized trust is a belief that acquired by socialization. (2) Communication with friends or colleagues had a positive effect on personalized trust, whereas it had no influence on generalized trust. (3) Generalized trust had a positive effect on participation in formal groups, as previous researches have argued. (4) Personalized trust had a positive effect on positive attitude to democratic values, while generalized trust had no positive effect.

The different effects of personalized and generalized trust on two aspects of social capital, civic engagement and democratic values, indicate that both type of trust is important in making democracy work in Japan. While generalized trust encourages Japanese people to participate in civic engagement, personalized trust develops positive attitudes to democracy. It should be careful to apply this finding other cultures, of course, but the role of personalized trust in democracy among Asian society should be investigated further.

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REPRODUCTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, TRUST AND ENTERPRISE NETWORKS: BY WAY OF EXAMPLE THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE FIRMS' SMALL AND MIDDLE BUSINESS IN THE URAL FEDERAL DISTRICT (RUSSIA)[1]

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Empirical verification

The authors conducted a factor analysis of the obtained empirical data for the evaluation of the most effective ways of overcoming obstacles. We found that all the possible ways of solving these problems were reduced to three main ("large" according to V. A. Yadov) factors (the area insignificant signs of shows above the third factor). Analysis of the data by the method of the main components of the rotation matrix showed that

Analysis of the data by the method of the main components showed that the largest rotated factor loadings a matrix of the variables "corruption" (0.557), the "people in power (authorities)" (0.672) and "blat" (profitable connections) (0.688) are related to one basic ("large") the first factor conditionally named us as *ties of corruption* (*corruption connections*). The variable "strong partnership" with factor load 0.769 refers to the second factor named us as *partnerships* (*partner connections*). Other variables were assigned to the third main ("big") factor (the "complaint" – 0.694, "visual propaganda" ("evident agitation") – 0.569, "mergers and acquisitions (absorptions)" – 0.416) which essentially uses the resources of social capital at the macro level. In turn, this macro-level social capital acts as a specific characteristic of the institutional environment in the form of social norms, rules of conduct, which are common for all surveyed firms. The third macro factor was named us as *the social capital of the institutional environment*. Identified factors (corruption, partnerships and social capital of the institutional environment) talk about the use in business networks of personalized elements of social capital which being a general supply of resources of a certain economic entity (the certain managing subject) shall be recorded in the form of a long-term (strong) social connection with the bureaucrats, civil servants in power, by officials, competitors, clients, customers and the various business partners.

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Theoretical and empiric verifications problem of embeddedness (engrain) personalized elements of social capital as the success of the business examined in the river-bed of paradigm "order of the 'closed access'" (opposite to the order of "open access" in the theory of Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast (2009)), social embeddedness (engrain) in an economy investigated also within the framework of conception of social capital (Brunie A., Bourdieu P., Coleman J., Putnam R.), "trust radiuses" (trust radii) (Auer-Rizzi W., Bjørnskov Ch., Endreß M., Fukuyama F.), we have studied the practice of "immoral family", "double standard", "double morality" (on the basis by the ideas of F. Fukuyama's).

Research aim: verification of mechanisms reproduction of partner networks and corruption connections by the forms embeddedness of the personalized social capital in the systems of social co-operations the entrepreneurship.

Research methods: theoretical re-interpretation of modern conceptions of social capital in business-organizations, of them operationalization and verification.

Empiric part of project is presented by representative sociological research within the framework of study of problems of embeddedness and functioning of the enterprise networks to order of "VCIOM-Ural" by the interview method of the impressive territorial sample: 1003 respondents in Uralsk Federal district; from them: owners of business – 14%; heads of business – 22%; heads of structural divisions of business – 24%; managers of an average link – 40%.

The content description of research. The concept of the social capital by F. Fukuyama underlies of the empirical opinion and distinctly enough operationalizationes and approaches for Russia. From the point of view of F. Fukuyama the social capital is a set of informal social norms and the values divided by members of group entering into a social network and promoting effective cooperation inside and out of it. Thus "trust radiuses" (*trust radii*) are matter between members of a network. Applying the concept of the social capital "across Fukuyama" in relation to enterprise networks in Russia the attention has been focused on its following qualitative signs that makes in aggregate the *hypotheses* of our research: (1) Radiuses of trust are narrowed and their price increases; (2) Immoral experts within the limits of a paradigm of "immoral domesticity", "double standards", "double morals", social norms "friends and foes", insider/outsider distinction ("ins and outs") within the data network of solidarity and network of cooperation matter; (3) As consequence the social capital of such quality is transformed to the monetary capital, including in form a corruption; (4) Circulation of the financial capital provides the stability and development in these social networks under the scheme of positive feedback: the more is the social capital in a context of a paradigm of immoral domesticity "friends and foes": the more is corruption – the more is successfully business; (5) Some small firms and moderate-sized firms are just scraping by in this economy survive; this small firms and moderate-sized firms are built in corruption network schemes with use of an administrative resource; (6) The return thesis is true also: the unsuccessful small firms and moderate-sized firms aren't built in corruption network schemes with use of an administrative resource.

Intermediate results

The attempt of verification of issues of the day of enterprise networks is produced on the basis of conception of social capital. As key parameters of enterprise network were chosen such her components as business descriptions (key characteristics of business), de-

scriptions (characteristics) of obstacles to business, the separate directions of corruption as one of descriptions of informal network; methods of overcoming of obstacles to business; corruption as the engrained phenomenon is in enterprise networks (meaningful parameters of corruption); "strong partnership"/"partner connections", business success as resulting network description (as key characteristics of business); the safety of entrepreneurial activity as ontological definitions.

General conclusions are presented in 13 points (below in this text).

Theoretical approaches. The problem of social capital as it applies to the business / to the free enterprise was put by Karl Marx quite clearly. He discovered that social relations can become "a commodity": they can be sold. Karl Marx set that system of capitalism mediates social relations and relationships of production such as among workers and between workers and capitalists through capitals and commodities, including labour, that are bought and sold on the market. This idea about "marketability" of social relations Émile Durkheim transformed in its own way. He set that a social asset and a social capital are related to the people and to the organizations of people pursuing collective aims. Therefore social capital in religion plays role of the both in the function of maintenance of social unity of community and in the methods of realization of "the solidarity" and "the moral community" (Дюркгейм, 1995, с. 268). (However, his controversial beliefs that r social capital in religion and "moral community" could be explained in terms purely of social interaction and social capital earned him many critics). Social capital considered in the context of height of his cost, including to the cost "religious", too is a certain commodity, and is "an asset" ("the resource").

The term a "social capital" in a modern scientific turn was entered by Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1992; Бурдьё, 2002), James Coleman (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Коулман, 2001), Robert Putnam (Putnam, 1993, 1996, 2000), Francis Fukuyama (Фукуяма, 2002, 2006), who found this concept is valuable and promising tool of socio-economic analysis. Social capital as one of the rare resources P. Bourdieu treated on an equal basis with other forms of capital: economic, symbolic, cultural, which can easily be converted to any, including in the form of money. The specificity of social capital P. Bourdieu found in the relations of reciprocity – the expectations of mutual exchange, supported by the markets and culture, which are impossible without at least a minimum level of trust; therefore, the social capital is "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the presence of strong networks, more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Бурдьё, 2002, с. 65). The sources of social capital were considered by means of the creation and use of the individual networks of more or less institutionalized relationships between people who "know and recognize each other". A fundamental its basis of an individual is his belonging to one group or another. In this case, the stronger a well-developed social network of personal relations, whom the individual creates by constant work on their relationship and to which he may refer, the higher the chances of his reproduction of social capital.

J. Coleman believed that social capital is productive, like other forms of capital, since it facilitates the achievement of these purposes, in the absence of which it would be impossible. They identified three forms of social capital: "the obligations that depend on the soundness of the social environment", "expectations, which depend on the soundness of the social environment", "the ability of the social structure to the transfer of information flows and norms accompanied by sanctions (Коулман, 2001, с. 138) that allowed V. V. Radaev to make an re-interpretation the true approach J. Coleman in a short aphoristic phrase: "Social capital is the set of relations, which are connected with the ex-

pectations of what the other agents will fulfill their obligations without the application of sanctions"; and "the simultaneous concentration of expectations and obligations expressed generalizing concept of the trust (доверие)" (Радаев, 2008, с. 129). R. Putnam is a scientist that set "the drive" of modern discussion about a social capital. He counted up a necessity to "apply especially sociological concepts during the quantitative study of some social and economic phenomena" (Putnam, 1993, p. 3). A social capital he defined as "descriptions of social life are *networks, norms and trust*, that induce participants to the more effective united action on the achievement of general aims" (Putnam, 1996, p. 66). The more obligations and expectations are accumulated in this association, converted in corresponding social networks, norms and levels of trust, the more and the higher for the members of concrete network their faith in reciprocity and, consequently, the more, the better and the higher level of social capital.

The disciples R. Putnam increasingly turning to the concept of "social trust", considering it one of the most important components of the initially unified in content plan of the term "social capital". "The more recent literature has stressed the need to separate the constituent elements of Putnam's social capital concept, and in particular emphasizes the role of social trust. This is in turn defined as the confidence people have that strangers, i. e. fellow citizens on whom they have no specific information, will not take advantage of them" (Bjørnskov, 2008, p. 271). The "climate of trust" on any territory matters for development of business.

Leaning against data of the *World values survey,* containing, in particular, a question: "Do you consider that most people can trust?", Christian Bjørnskov concluded that a social capital and social trust are conditioned by in any case next factors: by the level of national economic development; by quality of life and degree of subjective satisfaction by her; by character of legislative and executive power in a country; by availability of education; by the level of corruption and criminality (ibid., p. 271–272). Matters that both descriptions of social capital and descriptions of social trust are different enough for every country of the world, especially for specific in this plan Russia. "Using the answers to the *World Values Survey* question 'In general, do you think that most people can be trusted?', the by now quite substantial literature has found that social trust is associated with a set of different outcomes: economic growth, the rule of law and overall quality of governance, corruption, education, the extent of violent crime, and subjective well-being are all associated with the propensity of people within any nation to trust each other" (ibid., p. 274–275).

Modern analysts are assure that the strongest determinant of the level of social trust in the context dividing of society into groups in accordance with the level of profits (to the unevenness of profits) and social status that comes forward as public and intra-national societal fractionalization. Ch. Bjørnskov takes a closer look at the importance the concept of the fractionalization for the understanding of the parameters the social trust. He argues that the determinants of the trust can be divided into two categories: those affecting *individuals' trust radii* and those affecting *social polarization*. These effects differ systematically across countries, questioning standard interpretations of the influence of fractionalization on trust (ibid., p. 271). The investment of F. Fukuyama in conception of social capital consists of that he considered a social capital as factor assisting a height to welfare and competitiveness of country (nations), and bound the concept of social capital to the social norms and "*radius of trust*" ("*trust radii*"). Fukuyama accented as elements of social capital on the formed in the process of communion and co-operation the general systems of the social norms, the values, the aims and the utilitarian

benefit. Opening of Fukuyama consisted of that he expounded conception of "radius of trust", proving a hypothesis that efficiency of economy of country depends on inherent to one or another society of "radius of trust" if he is small, it limited to mainly family and friendly connections, then economic relations in a country are not so effective, as would be (Фукуяма, 2006, с. 179–181). For Russia and Ukraine, in terms of Fukuyama, the radius of trust narrows, and the cost of him increases (там же, с. 449).

Determining a social capital as set of the informal norms and values, divided by the members of group and assisting co-operation into her, Francis Fukuyama linked the level of social capital in society and collective social memory. Studying the "radiuses of trust" between businessmen in one or other countries Francis Fukuyama proved that the "radius of trust" straight had contacted with economic development of country: what he is anymore – that the economic constituent of this country is better. All of it is shown on facts: as Japan, Germany, USA, India, China and other countries, differentiate exactly on the sign of *"trust radii",* including Russia, Ukraine, countries of Eastern Europe. "Societies of subzero trust" (Russia and Ukraine are taken) are characterized by not absence of trust on the whole, and strong, depending on a situation, by amoral practices. A social capital exists within bounds of every such separate amoral practice – within the framework of "nepotism – amoral nepotism", and "double standards". The examples of negative influence of ambivalent moral (distinctions between an internal and external moral, between internal and external norms and values) are educed "it and stranger" on social co-operation and solidarity. As examples of negative influence on a management and economy a corruption and bribery are examined. Using empiric data and attracting statistical materials from the national and international different sources of Ch. Bjørnskov extended the empiric base of verifiable hypothesis of "trust radii" not simply substantially, but grounded theoretical distinction of individual "radiuses of trust" in a context social fractionalization/distancing within the framework of the national states (Bjørnskov, 2008, p. 271). In addition, the functioning of elements of social capital, as well as different forms of trust is examined in the context of interlacing (linking) of formal and informal economy. This theme develops D. Gambetta, which has revealed the formation mechanisms of solidarity and trust in the social capital by the example of the Sicilian mafia, emphasizing the high importance of the conceptual separation of trust and reliability (Gambetta, 1993, 2000a, b). As researches of social capital show in activity of organizations and in a management especially clear the desynchronization (errors) of the values reveals inter-personality forms and network forms of trust (Auer-Rizzi, 2007).

The methodological productivity of conception of social capital for the empiric analysis of social networks for business consists of that from one side the modern context of interpretations of "social capital" reflects hard logic of peculiar, and from other it will mobilize the adaptive resources of vital functions (Brunie, 2009). In scientific and practical plans development of conception of operating trust is important, or trust as action (Endreß, 2002, 2004). V. Radaev believes rightly that embeddedness connections/embeddedness ties (in contrast to random connections) arise when the are taken into account the status of the counter-party, the past experience of working with him, his reputation, recommendations of third parties, personal acquaintance or kinship, belonging to one social group (education, ethnicity etc.) finally, the subjective preferences. These connections arise from the selective affinity partners (elective affinity) (Радаев, 2011, с. 70).

So, takes place large enough theoretical and empiric material testifying to the utility of conception of social capital for business and for his social networks are accumulated in modern scientific literature.

Verification of mechanisms of reproduction of social co-operations and work of enterprise networks

This procedure was conducted on basis: (1) descriptions of business of size of business and pattern of ownership; (2) descriptions of obstacles to business (efficiency is not efficiency of government control, business capture by public agents, burdensomeness of mechanism of grafts, payment to the crime, individual approach of officials, administrative obstacles); (3) separate directions of corruption as description of informal network (of subornation supervisory organs; fight against "ambages" (the creation of unnecessary barriers: "bureaucratic acrimony"); the use of power is in competitive activity; affecting legislative level); (4) methods of overcoming of obstacles business (strong partnership, "people" in power, complaints, protection; associations, "evident agitation"); (5) exposure of signs of corruption as the social phenomenon in enterprise networks (character of corruption, volume of graft, frequency of grafts); (6) fixing of business success as resulting network description (of term of existence/experience at the market, economic constituents of success: of income, volumes of sales, profitability, recoupment); (7) safety of entrepreneurial activity as ontological description of social network.

General conclusions on given analysis the stage it is possible to take to the following:

(1) A hypothesis was confirmed, that as a measuring device of stability of network a sign can be used "experience of work at the market" (Table 1, Figure 1).

Confirmed the hypothesis that as a measure of the sustainability of the network can be used sign of "the duration (number) of years on the market". However, this situation revealed "the problem of the account": the fact that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have a high "ontological volatility", that is quite often appear (registered) and quite often die. Nevertheless, it was revealed on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs): 5% of the firms in the market has been more than 20 years; 20% of the firms on the market from 13 to 20 years; 60% of the firms on the market from 1 to 12 years; 15% of the firms of less than one year. The average period of work in the market of the enterprise was 10.6 years – with a standard deviation of 12.5 years. The most frequent answer (fashion) amounted to 5 years, and a median of 7 years (that is, half of the enterprises have less than 7 years); the share of other insignificant (less than 5% of the total) (Figure 1, Table 2). Distribution of firms on experience of work at the market gives strong reasons to conclude that, not looking on political declarations that functioning of networks of small and mid-size businesses on the whole not "steadily" – actually it not quite so.

(2) Success of business is interconnected today first of all with the size of firm (on the test of ANOVA – F of statistician 25.7 (F – a criterion is a size, characterizing correlation of dispersions of two distributions, value F- criterion more than 10 specifies on the substantial exceeding to intergroup dispersion above within cells), meaningfully depends

Table 1

Descriptive statistics: Number of years on the market
(answer to the question: "How many years does your enterprise run?", April 2011; sample for small and medium-sized firms UFD – 1003 people)

Number of years on the market	All	Arithmetic average	Median	Mode	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum	25%	50%	75%
Mean	1003	10.6	7	5	12.5	0	93	4	7	13



Fig. 1. Distribution of companies upon experience of work on the market

on the sphere of activity and mildly related to the region of registration. At the same time business success with Ural Federal District is poorly enough related to the level of competition at the market. Namely: business success with an enterprise environment is first of all determined by availability of credit resources, but not level of competition at the market, that talks about not very strong development of market relations. Competition markets in Ural Federal District are trade (including retail); transport and connection; educational services.

(3) The Cross-correlation analysis showed that among different parties of business straight bound by strong cross-correlation dependence: availability of business information (r=0.709 at an error less than 0.0001); competitiveness and business (r=0.655) success; availability of resources of connection and communication (r=0.565), that make basic descriptions of social capital also.

(4) It was educed, that quality of enterprise environment highly enough in Ural Federal District (on the sign of availability of services in contiguous industries): 57% entrepreneur of small and mid-size businesses consider that to find such services "easily enough"; 33% that finding such services is "always possible at the expense of a minimum of efforts"; total 90%. It means that the real business is easily enough oriented in the enterprise space, and if we it admits to take off different obstacles and bureaucratic hurdles then he will manage quickly enough and easily to develop practically in any industry of national economy.

(5) The hierarchy of threats is as follows: the competition has increased significantly – 40% is difficult to find the necessary qualifications of workers – 35% is difficult to find the necessary financial resources for business – 32% became tense situation on the labor market – 24%; summed providers (subcontractors) – 22% of consumers do not pay

Table 2
Results of the nonparametric test of Kruskal and Wallis, April 2011; n=1003

	Measuring the success of your business (from 1 low to 5 high)	**If necessary, how easy or hard to find services related to your business industry? (from 1 to 5 impossible–easy)**	**How you access to credit? (from 1 low to 5 high)**
	Average rank	Average rank	Average rank
Do not use the connections (32%)	464.39	494.92	465.25
Used primarily partnerships (43%)	540.05	531.54	518.04
Used mostly corrupt communications (17%)	470.10	464.65	515.50
Used and the of corruption connections and partnerships (8%)	516.47	454.20	531.96
χ^2	16.756	12.551	8.355
Asymp. Sig.	0.001	0.005	0.039

Note: 8% – used corruption connections and partnerships; 17% – used mostly corrupt communications; 32% – do not use the connections; 43% – used primarily partnerships.

on time (not acted) – 16%, low level of demand for our products – 15% the administrative burden – 13% is difficult to find qualified management personnel – 9%, there were debts to subcontractors – 4%, it is difficult to find the necessary property – 3%, there were debts to the banks – 3%, the cases of raids – 1%; illegal actions of law enforcement officials – less than 1%.

(6) Hierarchy of threats from the perspective of a possible financial loss: the instability of the environment – 61% (main threat), the inefficiency of government regulation – 39%, administrative barriers – 20%, qualified staff – 15%, capture of business competitors – 12%, narrower (underdeveloped) market – 10%; personalized officials – 7%; burdensome mechanism for bribes – 7%; business capture by the authorities – 6%; criminals pay – 1%.

(7) How entrepreneurs choose to overcome the obstacles? This rating is as follows: a strong partnership – 59% (this fact reflects the importance of social capital and cohesion in business networks), visual propaganda – 22%, "his people" in power – 18.4%; association (M&A) – 17.7%; profitable connections – 12%, corruption – 7%; complaints – 5% (the most legitimate ways to overcome obstacles to effective complaints say 5% – of the respondents that is to complain few can afford because it's pointless).

(8) A very important point is for the theory and practice of social capital: what does it mean to sign a "strong partnership", which is one of the priorities of the ways to overcome obstacles ranked first in the corresponding hierarchy (it is considered the most efficient way to 59%) reflects the fact of unity in business networks. What affects the "strong partnership"? A strong partnership helps to overcome the first market risk (Spearman ρ=0.154**) and the risk of errors and miscalculations in the design of projects (Spearman ρ=0.152**), helps to informally negotiate with the rules of competition in the market (Spearman ρ=0.123**). The other methods referred to as "infor-

mal, shadow", implying some degree of legitimate, direct methods of resistance. This is "our people in power", "cronyism" and "corruption", the third, fifth and sixth place in the ranking.

(9) The most dangerous for the entrepreneurs are market risk, socio-political and institutional changes, the risk of errors and miscalculations in the design of projects: what is called "unstable environment" for business, mainly caused by powerful (*"power–property"*) resource.

(10) It was found that the socio-political and institutional changes are most significant (with an error less than 0.001) associated with payments to crime (Spearman $\rho=0.192^{**}$) and estimates of business success (Spearman $\rho=0.127^{**}$) and to overcome these obstacles preferably by "his people in power" (Spearman $\rho=0.156^{**}$). The instability of the external business environment is overcome by the three methods.

(11) *Factor analysis of the data.*

In assessing the most effective ways to overcome obstacles conducted a factor analysis, by which all possible solutions to problems brought to the three major (area shows insignificant signs above the third factor). The study of the rotated component matrix revealed that the largest factor loadings of the variables of "corruption" (0.557), "his people in power" (0.672) and "pull" (0.688) refer to a single factor, provisionally named "corrupt communication". Chance of a "strong partnership" with the load factor 0.769 refers to another factor, called "partnerships". All other variables are assigned to the third factor (complaint – 0.694, visual propaganda – 0.569, M&A – 0.416). More clearly the grouping variables on the factors shown in Figure 2 in the component diagram.

Thus, *the first factor – the corruption* and *the second factor – the partnership* as a whole have a correlation (closely related) with the use of personalized social capital represents a stock of resources defined entity which it is a form of social capital in the form of stable social relationships the entrepreneur with government officials, with competitors and with their partners.

The *third factor* in Figure 2 component diagram of factors in the rotated space uses essentially macro-level of the social capital. In turn, this macro-level social capital acts as a specific characteristic of the institutional environment in the form of norms, rules of conduct that are common to all businesses.

Factor analysis showed that all the possible ways of solving these problems were reduced to three major ("the great" by V. A. Yadov) factors (area insignificant signs of shows above the third factor).

In turn, the macro-level social capital acts as a specific characteristic of the institutional environment in the form of social norms, rules of conduct, which are common for all surveyed firms. The third macro factor was named us as the social capital of the institutional environment. Identified factors (corruption, partnerships and social capital of the institutional environment) talk about the use of personalized elements of social capital which being a general supply of resources of a certain economic entity (the certain managing subject) shall be recorded in the form of a long-term (strong) social connection with the bureaucrats, civil servants in power, by officials, competitors, clients, customers and the various business partners.

(12) *Clustering of respondents in the four groups of entrepreneurs.*

Based on the identified strategies for the use of social capital and social networks, on the basis of the "how to act in order to overcome the obstacles in the business" was held clustering of respondents, as a result of which formed four groups of entrepreneurs – see Figure 3.



Fig. 2. Component diagram is rotated in space

Factor analysis of the data obtained in the component diagram: factor 1 – "corruption"; factor 2 – "partnerships"; factor of 3 is "the social capital of the institutional environment".



Fig. 3. Distribution of respondents by cluster groups (% of respondents), April 2011; n=1003

1 group: 8% – is used and the of corruption connections and partnerships;
2 group: 17% – is used mostly corrupt communications;
3 group: 32% – do not use the connections;
4 group: 43% – is used primarily partnerships.

The first group consists of those who use approximately in equal measure and corruption and partnerships – such was 8% of all entrepreneurs/owners of small and medium-sized firms, participating in our survey. It can be assumed that they are trying to use and the clean partnership" and corrupt connections depending on the situation and circumstances. *The second group* consists of those who used primarily corruption – there were 17% of our sample. It can be assumed that they seek to solve their problems, mainly through corrupt connections and corrupt partnership. *The third group* includes those who do not "use" any connection there were 32% of our sample. It can be assumed that they are only at the institutional level of social capital, without the use of any of their own social networks. *The fourth group* includes those who use mainly partnerships – there were 43%

of our sample. It can be assumed that they just always focused exclusively on partnership relations, are in the business "without the help of corruption".

These digital conclusions seem to be quite paradoxical, if take into account the fact of mass ideological obsession with all-might and the totality of the modern Russian corruption. They require, of course, of his strong rethink, re-surveys and comparison with data obtained by other sociological services for the same (still better than similar) method of the interview.

(13) *Assessment of the use/non-use of links is reflected* (*is carried*) *on the business of the employer.* In conclusion of the article, we examine how the use or not use those or other relations is reflected in the success of the business of the employer. In the survey of small and medium-sized firms entrepreneurs were asked about how they evaluate different aspects of the business: business success, competitiveness, access to credit resources, information etc. To test the significance of the differences of these parameters in the cluster groups used nonparametric test Kruskal and Wallace for the few independent examples. It was found out, that on a number of parameters in the assessments of the business statistically significant differences between the cluster groups is observed (Sig.>0.05). And therefore, the use of the links does not give special benefits in enhancing the competitiveness of the company, its opportunities for business, political information. This is another rather paradoxical conclusion of our empirical research. Marked statistically significant differences in assessments of the success of the business (Sig. = 0.001), the simplicity of the search services related to the business sectors (Sig.=0.005>0.001, but <0.01) and the availability of credit resources (Sig.=0.039>0.01, but <a 0.05) (table 2). These three parameters, which is in fact the main for business development, most of all are determined by the nature used by the employer of social relations. These three parameters, in fact, are basic for the development of business, the most heavily depend on the nature of the social relations, which uses the employer. As we can see from the table 2, business success and ease of search services in related industries is significantly higher when using partnerships. Strange as it may seem, but in this case, the use of corruption relations does not give special advantages for successful business.

Only when assessing the availability of credit resources and those of entrepreneurs, which use the entire arsenal of relations (and corruption and partnership) is somewhat higher appreciate their opportunities.

Thus, undoubtedly, the use of social relations gives certain advantages entrepreneur, first of all, expanding its access to resources. But the success of the business is more attributable to the inclusion of it in the affiliate network structures, than to the climate of corruption, based on personal acquaintances of the owner of the business (that is, owners in 1.5 times more often demonstrate orientation on the corruption scheme, than hired managers). Thus, 47% of those who, to overcome the obstacles in the business uses mainly corruption, note that the average amount of bribes or "very high" or "medium, but burdensome for business". This fact testifies to the fact that in some cases employers are involved in the corruption scheme is not on its own initiative. Bribery, search for "their people" is used by small and medium-sized business is not so much for the development and increasing of their success (for example, access to resources, exclusive information, access to new markets etc. are more typical for the large enterprise, how to overcome the arising of administrative barriers. In this case, we must conclude that the relatively low level of social capital as a public good strongly limits the possibilities of use of the institutional environment for the decision of business problems. So, apparent-

ly not trusting any law enforcement authorities or the courts, the employer is faced with the extortion of controlling bodies, prefers to give bribe to the right person, and not be turned with the complaint to the relevant authorities.

So, we can make a General conclusion that the use of the entrepreneurs of the personified social capital enhances its success in the market, and especially it concerns the development of a strong partnership between owners, managers and representatives of small and medium-sized firms. Involvement in the corruption scheme for small and medium business does not give the distinct advantages, but it replaces the lack of development of the institutional environment. Finally, a relatively low General social trust in the Russian society, lack of social norms and values of market interaction, i. e. social capital as a private resource of interpersonal relationships will compensate the lack of social capital as a public good.

Business success and ease of search services in related industries is significantly higher when using partnerships. As anyone will look like it is paradoxical, but the use of corruption relations does not give special advantages for successful business in our case, that is, in the Urals Federal district. Only when assessing the availability of credit resources of those entrepreneurs, which use the entire Arsenal of relations (and corruption and partnership) their opportunities to evaluate above.

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RELATION BETWEEN SOCIAL CAPITAL AND MONETARY ATTITUDES[1]

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Introduction

During the recent decades there has been a shift in the social sciences from the so-called 'conflict paradigm', i. e. from the analysis of intergroup differences and social conflicts towards the analysis of social integration. One aspect of this transition is the active development of the social capital theory. If in 1991, there were only two references to social capital in the Web of Science, in 2005 and 2006 there were already 403 and 443 references respectively (Ostrom, Ahn, 2010, p. 18). In general, these studies have demonstrated that societies that have a special 'relations resource', which is expressed in mutual trust, solidarity, common standards, and equality are more successful in their economic development, and people in these societies have higher levels of subjective well-being and health. In the field of social psychology, there is a relatively small amount of works devoted to social capital, and they all aim to study its relationship with the mental health and psychological well-being of the individual. The whole variety of researches still evades the issue related to mechanisms of the social capital influence on the economic development of societies. In fact, social capital is the relations between people which can be converted into financial capital. How does this conversion occur, and what changes in economic behaviour of people emerge with the advent of social capital? The scientific relevance of the research is to formulate and study the problem of the social capital relationship with individual economic behaviour through which social capital leads to an increase in the material well-being of the society as a whole. In both a theoretical and an empirical sense, it still remains unclear as to how social capital of civil society affects economic parameters. The mechanisms of this relation and the spill-over effects remain under-researched (Westlund, Adam, 2010, p. 900).

Theoretical background

The concept of social capital is very general and, partly due to this, has been used in explanations of a wide variety of socio-economic phenomena (Grootaert, Van Bastelaer,

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2002). Interest in social capital has expanded rapidly in sociology, social psychology and economics; The number of references to social capital in the Web of Science grew from two in 1991 to 443 in 2006 (Ostrom, Ahn, 2010, p. 18). Häuberer (2011) has summarized the main findings and proposed a useful broad definition of *social capital as "resources embedded in social relationships that benefit purposive action"* (p. 148).

Many researchers have drawn upon the concept of social capital to understand economic development. For example, studies have credited social capital with contributing directly to economic growth (Helliwell, Putnam, 1995; Knack, 2003), with creating conditions for economic growth (Woolcock, 1998; Torsvik, 2000), with increasing the share of investments in GDP (Knack, Keefer, 1997; Coates, Heckelman, 2003), and with reducing income inequality (Zak, Knack, 2001). However, the underlying psychological mechanisms of the effects of social capital on individuals' intentions and behavior are not widely understood.

Social capital can have a direct impact on certain types of economic behaviour. The confidence level affects investment and financial behaviour. In particular, it has been demonstrated that in Italian regions with a high level of social confidence, people use checks more readily than cash, invest in stocks, have access to institutional credits, and are more reluctant to use informal loans. The financial behaviour of people who have moved from one region to another is largely determined by the confidence level in a community where they have moved from, and not where they have moved to (Healy et al., 2001). Confidence is associated with the fact that people are starting to use credits more actively (Knack, Keefer, 1997). Social capital is associated with saving behaviour. It has been shown to influence saving behaviour in teenagers (Sewamala et al., 2010). Networks being an element of social capital are changing the behaviour of people in finding work and make it more successful (Barbiery, Russel, Paugam, 1999).

In a study of the predictive ability of the theory of social capital in relation to purchasing behaviour, it has been demonstrated that this theory is to predict consumer behaviour (Miller, 2001). In this case, the fact that humans belong to one community and have a common social identity gives rise to reciprocity relations. The study has revealed that reciprocity is a mediator of belonging to community and consumer behaviour (Miller, 2011, p. 487).

From here, the assumption that social capital can be linked to real economic behaviour and economic and financial attitudes of an individual is justified. Pre-existing empirical studies have shown that social capital has an impact on different types of economic behaviour of humans.

The next question which we will shortly discuss is a question about measurements of the social capital for our research.

a) A central dimension in the conception and operationalization of social capital by most researchers is the degree of trust that members of a society have in one another and in the social system (e. g., Fukuyama, 1999; Putnam, 2001). This dimension serves as a basic indicator of social capital in the majority of empirical studies (Svendsen, 2010). However, one has to differentiate between particularized trust, which we invest in family, friends, neighbors and colleagues and diffuse or social trust which means the extent to which individuals within a society tend to make positive evaluations of the trustworthiness of their fellow citizens (Allum et al., 2010, p. 41). In our research we have estimated *generalized trust* (Putnam, 2001).
b) The next dimension of social capital is group identity. Group identity was considered earlier by other authors as one of components of the social capital (Nahapiet, Ghoshal,

1998). In our case it will be social identity or more exactly *civic identity*. From our point of view, civil identity can be defined as a part of the personal self-concept, or more precisely, as the individual's knowledge that he/she belongs to certain society together with some emotional and value significance to him/her of the society membership.

c) The basis of social capital is the quality of attitude towards social relations to those objects with which an individual interacts. However, an attitude toward social objects is impossible without their perception and understanding of them. Social images are also associated with human behaviour and their social attitudes. Consequently, the study of social capital effects on economic behaviour and economic setting must necessarily involve the consideration of *perceived* social capital (Van Staveren, Knorringa, 2007). It may particularly affect binding social capital, and it is likely to be a factor mediating the effect of social capital on economic behaviour.

The perception of the level of social capital is important for one's own orientation toward success and economic activity. For instance, Kilkenny et al. (1999), based on the empirical data obtained from the study of 800 small companies in 30 cities in Iowa, have demonstrated that the perceived support of the local community combined with equality and in-house support are in a positive way and highly significantly associated with the employees' perception towards the success of their companies (Kilkenny et al., 1999).

The added value of the present research is:

a) to consider one possible psychological mechanism through which the level of social capital in a society affects economic attitudes. The mechanism we examine is the mediating role of economic attitudes. This focus is in line with general theories of attitudes (Eagly, Chaiken, 1993) and the Reasoned Action (Fishbein, Aizen, 2010) in social psychology
b) to specify and test a structural equation model that relates social capital (perceived social cohesion, level of general trust, positivity and strength of civic identity) together with the demographic variables of education, gender, and age to attitudes toward money.
c) to test whether social capital (perceived social cohesion, level of general trust, positivity and strength of civic identity) mediates the effects of age, gender and education on economic attitudes partially or fully.
d) by using a Russian sample we can study the effects of a society in transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy.

So, it is necessary to check the number of specific hypotheses on the connection of measurements of social capital (general trust, civil identity, and perceived social capital) with monetary attitudes. The logic of causality from levels of trust and of perceived solidarity to monetary attitudes is straightforward. If individuals do not trust those around them and do not feel solidarity with them and expect mutual social support, they will strive to compensate for this lack of experienced social capital by insuring their security and welfare through other means. One alternative is to maximize financial capital. Financial capital can refer to money used by entrepreneurs and businesses to buy what they need to make their products or provide their services or to that sector of the economy based on its operation, i. e. retail, corporate, investment banking etc.

If the social environment comprises a number of people *contributing with their social capital* (confidential, tolerant to out-group members having high civic identity), it leads to a decrease in the number of economic behaviour types that impede the development

(tax evasion, bribery). An individual begins to behave in such a way that enhances social capital, because he or she a) follows the general rules, and b) produces 'investment' in the social environment in order to maintain social capital, which creates a favourable environment for his/her economic behaviour.

Concerning *perceived social capital*, the evaluation of the social environment as having a high level of social capital leads to a) an increase in time perspective of his/her economic behaviour (which should lead to the connection of social capital with the investment and saving behaviour), and b) increased confidence in the stability of the society (which should be associated with readiness to start a business, use credits etc.).

Therefore, when people behave in a way that increases the social capital of the society, they whether consciously or not, act to create favourable conditions for themselves in order to realize economic behaviour and to improve their own living standards. Accordingly, an individual's attitudes based on which social capital (e. g. readiness to confide) is evaluated should be related to economic behaviour or economic attitudes.

We suggest that social capital affects economic behaviour when two conditions are met. Firstly, when the individual himself/herself contributes to social capital, although this does not allow them to behave improperly within the environment and benefit at the expense of others. Secondly, when an individual evaluates the social capital of the environment as high, this gives them the opportunity to (a) enhance his/her economic activity, and (b) tends towards a higher degree of economic risk.

Hence, we expect that the level of trust, of civic identity and of perceived social solidarity (perceived social capital) will promote attitudes which will favor the maximization of financial capital.

We also suggest that higher levels of civil identity increase attitudes which favor the maximization of financial capital. The reverse causal direction seems less plausible. The degree of one's civil identity affects various parts of an individual's life, for example, the attitude to representatives of foreign culture, representatives of one's own culture, as well as monetary attitudes. In particular, a negative and weak civil identity, as a result of the uncertainty of an individual in its own country, may be connected with money accumulation. The objective of such accumulation is the acquisition of confidence and use of money as means of influence on the surrounding social context, which has insufficiently operating laws, corruption etc. Thus, the consequence of monetary attitudes is not a condition of civil identity, but monetary attitudes may change depending on the degree of civil identity.

Therefore we can state the following as hypothesis 1.

H 1: The higher the social capital (perceived social capital, level of general trust, positivity and strength of civic identity), the more positive the monetary attitudes are.

The literature on the determinants of social capital and the empirical evidence shows that increasing education has also a positive effect on social capital (perceived social capital, level of general trust, positivity and strength of civic identity) (Svendsen, 2010). Therefore hypothesis 2 can be formulated as follows:

H 2: The higher the education of an individual, the higher the social capital (perceived social capital, level of general trust, positivity and strength of civic identity) of the individual.

Due to the fact that, on average, men still hold higher occupational positions in society and are better integrated into professionally relevant networks (Lin, 2001), we also hypothesize that gender affects individuals' levels of social capital. Specifically:

H 3: Men have a higher social capital than women.

The case of age is more complicated. With advancing age, people attain higher occupational positions and become more integrated within social networks. However, following retirement, and sometimes even earlier, integration diminishes slowly or more rapidly depending on one's final occupational status. This last aspect is less relevant for our empirical analysis, as all respondents are under 60. In any case we can postulate the following relationship (Lin, 2001).

H4: The higher the age, the higher the social capital.

Although we argue that the effects of the socio-demographic characteristics on attitudes toward money are mediated through subjective social capital, we have no theoretical grounds for positing whether the mediation is complete or only partial. We therefore test for both full and partial mediation in the models described below.

Method

Participants in the study

Between May 2010 and March 2011, a convenience sample of Russian adults responded to a questionnaire. The sample included 634 respondents (304 men and 330 women), aged 20 to 59, with a mean age of 40 years and a median age of 41. We have used a simple random sampling system.

Respondents were recruited in seven different regions of Russia: The Moscow Region – 16.5% of the sample, Irkutsk Region – 16.4%, Kemerovo Region – 38%, Transbaikal Province – 14.6%, Republic of Bashkortostan – 10,8%, Stavropol province – 3.3%, and Chechen Republic – 0.4%. The sample were relatively highly educated, with 2.4% having completed general secondary education, 21.1% with specialized secondary education, 21.5% having partial higher education, and 55% with a higher education. The sample exhibited the substantial heterogeneity of occupations.

Instruments and indicators

1. Social capital (see Appendix A)

Social capital was measured via three first order factors (latent variables), which themselves were measured by multiple indicators in the case of perceived social capital and civic identity, and by one item in the case of generalized trust.

1) *Perceived social capital:* Respondents rated how typical five different behaviors that express cohesion and reciprocity are among the people in their environment (e. g., Behaving respectfully to one another). For that we have used five items on a 5-pt scale (see block of questions № 1, Appendix A).
2) *Civic identity* (self-developed instrument). We assessed two aspects of civic identity, strength and valence, each on a 5-pt scale.

a) Respondents indicated the *strength* of their civic identity in response to the question: "Do you feel that you identify closely with your country (Russia)?" (question № 2, Appendix A).
b) They indicated the valence of their civic identity in response to the question: Which [one] of the following describes your feelings about your [Russian] nationality (pride, confidence, none, offence, shame)? (question № 2, Appendix A). According the instruction, respondent was required to choose one of them.

3) *Generalized trust.* We assessed individuals' general level of trust with the following question from the World Values Survey: Generally speaking, do you feel that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? (labeled at the end points 1 – you can't be too careful, 5 – most people can be trusted) (question № 2, Appendix A).

2. Monetary attitudes

We administered the Russian version of the Money Beliefs and Behavior Scale developed by Furnham (1984; Furnham, Levis, 1986). This scale consists of four sub- scales that he labeled Inadequacy, Power, Retention and Security. The content each set of subscales and characteristics of reliability you can see in Table 1, Appendix B.

Appendix B contains the matrix of correlations among all of the variables used in this study.

For the data processing we have used the method of **Structural equation modeling** (SEM). Structural equation modeling is a powerful multivariate method, allowing the evaluation of a series of simultaneous hypotheses on the impacts of latent and manifest variables on other variables, taking measurement errors into account. As SEMs have grown in popularity in recent years, new models and statistical methods have been developed for a more accurate analysis of more complex data.

Major applications of structural equation modeling include:

- *causal modeling,* or *path analysis,* which hypothesizes causal relationships among variables and tests the causal models with a linear equation system. Causal models can involve either manifest variables, latent variables, or both
- *confirmatory factor analysis*, an extension of factor analysis, in which specific hypotheses on the structure of the factor loadings and inter-correlations are tested
- *second order factor analysis,* a variation of factor analysis, in which the correlation matrix of the common factors is itself factor analyzed to provide second order factors.

Results and Discussion

Test of measurement models and descriptive results

We applied a two step strategy for testing our models. First we tested the measurement models and then we estimated the full structural equation models (Anderson, Gerbing, 1988). Initially, we used confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate the reliability and validity of the monetary attitude factor structure, suggested by Furnham in our sample with the Russian version.

Table 1 shows the factor structure of each of the four monetary attitudes, considered separately. We eliminated items until we obtained the performance measures of quality that met the commonly recommended cut-off values for model fit (see Brown, 2005). These were: $p>0.05$, $CFI>0.95$, $RMSEA<0.05$, and p-level>0.50. The original scale consisted of 55 items. Based on selecting only those items that exhibited good validity in terms of factor loadings and that formed reliable scales, we used only 17 of these items. Each of the four monetary attitudes was measured by at least four items. Table 1 reports the fit measures and standardized factor loadings from the separate confirmatory factor analyses.

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in further modeling with SEM.



Fig. 1. Path diagrams of four models tested

Table 1
Estimates and goodness of fit of the five Furnham scales

Goodness of fit of the models	Questions	Standardized regression weights
"Inadequacy" $\chi^2 = 7.59$; df=5; p=0.18; CFI=0.99; RMSEA=0.03	**m51**[1] I believe that I have very little control over my financial situation in terms of my power to change it.	0.49
	m52 Compared to most other people that I know, I believe that I think about money much more than they do.	0.55
	m50 Most of my friends have more money than I do.	0.42
	m39 I believe that time not spent in making money is time wasted.	0.47
	m47 I often argue with my partner (spouse, lover etc.) about money.	0.53
"Power" $\chi^2 = 3.94$; df=2; p=0.14; CFI=0.99; RMSEA=0.04	**m16** I often use money as a weapon to control or intimidate those who frustrate me.	0.84
	m19 I sometimes feel superior to those who have less money than myself regardless of their ability and achievements.	0.57
	m14 I sometimes "buy" friendship by being very generous with those I want to like me.	0.59
	m13 If I have money left over at the end of the month (week) I often feel uncomfortable until it is all spent.	0.48
"Retention" $\chi^2 = 1.0$; df=2; p=0.61; CFI=1.0; RMSEA=0.000	**m6** I often have difficulty in making decisions about money regardless of the amount.	0.64
	m7 I am financially worse off than most of my friends think.	0.61
	m4 I often say "I can't afford it" whether I can or not.	0.53
	m23 In making any purchase, for any purpose, my first consideration is cost.	0.40
"Security" $\chi^2 = 0.68$; df=2; p=0.71; CFI=1.0; RMSEA=0.000	**m21** I firmly believe that money can solve all of my problems.	0.55
	m28 The amount of money that I have saved is never quite enough.	0.50
	m38 I worry about my finances most of the time.	0.54
	m20 I believe that my present income is far less than I deserve, given the job I do.	0.52

Table 2
Mean values and standard deviations for social capital indicators (5-point scales)

Items	M	SD
Generalized trust	2.66	1.05
Strength of civic identity	3.19	1.11
Valence of civic identity	3.21	1.15
Trusting one another	3.43	0.66
Behaving respectfully toward one another	3.71	0.83
Treating other people as equals.	3.47	0.86

1 "m" means "monetary attitude" in our codebook and number of "m" – is the number of questions in our questionnaire.

Table 3
Mean values and standard deviations for Furnham monetary attitudes scales
(composite scores, 5-point scales)

Scales	M	SD
Inadequacy	2.14	0.77
Power	1.52	0.72
Retention	2.74	0.91
Security	3.01	0.92

Structural equation models

Figures 2 to 5 present the results of the structural equation models for the influence of gender, education, age and social capital on each of the four monetary attitudes. We performed all the analyses with AMOS 19 using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (Arbuckle, 2010). We have presented the standardized coefficients in the Figures. From each of the structural models (which you can see below) the variables which worsened the quality of models have been excluded. Thus, the total models contain a smaller quantity of variables, in comparison with what is specified at the description of a technique of research.

In Figure 2, one finds the standardized coefficients for the model to explain retention. Firstly one can see that the indicators of retention and the indicators of social capital all have sufficient factor loadings over 0.40, with one exception. This exception is trust which has a very low loading of 0.18, which shows that this indicator has a low formal validity and seems to measure a different facet of social capital compared with civic identity and perceived social capital. The strongest predictor of Retention is social capital (–0.31), which has the expected negative sign. In other words the more social capital people have, the lower their Retention is. Age has the strongest effect of the demographic variables on Retention with 0.24, demonstrating that the older people grow, the higher the retention becomes. Education reduces the retention slightly as expected at (–0.13), whereas men have a higher Retention than women. Finally, one can see that



Fig. 2. Model of Determinants of Retention
χ^2=43.7; df=30; p=0.051; CFI=0.98; RMSEA=0.027.



Fig. 3. Model of Determinants of Inadequacy
χ^2=29.7; df=20; p=0.075; CFI=0.98; RMSEA=0.028.



Fig. 4. Model of Determinants of Security
χ^2=35.1; df=29; p=0.21; CFI=0.98; RMSEA=0.018.

the positive indirect effect of age via social capital adds up to the direct effect, as both have positive signs.

From Figure 3, one can see that the measurement model for Inadequacy has nearly the same standardized factor loadings as the model for Retention in Figure 2. An exception is the much higher loading of trust on social capital in the model form Inadequacy. In addition, trust has a significant directly negative effect on the fifth indicator of Inadequacy and a significant but small positive direct effect on the second indicator of Inadequacy, which are not mediated by social capital. Let us now refer to the structural relationships. Age has a smaller positive effect on the dependent construct, as there is also a direct positive effect of age on the first and second indicator of Inadequacy. This par-



Fig. 5. Model of Determinants of Power
χ^2=22.7; df=16; p=0.12; CFI=0.99; RMSEA=0.026.

tial mediation via the construct Inadequacy means that the two first items seem to contain specific components not contained in the general construct (Howard, Wainer, 1993, Muthen et al., 1991).

Figure 4 contains the results for the explanation of the Security attitude. The coefficients of the measurement model are again very similar to the two former models and demonstrate the sufficient validity of the items. The effect of social capital is again negative and very similar to the coefficients in Figures 2 and 3. The quantitative effects and the signs of the three demographic variables on social capital and Security are nearly identical to those in Figure 2 for the Model to explain Retention. That is, the older the respondents are, the less social capital they have. Moreover, people who are more highly educated are less security oriented, whereas women and older people are more security oriented. As in Figure 3, trust has also a direct negative effect on one of the indicators of the attitude. In the last model given in Figure 5, the standardized coefficients for the factor loadings are again satisfactory, ranging from 0.49 to 0.84. However, the effects of the demographic variables change rather a lot. Gender is the only demographic variable in this model which has a significant effect on power and also on two of its indicators. The effect of social capital on power is negative and nearly as weak as the effect of gender.

Confirming our basic hypothesis, we found that higher levels of social capital were negatively associated with negative (by its sense) monetary attitudes (Inadequacy, Retention, Power and Security). It was an unexpected result that the majority of relations with monetary attitudes were through civil identity. Nonetheless, it has a good predictive value in half of its models together with the interpersonal trust.

We should draw attention to the specific links between civil identity and Security, which is separate from the other characteristics of social capital. This data shows that individuals who have a weaker civil identity, and usually do not expect governmental support, may focus themselves on finding such security in money (see in Figure 4). Nevertheless, social capital (trust and civil identity) has the most significant effect on the set of monetary attitudes, when combined with the "Inadequacy" scale. The negative relation of social capital to the monetary attitude Retention stands for the fact that social capital may decrease the desire to save money as a source of personal security. Such an effect at a macro-level will be manifested by the lack of desire to invest, striving to save money as a source of Security. This thought is proved by the earlier detection of the positive connection of trust with the rate of investments in GDP (Knack, Keefer, 1997). The re-

sult confirms this thought by the presence of a negative connection between social capital and striving towards monetary accumulation.

The link between social capital and the perception of money as a resource for having influence on other people (the scale power/spending) was expected to be negative. It is not surprising that this block of monetary attitudes is connected only with the acceptable social capital. The expectation of less support from one's social surroundings may be linked with more readiness to use money in order to manage social reality.

There is empirical evidence to show that social capital is connected with the level of collectivism (Allik, Reallo, 2004), which is common for any hierarchical society. Social capital, which is based on trust and equality, probably promotes the formation of such types of relationships, where intentions to use money as means of building hierarchy and for the manipulation of people and their intrinsic usefulness, will decrease.

Confirming our basic hypothesis, we found that higher levels of individual social capital were associated with adverse monetary attitudes. Attitudes toward money as a means of influence and protection and the desire to accumulate it, reflect a personal sense of dependency on money and lead to a constant concern about money. Greater social capital, by providing social support that serves as an alternative source of security, influence, and protection, may reduce this dependence on money.

Finally, we found that the effects of age, education and gender were quite different depending on the varying facets of economic attitudes used. For Retention, partial mediation only worked for age, whereas education and gender had only direct effects on retention. In the case of the Inadequacy scale, only age had a direct effect. Moreover, age also had direct effects on two of the items to measure Inadequacy, revealing an item bias for these two items, which we took into account by our re-specification of the model. Concerning security, one could see that the effect of age via social capital on security was partially mediated. Gender and Age determined only Security directly, and not via social capital. For the explanation of Power, only gender had a direct negative influence. However, this was nearly canceled out by the positive effect of gender on one item of Power.

Findings

1. Confirming our basic hypothesis, we found that higher levels of social capital have opposite correlations toward negative monetary attitudes (Inadequacy, Power, Retention, Security).
2. Monetary attitudes as a means of influence and of protection and the desire to accumulate it make a person dependent on money and lead to constant concerns about money.
3. As we have interpreted the findings of this research, they suggest that a high social capital, by providing social support that serves as an alternative source of security, influence, and protection, may reduce this dependence on money.
4. An important finding of the research is that the component of social capital that correlated most frequently and strongly with monetary attitudes was civic identity, sometimes together with trust. A crisis of civic identity or people's loss of civic identity may lead them to strive to accumulate money and to attribute more subjective value to it. Money may serve as an alternative source of certainty and security when one loses faith in and commitment to the surrounding society as a source of meaning and security.

5. From our findings we suggest that the negative association between monetary attitudes and individual level social capital suggests that, when social capital (whether societal or individual) decreases, people try to compensate for it by accumulating financial capital. This, in turn, leads to a shift in attitudes toward money and puts a greater emphasis on money as a source of security. On the other hand, an increase in social capital can lead to a shift in attitudes toward money that deemphasizes their importance for personal security. This interpretation of our findings may help to explain why societies with low social capital have more corruption and greater inequality. Corruption and inequality are social manifestations of the individual monetary attitudes that we have observed.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Measures of Social Capital

1. How typical is it for people in your environment to relate to one another in each of the following ways?

Behavior	**Very unusual**	**Somewhat unusual**	**Hard to say**	**Somewhat typical**	**Very typical**
Trusting one another	1	2	3	4	5
Behaving respectfully to one another	1	2	3	4	5
Treating one another as equals	1	2	3	4	5
Willingly sharing material goods (money, clothing, household possessions etc.) with those in need	1	2	3	4	5
Willingly sharing thoughts, ideas and feelings with people who need them	1	2	3	4	5

2. Do you feel that you identify closely with your country (Russia)?

No, I have no such feelings at all	Yes, but only a very weak feeling	Sometimes I do, sometimes I don't	I almost always feel that way	I always feel entirely that way
1	2	3	4	5

3. Which (one) of the following describes your feelings about your (Russian) nationality? Please, choose only one of them.
   1) Pride; 2) Confidence; 3) No feelings; 4) Offence; 5) Shame.

4. Generally speaking, do you feel that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

You can't be too careful				Most people can be trusted
1	2	3	4	5

Appendix B. Correlation matrix

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
1	sc1		0.63	0.50	0.13	0.20	0.21	−0.06	0.03	−0.13	−0.07	−0.14	−0.13	−0.03	−0.02	−0.06	−0.02	−0.09	−0.02	−0.12	−0.10	−0.09	−0.05	−0.04
2	sc2	0.63		0.49	0.05	0.17	0.10	−0.04	0.02	−0.08	−0.12	−0.13	−0.08	−0.08	−0.01	−0.04	0.01	−0.02	0.06	−0.07	−0.04	−0.04	0.01	−0.05
3	sc3	0.50	0.49		0.12	0.16	0.23	−0.01	0.00	−0.07	−0.04	−0.04	−0.09	−0.01	−0.03	−0.02	0.00	−0.11	−0.02	−0.13	−0.02	−0.04	0.06	−0.03
4	St. EI	0.13	0.05	0.12		0.42	0.15	−0.08	−0.14	−0.15	−0.03	0.00	−0.04	−0.02	−0.07	−0.08	−0.08	−0.09	−0.08	−0.06	−0.06	−0.11	−0.05	−0.09
5	Val. EI	0.20	0.17	0.16	0.42		0.10	−0.07	−0.12	−0.21	−0.04	0.02	−0.01	−0.09	−0.13	−0.16	−0.07	−0.05	−0.09	−0.07	−0.07	−0.06	−0.09	−0.07
6	Trust	0.21	0.10	0.23	0.15	0.10		−0.03	−0.01	−0.01	0.10	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.03	−0.03	−0.08	−0.15	−0.16	−0.06	−0.06	0.05	−0.02
7	m4	−0.06	−0.04	−0.01	−0.08	−0.07	−0.03		0.34	0.31	0.02	0.03	−0.02	0.06	0.16	0.24	0.22	0.18	0.18	0.07	0.09	0.14	0.19	0.18
8	m6	0.03	0.02	0.00	−0.14	−0.12	−0.01	0.34		0.39	0.07	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.16	0.18	0.23	0.21	0.19	0.08	0.13	0.10	0.24	0.24
9	m7	−0.13	−0.08	−0.07	−0.15	−0.21	−0.01	0.31	0.39		0.15	0.12	0.07	0.03	0.23	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.17	0.21	0.27	0.29	0.27
10	m13	−0.07	−0.12	−0.04	−0.03	−0.04	0.10	0.02	0.07	0.15		0.32	0.39	0.28	−0.02	0.16	−0.02	0.06	0.00	0.20	0.17	0.10	0.17	0.21
11	m14	−0.14	−0.13	−0.04	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.32		0.50	0.31	−0.10	0.08	−0.07	−0.01	−0.02	0.16	0.12	0.05	0.07	0.25
12	m16	−0.13	−0.08	−0.09	−0.04	−0.01	0.01	−0.02	0.00	0.07	0.39	0.50		0.49	−0.08	0.14	−0.06	0.04	0.03	0.22	0.16	0.02	0.07	0.27
13	m19	−0.03	−0.08	−0.01	−0.02	−0.09	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.28	0.31	0.49		0.00	0.18	0.01	0.07	−0.04	0.15	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.23
14	m20	−0.02	−0.01	−0.03	−0.07	−0.13	0.01	0.16	0.16	0.23	−0.02	−0.10	−0.08	0.00		0.28	0.25	0.25	0.30	0.06	0.14	0.20	0.18	0.08
15	m21	−0.06	−0.04	−0.02	−0.08	−0.16	0.03	0.24	0.18	0.27	0.16	0.08	0.14	0.18	0.28		0.23	0.29	0.29	0.19	0.22	0.16	0.21	0.27
16	m23	−0.02	0.01	0.00	−0.08	−0.07	−0.03	0.22	0.23	0.25	−0.02	−0.07	−0.06	0.01	0.25	0.23		0.26	0.28	0.10	0.23	0.20	0.25	0.18
17	m28	−0.09	−0.02	−0.11	−0.09	−0.05	−0.08	0.18	0.21	0.25	0.06	−0.01	0.04	0.07	0.25	0.29	0.26		0.26	0.17	0.17	0.20	0.18	0.19
18	m38	−0.02	0.06	−0.02	−0.08	−0.09	−0.15	0.18	0.19	0.27	0.00	−0.02	0.03	−0.04	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.26		0.23	0.22	0.20	0.19	0.33
19	m39	−0.12	−0.07	−0.13	−0.06	−0.07	−0.16	0.07	0.08	0.17	0.20	0.16	0.22	0.15	0.06	0.19	0.10	0.17	0.23		0.24	0.19	0.18	0.29
20	m47	−0.10	−0.04	−0.02	−0.06	−0.07	−0.06	0.09	0.13	0.21	0.17	0.12	0.16	0.13	0.14	0.22	0.23	0.17	0.22	0.24		0.22	0.30	0.26
21	m50	−0,09	−0,04	−0,04	−0,11	−0,06	−0,06	0,14	0,10	0,27	0,10	0,05	0,02	0,01	0,20	0,16	0,20	0,20	0,20	0,19	0,22		0,20	0,24
22	m51	−0,05	0,01	0,06	−0,05	−0,09	0,05	0,19	0,24	0,29	0,17	0,07	0,07	0,00	0,18	0,21	0,25	0,18	0,19	0,18	0,30	0,20		0,26
23	m52	−0,04	−0,05	−0,03	−0,09	−0,07	−0,02	0,18	0,24	0,27	0,21	0,25	0,27	0,23	0,08	0,27	0,18	0,19	0,33	0,29	0,26	0,24	0,26	

CHARITABLE PRACTICES IN RUSSIAN CIVIL SOCIETY: TRUST AND DISTRUST AS FACTORS OF INVOLVEMENT[1]

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Civil society is one of the most meaningful spheres of life in modern society. In famous Russian sociologist T. I. Zaslavskaya's model of Russian society's transformation, "the diversity and maturity of the structure of civil society" is defined as the most important quality in forming basic institutions (Zaslavskaya, 2004, p. 120). Almost 10 years ago, the famous book *Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector* stated that "civil society has become a matter of increased analytical and political concern throughout the globe" (Global Civil Society…, p. 84). But "for all the attention it has attracted, however, civil society remains an elusive concept, and an even more elusive reality. There is no agreement about how to define the concept, let alone how to measure its presence or absence" (ibid.). Russian sociologists and foreign authors still underline that the necessary theoretical clarity in the understanding of civil society has yet to emerge (Russian authors: Andronova, 2004, p. 9; Volodin, 2000, p. 104; Mezhuyev, 2008, p. 3; Savnikov, 2007, p. 101), as there is no authoritative understanding of the nature of civil institutions (Mamut, 2002, p. 94).

In accordance with the author's approach, civil society is defined as the sphere outside the family, government and market that is created through individual and collective actions, norms, values and social connections, and fulfills a number of specific functions.

The first function is socialization. Here, individuals are socialized, which creates such values as solidarity, responsibility, justice and social activity. On the other hand, it produces certain social norms related to the implementation of these values in life, and lays the groundwork for incorporating them into law. It promotes the integration of society as a whole, providing stability and equality in social relationships, in civil society and outside of it.

The second function is mobilization. It motivates and mobilizes individuals and other social subjects to develop various types and forms of civil activity, including participation in charity, volunteering, community organization, work with non-governmental, non-commercial organizations etc.

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1 The results of the project "Monitoring of the State of Civil Society" carried out within the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2006–2011 are presented in this work.

The third function is control and protection. This involves the society's control over the action of government structures, which contributes to the optimal measure of the state's influence in social processes. This includes protecting the rights of individuals and groups.

The fourth function is articulation. This is where individual and group needs and interests are accumulated and subsequently expressed in other spheres of society – the government or business structures. This is also where public opinion is formed.

The fifth function is service. This is where the various demands of individuals and groups are met through social services provided by members of civil society in the sphere of education, science, culture, art, healthcare, preventative healthcare, promotion of a healthy lifestyle, improvement of the moral and psychological state of citizens, physical education and sports, social support, environmental protection, aid to the victims of natural disaster and refugees, and so on.

Civil society is also a field of relationships and convergence of many social institutions (the third sector, charity, local self-governance, laws and freedom etc.), the socially important result of its functioning manifesting itself as relevant social practices.

A necessary condition for the development of social practices of civil society that provides stably functioning institutions is an optimal balance of trust and distrust. In this article, we will analyze various civil practices through this lens using concrete empirical material gathered via a nationwide survey of the population as part of the monitoring research on the state of civil society conducted since 2006 by the National Research University Higher School of Economics; Centre for Studies of Civil Society and Non-Profit Sector. This wide-scale survey of urban and rural populations is based on a representative sample of the Russian population, aged 18 years and older. The form of the survey is face-to-face interview at the respondents' place of residence. The total sample size is 2000 people, selected on the basis of a multi-stage stratified territorially random sample. The survey is conducted in 43 regions of the Russian Federation in 2011. Support from the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics is gratefully acknowledged. The author would also like to thank the Public Opinion Foundation which used the tools provided by the author to gather empirical data with exemplary efficiency and integrity.

Understanding of charitable practices of civil society

Charity is one type of social practice of civil society. Social practice, or practices, is becoming increasingly featured as a primary category in anthropology, philosophy, history, sociology, political theory, linguistic theory and literary theory, which creates a general paradigm for social sciences (Volkov, 1997, p. 10). There are two main interpretations of social practice used in social sciences. The first is the interpretation, which originates in the work of L. Wittgenstein, is that the practice or "life form" that is adopted in a given culture sets the conditions for making sense of everyday language. This means specific activity that combines words and action through language. The second interpretation of social practice is more traditional and widespread in social sciences – that practice is an inexplicit, implicit and unequivocal knowledge and skill in a social environment (ibid., p. 11). Social practices reproduce the self-evident social fabric of everyday life, making it unambiguous/unequivocal for participant actors. In other words, collective social practices support the existence and functioning of the social structure of society.

The real functioning of social institutions is a manifestation of the social practices of civil society. For example the functioning of a charitable institution can be seen in the practice of charity and donations, while the functioning of a local institution of self-governance is illustrated in various practices of community organization. Social practices of civil society embody the legal and cultural norms of life. They are contextual in the sense that they are specific to the culture, social structure, geography and social group. These practices and their reproduction allow people to relate to and coincide with their social environment. For the individual, shared social practices comply with the adopted, internalized required values and moral concepts, as well as legal norms characteristic of the person's culture and society. Practice is understood not only as following a set of rules, but also as observing the implicit moral obligation of a specific society, which contributes to the overall social system's stability.

On the one hand, the individual perceives social practices not just as habit, but also as proper, unquestioned and undoubted actions rooted in a specific social context. By reproducing these practices, the individual demonstrates approval and support of the social structure and thus contributes to its stability. Widespread practices provide an "aggregate understanding of human existence" (Safronov, 2009, P. 2,004), and make social systems and institutions uncomplicated and sustainable.

On the other hand, in contrast to rigid structural and functional approaches, modern theoretical understanding of social practices implies the possibility for individual action. This allows for the possibility of the reverse effect on practices by a currently active individual or group – the active role of collective human activity in reproducing and changing social systems. As a result, practices can be corrected and changed. For example, French historian and social philosopher M. de Certeau in his book *The Practice of Everyday Life* highlights the creativity of social actors who are not likely the consumers of products and patterns of the prevailing social system, but the producers of their own action and practices. Individuals are also able in everyday life to transform external social order and practice to suit their own local environment, interests and demands (de Certeau, 1984).

Institutionalized practices of civil society, characterized by the highest social significance, large scale and continuity, are the stable core of life in a society. Less common, sporadic and poorly mastered practices, as well as those that are contrary to the society's accepted norms, are, in the words of T. I. Zaslavskaya, the periphery of public life and not incorporated in institutions (Zaslavskaya, 2004, p. 116).

The core of public life is made up of the practice of mutual help and support, protection of rights and freedoms, community organization and participation in self-governance, as well as the practice of donating money and charity work, participation in the activities of non-government and non-commercial organizations and citizen initiatives etc.

Trust in civil society facilitates cooperation and serves as the reproducer of the relationships of mutual support, and individual and group measures to address issues related to the broader social community, and so on. The connections of the individual and the group become more stable, and their inclusion in society more complete. Trust needs to be produced and reproduced in relationships that form the basis of everyday practices of civil society, which in turn support the stable functioning of civil institutions. That said, trust itself stimulates these relationships and civil society as a whole[1].

1 These theorems follow the logic of Y. V. Veselov in analyzing the function of trust in society. For more information, see Veselov, 2004, P. 28)

As our research shows, trusting people participate more frequently in the practices of civil society than distrusting people. There is an inverse relationship, as participation helps build trust. We look at the example of Russians' participation in charitable practices and examine the determinants that affect the population's participation in various practices of civil society and the role played by trust and distrust.

Trust and participation in cash donations

Cash donations to people in need are a form of social integration. They are also, to some extent, a way to express mutual trust: from those giving, this is trust in the fact that those receiving charity are actually in need; and from those receiving, this is trust that they will be helped.

The practice of giving money to people in need is endorsed by an absolute majority of Russians. When asked the question "*How, in your opinion, are people who make cash donations perceived – with approval or disapproval?*", 83% said "with approval", 8% said "with disapproval" and 9% did not answer. Those who are trusting were more likely on average than those who are distrusting to believe that we approve of those who make cash donations (see Table 1)[1].

Russians' opinions about the possibility of trusting people that make cash donations vary. About one third said that donators can be trusted more, and another third said that donators should not be trusted more than anyone else. Only 6% said donators should be trusted less than others. One quarter of those surveyed do not know anybody who makes cash donations. Also, those who trust people believe more often than others that those who make donations can be trusted more than other people (44%, versus the average of 33%).

Reflection on the causes to which they would donate money if they had the necessary disposable income to do so, respondents most frequently said they would help the weak,

Table 1

Answers to the question "How, in your opinion, are people who make cash donations perceived – with approval or disapproval?". By total sample and based on answers to questions about trust in the majority of people (% of the group by column)

	Overall population	**Do you believe that most people can be trusted, or do you think people should be cautious in their relationships with others?**		
		Most people can be trusted	**One should be cautious in relationships with others**	**No answer**
Share of the group	100	22	75	4
Approval	83	89	82	65
Disapproval	8	6	9	14
No answer	9	6	9	21

1 As part of this study, we developed a typological group based on signs of trust or distrust in people in general. The question in the survey was formulated in the following manner: "Do you believe that most people can be trusted, or do you think people should be cautious in their relationships with others?" About 22% answered that most people can be trusted and 75% said people should be cautious in dealing with others.



Fig. 1. Distribution of answers to the question "To what cause would you donate if you had the necessary disposable income?" (% of people surveyed)

especially children. Russians most often selected "children's surgery" as a possible goal of donation. In second place was "aid to orphanages". This was followed by helping the elderly and disabled people, in about the same proportion. People are less willing to donate money to support environmental movements and or the arts (see Figure 1).

Trusting people were more likely than average to indicate several causes to which they would donate if they had the necessary disposable income. These included help for the disabled (42%); nursing homes (37%); and adult surgery (32%). Distrusting people were more likely to select none of the options. Those who did not answer the question about trusting people were more likely than others to say they would donate to help develop sports (19%).

When indicating intermediaries for cash donations, respondents most often noted relatives or friends of those receiving donations (see Table 2). In second place, albeit with a large gap, were government institutions and social services. In third place were local charity organizations, foundations and all people close to the needy. Respondents were most likely to be certain that the money would reach the person in need if they receive it in person. Most respondents believe this. This reflects the crisis of institutional trust in Russian society.

In selecting an intermediary for giving money to a person in need, trusting people more frequently than average and non-trusting people picked local charity organizations and foundations (18%). Those who did not answer the question about trust were more likely to choose religious communities, parishes or church groups (14%), or those who are around people in need (19%).

There was no significant difference based on the criterion of trust/distrust in questions about the *conditions under which people would make donations* and about *trust in various ways that donations are collected*. Overall, when asked under what conditions they would make cash donations, most Russians (81%) said they would do so if they were sure that the money would reach its intended target. This lack of trust among Russians in intermediaries of charity needs to be solved in order to increase philanthropic activity in the country.

Table 2

Distribution of answers to the question "If you had the chance to make a donation to a person in need, through what kind of organization would you do this?", for the entire sample and based on respondents' religiousness (% of the group by column)

	Overall population	What is your religious affiliation? (one answer)	
		Comply with religious beliefs when I can, but do not attend religious services	Comply with religious beliefs when I can, and occasionally attend religious services
Share of the group	100	39	23
Relatives and friends of those in need	58	59	60
Government institutions, social services	14	14	17
Local charity organizations, foundations	11	11	10
Large companies, businessmen	2	2	1
Foreign charity organizations, foundations	1	1	1
Civil imitative groups, movements	4	5	4
Religious communities, parishes, church groups	9	6	15
Connect with people with personal or family experience with similar problems	9	8	12
All those close to people in need	11	12	13
Do not trust intermediaries	14	14	12
Other	1	1	0
No answer	5	5	4

Only one fifth of respondents (19%) indicated that personal acquaintance with the recipient of charity is important. Another 14% noted the importance of moral satisfaction from this type of activity. Other proposed conditions scored less than 10% among the overall population and about the same share (with rare exceptions) based on socio-demographic and typological group. Answers such as closeness in spirit of the person in need, improving the quality of daily life, income tax benefits and help for animals were chosen by 3–7% of respondents.

Being sure that money would reach its intended target was most important for Muscovites (90%) and respondents with high incomes of over R7,000/month (90%). Fewer people noted this from the following groups: unemployed (74%); Muslims (75%); people over 60 years old (73%); and this answer was given least frequently by people that did not graduate high school (63%). Compared with Russians, Tatars (24%) and other nationalities (29%) said that personal acquaintance with the person in need was more important. This trend is reflected in religious affiliation. Muslims and other represen-



Fig. 2. Distribution of answers to the question "What type of donation collection do you trust more than others? (% of respondents)

tatives of other religions (combined 25%) were more likely than Russian Orthodox and atheists to say personal acquaintance was an important factor.

Respondents are most certain that donated money will reach the person in need when it is received in person. Most of those surveyed hold this belief. People also tend to be more trusting when money is collected by friends or acquaintances. Bank transfers and money collection at work were also noted relatively often. People expressed less trust in other types of money transfers (see Figure 2).

There was a difference in trust in various forms of cash donations based on age group. People aged 35–44 years were more trusting than average when giving money to someone in need in person (65%). Based on education level, we saw that people with professional (19%) or university-level education (21%) were more likely to trust money transfers to people in need via a bank or bank cards. There was more trust in collections made by friends or acquaintances among people with university-level education (23%). Based on income, the wealthiest (income of over 20000 rub./month) were more likely to trust this type of donation (23%). Based on the material standing of a person's family, expressed as consumer practices, we noticed that people who can afford to purchase large appliances were more likely to say that they trust collection boxes (15%) or collections made by friends or acquaintances (23%).

There was some difference in preferred form of donation based on occupation, as well. Executives were more likely than average to trust when money was given directly to the person in need, excluding beggars (65%), as did the unemployed who do not plan to look for work (67%). Specialists (21%) and executives (19%) were most likely to trust banks and bank cards with their donations. White-collar workers and technicians (23%) and specialists (19%) were the most trusting of donation collections at work. The latter were also more trusting of donating through friends and acquaintances (25%). Students were the most likely to trust collection boxes (14%) or donations at school (18%).

Table 3
Distribution of answers to the question "What type of donation collection do you trust more than others?" from the total sample and by respondents' level of religious affiliation (% of group by column)

	Overall population	What is your religious affiliation? (one answer)	
		Comply with religious beliefs when I can, but do not attend religious services	Comply with religious beliefs when I can, and occasionally attend religious services
Share of group	100	39	23
Giving to beggars, alms	20	21	27
Collected personally by the person in need, excluding beggars	60	61	64
Collection boxes	9	9	11
Payment terminals	4	4	5
Internet, using online wallet	2	1	2
Via banks, using bank cards	14	13	12
Mobile (SMS)	3	2	4
Fund-raising organizations in the community	6	5	9
Collecting money at work	13	12	15
Fund-raising at school	5	5	5
Collected by friends, acquaintances	18	17	23
Monthly deduction from salary	4	3	5
Other	2	1	3
Any form	5	4	2
No answer	8	9	6

There was also a difference based on type of residence. Muscovites were more likely than average to trust donations given directly to the person in need, except for beggars (71%). They were also more trusting of donations given through friends and acquaintances (29%). Residents of large cities (from 250 000 to 1 mil. people) were also more likely than average to trust such form of donation as alms giving (27%). Residents of average-sized cities (50 000 to 250 000 people) were the most likely to trust banks and bank cards with their donations (20%).

The following finding is completely logical: among those who trust religious communities, parishes and church groups as intermediaries for donation, most are religious and attend religious services (see Table 2). These same people are also most trustful of almsgiving and donations through friends and acquaintances (see Table 3).

Thus, a balance of trust and distrust is a prerequisite for the development of cash donations as a social practice of Russian civil society. We now turn to the common factors that can be identified in the population's participation in volunteer work.

Trust and Russians' participation in volunteering

Despite the universally recognized importance of volunteer work, the interpretation of this concept is still not clear cut. The content of the terms "volunteer work" and "volunteer" varies by country and is closely connected to cultural and historical traditions. The Russian understanding of *dobrovolchestvo* has its own connotations and historical and cultural significance that differ from the British and American understanding of volunteering, the French understanding of *volontariat,* the Italian understanding of *volontariato,* the Swedish understanding of *frivillig verksamhet,* or the German understanding of *Ehrenamt* (Anheier, Salamon, 1999).

Definitions of volunteering emphasize such categories of time, work and activity.

- Any activity done during one's free time for the benefit of another person, group, or organization (Wilson, 2000, p. 215).
- Time spent voluntarily and without pay for any organization with the goal of providing a benefit to people or fighting for a specific case (Gaskin, Smith, 1997).
- A sacrifice of time to help other people without receiving a payment in return in the form of money (Hodgkinson, 1992, p. 619).
- A public collaborative work that benefits participants volunteering, the people to whom this work is directed and society as a whole (Nesbit, 2008, p. 1).
- Activities carried out by people voluntarily without remuneration and aimed at achieving a socially significant goal, or solving societal problems (Kudrinskaya, 2006, p. 15).

We define volunteering as a socially positive activity carried out by people with no coercion and without pay in the interests of organizations, groups or people that are not members of their immediate family or close relatives.

As part of the above-mentioned survey of the population that we conducted in 2011, we first explained to the respondents that people who do volunteer work are those who "do something for the social good without coercion or pay for people NOT in their immediate family and NOT close relatives". We then asked the question: *"Excluding helping your immediate family and close relatives, have you done any volunteer work in the last year? In other words, have you done something for the social good without coercion or pay, NOT including for your family?".* The result was that 35% said they had, 60% said they had not, and 5% did not answer. Those who also said that most people can be trusted were more inclined to do volunteer work than those who said one must be cautious in dealing with other people (39% and 34%, respectively).

Those in the 35–41 year age group were more likely than average to have done volunteer work in the past year. The eldest group was most likely to have not volunteered. As education level and income rise, so does the likelihood that the person has volunteered. The family's material wellbeing, measured by their consumer potential, follows the same trend: those who are more financially independent (those who can afford to buy a car) were more likely to say that they have done volunteer work (44%). There is some difference based on occupation. Executives were most likely to have volunteered (45%), while unemployed people who do not plan to look for a job were the most likely to say they have not volunteered (66%). Workers in the manufacturing sector were more likely than those outside of this sector to have volunteered (42% and 36%, respectively). Religious people more often said they had volunteered than did non-religious people (37% and 30%, respectively).

Table 4

Distribution of answers to the question "What among the listed options have you done in the last year without coercion or pay, and NOT for your immediate family or close relatives?" (% of those surveyed)

	%
Help with household chores or personal services (cleaning, minor home repair, gardening, help with children, the elderly or people with disabilities, prepared/served food etc.)	29
Professional or specialized work (consulting, research work, administrative work, medical care, education, legal consultation or representation, event organization, specialist conference etc.)	6
Help with collecting money or donations, organizing community support (e. g. campaigning in the community, distributing information etc.)	5
Help with clerical work, office work (stuffing envelopes, copying, making phone calls etc.)	4
Help in emergency situations (fire, search and rescue operations, natural disasters environmental protection etc.)	4
Public support, speech	3
Work as a member of an executive body of a community organization, administration	2
Other	3
None	56
No answer	2

Respondents were asked "*What among the listed options have you done in the last year without coercion or pay, and NOT for your immediate family or close relatives?*". The majority (56%) selected "none" and 2% did not answer. Of the remaining 42%, the most common answer was help with housework. Other types of volunteering were selected more rarely, at most by 6% of respondents (see Table 4).

The eldest respondents (older than 65) were less likely to say that they had done one of the activities, 70% of them claiming to have done none of them. People with higher education more frequently than the average selected the answer "Professional or specialized work (consulting, research work, administrative work, medical care, education, legal consultation or representation, event organization, specialist conference etc.), choosing this 12% of the time. This type of volunteer work was also more frequently selected by the most financially independent group (income of over 20 000 rub./month) at the same 12% rate. Based on consumer potential, those more independent (can afford a car) were more likely to select nearly all of the listed volunteer activities.

Looking at a breakdown by occupation, we find that people who are unemployed and do not plan to look for work were more likely to report that they had helped with house work or personal services (cleaning, minor home repairs, gardening, help with children, the elderly, or people with disabilities, preparing/serving food etc.), 36% of the people in this group selecting this option. Executives said more often than other groups that they have helped with collecting money or donations, and organizing community support (e. g. campaigning in the community, distributing information etc.) at 11%. Specialists more often noted that they had done professional or specialized work (consulting, research work, administrative work, medical care, education, legal consultation or rep-

resentation, event organization, specialist conference etc.) at 14%. Students answered that they had helped with clerical work or office work (stuffing envelopes, copying, making phone calls etc.), as well as public support and making speeches, at an above-average rate of 10% for both.

In answering the question "*What among the listed options have you done in the last year without coercion or pay, and NOT for your immediate family or close relatives?*", "trusting" people were more likely than "cautious" people to have helped with housework or personal services (33% and 28%, respectively).

On average, the people who do volunteer work spend 16 hours a month doing this. The question that was asked of these volunteers was phrased in the following manner: "Please estimate roughly how much time you spent on average per month doing unpaid volunteer work?" Again, we asked this of the 42% of the total sample. A mere 2% said more than 50 hours, while 9% said 11–49 hours, 2% said 6–10 hours, 5% said 3–5 hours and another 5% said 1–2 hours.

This 42% of respondents that said they had done volunteer work were also asked "*Through what organization did you do this work? Or did you do it on your own?*". More than half said that they had done this volunteer work on their own. Among those who said it was through some organization, 6% said it was through work and 3% said it was through a community organization. Other options were selected even less often.

Most respondents (79%) think that people are approving of those who do volunteer work; while just 9% believe the opposite. Among those who think that most people can be trusted, the most common opinion is that people look at volunteers with approval, and they said so more frequently than the people who believe that one must be cautious in dealing with others (84% and 79%, respectively).

When asked the question "*In your opinion, can you trust the people who do volunteer work and those who you know personally more than others, less than others, or the same as others?*", 35% said these people were more trustworthy. Just 4% said they were less trustworthy and 33% indicated no difference in the level of trust between them and all other people. Twenty-three percent said that they did not know anyone who does volunteer work, and 7% did not answer. Trust in people in general affects a person's assessment of whether people they know or those who do volunteer work can be trusted. "Trusting" people more frequently than "cautious" people believe that volunteers are more trustworthy (43% and 33%, respectively).

Despite the fact that volunteering is a socially approved activity that positively impacts the perception of a person's trustworthiness, Russians' level of involvement in these activities has remained at a low level for the entire length of our monitoring research on the state of civil society. Why do Russians shy away from volunteering? What prevents them from volunteering more? When asked, many respondents cited low wages as the main hindrance. That said, plenty of other reasons were given besides poverty. These included distrust in the people in need of help and a decline in morality. Coming in behind these reasons were a lack of value in volunteering among the population, and a lack of trust in those who organize volunteer work (see Figure 3). Reflecting on the reasons why people do little volunteer work, trustful people more often pointed to a "lack of information about the work of community organizations" (19%).

There was no significant difference in answers to this question based on age, but there was based on education level. First, those with higher education were more likely to answer the question and more likely to cite a lack of trust in state and municipal institutions that organize volunteer work, as well as distrust in those who organize volunteer



Fig. 3. Distribution of answers to the question "Why do you think people so rarely do volunteer work? What prevents them from doing more? (% of those surveyed)

work in general (21% and 24%, respectively). People with some professional education more often pointed to distrust in the organizers of volunteer work (27%).

There was also some difference in the distribution of answers based on income level. Those who did not receive an income in the previous month were more likely than average to cite low wages as a reason for the lack of volunteer activity among Russians (61%). People making 12 000–20 0000 rub./month more often said the reason was a lack of information about the activity of community organizations (19%). The most financially independent (over 20 000 rub./month) were more likely to say the cause is a lack of trust in the people who organize volunteer work (26%) or distrust in state and municipal institutions that organize volunteer work (24%). The distribution based on a family's material wellbeing, expressed as consumer potential, paints a similar picture: poor people say it is low wages, and well-off people say it is a lack of trust in the organizers of volunteer work.

The difference in answers based on occupation is also evident. Executives answered "Distrust in state/municipal institutions that organize volunteer work" at an above-average rate of 22%, as did specialists (23%), though the latter group was more likely to cite distrust in general (26%). Both categories of unemployed people (those who do not plan to look for a job and those seeking employment) more often believed the reason was low wages (63% and 60%, respectively).

A breakdown by area of residence shows that Muscovites are more likely to believe that low involvement in volunteer work is the result of a lack of trust in the organizers of volunteer work (34%), while those in large cities (250 000 to 1 mil. people) more often said it was due to a lack of value in volunteering among the population (27%).

In all, Russians' involvement in volunteer work is influenced by myriad factors (for more details see Mersiyanova, 2010), and it would be a mistake to overlook the impact that trust and distrust has on this.

Conclusions

We looked at the mutual influence of trust and the population's involvement in social practices in civil society, specifically volunteer work and cash donations. These social practices stand out for their high social significance, large scale and continuity, and are at the core of the life of civil society.

A mutual influence of trust and the population's involvement in volunteer work and cash donations was evident in our research. Here is an example. Experience of participating in charity is associated with trust in other people. Those who have done something for other people without receiving anything in return in the past year are more likely than those who have not done so to believe that most people can be trusted. The pattern holds true in relation to people in one's immediate surroundings. Those who have experience in social activity for the benefit of another are more inclined than others to say that most people in their immediate surroundings can be trusted.

Looking at this from a different angle, those who believe that most people can be trusted were also more likely than those who think one must be cautious in dealing with others to say that they have done volunteer work (39% and 34%, respectively). More of those who trust people believe that we approve of people who do volunteer work than distrusting people (84% and 79%, respectively). Trust in people in general affects the assessment of whether personal acquaintances that do volunteer work can be trusted. "Trusting" people are more likely than "distrusting" people to say that volunteers are more trustworthy (43% and 33%, respectively).

Trust and distrust fulfill specific functions in relation to social practices of civil society. Trust forms the basis for self-organization of joint activity among people, and supports moral principles and social norms; fosters social integration and communication among individuals and their communities. The prevailing level of trust in a given situation forms the impression of that situation. Distrust protects people from undesirable consequences of an interaction. It also leads to a distancing, which results in an in an inadequate level of involvement of the population in the everyday practices of civil society.

Thus, if there is no proper balance between trust and distrust, it makes it difficult to get people engaged in social practices of civil society, which prevents these practices from becoming large-scale and widespread. It contributes to the emergence of sporadic and underdeveloped social practices, which impedes the development of civil society itself as one of the basic institutions of Russian society.

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INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRUST PROBLEM

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Problems with social and economic reforms, social transformations and social instability in the Russian society are related to distrust of the significant social institutions. A certain part of erroneous resolutions made by the state is accounted for by lack of attention to the development of systemic, institutional and social trust, which caused structural and functional reproduction of social deformations in the Russian society. Almost immediately there were destroyed both the institutions of trust themselves and the institutional constituent of trust. Taking into account the fact that in the Soviet state there was no private property and different activities related to commerce in various spheres were criticized and pursued juridically, it is obvious why in today's Russia the birth of intellectual property institution, forming of legislative norms and as a whole inclusion of our society in the worldwide civilization experience of legal regulation in this sphere are being put into practice with so many complications and contradictions. However the causes are not limited by those given above. Juridically confirmed borders of intellectual property institution exist, however many complications that emerge during application of this law in practice indicate the necessity of viewing these norms and rights from the positions of sociology, economics and philosophy. It is necessary to view the establishment of this social institution in history of the Russian state, to find out its characteristic features and peculiarities at each historical period in connection with the available practices of trust relationship in the society. It is also necessary to answer this question: who in the first place needs legislative confirmation of intellectual property right, first of all copy right and patent right, and formation of intellectual property institution and who benefits from it today? One considers as very urgent today the question of potential to restore trust as a qualitative characteristic of our society, favoring social and economic progress and contributing to the construction of socially oriented constitutional market state.

Theme of trust in sociology

Trust is a complicated social phenomenon that is interpreted in different ways by many sciences: sociology, anthropology, culturology, philosophy, psychology, economics and law.

Separate aspects of concept of trust are analysed in P. Blau, A. Giddens, R. Darendorf, J. Koulmen, N. Luman, A. Seligmen, P. Sztompka, F. Fukuyama, T. Yamagishi's works, which studied it from the point of view of designing and development of a social order, social institutes, interpersonal, intergroup and conflict interactions and the relations. So, N. Luman carried out important distinction of concepts of system trust and personal trust; also he put forward criterion of distinction of trust and confidence – depending on ability of the individual to distinguish dangers and risks (Luhman, 2000). F. Fukuyama in a context of a paradigm of the social capital stated idea of "the trust radius" according to which efficiency of this or that national economy depends on the radius of the trust inherent in society (Fukuyama, 2003). J. Buchanan, M. Granovetter, J. Knight, O. Williamson conducted trust researches within institutional and contract theories. B. Gukha-Haznobis, R. Kanbur, E. Ostrom studied trust in a context of an interlacing of elements of formal and informal economy; they understood trust as "the social capital out of the government", unlike institutes which they understood as "the social capital in the government" (Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, Ostrom, 2006). The interfaced subjects of low level of system trust, high transactional expenses, opportunism and corruption became one of the new directions of social and economic studying of trust. Within this conceptual field the trust role in transitional societies in G. Kertman, Y. Kornay's works etc. is investigated.

Russian sociologists Y. Veselov, T. Zaslavskaya, R. Ryvkina and others contributed much to the development of this theme; the scientists emphasize low level of institutional trust in Russia, which causes discrepancy between formal norms and individual expectations. The conception of trust is used to explain relatively new class of phenomena, namely, loyalty of consumers, organizational interactions, corruption; it is also used to study forced, reputation, network and other types of trust as components of market relations.

It should be specially noted that since 2000s big contribution to the studies of trust subjects has been made by St. Petersburg school of economic sociology. The group of researchers under leadership of Y. Veselov and with participation of E. Kapustkina, M. Sinutin, V. Minina have released the work entitled "Economics and sociology of trust" which with economic and sociological approach discloses public nature of trust, the meaning of its economic and social functions, the essence of trust transformation, great attention being paid to research of trust in today's Russian society. Quite recently in 2011 they published a monograph by Y. Veselov "Trust and justice: moral base of modern economic society", which demonstrates permanent interest to this problem in the system of Russian sociological knowledge in general.

The problem of trust in modern society

Current societies are differentiated in accordance with culture of trust. F. Fukuyama was the first to work out this notion: according to his conception culture of trust is the product of a definite period in history of any country; during this period trust and distrust are accumulated in various social practices due to definite social purposes, norms and values (Fukuyama, 2003). R. Coase connects the problem of property with the phenomenon of trust and as well as F. Fukuyama comes to conclusion that trust is one of the most significant institutional fundamentals of business (Coase, 1978). According to economic and sociological approach culture of trust is permanently "reproduced in social practices and can be planned and regulated" (Veselov, 2011). However culture as a whole and culture of trust in particular are not created all of a sudden. This is preceded by long term; transformation of a society with low level of trust will require life

spans of several generations. Sztompka emphasizes that absence of culture of trust will cause formation of culture of distrust in which everyone distrusts one another at different levels of interaction: interpersonal, institutional, public (Sztompka, 1999). Trust tendencies begin to form gradually in the process of transformation of the Russian society into the market one.

Current transnational corporations and the institution of intellectual property that is being formed in Russia are connected much more tightly than it can seem from the first sight. In many countries of the world there is understanding of inadequacy both in corporate relations that add to decrease of trust and in partner relations that imply trust and stimulate it: paternalism in these countries is related to partner relations only, while corporations are not given any privileges or benefits. Unfortunately current Russian economy is an exception out of the common rule. As a matter of fact this explains high level of monopolization of our economy, its low efficiency and overall deficit of trust in it.

Property right to an intellectual product and trust problem

Regulatory legislation in relation to intellectual property has been worked out by analogy with legislation in the sphere of material property. If we accept the understanding of intellectual property as a social institution and rely on the current legal norms we may find ourselves in a predicament. On the one hand the main public function of intellectual property as a social institution is to stimulate regulation control and distribution of knowledge, information and ideas in a society. On the other hand the functions of this institution have to be aimed at stimulating creative activity granting exclusive rights to the author of intellectual property and guarantying protection against encroachment on knowledge, ideas, information from the side of other members of society. It is an objective situation that is observed in the present historic period, however, one can state that this situation represents quite a distorted picture. In current society the formula made from the position of corporate economy – "those who are stronger run the show" – is urgent because economy possesses opportunities to affect both the sphere of morals and the sphere of justice and form them in its own image (Veselov, 2005). Institution of private (or corporate) property acts as the key obstacle in the way of building up trust relationship towards social institutions of current society and to some extent in the way of free distribution of new knowledge.

As a rule birth of intellectual property institution is viewed as natural evolutional development in understanding how important it is to establish and protect authorship etc. They say that inventors, authors of discoveries and research works were the first who got aware of necessity to protect their rights against encroachment of other people and they started to demand guarding and protection (Lebedintceva, 2010). And as capitalism develops further it gives opportunities for economic exchange of intellectual products and we feel insistent need for implementation of regulating, coordinating and legislative functions by state in this sphere, we feel need for municipal protection and international legal safeguard of "intellectual rights". But as a matter of fact the factors determining social and economic progress prove to be more complicated. From the beginning governments of different countries were involved in registration of intellectual property rights. Juridically confirmed intellectual property rights were necessary for just one definite subject, that is the state acting at the market due to which institution of intellectual property starts to develop. It is stated that juridical registration of creative work was not paid much attention partly because necessity to sell the products of intellectual activity emerged comparatively not long ago but before it such production was

distributed out of the market without being object of market relations. Some significant reasons of this situation can be as follows – low cultural level of subjects involved in economic activity and the fact that realization of intellectual production has been carried out very slowly during lifetime of many generations. It seemed that products of intellectual activity did not have any practical value (i. e. economic turnover). In fact the things would stay as they used to be unless the state took the initiative. In the current world leadership was taken over by organizations whose turnover competes with GDP of some countries – we mean transnational corporations and their interests at the market. The question is why at a definite historic moment the state took interest in development of a new social institution.

Russia in the second half of the XVIII–beginning of the XIX centuries being isolated and having a number of relatively self-sufficient economic sectors begins to face lag in scientific and technical sphere. However lag in economic area was not so obvious in comparison with western countries: according to gross measures in the middle of the XVIII century cast iron smelted in Russia exceeded by one a half the amount of cast iron smelted in the then world economic leader – Britain, and most of the metal was exported. But inventive activity was widely spread in western countries: according to encyclopedia by Brockhaus published in 1898 it is obvious that activity aiming at making inventions and patenting them gained wide popularity and it had steady tendency for expansion (see the Table).

Level of patent protection of inventions corresponded to the might of the country and contributed to its steady position at the world's arena and created opportunities to establish rules in relationship regulations. Great Britain, the USA, Holland and France (since 1791) granted several hundred patents for various sorts of inventions and technical innovations. For the same period (1812 included) Russia granted only 76 privileges legalized various "crafts and trades" along with the patent right. It was 1812 when Russia passed the law of privileges for inventions, arts and crafts. From these positions the information presented in the Table gives quite positive picture per se but it does not seem so positive when it comes to comparison with other countries.

Thus, by the time of the beginning of work of the Parisian convention on protection of industrial property at the end of the XIX century it was obvious that the developed

Table 1

Number of the granted patents in the different countries, including Russia in the XIX century

Country	**Number of the granted patents till 1870**	**Number of the granted patents with 1870–1895**
France	100905	161796
Great Britain	51337	171746
Belgium	33433	85746
Germany	8833	92763
Italy	3744	33654
Sweden	1557	8208
Switzerland	0	10738
Russia	1379	4720

Source: By data of "The Encyclopedic Dictionary" // F. A. Brockhaus, I. A. Efron. St Petersburg. 1898. Patents for Inventions.

states use the control concept, in the necessary course structuring idea of how the market works. This concept reflected institutionalized agreements also peculiar to these market between actors of different level concerning the principles of action concerning the objects which are subject to patent regulation. It allowed to keep leading positions not only in creation of new inventions, but also in their patent protection operating in as much as possible extensive trade and economic space.

Technical progress and innovative activity by the end of the XIX century allowed inventors to improve not only cars, tools, adaptations, but also technological processes, methods of application of these means, and that is especially important, production of industrial production, i. e. means of mass consumption. As result, because of already created streams of assignment of objects of property, there was one more basic change of a situation: high-quality redistribution of these streams between the different principles of assignment. As inventive activity gains mass character, the products made by the industry, so all share of a stream of this new production become inventions starts being appropriated any more by the traditional principle, and on the basis of the principles entered by patent system.

Up to 1870 there was some ambiguity as on necessary conditions for issue of the patent, and on the bodies responsible for it. To estimate work of patent system of the Russian Empire it is represented rather difficult: in archives not enough ordered documents as patent activity was divided on many ministries and departments, the uniform patent bureau appeared only in 1896. However, on attestations of eyewitnesses, it is possible to draw a conclusion that process of issue of privileges was extremely long and bureaucratized. Business of patent agents, "accepted" to the officials responsible for privileges prospered. More than 80% of privileges were given out to foreigners that indirectly speaks about a priority of import of technologies. However, by the end of the XIX century. many patent agents were representatives of the multinational companies so the patent application could move at the same time, say, the American in Paris, London, New York and St Petersburg.

M. Veber states that in a traditional society the economic player is guided by irrational purposes, the example of this can be scientists who made scientific achievements at that period but did not want any commercial profit but at the same time they assumed and wished so that their inventions could be practically applied. What were the things that encouraged and motivated them to stay involved in scientific and innovative activity? There is an opinion that "it was an original project (with resemblance to Plato's state) and it was not clear if this project could be ever realized" (Philosophy of Technics, 1997). Other motives must be taken into consideration as well, these are: undeveloped market could not offer sufficient economic stimuli for application of scientific inventions, in this sense they present little economic value in comparison with universal significance of fundamental scientific achievements; craft-work, manufacturing, commerce were considered to be the lot of people who did not belong to upper-class; scientists made their living due to their status in society or due to the patronage of powerful titled personalities who expressed state interests. Economic thinking of the traditional society as a whole did not acknowledge modern economic institutions. Perception of property rights and attitude to property in general are viewed as natural conditions of management. Land, for example, was not treated as the object of legal rights but as the object of labor – it was the process of labor that confirmed moral right for property. Private property of land was hardly recognized, nothing to say of intellectual property. Later this logic finds reflection in legislation system of the Soviet Union.

After the revolution in 1917 the Soviet state granted exclusive rights for technical decision to inventors, technical decision began to be called invention. Accordingly authors were granted authorship, but it had no relation to the property right for material object, in which author's work was embodied. As a result there was set up a system which stimulated innovative activity not by means of market mechanisms but through moral and financial compensation which, as it meant, had to be proportional to social value of inventions (technical decisions) or author's works. In spite of the fact that in the Soviet state traditional trust based on personal characteristics begins to acquire rationalized features, the fundamentals remained the same: trust in monarchy was transformed into trust in communist leaders and the state as a whole. Therefore there were no obstacles for planning and regulating property forms by state (Shchennikova, 1995). Approaches to the institution of ownership, to its structure and to mechanisms of its regulation changed dramatically in 1990 when new legislation was adopted stating that property in the USSR exists in the forms of private property, community property and state property. In that period the term "intellectual property" emerges: the law stated that "relations in the sphere of producing and applying inventions, discoveries, works of science, literature, art and other objects of intellectual property are regulated by legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialistic and autonomous republics" (The Law On Property in the USSR, 1990).

Low level of institutional trust in economic institution of intellectual property observed in the current society can be explained by "exclusion" of the inventor from the process of practical application of his invention. This was the weakest point in inventive work inherited from the former USSR. Many inventions were not introduced in industry; they could not find any practical implementation. Since the state was the only subject of law and owned the right for inventions protected by authorship certificate all the inventions were considered national heritage. Enterprises (companies, organizations) produced such inventions had no right to claim ownership for these inventions, they could only act as applicants for patents of invention.

Implementation of inventions was carried out in the terms of "intrusion". Since the exclusive right for implementation of any invention nominally belonged to the state it meant practically that the state granted the right to implement any invention to any enterprise, organization or institution without any permit from the organization produced this invention. Centrally arranged "intrusion" of inventions into industry occurred, as a rule, under the guidance but more often it did not occur at all. The author could not be the master of his invention even if he wished to, but the state could fulfill this function but more often (frequently because of inertia of some officials) it did not want to get engaged in implementation of innovations or contribute to the development of economy as there were no stimuli to do it with no competition at all. As a result the problem with implementation of inventions and research work products was one of the most painful for the Soviet economy: implementation terms were too long especially if we compare similar implementation terms and starting points of practical use of an invention in other countries. In such countries as the USA and Germany period between the date of application for invention and the date of its first practical implementation in economy took a bit more than a year in 1990 while in the USSR it took four years (Lebedintceva, 2012a).

Thus the USSR formed and put into practice two systems of stimulation and development of intellectual innovative activity: the first one was based on authorship certificates, that is so-called authorship right that was intended for domestic use because there was no institution of private property; the second one was based on patents and it was intended for interaction with capitalist countries at foreign market. At the interna-

tional arena the soviet state performed as a gigantic innovator, a capitalist of state scale due to patent system.

The Soviet Union realized two essentially opposite systems of state stimulation and development of intellectual innovative activity: use of patent system meant that innovations (inventions, works) were viewed as material objects (like in the rest of world), which made the soviet system compatible with foreign countries in international relations; use of authorship certificates domestically meant that innovations were viewed as immaterial objects, which made the system compatible with basic socialistic principle of prohibition on private property. Soviet trust is explained by "subordination of personality to community in the name of public good", and top leaders of the country pointed both to significance of trust in society and to lack of it. It was not done by accident as there were circumstances indicating of a gap between interests of soviet working people and administrative bureaucracy.

However, in contemporary Russia the situation has not improved, but greatly deteriorated. So, if in 1980 more than 85 thousand contracts have passed the state registration, 115205 of the results of intellectual activity, more than 100000 reports on Research & Development, then after 20 years, the annual volume of state registration dropped significantly respectively: 12072 (7 times), 9872 (12 times), 5780 (18 times). This approach has caused extremely negative consequences for the country, first of all, the leakage of the "brains" and technologies. Thus, in the 1990s there was not the creation of a new trust, but only the destruction of the old type: the trust has been replaced by coercion, distrust to the authorities and other people became a common feature. New trust was in process of formation.

All this has not helped to create a relationship of trust between the inventors and the state. The culture of disbelief in this context is expressed in ingrained during the years of Soviet power stereotype: "I have an idea and the goal of the realization. When I carry out the idea, the result appears, we publish it or patent. On this I calm down. More is not my business to implement all of this, it is so hard. As a result, there are several firms on our developments and they use our achievements" (excerpts from studies of the European University at St Petersburg "History of technical breakthroughs in the Russian Empire in XVIII–early XX century: lessons for the twenty-first century"). So to commercialize innovative idea, to build a working chain from idea to product, combining the role of the inventor and the manager is the task that is traditionally difficult for scientists from Russian innovation sector. Representation among domestic innovators about the division on those who "carries the idea" and those who "introduces", are transferred from the past to the present and broadcasted in the future. The trouble of Russian mentality is in denial of the private property for a long time and, in particular, the positive attitude to the commercialization of scientific developments. With regret we have to state that regardless of the direction of the institutional development the frequent changes in the institutions always undermine the already established relationship of trust.

In modern Russia the Expert Council on legal regulation and protection of intellectual property in the State Duma is developing a social-state concept of development of the market of intellectual property in Russia, creation of new public institutions that protect the interests of the participants, the occupation of Russia a worthy place on the international market of intellectual property. However, in our opinion, that is the problem, as long as we treat the information and knowledge as to objects of a market economy, generated and exchanging according to the laws of commodity production, the Russian state will not be able to take the place in the world economic system, in which she rightly claim to take. Low efficiency of the functioning of the new Institute testifies not only

about the weakness of the institutional framework, but also allows you to doubt the adequacy of its basic principles. If you start from the goals of social development, then in general they have the desire of the company to harmonize their reproduction, and the category of trust and fairness are here as an important tool of giving the public reproduction of the humanist sense (Soshnev, 2005). Not being an absolute norm in the public relations, trust and fairness are manifested in the social, economic, legal and other forms in which they have their own nature, mechanism of implementation and functions. The specific historical conditions affect their design by society, the question is, who the most influential figure in the design is.

The Russian state continues to recreate that system of the social and economic relations which, on the one hand, strongly differs from capitalism in the developed countries as it is directly imposed by them as leaders on the international labor market, on the other hand, is very limited in opportunities of the development.

Since in the social sciences an indication of the role of knowledge and information as a key resource in the modern workplace has long become a common place, as far as the problem of private intellectual property is receiving increasing attention. Recently a lot has been said and written about the formation of a new type of society that is called in different ways: post-industrial, information or knowledge society. However, in the basis of a new society are all the same principles of economics of capitalism. The main imperatives of the market economy remain the same, therefore, when analyzing the development of information, intellectual sphere we should take this into account. Any innovations somehow or other connected with information and knowledge, fall under the effect of the laws of market criteria of commodity production: one should buy them, sell to make a profit (Webster, 2004). The market dictates the direction of development: the information should be transformed into a commodity, that is, access to it will increasingly be possible only on the commercial basis. Only as a result of the global economic development the world capitalist economy has evolved into a stage of corporate capitalism. In the so-called economy of knowledge or information sphere the interests of transnational corporations are dominated, which are characterized by the high concentration of capital, which, as a rule, can dictate their interests or, at least, to exert pressure on the state, and even on the international community. The basis of their competitiveness is the development and effective use of social, innovation and organizational and managerial capacity.

The ownership of the knowledge allows capital to acquire control over the products of intellectual work. This control is used to monopolize the use of the new knowledge by capital, not to allow competitors to use this knowledge in production. For capital it, of course, is the condition of rent extraction from controlled by it intellectual products, but severely limits the scope of involvement of the results of creative activity of the people in the development and improvement of production. Thus, the ownership of the knowledge is one of the most important economic basis for the transformation of knowledge and information in the objects of commercial secrets.

The key to capitalism issue is the question of the role of the market. The main principle of the market is the desire to maximize profits, which effects in the sphere of information on the quantity and quality of information, which depends directly on the possibility of selling it profitably. It is logical to assume that the market will somehow influence the decision about the kind of information to produce and under what conditions to do it. Intellectual property, patenting and protection of author's rights are the areas of law, which thrive in the information age that is an indication of how important the property rights to the information are in our days. According to G. Schiller, the information revo-

lution was not only for the use of the corporate sector; it was ruled and promoted by the corporate capital. On the first place in their list of priorities is the development of information and information technologies in the interests of private business and not in the interests of society as a whole (Webster, 2004). Therefore, information technologies carry the stamp of the corporate capital, and then any other interest groups in the modern society. The production of knowledge, as the training of creative workers, subordinated to the interests of self-increasing capital. Creative abilities and knowledge are sent to areas where the recoverable income has the highest values. In the realities of the late modern capitalism, it is first of all a giant bubble of the financial market, the state bureaucracy, military production, mass culture. And in the real sector the potential of the intellectual labor is also subjected to the interests of the corporations.

In fact the system of intellectual rights to the results of creative activity is created only for the protection of the economic interests of producers of objects of the copyright, and not the interests of authors, and so much the more society as a whole. The modern doctrine is unanimous of recognition of the dual (mixed) the nature of copyright and patent rights, including in its membership both personal and property rights. This fact is reflected in the legislation on the protection of intellectual property of the majority of countries of the world. However, in the modern legal practice the word «property rights» already means something entirely different than what we invested in this concept initially. "In our (American – author's note) tradition, – writes L. Lessig, – intellectual property is a tool. It lies in the basis of the active community of the authors, but it remains subordinate to the value of creativity. The current controversy turned all upside down. We are so concerned about the protection of the tool, that we have lost sight of the value. The source of this confusion lies in the fact of delimitation that the law no longer troubles to conduct, – between republishing someone else's work, on the one hand, and the taking of the foundation and its transformation, on the other hand. The law on copyright from the moment of its birth was only used for publication, but today it regulates that and the other" (Lessig, 2007). The estimated approval of the surrounding any modern professional practice and existing at the level of myths, in respect of copyright do not withstand criticism. For example, when they say that copyright fosters creativity, they mean the economic compensation of the results of labor (or costs) of the author. Indeed, the author can sometimes get a fee for his work. However, is this fee base or incentive of new creativity of the authors? And as far legally compare, for example, received social benefits with the costs incurred or expenses that have no direct relationship to him? Social life can't fit the economic idea of the equivalence of costs and results. The achievement of exceeding of the costs of social result can be explained from the standpoint of the economy of the social sphere, and not from a position of market efficiency. If the financial position could influence the creativity, the most creative people would be the richest people. However, this happens very rarely. Between income and creativity there is no direct connection. From the standpoint of the market economy, fees or compensation for creative intellectual work pays the physical costs of energy of the author as of the workforce. Another no less important question is whether legal system contributes to the creativity. One of the main elements of the copyright system (as well as of the whole system of intellectual property) is the possibility of transfer of property rights to other persons in whole or in part. Such exclusive transmission of rights is contrary to the principles of human rights on the results of the creative intellectual activity. The universal Declaration of human rights has article 27 (2) declares that every person has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary

or artistic production of which he is the author. In 1998 there was a conference «Intellectual property and human rights», organized by the world intellectual property organization (WIPO) in cooperation with the Commission on human rights the United Nations, devoted to the 50-year-old anniversary of the adoption of the universal Declaration of human rights (Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 1999). As a result the allocation of intellectual property for human rights came to be regarded as recognition of the exceptional importance of intellectual property for development of any society. However, if we identify the intellectual property with some of the human rights, this leads to a number of contradictions. Human rights cannot be transferred to other persons and they are during the whole life of man. Moreover, it is impossible to abandon their human rights even in the event of a terminal illness, and physical suffering. Thus, human rights belong to everyone for all of his life, and under no circumstances can be transferred to anyone. In the system of intellectual property there is another position because property rights can be fully transferred to other persons. So called personal non-property rights remains for the author or, in other words, the fact that on the cover of the book there will be standing your last name, and not someone else's. Supporters of the modern system of intellectual property defend also the need for continued protection of the products of intellectual work, which, for example, in accordance with the Berne Convention is the whole life of the author and fifty years after his death (Berne convention, 1990). They try to convince the public that the continuous protection corresponds to the interests of the close family members of the author. However, as a rule, these rights do not belong to the author or his relatives, but to entirely different individuals and legal entities. Avoid contradictions to human rights principles of modern intellectual property system is possible only in case of refusal from the exclusive transfer of the property rights, or the understanding of intellectual property as a human right.

Any sensible person understands that created product does not appear by itself and has its basis in the many other works. This is especially true in science and technology, where any achievement is based on the already known results. There is continuity between the new achievements and the existing level of development of a science or technology. The isolation of scientists and engineers from the results achieved by the others, leads to the degradation of science and technology. The so-called commercial secret is the essential point of the functioning of the capitalist system, because it protects the possibility to gain additional profit, and profit is the main motive of the entrepreneurial activity. The commercial secret is in contradiction with the other fundamental principle of the market economy – the principle of universal awareness of market agents and producers of the state and potential of production. With a rapid increase of the role of knowledge and information in the process of production private intellectual property of the conditions of the development of capitalist production begins to turn in the brake, because it makes the barriers to the broadest possible use of the basic resource of modern production (Kolganov, 2002).

This situation is compared with the existence of the feudal privileges and economic boundaries between the feudal possessions in the era of capitalist economy. At that time the privileges and borders created barriers for free movement of goods, capital and labor, and interfered with the involvement of the land into economic circulation, ultimately, impeded economic progress. Only the struggle for the elimination of these barriers has allowed the capitalist system of economy expand all pledged in its potency. Without the free movement of knowledge and information it becomes impossible to output on a new stage of social and economic progress. "The free culture is not a culture without prop-

erty, it is not a culture, where the work of artist is not paid. A culture without property, in which the creators do not get payment, is anarchy, but not freedom. On the contrary, the free culture is a balance between anarchy and control. Free culture, as well as the free market, relies on the property. It is driven by the laws of property and contractual relations, adopted by the state. But as feudal property distorts the free market, modern property rights cripple free culture" (Lessig, 2007).

Thus, access to information and use of information is absolutely essential not only for the progress of science and technology, but also for any other spheres of public activities.

In order to harmonize their reproduction society should use social trust as specifically historical way to the mainstreaming of humanistic ideals, which is obvious to be outside of history; as the society's ability to save itself, being in a harmonious dynamic equilibrium. In the modern world there is a complicated problem: on the one hand, the growing role of non-material production (first of all intellectual and educational activities), and, on the other hand, intellectual property as a stop on the way to a harmonious development, as a expresser of the strengthening of inequality in the area of movement of knowledge, information and education. From these positions Law of the Bay–Dole, adopted in the USA in 1980, is not a progressive, which allowed the universities to patent the results of research conducted at the expense of budget funding and extra-budgetary funds, as well as in their commercialization. Getting patents in the hope of income, they put obstacles in the path of the exchange of ideas, so important for the development of science and true innovation. Moreover, for the majority of universities maintaining of units on technology transfer and registration of patents is unprofitable.

The economic markets play an essential role in the course of a choice of a way of scientific and technical development. Acceleration of formation of the arising interested groups is promoted by such factors, as increase of a role of economic and social networks and transformation of objects of scientific and technological researches (Callon, Rabeharisoa, 2008). The network model as a form of coordination and the organization of the market becomes dominating in the field of economy. The similar model promotes formation of "a new innovative mode". For this mode interaction of such diverse actors representing different regions and the countries, as the academic research laboratories, consulting agencies, the public coordination centers, governmental services, firms contractors, local administrative bodies, consumers is characteristic. The relations of cooperation are accompanied by the competition not between the separate companies, as earlier, and between networks. Representatives of each network seek to advance an own innovative product. On the one hand, techno and economic networks are in process of continuous evolution: their management tries to adapt for changing social and economic conditions. At the same time acceleration of innovative process is accompanied by concentration of research projects. As well as during previous eras, the management of the research centers prefers to use rather existing ideas and development, than to look for new ways of development of science and equipment.

If the results of intellectual labor create public fund of knowledge, knowledge will become thus in the public domain (Lebedintceva, 2012b). This will not mean infringement of the personal non-property (e. g., intellectual property) rights of creative workers. Information freedom can to some extent make carriers of knowledge from the employees the free individuals who get a truly wide public prestige. The role of the state can be the stimulation of the innovation process, it is necessary to support and encourage the commercialization of ideas. Russia is facing a serious problem – to modern economy in a large scale, and the need to re-institutionalize confidence, ensuring its gradual evolu-

tion does not cause doubt. The uniqueness of the situation consists in the possibility to look into the issues of intellectual property "from scratch", to take advantage of the weak patent system and, thus, serve as an example to the rest of the world.

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TRUSTFUL RELATIONSHIP AT WORK: THE PRESENT STATE OF JAPANESE ORGANIZATION

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Introduction. Globalization, and Rationalization of the management system in the Japanese Company

Workplace relationship used to be very close in Japan: Company looked after the employees for their life time and the employees used to demonstrate their devotion and loyalty to the company. There were a strong sense of trust between employers and employees.

However, due to the globalization and intensified international economic competitions, it has become very common for Japanese companies to restructure the traditional employment systems. For examples, the lifetime employment system and the seniority wage system have been reviewed at lots of companies in order to improve the productivity and efficiency.

These changes have hugely damaged the traditional trustful relationships between an employer and the employees. The sense of belonging at workplace has become weak and Japanese employees are stressed with their unstable employment conditions.

As a researcher at Labor Research Council which founded by Japanese trade union, I have lots of opportunities to meet with the officials of trade unions. During the meetings with them, I often hear that mental disorders have become one of the most serious problems at their workplace.

The investigation conducted by Japanese government also indicates an increase in the number of the employees who claims their mental disorder was caused by poor working conditions. According to Figure 1, the number of the claims was 265 ten years ago (2001), but in 2011, it swells up to 1272. Both number of claims and the approved claims have increased rapidly over last 10 years. Most of claims were made by regular workers, and they were mainly in their 30s and 40s. Although we cannot deny other possible reasons for this increase, the transition of the relationship in the workplace is considered to be one of the major factors. Therefore, relationship on the workplace, especially, trust at workplace has been one of the popular research themes in Japan.

Explanation about data used

Before going into main subject, I would like to point out the features of the questionnaire survey which this thesis is based on. The title of the survey was "Survey about Relation-



Fig. 1. The number of Industrial accident claims associated with Mental Disorder
Source: Govt. of Japan, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Report of "The State of the Industrial accident and the Compensation related with brain and heart disease and mental disorder".

ship". This survey was conducted by Labor Research Council from February to July, in 2012. The questionnaires were handed out and collected through the trade unions. We collected 6744 samples for this survey. Almost all of these samples are datum of regular employees including both employees of private enterprise and public servants. Actually, this survey included questions about relationship outside of the workplace, such as relationship with their neighbors or with family and so on, but I will take up only questions related to the workplace in this thesis.

The actual and the ideal relationship in workplace

To begin with, I would refer to respondents' actual relationship with their superior and colleagues at their workplace.

1. The actual workplace relationship. In order to grasp the actual status of workplace relationship, we divided workplace relationship into three different types in our questionnaire survey.

First type is a most intimate workplace relationship. The descriptor for this type is "I can talk about my personal problems and help each other at work and also in private" (Type I). The second type also includes relationship outside of work but the relationship is less intimate than Type I. The descriptor for this option is "I often have a meal or a leisure time together" (Type II). The third type is simple that there is no socialization outside of work. The descriptor for this option is "No personal interaction outside of workplace with their superiors or colleagues" (Type III). In short, the percentage which combined Type I and Type II is the ratio of employees who have personal relationship outside of work.

According to Figure 2, there are fewer people who have personal relationship with their superiors (that is Type I + Type II). It's only 20% altogether. The majority of the respondents are Type III, no personal interaction with their superior outside workplace.



Fig. 2. Actual relationships in workplace
Type I: I can talk about my personal problems and help each other at work and also in private.
Type II: I often have a meal or a leisure time together.
Type III: No personal interaction outside of workplace with their superiors or colleagues.
Type IV: I don't have any superiors/colleagues.
I + II = Employees who have personal relationships outside of work.

On the other hand, in terms of workplace relationship with their colleagues, half of the respondents have a personal relationship, the remaining half have no interaction with their colleagues outside of their workplace. The result is quite different from the case with superior.

2. The ideal workplace relationship. Next, I would like to talk about the ideal relationship in the workplace. There are roughly there different types:

The first one is the most intimate relationship. The descriptor for this option was "I want to talk about personal problems and help each other at work and also in private" (Type I). The second type also includes relationship outside of workplace, while the relationship is less intimate than Type I. The descriptor for this option was "I want to have a meal or a leisure time together" (Type II). The third type is that "I don't want to interact with superior/colleagues outside of work" (Type III). That is to say, the ratio which combined Type I and Type II make up the ratio of employees who want to have personal relationship with their superior or colleagues outside of work.

According to Figure 3, with regard to a relationship with their superior, 41% of respondents wish to have personal relationship. This exceeds percentage of the people who actually have personal relationship with their superior by 21 percent.



Fig. 3. Ideal relationship in workplace
Type I: I want to talk about personal problems and help each other at work and also in private. Type II I want to have a meal or a leisure time together.
Type III: I don't want to interact with superior/colleagues outside of work.
Type IV: I don't want to have any relationships with superior/colleagues.
Type V: Unsure.
Type VI: I don't have any superiors/colleagues.
I + II = Employees who want to have personal relationship with their superior or colleagues outside of work.

Similarly, regarding a relationship with colleagues, 66% of respondents wish to have personal relationship. This also exceeds actual percentage of the people who have personal relationship with colleagues by 16 percent.

In reality, there are many employees who do not socialize with their workmates outside of work, but wish to have personal relationship outside of their work.

The actual relationship in the workplace and generalized trust

Trust is one of the important factors of human relationship. Now, I would like to indicate the influence of trust upon workplace relationship.

Firstly, I would like to talk about respondents' sense of trust towards other people. We asked if they feel other people are trustworthy. The descriptor in the questionnaire was "Do you agree with the following statement; Generally, I feel other people are trustworthy". According to Figure 4, 54% of respondents agreed with this statement and 11% of the respondents disagreed. Roughly half of the respondents agreed with this statement across the generations.



Fig. 4. Sense of trust towards others
"Do you agree with the following statement: Generally, I feel other people are trustworthy".



Fig. 5. Actual relationship in workplace and sense of trust
"Do you agree with the following statement: Generally, I feel other people are trustworthy".
Type I: I can talk about my personal problems and help each other at work and also in private.
Type II: I often have a meal or a leisure time together.
Type III: No personal interaction outside of workplace with their superiors or colleagues.

Next, I would like to show the influence of trust upon the actual workplace relationship. Figure 5 shows relationship between the actual relationship in the workplace and sense of trust towards others.

Obviously, many of Type I or Type II employees feel others are more trustworthy than Type III employees. Therefore, we could say that the sense of trust towards others influences the state of relationship in the workplace to some extent. However, we can't determine that sense of trust is only one crucial factor which influences workplace relationship.

Simultaneously, we also have to consider the influence of the characteristics of work. Table 1 shows the conditions of work according to the state of actual relationship in the workplace.

Interestingly, same tendency appears in for relationship with their superiors and colleagues. The notable point revealed in the following working conditions: "1) Work done by a team frequently" and "7) Usually, communication in the workplace is conducted by conversation, without using e-mail".

With regard to relationship with superiors, among those Type I employees (they can talk about personal troubles and help each other at work and in private), to 47% of them "1) Work done by a team frequently" was applicable and to 52% of them – "7) Usually, communication in the workplace is conducted by conversation, without using e-mail".

On the other hand, among Type III employees (they don't want to interact with their superior outside of work), the former is applicable to 36% of them and the latter is applicable to also 36%. It is considered that individual work and frequent use of e-mail in the workplace contributed to the weakening of relationship in a workplace.

Table 1
Characteristics of work (multiple answer)

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	NA	N
Total		37.2	17.3	17.7	21.6	20.6	50.7	38.7	15.7	0.9	6744
Actual Relationships with Superiors	Type I	**47.2**	19.9	15.3	22.2	19.3	**57.2**	**51.6**	**23.4**	0.1	680
	Type II	41.7	20.9	19.4	26.5	23.0	**57.9**	**48.0**	18.8	0.2	660
	Type III	35.6	16.8	17.9	21.2	20.7	49.7	36.4	14.4	0.3	5252
Actual relationships with Colleagues	Type I	**47.5**	17.4	17.1	24.5	21.0	**56.4**	**52.4**	**21.7**	0.1	973
	Type II	40.1	19.2	18.4	24.6	20.8	52.3	41.7	16.4	0.5	2400
	Type III	32.5	16.4	17.5	19.1	20.6	48.9	32.9	13.4	0.2	3174

1 = Work done by a team frequently.
2 = Changes of roles/positions at workplace rarely occur.
3 = Ongoing professional development (learning new skills/knowledge) is not required.
4 = Most of the colleagues are same gender and/or same generation.
5 = After hour work is generally not necessary.
6 = Annual leaves are accessible and flexible.
7 = Usually, communication in the workplace is conducted by conversation, without using e-mail.
8 = I rarely feel mental stress in the workplace.

Conclusion

Finally, I would like to summarize main point of this thesis.

1. The state of workplace relationship is varied and there are many employees, who have no interactions outside of work, but wish to develop personal relationship.
2. The sense of trust influences the state of relationship in the workplace to some extent. However, I can't say that sense of trust is the only definite influence to relationship in the workplace.
3. Individual work and frequent use of e-mail as a tool of communication in workplace may weaken workplace relationship. However, employees, especially white-collar employees, cannot avoid the technology in order to ensure efficiency at workplace and survive the grobalized business scenes. State of workplace relationship is also related to trust. It is certain that trust and workplace relationship will be one of the very fascinating themes for further research.

SOCIAL AND INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE

TRUST OF NATIONS ON CULTURAL MANIFOLD ANALYSIS (CULMAN) – SENSE OF TRUST IN OUR LONGITUDINAL AND CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEYS OF NATIONAL CHARACTER[1]

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Introduction

The objective of this paper is to study the variability of peoples' basic social values as reflected in data from our past surveys on national character over the past six decades. Among other issues, I focus on trust systems in order to explore what aspects of sense of trust are stable and what aspects are variable longitudinally in accordance with economic or political conditions. The background and the significance of this study are as follows.

The last two decades have witnessed a rapid global change that has led us to the destruction of the traditional world order and the chaos before the construction of a new order. Japan has struggled with recession in a period called the "lost decade," which eventually lasted much longer because of the crisis emerging from various domestic and international problems including the housing loan problem in the U. S. A. On the other hand, several military or political conflicts have been occurring in certain areas. Each nation and race has its own culture, social values and ways of thinking, which underlie its system of economy, politics, social life etc. I believe that mutual understanding of these aspects with respect to each nation is the key to the peaceful development and economic prosperity of the world (Yoshino, 2005a, b, 2012). We ought to encourage people to adopt the kinds of social values that are tolerant of their manifold variety and differences at the global level.

The Institute of Statistical Mathematics (ISM) has been conducting a longitudinal nationwide social survey on the Japanese national character every five years since 1953, using mostly the same questionnaire items (Hayashi, 1993; Mizuno et al., 1992, Sakamoto, et al., 2000). By the term "national character," we intend to mean characteristics

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1 Key Words and Phrases: cross-national comparison, cultural manifold analysis, interpersonal relations, Japanese, longitudinal survey, national character, public opinion, social survey, trust.

This is a revised and combined version of two previous papers (Yoshino, 2009; Yoshino, Nikaido & Fujita, 2009), including updated and augmented survey data sets.

reflected in people's response patterns in questionnaire surveys (cf. Inkeles, 1997). This survey is a type of general social survey, so the questionnaire covers various aspects of people's opinions about their culture, daily life, economy, education, environment, interpersonal relationships, politics, religion, security etc. (see http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/ks_e/index_e.html).

This survey research was started to establish a scientific system of public opinion poll based on a statistical sampling theory introduced from the USA immediately after the World War II, and in order to clarify the Japanese national character. Although the sampling theory itself had been already invented by the Japanese statistician, Toyojiro Kameda, as early as in 1924, it was not linked to the development of public opinion poll in the post-WWII democracy in Japan. Instead, Japanese researchers used some textbooks from the U. S. A. to invent a practical sampling method adapted to Japan. The system of public opinion poll must have been important at the postwar time when Japan was expected to change from a military regime to a democratic country (Yoshino, 1994, 2005a).

It is said that, stimulated by this survey, some now well-known surveys such as European Values Survey, Eurobarometer, and the General Social Survey (GSS) of U. S. A. have started. Currently, many countries have been carrying out similar time series surveys, such as Allbus in Germany, Credoc in France, World Values Survey (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995) and so forth.

Since 1971, the Japanese national character survey has been expanded to cross-national surveys for a more advanced understanding of the Japanese national character in the context of comparative study (Hayashi, 1973). Selecting items of those nationwide surveys, we designed our questionnaires to compare peoples' social values, their ways of thinking and their feelings, and more explicitly: their cultural identities; interpersonal relationships; religious attitudes; and social values with respect to science and technology, politics, the economy, social security, freedom of speech, leadership etc. These aspects may yield psychological distances between nations or cultures which are evidenced in certain response patterns. Based on statistical survey data on these aspects, our research team has been attempting to clarify peoples' attitudes and values as well as the characteristics of their civilizations quantitatively. Our final goal is to develop a behaviormetric study of civilizations through social survey data as a branch of social science so that it will give us fundamental information for the peaceful development of the world (Hayashi, 1993, 2001a; Hayashi et al., 1998; Yoshino, 2000, 2001a, 2005a, 2005b, 2007).

In order to be considered a scientific study, the cross-national survey must overcome multi-faceted methodological problems. First of all, it is a difficult task to scientifically compare responses collected under different conditions. Since different countries use different languages and may utilize differing statistical sampling methods, there is no a priori knowledge as to how these varying conditions influence peoples' responses even in cases where there is no substantive difference between the peoples.

Thus, an important problem for our study is to investigate those conditions under which meaningful **cross-national comparability** of social survey data is guaranteed. This problem involves many analytical and methodological sub-problems. Among others, they are concerned with 1) translation (i. e., the same questionnaire items must be written in different languages), 2) comparison of data sets collected by different sampling procedures used in different countries, 3) characterization of the nations (i. e. in which aspects and to what degree certain nations are similar or dissimilar to others), and 4) the description of nations in terms of common logic, rather than logic particular to a certain nation. These sub-problems are complementary in the sense that solutions of

these problems are related to each other. Some findings have been reported in our past publications (C. Hayashi, 2001b; F. Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2002; Yoshino, 2001c, 2007; Yoshino, 2007; Yoshino, Hayashi, Yamaoka, 2010).

We have taken a step forward, however small it might be, toward a scientific foundation of cross-national comparison with our established methodology for the mutual understanding of peoples all over the world; for prediction of mass behavior of a certain nation in response to a particular event; prediction of the political determination of a particular nation in international relations; scientific understanding of the rise and fall of civilizations; and investigation of an ideal condition in Japan and the world for the development and maintenance of world peace.

The composition of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, an explanation of our paradigm called the "cultural manifold analysis" is presented. Section 3 reviews the past studies on trust. In Section 4, I summarize some aspects of fundamental social values of the Japanese and their sense of trust as identified in our longitudinal survey of the Japanese national character. In Section 5, I present a cross-national comparative analysis of trust and some social values as explored through our past surveys. This considers also the Japanese immigrants in Brazil, Hawaii, and the U. S. West Coast. Finally, Section 8 presents some comments for our future research.

From Cultural Linkage Analysis (CLA) to Cultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN)

The early years of our survey research has invented a paradigm called "cultural linkage analysis (CLA)" (Yoshino & Hayashi, 2002). The idea is roughly as follows.

In our search for conditions which can guarantee meaningful cross-national comparability of social survey data, we decided that beginning our study by a comparison of two nations (or social groups) which have some similarity and some dissimilarity would have more meaning than attempting to begin from a comparison of two totally different nations (or social groups). Then, our task is to investigate in what aspects and to what degree the peoples of the nations (or social groups) involved are similar or dissimilar to each other.

Our cross-national survey was started with the comparison of the Japanese in Japan with Americans of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii (Honolulu residents) in 1971.

See Table 1 for a partial list of our past cross-national surveys. Some of those nations or areas share certain common features such as race or language. Therefore, they provide meaningful links for comparison. Extending the chain of links may eventually make a chain of global cross-national comparison.

Developing the idea of spatial comparison for temporal and thematic comparison, CLA eventually includes the following three subjects: a **spatial** link as described above, a **temporal** link inherent in longitudinal analysis, and an **item-structure** link inherent in the commonalities and the differences in item response patterns within and across different cultures (Yoshino, 2005a). This is the basic idea of cultural linkage analysis invented by Chikio Hayashi around 1978.

Succeeding Hayashi's works, Yoshino (2005a) and his colleagues are developing a paradigm called "**cultural manifold analysis (CULMAN)",** which introduces *hierarchical structures* into the three types of links of CLA.

The concept of "manifold" is originally from geometry: a map of the globe (the earth) consists of a set of local charts, where each local chart covers a certain area or region in a simple fashion (such as a Euclidean plane), some of them may partially overlap each

Table 1
List of Past Main Surveys on National Character by ISM

1953–present	**Japanese National Character Survey (every five years)**
1971	Japanese Americans in Hawaii
1978	Honolulu Residents, Americans in the Mainland
1983	Honolulu Residents
1988	Honolulu Residents
1987–1993	**Seven Country Survey**
1987	Britain, Germany & France
1988	Americans in the mainland of U. S. A., the Japanese in Japan
1992	Italy
1993	The Netherlands
	Recent Overseas Japanese Survey
1991	Japanese Brazilians in Brazil
1998	Japanese ancestry Americans in the U. S. West Coast
1999	Honolulu Residents in Hawaii
2002–2005	**East Asia Values Survey (EAVS)**
	Japan, China (Beijing, Shanghai), Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea & Singapore
2004–2009	**Pacific-Rim Values Survey (PRVS)**
	Japan, China (Beijing, Shanghai), Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, U. S. A., Singapore, Australia & India
2010–2014 (ongoing)	**Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APVS)**
	Japan, China (Beijing, Shanghai), Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, U. S. A., Singapore, Australia & India

Notes: All of these are face-to-face surveys based on nationwide statistical random sampling data, except for Hawaii, Brazil, Mainland China, i.e., Beijing and Shanghai (urban areas only), Australia (Queensland, New South Wales, & Victoria), and India (10 major cities).

Although the Japanese title of the survey project 2004–2009 literally means the Pacific-Rim Values Survey, the title "The Asia-Pacific Values Survey" was occasionally used for the project in the past English publication, because it covered not only Pacific-Rim Area but India. From now on, we designate the Pacific-Rim Values Survey (effectively 1st round of the Asia-Pacific Values Survey) for the 2004–2009 project and the Asia-Pacific Values Survey for the 2010–2014 project (effectively 2nd round the Asia-Pacific Values Survey).

other, and the whole set of charts covers the globe (a non-Euclidean space). The set of charts may construct a sort of hierarchical structure, where each level of charts may correspond to an extent of coverage (e. g. Japan and China, Asia, Eurasia, or the world): the larger chart corresponds to the higher level. The larger chart may correspond to the less restricted scaling. In our case, the concept of spatial chart can be extended for the temporal link and item-structure link as well. (The idea is closely linked to Klein's Erlanger Program of modern geometry.)



Fig. 1a. An Example of Temporal Linkage
Each temporal chart covers each time, and all charts make a longitudinal linkage of time series comparison. Each chart may correspond to a certain set of items to study.



(a). One-dimensional linkage of comparison



Relationships of Similarities (commonalities) and dissimilarities are multidimensional. Each chart of countries or regions under comparison may correspond to a set of questionnaire items to ask.

(b) Multidimensional linkage of comparison.

Fig. 1b. An Example of Spatial Linkage
Extension of local paired-comparisons leads to a global comparison.

See Fujita & Yoshino (2009) and Matsumoto (2006) for examples on a sort of trade-off that exists between the extent of countries and the level of analysis on peoples' sense of trust in social systems or institutions.

We are developing our survey research on "data science" (Hayshi, 2001b; Hayashi et al., 1998; Yoshino, 2001c, 2007; Yoshino, Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2010) under **the Prin-**



Fig. 2. Illustration of Hierarchy of Charts (Links) of a CULTURAL MANIFOLD
Some charts may overlap each other in a hierarchy, and the structure may show dynamic changes over many decades.

ciples of Complementarity toward a certain practical problem. Here the meaning of "complementarity" is multi-fold, and it covers the following aspects:

1) Complementarity in the methodology: data collection vs theory.
2) Complementarity in the range of aspects to investigate: analysis of a single aspect vs synthetic study of various aspects.
3) Complementarity in the areas or nations to compare: local region vs more global area.
4) Complementarity in statistical scaling: uni-dimensional scaling vs multi-dimensional pattern analysis.

See Yoshino & C. Hayashi (2002), Yoshino (2005a), Yoshino, F. Hayashi & Yamaoka (2010) and Yoshino, Nikaido & Fujita (2009) for more explanation on our paradigm and for history of our cross-national surveys.

Reconstruction of Trust in the Transitional Period

The transition after the end of the Cold War brought domestic and international confusion in various areas worldwide as well as in various domains of daily life. On the other hand, there has been a rapid transition from the established social system based on traditional industry to a system founded on highly advanced information technology in the last two decades or so. The global rise of the new kinds of social and political movements has also brought confusion into our daily life. As a result, we are facing the collapse of our sense of trust in traditional systems of education, ethics, family, law, marriage, work environment, and so on. This does not necessarily mean, however, that each individual has totally lost his or her interpersonal trust. Nowadays, many people are engaged in activities of non-profit organizations (NGO) or non-governmental organizations (NPO) more extensively and more intensively than previously seen (Hayashi & Iriyama, 1997; Yoshino, 2003). It may be that people's sense of trust and energy are being directed toward the development of a new interpersonal system. Thus it is important to investigate how people's attitudes toward the traditional trust system will be changed in the near future.

Under these conditions, "trust" has been extensively studied during the past two decades. It is now necessary to consider how we can develop international trust in order to prevent conflicts between different countries, races or religious groups.

In his comparative economic theory, Fukuyama (1995) treated "trust" as a social capital and contrasted Japan, USA and Germany as highly trustful countries with China and Italy as less trustful countries. (See Yoshino (2006) for the study on trust in China.) Although he focused on aspects of trust as a property of national character, there are various possible definitions of "trust", all of which may be roughly classified into "trust in transactions" and "trust in normative philosophy", as summarized in: Hosmer, 1995. The study of trust in normative philosophy has a long history, at least since Aristotle in the West, and Buddha and Confucius in the East, but it is rare these days. Uslaner's (2002, 2010) studies present an exception. On the other hand, the study of trust in transactions has been the focus of many papers published during the recent years of globalization.

Zucker (1986) pointed out three ways for production of trust: 1) process-based trust tied to past exchanges; 2) characteristic-based trust tied to personal characteristics, such as family background and ethnicity; and 3) institution-based trust tied to formal societal structures. Shapiro (1987) criticized the third category because he believes that trust cannot be institutionalized. Further, Zucker claimed that trust was not directly measur-

able. This may have influenced Fukuyama's methodology as he used various datasets concerning "distrust" such as the crime rate, divorce rate, and unemployment rate, rather than a direct measure of trust in public opinion surveys. My focus in this paper is mainly on the second of Zucker's three categories of trust, i. e., that based on personal characteristics, although the three categories are mutually interrelated.

Banfield (1958) regarded "distrust" as the culture of the poor. This motivated Yoshino (2002) to investigate the relationships between people's sense of trust and their economic conditions. His data show some cross-national differences in the degree of correlation between people's sense of trust and their household income or subjective social class (more details are given in Sec. 5.4).

Miyamoto, Fugita & Kashima (2002) developed a theory of interpersonal relations derived from G. H. Mead's approach. In the theory, they presented a psychological framework balancing direct behavior and deep cognition to enable an understanding of the differences in character between Japanese and Americans. For example, they indicated that the Japanese prefer to delay action and pay more attention to the perception of others, perception of themselves, and perception of the situation, whereas the Americans favor direct action and pay more attention to their own views. Their theory also can be used to study the Americans with Japanese ancestry (or Japanese immigrants in general) and their transition of generations from Issei and Nisei to Sansei, etc. Or this theory may lead to an understanding of the interaction between racial origins and social environments. It may be interesting to see Table 1 of Yoshino, 2009, for differences of generations or countries/areas with respect to general response tendencies in face-to-face surveys. (See also Fugita, Kashima, Miyamoto, 2002; Fugita, Miyamoto, Kashima, 2002.)

As for measurements of national character, Inkeles (1997) claimed that aspects directly related to economic or political conditions should not be regarded as part of "national character". It is reasonable, however, to assume that people of different countries may respond differently to certain economic or political items on a questionnaire (i. e., "Are you satisfied with your living conditions?") even under the same economic and political conditions and that such differences in response patterns may be closely related to "national character". For example, in the late 1980s, Brazilians showed a high degree of life satisfaction and happiness even when their country was experiencing severe conditions regarding international debt. On the other hand, the Japanese did not show a high degree of life satisfaction and happiness even when their economy was close to being the best-performing in the world. To understand phenomena like these, we need to identify general tendencies in different peoples' manners of responding; both objective and subjective means of measurement must be employed.

Among various efforts to relate trust with social issues in the last two decades, public health may be one of the most productive fields in the study of social capital (voluntary activity or interpersonal trust) and social groups, as exemplified by Kawachi and his colleagues (1997). For example, they reported that a greater degree of social capital is closely linked to better health as measured by medical research experiments and social surveys at the individual and state levels in the USA. These results have been confirmed in some countries, but not in others. In Japan, no clear relationship had been confirmed until recently, probably because one difficulty is to identify what spatial unit (prefecture, city, village etc.) should be adopted in attempts to relate health with social capital (sense of trust). Ichida and his colleagues (2005), however, performed intensive studies on this matter and finally showed a positive relationship between health and social capital in their survey at villages of Aichi prefecture in Japan.

On the other hand, Yoshino and Tsunoda (2010) show that, as for the ranking of interpersonal trust scaled by the GSS trust items (see Sec. 4.2), the Japanese are in the middle and the Italians and the French are in the lower echelons respectively, but that they all rank higher in life expectancy than the countries that rank higher on interpersonal trust such as the USA and Britain. This suggests that the positive response rates of interpersonal trust and peoples' health (life expectancy) are not simply, but intertwiningly related to each other. Thus, we may have to question the universal validity of the GSS items as a scale of trust in the cross-national comparative context. Or we may need to apply multidimensional analysis to the response data. At least we need to think about the general response tendency of each ethnic group, nation or race, such as the Japanese preference for the middle categories and the French preference to express critical attitudes. (See Yoshino, 2009, Sec. 2, or Yoshino & Osaki, 2013, for the cross-national comparison of the degrees of preference for middle responses, or preference for avoidance of polar responses in questionnaire.)

Logistic regression analysis by Tsunoda, Yoshino & Yokoyama (2008) revealed certain relationships between two dependent variables on self-rated health and health dissatisfaction, and some independent variables such as religion, social capital, spirituality, superstitions etc., as part of a national character study. For example, in males with negative attitudes on generalized trust, the number of self-reported symptoms was greater; in females, negative attitudes on norms of reciprocity were associated with a greater number of self-reported symptoms. Moreover, health dissatisfaction in females was aggravated by low perceptions of support. In both genders, self-reported symptoms and health dissatisfaction were greater in the presence of anxiety. A larger number of self-reported symptoms were associated with adherence to religion and spirituality in males. In females, the degree of health dissatisfaction was greater in those with low income and concern about superstitions. Thus, from the viewpoint of social capital, perceived health is susceptible to personal relationships in females and to distrust in males. Among other factors, anxiety was found to be a key factor affecting perceived health. In addition, females were influenced by economic status and superstitions, whereas males were more concerned about religion or the mind in relation to health. The authors of that study suggested that these findings be used in developing public health policies in Japan.

Interpersonal Trust and Some Social Values

In this section, I consider certain aspects of "trust" reflected in responses to our nationwide surveys. I pay attention also to the survey data on variability of people's trust systems in order to explore which aspects of people's sense of trust are stable over many decades and which vary with changes in economic and political conditions. As mentioned previously, some researchers say that "trust" is not directly measurable. But I believe that people's responses in questionnaire surveys can reveal certain aspects of their sense of trust if time series patterns or cross-national patterns of those responses are adequately analyzed and general response tendencies of nations and personality types are adequately considered. (I never mean to imply that any scale on the sense of trust always works in the same way cross-nationally and longitudinally.)

Our longitudinal nationwide social survey, called "Nihonjin no Kokuminsei Chosa (Japanese National Character Survey)", has been using mostly the same questionnaire items over six decades (Mizuno et al., 1992; http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/ks_e/index_e.html). Although the definition of "national character" may be very problematic

in a political or sociological sense, here it simply refers to characteristics of people's response patterns to questionnaire surveys (Hayashi et al., 1998). This is similar to the idea of Inkeles (1997) that each nation or social group is characterized by statistical modes of response distributions in surveys, although our approach was developed independently of his work. Since 1971, the survey conducted by ISM has been expanded to a cross-national comparative study for a more advanced understanding of the Japanese national character (http://www.ism.ac.jp/~yoshino/index.htm).

Our longitudinal survey of Japanese national character shows some stable aspects of attitudes and social values of the Japanese (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997; Yoshino, 1994). In the following, I briefly explain certain fundamental dimensions of the Japanese social values, and some results of the analysis of the sense of trust among Japanese along several dimensions.

Fundamental Dimensions of the Japanese Social Values

Hayashi (1993) has identified two important dimensions that underlie the Japanese national character: 1) the dimension of interpersonal relationships ("Giri-Ninjyo" attitude, or a sort of conflict between obligation to social duties on one hand and the need to express "warmheartedness" on the other, which is particular to Japanese interpersonal relationships), and 2) the dimension of contrast between the modern and traditional in their way of thinking.

On one hand, Japanese interpersonal attitudes have been stable, at least over the last half century, and probably much longer. (Most likely, the basic aspects of interpersonal attitudes may be stable in any country over the years. However, certain aspects sensitive to changes in economic or political conditions may vary in the short term in most countries.)

On the other hand, Japan has strived since the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to overtake Western science and technology and develop it into a Japanese adaptation. Probably this enduring effort underlies the dimension of the traditional versus modern orientation in the Japanese way of thinking.

However, the Japanese way of thinking has been gradually changing. Our survey of 1978 identified a generation gap between people aged 20–24 years old and those older than 25 years[1]. Since signs of generational changes appeared as early as in 1978, the Japanese way of thinking had become more complicated than ever. Furthermore, the Japanese have been living in a transitional period from the established social system to a system of a highly advanced information age in the last two decades or so. This has brought disruption not only to the fields of science and technology but also to the fields of economics and politics. In this period of confusion, the majority of Japanese people have come to distrust traditional systems such as banking and bureaucracy as well as legislature, police etc. (Yoshino, 2002), in spite of the stereotype of Japan being a highly trustful nation (Fukuyama, 1995). This must be closely relating to the recent changes of governmental parties. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governed Japan some four decades alone (1955–1993) and then in a coalition with other parties since 1993 until 2009. This might symbolize the Japanese political attitude that dislikes rapid changes.

1 Note that the younger generation was born more than 10 years after the end of World War II. In 1956, the Economic White paper declared, "Japan is no longer in the post-war condition", and this symbolized the start of the high-speed development of industry and economy. On the other hand, Japan had to face pollution problems as a result of the high-speed industrialization around 1970.

Under the name of globalization, however, Japan came under pressure to restructure its social systems including business, education and law in the last two decades. This necessitated the change even in the most fundamental human relationships not only in business but in daily life, eventually sapping at the source of national power. An aspect of confusion appeared as switching of governmental party from LDP to Democratic Party in 2009 and then back to LDP in 2012. The current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, once forced to resign in 2007 but revived politically in December 2012, is struggling for the revival of the Japanese national power.

In people's attitudes, values, or ways of thinking, there are some aspects that may change according to economic and political changes on one hand, but some other aspects must be stable to maintain the social order of efficacy.

Sense of Interpersonal Trust of the Japanese

Psychological studies of measures of interpersonal trust have been developed in the past decades (Rosenberg, 1956; Rotter, 1971). Many of these studies may have some methodological limitations because they are based on samples too small, or not on random samples. The significance of such studies, however, may have been justified by the statement of Rotter (1971) in the time of the Cold War. He noted: "It seems clear that disarmament will not proceed without an increase in trust on one or both sides of the iron curtain" (Rotter, 1971, p. 443). The iron curtain was torn down more than two decades ago, but new local conflicts have been occurring incessantly all over the world. This necessitates the continued study of interpersonal and international trust. And the study of production of trust necessitates the measurement of trust.

Zucker (1986) questioned the direct measurement of trust. Fukuyama (1995), probably influenced by Zucker's idea, used several objective measures related to distrust such as the crime rate, divorce rate, or unemployment rate for the study of cross-national comparison of trust levels. Although it is questionable whether trust can be *directly* measured, it is certain that people's responses to questionnaire surveys may provide us with some important information on their sense of trust, provided that items are appropriately chosen and response data are adequately analyzed.

A set of three items has been used to measure people's sense of trust by the General Social Survey (GSS). (See Yoshino & Osaki, 2013, for some history of those items in research.) Although the GSS started as a sort of American version of our Japanese National Character Survey, beginning in 1978, we adopted the three items. They are stated as follows[1]. (For the Japanese questionnaire, see the ISM Research Report № 83, 1999; http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/index.html.)

2.12a) Would you say that most of the time, people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?

1. Try to be helpful,
2. Look out for themselves,
3. Other (*please specify*),
4. Don't know.

1 All through this paper, figures, such as № 2.12, correspond to the common item code of the questionnaire of our surveys. Except in some cases, I leave the exact wording of items and the precise data on response rates to the ISM Research Report № 85 (Sakamoto et al., 2000). As for our past surveys, our home pages are: http://www.ism.ac.jp/~yoshino/; and http://www.ism.ac.jp/ism_info_j/kokuminsei.html.

2.12b) Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?

1. Take advantage,
2. Try to be fair,
3. Other (*please specify*),
4. Don't know.

2.12c) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

1. Can be trusted,
2. Can't be too careful,
3. Other (*please specify*),
4. Don't know.

Here I should discuss the dimensionality and wording of these items.

First, originally Almond & Verba (1963) used factor analysis to select several items among hundreds of items on trust in a survey of students, and the above-quoted three items survived to be included in the GSS or other related surveys. Thus, the three items were supposed to measure different dimensions of trust: № 2.12a was related to a sort of trust of neighbors (or norm of reciprocity), № 2.12c was related to generalized interpersonal trust, and № 2.12b may have addressed something in between these two items. Our data, however, have repeatedly demonstrated that № 2.12b and № 2.12c are highly correlated for the Japanese, whereas № 2.12a and № 2.12b are highly correlated for Americans. Thus, two of the three items (a & c or b & c) may capture independent aspects but all three do not necessarily. Therefore, I sometimes use the independent items № 2.12a and № 2.12c when we have to reduce the number of items in a questionnaire. (Each country of our Asia-Pacific Surveys corresponds to either the pattern of Japan or the U. S. A., therefore, the independence of dimensionality of these two items always held, with only exception being India (2008 survey) which showed higher correlation between № 2.12a and № 2.12c (Yoshino & Osaki, 2013).)

Secondly, as for № 2.12c, some people may suspect that the second response category "can't be too careful" is not likely to mean distrust but to mean another positive social value related to self-discipline. This may explain the higher rates of selection of this category than the first category "can be trusted" in many countries (Yoshino, 2002).

NORC-ROPER (1986) reported comparative survey data with respect to the effect of the second category. In the survey two cases were compared: in Case 1 the same wording as № 2.12c was used and in Case 2 the phrase "can't be trusted" was used. The second category was less frequently chosen in Case 2 than in Case 1, i. e., that is, more people answered "can be trusted". The same pattern of response change was found in Japanese surveys (Compare Sakamoto et al., 2000, with Oosaka-syogyou University & Tokyo University, 1999). In summary, the wording of № 2.12c may be considered a sort of advanced technique to induce people's true opinion ("honne" in Japanese), reducing a degree of social desirability in responses ("tatemae" in Japanese).

The response distribution of the Japanese to the three items over the past three decades is shown in the home pages of our Japanese National Character Survey (http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/data/html/index/index.htm). Figure 1 shows the percentage of those who chose optimistic categories for all three items ("1" of № 2.12a, "2" of



Fig. 3. Interpersonal trust scale of the Japanese based on the three GSS item

№ 2.12b & "1" of № 2.12c). In this paper, I use the percentage of those who selected positive responses to all three items, as the trust scale. There may be, however, other definitions of the trust scale based on these three items.

Based on this scale, the Japanese people's sense of trust has been fairly stable during the last three decades. Figure 2 of Yoshino (2005b, p. 151) shows greater changes in trust in Americans than in Japanese during the past three decades. Closer analysis shows that younger generations generally have more positive attitudes on interpersonal trust (№ 2.12c) than older generations. In the 1998 survey, those aged 60–64 years showed a remarkably low degree of trust, although they had not shown such a low degree of sense of trust when younger. They were children during WWII and experienced a drastic social change from the military regime to the postwar democracy. In addition, they had a hard time surviving in the time of famine during and immediately after the war. Furthermore, it is their generation who reconstructed the ruins of Japan into a highly advanced industrialized country. In 1998, most people of this generation had been retired from the lifelong employment system in Japan. Under the economic depression of the 1990s, the "lost decade", they could not get as high a pension as they had expected and many of those people had a hard time finding new jobs. The above-mentioned data may reflect their distrust towards the social systems that did not compensate them sufficiently for their lifelong hard work. It is remarkable that people of this generation form a cohort in the sense that their opinions and values are different from the other generations in many cases (see Mizuno et al., 1992).

In analyzing more recent survey taken in 2010, I found the following. Roughly, cross-tabulation of each of № 2.12a, b, c with respect to gender, age, or education does not seem to show any remarkable differences of response patterns. Looking at the response distributions of the cross-tabulations more precisely, however, reveals some differences. As for gender, women are more optimistic than men on № 2.12b, but both men and women show the same response patterns on № 2.12a and c. As for the education level by gender on № 2.12b, generally women are more positive than men, disregarding their education levels; besides, men with higher education show a higher rate of distrust than men with lower education on № 2.12b. No such a trend was observed for women. On № 2.12c, the higher the level of education, the higher the rate of trust for both genders. In the cross-tabulation of gender by age, more women aged below 35 years tended to choose "can't be too careful" in № 2.12c than the other age groups.

The Japanese sense of trust has been more stable with respect to economic changes than that of Americans. The economic structural reformation of the last decade, however,

seemed to have damaged the Japanese sense of trust to some extent. In the early 1990s, the educational system was changed significantly from a system that imposes hard work on pupils to a system that gives them more free time, called "yutori-kyoiku (relaxed education)", in spite of the fact that other countries were trying to imitate the hard-work education in order to catch up to the then high economic level of Japan. The new system was expected to produce creative youth with diverse attitudes and social values, but it simply produced many self-centered persons lacking basic skills in various fields. In the early 1990s, economic conditions were still fairly good. Then, these young people enjoyed moving easily from one workplace to another, not within the system of traditional life-long employment, trying to find the best place for him/her, as if looking for a "blue bird". On the other hand, the system of employment has changed from life-long employment to the system where workers can easily be fired including those in public sector jobs. This has produced distrust between employers and employees: workers are afraid of losing their jobs, whereas employers are afraid of losing workers soon after they invest heavily in their training.

Meanwhile the government has lost people's trust in the welfare system of national pension. Although senior people have to rely on younger persons for future financial support, the population of younger generations has been decreasing, and they are less motivated to pay pension costs, considering the balance between their total payment and their return in the future. These situations necessarily lead to loss of trust between the young and senior people.

Thus the difference in trust found in Japanese and American samples may largely come from the difference between the employment systems: workers' salary may be reduced but workers may not be fired so easily in the life-long employment system of Japan, at least until recently. This reminds us of the Chinese proverb of Mengzi: "No stable mind without a stable job". All of those social reforms have been done under the guise of globalization. Without consideration of the culture of each country, it simply leads to confusion.

Inaba (2002, p. 72, Figure 1–12) showed the relationship between the crime rate and the sense of interpersonal trust (№ 2.12c) during 1983–2003. It was suggested that there was a certain causal relationship between the economy and trust in Japan: the economic change from prosperity to recession gradually led to an increase in crime and eventually to an increase in people's sense of distrust with a time lag of some five years.

Yoshino (2002) discussed several other aspects of trust such as trust in politics, science and technology as well as the work ethic of the Japanese. He concluded that some aspects of trust might be variable according to economic and political conditions whereas other aspects may be more stable over time. Generally, the Japanese show stability in interpersonal trust, whereas their attitudes toward work and the work ethic seem to have been influenced by economic and political conditions, although the Japanese used to have the stereotype of being diligent workers (called the "economic animal" in the 1980s). As for the interpersonal trust measured by the three items of the GSS, the sense of trust of Americans was more variable than that of the Japanese, probably because of economic and political changes (Yoshino, 2005b, Figure 2).

This may remind us of Banfield's (1958) statement that distrust is a culture particular to the poor. This can be contrasted with Fukuyama's (1995) observation that certain peoples such as Japanese and Americans are more trustful than other peoples such as Chinese and Italians because the latter have had a long history of very strong political centralization and did not develop a trustful community beyond their families.

Cross-National Comparison of Interpersonal Trust & Institutional Trust

In this section, I present an overview of people's sense of trust as shown in our past cross-national surveys. These surveys included the three items on interpersonal trust from the GSS mentioned in the previous section.

Sense of Interpersonal Trust

Table 2 shows the response distributions of the GSS trust scale for all countries/areas that we have surveyed over the past three decades.

Miyake presented an analysis of this topic (Hayashi et al., 1998, ch. 7 of Part II) as a member of our Seven Country Survey. This survey included Japan, U. S. A., Britain, West Germany, and France during 1987–1988 and Italy and the Netherlands during 1992–1993. He concluded that the trust scale has low correlations with gender and religion, but stronger correlations with family income, educational level, and social class (higher scores for these attributes were associated with higher scores on the trust scale).

On this scale, West Germany, Britain, and USA were higher than Japan and the Netherlands, but the difference was small. The French and Italians were clearly lower than those in other nations. In addition, Miyake found that those who had a religious faith gave more positive responses to item № 2.12a) "most of the time, people are trying to be helpful for others", irrespective of their religious affiliation.

Interestingly, Miyake found a gender difference in responses to item № 2.12b) "most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance". Specifically, women gave more optimistic answers than men, i. e. "they would try to be fair". As for item № 2.12c "most people can be trusted", there was a clear difference between the social classes in all seven countries: the higher the social class, the more trustful. The difference between classes was remarkably large in France and the U. S. A. Miyake observed also that a higher level of education was associated with greater trust, and he suspected that the association was due to the correlation between education and social class. (Although there was a relatively strong correlation between education and social class or between education and income in the U. S. A., this is not necessarily the case for all other countries.)

Figure 2 shows the percentage in each country of those who gave positive answers to *both* № 2.12a and № 2.12c in the three items of trust. (I used those two items because № 2.12b was missing in some of our past surveys, and as mentioned already, I have confirmed that the general pattern on that figure was almost the same as on the figure that was made using all three items for the countries or areas where all three items were asked.)



Fig. 4. Cross-national comparisons of all of the our past surveys: rates of positive respondents to all of the GSS 2 items (№ 2.12a & № 2.12c)

Table 2
The percentages of positive responses of GSS 3 items on trust
Q36 “People are always trying to be helpful to others”.
Q37 “People are trying to be fair”.
Q38 “People can be trusted”.

Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APVS)										
Survey year	2011	2011	2011	2011	2012	2012	2013	2012	2010	2010
APVS	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singapore	India	Australia	USA	Japan
Q36	72	66	43	46	52	50	–	59	51	41
Q37	57	58	40	53	53	49	–	63	53	57
Q 38	42	36	21	21	32	34	–	45	31	44

Pacific-Rim Values Survey (PRVS)											7 Country survey							
Survey year	2005	2005	2005	2006	2006	2007	2008	2007	2006	2004	1988	1987	1987	1987	1992	1993	1988	1988
APVS	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singapore	India	Australia	USA	Japan	USA	FRA	UK	FRG	ITA	HOL	JPN-A	JPN-B
Q36	67	65	41	46	57	50	61	54	56	36	54	19	53	43	21	32	31	29
Q37	51	53	42	61	45	51	29	59	56	55	56	36	58	55	30	48	53	56
Q 38	37	34	19	19	30	26	52	43	41	41	42	23	36	38	14	48	39	34

East Asia Values Survey (EAVS)										Singapore Races								
Survey year	2002	2002	2002	2003	2003	2004	2003	2002	2002	2004			2007			2012		
APVS	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singapore	Kunming	Hangzhou	Japan A	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Chinese	Malay	Indian
Q36	62	59	36	38	58	51	48	61	35	50	54	55	50	57	43	48	58	53
Q37	53	65	46	58	45	52	41	55	59	53	50	53	50	53	50	48	55	48
Q 38	36	33	19	14	28	33	32	39	37	33	37	28	25	25	28	33	33	45

Japan Surveys												Japanese Immigrants Surveys			
Survey year	1988	1988	1993	1998	2002	2003	2004	2004	2008	1988	1988	1999	1999	1998	1991
APVS	Japan A	Japan B	JPN – KS9	JPN – KS10	Japan	JPN – KS11	Japan A	Japan B	JPN – KS12	Hawaii JA	Hawaii Non-J	Hawaii JA	Hawaii Non-J	JAWCS	BRZJB
Q36	31	29	29	30	36	34	35	37		58	66	68	65	66	41
Q37	53	56	65	61	55	62	59	–		68	66	–	–	–	–
Q 38	39	34	38	33	41	33	37	39		60	46	56	59	61	6

Note: JA – Japanese Americans; JAWCS – JA on the West Coast; BRZ JB – Japanese Brazilian in Brazil.

Stability of response patterns may be confirmed by comparisons of two or three surveys in the same countries (areas) over years. Examples are the surveys in Japan in 1988, 2002, 2004 and 2010, or those in Beijing and Shanghai in 2002, 2005 and 2011.

The percentages of positive responses in the U. S. A. and Britain were high, whereas those in Italy and France were low. In a sense, this result may be consistent with Fukuyama's claim about trust and national character. However, a close look at this figure show more complicated reality because the percentages of positive responses in surveys from Mainland China (Beijing, Shanghai) were higher than might have been expected. As for the data of China, there may be several possible explanations. First, the data really do indicate that the Chinese might have a higher sense of interpersonal trust. Secondly, the Chinese might have tried to show a higher sense of interpersonal trust because they have been sensitive to their international reputation such as that observed by Fukuyama. Thirdly, the questionnaire items are constructed as a trust scale for Americans, so they may be unsuitable for the measurement of trust in other nations. Fourthly, we must be careful about the semantics of the trust scale. For example, Dogan (2000, p. 258) states: "Erosion of confidence is first of all a sign of political maturity. It is not so much that democracy has deteriorated, but rather the critical spirit of most citizens has improved…". This suggests that we must always be sensitive to the distinction between the face value of a scale and its semantics. In this context, trust and distrust may not be opposite in a uni-dimensional scale but, rather, they may be closely related in one's mind.

Trust of social institutions and systems

The questionnaire of the EAVS: 2002–2005, PRVS 2004–2008 and APVS 2010–2014 included the same set of items on organizational trust as used in the World Values Survey (WVS), with an additional item of trust in science and technology. The items are as follows.

Q. 50. How much confidence do you have in the following? Are you very confident, somewhat confident, not confident or not confident at all? (*Show card 31*).

	Very confident	**Somewhat confident**	**Not confident**	**Not confident at all**
Religious organizations	1	2	3	4
The law and the legal system	1	2	3	4
The press and television	1	2	3	4
The police	1	2	3	4
National federal bureaucracy	1	2	3	4
National Assembly (Federal Parliament)	1	2	3	4
NPO/NGO (Non-Profit and Non-Governmental Organization)	1	2	3	4
Social welfare facilities	1	2	3	4
The United Nations	1	2	3	4
Science and technology	1	2	3	4

Table 3 shows the sum of percentages of positive responses, i. e., "1. Very confident" and "2. Somewhat confident" for each of the above-mentioned items. Yoshino's (2005b) analysis of the same items in the EAVS was consistent with the analyses of the PRVS and APVS for countries (areas) repeatedly studied in these three surveys.

Yoshino (2005b) transformed those response data into standardized scores country by country to minimize the effects of general response tendencies particular to in-

dividual countries. Then, Yoshino (2009) used a much easier way to reduce the general response tendencies in countries. First, the original response categories are re-categorized to sum up the percentage of responses to positive categories ("1" & "2"). Secondly, the percentages of positive responses are compared in each country item by item. This yields a rank order of items in each country. Thirdly, the rank orders of all countries (areas) involved are compared. This procedure results in loss of some information from the original data, but provide more cross-national comparability. This is a trade-off that we have to make in order to secure cross-national comparability beyond a simple comparison of face values of the original data.

Table 3 includes data from the EAVS (2002–2005), PRVS (2005–2008), and APVS (2010–2014). Generally consistent patterns have been found in the countries (areas) participating in all three surveys, although the response distributions may not be totally unchanged over years. For example, the item-by-item differences in percentages between the Japan surveys in 2002 (EAVS), 2004 (PRVS), and 2010 (APVS) were within the margin of sampling error. The maximum difference was some 10%, for example, on NPO/NGO. So roughly, the stability of data was confirmed. (The percentage changed from 55% in 2002 down to 45% in 2004, then up to 49% in 2010. It might be a result of the fact that activities of NPO/NGO had been increasing whereas some people disguised their groups as NPO/NGO to manage illegal businesses in the early years of 2000s, which was one of the reasons that the Japanese laws on registered organizations were substantially revised in 2008.)

Except for India, Hong Kong, Taiwan, USA and Singapore, in all of the countries (areas) there was a low degree of confidence in religious organizations. Even in these five countries (areas), the relative degrees of confidence were not very high when compared with all of the other items for each country, except for India. Japan and Mainland China indicated remarkably negative attitudes towards religious organizations. (The percentage of positive responses among Japanese was lower than among Chinese.) Of the 10 items on Q50, the percentage of positive responses has been the lowest for religious organization among Chinese. It is known that most Japanese respect religions or the "religious heart/mind" even when they do not have a religious faith (Hayashi & Nikaido, 2009), but they may be cautious about "religious organizations" because some religious groups such as the Aum Shinri-Kyo (Aum religious cult) caused serious problems in the 1990s. In China, the government has been very sensitive toward religious groups because in the long history of China frequently religious groups have overthrown governments. In some countries, some religious groups might be considered closely linked to terrorism.

The percentages of responses that show confidence in authority such as the "police", "government" and "congress" may represent various patterns of attitudes; probably those are concerned with democracy. In this sense, a negative attitude does not necessarily mean negation of such authority and it may express a mature democracy as Dogan (2000) suggested. The percentage of positive responses, however, may not be proportional to the degree of political maturity.

Singapore respondents indicated very high confidence in most of the items, but lower confidence in the UN. This response pattern might be related to a negative attitude towards global politics mainly led by Western nations.

As for the item on trust in science and technology, all the countries (areas) showed a high degree of confidence. Hayashi (1993) and Zheng & Yoshino (2003) have already presented cross-national analyses of data on science and technology from our seven-country survey. Hayashi (1993) concluded that the Japanese generally had positive attitudes

Table 3
Insitutional Trust of WVS Items
The figures show percentages of sum of positive categories “1. Very much confident” and “2. Confident some what”

Survey year		2011	2011	2011	2011	2010	2012	2012	2012	2013	2010
Item		Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	USA	South Korea	Singapore	Australia	India	Japan
Q52a	Religious organization	27	36	58	75	58	41	82	44	–	13
Q52b	The law and the legal system	85	82	86	53	56	51	83	78	–	72
Q52c	The press and television	68	64	56	44	21	63	78	33	–	70
Q52d	The police	75	72	69	59	65	46	92	89	–	70
Q52e	National government bureaucracy	83	77	50	46	26	34	89	47	–	38
Q52f	Congress/diet	83	75	53	38	22	17	88	46	–	25
Q52g	NPO/NGO	41	45	64	56	51	42	80	74	–	49
Q52h	Social welfare facilities	78	70	81	69	48	59	83	79	–	71
Q52i	The United Nations	59	54	70	61	40	68	82	63	–	59
Q52j	Science and technology	95	89	85	86	76	75	91	92	–	83

		RPVS										EAVS								
Survey year		2005	2005	2005	2006	2006	2006	2007	2007	2008	2004	2002	2002	2002	2003	2002	2002	2003	2003	2004
Item		Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	USA	South Korea	Singapore	Australia	India	Japan A	Japan	Beijing	Shanghai	Kunming	Hangzhou	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singapore
Q50a	Religious organization	24	32	60	66	69	46	84	48	90	15	12	20	29	24	24	59	64	49	82
Q50b	The law and the legal system	84	86	87	63	79	57	96	72	90	79	74	82	92	78	80	86	65	59	93
Q50c	The press and television	61	66	46	32	44	59	81	32	82	74	74	57	71	55	60	41	37	60	82
Q50d	The police	72	77	78	57	80	50	95	83	64	69	64	71	74	64	73	75	50	49	93
Q50e	National government bureaucracy	81	85	63	42	45	29	92	46	58	41	41	84	88	71	81	56	42	30	89
Q50f	Congress/diet	82	86	61	25	51	11	90	51	64	32	34	85	87	72	82	55	30	14	86
Q50g	NPO/NGO	40	46	64	40	65	31	70	74	69	45	55	36	53	39	48	59	38	41	76
Q50h	Social welfare facilities	73	74	81	56	62	59	78	74	83	70	68	70	80	61	69	77	52	62	84
Q50i	The United Nations	59	59	65	46	55	58	74	59	75	56	62	59	62	45	56	63	50	50	71
Q50j	Science and technology	96	94	88	73	87	75	93	88	93	76	73	97	97	95	90	84	76	78	87

toward science. However, they were negative regarding scientific approaches towards the understanding of the human heart and mind ("kokoro" in Japanese), solving social and economic problems, and the possibility of living in space stations in the near future (at the time of the survey in the 1980s). The response pattern of West Germans in 1987 was similar to that of Japanese in the sense that they were also more negative about science and technology than those in other Western countries. However, they were not as negative toward the contributions of science and technology to social problems as well as psychological problems of individuals as were the Japanese. These responses might remind us that the theories of Hegel and Marx and the scientific psychological theories of Freud originated in Germany and Austria.

As for data from the APVS, all of the countries (areas) were highly positive toward science and technology, with rates of positivity for that item being the highest among all items. In particular, the rates for Mainland China were remarkably close to 100% in both the APVS and EAVS. There may be several possible explanations for this. On one hand, the high rates may represent the fact that in the past decade China has been emphasizing the scientific reformation of governmental sections, military systems, and social systems as a priority in their social planning. On the other hand, until recently they have not paid much attention to the negative impact of science and technology that advanced industrial countries have experienced in the past. This is probably because they placed priority on economic development in the past two decades or so. This may explain the overly positive attitudes. After the Beijing Olympics in 2008 or even slightly before it, the Chinese government started paying attention to the negative side of rapid economic and industrial development and began planning to improve environmental conditions, including air and water pollution. Also they are giving attention to political issues such as the social gaps between urban and rural areas. They are struggling to deal with these domestic problems, but the complete solutions seem very far away to many observers' eyes, in spite of their rising powers in international relationships.

As a final comment in this section, it should be noted that Sasaki & Suzuki (2000, Ch. 11) concluded in their study on trust in science and technology that "a single scale is not adequate to measure people's sense of trust in science and technology because people's attitudes differ from one issue to another within the fields of science and technology". Probably this is also the case with our study on people's sense of trust in general.

Basic Social Values

In this section, I show some data concerning people's basic social values: attitudes towards Confucian teachings, evaluations of degree of importance of various areas of daily life, and choices of Oriental versus Western values.

First, Table 4 shows the response distributions with regard to Confucian teachings of the APVS. The question asked is as follows.

Q. 9. "How do you feel about each of the following traditional values?" The response categories are "strongly agree", "agree to some extent", "disagree to some extent" and "disagree strongly".

a) We should respect our ancestors.
b) The eldest son should look after his aging parents.
c) A wife should obey (follow) her husband.
d) Not to marry someone whom your parents object to.
e) We should obey (follow) older people.

f) It is important to have a son to keep the family line going.
g) Men should work outside the home and woman should tend to housekeeping.

The patterns of response distributions have been consistent for the countries (areas) surveyed in EAVS (Yoshino, 2005b), PRVS (Yoshino, 2009) and APVS, although the percentages may show some changes or fluctuation over years. One may notice that the percentages of positive choices in the U. S. A. are larger than those of the Asian countries for some items. It could not be that Americans are more influenced by Confucian teachings than people in Asian countries, so we may confirm that the Asian countries have already departed from the literal teachings of Confucian philosophy[1].

More detailed analyses, however, show that there are national differences between, for example, China, Korea and Japan, as well as gender and age differences (see Zheng, 2005, for the analysis of the EAVS). The Confucian philosophy originated in China around the fifth or sixth century B. C., but it has had a greater influence in Korea than in China since the end of 14th century A. D. It had a limited influence on the dominant class in Japan only in the Edo era ("samurai era" of 17–19 centuries). These historical differences may have led to national differences in response distributions of those items. On the other hand, under the present conditions people cannot follow the Confucian teaching literally. For example, one of the national problems is on the decreasing number of children in almost all countries in East Asia. This will be a serious problem in the near future for the maintenance of national productivity or social systems concerning health care and financial support. This naturally makes it difficult for elderly parents to be completely taken care of by their children, not to mention "by the eldest son".

In addition, it may be worthwhile to note that the unexpected combination of Confucian teachings and advanced medical technology caused an ethics crisis in South Korea and Taiwan several years ago. As seen in the sentences of "b" and "f" of Q. 9, there has been strong social pressure on women to bear a son under Confucian teaching, so wives had a hard time when they did not bear a son. In some cases, they adopted a boy from their relatives. Modern medicine has made it possible to bear a child by a "surrogate mother". As a result, in several cases rich Korean parents did not honor their responsibility to take care of the baby when they found that surrogate mothers were to give birth to female babies (occasionally poor Chinese women). Another problem may be an unbalanced ratio of males and females in South Korea. This may be another piece of evidence against the "utility" of modern medicine without new ethics that are suitable to the time of modern science.

(Incidentally, adoption of children is different between Japan, China and Korea: the Japanese may adopt a child even if there is no blood relationship between the child and the parents, whereas the Chinese and Koreans adopt a child from among their relatives whenever possible.)

Next I show the response distributions of importance of various areas in daily life. Table 5 shows for each item and each country (area) the sum of percentages of positive categories 5, 6 and 7.

In all the countries (areas) we have surveyed, the degree of importance of "immediate family" was the highest among various aspects of daily life. The degree of impor-

1 A mistranslation was introduced by the survey agent in the U. S. A.: "obey" should have been used in "c "and "e" where "follow" was used. But this mistake itself may show a lack of understanding concerning Confucian teachings in the U. S. A. The mistranslation was left in the U. S. A. 2006 survey and Singapore 2007, but was corrected in the surveys of Australia 2007 and India 2008.

Table 4

Confucian Teachings of the Asia-Pacific Values Survey (2010–2014), the Pacific-Rim Values Survey (2004–2008) & the East Asia Values Survey (2002–2005)

The figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1) strongly agree" & "2) agree to some extent"

APVS Survey Year	2011	2011	2011	2011	2012	2012	2010	2012	2012	2013
Item	Beijing	Shang-hai	Hong Kong	Tai-wan	South Korea	Singa-pore	Japan	Aus-tralia	USA	India
Q9a: We should respect our ancestors	99	97	95	99	82	96	92	95	97	–
Q9b: The eldest son should look after his aging parents	77	74	79	68	27	55	37	39	54	–
Q9c: A wife should obey (follow) her husband	33	27	44	43	49	66	34	26	41	–
Q9d: Not to marry someone whom your parents object to	11	16	10	14	49	40	27	19	34	–
Q9e: We should obey (follow) older people	61	58	61	61	60	82	56	54	62	–
Q9f: It is important to have a son to keep the family line going	31	27	31	38	36	47	33	29	51	–
Q9g: Men should work outside and woman should tend to housekeeping	30	28	30	31	32	29	24	13	22	–
PRVS Survey Year	2005	2005	2005	2006	2006	2007	2004	2007	2006	2008
Item	Beijing	Shang-hai	Hong Kong	Tai-wan	South Korea	Singa-pore	Japan	Aus-tralia	USA	India
Q9a: We should respect our ancestors	96	97	99	98	84	96	91	96	96	100
Q9b: The eldest son should look after his aging parents	70	61	76	66	45	55	32	44	45	77
Q9c: A wife should obey (follow) her husband	21	20	41	45	60	60	36	29	52	82
Q9d: Not to marry someone whom your parents object to	7	12	7	11	44	28	27	18	37	76
Q9e: We should obey (follow) older people	43	50	54	66	72	51	54	44	56	96
Q9f: It is important to have a son to keep the family line going	21	25	34	39	34	43	30	35	45	74
Q9g: Men should work outside and woman should tend to housekeeping	21	20	29	40	26	28	26	15	17	56

RAVS Survey Year	2002	2002	2003	2002	2002	2003	2003	2004	2002
Item	Beijing	Shang-hai	Kun-ming	Hang-zhou	Hong Kong	Tai-wan	South Korea	Singa-pore	Japan
Q9a: We should respect our ancestors	96	97	93	94	97	100	88	96	92
Q9b: The eldest son should look after his aging parents	50	51	51	59	64	67	45	41	31
Q9c: A wife should obey (follow) her husband	12	11	15	14	40	55	64	65	32
Q9d: Not to marry someone whom your parents object to	3	6	5	6	7	18	32	25	22
Q9e: We should obey (follow) older people	37	40	30	32	49	68	62	46	43
Q9f: It is important to have a son to keep the family line going	15	11	15	17	30	53	41	42	28
Q9g: Men should work outside and woman should tend to housekeeping	12	14	16	12	25	46	35	29	23

Survey Year	Taiwan, 2006		Singapore, 2004			Singapore, 2007				Singapore, 2012			
Item	Native Taiwan-ese	Chinese main-lander	Malay	Indian	Others	Chi-nese	Malay	Indian	Others	Chi-nese	Malay	Indian	Others
Q9a: We should respect our ancestors	98	96	94	98	96	96	94	96	94	96	96	94	-
Q9b: The eldest son should look after his aging parents	65	70	54	51	44	51	66	80	63	43	65	59	-
Q9c: A wife should obey (follow) her husband	44	50	83	72	63	56	81	68	66	61	84	74	-
Q9d: Not to marry someone whom your parents object to	12	9	44	49	37	24	40	40	28	35	55	50	-
Q9e: We should obey (follow) older people	67	48	65	70	70	45	69	69	63	79	88	92	-
Q9f: It is important to have a son to keep the family line going	40	35	55	46	48	41	51	41	47	47	48	50	-
Q9g: Men should work outside and woman should tend to housekeeping	40	37	39	24	33	27	31	26	28	28	37	32	-

Note: In USA 2006 & Singapore 2007 surveys, the word “follow” was used in Q9c nad Q9e by mistranslation.

Table 5
The Degrees of Importance of Aspects in Daily Life
The figures show the sum of percentages of positive categories 4, 5, 6 & 7

APVS survey year	2010	2011	2011	2011	2011	2012	2012	2013	2012	2010		
	Japan	Beijing	Shang-hai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singa-pore	India	Australia	USA		
Q18a Family	97	98	96	96	98	99	95	–	97	94		
Q18b Career	89	90	92	90	93	95	93	–	83	86		
Q18c Free time	92	81	86	92	95	98	98	–	93	90		
Q18d Friends	96	91	93	94	95	99	95	–	94	95		
Q18e Relatives	96	97	96	95	98	98	99	–	95	95		
Q18f Religion	42	26	42	50	64	65	80	–	48	77		
Q18g Politics	78	60	57	52	38	69	43	–	41	51		
RPVS survey year	2004	2005	2005	2005	2006	2006	2007	2008	2007	2006	1988, Hawaii Residents	
	Japan A	Beijing	Shang-hai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singa-pore	India	Australia	USA	Japanese Americans	Non-Japa-nese
Q18a Family	93	93	92	92	97	97	96	96	92	91	95	94
Q18b Career	72	77	85	80	89	96	86	93	66	77	73	80
Q18c Free time	70	59	69	73	85	94	87	68	80	82	78	75
Q18d Friends	81	67	80	74	80	91	86	82	83	88	87	80
Q18e Relatives	89	89	89	90	95	96	97	93	89	93	94	85
Q18f Religion	21	14	28	31	38	47	69	81	36	68	61	58
Q18g Politics	49	43	51	23	19	43	39	37	29	35	39	39

EAVS survey year	2002	2002	2002	2003	2002	2002	2003	2003	2004
	Japan	Beijing	Shang-hai	Kun-ming	Hang-zhou	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singa-pore
Q18a Family	94	95	98	93	95	94	97	97	95
Q18b Career	78	87	91	84	90	81	88	95	81
Q18c Free time	77	68	74	70	78	74	84	93	88
Q18d Friends	85	76	82	77	84	76	76	93	88
Q18e Relatives	92	91	94	91	94	92	94	97	97
Q18f Religion	24	11	18	17	24	28	43	49	72
Q18g Politics	48	41	44	46	45	20	22	45	37
7 country survey	1988	1988	1987	1987	1987	1992	1993		
	Japan A	Japan B	FRA	UK	FRG	ITA	HOL		
Q18a Family	95	94	93	96	87	98	94		
Q18b Career	85	83	85	57	51	75	62		
Q18c Free time	76	78	73	66	83	70	83		
Q18d Friends	87	85	73	76	84	80	88		
Q18e Relatives	91	91	83	83	81	93	86		
Q18f Religion	38	37	35	36	38	64	33		
Q18g Politics	54	53	23	26	40	28	32		

1999, Hawaii		1998	1991
Japanese Americans	Non-Japa-nese	JA on the W. Coast	Japanese Brazilians
99	94	93	94
66	77	74	95
80	80	83	63
91	83	92	87
97	88	96	96
58	55	47	74
34	31	26	49
	1988		
	USA		
	98		
	65		
	74		
	83		
	90		
	76		
	46		

tance of "relatives" was the second highest, but it may show variations compared to those of "immediate family": the percentages of positive categories for relatives were closer to those of "immediate family" for Asian people as well as Japanese immigrants than for Western people (except Italians). These findings may be closely linked to national character. Thus we confirmed that all people think that the family and relatives are important among other aspects of daily life, disregarding differences between the East and the West.

As to the third highest choice, the percentages selecting "career", "friends" and "free time" varied among countries. This seems related to economic conditions more than national character, so the percentages may vary more over time.

The Seven Country Survey, EAVS, PRVS and APVS included the following item which asks respondents to choose two response categories from the four presented: two Oriental principles and two Western principles.

Q. 33. If you were asked to choose the two most important items listed on the card, which two would you choose (select two)? (*Show card 22*).

	Selected	Not Selected
a. Filial piety/Love and respect for parents	1	2
b. Repaying people who have helped you in the past	1	2
c. Respect for the rights of the individual	1	2
d. Respect for the freedom of the individual	1	2

Six possible pairs can be selected among the four items. Table 6 shows the percentages of the selection of each of the possible pairs in the surveys[1]. Some countries, such as Japan and the U. S. A., were studied in three surveys. The patterns selected in Japan are fairly consistent while those of the U. S. A. differ slightly. (The 1988 Japan survey and the 2004 Japan survey used the same sampling methods and field work contractor. The fieldwork company of the 1988 U. S. A. survey was GALLUP, and that of the 2006 U. S. A. survey and the 2010 U. S. A. survey was Kane, Parsons & Associates. GALLUP then used random-walk sampling, and Kane, Parsons & Associates used quota sampling with respect to age, gender and race in 2006 and random route sampling with the quota table on age, gender and race in 2010.)

In all countries (areas) in Asia, the first choice was pair "a. Filial piety/Love and respect for parents" and "b. Repaying people who have helped you in the past". On the other hand, even in Western countries, the choice of pair "c. the rights of individuals" and "d. the right of freedom" was not a majority choice. Only in France and West Germany (in 1988, i. e., before the unification) was the rate of selection of that pair higher than in the other countries, but at most it was 30% or so.

For all countries, "a. Filial piety/Love and respect for parents" was the single first choice (i. e., the rate of selection for each of the possible 4 choices when it is tallied individually, even though Q. 33 asked the respondents to choose two, not just one, items; this is consistent with the previous observation from data in Table 4. That is, the degrees of importance of immediate family and relatives were the highest and the second highest, respectively, in all countries (areas). Although the Japanese generally tend to show preference of middle answer categories, as mentioned in Section 2 of Yoshino (2009), they also choose the highest degree as far as the importance of family is concerned.

1 The patterns for EAVS and APVS are almost the same for the countries (areas) surveyed in both EAVS and APVS. See Yoshino (2005b) for further information.

Table 6

The rates of Two Choices from the Four Choices:

A (filial piety), B (pay back to a benefactor), C (the right of individuals) & D (the right of freedom)

APVS survey year	2010	2010	2011	2011	2011	2011	2012	2012	2013	2012
	USA	Japan	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singapore	India	Australia
A&B	21	55	67	57	44	54	43	48	–	18
A&C	22	10	15	18	15	17	14	27	–	26
A&D	14	13	12	12	22	13	17	10	–	12
B&C	15	6	2	3	5	6	7	6	–	11
B&D	6	11	2	3	6	5	8	3	–	5
C&D	19	5	2	3	7	5	10	7	–	27
PRVS survey year	2005	2004	2011	2011	2011	2011	2012	2012	2013	2012
	USA	Japan	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singapore	India	Australia
A&B	26	48	55	58	44	53	51	45	34	16
A&C	23	12	19	18	14	17	18	30	23	31
A&D	11	15	13	12	26	12	15	12	11	12
B&C	12	8	5	4	3	5	7	6	2	8
B&D	7	12	4	3	7	7	6	3	2	4
C&D	22	8	5	4	7	6	4	4	1	25
7 Country survey year	1988	1988	1992	1987	1987	1993	1987			
	USA	Japan	Italy	France	W. Germany	Holland	UK			
A&B	20	47	24	20	9	12	32			
A&C	40	14	30	14	28	30	20			
A&D	13	20	26	20	19	26	13			
B&C	6	5	4	8	4	3	11			
B&D	3	7	3	11	3	1	8			
C&D	20	8	14	27	37	28	16			

Throughout human history, "family and relatives" has formed the core for survival, whereas political human rights, such as rights of individuals or the right of freedom appeared only recently, although no one would deny the importance of human rights. Probably family and relatives are universally valued in both the East and the West, whereas rights of individuals and the right of freedom originated in the "modern west", thus they may be differently viewed in the current political system of each country. This may mean that each country has its own way to develop democracy as well as economic prosperity; therefore, no country should impose its particular version on other countries but respect the others' ways.

Sense of Trust among Japanese Immigrants, and Ethnic Differences Within a Single Country

In this section, I show more details of the survey data on Japanese immigrants in Hawaii (Yoshino, 2001b), Brazil (Yamamoto et al., 1993), and the U. S. West Coast (Yoshino, 2000, 2001a), to observe differences in regions or generations. Also I briefly study ethnic differences (the Chinese, Malays and Indians) in Singapore, as well as comparison of Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders in Taiwan.

Some analyses of our past surveys have already clarified similarities and dissimilarities between Japanese living in Japan and the Japanese immigrants abroad. First, the Japanese tendency to avoid polar response categories and to prefer intermediate response categories in a questionnaire survey (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997) is not necessarily inherited by Japanese immigrants in the same way (Hayashi et al., 1998, p. 388). There are some variations in this tendency due to the social context of the host country. For example, immigrants need to make clear their intentions in order to communicate successfully in their host countries such as the USA (mainland). Otherwise they would be unable to get along with others as well as to protect their rights.

Secondly, we found that the Japanese style of interpersonal attitudes (Giri-Ninjyo attitudes) or religious attitudes was preserved among the immigrant Issei and Nisei (first & second generations) in the U. S. A. The third and younger generations seem to have become more adapted to the country where they were born and now live. These observations have been explained by Hayashi (1993), Yamaoka (2000, Figure 4 & Table 3), and Yoshino (2000, p. 197; 2001b, p. 52; 2002).

Here I reexamine those observations on the sense of trust among Japanese immigrants in Brazil, Hawaii, and the U. S. West Coast with results from our recent survey and analyses.

Generally, Brazilian Japanese showed a much lower degree of sense of trust for each of the three items (№ 2.12a, № 2.12b, № 2.12c) than most responders in the seven countries mentioned in Section 4.2.1 (see also Yamamoto et al., 1993, p. 435). Furthermore, an even lower degree of trust was found in the third or younger generation than in the first and second generations[1]. As a whole, the pattern of sense of trust in Brazil appeared close to that of France (1987 survey) and Italy (1992 survey). As for the immigrants in Hawaii and the West Coast, they showed higher degrees of a sense of trust than most responders in the seven countries, including Japan and the U. S. A. (Unfortunately, the survey of the U. S. West Coast Japanese immigrants did not include № 2.12b.) For an understanding of the generations of Japanese immigrants in the U. S. A., there is a frame of comparison, as Kitano (1993, ch. 13) showed. Namely, the first generation (Issei) were

1 We should keep in mind that the economic condition of Brazil was bad in the year of survey.

called "Japs" and were discriminated against as immigrants from Japan. The second generation (Nisei) represents Japanese Americans who have been constantly in search of their own identity between the USA and Japan (many of them voluntarily fought in WWII as American soldiers while their parents were placed in concentration camps by the American government). The third generation or younger are simply Americans of Japanese descent.

Figure 8 of Yoshino (2002) showed that there was no significant difference between the Japanese Americans and the non-Japanese Americans among Honolulu residents with regard to trust (№ 2.12a, b, c). (In Hawaii, no ethnic group is the majority and Japanese Americans comprise the largest group among the minorities, except Caucasians.) Furthermore, Figure 9 of Yoshino (2002) provided details of the cross-ethnic comparison among Hawaii residents (several racial groups with a small sample size, e. g., less than 20, were omitted from the analysis). We should be careful in our conclusion because the samples for each are too small.

Time series data sets are available for the Hawaii Resident Survey. Figure 10 of Yoshino (2002) shows longitudinal changes among Japanese residents of Hawaii in terms of trust for each generation. There was no large difference between generations in over two decades, except for some differences between Nisei and Sansei in 1988. This may be explained by the many mixtures of ethnicities in Hawaii. Also, there was little change in the sense of interpersonal trust in each generation over these two decades. (It may be worthwhile noting that those with higher education have been increasing (Yoshino, 2002, p. 67). In most countries or regions that we surveyed, age and education level turned out to be negatively correlated, with younger residents having higher education levels.)

As for Japanese Americans on the West Coast, the survey questionnaire included only two items on trust (№ 2.12a & № 2.12c). Data for the West Coast (Figure 1 of Yoshino, 2002) showed a large difference between generations: the older generation seemed the more trustful. This was not seen in the Hawaii data. We should be very careful when interpreting the data, because there may be several compounding factors (such as age, generation, physical conditions, economic conditions, and residential area). However, there is a difference between Japanese Americans in Hawaii and Japanese Americans on the West Coast with regard to generational differences (compare Figure 10 with Figure 11 in Yoshino, 2002). This may be related to differences in their concepts of ethnicity. That is, Japanese Americans in the mainland would have no problem classifying themselves as Americans of Japanese descent. On the other hand, many Hawaiian residents are of highly mixed ethnicity in this multi-ethnic society, so that people's perception of ethnicity is dependent upon *how they identify themselves* in the ethnic classification – this ought to be no different for the Japanese Hawaiians. In addition, the different conditions of Japanese Americans in Hawaii and on the West Coast during WWII may have had an effect on their attitudes and social values[1].

Next, the ethnic differences (the Chinese, Malays and Indians) in Singapore in interpersonal trust are shown in Table 2. General patterns seem stable over years, although there may be some changes of response distributions on the items. Among others, an increase in the positive response on Q. 38 among the Indians (generalized interpersonal trust) may be remarkable: 25% in both 2004 and 2007, and 45% in 2012. This increase might be related to India's rapid development in the international economy and politics

1 In Hawaii, there was no concentration camp, and Japanese American Nisei soldiers did not have as much emotional conflict with their Japanese parents. For more details, see Dowds, 1986; Kashima, 2003; Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Miyamoto, 1984.

in the last decades. We might need to be careful about, however, the possibility of statistical fluctuation due to the smaller sample size that accompanies an analysis involving breaking down the sample by ethnicity. This is also the case with the ethnic differences in Singapore in Table 4.

As for comparison of native Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders in Taiwan, Table 4 shows almost the same pattern, probably except on Q. 9e (obedience to seniority): more positive responses were seen among the native Taiwanese than the Chinese mainlanders. However, we need to be careful about the distinction of the categories of "native Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders". Although the categories are important in analyses, they occasionally relate to some sensitive political matters. The distinction between the two groups is on self-report, and the sample of valid returned questionnaires in our survey was biased to fewer mainlanders than would be expected by census data. There are at least two possibilities: our sample might have been truly biased; or the mainlanders might have hidden their identities for certain political reasons. Therefore, this analysis is tentative.

To conclude this section, let me summarize Yoshino's (2002) analysis of the relationships between trust and economic conditions. There are different perspectives on people's sense of trust, such as the historical perspective of Fukuyama (1995), or the economic perspective of Banfield (1958). Yoshino (2002) studied some relationships between people's sense of trust and their social class or income (both self-reported variables).

As for the relationship between trust and self-reported social class in the longitudinal survey of Japanese National Character, the result was consistent with Banfield's (1958) claim. More detailed analyses on the comparative data of the seven countries showed some differences between countries. For example, West Germany was remarkably different from the others: the middle category (not necessarily "middle class") of social class was less trustful than the high and low categories. The pattern in the U. S. A. was opposite that of West Germany.

There were some differences among countries in the relationship between trust and self-reported income. For Britain and the USA, trust was almost linearly related to income categories: the higher the income, the more trustful. West Germany and Japan did not follow that pattern. Italy and France showed a much lower level of relationship of trust with social class and with income. Throughout all social classes, Italians consistently indicated the lowest degree of trust whereas in France social class was linearly related to trust. As for income, there was a significant linear relationship with the degree of trust in both Italy and France, but the relationship was less pronounced than in the cases of Britain and the U. S. A.

For reference, the correlation coefficients (Kendall's tau) between social classes and income (both 3-point ordered categories) were 0.47 in the Netherlands, 0.36 in U. S. A., 0.34 in Britain, 0.30 in West Germany, 0.29 in Italy, 0.28 in France, and 0.24 in Japan. These patterns of correlation may represent some differences in social structure (or national character) between countries. For example, "income" or "education" may be more directly related to "social class" in the U. S. A. than in Japan, at least before the too rapid social reform of Japan in "the lost decade". Thus we need to consider social background and institutions for a better understanding of this matter.

Conclusions

In this paper I have presented people's sense of trust from our survey data under our research paradigm called CULMAN. As a whole, this paper has shown some differences between countries, races, and generations regarding senses of interpersonal and insti-

tutional trust as well as some universal features of some social values across all the peoples. We need to be cautious, however, when we interpret the results because survey data on "trust" are often a compound of many variables including economic and political factors as well as people's general response tendencies. In addition, we should consider the utility and limitation of items that are used for measuring trust. Scales may be used to measure some important dimensions related to trust, but there may be other important dimensions of trust. That is, "sense of trust" can be considered in various contexts, such as intra-personal or interpersonal relationships, inter-social groups, transactions, or moral philosophy. Nevertheless I believe that our survey data has clarified certain aspects of the differences among several countries or social groups in terms of trust and has also clarified certain aspects of the generational differences among Japanese immigrants abroad. I will provide some comments for our future research as follows.

First, in order to facilitate a mutual understanding between East and West, we need to pay much attention to differences in social values. The study on the scale of trust (Yoshino, 2005b, 2006) may caution us on the applicability of a certain "single" scale invented in Western cultures to Eastern cultures, or vice versa. For example, it is not always the case in Asia that "distrust is a culture of poverty", as Banfield (1958) mentioned. A Chinese proverb says that "Fine manners need a full stomach" (or "The belly has no ears"), but another says, "Be contented with honest poverty". Gallup (1977, p. 461) reported that in their global survey they could not find very poor but still happy people. I think that they missed well-known observations. For example, Brazilians were very optimistic even when Brazil was the worst debtor nation in the 1980s (Inkeles, 1997). Inglehart reported a correlation of.57 between economic development and life satisfaction for some 20 countries surveyed in 1980s (Inkeles, 1997, p. 366–371). But life satisfaction in Japan in the 1980's was lower than around 2000, although Japan was prosperous in the 1980s but struggled with the recession around 2000. Thus, we need to measure various aspects of social values in order to understand different cultures in the age of globalization.

Secondly, it is important to note that people's negative responses do not necessarily mean that they lack a sense of trust. As Dogan (2000, p. 258) mentioned, there are several positive interpretations of people's sense of distrust. For example, people may express distrust or complaint toward the government or political leaders, not because they lack intra-personal or interpersonal trust, but because they know that it is a way to improve their own country and eventually our world in a democratic way.

Thirdly, a comment is provided for the development of the framework of CULMAN (cultural manifold analysis). The last century was the time of expansion of western civilization, and this century is said to be the time of Asian revival. In this time of globalization, I think that world leaders should be knowledgeable about world geography and history and sensitive to the conditions of all countries and nations, if they wish to take seriously their responsibility to develop and maintain world peace. Differences between cultures or civilizations occasionally prevent us from deeply understanding each other. In studying world history as well as regional histories of different cultures and civilizations, however, we should remember that there are various ways of successful social development. Thus we should not impose our own social values on any other country or nation.

Some institutional systems or customs are changing, converging towards more universal ones under the influences of transnational exchange or trade. Other systems are, however, becoming more sensitive to cultural differences, as a reaction to globalization. The last two decades have shown that, at least for the foreseeable future, globalization does not lead us to a single unified global culture or a single "superculture" on the earth

(cf. Yoshino, 1992)[1]. Our survey team has been developing a methodology called "Cultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN)" for cross-national comparisons. I think it is possible to use CULMAN to develop a framework of policy making to bring about a gradual development of, so-to-speak, a Global Cultural Manifold (GCM) (Yoshino, 2008; Yoshino, Nikaido & Fujita, 2009, p. 107, Figure 6).

The GCM is a set of hierarchical overlapping local charts, and each chart covers a certain area (region, country, national groups, civilization etc.). In each chart, we may assume that people share a certain culture or social values: A larger chart corresponds to a less restrictive but to a more universal culture or social values. Thus, according to the size of the chart (area, region or social group), people may be able to consider the degree of rigidity in decision-making, or the extent of regulations concerning various types of exchanges (e. g., contracts in transnational business or international trade within the members in the region). The charts of GCM must be dynamic. Therefore, each chart may be enlarged, shrunken, or disappear over time. Two overlapping charts may be assimilated to make a larger chart. Also, a new chart may appear. The EU may exemplify the concept of GCM. Currently, East Asia and the Asia-Pacific area are presenting other examples, although many people used to doubt such unification because of their too complicated diversity of races, languages, religions as well as political systems.

Weber (1904–1905) argued in his theory on religion and capitalism that Asian countries would not be able to develop capitalism. Now we know of so many counter-examples (such as Japan, Korea, NIES, and China) that go against his argument. Some people argued that the Japanese adaptation of Confucian philosophy functioned as a substitute for the Protestant ethic and led Japan to successfully develop capitalism (Morishima, 1984). But the past decades have seen many examples to show that economic success is not necessarily linked to a particular ethic, ideology, or religion. Now we have more data to consider the relationships between economic development, social systems and social values. For example, in this paper, I have shown that Asian countries have already departed from the literal teaching of Confucian philosophy. In this time of globalization, I would like to emphasize the fact that there are various ways for successful social development. Therefore, we should not impose one's own social value on any other country if we intend to develop a peaceful world.

The Japanese mind is the world of an ambiguous self, multiple realities, and multi-valued attitudes (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997). Occasionally, Japan is considered as a homogeneous society with respect to individual opinions, but this is not the case in reality. Simply because the Japanese tend to refrain from making definitive commitments in order to avoid possible conflicts, they often appear to be ambiguous and homogeneous.

A new style of society demands a new type of social system. Bringing this about would first necessitate destruction of a traditional system. A leader in Japan would have to think about the balance between conservation of fundamental human relational systems and quick destruction of obsolete social systems in the transitional age, as would the leaders all over the world. The last two decades, however, have seen that such destruction has gone too far even in the areas that we have to conserve, for example, in the realm of maintaining trustful human relationships, under the misguided globalization. A positive side of ambiguity may lead us to generosity to accept different social values whereas a negative side may lead us to confusion or irresponsibility.

1 For a detailed review of the literature on "globalization" and cultures, see Guillen, 2001, p. 252–254.

On March 11 in 2011, the mega-earth-quake of East Japan, with the huge tsunami and the Fukushima nuclear plant accident caused by the earthquake, brought about Japan seemingly insurmountable difficulties, and Japan has still been struggling to recover from the damages. The world media, however, reported about the calm attitudes of the Japanese even in the tragedy: the devastated yet surviving Japanese kept order in front of grocery stores to buy food, which may look remarkable to people of other countries' where even a natural disaster can frequently lead to a riot. On the other hand, many Japanese had a chance to reconsider the values of their own life and work, and to think of various ways of contributing to the people and area damaged by the quake. Many news stories and surveys have repeatedly reported about the human bond and the importance of family, relatives and friends, not only on a domestic, but worldwide scale. We have confirmed that the differences on ideology or religions are minor, as compared with the universal importance of human bond or trust between peoples.

It is my sincere hope that mutual understanding among the various cultures and civilizations will prevent unnecessary conflicts between nations and cultures and will lead us to a peaceful and prosperous world in the 21st century.

Acknowledgment

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ATTITUDES OF TOLERANCE, TRUST AND XENOPHOBIA OF THE RUSSIAN YOUTH

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The youth is not just a social or age group, it is the main resource that builds the future of a country. Therefore, in any society it performs primarily the strategic function. In any society, the younger generation is not a uniform, homogenous group, its members represent various interests, assimilate different values, including the fundamental ones. Young people differ from each other not only in cultural, social and demographic characteristics. Large-scale reforms in Russia produced a different social space that the youth of today have to learn.

The social space in question, as any social space, is full of diversity, where along with the economic positive changes people's attitudes transform as well, and these changes are not always positive: inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations aggravate, there is a struggle for access to resources and source of wealth.

At the same time, we must not forget that the aggression, vandalism, murders and suicides are the phenomena that accompany the history of mankind since the beginning of time (Soldatova, 2003). In this case, the youth is the social group that is the most sensitive and vulnerable part of the society and the "barometer" which can help to predict the future of the country when it faces the negative and most brutal events generated by life. It is known that young people are not always able to perceive literally and fully the richness and diversity of the social and cultural space within which they develop and live. Sometimes, it is difficult for young people to make the choice of their selves, their life, the choice as to which socio-cultural group they would like to belong to, what values to make the main landmarks of their lives and destinies.

However, as it is quite clear, the younger generation who grew up on the examples of violence and the patterns of aggressive behavior are not always able to choose strategies of con-sentience and trust among different people. In this respect, xenophobia is the most important property that determines the negative relationship among people, the severity of which it is necessary to study. Xenophobia is one of the most important varieties of intolerance to the others, "strangers" (Federal program…, 2001). In a general sense, xenophobia is the fear and rejection of any groups perceived as "strangers" (ethnic, religious, social) (Kagan, 2004). The tendency of humanity to divide the world into "us" and "them" is indestructible.

In modern society, xenophobia extends to a wide range of objects, according to which the following types are distinguished:

- racial and ethnic phobias (ethnophobias) determining the prejudice and discrimination against people of another race or ethnic group (e. g., white and black racism, anti-Semitism, sinophobia etc.);
- religious phobias determining the fear and prejudice against followers of different confessions (e. g., islamophobia, phobias against the representatives of the various religious cults);
- phobias against groups that differ in social, cultural, material and physical characteristics.

What particular human group evokes the greatest hatred, and in what form it is expressed, depends on the culture, education and the specific features of social conditions. Watershed may be based on religious affiliation, origin, territorial or state affiliation, national or ethnic origin, skin color etc. (Soldatova, 2003).

The problem of human survival associated with a sense of security, therefore overlaps with another psychological category, which is trust. Trust as well as xenophobia is a specific relationship to otherness of a person, anticipation in case of uncertainty. On the basis of this anticipation, we are having different kinds of relationship, generating, in turn, different expectations. It can be said that the basis of tolerance is a special relation to the other person based primarily on the absence of fear in relation to that other. In other words, trust is one of the most important conditions of true tolerance (Skripkina, 2002).

Nowadays tolerance is a key discourse of a pluralistic, multi-cultural, multi-confessional open society.

Tolerance is understood as a universal norm of maintenance of diversity in the evolution of various complex systems and is the potential for the development of multiple forms of symbiosis, social and political interaction, cooperation, mutual assistance and consolidation of different types, races, nations, nationalities, countries, religions and worldviews.

An empirical program of assessment of the level of tolerance, xenophobia and trust was developed in cooperation with colleagues from the Moscow center of tolerance on the basis of methodological and theoretical analysis of the phenomena of tolerance, xenophobia and social trust (Federal program…, 2001).

This paper is dedicated to the analysis of the results of the study of the degree of tolerance attitudes among young people living in different regions of Russia.

The method comprises the following indices and indicators:

Trust index

- social trust scale
- interpersonal trust scale

Tolerance index

- ethnic tolerance scale
- social tolerance scale
- scale of tolerance as personality feature

Xenophobia index

- scale of xenophobia in relation to stigmatized others
- scale of xenophobia in relation to unknown people

In addition to these scales, the terms of the survey included a list of possible objects of xenophobia. The respondents were asked to indicate whom they considered strangers. On this basis, the groups that respondents consider strangers were distinguished (Figure 1).

Homeless people	Chechens
Orthodox	Mentally handicapped
African	Muslims
People with AIDS	Persons from the Caucasus
Chinese	Disabled people
Prostitutes	Americans
Migrants, refugees	Homosexuals
Jews	Gypsies
Russian	Ukrainians
Drug addicts	Others

The study involved more than 2.5 thousand respondents (seniors and students) living in 19 cities, which were divided into regions (Figure 2).

Moscow	Far East: Ussuriisk, Khabarovsk
Central Russia and Volga region: Kursk, Belgorod, Saratov	South Russia: Rostov-on-Don, Krasnodar, Volgograd
East Siberia: Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Kurgan	North Caucasus: Grozny, Makhachkala, Vladikavkaz, Karachai, Nazran, Maikop, Elista

The analysis was conducted for the entire sample as a whole, for each region separately, as well as a comparative analysis of the data was carried out among high school and university students. Here is a brief mention of the analysis of the main results of the study.



Fig. 1.

Comparing the range of alien groups for high school and university students, we can note a significant difference in the number of the selected groups – university students show less pronounced dislike of the named communities at a statistically significant level.



Fig. 2. Charts of the scope of trust indices among high school and university students

Index of generalized trust among high school and university students

Differences in the index of generalized trust among high school and university students are not significant (Kruskal–Wallis coefficient KW-H=0,208177804, p=0,6482), but, according to our data, it gives the opportunity to observe the trend, which consists in the fact that social trust decreases and interpersonal trust increases in the student's age, which is shown in Figures 3 and 4.

Index of generalized tolerance

As can be seen from the figure, university students show a significantly higher tolerance than high school students do (Kruskal–Wallis coefficient=11.6, the significance level is p=0.0007).



Fig. 3. Charts of the scope of social trust indices among high school and university students



Fig. 4. Charts of the scope of interpersonal trust indices among high school and university students



Fig. 5. Charts of the scope of tolerance indices among high school and university students

There are similar significant differences among high school and university students on the components: ethnic, social and personal tolerance.

These data suggest that high school students in almost all regions of the Russian Federation show ethnic, social and personal intolerance to particular social groups of people.

Thus, particularly high school students are a potential "risk group", which needs a special work on promotion of tolerance attitudes.

Moreover, we believe that our findings allow us to propose an assumption that the student environment (meaning studies at institutions of higher education) has a positive effect on the formation of tolerance attitudes.

Generalized index of xenophobia in the entire sample

As can be seen from the charts, university students show a significantly lower level of xenophobia than high school students at a statistically significant level (Kruskal–Wallis



Fig. 6. Charts of the scope of xenophobia indices among high school and university students



Fig. 7. Charts of the scope of xenophobia indices to unknown people among high school and university students

coefficient=22, the significance level is p=0.03). The difference of xenophobia index to stigmatized others is similar.

The differences between high school and university students in xenophobia index to unknown people are slightly less (see Figure 6).

To sum up, it can be noted that as people grow older social maturity and adequacy of assessment of the social situation grows, tolerance level increases and the level of expression of xenophobia decreases. However, let us note again that the student sample involved only university students. Despite the significant differences in the results among

high school and university students, it should be noted that the university students also have xenophobic attitudes and show intolerance towards other ethnic, national, racial groups, as well as to the representatives of other confessions. Nevertheless, the percentage of these manifestations is not that small. It makes an average of >26% of the university students.

The study suggests some generalizations.

Today Russian high school students living in all regions of the Russian Federation show ethnic, social and personal intolerance to certain social groups of people. This is especially seen in relation to migrants. According to our data, the source of intolerance towards migrants in schools is always the children – the local population.

As university students are more mature in their judgments than high school students are, the level of their social trust is more realistic than that of high school students. With age, there is a more mature attitude towards vulnerable groups of population. University students reject those stigmatized groups who have deviations in their behavior (prostitutes, drug addicts) to a greater degree, and the treatment of people who can not change their affiliation to the "despised" social group (e. g. the mentally handicapped and the disabled) becomes more tolerant.

The comparison of the two components of trust index – the indicators of social and interpersonal trust – allows noting the trend of the reduction of the level of social trust and raising the level of interpersonal trust among university students.

In these circumstances, education bears a special responsibility. World experience shows that trust and tolerance cannot be invested from nowhere, it cannot be legally adopted, and it can only be "grown" in the soul of each person. As you know, people build a world-view in which they live. It is known that mankind has developed two main types of culture: the culture of conflict and the culture of dialogue and consent.

Therefore, education must be a guarantee not only of the intellectual potential of the country. In a country where economic development is the only main landmark, the socio-cultural (spiritual) element is always affected. In this regard, the most important question is a question concerning the content of liberal education. And from this point of view, education, upbringing and the media build a world-view of every young person, and a formed world-view is the image of the culture that is created by mankind and internalized by the younger generations.

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THE FEELING OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND THE VIEW OF RELIGIOUS MIND – AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

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Introduction

It was assumed that religion would become obsolete in coincidence with the modernization of society. In reality, however, there are more than a few countries, such as America, where a proportion of the people who keep a religious faith. Besides, we notice today a frequency of international conflicts brought forth by the difference between of religions. Those phenomena probably indicate a significant influence of religion upon society even today.

In the case of Japan, Religious life underwent remarkable changes in the Meiji era (from 1868) when Japan lunched on modernization, and this change has been promoted further in the post-War period since 1945, leading certainly to a significant decrease of the religious believers. A ratio of the believers in any religion (Buddhism, Shintoism, Christianity or any other) in Japan is quite small compared to Western advanced countries.

Even though the believers in a certain established religion have decreased, however, a kind of the religious mind is presumably alive in Japanese spirit and affects the way of thinking and behavior in various matters of life. In this paper the feeling of trust will be looked into with reference to the religious mind in international comparative perspectives.

Data and Method

The data hereby are an outcome of the Asia-Pacific Value Survey in 2004–2009 (over ten countries/regions): Japan, Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, India, Australia and U. S. A.

The feeling of trust in personal relations will be measured with the following three questions that are used widely by American researchers for a trust survey.

A. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?

1. Try to be helpful
2. Look out for themselves
3. Other (please specify)

B. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?

1. Take advantage
2. Try to be fair
3. Other (please specify)

C. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

1. Can be trusted
2. Can't be too careful
3. Other (please specify

The distribution of answers to each question is illustrated in Table 1. The feeling of trust is measured with an assembled number of the answers: 1 in Question A, 2 in Question B and 1 in Question C. Therefore, the assembled number is shown by 0, 1, 2 or 3, that indicates a degree of the feeling of trust by each respondent. The distribution of the answers by 0–3 indicates hereby the Scale Value of the Feeling of Trust. It is displayed in Table 2. It should be taken into account, however, that there are around 10% of Japanese respondents who answered "Other" or "Don't know" to each of three questions, and around 20% of the respondents of Shanghai who gave the answer "Other" or "Don't know" to the question B. This leads to relatively low points in Table 2 by Japan and Shanghai (as well as Beijing).

As seen in Table 2, the scale value is recorded highest in USA and Australia, while rather low in Asian countries/regions. It should be taken into account that such difference might be caused by a variety between USA/Australian and Asian people concerning

Table 1
Distribution of Answers to Three Levels of Trust

	Total N	A. People trying to be helpful			B. People talking advantage			C. People can be trusted		
		Try to be helpful	Look out for themselves	Other DK/NA	Take advantage	Try to be fair	Other DK/NA	Can be trusted	Can't be too careful	Other DK/NA
Japan	1139	34,8%	53,6%	11,6%	29,9%	58,6%	11,4%	37,4%	51,9%	10,7%
Beijing	1053	67,3%	29,2%	3,4%	34,6%	51,4%	14,1%	36,6%	61,3%	2,2%
Shanghai	1062	65,3%	26,8%	7,9%	23,5%	53,4%	23,1%	34,4%	59,9%	5,7%
Honkong	849	41,0%	53,1%	5,9%	52,2%	42,3%	5,5%	18,8%	79,7%	1,4%
Taiwan	603	45,9%	51,2%	2,8%	35,0%	61,0%	4,0%	18,7%	80,6%	0,7%
South Korea	1030	56,7%	40,7%	2,6%	47,6%	45,0%	7,5%	30,4%	65,6%	4,0%
USA	901	56,4%	41,1%	2,6%	41,0%	56,5%	2,6%	41,2%	55,8%	3,0%
Singapore	1032	50,4%	44,4%	5,2%	44,7%	50,6%	4,7%	25,8%	67,3%	6,9%
Australia	700	54,0%	42,6%	3,4%	37,4%	59,0%	3,6%	42,9%	53,9%	3,3%
India	2002	61,2%	37,5%	1,3%	69,5%	29,4%	1,1%	51,6%	46,7%	1,6%

Table 2
The Scale of Values in 10 Countries/Regions

	Scale value of trust				Total	
	0	1	2	3	%	N
Japan	26,7%	31,4%	26,3%	15,6%	100%	1139
Beijing	16,4%	30,3%	34,9%	18,4%	100%	1053
Shanghai	19,9%	26,7%	33,9%	19,5%	100%	1062
Honkong	35,1%	35,0%	22,6%	7,3%	100%	849
Taiwan	23,4%	38,1%	27,9%	10,6%	100%	603
South Korea	22,9%	36,5%	26,2%	14,4%	100%	1030
USA	27,0%	19,4%	26,2%	27,4%	100%	901
Singapore	29,7%	27,7%	28,6%	14,0%	100%	1032
Australia	25,0%	21,3%	26,6%	27,1%	100%	700
India	20,4%	28,6%	39,4%	11,6%	100%	2002

the way of perception on the three questions of trust-related issues, although this scale value might be used in a general sense as a one-dimensional scale to measure the trust. For example of the case of Hong Kong, a proportion of the scale value 0 is the largest, whereas the scale value 3 is the smallest, which could not lead easily to an conclusion that the level of trust in this region would be the lowest among surveyed countries/regions.

However, in a particular country/region where the same culture is shared generally by people, it is probable to conduct an analysis regarding a relationship between the feeling of trust measured with a scale value and the level of people's inclination to other issues such as the religious mind. Later, let us look into the traits of the feeling of trust in connection with the religious mind in each particular country/region.

Religious Faith and Religious Mind

Since 1958 the questions concerning the religious faith and the religious mind have been used in the Survey on the Japanese National Character. This Survey was started by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics in 1953 and has been repeated each five years ever since, and are conducted also for international comparative investigations as well. The questions are two, as follows.

D. Now I would like to ask you a few questions about religion. Do you have any personal religious faith?

1. Yes
2. No

E. Without reference to any of the established religions, do you think a religious mind is important, or not important?

1. Important
2. Not important
3. Other

The respondents who chose the answer 1 against the Question D are asked as to which religion they believe, but it is not referred hereto. Different from the Western people whose attitudes could be revealed with a question as to whether they believe in a religion or not, Japanese people's attitudes toward a religion is rather ambiguous. Although they don't believe in any religion, they regard a religion as important in spiritual life. Japanese people living abroad are sometimes impressed by local people with a surprise that the Japanese maintain a certain level of moral and ethics in spite of the fact that they do not have any religious faith.

A proportion of the respondents who answered that they don't have any religious faith is around 30% continuously from the Survey of 1955 until today. In the first phase of the Survey Question E was given only to the respondents that answered "don't have any religious faith", probably because those who have religious faith were assumed to regard necessarily the religious mind as important. Later, since the Survey of 1970, all the respondents of Question D have been asked also to Question E, in order to reveal the relations between the religious faith and the religious mind.

As expected before, even those without a religious faith might attach importance to the religious mind in Japan, while not necessarily in other countries/regions. However the difficulty of translation of a word "the religious mind" should be taken into consideration. What is understood by the word "religious mind" is ambiguous in fact. In spite of that, the meaning of it could be clarified through analyzing its relations to 'religious faith'.

Now, let us follow a trend of the distribution of answers to Question D ('have a religious faith') and E ('religious mind is important') in the Survey on the Japanese National Character 1958–2008, displayed in Table 3. According to the figures, the proportion of "mind" among "faith" has been remarkably high since 1983. It has recorded 93–94% continuously. Remaining 6% is "Religious mind is not important", "Other" or "Don't know".

On the other hand, a proportion of the answer 'religious mind is important' among the answers 'not have a faith' recorded 70% or a bit more in the Survey up to 1983, but it has been shifting around 60% afterward. It means that those who think 'religious mind is important' are rated around 70% irrespectively whether they have a religious faith or not. This fact illustrates the views of religion by Japanese people among whom only 30% or so are religious believers.

Table 3

Change in the Proportion of Response for the Two Question Items (%): Japanese National Character Surveys

Japanese National Character Survey											
Survey year	1958	1963	1968	1973	1978	1983	1988	1993	1998	2003	2008
'Have a religious faith'	35	31	30	25	34	32	31	33	29	30	27
'Religious mind is important' in 'have a faith'	_	_	_	_	_	94	93	94	93	94	93
'Religious mind is important' in 'have not a faith'	70	77	76	69	74	73	63	61	58	60	60
'Religious mind in important'	(80)	(84)	(83)	(77)	(83)	80	72	72	68	70	69

Table 4
Cross-tabulation of the answers:
'Have a religious faith' and 'Religious mind is important'(%)

Religious mind (Nation, year*)	Have a religious faith			Total of religious faith (D)	Religious faith or mind (D+ D2E1)	Don't have a religious faith			
	Important (D1E1)	Not important (D1E2)	Other (D1D3)			Important (D2E1)	**	Not important (D2E2)	Other (D2E3)
India (AP) 2008	74	17	1	93	97	4	(57)	3	0
Italy (7N) 1992	81	5	2	88	93	5	(44)	5	2
USA (AP) 2006	69	8	2	79	86	7	(34)	11	2
Singapore (AP) 2007	67	8	3	79	86	7	(33)	12	2
FRG (7N) 1987	56	17	5	77	81	3	(14)	17	2
Taiwan (AP) 2006	58	5	1	65	85	20	(58)	12	2
UK (7N) 1987	48	14	3	65	76	11	(30)	22	2
France (7N) 1988	52	11	2	65	76	11	(31)	22	2
NL (7N) 1993	41	14	5	60	69	9	(22)	26	5
South Korea (AP) 2006	51	1	1	54	81	27	(58)	13	6
Hong Kong (AP) 2006	31	5	2	38	71	32	(53)	22	8
Japan(AP) 2004	27	1	1	28	73	45	(63)	15	12
Shanghai (AP) 2006	17	5	5	28	43	16	(22)	35	22
Beijing (AP) 2006	9	3	1	14	44	30	(35)	47	9

Notes: * 7N: The Seven Nation Survey in 1987–1993, AP: The Asia & Pacific Value Survey in 2005–2008. ** Percentage of respondents of 'religious mind is important' in respondents of 'Don't have a religious faith'.

In Western countries, presumably, the view of 'religious mind is important' is closely connected with that of 'have a religious faith'. But in any countries/regions there are a certain number of people, though not so many as in Japan, who are not believers of a religion but regard a religious mind as important, shown in Table 4.

Relations between the Feeling of Inter-personal Trust and the View of Religion

Next analysis leaves a focus on the relations between the view of religion above examined and the feeling of interpersonal trust.

Concerning the view of religion, responses can be classified into four groups, as seen below (Table 5). As for the feeling of interpersonal trust, the responses are classified into two: "High" (scale value = 0 or 1) and "Low" (scale value = 2 or 3).

As seen above, in surveyed countries/regions, with an exception of Shanghai, a degree of the feeling of trust is lower in Group B than A, and higher in Group C than B. Even if Japan has only 6 respondents in Group B, it shows similar traits as other countries/regions in this concern.

Table 5
Cross Tabulation of Two Valuables

		E. 'Religious mind in important'	
		Yes	No
D. 'Have a religious faith'	Yes	D1E1	D1E2
	No	D2E1	D2E2



Fig. 1. Relations between the Feeling of Trust and the View of Religion

It should be noted that a degree of the feeling of trust in Group C is different between countries/regions. In some countries/regions it is high, though in other countries/regions low. In the Case of China, any relations between the feeling of trust and the view of religion cannot be noticed clearly. China underwent a time when the religion was contradicted politically, and then it has revived in recent years, so that people's view of religion may be ambivalent compared to other countries/regions. In the case of India, contrastingly, Group A occupies a great proportion among respondents, while D is small, and the view of religion is significantly correlated with the feeling of trust.

In surveyed countries/regions, except China and India, the difference in a scale value of the feeling of trust is correlated with the attachment of importance to the religious mind, rather than the religious faith in itself. People who have a religious faith but don't attach importance to the religious mind are supposed to be rigid believers of a certain religion than those who have a religious faith and attach importance to the religious mind. Mostly, those according to whom the religious mind is important are presumed to conceive the religion mind as ethics and morale in secular life.

On the other hand, a level of the feeling of trust by those who neither have any religious faith nor attach importance to the religious mind is not necessarily very low. In some countries/regions their level of the feeling of trust is rather high. In those countries/regions the feeling of trust can be characterized as a matter of the moral in secular life but not as a matter of the faith in a specific religion. "Religious mind" is assumed to express the specific Japanese attitudes to a religion. But in other countries social ethics like trust are not necessarily dependent on the religious faith. In this sense, a conceptual distinction of 'religious mind' from 'religious faith' would be effective in trust studies.

By taking this point into account, analyses of the relations between the view of religion and the social consciousness such as the sense of trust are to be extended to other countries/regions on empirical bases.

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INTERPERSONAL, LOCAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST (EXPERIENCE OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS)[1]

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Research on the role and place of trust in human society have been carried out by sociologists since the early 80s. In the early 80s issues of trust were studied by Luhmann (Luhmann, 1979), Bernard Barber (Barber, 1983). In 1990s, Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 1995), Barbara Mishtal (Misztal, 1995), Adam Seligman (Seligman, 1997), Sztompka (Sztompka, 1999). After the year 2000, there have been works by authors such as Russell Hardin (Hardin, 2002, 2004), Eric Uslaner (Uslander, 2002), Roderick Kramer and Karen Cook (Kramen, Cook, 2004), Charles Tilly (Tilly, 2005), Mattei Dogan (Dogan, 2005), Diego Gambetta, Heather Hamill (Gambetta, Hamill, 2005). In Russia, since the beginning of the 21st century, Kozyreva P. M. (Kozyrev, 2011) has been working on the research into the issues of trust.

The growing interest in trust exists due to a number of objective factors, including the processes of globalization, entailing an increase in areas of risk in different areas of society and private life (migration, drug trafficking, reduction of personal safety etc.). In Eastern Europe, the radical transformation of the socio-political system that was produced by the post-communist trauma (Sztompka, 2001) in these societies was added to these processes. In the new reality that followed the collapse of communism, the primary element of society was disturbed – social action, conceived as a *behavior of a person that is conscious, correlated and focused on the actions of other people* (*regardless of whether it is external or internal, is reduced to non-intervention, or patient acceptance*) (Weber, 1990). This definition implies that people need to know the rules, values of the society in which they live, and expect others to behave in accordance with these rules (i. e. trust them). In the state of social and cultural transformation, people are losing their value orientations, they do not know what is "right" or "wrong", there is the state of social anomie. Social trust, understood as *the realization of the predictability of the actions of others*

1 The data are collected within the frames of the project № 116438837 "Social Trust – Between Knowledge and Practices" financed by the Polish Ministry of Science and coordinated by Institute of Sociology, University of Szczecin (project manager: Oxana Kozlova, author of methodological concept and tool: Albert Terelak).

The materials previously published in the collective monograph "Cultures of trust", ed. O. Kozlova and K. Izdebska, Szczecin, 2013 are partialy used in this article.

and the certainty of the existence of rules (*laws*) *by which social institutions* (*government, the courts, the army*) *function*, is reduced in such an environment. A "culture of cynicism" appears – *a "mandatory" widespread belief in the universal lack of trust and dependability, justifying mistrust and suspicion as the correct social position* (Sztompka, 2012). Polish sociologist P. Sztompka analyzing societies in which the culture of cynicism is dominant, guided by the logic of functionality, comes to the conclusion that "when there is not enough trust, the resulting void is filled by alternative solutions that perform similar functions, that satisfy the universal desire for trust, predictability, order etc." (Sztompka, 2012). Thus, it can be assumed that the lack of trust on some levels of public life, it compensated by an increase in another. "No matter what area of life is no longer credible, the result is to place the trust in another place" (Coleman, 1990).

P. Sztompka (Sztompka, 2012) identifies six mechanisms to adapt to the "culture of cynicism":

1. Belief in providence: the transition from the discourse of subjectivity to the discourse of fate.
2. Corruption. The essence of public relations is replaced by a network of mutual services, barter agreements, unhealthy pseudo-community of people giving and taking bribes.
3. Usurpation of the exaction of decency, excessive vigilance, taking upon oneself the functions of personal supervision and control.
4. An exaggerated use of legal institutions.
5. Striving for the ghetto – enclosure by walls, delineating insurmountable boundaries around the group in a hostile alien environment. Generalized distrust of the public is balanced by a strong loyalty to the tribal, ethnic or family groups.
6. Paternalism. Dreams about the authority of a strong autocratic leader, a charismatic personality.
7. Externalism of trust. Under the rule of an atmosphere of distrust towards local politicians, institutions, goods, labor markets, and so on, people are turning to foreign communities and base their hopes on their leaders, organizations, or products, and emigrate in search of work.

If mechanisms 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 are of a psychological or individual character, corruption and striving for ghettos are social mechanisms of adaptation to the culture of cynicism, as they form informal communities in the case of corruption and joint protection, as well as in the case of striving for the ghetto. Striving for the ghetto, and corruption have the common feature to which the British anthropologist Edward Benfield gave the term "amoral familism" – "the inability for co-action with anyone other than family… Relative to the external world, this leads to the creation of an atmosphere of manic, paranoid cynicism. Public life is saturated with a mixture of anxiety, uncertain chronic fear, suspicion, creation of conspiracy theories, fear, foreboding, even paralyzing thoughts associated with the start of actions on a larger scale" (Banfield, 1967).

Thus, we can assume that a growing distrust of social institutions such as the state, the police, the courts is compensated by the increase of trust in each other and neighbors. Informal connections are beginning to dominate over the formal, which in turn revives pseudo-traditional social practices, such as corruption and nepotism. In other words, quasi-feudal social relationships are flourishing within the social institutions of modern society. They perform the functions of adapting people to the new social order and play the role of a mitigating factor in the transformation of post-communist societies.

In view of the above, I have put forward the hypothesis of a *compensatory nature* of interpersonal trust. If this assumption is true, \the highest degree of interpersonal trust must exist in societies with very low levels of trust in other areas of public life. This hypothesis was on the results of the study conducted in December 2010 in the five countries that have experienced a post-communist trauma (Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Russia). Method – survey, sampling – quota-targeted. 5118 students, aged 17–27, of capital city and regional universities in these countries were surveyed. I differentiated social trust into macro-, meso- and micro-environments, according to the division adopted in the Russian academic world, in which macro-environment is understood to be the *set of institutions and relationships, extending over the existing socio-economic system with the appropriate political regime* (Thesaurus…, 2009). The institutions of macro environment consist of the methods of material production, the political system, civilization etc. In sociology, it is being studied as the relationship between man and the state, social and political institutions. Thus, social trust at the macro level (institutional trust), was studied by me through the prism of trust in institutions and social roles of the macro-environment (government, state officials). Meso-environment can be understood as *a set of institutions and relationships that form the basis of the socio-anthropological structure of society* (Thesaurus…, 2009). The meso-environment includes institutions that form and represent the relationship between man and society, as a citizen, villager, a member of a particular social group. Therefore, the trust at the meso-level (local trust), I looked at through the prism of trust in the people living in the city and neighbors. Micro-environment is a *set of institutions and relationships that make up the immediate social environment of a person and have a decisive influence on the formation and development of personality* (Thesaurus…, 2009). The institution of the micro-environment include: family, labor groups, small social groups and communities. Trust at the micro level (interpersonal trust) is manifested in the family, labor groups, small social groups and communities. This is trust in the people with whom we work closely and directly interact (friends, sexual partners, colleagues at work/school). The trust in the relatives of the respondents (brothers, sisters, parents) in the analysis of interpersonal trust, were not considered by me for the following reason. A person chooses his friends and partners, while in the case of the family and parents, the person has no such choice. Therefore, the trust in friends and partner has a rational, social nature consistent with the definition given above of social, while the trust in relatives and parents connects people to each other for biological and irrational reasons.

To test the hypothesis of the compensatory nature of interpersonal trust, the following needed to be done: first, the level of interpersonal trust in the different countries needed to be measured, secondly, it needed to be compared with the level of trust in other areas of public life. If the hypothesis is correct, the level of interpersonal trust must be the highest in the communities where we can see the lowest level of trust in other social spheres.

The level of interpersonal trust

From the research questions, I have chosen the following:

- question № 26[1]: *"I have never been* (*would never be*) *tempted to distrust or check the contacts/relationships of my partner/husband/wife";*

1 The questions are listed in the order they appeared in the survey.

- question № 27: *"I have never been (would never be) tempted to distrust or check the contacts or relationships of my partner/husband/wife, regardless of his/ her behavior";*
- question № 28: *"I can call most of the people from my immediate surroundings my friends";*
- question № 30: *"Full trust in the relationship between a man and a woman usually ends in one of the partners cheating";*
- question № 31: *"Personal topics should not be touched upon in a student-teacher relationship"*;
- question № 32: *"I am often suspicious regarding the motives of others";*
- question № 35: *"In my surroundings, there are people with whom I can (could) share my innermost secrets".*

The answer options for these questions were the following:

- *Strongly disagree;*
- *Somewhat disagree;*
- *Not sure;*
- *Somewhat agree;*
- *Strongly agree.*

Every answer option was assigned a number from one to five. For questions № 26, 27, 28 and 35, the answer option "*Strongly disagree*" was assigned 1 point, the option "*Somewhat disagree*" was assigned 2 points, the option "*Not sure*" was assigned 3 points, the option "*Somewhat agree*" – 4 points, and the option "*Strongly agree*" – 5 points. For questions № 30, 31, and 32, the scoring was reversed: the answer option "*Strongly disagree*" was assigned 5 points, "*Somewhat disagree*" – 4 points, "*Not sure*" – 3 points, "*Somewhat agree*" – 2 points, and 1 point for "*Strongly agree*".

Then all the scores were summed up. The range of the resulting numbers was from 7 to 35 points. The average "coefficient of interpersonal trust" was 22.5, with a mode of 23. The dispersion of average scores in different countries can be seen on Table 1.

According to the average values, we can see that the highest interpersonal trust exists in the Czech Republic and Lithuania, while the lowest is in Russia and Ukraine.

In order to analyze interpersonal trust in more detail, I created 4 groups, which I called "very low trust group", which included the respondents whose trust coefficients were between 7 and 13 points, "low trust group", whose trust coefficients were between 14 and 20 points, "medium trust group" – 21–27 points, and "high trust group" – 28–35 points. See Table 2.

Table 1

Average coefficient of interpersonal trust by country

Rank	Country	Average	Standard Deviation
1	Czech Republic	23.3766	3.91893
2	Lithuania	23.2385	4.18380
3	Poland	22.7990	4.80378
4	Ukraine	21.8958	3.97509
5	Russia	21.5383	4.18787
Total		22.4851	4.30633

Table 2
Grouping by interpersonal trust

Groups	Number of Respondents	% of the total number of respondents
Very low trust	119	2.3
Low trust	1497	29.2
Average trust	2847	55.6
High trust	643	12.6
Total	5106	99.8
Missed	12	0.2
Total	5118	100.0

Thus, we see that there are more people trust each other in interpersonal relations than people who don't. The high trust group is five times larger than the low trust group, and the quantity of people with medium and high trust makes up 68.2% of the overall number of respondents.

The distribution of groups with varied levels of trust by country is as follows. See Table 3.

As we can see from the table, the countries leading in the very low trust level category are Poland with 3.3% and Russia with 3.2%. However, 18.2% of Polish respondents are part of the very high trust group, which shows that Polish students are much more radical in their estimates of interpersonal trust than their peers from other countries. At the same time, Russia is the leader among the countries with very low and low levels of trust. It should also be noted that Russia and Ukraine are two countries that did not reach the milestone of 10% in the very high trust group. The number of Russian and Ukrainian respondents in this group is almost two times less than the number of Polish, Lithuanian and Czech students in the same group. Such a low level of interpersonal trust refutes the stereotype that shows Russian people as a nation that stands out from the others by having especially cordial and warm relationships with their loved ones. It also shows a high level of atomization of Russian and Ukrainian societies.

Table 3
Interpersonal trust groups, distribution by country
(% of the total number of respondents)

	Country					Total
	Russia	Czech Republic	Lithuania	Poland	Ukraine	
Very low trust	3.2	0.8	1.3	3.3	2.7	2.3
Low trust	35.6	21.8	24.0	29.2	33.0	29.3
Medium trust	53.6	61.9	59.4	49.3	56.3	55.8
High trust	7.7	15.5	15.3	18.2	8.0	12.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Interpersonal trust and trust in other areas of public life

In order to check the hypothesis of the compensatory character of interpersonal trust, it is necessary to compare the interpersonal trust level with the trust level in other areas of public life. Accordingly, the questions were chosen that could be classified in the meso and macro levels of social trust.

On the meso-level I selected the questions that relate to the local measurement of public trust and, from them, by a procedure similar to the development of the coefficient of interpersonal trust, was developed the "coefficient of local trust". I chose the following questions:

- question № 56: *"I would prefer that my neighbors knew as little as possible about my personal life";*
- question № 57: *"Residents of my town/neighborhood are rarely polite";*
- question № 58: *"There are very few people in my town/neighborhood that are ready to be socially active in a way that would benefit the town/neighborhood";*
- question № 59: *"The people in my town/neighborhood are strangers to me";*
- question № 60: *"The residents of my town/neighborhood are, in the main, respectable people";*
- question № 61: *"If necessary, many of the residents of my town/ neighborhood would selflessly help me";*
- question № 62: *"In my town/neighborhood only the residents of the area can feel safe";*
- question № 63: *"If something bad happened to me in my town/neighborhood the people whi saw this would not help me".*

For questions № 60 and 61 the answer option "*Strongly disagree*" was assigned 1 point, the option "*Somewhat disagree*" was assigned 2 points, the option "*Not sure*" was assigned 3 points, the option "*Somewhat agree*" – 4 points, and the option "*Strongly agree*" – 5 points. For questions № 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 and 63 the scoring was reversed: the answer option "*Strongly disagree*" was assigned 5 points, "*Somewhat disagree*" – 4 points, "*Not sure*" – 3 points, "*Somewhat agree*" – 2 points, and 1 point for "*Strongly agree*".

Then all the scores were summed up. The range of the resulting numbers was from 8 to 40 points. The average "coefficient of local trust" was 24.2, with a mode of 24. The dispersion of average scores in different countries can be seen on Table 4. Poland had the highest coefficient of local trust, then the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Russia. Ukraine, on the other hand had the lowest coefficient.

Table 4
Average coefficient of local trust by country

Rank	Country	Average	Standard Deviation
1	Poland	25,2419	5,25924
2	Czech Republic	24,9954	4,33243
3	Lithuania	24,5885	4,49166
4	Russia	23,3262	4,51817
5	Ukraine	23,1958	5,14044
Total		24,2153	4,78802

Table 5
Distribution by local trust levels

	Number of respondents	% of the total number of respondents
Very low trust	153	3.0
Low trust	2045	40.0
Medium trust	2562	50.1
High trust	314	6.1
Total	5074	99.1
Missed	44	0.9
Total	5118	100.0

Then, based on the score, all respondents were distributed into 4 groups – the group of *very low trust level* included respondents with 8–15 points, the *low trust level* group included respondents with 16–23 points, the *medium trust level* group included respondents with 24–31 points, the *high trust level* group included respondents with 32–40 points. See Table 5 for the results.

If we compare the data with the data for the groups of interpersonal trust, we can see an increase in the percentage of very low-and low-confidence and, respectively, a decrease of middle and high levels of trust. Regarding interpersonal trust, the percentage of respondents in groups with very low and low trust was 31.5 and, respectively, with average and high levels of trust 68.2 %. Whereas, regarding local trust 43 % of the respondents were included in the group of very low and low levels of trust, and 56.2 % in the group with high and medium levels of trust, respectively. Thus, at the local level, people are less trusting than at the interpersonal.

The distribution of local trust groups by country shows that (see Table 6) there is hardly any difference between groups of local trust and interpersonal trust. In groups of very low local trust level, as well as in groups of interpersonal trust, Russia stayed in second place, while Ukraine traded places with Poland, taking first place (in the group with very low interpersonal trust, Ukraine was in third place). In other groups the ratio of countries with the largest number of respondents has remained the same as in the groups of interpersonal trust.

Table 6
Groups of local trust. Distribution by country (% of the total number of respondents)

	Country					Total
	Russia	Czech Republic	Lithuania	Poland	Ukraine	
Very low trust	3.6	1.8	2.6	2.9	4.0	3.0
Low trust	46.1	34.4	37.8	36.1	44.7	40.3
Medium trust	46.9	56.8	53.7	49.3	47.3	50.5
High trust	3.4	7.1	6.0	11.7	4.0	6.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Further, the "institutional trust coefficient" was developed. It corresponds to the macro level of social life. The following questions were selected from the questionnaire:

- question № 47: *"Most politicians in Russia – are untrustworthy manipulators";*
- question № 48: *"Most government officials in Russia are respectable people";*
- question № 50: *"Most politians really care about the well being of the country, but some have better plans, while the others do not";*
- question № 53: *"Russian state institutions treat everybody equally fairly";*
- question № 54: *"I believe that the taxes that are paid by the Russian citizens are used properly and efficiently";*
- question № 55: *"To most high-ranking government officials, personal gains are more important than the public good".*

For questions № 48, 50, 53 and 54 the answer option *"Strongly disagree"* was assigned 1 point, the option *"Somewhat disagree"* was assigned 2 points, the option *"Not sure"* was assigned 3 points, the option "*Somewhat agree*" – 4 points, and the option *"Strongly agree"* – 5 points. For questions № 47 and 55 the scoring was reversed: the answer option *"Strongly disagree"* was assigned 5 points, *"Somewhat disagree"* – 4 points, *"Not sure"* – 3 points, *"Somewhat agree"* – 2 points, and 1 point for "*Strongly agree*".

Then all the scores were summed up. The range of the resulting numbers was from 6 to 30 points. The average "coefficient of institutional trust" was 13.6, with a mode of 12. The dispersion of average scores in different countries can be seen on Table 7. Poland had the highest coefficient of institutional trust, then the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Russia. Ukraine, on the other hand had the lowest coefficient. If we compare the institutional trust coefficient results with that of the local trust, there are no changes, all countries kept their respective places. Therefore, countries where the level of local trust is low also have a low level of institutional trust.

Further, all respondents were organized into four groups – the group of *very low trust level* included respondents with 6–11 points, the *low trust level* group included respondents with 12–17 points, the *medium trust level* group included respondents with 18–23 points, the *high trust level* group included respondents with 24–30 points. See Table 8 for the results.

As we can see from the table, the institutional trust situation is radically different from the local and interpersonal trust situation. In the latter, the groups with very high and high levels of trust reach 68.2% and 56.2% respectively, while in the case of institutional trust that number is only 18.8% of all respondents. This shows a significant gap

Table 7

Average coefficient of institutional trust by country

Rank	Country	Average	Standard Deviation
1	Poland	14.4181	4.03654
2	Czech Republic	13.8316	3.68971
3	Lithuania	13.7654	3.98539
4	Russia	13.5188	4.31275
5	Ukraine	12.1781	4.37825
Total		13.6167	4.14957

Table 8
Distribution by groups of institutional trust

	Number or Respondents	% of the total number of respondents
Very low trust	1601	31.3
Low trust	2524	49.3
Medium trust	919	18.0
High trust	42	0.8
Total	5086	99.4
Missed	32	0.6
Total	5118	100.0

Table 9
Groups of institutional trust. Distribution by country
(% of the total number of respondents)

	Russia	Czech Republic	Lithuania	Poland	Ukraine
Very low trust	33.1	26.6	29.9	24.6	46.4
Low trust	47.0	56.9	51.9	52.6	38.4
Medium trust	19.4	15.6	17.3	21.3	14.9
High trust	0.5	0.9	0.9	1.6	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

in trust between micro – and meso-levels on the one hand and macro level on the other. The distribution of groups of institutional trust by country is shown in Table 9.

Based on the data, the following can be said. The hypothesis about the compensatory nature of trust as a whole was not confirmed. Poland is the country with the highest level of trust on all levels. The Czech Republic and Lithuania are in second and third place. Ukraine leads in the level of distrust among the surveyed country. An unusual situation in the various levels of trust has been noted in Russia. Russia has a low level of trust on the interpersonal and local levels, while on the macro level, while there is still a low average level of trust, has a total of 19.4% of respondents with a medium level of trust, outstripping The Czech Republic and Lithuania. This is an unexpected result. When I began the analysis of the data, I anticipated that Russia would have the lowest level of trust on the institutional level and the highest on the interpersonal level, which is why I put forth the hypothesis of the compensatory nature of social trust. The research, however, proved that the opposite is true. Russian people, just like the Ukrainians, do not trust friends and neighbors, whereas they trust the government more than Czech, Ukrainian and Lithuanian people. Based on the fact that the hypothesis of a compensatory nature of interpersonal trust has not been confirmed, it can be assumed that in Russia, the society is disintegrating, since the decreasing level of trust in the institutions of the macro-environment is not compensated by an increase of trust in informal relationships. Notwithstanding, in Russia, we are witnessing the growth of informal relationships, which manifests itself in the shadow economy, common-law marriages, corruption

etc. It can be assumed that individuals that are part of informal communities in Russia do not have trust in each other (parent-child relation is not a part of my assumption, as this relationship lies more in the fields of biology, not sociology). The members of these informal communities are saturated with the spirit of suspecting each other. Therefore, these communities are of a situational and short-lived nature, as the whole situation in Russia is paradoxical in nature, feudal communities are being created, but the people they consist of have very individualistic mentalities. All this creates a feeling of a bifurcated reality. The is the reality "on paper" and the "actual" reality. This duality leads to frustration, and the paradox of consciousness, when people believe in two mutually exclusive ideas at the same time (Toschenko, 2008).

Perhaps, it is due to this that 19.4 percent of Russian respondents trust the government. In Russia, during the twentieth century, informal horizontal links between people were destroyed, but instead the state created social institutions that perform the function of the destroyed communities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these institutions were also destroyed, but the memory of them has remained and it shows, among others, in the trust in the government. Perhaps this trust is not based on facts but on the "ideal" views the Russian students have of the state. People are negative about the current Russian government, they believe that the state should perform the tasks that are actually performed by informal networks, above all the functions of adaptation and protection. This is why they believe and expect that the state will once again take on this role, as it did in the Soviet Union. In any case, this unexpected result requires re-inspection. And, in the case of the confirmation of my findings, the creation of an adequate interpretation of the data.

Conclusions

1. Russia and Ukraine are the most atomized societies of the countries that participated in the study.
2. Distrust at the institutional level in Russia is lower than in Lithuania and the Czech Republic. This was a surprising conclusion and requires either confirmation or refutation, and, in the case of a confirmation – an adequate interpretation of this fact.
3. In Russia, feudal in nature communities are being created, but the members of these communities are imbued with the spirit of distrust in each other. These communities are situational and of a short-lived nature.
4. The lack of social trust on some levels of public life is not compensated by an increase on others. *The trust does not go to other levels, it simply disappears.*

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SOCIAL AND INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN THE CONTEXT OF VALUE ORIENTATIONS OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE

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Trust penetrates various aspects of social life and provides a sense of confidence in the honesty, integrity, and adequacy of the person you are communicating with, the success of which in today's "risk society" is provided by a mutual understanding, as well as mutual obligations, benefits and interests. In a modern society, the level of trust is regarded as one of the pillars of social capital, which plays a key role in the stable development of society. Research shows that the levels of social and interpersonal trust in different countries differ significantly, depending on the level of development of the cultures of trust in these countries. These figures are especially relevant for the countries of Eastern Europe, which have undergone significant economic and political changes in the recent decades. The world development trends formed in the late twentieth century caused the devaluation of many old, and the rapid rise of many new values and needs.

The younger generation of Eastern European countries has grown up in different, new social and economic conditions. The important indicators of the adaptation of young people to the new realities are their value orientations and attitudes, as well as the level of interpersonal trust in the immediate surroundings (family, friends), and towards most strangers. In this context, *the aim of our research* is actualized, and includes the comparing the levels of trust and dominant value orientations of young people in Russia and other European countries and identifying the values that support or hinder the development of the culture of trust.

Many studies are aimed at the investigation of trust issues, in which many different aspects of this phenomenon are covered. One of the main directions of this research is theoretical in nature and is related to the definition of trust, distinguishing its types, functions. (Shtompka, 2012; Uslaner, 2002; Alekseeva, 2008). Another trend in the research of trust is connected with the identification of determinants that determine the height of the level of confidence indicators, on both group and individual levels. A lot of data has been gathered regarding this issue: the interrelation of the level of trust to the economic development of the country (Fukayama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 1993), the development of democratic institutions (Inglehart, 1997), income inequality (Uslaner, 2002) and others have been established. Regarding the determinants of trust

at the individual level, it was found that a higher level of trust is common for people with higher levels of income and education, and a lower level of trust is common for the unemployed, divorced, and minorities who are discriminated against. (Bjørnskov, 2006). In addition, it can be argued that a high level of trust is supported by the involvement of the individual in broad social networks, daily communication with family, friends, colleagues, active citizenship and participation in the activities of various organizations (Delhey et al., 2011; Veld et al., 2009).

Our contribution to the study of the problems of trust includes several aspects. Studies aimed at the identification of the determinants of high levels of trust and the consequences of its distribution, have touched upon various aspects of life of the individual and of society, but the question of the correlation between trust level and value orientations has remained unanswered. Many years of research by R. Inglehart, Schwartz, Hofstede have shown that modern societies differ greatly in the prevalence of certain value orientations, while the levels of trust in the countries vary greatly as well. If we accept the thesis of V. Rukavishnikov that interpersonal trust is a "universal moral *value*", we meet with the need to study the relationship between the level of trust and the values that are dominant in society. Our study is devoted to this issue. An equally important feature is addressing the study of attitudes and the level of trust not of the population of Eastern Europe in whole, but only the younger generation that has grown up in the new socio-economic conditions, and in the next decade will be the foundation of society.

In international comparative studies there is a division of European countries into four groups: the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, Scandinavia and Western Europe. This division is often backed up not only by the territorial proximity of countries, but the similarity of attitudes of people within each group, as well as significant differences between the groups. In our study, we consider only the countries of Eastern Europe, which allows us to draw attention to the internal heterogeneity of the group and to compare the countries by the level of trust and the dominant value orientations of young people.

As an *empirical basis* for the study we used the results of an international comparative study, organized by the University of Szczecin (a survey of students from Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania and the Czech Republic)[1]. The total number of respondents is 5118 people. The survey was conducted in February–May 2010.

Personal trust: two levels of measurement

While different qualifications of trust exist, they are often based on the definition of the various recipients of trust. For example, P. Sztompka offers analytical framework of trust and it includes the following types (Sztompka, 1991): personal (virtual and contact trust); categorical (trust in the representatives of different age, sex, race and education), positional (trust in social roles), group (trust in a particular group), institutional (trust in social roles); commercial (trust in companies, manufacturers of goods); system (trust in social systems, rules and regulations). In our study we are only looking at interpersonal trust, which is in turn divided into "general public trust" and "special inter-

1 The survey was conducted in the framework of the research project "Social trust: between theory and practice", supported by a grant from the Polish Committee for Scientific Research, implemented in 2009–2012 under the direction of Doctor of Sociology O. N. Kozlovoy, author of the survey instrument – Associate Albert Terelyak.

personal trust". Such distinction has been officially recognized in sociological research. (Rukavishnikov, 2008; Alekseev, 2008; Delhey et al., 2011). "The general public trust" (or "generalized") is understood as an ideological tendency to trust strangers, of which the individual has no prior information that allows him to predict the consequences of a relationship with them ("virtual trust" in the terminology of P. Sztompka). "Special interpersonal trust" is defined by the individual's trust towards his inner circle, family members and relatives ("contact trust" in the terminology P. Sztompka).

Comparing these two types of trust, A. Alekseeva highlights their distinctive features (Alexeeva, 2008): generalized trust is regarded as a phenomenon of the macro-level, reflecting the culture of public trust and interpersonal trust as a more "flexible" phenomenon that depends on situational factors and expressing trust either in a similar situation, or a toward a specific counterparty. Generalized trust is treated as an ideological attitude that reflects the positive outlook on the world, the main source of which is the ontological experience gained by the individual in the process of primary socialization, which is not related to specific situations of interaction, the subject and the object of trust, while these elements are integral to interpersonal trust.

To measure generalized and interpersonal trust several different indicators are used (for more details see: Kertman, 2006; Rukavishnikov, 2008). In our study, the level of generalized trust for each respondent was assessed as the average value of the responses to the following statements: "In general, people can be trusted", "Distrust of people is a bad quality", "It is better to be suspicious than to trust people", "In relation to people it is better to be cautious and not to trust them too much". For the last two negative statements, responses were previously encoded so that the maximum code for all four statements corresponds to the maximum level of confidence.

The level of interpersonal trust was assessed as the average value of the following responses: "I have never been (would never be) tempted to check the contacts/relationships of my partner/husband (wife)", "I have never been (would never be) tempted to check the contacts/relationships of my partner/husband (wife), in spite of his/her behavior", "Normally, I assume that the other people could not get along with me", "Complete trust in the relationship between a man and a woman usually ends in the cheating of one of the partners". The last two statements were also preliminarily encoded.

The levels of general and interpersonal trust of Russian and other Eastern European youth covered in the study differ. However, as a general rule, the average level of interpersonal trust is higher than the average level of general trust.

Such correlation of the two levels of trust is characteristic specifically to societies that are undergoing transformational processes.

The youth of Poland and Lithuania show a high level of interpersonal trust and the highest level of general public trust. Russia and Ukraine show an intermediate, medium level of general trust, while the level of interpersonal trust in these countries is the lowest.

The magnitude of general trust here can be considered one of the fundamental factors that determine the economic growth in society. The level of trust, defined as "expectation occurring in the community that other members will behave more or less predictably, fairly and with attention to the needs of others, in accordance with some general rules" (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 52), determines the formation rate of social capital and affects the economic development of society. In this regard, the difference between the two pairs of countries (Poland and Lithuania, on the one hand, and Russia and Ukraine, on the other) reflects the considerable success of the first pair on the path of market and democratic reforms. Compared to these countries, there is a somewhat surprisingly low



Fig. 1. The level of general and interpersonal trust by country[1]

level of trust in the Czech Republic, which, however, demonstrates the highest level of interpersonal trust of all the countries. This can possibly be explained by the specifics of the post transformational development of the country, as well as the specific processes of socialization of the young generation.

If interpersonal trust arises in situations of "face-to-face" interaction, generalized trust, being formed under the influence of norms and values of the society, is an indicator of the culture of trust in the said society. Such a perspective allows us to consider social trust in the light of the values and attitudes shared by the majority of society. Next, we turn to a comparative analysis of the value orientations of young people in Eastern European countries and the relationship between these orientations and interpersonal trust.

Value orientations of young people

Value orientation of people in different countries of the world today are subject to ongoing international monitoring, they allow us to see how the full range of the world's economic and political changes affects the fundamental values of different societies, and to explore the ability of cultures to modernize.

In our study, by individual values we understand a person's beliefs in the importance for him personally of an object or phenomenon, an indifference to some fact or aspect of reality.

To compare the prevalence of certain value orientations among young Eastern Europeans, a transformation of the original data was required. Initially, the database demonstrated the individual marks assigned by the respondents to a list of 25 different values, which were based on their personal beliefs and experience. Using factor analysis, these values were grouped into six enlarged blocks (values of the second level of integration), the resulting model explained 54.5% of the total dispersion.[2]

The first factor is individualism and self-expression, which includes the following initial values (first-level): independent decision making, independence, individualism, the

1 According to analysis of variances, a statistically significant difference (at the 0.01 level) between the mean levels of total social confidence doesn't exist between Russia and Ukraine, Russia and Latvia. For the remaining pairs of countries, the difference in the level of this type of trust is significant. With regard to interpersonal trust, the average level for this index was not significantly different in Russia and Ukraine, Ukraine and Lithuania, Lithuania, Poland and the Czech Republic.

2 Factor analysis, method principal components with the rotation method "Varimax".

search for new and exciting things, the opportunity to develop one's own interests, creative work, the opportunity for self-improvement, the freedom to satisfy one's own wishes.

The second factor – self-assertion – is made up of a special sense of being irreplaceable at work/competence, professionalism, the importance of work which provides good opportunities for career growth, the authority to organize work, to manage and control others, the importance of being respected, as well as the importance of fighting for one's own correctness and not allowing others to deceive you (politicians, leaders etc.).

The third factor – the family – stability, prosperity, secures financial situation in the family, an emotional bond with their families, a sense of being needed. This represents the traditional way of life, feeling protected, having close, trusted people you can rely on, no matter what occurs at work and in society.

The fourth factor – helping others – includes the ability to spread important social values (kindness, justice, knowledge etc.) and the ability to help people.

The fifth factor – infantilism – consists of high importance of values such as peace of mind, lack of commitment, minimum effort to achieve goals, the existence of the least possible number of situations in which one needs to make difficult decisions. This value orientation is the opposite of individualism, self-reliance and self-expression.

The sixth factor – hedonism – focuses on having fun alone and with others.

The results of the factor analysis helped us group the original questionnaire (first-level values) into units of values (of the second level). Further the comparison of countries was carried out using these units (individualism, self-affirmation, family, helping others, infantilism, hedonism).

The average values of the six factors identified by factor analysis can be used to compare the values of young people from different countries. However, the resulting model based on these results would explain a little more than 50% of the total dispersion. In this regard, it was decided instead to use the values of the factors of a special index, calculated as the average weighted variables in each of the factors (Schwartz Method: Schwartz, 1997)

First, the average of all the variables included in each of the blocks was calculated for each respondent. Since when answering the questionnaire respondents tend to choose the same position of the scale, an offset appears. To get rid of this effect, the average scores were normalized: the average mark which the respondent assigned to all the values listed in the questionnaire was subtracted. As a result, a number that reflects how this or that value orientation (individualism, family, hedonism etc.) is important to the respondent in relation to the importance of all values on average was obtained for each respondent. Then we calculated the average values of these indexes across countries.

As a result, the final indexes (individualism, self-affirmation, family, helping others, infantilism, hedonism) *reflect the priority of a value compared to all the values in general for all respondents from the same country.*

The value orientation of the respondents from different countries was represented in the form of value profiles constructed from the values of the indices described above (see Figure 2). *If the index value is greater than zero, then this value is more important than all the values of the average, and vice versa, if the index is less than zero, then the value is less important than all the values on average.*

The young people of post-socialist countries consider the most significant value in relation to all the others is the family well-being and stability, as well as emotional intimacy with relatives. The highest value of the index for this value exists in Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Poland, however it is lower in the Ukraine and Russia. For these post-so-

cialist countries, the process of adaptation to the new social realities turned out to be rather difficult and complex. The danger of an ideological vacuum in which the society ended up as a result of the transition, was seriously underestimated during the reforms. In this situation, the inner circle (family and friends) proved to be the most resistant to the adverse factors that were brought about by the transformational processes. A necessary level of mutual trust and understanding was maintained.

In second place for relevance and importance for the youth of most of the countries is individualism, including independence, freedom in making decisions and taking responsibility for them. As in the case with family values, the value of individualism is more supported in Latvia, the Czech Republic, Poland and to a lesser degree – in Russia and Ukraine. It must be stressed that the value of individualism is one of the most important values in modern society. The prevalence of this particular value among others, testifies to the success of the ongoing changes in the society, the formation of creative people that are able to successfully adapt to and understand the technologically developed and dynamic Western civilization.

The general consensus of indifference in the answers of respondents from different countries can be noted respecting infantilism. This value is the least significant in relation to all others in all countries.

In respect to hedonism, the responses of students from different countries varied significantly. The wish to have a good time with their friends is more important for the young Czech, Polish and less – Lithuanian, Russian and Ukrainian young people. Hedo-



Fig. 2. Value profiles by country

nism, as a component of individualistic values (though negative) is weaker expressed in the Russians and Ukrainians than in most other Europeans.

The attitudes towards the value of self-assertion differed – it is more important for the youth of Lithuania, less important for Russians, and even less important in the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine.

Regarding the value of helping others small, subtle differences in the responses of the youth from different countries can be seen. For all respondents this value has an average, medium level of importance in relation to all the values in general.

Summarizing the comparative analysis of the value orientations of Eastern youth, it should be noted that the most important pair of values for respondents in all countries is: individualism, self-expression, on the one hand, and family well-being and stability of the other.. The dominance of this pair of values is a manifestation of an antinomy (Toshchenko, 2010), which is characteristic of the normative value system of a society that is undergoing a transformation. A preference for the traditional way of life, preservation of the family, the need for security, in close, trusted people is combined with a high importance of individualistic values. The rejection of the communist ideology and the formation of the institutions of a market economy led to the actualization of the values of self-affirmation and hedonism, which are most clearly opposed to the values of civic responsibility and helping others. The priority of self-interest caused serious damage to altruistic, solidarity values (Yasin, 2003).

Next, we turn to the relationship between value orientations and levels of generalized and interpersonal trust.

The correlation of the level of trust and value orientations

The process of building a culture of trust is of an ongoing nature, evolving from the past through the present into the future (Sztompka, 2012, p. 297). On the one hand, this process is influenced by various macrosocial conditions, and on the other a culture of trust is the result of a "climate" and atmosphere of trust in society, which in turn are made up of individual actions and attitudes of people.

The following features of people, to a greater or less extent contribute to the spread of the culture of trust: "overall activity and a sense of readiness for action, rather than inaction; optimism, rather than pessimism; focus on the future, rather than the present; high demands and the desire for success, rather than low needs and a focus on adaptation; innovation, rather than conformism" (Sztompka, 2012, p. 306). Moreover, in order for the described "syndrome" of individualism to be beneficial to the formation of a culture of trust, it must be common, typical in the society. Thus, the level of trust in society is not only connected with the terms of the extended social context, but also with individual characteristics and attitudes of people. Next, we consider the relationship between dominant value orientations in a society and the level of trust, general as well as interpersonal.

First, let's consider how the value orientations of young people from different countries are related to the level of *"general social trust"*. Let's start with the values of individualism, independence and family stability and well-being, as they are most important to students in most countries. These values are the most important for the representatives of Latvia and Poland, and it is in these countries that we can see the highest level of the general social trust. The opposite situation exists for the youth of Russia and Ukraine. For them, the considered pair of values is also dominant in relation to the other values,



Fig. 3. General trust and Individualism



Fig. 4. General trust and family

but in comparison with students from Poland and Latvia, the importance of individualism and family well-being is much lower. Respectively, the level of the developed level of trust among the Russian and Ukrainian young people is significantly lower. Thus, for these four countries we can observe a definite relationship between the level of trust and the importance of family and individualistic values. The Czech Republic differs from this trend. Students in this country show a low level of overall social trust while at the same time individualistic and family values are fairly important to them.

Let's move on to the next pair of values: self-assertion and helping others.

Self-assertion, respect of others and power over others is more important for the young people of Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine. At the same time a medium level of overall social trust is noted in these countries. The Czech Republic has low scores in both of these categories. At the same time, in Poland, where there is the highest level of trust among all the countries, the importance of the value of self-assertion is medium when compared to the other countries.



Fig. 5. General trust and self-affirmation



Fig. 6. General trust and help



Fig. 7. General trust and hedonism



Fig. 8. General trust and infantilism

As in the case with the value of self-affirmation, the relationship between the value of helping people and the level of trust is ambiguous. For Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, the Czech Republic it is fair to draw the following connection: in countries with a high degree of importance the value of helping others, the level of general social trust is higher. However, Russia does not fit into this trend: while the importance of helping others is at a very low level, the level of trust is almost the same as in Ukraine and Lithuania.

Regarding the last pair of values (infantilism and hedonism) we can see that for the students of two countries (Lithuania and Poland), these values are of low importance, while they have the highest level of general social trust. For the remaining three countries, the situation is reversed: they demonstrate the highest level of importance aspiring for a good time and having a lack of responsibility, the level of general social trust in these countries, however, is lower.

Next, we will consider how the value orientations are related to the *"special interpersonal trust"*.



Fig. 9. Interpersonal trust and individualism



Fig. 10. Interpersonal trust and family



Fig. 11. Interpersonal trust and self affirmation



Fig. 12. Interpersonal trust and help

At the group level, family and individualistic values are linked to the level of "special interpersonal trust". In Poland, Latvia and the Czech Republic the considered values are ahead of all others on the level of importance, and these countries demonstrate the highest level of interpersonal trust. Compared to these countries, in Russia and Ukraine independence, autonomy and family stability are less important, and the level of interpersonal trust is significantly lower (the lowest of all the countries represented in the study).

Such values as self-assertion, hedonism and infatilism at the country level are not correlated with the level of interpersonal trust.

Thus, in countries with a high level of importance of these values, the level of interpersonal trust can be high as well as low.

For example, a high degree of importance of self-assertion was recorded for students from Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia, while in the latter two countries, the level of interpersonal trust is very low, while it is high in Lithuania.

A similar situation exists with the values of infantilism: they are important for the respondents from the Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine and Russia. However, in the first two countries, the level of interpersonal trust is much higher than in the last two.



Fig. 13. Interpersonal trust and infantilism



Fig. 14. Interpersonal trust and hedonism

The relationship between the degree of prevalence of certain value orientations of young people in Eastern European countries and the level of social and interpersonal trust can only be traced for one pair of values: "individualism" and "family stability". Countries in which these value orientations are more common among college students, demonstrate a higher level of trust. A greater or lesser importance of the other values (self-assertion, hedonism, infantilism) appeared to be unrelated to the level of trust among the students of these countries. Thus, on the group level, a tendency of young people towards the importance of individualistic and family values, is correlated to the two levels of trust: general social and interpersonal. For most of the considered parameters, the closest were the positions of young people from Russia and Ukraine, on the one hand, and Poland and Latvia (sometimes the Czech Republic) on the other hand.

Conclusion

Economic and social developments in modern post-socialist governments have changed the living conditions of people, as well as their understanding of the society that they live in and have generated significant changes in the complex representations of social reality. Under these conditions, the level of trust in society could not have stayed unaffected. Since trust is the basis of interaction between individuals, defining their orientation in the new social space, the value orientations of young formed during the last two decades is of particular importance for the evaluation of these changes. They are interested in living in a constantly changing world, they are not afraid of competition, which makes them work hard, as well as fight for their rights and interests. It is noteworthy that in the Eastern European countries mentioned in our study, the configuration of value orientations of the younger generation shows fundamental differences. The values of individualism, which are based on the belief in yourself, perseverance, and self-confidence are becoming more common. These, in turn, are the individual determinants of trust, the character traits that contribute to the spread of the "individual syndrome" of trust (Sztompka 2012, p. 306). The result is the formation of a new type of person that is capable of innovation and creativity, which is in demand in the man-made, dynamic, ever-changing modern civilization. At the same time, a high level of importance of family stability and prosperity is maintained. As shown by P. Sztompka (Sztompka, 2012, p. 314), it is this particular value that acts as the basis for creating an atmosphere of trust in society, promoting a culture of trust, even among the less affluent and educated population, compensating for the lack of economic resources.

The adaptation process of post-socialist countries to new social conditions takes place at different speeds and with different degrees of success. Countries of the former Warsaw Pact and the Baltic countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Lithuania), becoming part of a European political and economic system had some advantages that allowed them to build more social potential to surpass the former Soviet Union countries (Russia and Ukraine) in the levels of social and interpersonal trust. According to P. Sztompka (Sztompka, 1991), the gradual elimination of the fundamental factors of distrust in countries that have become part of the "European family", was aided by the preservation of traditional values such as family support, communication with close and reliable people. In addition, a more intense growth of GDP and GNI, compared to Ukraine and Russia, in post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe that are part of the EU, has allowed a significant economic progress, a new quality and standard of living, as well as the successful establishment of the market and private property, which has become the reason

for achieving a greater efficiency of social transformation in these countries. As a consequence, in these societies, the process of transformation of value priorities, in particular the spread of values of individualism is faster. An important consequence of these processes is the achievement of a high level of social and interpersonal trust, an increase of personal and social capital, as well as the spread and strengthening of the culture of trust.

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DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL WELL-BEING AND TRUST OF THE CENTRAL RUSSIA REGION'S POPULATION[1]

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In the conditions when Russian society is undergoing a structural transformation, it is important to give integral representation to the dynamics of sociocultural structures and processes that are going on in particular regions, and it is vital to examine these processes analytically in the context of dynamics of sociocultural space in all post-soviet Russia. To study this, one should focus on the changes in socio-economic indicators, investment potential, integral risk, innovative activity, parameters of standard of life, and civil activity, as well as on recreation of profiles and contours of a region's sociocultural modernization. Social well-being and social/personal trust are important indicators of how the country's population estimates the on-going social processes.

Social well-being is an important subjective-objective parameter of living conditions of the population. In any regional community, social well-being depends on the individual (social group, population at large) and on the regional authorities that determine the parameters of economic, political and social processes in a region. In the first case, social well-being is manifested in people's subjective perception of their social position and the degree of satisfaction of their needs and interests; it reflects the qualitative indicators of social changes in a region. In the second case, we link social well-being with a set of parametric data presented in statistical indicators and in the data of rating agencies.

According to Zh. T. Toshchenko, social well-being can be viewed as an integral indicator of a person's adjustment to new conditions and as an indicator of successful/unsuccessful adjustment that determines the meaning of people's actions and behavior (Toshchenko, 1998). This parameter is quite substantial, because it allows to show the evolution of indicators of population's social well-being in Russian regions in the context of social changes, in particular, during processes of modernization.

We will proceed from the assumption that social well-being can be viewed as an important parameter of population's trust to social institutes and holders of various statuses in a region. Social well-being includes the following components: *the degree of people's protection from dangers, the degree of people's satisfaction with their life in general, the degree of social optimism*.

1 The study has been carried out with support of the RHSF (project № 12-03-00426a).

Sociological research conducted in the framework of the All-Russian program "Sociocultural Evolution of Russia and its Regions" by the Center for Studying Sociocultural Changes of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) Institute of Philosophy demonstrates that estimations of the living conditions and social well-being of the population are ambivalent. It can be illustrated both by the example of the all-Russian research carried out by the Center in 2010 and by the regional researches that have recently been performed within the program.

A number of research projects have been completed in Kursk region and several monographs have been published based on the analysis of statistical documents, expert estimations, and sociological monitoring employing the method called "Sociocultural Portrait of Region", which was developed in Center for Studying Sociocultural Changes (Lapin, 2010). The projects and monographs indicate sociocultural potential for development of the region, describe the social well-being of the population, its civil activity, the problems perturbing the region's inhabitants, and the character of the region's evolution in the post-soviet period. Among the key problems of the region we should distinguish the standard of living, social stratification, cultural and intellectual potential, and also a number of latent problems (innovative activity, labor relations etc.).

Here we will dwell upon the issue of social well-being. We will use the results of sociological surveys. Note that population-based surveys have been conducted in Kursk state University sociological laboratory in 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2012 in various localities of the Kursk region. In the course of the studies using stratified multistage sampling with random selection of respondents. The sizes of the samples were 500 (2006), 1128 (2007), 1000 (2009) and 1000 (2012) people, and the statistical error for one parameter was no more than 3%. The survey was conducted in the form of one-hour interviews (62 questions) in confidential and domiciliary atmosphere.

Let us look at the components of social well-being one by one. First of all, we will discuss how (to what degree) the residents of the region feel *protected from dangers*. See Table 1.

We can see in the table, that danger evaluation in the survey 2012 shows crime in the first place (60% of answers), *poverty* (58.5%) in the second place, and *arbitrary behavior of officials* (56.5%) in the third. Then follow *environmental threat* (50.7%) and the danger of *abuse by law enforcement authorities* (49.6% of answers). The significant weight of the poverty danger tells us that economic crisis produced substantial influence on the social moods of the inhabitants of Kursk region. However, in an analogous survey conducted in Tyumen region in 2009, the first three places were distributed in the same way: the first place on vulnerability scale is occupied by crime (53%), the second – also by poverty (48%), the third – by arbitrary behavior of officials (43% of answers), the fourth – by arbitrary behavior of law enforcement authorities (36%). Then follow ecological threat and loneliness (feeling abandoned) which share the same position (each – 34% of answers) (Sociocultural portrait of Tula region, 2011). We can see that ranking of dangers almost coincided in the two Russian regions which are quite distant from one another, however the acuteness of these dangers in Kursk region is felt with greater intensity. And in Tula region, a region in the Central Federal District, the danger of arbitrary behavior of officials is brought to the forefront (61.6% of answers), followed by the danger of crime (57.7% of answers), poverty (56.1% of answers), ecological threat (50.0% of answers), and arbitrary behavior of law enforcement authorities (47.1%) (Sociocultural portrait of Tula region, 2011). It is evident that the relations with authorities constitute the most critical problem in this region.

Table 1
Protectability of Kursk residents from social dangers
(% of the number of respondents, 2009/2012)

Kinds of dangers*	Protected	Likely protected	Difficult to say	Unlikely protected	Not protected at all	RF, 2010* Not protected
Criminality	5.6/6.6	7.1/12.4	25.8/21.0	34.8/31.0	26.7/29.0	62.3
Poverty	5.3/8.9	10.2/13.0	25.1/19.6	33.0/27.9	26.4/30.6	59.1
Ecological threat	10.7/8.5	17.1/16.6	26.3/24.2	23.1/26	22.8/24.7	64.5
Functionary lawlessness	6.7/6.6	10.7/13.7	31.4/23.2	31.4/31.0	19.8/25.5	51
Law machinery lawlessness	7.9/10.0	12.7/13.7	32.5/25.0	29.0/29.6	17.9/20.0	44.4
Loneliness and neglect	18.7/21.4	19.3/17.7	24.3/21.9	21.0/18.6	16.7/18.6	41.8
Oppressions because of age and sex	38.5/32.4	24.9/26.1	20.9/22.9	10.4/12.5	5.3/6.1	29.5
Political persecutions	38.7/27.5	19.6/22.1	27.5/28.3	7.2/12.9	7.0/9.2	20
Race discrimination	53.5/48.8	22.2/24.7	15.7/16.5	4.8/7.0	3.8/3.0	14.3
Religious persecutions	55.4/52.0	20.9/23.7	14.7/15.6	4.7/6.4	4.3/6.4	12.8

Note: * – referring to "RF (Russia), 2010" here and hereinafter we will use the results of the sixth wave of the All-Russian monitoring "Values and Interests of Russian Population" which were obtained in 2010 by the RAS Center for Studying Sociocultural Changes.

Assessment of protection, from the dangers of which are fixed for a number of years in the studies on the Kursk region, is undergoing some changes. Nevertheless, in the course of all the measurements of crime danger, poverty, arbitrariness of officials and law enforcement bodies, as well as environmental hazards are coming to the fore. Dynamics assessment of the security of the region's population from social dangers in 2006–2012 are presented in Figure 1.

As we can see, the problem of protection from crime in all measurement remains the dominant, although its topicality is somewhat reduced. In the post-crisis period has increased severity of the danger of poverty. The high assessment of the arbitrariness danger of officials testifies about an important social institution crises – the Institute of management.

The second important component of social well-being is *people's satisfaction with their lives*. Comparing the results of 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2012 allows revealing some dynamics of social well-being. Let us have a look at the table below.

Comparing the results of field research indicates that with the decrease of population's life level in the crisis period, the satisfaction with life did not decreased, but on the contrary, increased.



Fig. 1. Dynamics assessment of the main social dangers of Kursk region inhabitants (summarized answers "Not protected" and "Perhaps, is not protected"), 2012

Table 2
Kursk Region Population's Satisfaction with their life
(% of the number of respondents, 2006–2012)

Variants of answers	2006	2007	2009	2012	RF, 2010
Absolutely satisfied	9	10.7	10.4	11.6	12.5
Rather satisfied	37	39.0	41.7	43.1	46.3
Found difficulty in exact replying	20	16.3	15.5	17.1	14.1
Not quite satisfied	28	27.9	27.9	24.6	20.9
Absolutely dissatisfied	5	5.9	4.4	3.0	5.8
Refused to answer	1	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.3

We explain this fact, however paradoxical it may seem at the first sight, firstly, by a certain inertia in public perception of social phenomena, secondly, by common traits in the national mentality of the Russian regions' residents, and thirdly, by value shifts in the consciousness of the people inhabiting the region. We should note that the impact of the financial crisis in Kursk was not as severe as in some other regions in Central Russia, including neighboring Belgorod and Lipetsk regions.

The analysis of the survey results also shows that the respondents give rather realistic evaluations of their capabilities and prospects. Let us now address the third constituent of the social well-being – the confidence of the region's population in the future (Table 3).

The data in the table demonstrates that the confidence in the future over the past few years slightly grew up. In comparison with All-Russian indexes, the percentage of people in Kursk region who are confident about their future is less than across Russia (36.8% vs 50.0%), yet the percentage of unconfident people is also slightly lower than the all-Russian indices (26.9% vs 28.2%). And more than one third of the polled residents of the region find it difficult to give a definite answer to this question.

Table 3
Confidence of Kursk region's population in the future
(% of the number of respondents, 2006–2012)

Variants of answers	2006	2007	2009	2012	RF, 2010
Quite confident	8	9.6	7.8	11.7	13.8
Rather confident than not confident	31	23.0	25.6	25.1	36.2
Can't say exactly	33	30.3	38.4	35.5	21
Rather not confident than confident	20	21.3	18.4	18.4	18.1
Not confident absolutely	7	15.4	9.1	8.5	10.1
Refused to answer	1	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.9

According to the formula developed by N. I. Lapin (Regions in Russia, 2009), we calculated the indexes of social well-being for Kursk region's residents and compared them with all-Russian indicators. The data in table 4 clearly demonstrate that the social well-being index dropped in the region and in the country on the whole.

As we see, the social well-being indices are slightly higher in Kursk region than in Russia on the whole. To our mind, relative remoteness from the capital city, self-reliance and ability to adjust in changed socio-economic conditions are the factors that allow Kursk residents to give a more positive assessment to their well-being than one of an average Russian citizen. Our assumption is confirmed by the fact that Tyumen region, socially and economically successful and even more remote from the federal center, had a higher social well-being index in 2009 – 0.65, while Tula region, which is situated close to the capital, had a rather low social well-being index – 0.38 (Mosin, 2011). Such a low index is clearly insufficient for sustainable development of a regional community.

Some authors consider social well-being to be an integral parameter characterizing realization of a person's life strategy, his/her attitude to the reality, and subjective sides of his/her personality (Petrova, 2000). Indicators of social well-being correlate, as a rule, with the population's attitudes to social institutes, processes, and events, as well as with showing a certain degree of trust on personal and institutional levels.

Table 4
Population's social well-being index

Component of well-being, its index	Kursk Region, 2006	Kursk Region, 2007	Kursk Region, 2009	Kursk Region, 2012	RF*, 2006	RF, 2010
Security from dangers (Ks)	0.63	0.62	0.63	0.59	0.58	0.59
Satisfaction by life on the whole (Ksl)	0.57	0.64	0.65	0.67	0.66	0.59
Social optimism (Ko)	0.67	0.62	0.59	0.63	0.58	0.50
Index of social well-being (Isw)	0.62	0.63	0.62	0.63	0.61	0.56

Note: * – referring to "RF (Russia), 2006" we will use the results of the fifth wave, and referring to "RF (Russia), 2010" – the sixth wave of the All-Russian monitoring "Values and Interests of Population of Russia" which were obtained in 2010 by the RAS Center for Studying Sociocultural Changes.



Fig. 2. Distribution of answers to the question "Do you feel or do not feel the proximity with such people?" (% of number of respondents, 2012)

The personal trust of Kursk residents is manifested in *stratified proximities*. The region's inhabitants were asked to answer the question: "To what extent do you feel proximity to or distance from such people ("intimate"–"alien"). The distribution of answers is shown in Figure 2.

According to survey, respondents show the maximum social proximity to their fellow-townsmen. The difference in a proximity assessment with inhabitants of all Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union is absolutely insignificant. The proximity with inhabitants within the world is minimum. Distribution of answers to a question testifies that; for citizens of the region the intra-settlement structure, is most significant. Respectively the identification of the micro level is more significant, than the macro level. Interestingly, residents of other regions of Russia demonstrate similar views.

We also need to discuss the circles of mutual understanding and characteristics of the region's population (see Figure 2). Let's note that respondents could choose up to three versions of answers.

The chart shows that the closest for Kursk region's people is the *family,* then follow *friends*, *professional proximity*, proximity of *neighbors* and proximity to the people who *practice the same religion*.

One of the survey questions touched upon institutional trust of the region's population. The relevant results are given in Table 5.

The economic crisis resulted in a decrease of population's trust to some social institutions. It should also be noted that the data of the regional research generally confirm the All-Russian trend that the country has been experiencing a *crisis of citizens' trust* to state institutions in the recent years. In Kursk region, these are, first of all, regional offices of political parties ("I do not trust much" and "I do not trust at all" – 50.5% of respondents), the governor (50.2%), the regional duma (47%).

The rating of distrust to social institutions is different in Tyumen region: mass media – 40%, police – 40%, regional offices of political parties – 34%. These are the research results from Tula: those who do not have trust to regional offices of political parties account to as much as 50.8%, the police – 48.6%, the regional government – 43.6%. As we can see, distrust to regional offices of political parties are on the first place in Tula region, it is higher than in Kursk and Tyumen regions. So, it is no wonder that there



Fig. 3. Distribution of answers to a question "Among which people you meet that has the greatest mutual understanding?" (2012)

were announcements about establishing a new political party in Russia under the name "Against all". The main goal of this party is to re-introduce the option "Against all" ("None of the above") in the voting ballots.

The trust of population to social institutions is an important source for their authority and, at the same time, an indicator of their efficiency. The trust crisis, which manifests in the fact that a substantial part of the population does not trust the key social institutions of the country, weakens the demand for sociocultural potential in the life of the social system. It is especially expressively displayed by the trust levels of the young people and students in particular.

A field research was carried out in April–May 2010 to study the trust of Kursk students to main social institutions. The total sample of the research was 375 students of higher and vocational educational institutions between 14 and 29 years of age. Male and

Table 5

Level of trust of Kursk region's population to institutions of power
(% of the number of respondents, 2009/2012)

	Court	**Governor**	**Labor unions**	**Public prosecutor's office**	**Police**	**Party, regional department**	**Parliament**	**Mass-media**
Fully trust	14.3/15.7	20.0/5.5	6.3/6.4	9.1/11.7	7.5/9.3	4.3/3.1	7.4/5.3	4.4/7.1
Likely trust	32.3/34.0	37.3/18.7	16.6/21.7	21.4/31.0	15.7/22.5	11.5/12.9	19.0/7.8	16.0/25.4
Difficult to say exactly	22.9/17.3	20.8/23.3	38.9/30.3	30.2/21.3	26.2/19.0	32.3/28.3	29.6/25.9	28.3/20.6
Trust not completely	19.7/20.1	12.3/25.9	18.0/19.0	25.4/21.4	28.4/29.6	26.9/26.7	23.8/25.7	29.2/26.3
Don't trust absolutely	8.5/10.5	7.2/24.3	15.1/16.9	11.5/12.4	20.3/18.4	21.7/23.8	17.3/21.3	20.1/19.2
Don't know	1.4/2.1	1.2/2.1	3.6/5.0	1.3/2.0	0.8/1.0	2.0/4.9	1.6/3.8	1.2/1.1
Refuse to reply	0.9/0.3	1.2/0.2	1.5/0.7	1.1/0.2	1.1/0.2	1.3/0.3	1.3/0.2	0.8/0.3

female respondents constituted 43% and 57% of the sample respectively. Primary sociological information was gathered using questionnaires. The statistical error on one parameter did not exceed 3%.

According to the results of research, only one quarter of the respondents (25.6%) think that the majority of people can be trusted, and two thirds (74.4%) of the students hold the opposite opinion (one should be careful in interaction with people). This distribution of answers shows that young people generally have a low level of trust to people.

The young generation thinks that these days one can achieve success in the society if he/she seldom trusts people. The answers of respondents confirm it: more than a half of the respondents (57.5%) believe that today success in life comes to those who mostly do not trust people. 42.5% of respondents adhere to the opposite point of view.

Now we will discuss institutional trust. According to the regional research, young people put the most trust among social institutes in the institute of education (80%); the institute of religion is on the second place (75.7%), and health care institute – on the third. The youth of Kursk region do not trust, first of all, the Russian government (63.7% of respondents), mass media (61.2%) and law enforcement agencies (56.3%).

The answers to the questions about trusting representatives of social institutes can seem rather unexpected. So, the most trusted by students are the scientist (83.8%), teacher (83.1%), military (79.4%), priest (73.8%), and doctor (68.1%), who enjoy full or partial trust of the respondents. Then follow the police officer (41.9%), shop assistant (35.1%), journalist (23.1%), businessman (20.7%) and politician. We should note that young respondents have a great difficulty in assessing their trust level to the judge, whom the respondents are inclined both to trust (49.4%) and to distrust (43.8%). The comparison of answers to the two questions shows that generally the trust to representatives of social institutes is slightly higher, than the trust to the institutes themselves. The only exception is the mass media (33.7%) that are trusted by more respondents, than their representative – the journalist.

Results of the research confirm the conclusions made in a number of All-Russian investigations which have shown low level of interpersonal and institutional trust in the Russian society. Thus, one cannot but agree with L. D. Gudkov who has noted that low interpersonal trust in Russia "correlates with a low level of recognition of individual responsibility and civil solidarity, distrust to politics or public work, alienation and distancing from politics, negative attitude to the government, local authorities, and deputies, understanding one's impotence to influence the decision-making by the authorities at different levels, and non-readiness to participate in public affairs or actions that go beyond the problems of everyday life…" (Gudkov, 2012). We find confirmations for this statement when doing annual sociological researches in our region that are carried out in line with preparation of annual "Reports on Condition of Civil Society in Kursk region". We will discuss the materials of these reports.

In the Report of 2010, less than a quarter of respondents (23.4%) answered in the affirmative to the question "Can the people, in your opinion, influence the power (political decisions)?". About a half of respondents (42.6%) consider that their ability to influence administrative decisions is limited. It is, of course, a very regretful fact that almost every third respondent points to inability of Russian citizens to influence political decisions (Report, 2010).

According to the Report of 2012, few inhabitants of the region are involved in the activities of non-profit organizations today – only about 6% of the population of Kursk region are members of public organizations (in 2010 – 7%), and approximately the same

percentage declare themselves supporters of certain political parties (Report, 2012). At the same time, people in the region attach more importance to initiatives of the population that are considered an instrument for population's activization and development of institutes of civil society. According to the Report of 2012, more than 40% of Kursk residents are satisfied with available opportunities to take initiative in their lives, but the same number of the region's inhabitants are not satisfied with these opportunities.

In discussing the issue of trust in the regions of Central Russia, it is necessary to use the reconstruction of the social trust space in Russia, that was performed by the Fund of Public Opinion (FPO) according to the data of two national megapolls "Georaiting" of 2007 and 2008. The description of the Russian space of social trust encompasses 68 regions.

Its structure was presented in three axes: the first axis – the institutional (public) trust, the second axis – personal responsibility at a far and average social distance, the third axis – personal civil activity. The reconstruction divided the Russian regions into five clusters: 1) "civil" cluster (19 regions) – public trust with existing personal responsibility and personal civil activity; 2) "paternalistic" cluster (9 regions) – public trust without personal responsibility; 3) "activist" cluster (11 regions) – personal civil activity without public trust; 4) "individualistic" cluster (11 regions) – personal responsibility without public trust and personal civil activity, and 5) "socio-depressive" cluster (18 regions) – absence of trust, responsibility, and activity (Petrenko, 2009).

This research covered all Central regions of the Russian Federation, which allows dividing these regions into relevant groups. We should note, however, that none of the regions in the Central Federal District was attributed to the "paternalistic" cluster. This fact is an important evidence that in Central Russia, as well as in Russia on the whole, a new type of the individual is gradually evolving, who less and less depends on the authorities and other social institutes and more often counts on himself/herself. We stated in several publications about Kursk region, that the population "on the whole became quite adapted to on-going changes during the years of social and economic transformations, at the same time the people rely more on themselves and their own capabilities, showing, however, moderate optimism when assessing their prospects" (Kogay, 2010).

Cluster distribution of the regions of Central Russia is presented in Table 6.

We see that a small number of the regions are in the "activist" cluster, and ten regions are in the clusters that are characterized by absence of public trust. The study shows that the features of civil climate in Central Russia, as well as in Russia as a whole, are mostly determined not by geographical position or economic development, but by sociocultural environment which defines the nature of interpersonal and social confidential relationship.

Table 6

Typology of Central Federal District regions in the social trust space

"Civil" cluster	**"Activist" cluster**	**"Individualist" cluster**	**"Socially-depressed" cluster**
Belgorod region	Kaluga region	Bryansk region	Vladimir region
Ivanovo region	Moscow	Kostroma region	Voronezh region
Orel region	Moscow region	Kursk region	Lipetsk region
Smolensk region		Tambov region	Ryazan region
Yaroslavl region		Tula region	Tver region

The dynamics of this environment, in its turn, has an impact on possibilities of modernization processes in the regions of the present-day Russia. Sociocultural modernization, as N. I. Lapin justly notes, is connected with formation and implementation in everyday life of a system of values based on one's personal development, and realization of these values is provided by relevant social institutes and structures (Lapin, 2012). The indicators of population's social well-being and trust in the regions of Central Russia point out increasing tension of social space (Belyaeva, 2012), which obviously does not contribute to progressive sustainable development of regional communities. Overcoming this tension is one of the most important challenges for activating the resources to carry out modernization in the country's regions.

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SOCIAL TRUST AND THE SOCIAL BEHAVIOR OF YOUTH IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

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Problems of social trust are directly linked with the idea of quality of life. First of all, this link can be seen in the trust of citizens to government and formal state institutions. Primarily, they include the President, the Government, the State Duma, local authorities and legislatures, political parties, law enforcement agencies and courts of different levels.

In Russian sociology, there is a tradition of studying the degree of confidence of different social and demographic groups to these institutions both as part of large sociological surveys that discover the specific features of Russian society and in political studies that predict voting behavior of inhabitants of particular regions.

In this paper, an attempt is made to compare the findings of such measurements with the data of an October 2012 study by the RSUH Department of Sociology under the supervision of Zh. T. Toschenko that used questionnaires to examine the quality of life. This analysis provides a view of the self-perception of Russians with regard to the assessment of individual aspects of life in the country: personal economic status, social status, personal security, access to education, social services and healthcare, maternal and child welfare, employment, recreation etc. This study identified four major groups surveyed: youth, retirees, urban and rural population of working age.

The body of research data indicates a relatively low level of trust in selected public institutions against the background (from the point of view of Russians) of entrenched social and economic problems. These include problems of housing and utilities, access to childcare and educational institutions, quality of healthcare, road construction, salaries and pensions of public employees, livability of communities, organization of leisure. These problems are mentioned in every study in every region of the country from year to year.

However, self-esteem of Russians in terms of socioeconomic well-being is mostly rather high. For example, the majority of respondents identify their income as close to average (53.8%) or even above the average (12.5%). Responses to indirect questions traditionally support this conclusion. About 40% of respondents reported that in financial terms they can afford almost everything and only expensive items such as a car or a second home are less affordable. In addition, 36% of respondents say that they spend 41–60% of their income on food and housing bills, while 33% spend only 20–40% of their income.

Perhaps the low level of public confidence compensated by fairly high level of interpersonal trust, which particularly extends to specific persons representing the government. Thus, trust in individual politicians is higher than that in their formal status. This applies to both the President and the mayors of individual cities, specific party leaders and individual ministers… It is the individual potential that representatives of different socio-demographic groups inhabiting different regions of the country base their hopes on. For example, research findings suggest that, on average, only 12% of adult Russians fully trust the representatives of local authorities, while the governor of Moscow Region, S.K. Shoigu at the time of this survey, enjoyed the full trust of 66% of respondents. As for the trust in the status of the President of the Russian Federation, its level was less than 30%. At the same time, 50% of Russians trust Mr Putin.

Russian government is trusted by only 27% of Russians, political parties – only 22% (question had multiple answers). At the same time, United Russia enjoys 22%, Fair Russia – 8%, Communist Party – 11%, and LDPR – 9% of trust.

Not too high is the level of trust in the domestic media. According to this survey, it is 17%. More significant is the confidence that Russians have in the Russian Orthodox Church. 24% of respondents trust that institution.

Former local officials well known to the electorate often fail to keep their words and their popularity decreases. According to the information obtained during the same study, over 20% of the respondents didn't know the name of their active deputy.

The analysis of the respondents' answers who told they don't want to take part in the elections (20%) showed the main reasons of electoral passivity of such kind. Numerous variants of answers could be joined in the following semantic groups.

- Don't vote on any elections
- Elections of local departments rose no interest
- There's no candidate to vote for
- Nothing depends on me
- On objective reasons (family celebrations, planed event, departure)

We can see distribution of these answers among those who quaint they don't take part in any elections. In addition the question was formulated in the following way: "If you decided not to vote, explain why, please".

Evidently there's not so many respondents who quote on objective reasons (31%). The most part do not see any sense in this process.

Such a situation allows promoting any person into local political structures. But it's just a hypothesis, if you have no money and administrative resources. Even one of these items may produce good results and both of them almost guarantee a success.

Hypothesis of greater importance of interpersonal relations is evidenced by the fact that one of the first places in the ranking of leisure types preferred by Russians is "spending time with friends and family". More than 90% of respondents are satisfied with their social network.

Interpersonal communication can act in Russia as the universal mechanism providing solutions to problems and giving hope for a better future and can be capable of stimulating patriotic feelings. For instance, 48% of respondents feel confident in the future, and in the ranking of factors affecting success in life, different forms of personal communication are in the second place.

More than half of the respondents reported that they felt proud of their country. Asked about the pride of the country, the population is almost equally divided. This is

an alarming symptom. Much has happened in the country that did not contribute to the consolidation of the national image, which led to the unpopularity of patriotism in some circles. Such involvement in the fate of the country, a sense of belonging and feeling part of one's nation is minimized mainly among respondents with low and high or upper-middle income. This was seen in individuals who do not have children or who have only one child in the family, whereas the respondents representing large families still have strong patriotic feelings.

This situation is indirectly confirmed by the fact that one in four respondents wants to live abroad. One in five (21%) would like to travel or work abroad, which creates the possibility of conversion of the desire into a sustained commitment to this intention.

However, the fact that the Russians who have two or more children give mostly negatively answers when asked about their desire to live abroad inspires confidence in the future and hope that they will be able to pass their patriotic views on to children.

It is especially important to follow how these indicators of social trust and quality of life are manifested in the responses of young Russians.

During the last decade, the Russian society has been experiencing deep socio-economic and political transformations that also impact the younger generation against the backdrop of the current tendency to an aging population. The chain of social experience transfer from parents to children is broken. The society is changing faster than the time that parents have to reinforce their social experience in order to pass it to the new generation.

The processes taking place among youth are quite controversial from the social point of view. On the one hand, young people have to accept existing objective conditions of the social and production life. On the other hand, youth inherent desire to work out their own stance (to construct their world) under the conditions when rapid social transformations cause the change of subjective attitudes in the minds of the younger generation.

Young people today are a non-homogeneous social group not adapted to the changing world of adults. At the same time, this is the most active part of the society with a large potential to innovation to change it. These are the factors that actualize studying of new phenomena in the social behavior of youth and especially students of contemporary Russia.

An attempt to determine how the today's youth understand the concept of patriotism gave the following results. When asked whether they consider support for current government a manifestation of patriotism, 27.6% responded positively (8.9% answered yes, 18.7% answered rather yes), 45.9% responded negatively (26.7% answered no, 19.2 answered rather not) (see Figure 21). These figures show that the credibility of the current government among students is not enough for unconditional support. Troubling is the fact that almost a third of respondents (26.5%) could not answer the question. Majority of those who found it difficult are in the age group of 15 to 18 years (29.0%). This once again confirms the assumption that young people in their real everyday life are far from politics.

The issue of confidence in the authorities was separately raised in the survey. The numbers speak for themselves. President of Russia enjoys the full confidence of 7.8%, partial confidence of 18.4%, is not trusted by 37.9% of young Russians. 35.5% of the respondents preferred not to answer. Parliament (State Duma, Federation Council) has the full confidence of 10.9%, partial confidence of 33.3%, is not trusted by 40.7% of young people. 14.9% of the respondents preferred not to answer. Government has the full confidence of 8.9%, partial confidence of 29.6%, is not trusted by 42.3% of students. 19.1% of the respondents preferred not to answer. Local authorities are fully trusted by 11.5%,

partially trusted by 40.4%, not trusted by 37.7% of students. 10.5% of the respondents preferred not to answer.

Political interests of the youth could be represented by political parties. However, when asked "Do you trust political parties", the majority (68.8%) of respondents gave a negative answer.

In this regard, there is a question about the general political involvement of young people. When asked whether they participated in political rallies and demonstrations during the academic year, 1.9% responded "yes, many times", 3.5% responded "a few times", 8.6% responded "once or twice" and 18.6% answered "no, but would like to go". Most respondents gave a negative answer: "No, I do not want" (67.4%). Thus, the political involvement of young people according to this study correlates well with other Russian data and is approximately 2%. This ultimately indicates a low level of confidence in any institutionalized forms of political life.

It can be assumed that young people are most aware of the political activities of youth groups than the relevant activities of the "adult" institutions and political parties. However, it is not so. The most popular and well-known organizations are committed to the revival of patriotism and nationalism, which often result in radicalism and extremism. More than a half of the Russian people don't remember even one youth organization, the remaining call radical and forbidden movements and pro-Kremlin organizations. It is evident that some trends in the young people activity are provoked by the authorities, which have no consistent position on the globalization process.

Interesting is the level of the young Russians awareness of the skinhead radical movement. This is an international youth movement supported in all European countries, which propagates certain music, first of all. But in Russia it is a radical and even extremist movement. They behave like hooligans to people of any non-titular nationality and explain such behavior by the wish to preserve their ethnical identity and protect the interest of their native country and its people. Such social stigmatization is a specific form of the youth patriotism in the globalizing world with its intensive horizontal mobility and an increased share of migrants and growth of ethnical differences. Our research evidences high popularity of the skinhead movement among the Russian youth. However the level of its support is very low, as Diagram 2 shows. The same is about the antipodal movement, a so-called "antifa". The antifa representatives declare the necessity of the physical fight against the skinheads, which are considered fascists, for the love of the motherland, people and history. At the same time, the antifa members are mostly recruited from the skinheads and they look and behave like the skinheads too.

Almost a third of respondents (26.8%) could not answer the question about their attitude towards antifascists. 32.1% of respondents do not know what antifascism is, and this makes up the majority of respondents (58.9%). Definite opinion in support of antifascists is shared by 15.3% of respondents ("fully support" – 6.4%; "somewhat support" – 8.9%). Definite opinion against antifascists is shared by 25.7% of respondents ("do not support" – 19.4%; "probably do not support" – 6.3%).

Half of the respondents do not link their patriotism with the support of the current government or buying the products of local manufacturers. The vast majority of respondents do not think that hostility to people of other nationalities is the manifestation of patriotism. This gave a basis to determine the threshold of tolerance among students as fairly high. The new form of patriotism among modern studying youth may be, for example, the patriotism of sport fans (not hooligans) feeling pride for their country during important world sport events.

When asked "Do you consider hostility to persons of another nationality a manifestation of patriotism," the vast majority of respondents (81.0%) answered negatively ("no" – 63.2%; "probably not" – 17.8%). It should be noted here, that the conviction that hostility to persons of other nationalities cannot be a manifestation of patriotism grows with age. Among young people aged 24–29 years only 5.0% answered positively ("yes" – 1.9%; "probably yes" – 3.1%). Only 9.9% of the young people surveyed preferred not to answer.

This can explain why the youth have formed a more definite opinion of the intolerance of skinheads. Vast majority of respondents disapprove of their activities (73.4%: 64.9% – "disapprove"; 8.5% – "rather disapprove"). 12.2% found it difficult to express their opinion, and 8.5% of the respondents are unaware of who skinheads are.

Perhaps, an expression of patriotism is the answer to the following question: "Would you like to live and work abroad?". Positive answer was given by only 13.5% of young people. Following reasons for such an answer were given in descending order: "it is more promising, more opportunities for self-realization", "it is better there", "better standard of living", "social security throughout life", "higher income". Thus, this choice is not related to politics. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that quite a large share of young people would like to live and work abroad temporarily (40.6%). This response is most popular in the age group 15 to 18 years (44.4%). Almost a third of respondents do not consider this an option (27.4%). Interestingly, negative answer was given by the senior group of students (24 to 29 years) (34.2%). Apparently, this group have found their place in their home country.

Thus, this study shows the virtual absence of credibility of public institutions. One of the reasons for this phenomenon is the clearly perceived by a majority of respondents (60.5%) impossibility to exercise all their rights. In addition, 18.8% (nearly one-fifth of the respondents) did not even try to evaluate this possibility (9.2% – "never considered", 9.6% – "undecided"). When asked "Did you attend the elections", the majority of young people answered negatively (77.8%). Most indicative is that 11.7% of respondents (almost a fifth) answered "attended, but I do not remember how I voted".

The study shows that youth declares and behaves conformally every time the society and, first of all significant adults demonstrate understanding and consideration of their views and interests. First of all, it refers to the leisure practices of youth. When organizing their leisure studying youth often use traditional forms – reading newspapers, magazines; going to the cinema, theaters, exhibitions and concerts; sports, watching TV and video. And still the absolute leader among traditional leisure practices is meeting with friends, buddies. The youth also uses the new forms of the organization and spending their leisure time; among them is visiting the Internet resources, computer games, visiting clubs and bars, youth hang outs, shopping and celebrating holidays new for the Russian culture – St Valentine's Day, the Halloween etc. In contacts with other social groups conformism for the youth is often expressed as non-conformism, not meaning that their opinion is changing under the peer pressure but that they prefer their opinion to the opinion originally shared with the group.

The social portrait of a young student is quite complicated, controversial, however, in general, it demonstrates the positive component comparing to other social groups and the society at large.

If we talk about the youth attitude towards other social groups, we have to note that their world view is bipolar. There are us, the youth, and them, the adults, who oppose us, impose their opinion to be reckoned with "The public opinion" for young people should be understood as the view of adults. The opinion of young people in general

is, as a rule, his or her own one (or the opinion contrary to the opinion of an adult with whom the young person fights). A young person believes that this he or she is the voice of the group opinion which uniqueness usually lies in its commonplace. The notorious "rebel spirit" is not so much peculiar of specific young people but is the norm for youth as the community, naturally, while maintaining an impressive series of conformity manifestations in the traditional form in respect to a specific youth group. Conformity in respect to the "public opinion" (i. e. adults' opinion) is expressed in youth in the traditional form (the change of the opinion under the pressure of the group in favor of thereof), unless the fathers and sons conflict of interests is declared.

The attitude of youth to the society as a whole can be reduced to the concept "young people do not chose the society they live in". And that is why clear answers are given to the question: "What does it mean for you to be a citizen?" – "to live with a passport in a certain state"; "to be a patriot"; "to be law abiding". The general loyalty and conformity in relation to society is obvious, however, the youth do not forget about their own interests.

Professional and life trajectories of young Russians are clearly defined and connected, as a rule, with the desire to succeed in the chosen professional field, to build a family and several children. All this reinforces the conclusion that interpersonal relations are highly relevant to Russians.

For example, the vast majority of young respondents (89.0%) sees their future in the light of having a family, and more than half (59.3%) of the respondents, who can be classified as the generation of only children, plan to have two (44.2%), three (11.7%) or more (3.4%) children.

The study showed that counting on oneself, on one's own strength is an appealing feature for modern studying youth. Young people believe that in order to achieve prosperity and success in life they, first of all, need education (18.4%), abilities and talent (12.6%) as well as hard work, conscientious attitude to work (12.1%)

It's an interesting fact that the secondary employment is becoming a constant companion for studying youth. One third of students permanently combine study with work, and one fifth of students do it on a case-to-case basis. Forms of this combination vary: from shift work to working from home, employment from a full time job to several hours a day. The main cause for students' secondary employment is their desire to be financially independent from their parents and to live with dignity. This again indirectly refutes the prevailing view of social infantilism of today's youth.

One of the main fears of the young Russians is the prospect to stay without tangible livelihood and the associated fear not to be able to find a job or to lose the existing one. Certainly, material well-being plays quite an important but not the main role in the life of a young person (not the basic value). The study shows that material well-being is "very important" only for one third young person (35.2%) Almost half said "rather important" (49.3%) as an integral part of life (according to open-ended questions) and 11.7% of respondents said that it was of not much importance ("not important" – 4.4%; "rather not important" – 7.3%.) The experts also revealed a pattern that the issues of material well-being concern the older group of studying youth from 24–29 much more ("very important" – 36.9%; "rather important then not" – 53.1%) Financial independence from their parents is especially valuable for them.

The study shows that the significant part of young people make active efforts to solve the problems associated with material disadvantage. Practically every third (28.7%) constantly combines work with study, and every fourth (24.5%) works from time to time. The fifth part named the need of money as the reason to combine study with work. How-

ever, the main reason (46.1%) of combining study with work is to be financially independent from their parents.

Egalitarianism in the opportunity to implement one's fundamental rights and freedoms declared by politicians as the main achievement of modern democratic society significantly contributed to the gender neutrality inside social groups. In young people's consumer and electoral behavior only minor gender differences are observed. Moreover, young women are interested in politics not less then young men, and the representatives of the "strong half of humanity" do not mind to go shopping at all.

The studies suggest that today the Russian students are positively-minded young people who have enough intelligence, strength and desire for the life in a modern society, who appreciate the present and make big plans for the future. This generation cannot be called lost. They know exactly what they want, what they believe in and what they hope for.

Thus, young Russians count, too, on interpersonal relationships and exhibit a high level of social trust in them.

Comment

The survey was conducted in the seven RF regions and represented the students of vocational and technical schools and higher educational establishments of Moscow, Vladivostok, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, Kazan, Nizhniy Novgorod, Rostov-on-Don, using the cluster quota sampling (quotas by gender, age and the type of an educational establishment and clusters in the cities of seven subjects of the Russian Federation with the total sample of 1500 respondents).

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ДОВЕРИЕ В ОБЩЕСТВЕ, БИЗНЕСЕ И ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ

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В книгу вошли материалы конференции «Бизнес. Общество. Человек» (30–31 октября 2013, Москва), организованного Национальным исследовательским университетом Высшая школа экономики. Цель конференции – междисциплинарный анализ актуальных проблем изучения бизнеса в социальных науках: отношений между бизнесом и обществом; социального капитала и доверия, бизнеса и корпоративной культуры; личности, группы, а также организации в бизнесе, проблем и перспектив бизнес-образования и бизнес-консультирования и т. д. В книге представлены результаты исследований доверия и социального капитала, проведенные в различных странах Европы, Азии и в России. Авторы – известные социологи, психологи и экономисты. Результаты этих исследований были обсуждены в ходе конференции. Статьи публикуются в авторской редакции.

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АННОТАЦИИ СТАТЕЙ НА РУССКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ

ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ И МЕТОДОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ДИСКУССИИ

РОДИТЕЛЬСКАЯ СОЦИАЛИЗАЦИЯ И ОПЫТ ПРЕДАТЕЛЬСТВА: КРОСС-КУЛЬТУРНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ДОВЕРИЯ

М. Сасаки

Многие исследователи проблемы доверия отмечают, что то, что считается доверием в одной культуре, может не считаться таковым в другой культуре. Аналогичным образом, то, что считается достойным доверия в одной культуре, может рассматриваться как недостойное доверия в другой (ср. Dietz, Gillespie & Chao, 2010). Дитц, Гиллеспи и Чао (2010, с. 23) подчеркивают, что эмпирические исследования и разработанные на их основе теоретические модели необходимы для преодоления кросс-культурных различий в понимании динамики социального доверия (также ср. Barber, 1983; Luhmann, 1980). Ряд кросс-культурных исследований проблемы доверия были предприняты и в последующие годы (напр., Delhey & Newton, 2003; Paxton, 2007; Gheorghiu, Vignoles & Smith, 2009; Sasaki & Marsh, 2012).

В настоящей работе рассматриваются следующие вопросы: (a) насколько значительно родительская социализация в отношении доверия/недоверия влияет на восприятие доверия/недоверия детьми, когда они становятся взрослыми; (b) как разное отношение родителей к соблюдению обещаний, данных детям, связано с родительской социализацией в детстве в плане доверия/недоверия; (c) как опыт предательства влияет на восприятие доверия во взрослом возрасте и (d) является ли опыт предательства более сильным фактором воздействия на восприятие доверия/недоверия во взрослом возрасте, чем родительская социализация в отношении доверия/недоверия. Затем мы представляем краткое обсуждение имеющихся исследований по этим вопросам.

ЧУВСТВО ДОВЕРИЯ В ЯПОНСКОМ И РОССИЙСКОМ КОНТЕКСТАХ: СХОДСТВО И РАЗЛИЧИЯ

А. Ишикава

Несмотря на географическое соседство Японии и России, народы наших стран не всегда обнаруживают хорошее понимание друг друга. Вероятно, это является следствием исторических, политических и культурных различий между двумя народами. Учитывая сложившуюся ситуацию, автор исследует российский и японский контекст понятия социального доверия с целью улучшить взаимопонимание между нашими народами.

В работе использован метод количественного анализа данных по Японии и России, полученных в ходе Международного сравнительного исследования социального доверия, которое проводилось группой ученых под руководством Масамичи Сасаки в 2010–2012 гг. (Sasaki 2012). Данное исследование было проведено в семи странах: Чехия, Германия, Япония, Россия, Тайвань, Турция и США (позднее была добавлена Финляндия) на основе общего стандартизованного опросника.

В центре внимания данной статьи находятся Япония и Россия. Данные по США и Германии привлекаются дополнительно для сопоставления с характеристиками Японии и России. Размер выборки по Японии составляет 924 респондента, выборка по России – 1600 респондентов, выборка по США – 1008 респондентов и выборка по Германии – 1007 респондентов.

ДОВЕРИЕ: ПРОБЛЕМЫ СТАНОВЛЕНИЯ НОВОЙ СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ ПАРАДИГМЫ В УСЛОВИЯХ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РОССИИ И ЯПОНИИ

Н. И. Дряхлов, С. А. Митупова, В. В. Попов

Статья посвящена рассмотрению актуальной на современном этапе проблеме развития социального «доверия». Мы подходим к анализу данного фактора как к важному элементу формирования стабильного общества, где не уровень материального обеспечения формирует позитивное направление развития, а именно доверие. При этом в расчет не принимаются частнотеоретические подходы трактующие доверие как элемент снижения транзакционных издержек, капитала и прочих экономических элементов. В социальном понимании доверие изначально элемент формирования всей социальной структуры, а затем в рамках стратегического интереса формируются групповые и индивидуальные интересы и доверие к их достижению.

Особый акцент статья делает на понимание различий свободы и несвободы в проявлении доверия. Для пояснения некоторых положений статьи и их соотнесения приводится табличный материал.

В целом статья акцентирует внимание на общественно значимых подходах к пониманию феномена «доверия»: доверие в современном мире является главным фактором социального развития; доверие не исследовано в должной мере как основа единства социальной системы общества.

В исследования доверия можно выделить ряд направлений способствующих научно-мировоззренческому, социальному, культурному, нравственному, экономическому развитию общества; доверие исследуется как пассивное (ожидание) проявление личности в отличие от ранее используемых подходов, например у М. Вебера, где доверие к достижению цели обуславливалось активным, целерациональным действием личности.

ДИАЛЕКТИКА СОЦИАЛЬНОГО ДОВЕРИЯ И НЕДОВЕРИЯ

А. Б. Купрейченко

Точка зрения на доверие и недоверие как на относительно автономные психологические феномены в 50–70-е годы XX века высказывалась в работах M. Deutsch, J. Mellinger, W. Read, Б. Ф. Поршнева и др. В дальнейшем распространение получил более упрощенный подход к проблеме соотношения доверия и недоверия, согласно которому эти феномены рассматриваются как противоположные, взаимоисключающие и, тем самым, взаимосвязанные. Однако, в последние годы появляется

все больше работ, убедительно показывающих, что доверие и недоверие как психологические феномены в значительной степени независимы друг от друга.

В результате теоретико-эмпирического исследования доказана неправомерность определения доверия и недоверия как взаимоисключающих феноменов полярной валентности. Выполнен анализ условий, при которых субъекты способны одновременно доверять и не доверять друг другу. В работе определены общие признаки доверия и недоверия, условия возникновения и функции в регуляции жизнедеятельности субъекта. Основные функции доверия – познание и обмен. В работе представлен подход к дифференцированной оценке доверия и недоверия населения социальным институтам. Сформулированы характеристики, способствующие формированию доверия и недоверия, а также способствующие преодолению недоверия и повышению доверия у населения. Эти характеристики являются универсальными для различных социальных институтов.

КОНЦЕПЦИЯ ДОВЕРИТЕЛЬНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ ЛИЧНОСТИ

Т. П. Скрипкина

В статье содержатся основные положения авторской концепции доверительных отношений личности. Сущность концепции заключается в том, что доверие рассматривается как условие взаимодействия человека с Миром, с одной стороны, и как условие субъектности личности, с другой. В этой связи доверие интерпретируется как двухполюсная установка-отношение, которая, одной стороной обращена в мир, и, с другой – в себя самого. Таким образом, существует два относительно самостоятельных вида доверия: доверие другому и доверие себе как самоценному суверенному субъекту активности. Уровень доверия к себе всегда связан с уровнем доверия к другим, поэтому эти два вида доверия имеют лишь относительно самостоятельное значение и никогда не существуют одно без другого.

Доверие существует как личностная или социальная установка, как аттитюд, как эмоционально-оценочное отношение к другому и к самому себе. Взаимодействие (гармоничное–дисгармоничное) между личностными и социальными аспектами доверия, его эмоциональными, оценочными, поведенческими компонентами определяет качество, дифференцированность доверия. Таким образом, важнейшее условие возникновения определенного качества доверия – это степень (или мера) гармоничности его компонентов (эмоционально-оценочных, когнитивных, поведенческих).

Доверие к другим рассматривается как частный случай доверия к миру. В каждом акте общения всегда присутствует определенное количество или мера доверия, без которой общение превращается в акт безличной передачи информации. Выход за пределы «оптимальной меры» доверия как по отношению к себе, так и по отношению к другим, приводит к негативным последствиям в общении. Подлинная личностная гармония заключается в умении чувствовать эту меру и в то же время быть открытым как миру, так и самому себе и другим людям.

ДИНАМИЧЕСКОЕ СОДЕРЖАНИЕ ДОВЕРИЯ

И. В. Антоненко

К основным структурным элементам доверия как социально-психологического явления относятся: субъект и объект доверия, отношение доверия, деятельностное содержание доверия, функциональный орган доверия, субъектные, объект-

ные, средовые и ситуационные факторы доверия, ситуация доверия, социально-психологический механизм доверия, характеристики доверия как отношения, характеристики доверия как функционального органа, перцептивное, интерактивное и коммуникативное содержание доверия и социально-психологические функции доверия. Доверие необходимо рассматривать в узком (собственно доверие) и широком значении (весь спектр отношений доверие – недоверие, разные степени доверия и недоверия).

Поэтапное углубление в сущность доверия дает возможность постепенно развертывать структуру доверия, раскрывая содержание отдельных его моментов. Доверие всегда является направленным социально-психологическим отношением от субъекта доверия к его объекту (согласно классическому пониманию субъекта и объекта), и такое его представление является его самой общей моделью без какой-либо качественной характеристики собственно доверия. Непосредственным предметом разработанной социально-психологической концепции является доверие в межличностных отношениях.

ПРЕОБРАЗОВАНИЕ ДОВЕРИЯ В СОВРЕМЕННОМ МИРЕ

Ю. В. Веселов

В статье рассматривается меняющееся доверие в истории российского и советского общества. Преобразование первого порядка относится к революционному периоду начала двадцатого века, преобразование второго порядка начинается в конце 80-х гг. Широко распространенным является утверждение, что Советский Союз был явным типом общества с низким уровнем доверия. Некоторые исследователи продолжают утверждать, что культура низкого доверия продолжает существовать и сегодня в России.

В статье вопреки этому доказывается, что в начале своей истории Советский Союз представлял культуру высокого уровня доверия, но доверия традиционного. Это доверие затем было преобразовано в тоталитарное доверие. Изменения стали видны сразу после Второй мировой войны, потом постепенно развивалась культура недоверия властям, что привело страну к краху в начале 90-х гг. Современная Россия показывает стабильный рост нового типа доверия, который воспроизводится прежде всего на базе развития рыночной экономики.

ПРОБЛЕМА ИЗМЕРЕНИЯ СОЦИАЛЬНОГО ДОВЕРИЯ – «БОЛЬШИНСТВУ ЛЮДЕЙ МОЖНО ДОВЕРЯТЬ?»

А. Б. Купрейченко, И. В. Мерсиянова

Поиск основ, содержания и функций доверия продолжается уже многие десятилетия. В течение этого времени разрабатываются различные методические подходы и приемы оценки доверия. Одними из первых признанных инструментов выступали методики Дж. Роттера, М. Розенберга и др. (Rosenberg, 1957, 1991; Rotter, 1967). Один из вопросов методики М. Розенберга, опубликованной в 1957 году, приобрел наибольшую популярность и в настоящее время широко используется научным сообществом (см. World Values Survey). Этот вопрос звучит следующим образом: «Можете ли вы вообще сказать, что большинству людей можно доверять, или же, когда имеешь дело с людьми, осторожность никогда не помешает?»

Однако, в последние годы усиливается дискуссия на тему о том, что именно измеряет вопрос о доверии людям вообще (Белянин, Зинченко, 2010; Кертман, 2006;

Козырева, 2009; Купрейченко, 2008; Сасаки, Давыденко и др., 2009; Beugelsdijk, 2006; Glaeser et al., 2000). Развивая идеи этих и других авторов, мы обнаружили признаки того, что в российском обществе сосуществуют несколько различных вид доверия: базовое (генерализованное), традиционное (клановое), гуманистическое и альтруистическое, наивное и др. (Купрейченко, 2008). Различаются также и виды недоверия. Установлены социальные группы, у которых преобладает тот или иной вид доверия. Это позволяет сделать вывод о процентном соотношении в обществе эффективных (прогрессивных) и неэффективных (регрессивных и разрушительных) видов доверия и недоверия («хорошее» и «плохое» доверие недоверия).

ДОВЕРИЕ В ЭКОНОМИКЕ, БИЗНЕСЕ И ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ

ДОВЕРИЕ КАК ИНДИКАТОР ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОГО СОЗНАНИЯ И ПОВЕДЕНИЯ В РОССИИ

Ж. Т. Тощенко

Экономическое сознание и поведение в течение всей истории человечества играли и продолжают играть ситуацию в сфере социальной жизни. Они включают много индикаторов: результаты деятельности, потребности, мотивы, ценности и другие показатели. Среди них значительное место занимает доверие, которое всегда отражало одну из форм существующих социальных отношений и в то же самое время, уровень знания, и эволюции происходящих изменений в социально-экономических процессах.

В статье на основе сравнительного анализа данных всесоюзного (1990 г.) и всероссийского (2012 г.) исследований, а также при использовании результатов, полученных другими исследовательскими центрами России раскрывается феномен доверия на различных уровнях социальной организации общества – всероссийском, региональном, на уровне предприятий и организаций, а также на личностном уровне. Были выявлены основные тенденции и специфические черты эволюции доверия на этих уровнях.

Исследование показало, что на всероссийском уровне доверие к политическим, социальным и экономическим институтам в значительной степени уменьшилось. На региональном уровне доверие имело противоречивы характер в зависимости от ситуации в регионе: богатый или бедный, индустриальный или сельскохозяйственный, политически активный и имеющий этнонациональную специфику. Установлено, что доверие на предприятиях и организациях зависит от форм собственности – государственной или частной, муниципальной или акционерной. На личностном уровне доверие в значительной степени возросло и заняло ведущую роль среди других форм доверия.

ДОВЕРИЕ И СОЦИАЛЬНЫЙ КАПИТАЛ В ЯПОНИИ

С. Ясуно

За последние десятилетия, доверие было одним из ключевых вопросов в области социальных наук. Хотя не существует единого определения, доверие можно охарактеризовать как ожидание от других доброй воли (Barber, 1983; Гранвиль, Пэкстон, 2007). Огромное количество исследований показывает, что доверие регули-

рует межличностные отношения, экономические операции и делает сообщества эффективным. В контексте социальных исследований капитала, доверие рассматривается как составляющая социального капитала (Патнэм, 1993, 1995, 2000).

Целью данной работы было изучение предикторов персонализированного и генерализованного доверия, и сравнить влияние этих двух типов доверия на социальный капитал в Японии. Данные, используемые в этом исследовании являются частью EUROPEAN AND WORLD VALUES SURVEYS 6th WAVE.

Основные результаты заключаются в следующем: 1) Возраст и образование положительно влияют на общее доверие; 2) Общение с друзьями или коллегами оказывает положительное влияние на персонализированное доверие и не имеет никакого влияния на генерализованное доверие; 3) Генерализованное доверие оказывает положительное влияние на участие в формальных группах; 4) Персонализированное доверие оказывает положительное влияние на позитивное отношение к демократическим ценностям, в то время, как генерализированное доверие не дает положительного эффекта.

Различные эффекты воздействия персонализированного и генерализованного доверия на два аспекта социального капитала (гражданскую активность и демократические ценности) показывают, что оба типа доверия очень важны в создании демократии на работе в Японии. В то время как генерализованное доверие призывает японцев к участию в гражданской активности, персонализированное – развивает позитивное отношение к демократии. Конечно, следует с осторожностью переносить эти данные на другие культуры, однако роль персонализированного доверия в формировании демократии в азиатском обществе должна стать предметом дальнейшего исследования.

ВОСПРОИЗВОДСТВО СОЦИАЛЬНОГО КАПИТАЛА, ДОВЕРИЯ И ПРЕДПРИНИМАТЕЛЬСКИХ СЕТЕЙ: НА ПРИМЕРЕ ЭМПИРИЧЕСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ ФИРМ МАЛОГО И СРЕДНЕГО БИЗНЕСА В УРАЛЬСКОМ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОМ ОКРУГЕ (РОССИЯ)

В. А. Давыденко, А. Н. Тарасова

В данной статье представлены современные теоретические и эмпирические исследования в области реализации партнерских связей и бизнес-отношений с точки зрения практики корпоративных сетей и теории социального капитала. Описаны такие компоненты бизнеса, как препятствия бизнесу, неформальные связи, различные способы проявления коррупции, методы преодоления препятствий бизнесу, что было изучено на основе ключевых параметров сетей обследуемых малых и средних фирм. Воспроизводство социального капитала и доверия рассматривалась как базовый феномен социальной «укоренности» (embeddedness), или «включенности» (inclusion) в современную экономику корпоративной предпринимательской сети.

Изучались взаимные корреляции успешности бизнеса наряду с другими его параметрами как описание функционирования результативности работы сетей обследуемых фирм. Статья акцентирует внимание на изменениях в современных организационных механизмах и институциональных ограничений, включая права собственности, структуры управления и межфирменные отношения. В частности, была сделана верификация такой дилеммы: что на самом деле способствует эффективности работы сетевых структур – коррупция и/или бизнес-партнерство?

ВЗАИМОСВЯЗЬ СОЦИАЛЬНОГО КАПИТАЛА И ОТНОШЕНИЯ К ДЕНЬГАМ

А. Н. Татарко, П. Шмидт

В работе рассмотрены связи социального капитала и отношения к деньгам. Высказано предположение, что социальный капитал может выполнять регулятивную функцию в отношении людей к материальным ресурсам, которая может проявляться на индивидуальном уровне в особенностях отношения к деньгам.

Поскольку различные формы капитала могут конвертироваться друг в друга, то высокий социальный капитал индивида должен быть сопряжен с его меньшей ориентированностью на деньги.

Выборка исследования включала 634 респондента в возрасте от 20 до 59 лет и была уравнена по социально-демографическим характеристикам. Установлено, что социальный капитал, на индивидуальном уровне, отрицательно влияет на выраженность следующих групп монетарных аттитюдов: «накопление/сохранение», «власть/использование», «неадекватность», «безопасность».

БЛАГОТВОРИТЕЛЬНЫЕ ПРАКТИКИ РОССИЙСКОГО ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ОБЩЕСТВА: ДОВЕРИЕ И НЕДОВЕРИЕ КАК ФАКТОР ВОВЛЕЧЕННОСТИ В НИХ РОССИЯН

И. В. Мерсиянова

В статье рассматривается взаимное влияние доверия и вовлеченности населения в социальные практики гражданского общества на примере добровольческого труда и денежных пожертвований. Эти социальные практики отличаются наибольшей социальной значимостью, массовостью, постоянством и составляют устойчивое ядро жизнедеятельности гражданского общества.

Доверие и недоверие выполняют специфические функции по отношению к социальным практикам гражданского общества. Доверие выступает основой самоорганизации, совместной деятельности людей, служит поддержанию моральных основ и социальных норм; обеспечивает социальную интеграцию, определенный уровень коммуникации индивидов и их общностей. Существующий уровень доверия в определенной ситуации формирует перцептивную установку на ее восприятие. Недоверие защищает от нежелательных последствий взаимодействия, вызывает дистанцирование и, как результат, не достаточный уровень вовлеченности населения в повседневные практики гражданского общества.

Таким образом, отсутствие оптимального баланса доверия и недоверия будет затруднять вовлечение населения в социальные практики гражданского общества, что является препятствием для становления их как массовых и распространенных. Оно способствует появлению спорадических и недостаточно освоенных социальных практик, что будет затруднять становление самого гражданского общества как одного из базовых институтов российского общества.

ИНСТИТУТ ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУЛЬНОЙ СОБСТВЕННОСТИ В РОССИИ И ПРОБЛЕМА ДОВЕРИЯ

Л. Лебединцева, В. Попов

В статье предлагается экономико-социологический анализ проблемы доверия в сфере интеллектуальной собственности в России. Особое внимание уделяется анализу институциализации отношений в сфере интеллектуальной собственнос-

ти с акцентом на причинах возникновения, эффективности, формах, проблемах, основных заинтересованных сторонах в развитии этого института в дореволюционной России, Советском Союзе, на современном этапе.

Затрагиваются вопросы общего и особенного в соотношении «результат интеллектуального труда – продукт интеллектуальной собственности» в аспекте прогрессивного развития общества знания. Делается вывод о необходимости рассматривать отношения в сфере интеллектуальной собственности с позиций ее влияния на всестороннее развитие человека, гармонизацию воспроизводственных процессов в обществе в сфере образования и науки и др. как внеисторических гуманистических идеалов.

ДОВЕРИТЕЛЬНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ НА РАБОТЕ: СОВРЕМЕННОЕ СОСТОЯНИЕ ЯПОНСКОЙ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ

Ш. Огума

Данная работа освещает текущее состояние отношений на работе в Японии. Мы опрашивали японских респондентов, работающих на условиях регулярной занятости, относительно отношений, сформировавшихся на работе. Данные опроса показали значительный разрыв между реальными отношениями на работе и идеальным представлением респондентов об этих отношениях.

В то же время опрос показывает, что уровень доверия, которое является краеугольным камнем любых человеческих взаимоотношений, не был низким. Мы также отметили некоторые другие факторы, которые могут воздействовать на отношения, складывающиеся на рабочем месте, в частности, особенности работы и доступ к Интернету как инструменту коммуникации.

ОБЩЕСТВЕННОЕ И МЕЖЛИЧНОСТНОЕ ДОВЕРИЕ В КУЛЬТУРНОМ КОНТЕКСТЕ

ДОВЕРИЕ НАЦИЙ В АНАЛИЗЕ КУЛЬТУРНОГО МНОГООБРАЗИЯ – ЧУВСТВО ДОВЕРИЯ В ПРОДОЛЬНЫХ И ПОПЕРЕЧНЫХ СРЕЗАХ КРОСС-КУЛЬТУРНЫХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОГО ХАРАКТЕРА

Р. Йошино

В задачу данной работы входит исследование чувства доверия на основе данных лонгитюдного, кросс-культурного сравнительного исследования национального характера, проводимого Институтом математической статистки на протяжении последних шести десятилетий. Во-первых, в статье описана парадигма кросс-культурных, лонгитюдных исследований. Во-вторых, предлагается перечень японских социальных ценностей, включающих, помимо всего прочего, некоторые аспекты чувства межличностного доверия, полученные на основе нашего лонгитюдного исследования японского национального характера. В-третьих, представлено кросс-культурное сравнение межличностного и институционального доверия, а также некоторых базовых социальных ценностей, на основе наших предыдущих опросов, таких как, опрос по семи странам (Японии, США и пяти европейским странам), опрос по ценностям в Восточной Азии (EAVS) (2002–2005),

опрос по ценностям в странах тихоокеанского кольца (PRVS) (2004–2008) и опрос по ценностям в азиатских странах тихоокеанского бассейна (APVS) (2010–2014). Данные опросов свидетельствуют о том, что страны Восточной Азии уже отошли от традиционного конфуцианства, и что население здесь разделяет более общие социальные ценности вне различия Востока и Запада. В-четвертых, в работе представлен обзор данных по японским иммигрантам в Бразилии, на Гавайях и Западном побережье США для анализа взаимодействия среды и осознания этнической принадлежности. В завершении статьи прокомментированы направления будущих исследований.

УСТАНОВКИ ТОЛЕРАНТНОСТИ, ДОВЕРИЯ И КСЕНОФОБИИ У РОССИЙСКОЙ МОЛОДЕЖИ

Т. П. Скрипкина

В статье рассматриваются основные результаты мониторинга, направленного на выявления уровня выраженности толерантности, социального и межличностного доверия и ксенофобии у Российских старшеклассников и студентов, проживающих в разных регионах страны.

Мониторинг проводился с 2004 по 2010 гг. В мониторинге приняло участие 446 школьников и 382 студента, проживающих в пяти условно выделенных территориях РФ: Дальний Восток, Сибирь, средняя Россия, Северо-Кавказский регион и Москва.

В методику были включены следующие показатели: социальное и межличностное доверие; этническая толерантность, социальная толерантность, толерантность как черта личности; ксенофобия по отношению к стигматизированным чужим, ксенофобия по отношению к незнакомым.

Данные проведенного исследования позволяют, во-первых, выделить «группы риска» у молодежи, а также прогнозировать интолерантные и ксенофобные проявления у молодежи в различных регионах страны. В статье также проводится анализ взаимосвязи между этими явления в обществе.

ЧУВСТВО МЕЖЛИЧНОСТНОГО ДОВЕРИЯ И ВЗГЛЯД НА РЕЛИГИОЗНОЕ СОЗНАНИЕ – СРАВНЕНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ

Ф. Хаяши

Предполагается, что религия устаревает по мере модернизации общества. В действительности же, мы наблюдаем большое число стран, подобных Америке, где доля религиозного населения достаточно велика. Кроме того, сегодня становятся все более частыми международные конфликты на почве религиозных разногласий. Эти явления, по-видимому, указывают на значительное воздействие религии на жизнь общества даже в наши дни.

Что касается Японии, религиозная жизнь в стране претерпела заметные изменения в эпоху Мэйдзи (начиная с 1868), когда Япония вступила на путь модернизации. Эти изменения проходили и в последующее время, в частности в послевоенный период (с 1945). Результатом стало значительное снижение доли религиозного населения. В Японии число последователей любых религий (буд-

дизма, синтоизма, христианства и др.) значительно ниже, чем в развитых странах Запада.

Однако несмотря на снижение количества приверженцев конкретных религиозных конфессий, своего рода религиозное мышление присутствует в японском характере и определяет образ мыслей и отношение к различным жизненным ситуациям. В данной работе рассматривается чувство доверия в связи с религиозным мышлением в сравнительном международном контексте.

МЕЖЛИЧНОСТНОЕ, ЛОКАЛЬНОЕ И ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНОЕ ДОВЕРИЕ (ОПЫТ СРАВНИТЕЛЬНОГО АНАЛИЗА)

Р. И. Анисимов

Статья отражает результаты эмпирического исследования проведенного в декабре 2010 г. в пяти странах, переживших посткоммунистическую травму (Польша, Литва, Чехия, Украина и Россия). Метод – анкетирование, выборка – квотно-целевая. Опрошено было 5118 студентов столичных и региональных вузов этих стран в возрасте 17–27 лет.

В работе сформулирована гипотеза о компенсаторном характере межличностного доверия, которая предполагала, что упадок доверия в одних областях общественной жизни компенсируется его ростом в других. Для проверки этой гипотезы отдельно было рассмотрено социальное доверие на межличностном, локальном и институциональном уровнях. Был измерен уровень межличностного доверия в разных странах, и сопоставлен с уровнями доверия в других областях общественной жизни. Гипотеза о компенсаторном характере межличностного доверия не подтвердилась. Недостаток социального доверия на одних уровнях общественной жизни не компенсируются его увеличением на других. Доверие не уходит на другие уровни, а просто исчезает.

ОБЩЕСТВЕННОЕ И МЕЖЛИЧНОСТНОЕ ДОВЕРИЕ В КОНТЕКСТЕ ЦЕННОСТНЫХ ОРИЕНТАЦИЙ МОЛОДЕЖИ РОССИИ И СТРАН ВОСТОЧНОЙ ЕВРОПЫ

О. В. Китайцева, А. В. Кученкова

В данной статье представлены результаты исследования, основная цель которого заключается в сравнении уровня доверия и ценностных ориентаций молодежи России и других восточноевропейских стран, для оценки потенциала развития их социального капитала. В качестве эмпирической базы использованы результаты международного сравнительного исследования, организованного Щецинским университетом (опрос студентов вузов России, Польши, Украины, Литвы, Чехии, 2010 г.).

Основываясь на сравнительном анализе уровня общественного и межличностного доверия, а также доминирующих ценностных ориентаций молодежи в России и других странах Восточной Европы мы приходим к выводу, о существовании взаимосвязи между ценностными ориентациями и уровнем доверия в этих странах. Страны с более высоким уровнем доверия являются более индивидуалистичными, чем общества, где круг доверия ограничивается семьями и близкими людьми.

ДИНАМИКА СОЦИАЛЬНОГО САМОЧУВСТВИЯ И ДОВЕРИЯ НАСЕЛЕНИЯ РЕГИОНОВ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ РОССИИ

Е. А. Когай, А. А. Когай

В условиях структурной трансформации российского общества актуализируется задача интегральной репрезентации динамики социокультурных структур и процессов, происходящих в отдельно взятых регионах, а также их аналитического представления в контексте динамики социокультурного пространства всей России постсоветского периода. Важными индикаторами оценки социальных процессов со стороны населения страны являются социальное самочувствие и социальное/личностное доверие. Составляющими элементами социального самочувствия являются степень защищенности населения от опасностей, степень удовлетворенности населения своей жизнью в целом, степень социального оптимизма.

Индикаторы социального самочувствия и доверия населения регионов Центральной России свидетельствуют об усилении напряжения социального пространства (Беляева, 2012), которое явно не способствует поступательному устойчивому развитию территориальных сообществ. Преодоление данного напряжения выступает одним из важнейших условий активизации ресурсов для проведения модернизации в регионах страны.

СОЦИАЛЬНОЕ ДОВЕРИЕ И СОЦИАЛЬНОЕ ПОВЕДЕНИЕ МОЛОДЕЖИ В СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РОССИИ

М. Цапко

В российской социологии существует традиция выявления степени доверия представителей разных социально-демографических групп к этим институтам как в рамках больших социологических обследований, выявляющих нюансы жизни российского общества, так и в политических исследованиях, прогнозирующих электоральное поведение жителей отдельных регионов. Такой анализ дает представления о самоощущении россиян применительно к оценке отдельных сторон жизни в государстве: личном экономическом положении; социальном статусе; личной безопасности; степени доступности образования, соцобеспечения и медобслуживания; защиты материнства и детства; трудовой занятости; организации досуга и пр.

В статье демонстрируются особенности проявления социального доверия молодых россиян на конкретных цифрах недавно проведенного социологического исследования с использованием накопленных в ходе предыдущих замеров данных. Процессы, происходящие в молодежной среде, в социальном аспекте неоднозначны. С одной стороны, молодежи необходимо принять существующие объективные условия общественной и производственной жизни (то есть войти в мир взрослых). С другой стороны, молодежи свойственно стремление выработать свою позицию (сконструировать свой мир) в условиях, когда происходящие быстрые социальные преобразования вызывают изменения субъективных установок в сознании молодого поколения.

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