

# EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES

Volume 65  
Number 9  
November 2013

## CONTENTS

### Special Issue: Victims and Villians in Late Imperial and Early Soviet Russia

Guest Editors: Sarah Badcock and Gerald D. Surh

#### Articles

- Steve Smith*  
Introduction: Reflections on Villains, Victims and Violence 1691
- Sarah J. Young*  
Knowing Russia's Convicts: The Other in Narratives of  
Imprisonment and Exile of the Late Imperial Era 1700
- Sarah Badcock*  
From Villains to Victims: Experiencing Illness in Siberian Exile 1716
- Page Herrlinger*  
Villain or Victim? The Faith-Based Sobriety of the Factory  
Worker Petr Terekhovich in Soviet Russia, 1925–1929 1737
- Liudmila G. Novikova*  
Russia's Red Revolutionary and White Terror, 1917–1921: A  
Provincial Perspective 1755
- Matthew Rendle*  
Defining the 'Political' Crime: Revolutionary Tribunals in Early  
Soviet Russia 1771
- Aaron B. Retish*  
Controlling Revolution: Understandings of Violence through the  
Rural Soviet Courts, 1917–1923 1789
- James Ryan*  
Cleansing NEP Russia: State Violence Against the Russian  
Orthodox Church in 1922 1807
- Tracy McDonald*  
The Process of Collectivisation Violence 1827
- Gerald D. Surh*  
Afterword 1848
- List of Contributors 1852**



University  
of Glasgow

This article was downloaded by: [Liudmila Novikova]

On: 30 October 2013, At: 09:50

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



## Europe-Asia Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ceas20>

### Russia's Red Revolutionary and White Terror, 1917-1921: A Provincial Perspective

Liudmila G. Novikova<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> National Research University Higher School of Economics

To cite this article: Liudmila G. Novikova (2013) Russia's Red Revolutionary and White Terror, 1917-1921: A Provincial Perspective, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 65:9, 1755-1770, DOI: [10.1080/09668136.2013.842362](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2013.842362)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2013.842362>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

# Russia's Red Revolutionary and White Terror, 1917–1921: A Provincial Perspective

LIUDMILA G. NOVIKOVA

## *Abstract*

This essay re-examines White and Red terror during the Russian Civil War by studying public participation in the acts of political violence. It shifts attention from the ideological and political motifs of terror to places and contexts where violence occurred. On the example of paramilitary groups of White and Red partisans in Arkhangel'sk province in the Russian North, it demonstrates how local factors, such as the nearby frontline, poor economic conditions or traditional enmity between neighbouring communities, contributed to the escalation of terror at a grass-root level.

THERE WAS HARDLY A MORE TRAGIC ASPECT OF THE CIVIL WAR in Russia than Red and White terror. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives between 1917 and 1921 because they belonged to the 'class of exploiters' and were perceived as 'counter-revolutionaries' by the Reds, or were regarded as Bolshevik sympathisers by the Whites. Many of the victims were mutilated before they were killed. Their noses, ears and genitals were cut off, their eyes poked out. Many were frozen to death, or burned or buried alive. Some victims were cut into pieces (Mel'gunov 1924; Leggett 1981; Chamberlin 1987, pp. 66–83; Litvin 2004). The excesses of White and Red terror were well known to contemporaries. The lists of executed 'counter-revolutionaries' were routinely published in the Bolshevik press. Pictures of the mutilated remains of White and Red terror victims were widely publicised by the warring governments in order to discredit their adversaries. Red terror was discussed in the Russian *émigré* press and even became the subject of debates in Western parliaments (Azovtsev 1980; Fel'shtinskii & Cherniavskii 2004; Marushevskii 1926, p. 54).

The logic and purpose of the Russian revolutionary terror has long been debated by historians. While differentiating between the origins and motifs of White and Red terror, some scholars have underscored the political necessity of violence. They have argued that the Bolshevik terror was fuelled by the real mounting threat of counter-revolution whereas

The study was conducted in the framework of the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics in 2013.

the Whites used terror to settle scores with the revolutionaries and to return their lost privileges and property (Mayer 2000). Others believed that the Bolsheviks had recourse to terror in order to compensate for a paucity of popular support, and that in essence their regime depended on that ‘naked manifestation of unbridled coercive power’ executed predominantly through the Bolshevik political police—the *Cheka* (Leggett 1981, p. xxxv; Mel’gunov 1924). Another view attributed the ferocity of Red terror to Bolshevik ideology. It interpreted terror as an attempt to realise the utopian vision of a socially ‘cleansed’ world, an attempt that reached its climax during Stalinist purges (Baberowski 2003, p. 36). Scholars generally agree that White terror was lacking clear ideological implications and in essence was uncontrolled outbursts of vengeance of rogue White atamans (Brüggemann 2002, pp. 225–45; Sunderland 2005, pp. 293–97; Pereira 1997, pp. 122–38). Still, Red and White terror had much in common; both are usually seen as being directed and executed from above rather than conducted from below.

Although the top-down explanation of Red and White terror prevails, some recent research of political violence during the Civil War has pointed at a more nuanced and inclusive interpretation of terror. It has been convincingly argued that there was a direct continuity between the violent practices of the First World War and the Russian Civil War (Holquist 2002, 2003). On a more practical level, it has been demonstrated that besides the *Cheka* other institutions were responsible for the Bolsheviks’ political violence, such as Red Army detachments, troops for internal defence of the Republic (*voiska vnutrennei okhrany Respubliki*, VOKHR) and special detachments (*chasti osobogo naznacheniya*, CHON), as well as food supply brigades (*prodotryady*) that became important instruments of Red terror (Karsch 2006, pp. 181–242; Litvin 1993, pp. 50–51). Bolshevik violence occasionally received assistance from marginal elements in the rural society (Figes 1989, pp. 192–98); and some acts of terror, for example Jewish pogroms staged during the Civil War by Whites, Reds and Ukrainian nationalists, received sympathy and support from the local non-Jewish population (Budnitskii 2005; Pavlyuchenkov 1997, pp. 251–63). Whereas ordinary people are still generally regarded as victims rather than perpetrators of political violence (Narskii 2001; Osipova 2001; Krispin 2010), terror clearly had at least some assistance from below. A closer and more detailed examination of the interrelationship between mass and institutionalised terror will allow a deeper understanding of the dynamics of violence during the Civil War.

This essay looks into the issue of mass participation in White and Red terror. Focusing on Red and White partisan movements, it discusses in detail when, where and why ordinary people became involved in acts of political violence. Attention is shifted from the ideological and political motifs of terror to the places and contexts where violence occurred, and from state-organised terror to public participation in political violence. Red and White terror was a much broader phenomenon than the actions of *Cheka* or White military commanders and counter-intelligence. Terror was impossible without large-scale participation of the population alongside paramilitary groups of White and Red partisans who not infrequently on their own initiative tried to settle scores with ‘counter-revolutionaries’ or Bolshevik ‘sympathisers’. This essay argues that in many cases public initiative was a crucial factor in the genesis of terror. Ordinary people not only largely supported Red and White terror, but often triggered repressions or escalated the scale of violence. The competing governing bodies that incited terror were often unable to control popular violence. Violence from below only subsided after the end of the Civil War, leaving the state as the principal agent for the organisation and carrying out of violence.

The issues of Red and White terror are explored here through the prism of Arkhangel'sk province in the Russian North. This most spacious province of the European part of Russia was one of the principal battlegrounds between Reds and Whites during the Civil War that raged there between 1918 and 1920. The population of the region was overwhelmingly Russian and rural. It was primarily neighbouring rural communities that got involved in violent acts and escalated White and Red terror in the region. This essay explores how local factors, such as the nearby frontline, economic conditions and traditional enmities between neighbouring communities, helped to trigger mass violence. Consequently it tries to evaluate how decentralised and spontaneous, in fact, large-scale Red and White terror was, despite its political and ideological motivations.

The following account is based on military reports, correspondence of local administrators and self-government bodies, reports of Bolshevik commissars and agitators, protocols of village assemblies, addresses of partisan units to the military command, newspaper reports as well as later memoirs and investigation files of the *Cheka*. These documents stem from the two warring camps and are inevitably biased in their attempts to blame the enemy for the escalation of terror. They also do not provide a statistically accurate picture of terror for the whole area. Still, these multiple and detailed accounts of grass-root violence contain ample evidence on how, why and where violence occurred, who participated in it, and who became the victims of terror and why. Taken together, these documents allow for the reconstruction of typical patterns of violence at a local level. They also reveal the inner dynamics of grass-roots terror, and its relationship to the terror initiated by the state.

Because Red terror in the North both preceded and lasted longer than White terror, it is discussed at a somewhat greater length in the following account. I do not suggest, however, that at a grass-roots level Red terror was qualitatively or quantitatively different from its White counterpart. On the contrary, it is argued that the factors triggering terror on a local level as well as the scope and brutality of terror were rather similar on both sides of the Civil War front.

#### *Revolution and violence in Arkhangel'sk province*

Revolution came to Arkhangel'sk on 1 March 1917 with a telegram from the chairman of the State *Duma* M. V. Rodzianko that signalled the collapse of the old order. The following months witnessed growing chaos in administration and surging discontent from below. The Northern countryside, however, remained relatively calm throughout 1917 and most of 1918. There were no large-scale agrarian disorders, primarily because the region lacked landed nobility or large peasant landholdings introduced during the Stolypin reform. Agriculture played a secondary role in the rural economy with lumber production, fishing, hunting and sea trade being the main economic activities (Polyakov 1985, pp. 36, 165, 169–74). As a result agrarian conflicts were much less severe than in the Central and Black Earth regions and predominantly concerned disputes between the state and peasants over access to the state forests and meadows, or occasional clashes between neighbouring communities or peasants within one commune over the use of communal pastures and lands. Violent conflicts were relatively infrequent, and even radical levelling of communal landholdings was not omnipresent. Far from being swept along by the 'Black Repartition', from 1917 to 1919 Arkhangel'sk province experienced only partial levelling that took place in less than a quarter of

its 665 land communes (Sablin 2002, pp. 58–59). Most of the villages remained calm and awaited a solution to the agrarian question from the central authorities.<sup>1</sup>

In contrast to the countryside, the cities and towns of the region, with their barracks of army units and numerous migrant workers, became sites of growing unrest after February 1917. Discipline in the military garrisons of Arkhangel'sk, Murmansk and a few district centres rapidly disintegrated. Soldiers and sailors assassinated their commanders, marauded, traded out military stocks and robbed the local population. They tried to wrest control of the transport system, and randomly confiscated private and public goods that were carried by the railway. Spontaneously demobilising soldiers hijacked trains and pushed south through jammed tracks. The violence they committed on the way forced railway personnel on one occasion to hide in the woods when another train from Murmansk arrived at the station. The First World War, that brought these soldiers to the region, was not yet over. Still, by the autumn of 1917 both commanders and political leaders favoured the fastest possible demobilisation of the army and navy units that were virtually out of control (Kiselev & Klimov 1977, pp. 103–4, 147; Nachtigal 2007, p. 143; Buldakov 1997, pp. 122–23, 132–35; Wildman 1980–1987).<sup>2</sup>

Besides the unruly garrisons, throughout 1917 civil unrest was mounting among the urban population and migrant workers due to worsening food supplies. The situation in Murman district was particularly dire. During the First World War the new port of Murmansk was constructed there and a new railway line was laid through rocks and marshes to connect this ice-free port with the railway network of the empire. In addition to up to 70,000 Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war that were employed on the construction, many tens of thousands of contracted railway and construction workers had arrived in the region. For many months they had lived in miserable conditions, and were underpaid or not paid at all. After the beginning of the revolution many workers stopped working altogether and were waiting to receive their final payment so that they could leave the region. Hungry railway and construction workers lynched local administrators and at least on one occasion the Murmansk Soviet barely escaped the mob justice of exasperated building workers who had decided to settle scores with the authorities. Many workers fled the region. Others, staying without any means of subsistence, joined armed bands that looted and robbed the provincial population (Kedrov 1930, pp. 101–2; Nachtigal 2007; Kiselev & Klimov 1977, pp. 103–4, 147).

Local revolutionary authorities feared the outbursts of public discontent that they were unable to control. Still, not infrequently they had to rely on this grass-root violence and channel it to secure their own political domination. For example, for the local Bolsheviks, who had never had a significant number of followers in the region, the disintegrating garrisons, navy units and unruly migrant workers were the only sizable constituencies that overwhelmingly voted for the anti-war radical left during the elections to the Constituent Assembly in late 1917 (Spirin 1968, pp. 416, 420, 422).<sup>3</sup> In January 1918, the delegates from

<sup>1</sup>Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Arkhangel'skoi oblasti (hereafter GAAO), fond 1865, opis' 1, delo 152, list 15. Report of the Shenskursk district representative to the provincial self-government (*zemstvo*) assembly, 12 September 1918. 'Black Repartition' was obviously not typical to Northern provinces; see a similar observation about Vyatka province in Retish (2008, pp. 14–15).

<sup>2</sup>See also Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Murmanskoi oblasti (hereafter GAMO), f. P-2393, op. 2, d. 104, l. 133. Memoir of V. L. Bzhezinskii, part 1; Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF), f. P-5867, op. 1, d. 5, l. 39. S. N. Gorodetskii, Outline of history of Arkhangel'sk province, 1914–1917.

<sup>3</sup>Some 65.9% of votes in Northern garrisons were cast for the Bolsheviks during the Constituent Assembly elections. On the role of military garrisons in securing Bolshevik domination in provincial Russia, see also Raleigh (1986, ch. 8).

the Bolshevik party Central Committee succeeded in securing the radical left majority in Arkhangel'sk Provincial Soviet Executive Committee (*Ispolkom*). The new Bolshevik-left–Socialist-Revolutionary administration of the province often used improvised revolutionary units to secure the transition of power in the localities to the bolshevised Soviets. Red Guard detachments were formed from among volunteer workers, soldiers and sailors and sent out on long raids to the district towns and villages to fight for Bolshevik power and enforce recognition of the central government.

For example, in late March 1918 an armed detachment headed by the revolutionary sailor A. I. Vel'mozhnyi, was dispatched to the district town of Kholmogory. A few days earlier the district congress of peasant deputies, convened by a representative of Petrograd All-Russian Central Executive Committee (*VTsIK*), had been forcefully dispersed by demobilised soldiers who were enraged by the congress's decision to confiscate food 'surplus' from the population. After an exchange of fire the congress delegates fled first to Kholmogory monastery and then to the nearby village of Kolpachevo. For two days they waited there for military assistance from Arkhangel'sk. After its arrival, Vel'mozhnyi's detachment took Kholmogory under control, imposed martial law, reinstated the congress and ensured the election of the new *Ispolkom* with a Bolshevik chairman (Shumilov 1973, pp. 163–64).<sup>4</sup> In Pechora district the establishment of the Bolshevik administration was facilitated by the military raid of a Red Guards unit headed by the Bolshevik S. N. Larionov. Dispatched by Arkhangel'sk *Ispolkom* in May 1918, Larionov's party seized villages and towns along the Pechora river, deposed local self-government (*zemstvo*) boards, committees of public safety and non-Bolshevik *Ispolkomy* and established bolshevised soviets (Shumilov 1973, p. 176).<sup>5</sup> During these raids members of the 'bourgeoisie' and 'counter-revolutionaries' were randomly arrested and their property confiscated. The Red Guards usually lived off the local population and imposed extraordinary taxes to feed the troops. Material benefits were of primary importance in attracting hungry and underpaid workers, sailors and soldiers to the Red Guards (Karsch 2006, pp. 106, 181–242; Wade 1984; Tsytkin 1967).

In contrast to the Red Guards, in the first half of 1918 the *Cheka* played a rather insignificant role in combating 'counter-revolution' in Arkhangel'sk province. Its local branch was not established until June 1918, when the extraordinary commissar of the Soviet government Mikhail Kedrov arrived in Arkhangel'sk to bring the province in line with the policies of Moscow (Kedrov 1927, p. 12). Immediately after its creation the provincial *Cheka* ordered arrests of the oppositionist socialist leaders and members of the deposed city and provincial self-government bodies. But it could hardly spread its activities beyond Arkhangel'sk boundaries before the city fell to the anti-Bolsheviks who, with the support of the Allied expeditionary force, staged a coup on 2 August 1918.

During the first months of Soviet rule in Arkhangel'sk province Bolshevik power did not rely on ideologically motivated terror from above, and still less on popular support. It depended on the provincial authorities' ability to channel the violence of the often hard to control Red Guards and military units in order to secure their political domination. The victims of the first wave of violence were not very numerous, but the Red Guards' raids

<sup>4</sup>GAAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 12. Protocols of the Kholmogory district congress of peasant deputies, 21–26 March 1918.

<sup>5</sup>Otdel dokumentov sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Arkhangel'skoi oblasti (hereafter ODSPI GAAO), f. 1, op. 1, d. 8, l. 18ob. Report of the agitator I. A. Bogdanov, 9 June 1918.

established a pattern of political action that was employed by the warring powers during the ensuing Civil War. This led to the escalation of violence from below that the authorities were no longer able to restrain.

*Reds, Whites and political violence during the Civil War*

After the creation of the anti-Bolshevik Supreme Administration of the Northern Region on 2 August 1918, which was reorganised in October 1918 into the Provisional Government of the Northern Region, Arkhangel'sk province was cut across by the frontlines of the Civil War. On its side of the front, the White government tried hard to assert its monopoly of violence. One of its first acts was to order the population to surrender to the authorities all arms except hunting guns. It also rapidly organised a legal system that would deal with criminality and political dissent. Provincial commissars of the White government, the special 'commission to investigate abuses and illegal actions of the agents of the Soviet power', and the Governor-General of the Northern region, together with Allied counter-intelligence, all dealt with political opponents of the regime and sanctioned arrests of the former Bolshevik commissars, members of the Soviet executive committees and trade union leaders. The latter were incarcerated in Arkhangel'sk provincial prison and the dozen or so camps for political prisoners and captive Red soldiers established in the province. The largest ones were the camp on the island of Mudyug near Arkhangel'sk and, after it closed in autumn 1919, the prison in the abandoned fishing settlement of Yokanga on the Murman coast. Both camps at different times had over 1,000 inmates ([Rasskazov 1935, pp. 12, 45–47](#); [Potylitsyn 1931, pp. 45–53, 63–71](#)). Overall the number of political arrests under the White regime ran into several thousands.<sup>6</sup> The total number of those who spent some time under arrest in the Northern region, including leftist politicians, participants of the mutinies in White regiments, deserters and Red prisoners of war, as well as criminals and those arrested for speculation or travelling without special permission from military authorities, was probably close to 15,000. Several hundreds were sentenced to death in the region, predominantly by court-martials ([Potylitsyn 1931, pp. 21–22](#)).<sup>7</sup>

But despite the significant number of people arrested and executed for political crimes, overall White justice in the North was not particularly brutal by the standards of the Civil War. Even the court-martials that were later regarded as a symbol of indiscriminate, large-scale White terror, mainly handed out sentences of imprisonment and forced labour, not execution. Moreover, short-shrift justice was almost exclusively reserved for the ranks of the White Army who were tried for military crimes such as assassination of officers, desertion and espionage. Death sentences for civilians were an exception.<sup>8</sup>

The extrajudicial justice performed by some vengeful prison guards and rogue White commanders was altogether crueller and certainly more arbitrary. For example, the warden of Iokanga prison, Sudakov, renowned for his particular brutality, reportedly tortured and killed over 20 prisoners, later writing them off as being shot when attempting to escape. In another instance, the White commander N. P. Orlov, according to later data from the Soviet authorities, ordered the killing of up to 100 people when his troops briefly occupied Yarensk

<sup>6</sup>See GARF, f. 18, op. 1, d. 21. Reports of the White investigation commissions.

<sup>7</sup>See also GARF, f. 18, op. 1, d. 35, ll. 5–6ob. Expenses estimates of penal facilities of the Northern region, January–June 1919.

<sup>8</sup>See for example GARF, f. 29, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 264–65; f. 16, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 50ob., 70ff. Court-martial records.



district of Vologda province in late 1919 (Potylitsyn 1931, pp. 42–43). But the Whites' repressions against local soviet leaders, Red commissars and Bolshevik sympathisers on the newly acquired territories were not particularly frequent, as the White Northern front saw very few successful offensive operations. And despite Sudakov's arbitrariness, most deaths in prisons and camps in the White Northern region came as a result of malnutrition, miserable sanitary conditions and raging epidemics that took high tolls both in Red and White Russia.<sup>9</sup>

The most atrocious cases of White terror, despite assertions in the Soviet historiography, were performed not by the White commanders, military courts or prison wardens, but by ordinary northerners who were involved in the grass-roots Civil War. The rapid escalation of violence from below came to the Arkhangel'sk countryside many months after the beginning of the revolution and was triggered by the establishment of the Red–White front. Extreme violence occurred primarily in the immediate vicinity of the front zone. The North's particular geography made these areas especially vulnerable to destructive and violent raids. After the White offensive came to a halt in the autumn of 1918, sections of the Northern front extended from Arkhangel'sk in several directions like fingers of a hand. Impassable terrain covered with marshes and woods and relatively meagre military forces that acted in the North both on the Red and White sides made it impossible to form an uninterrupted defence line. Troops defended only the main lines of communication along rivers, railways and major roads. Warring parties could therefore easily bypass their rivals' defence positions, making long raids into the enemy's rear and bringing horror and destruction. Such raids forced the population to take sides in the political conflict and to become involved in the Civil War. They triggered large-scale guerrilla warfare that was distinguished by extreme violence. Particularly notorious in this respect were the raids of the Red partisan units led by the member of Arkhangel'sk provincial *Ispolkom* Aleksei Shchennikov in Pinega district and Moriz Mandelbaum in Pechora valley.

Shchennikov's and Mandelbaum's units were initially hardly different in composition and type of military action from those Red Guard detachments that were imposing Soviet power in the Arkhangel'sk countryside in the first half of 1918. These semi-regular troops consisted predominantly of volunteers, many of whom were attracted to the army by the promise of material benefits. But in contrast to the Red Guards, while acting in enemy territory, these detachments applied unrestrained violence.

Shchennikov's unit was organised in Kotlas, the centre of the Bolsheviks' defence positions, in September 1918. Already in mid-October around 150 members of the unit with several machine-guns appeared in Pinega valley. After accidentally gaining possession of a large shipment of grain that had been sent from Arkhangel'sk to feed the population of the district over the winter, Shchennikov's troops became unchallenged masters of the area. The unit's command arbitrarily used food resources and coercive power to secure its domination. It established committees of the poor that divided grain at their own discretion, and convened a congress of Soviet representatives that was to proclaim the district's loyalty to the Bolshevik government. A participant of the raid at a later provincial Communist party conference bluntly admitted that no elections whatsoever had been held and Soviet 'representatives' were simply 'appointed' by the unit's commanders. He also confessed that 'using our own discretion we executed worthless elements [from among the population].

<sup>9</sup>See for example GAAO, f. 50, op. 5, d. 329, ll. 124–25, 129ob.–30. Report on epidemics by Arkhangel'sk city self-government, 20 February 1919. On the role of epidemics in the Civil War see Adamets (2003).

On the orders of the committees of the poor—possibly it could be [regarded as a] crime—18 or even 20 people were shot in each [village] [...]. Provincial *Ispolkom* and local *ispolkomy* considered that a correct [decision].<sup>10</sup>

Besides terrorising the local population, members of the unit indiscriminately looted the area. They confiscated food, horses, cattle and fodder from the peasantry, imposed monetary indemnities and later divided the booty among the troops. Any resistance was brutally crushed. Terror reached its climax when Shchennikov's troops were forced to retreat from the region by the White and Allied offensive. The Red commanders mobilised the local peasantry with carts and horses to evacuate the booty and remaining grain supplies from the area. To enforce compliance, hostages were taken from the population. Many were mercilessly tortured and killed. Witnesses reported that in the village of Karpogorskoe alone over 40 people were to be executed. Before they died their eyes were put out, and their genitals and limbs cut off. Some bodies were cut into pieces, and on others the advancing White troops counted up to 22 bayonet wounds.<sup>11</sup>

In Pechora valley a similar raid was performed by a detachment belonging to Moriz Mandelbaum, an Austrian prisoner of the First World War who turned to Bolshevism while in Russian captivity. The detachment was formed on the orders of the command of the 6th Red Army of the Northern front. In mid-September 1918 Mandelbaum's unit, consisting of between 80 and 100 Red volunteers, boarded a steamer and drifted down the Pechora river into an area nominally controlled by the Whites. Regarding the local population as accomplices of White rule, Mandelbaum's soldiers shelled or randomly fired on each village they approached. They then encircled and occupied the settlement. After that, for several days the village became a site of plundering and pillage. Priests, wealthier peasants and alleged White sympathisers were arrested, tortured and killed. Witnesses reported that some people were tortured under a slow stream of water from a boiling samovar. Among those killed were women and children (*Dobrovol'skii* 1922, pp. 76–77; *Zherebtsov & Taskaev* 1994, pp. 11–12).<sup>12</sup> Many settlements were looted by Mandelbaum's soldiers several times. For example, Ust'-Tsil'ma, the administrative centre of the Pechora district, was first pillaged in mid-September 1918, then again two weeks later when the Red command learned of an arriving barge with grain that had been bought by the local consumer cooperative. The unit immediately returned. The stock of food was 'requisitioned' and the whole town was looted again. But the area suffered the worst devastation when Mandelbaum's unit began to retreat in the face of mounting White attacks. The Red soldiers not only took with them all the booty they could carry but also burned food stocks that they were unable to evacuate. This brought the whole population to the brink of starvation. Mandelbaum's actions prompted Pechora dwellers to organise self-defence. The male population of the villages, often to a man, armed themselves with hunting guns and

<sup>10</sup>ODSPI GAAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 26, ll. 55–56. Report of Stavrov, a delegate from Pinega district, at the first Arkhangel'sk provincial Communist party conference, 13–14 July 1919. See also Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv (hereafter RGVA), f. 39450, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 35, 37, 40; d. 10, l. 13. Telegrams from Pospelov, White administrator of Pinega district, and District Commissar Rogachev to Arkhangel'sk, 16, 17 and 19 September 1918; GARF, f. 3811, op. 1, d. 142, ll. 180–81. Report of F. Kobylin and A. Pervyshev, delegates from Nikitinskaya township of Pinega district, late 1918.

<sup>11</sup>GARF, f. 3811, op. 1, d. 142, ll. 180–81. Report of Kobylin and Pervyshev, late 1918. See also: *Vozrozhdenie Severa*, 25 and 26 December 1919.

<sup>12</sup>See also RGVA, f. 39450, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 77–79ob. Report of Captain Braier to General Marushevskii, 3 February 1919; *Vestnik Vremennogo Pravitel'stva Severnoi Oblasti*, 10 October 1918.

primitive Berdan rifles and formed guerrilla bands to defend their homes and take revenge on the Bolsheviks.<sup>13</sup> Similar peasant armed parties were organised by the Pinega population after Shchennikov's raid.<sup>14</sup>

The atrocities performed by Mandelbaum's and Shchennikov's units were publicised by the White press as illustrative examples of Red terror.<sup>15</sup> Still the actions of both detachments were not planned or even foreseen by either the *Cheka* or by higher Red command. Having learned of Mandelbaum's excesses, the command of the 6th Red Army and the *Cheka* branch initiated a special investigation. As a result, Mandelbaum was removed from his post and arrested (Taskaev 1997, p. 75). Shchennikov's actions were censured by the provincial party committee. Despite these censures, the Red command for months to come continued to rely on such semi-regular detachments that acted in the front zone. In contrast to mobilised troops that suffered from desertion and insubordination, these close-knit voluntary units constituted the backbone of the Bolshevik domination in the region, and the Red command often turned a blind eye to their atrocities.

The violent raids of Red voluntary units on White territory were frequent and successful because more often than not they received recruits and support from the population on the Red side of the front. Joining the Reds and assisting their raids on 'counter-revolutionary' territory was a form of self-protection for the local peasantry. Peasants were afraid that their neutrality could have been interpreted as sympathy for the Whites and that they could have themselves become targets of repression. Also, these raids were an important type of economic activity. When the revolution and the Civil War cut off the food supply to that largely non-agricultural province, and caused a decline in traditional home industries and seasonal work migration, for many communities the regular looting of the 'Whites' provided the main source of income. The male population of the front-zone villages eagerly participated in the Red raids or organised their own guerrilla units. They pledged their loyalty to the Bolsheviks and occasionally took part in military operations (Ponomarev 1967, pp. 34–35). In exchange they received not only a share of the loot, but also army food rations and monetary allowances from the Red command that constituted another source of income for the impoverished villages. These bands also guarded villages from the raids of White troops. How deeply the northerners became involved in such kinds of trade is evident from the example of Pinega district. According to Soviet sources, about 10% of the population was listed among the members of the partisan detachments. Together with family members, they constituted the absolute majority of the district's population (Troshina 2011).

A similar dynamic was at work on the White side of the front where, in some districts, up to half of the population fought in White partisan formations or assisted them.<sup>16</sup> White partisan detachments started to emerge on a mass level in autumn 1918. By January 1919

<sup>13</sup>RGVA, f. 39450, op. 1, d. 3, l. 199. Telegram of the chairman of the district self-government Podlesnyi and Commander Mikhhev, 8 December 1918; RGVA, f. 39450, op. 1, d. 6, l. 15. Report of the provincial commissar of Pechora district Ushakov, 22 January 1919.

<sup>14</sup>RGVA, f. 39450, op. 1, d. 18, ll. 7, 25. Telegram of Captain P. T. Akutin to Marushevskii, 2 January 1919; GARF, f. 16, op. 1, d. 6, l. 96. Telegram of District Commissar Rogachev to Arkhangel'sk, 24 October 1918.

<sup>15</sup>See for example *Vozrozhdenie Severa*, 25 and 26 December 1919.

<sup>16</sup>Even in the late 1920s up to half of the population was still disenfranchised in some townships of Arkhangel'sk province because it had fought voluntarily for the Whites in the Civil War. See Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (hereafter RGASPI), f. 17, op. 33, d. 465, l. 45. Summary of secret letter from Beik, secretary of Arkhangel'sk provincial party committee, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 27 April 1927.

partisans were fighting along the whole perimeter of the White front (Marushevskii 1926, pp. 43, 56; 1927, pp. 23–24). Living in the front zone, peasants organised guerrilla bands to defend their homes from the violent raids of the opposing armies, to get help and protection from one of the belligerent camps, and to secure the economic survival of their villages. For example, as the delegates from Tarasovo partisan detachment in the southern part of Kholmogory district explained to the White command in December 1918, their homes had been in the front zone since August and had been repeatedly looted by ‘Red Army Bolsheviks’ under the command of I. Ya. Gailit, a former member of Kholmogory district *Ispolkom*. Gailit’s unit routinely confiscated food stocks and peasant property together with horses and carts to carry the booty away. After one such raid in October 1918, peasants from the large village of Tarasovo and nearby settlements decided to organise self-defence. They voluntarily mobilised the whole adult male population, drove the enemy out of the area with a heated attack, recaptured stolen peasant property and seized the Red unit’s arms and its food supplies. Preparing for a long defence of their homes before the numerically superior enemy, they pledged allegiance to the Whites and asked Arkhangel’sk headquarters for assistance with food, arms, ammunition and military support.<sup>17</sup>

The White headquarters was initially reluctant to support the self-organised and hard to control partisan detachments, and favoured the creation of a single mobilised army. Still, like the Red command, by the end of 1918 they came to appreciate the services of the partisans who, on their own initiative, took up arms against the Bolsheviks. The White command not only provided Tarasovo partisans with necessary support, but started to issue food rations and money allowances to the partisans and their families on a par with the mobilised troops. Later the Whites even began to encourage the creation of new partisan units where they had not existed before. Partisan detachments were formally attached to larger military units and participated in the White campaigns (Marushevskii 1927, p. 33).<sup>18</sup>

The creation of numerous partisan detachments affected military campaigns in the North in many important ways. Partisan units significantly reinforced the opposing armies’ defence positions but hampered their offensive operations. Being closely tied to a certain area, partisan bands often refused to fight far from their homes. Even their internal structure sometimes reflected local affinities. Thus in Pinega valley the White volunteers from one township (*volost’*) constituted platoons, within platoons co-villages formed squads, and squads were divided into sections that consisted of close relatives.<sup>19</sup> Such partisan detachments eagerly participated in the raids on enemy territory and were ready to defend their own villages to the last man, but they often refused to be involved in large offensive operations far from their homes. When transferred to other parts of the front, partisans started to desert in droves because they were afraid that ‘alien’ troops would hand their villages over to the enemy (Sokolov 1923, pp. 22–23; Marushevskii 1926, p. 40).

Partisan warfare led to further brutalisation in the Civil War. Partisans took no prisoners of war and acted with extreme brutality on enemy territory. For example, a typical military

<sup>17</sup>RGVA, f. 39450, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 2–3. Report of Tarasovo partisan delegates to the Governor-General, 16 December 1918; ll. 7–8ob. Resolution of the assembly of the partisans from Poretskaya, Pertovskaya and Tserkovnicheskaya townships, 31 December 1918.

<sup>18</sup>See also GARF, f. 16, op. 1, d. 8, ll. 429–29ob. Report of General Marushevskii to the Provisional Government of the Northern Region, 23 December 1918; RGVA, f. 39450, op. 1, d. 4, l. 33. Report of Marushevskii to General Miller, 6 February 1919.

<sup>19</sup>RGVA, f. 39450, op. 1, d. 18, l. 4. Telegram from Captain Akutin, 1 January 1919.

report regarding the actions of the White Tarasovo partisan unit stated that, in March 1919 near the village of Toromy, the partisans clashed with a Red patrol. Of the Red forces, five men were killed, 16 wounded and three captured. 'The captured and wounded died after interrogation', the report bluntly stated.<sup>20</sup> A week later Colonel P. A. Dilaktorskii on the White Pinega front telegraphed to Arkhangel'sk about a successful skirmish with a Red rifle company: 'there were more than hundred killed, 58 captured. All [were] liquidated'.<sup>21</sup> Partisans sometimes set hunters' traps to catch Red patrols, and those caught were cruelly killed. One of these 'hunters' from Pechora boasted of personally killing 60 Reds. He justified his cruelty by the fact that his own family had perished at the hands of Mandelbaum's soldiers. Arkhangel'sk received reports of ice holes in the Pechora River that were filled with the frozen bodies of Bolshevik sympathisers and Red Army soldiers killed by the White partisans (Dobrovol'skii 1922, pp. 76–77; Marushevskii 1927, p. 46).

Before they died, the Red prisoners were often cruelly tortured. For example, a special Bolshevik committee for the reburial of White terror victims in Pinega district discovered signs of abominable cruelty when it exhumed mass graves in the villages of Shulomen', Alashevo, and in the town of Pinega after the Civil War. All bodies of victims were found undressed, some were decapitated, and others had numerous sabre wounds. Some bodies were found tied up and in a sitting position, which suggested that they had been buried alive. Among the victims there was at least one woman, a local teacher, who had apparently been executed for her leftist sympathies.<sup>22</sup>

Although such atrocities performed by the White partisans were often listed by the Red propaganda as examples of White terror, as a rule they were not initiated or even approved of by the White command. Moreover Arkhangel'sk headquarters made every effort to stop the massacres. Arkhangel'sk was fully aware that the stories of partisans' atrocities prompted the population on the other side of the front to put up stronger resistance to the Whites' advance. The partisans' murder of prisoners of war stemmed the flow of Red deserters to the White Army that urgently needed new recruits. But all attempts by the White authorities to restrain the partisans failed miserably. For example, the commander of the 8th Northern regiment that incorporated Pinega partisan units, decided to publish a brochure about the necessity to treat prisoners of war humanely and organised special lectures and discussions on the subject with the soldiers. But Pinega partisans showed extreme displeasure with his project. They insisted that their actions were justified as a response to the atrocities performed by the Red troops (Dobrovol'skii 1922, pp. 76–77). Unable to stop the vicious circle of terror, the White officials in Arkhangel'sk tried to write it off to the backwardness of the local population or to brutalisation of the peasants as a result of misdeeds by the Reds. They explained that, for the peasants, the Bolsheviks were 'enemies, wolves, beasts who ran into their village and who had to be killed' (Sokolov 1923, pp. 52, 7). In the end the White authorities had to tolerate the partisans' brutality because the White defence heavily relied on these voluntary guerrilla units. The Arkhangel'sk command not

<sup>20</sup>RGVA, f. 39450, op. 1, d. 18, l. 173. Telegram from Dilaktorskii to Marushevskii, 14 March 1919. See also: RGVA, f. 39450, op. 1, d. 29, l. 247. Telegram from Colonel Muruzi to Marushevskii, 20 May 1919; RGVA, f. 39450, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 2–2ob. Report of Tarasovo partisans, 16 December 1918.

<sup>21</sup>RGVA, f. 39450, op. 1, d. 18, l. 202. Telegram from Dilaktorskii to Marushevskii, 24 March 1919.

<sup>22</sup>Arkhir regional'nogo upravleniya Federal'noi sluzhby bezopasnosti po Arkhangel'skoi oblasti (hereafter ARU FSB AO), d. P-18021, l. 17. Report of the commission for the reburial of White terror victims in Pinega district, May 1920.

only chose to overlook partisans' ferocity but sometimes employed it to its own ends, sending the guerrilla units to suppress mutinies among White mobilised troops (Gorlenko & Prokopenko 1961, doc. 39; Sokolov 1923, p. 23).

*The logic of terror*

Attempts to reconstruct the inner logic of acts of violence do not provide simple answers. Still, we might ponder the question of where the impulse to kill neighbours came from. The partisans frequently employed ideological explanations provided by the Reds and Whites to justify their actions. They fought against 'counter-revolutionaries', punished the 'kulaks' (wealthy peasants) or took revenge on the Bolshevik 'robbers' and 'traitors'. Yet, as the authorities on both sides of the front rightfully complained, the partisans' actions in essence were not ideologically or even politically motivated. The commander of the White Army General V. V. Marushevskii noted that the partisans could not fully grasp the national and patriotic slogans of the White movement, they 'were unable in their comprehension to reach a broader perspective of, I do not say the state's, but at least regional interests' (Marushevskii 1927, p. 33). A member of the last White government in the North, B. F. Sokolov, echoed Marushevskii's words and asserted that 'it would be useless to seek in partisans' psychology statist or national feelings. It would be useless to underpin their hatred with anti-Bolshevik ideological considerations'. After all, the partisans 'did not care about Russia, about Russian needs in their totality', but only about their own villages (Sokolov 1923, p. 52). The elasticity of the partisans' ideological and political attachments was also noted by the Red authorities. Red partisans not only frequently ignored the instructions of the higher command, for example ordering them to leave their villages and retreat with the Red front, but on several occasions even turned arms against the Bolshevik troops (Troshina 2011).

It is evident that in the North ideologies often served as a veneer for economic considerations that provide rational explanations for the acts of violence. For impoverished Arkhangel'sk peasants, looting of their neighbours on the other side of the front became an essential source of income. Additionally, partisan activities were rewarded with military rations and financial allowances from the warring governments, who heavily relied on peasant volunteer troops. Thus grass-root violence became a profitable trade during the Civil War that certainly helped to justify it in the eyes of its perpetrators. For partisans the scarcity of food resources served as an important motivation to kill prisoners of war or captured enemy sympathisers. As White Karelian volunteers explained to their commander, when their own villages were on the brink of starvation it was impossible to 'waste' precious food reserves on feeding the enemy (Baron 2007, pp. 173–75). Despite the officers' attempts to intervene, Karelian partisans regularly massacred all their prisoners.

As violent raids on enemy territory happened regularly on both sides of the Civil War front, partisans' brutality was also a way to retaliate for the insults and pillages that the peasants or their families suffered at the hands of their rivals. Quite possibly, partisans treated captured enemy soldiers with extreme brutality in order to deter their adversaries from making similar raids on the partisans' home villages. That was probably why the partisans did not try to conceal their violent acts but often boasted of the violence that they performed. Tragically, this only prompted an increasingly brutal response from the other side of the front.

Besides immediate utilitarian explanations, mass violence in many respects was rooted in the tensions that existed in the northern countryside before the revolution. To explain partisans' brutality, contemporaries often referred to old conflicts that were recast in new terms. For example, the commander of the 7th White regiment explained the particular eagerness to fight and kill of peasant volunteers from Tserkovnoe township by the 'old feud between the two neighbouring townships'.<sup>23</sup> In Pechora district, according to the White command, different villages used the Civil War to settle old scores with their neighbours (Marushevskii 1927, p. 46). In Shenkursk district the traditional rivalry between lower and upper townships defined the Red–White divide and added volunteers to both Red and White partisan bands. Similar enmity between lower and upper townships in Pinega valley also influenced the geography of the front that cut the district into two parts (Dobrovolskii 1922, p. 43). It is remarkable that in the non-agricultural North it was not the desire for social revenge that underpinned mass violence against landowners and wealthier peasants as in southern regions (Figes 1989, pp. 47–61; Buldakov 1997, pp. 102–19), but localism and traditional rivalries for pastures, forests and fisheries between neighbouring rural communities that often triggered violence at a grass-roots level.

Spiralling violence was, to a large extent, the result of the general brutalisation of Russian society over the course of the lengthy military conflict after 1914. It is true that Russian villages had long had a tradition of violent retributions, in particular against horse thieves or crimes that threatened the survival of the household or peasant community in general (Worobec 1987; Frank 1987). Some scholars and intellectuals have seen the roots of revolutionary violence in the particular brutality of Russian peasant culture and practices (Gor'kii 1922; Buldakov 1997; Figes 1997). Still, the upsurge of violence during and after the First World War was essentially a pan-European phenomenon. The concept of 'violent societies' that was widely used by the scholars of post-World-War Europe, in particular of Weimar and Nazi Germany (Ziemann 2003; Gerlach 2006), can be applied to analyse Russian post-revolutionary society as well. The organisers, commanders and most active members of both Red and White partisan units were veterans of the First World War.<sup>24</sup> They brought home from the front not only military experience and new political language, but also the ability and eagerness to kill. In the conflict-ridden revolutionary society this commodity could be, and was, widely used. Thus the extremes of grass-root terror were partly repercussions of the brutal experience of global conflict.

In contrast to many interpretations of the Red and White terror that underscore the intentional and ideological side of the violence that was directed from above, the example of the Civil War in Arkhangel'sk province demonstrates how decentralised and spontaneous terror could be. Rather than controlling mass violence, different political authorities often tried desperately to channel it and to avoid the most harmful effects of the outbursts of grass-root terror. It was not direction from above but rather the collapse of state authority that made the violent excesses from below possible in the first place; and it was not until the end

<sup>23</sup>GARF, f. R-5867, op. 1, d. 23, l. 74ob. Letter from Colonel P. N. Geiman to headquarters, 8 December 1919.

<sup>24</sup>See for example ARU FSB AO, d. P-17697. Investigation materials on the organiser of Shenkursk partisan unit M. N. Rakitin, 1919–1920; d. P-18021. Investigation materials on the organiser of Pinega partisan unit S. M. Starkov, 1920; d. P-17950. Investigation materials on the members of Tserkovnoe partisan unit, 1920.

of the Civil War and the ultimate victory of the Reds that the state gradually reasserted its monopoly of violence.

In Arkhangel'sk province, however, the collapse of the White front and the end of military warfare in February 1920 did not bring an end to terror. During the first year of Soviet rule the triumphant Bolsheviks executed hundreds of people for 'counter-revolution' in the city of Arkhangel'sk alone (Lapin 2009, pp. 355–58; Doikov 2001, pp. 3–10).<sup>25</sup> Many more thousands, according to some estimates up to 100,000 political inmates, perished in 1920–1922 in the emerging Northern corrective labour camps (Leggett 1981, p. 464; Bulatov 2001, p. 52). They were White officers and soldiers, members of educated society and Northern peasants, as well as political prisoners from other regions of Soviet Russia, for example soldiers from Denikin's and Wrangel's White armies, Red deserters, participants in student riots, peasant rebels and mutinous sailors from Kronstadt. Although political Red terror did not subside after the end of military activities and the number of its victims often exceeded those of the Civil War years, this terror was different in kind. Now the state relied on security police and concentration camps rather than on hard-to-control violence from below in dealing with its political opponents. To be sure, there was still popular participation in violence, mainly in the form of denunciations or complaints which the returning Red Army soldiers wrote to the Soviets and party committees about the local 'counter-revolutionaries' in their home villages, but the execution of violence was gradually 'professionalised'. This makes the political prosecutions of the early Soviet rule akin to the later Stalinist purges rather than the largely decentralised and spontaneous terror of the Civil War.

This essay has re-examined Red and White terror in the Russian North focusing on its participatory nature and connection to the local contexts and conditions of the Russian Civil War. It has demonstrated that peasants from Arkhangel'sk province lived for many months in the front zone, where they were forced to arm themselves, to take sides in the military conflict, and to cast their loyalties and identities in political terms as Red and White supporters. They formed paramilitary groups of Red and White partisans and got involved in military campaigns, but they also looted their neighbours on the other side of the front, responded to assaults with increasing brutality, and annihilated their captives for political as well as practical reasons. Northern partisans interpreted their actions as a natural response to wartime conditions. Not infrequently, they also used the Civil War to settle local scores and to solve traditional rural rivalries. In the end, these local squabbles and conflicts overlapped with the state-sanctioned terror. Together they produced spiralling and often indiscriminate violence that became widely known as the Red and White terror.

*National Research University Higher School of Economics*

### *References*

- Adamets, S. (2003) *Guerre Civile et Famine en Russie: Le pouvoir bolshevik et la population face à la catastrophe démographique 1917–1923* (Paris, Institut d'études slaves).
- Azovtsev, N. N. (ed.) (1980) *Grazhdanskaya voina v SSSR*, Vol. 1 (Moscow, Voenizdat).
- Baberowski, J. (2003) *Der rote Terror: Die Geschichte des Stalinismus* (Munich, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt).

<sup>25</sup>Lists of executed can be seen, for example, in: *Izvestiya Arkhangel'skogo Gubernskogo Revkoma*, 28 May 1920, 10 August 1920; *Izvestiya Arkhangel'skogo Gubernskogo revkoma i Arkhgubkoma RKP(b)*, 14 September 1920, 22 September 1920; *Izvestiya Arkhgubispolkoma*, 2 November 1920.



- Baron, N. (2007) *The King of Karelia: Colonel P. J. Woods and the British Intervention in North Russia 1918–1919: A Brief History and Memoir* (London, Francis Boutle Publishers).
- Brüggemann, K. (2002) *Die Gründung der Republik Estland und das Ende des 'Einen und unteilbaren Rußland'. Die Petrograder Front des Russischen Bürgerkriegs 1918–1920* (Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz).
- Budnitskii, O. (2005) *Rossiiskie evrei mezhdru krasnymi i belymi (1917–1920)* (Moscow, ROSSPEN).
- Bulatov, V. N. (ed.) (2001) *Pomorskaya entsiklopediya, Vol. 1, Istoriya Arkhangel'skogo Severa* (Arkhangel'sk, Pomorskii gosudarstvennyi universitet).
- Buldakov, V. (1997) *Krasnaya smuta. Priroda i posledstviya revolyutsionnogo nasilya* (Moscow, ROSSPEN).
- Chamberlin, W. (1987) *The Russian Revolution, 1918–1921*, Vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press).
- Dobrovol'skii, S. (1922) 'Bor'ba za vrozozhdenie Rossii v Severnoi Oblasti', in Gessen, I. (ed.) *Arkhiv russkoi revolyutsii*, Vol. 3 (Berlin, Slowo-Verlag).
- Doikov, Iu. (ed.) (2001) *Rassstrelyany Arkhangel'skoi Gubcheka (1920–1921 gg.)* (Arkhangel'sk, Borgez).
- Fel'shtinskii, Iu. G. & Chernyavskii, G. I. (eds) (2004) *Krasnyi terror v gody grazhdanskoi voiny: Po materialam osoboi sledstvennoi komissii po rassledovaniyu zlodeyanii bol'shevikov* (Moscow, Terra).
- Figes, O. (1989) *Peasant Russia, Civil War: The Volga Countryside in Revolution (1917–1921)* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
- Figes, O. (1997) *A People's Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, Viking).
- Frank, S. (1987) 'Popular Justice, Community and Culture among the Russian Peasantry, 1870–1900', *Russian Review*, 46, 3.
- Gerlach, C. (2006) 'Extremely Violent Societies: An Alternative to the Concept of Genocide', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 8, 4.
- Gor'kii, M. (1922) *O russkom krest'yanstve* (Berlin, Izd-vo I.P. Ladyzhnikova).
- Gorlenko, A. F. & Prokopenko, N. R. (eds) (1961) *Severnii front. Bor'ba Sovetskogo naroda protiv inostrannoii voennoi interventsii i belogvardeishchiny na Sovetskom Severe (1918–1920): Dokumenty* (Moscow, Voen. izd-vo).
- Holquist, P. (2002) *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press).
- Holquist, P. (2003) 'Violent Russia, Deadly Marxism? Russia in the Epoch of Violence, 1905–1921', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 4, 3.
- Karsch, S. (2006) *Die bolschewistische Machtergreifung im Gouvernement Voronež (1917–1919)* (Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag).
- Kedrov, M. (1927) *Za Sovetskii Sever. Lichnye vospominaniya i materialy o pervykh etapakh grazhdanskoi voiny 1918 g.* (Leningrad, Priboi).
- Kedrov, M. (1930) *Bez bol'shevistskogo rukovodstva. Iz istorii interventsii na Murmane: ocherki* (Leningrad, Krasnaya gazeta).
- Kiselev, A. A. & Klimov, Iu. N. (1977) *Murman v dni revolyutsii i grazhdanskoi voiny* (Murmansk, Murmanskoe kniznoe izdatel'stvo).
- Krispin, M. (2010) *'Für ein freies Rußland ...' Bauernaufstände in den Gouvernements Tambov und Tjumen 1920–1922* (Heidelberg, Universitätsverlag Winter).
- Lapin, Ya. N. (2009) 'Arkhangel'skaya tyur'ma v 1920 godu', in Volkov, S. V. (ed.) *Krasnyi terror glazami ochevidtsev* (Moscow, Airis-Press).
- Leggett, G. (1981) *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police: The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (December 1917 to February 1922)* (Oxford, Clarendon Press).
- Litvin, A. (1993) 'Krasnyi i belyi terror v Rossii', *Otechestvennaya Istoriya*, 6.
- Litvin, A. L. (2004) *Krasnyi i belyi terror v Rossii, 1918–1922* (Moscow, Yauza-EKSMO).
- Marushevskii, V. (1926) 'God na Severe', in von Lampe, A. (ed.) *Beloe delo. Letopis' beloi bor'by*, Vol. 1 (Berlin, Mednyi vsadnik).
- Marushevskii, V. (1927) 'God na Severe', in von Lampe, A. (ed.) *Beloe delo. Letopis' beloi bor'by*, Vol. 2 (Berlin, Mednyi vsadnik).
- Mayer, A. J. (2000) *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press).
- Mel'gunov, S. P. (1924) *'Krasnyi terror' v Rossii, 1918–1923* (Berlin, Vataga).
- Nachtigal, R. (2007) *Die Murmanbahn 1915 bis 1919. Kriegsnotwendigkeit und Wirtschaftsinteressen* (Remshalden, Greiner).
- Narskii, I. (2001) *Zhizn' v katastrofe: Budni naseleniya Urala v 1917–1922 gg.* (Moscow, ROSSPEN).
- Osipova, T. V. (2001) *Rossiiskoe krest'yanstvo v revolyutsii i grazhdanskoi voine* (Moscow, Strelets).
- Pavlyuchenkov, S. A. (1997) *Voennyi kommunizm v Rossii: vlast' i massy* (Moscow, RKT-Istoriya).

- Pereira, N. G. O. (1997) 'Siberian *Atamanshchina*: Warlordism in the Russian Civil War', in Brovkin, V. N. (ed.) *The Bolsheviks in Russian Society: The Revolution and the Civil Wars* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press).
- Polyakov, Yu. (ed.) (1985) *Istoriya Severnogo krest'yanstva, Vol. 2, Krest'yanstvo Evropeiskogo Severa v period kapitalizma* (Arkhangel'sk, Severo-Zapadnoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo).
- Ponomarev, F. A. (1967) 'Vazhskaya operatsiya', in Godnev, N. I. (ed.) *V boyakh za Sovetskii Sever. Vospominaniya uchastnikov bor'by s interventami i belogvardeitsami na Severe v 1918–1920 gg.* (Arkhangel'sk, Severo-Zapadnoe knizhnoe izd-vo).
- Potylytsyn, A. I. (1931) *Belyi terror na Severe 1918–1920* (Arkhangel'sk, Severnoe kraevoe izd-vo).
- Raleigh, D. (1986) *Revolution on the Volga: 1917 in Saratov* (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press).
- Rasskazov, P. P. (1935) *Zapiski zaklyuchennogo* (Arkhangel'sk, Severnoe kraevoe izd-vo).
- Retish, A. (2008) *Russia's Peasants in Revolution and Civil War: Citizenship, Identity, and the Creation of the Soviet State, 1914–1922* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
- Sablin, A. V. (2002) *Agrarnaya revolyutsiya na Evropeiskom Severe Rossii. 1917–1921. (Sotsial'nye i ekonomicheskie rezul'taty)* (Vologda, Legiia).
- Shumilov, M. I. (1973) *Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya na Severe Rossii* (Petrozavodsk, Kareliya).
- Sokolov, B. (1923) 'Padenie Severnoi Oblasti', in Gessen, I. V. (ed.) *Arkhiv russkoi revolyutsii*, Vol. 9 (Berlin, Slowo-Verlag).
- Spirin, L. M. (1968) *Klassy i partii v grazhdanskoi voine v Rossii. (1917–1920 gg.)* (Moscow, Mysl').
- Sunderland, W. (2005) 'Baron Ungern, Toxic Cosmopolitan', *Ab Imperio*, 3.
- Taskaev, M. V. (1997) 'Pechorskii front v 1919 godu', *Belaya armiya. Beloe delo. Istoricheskii nauchno-populyarnyi al'manakh*, 4.
- Troshina, T. I. (2011) 'Pinezhskie "valety": vosstanie perevertyshei v noyabre 1919 goda', *Rodina*, 2.
- Tsytkin, G. A. (1967) *Krasnaya gvardiya v bor'be za vlast' sovetov* (Moscow, Nauka).
- Wade, R. (1984) *Red Guards and Workers' Militias in the Russian Revolution* (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press).
- Wildman, A. (1980–1987) *The End of the Russian Imperial Army*, 2 vols (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press).
- Worobec, C. (1987) 'Horse Thieves and Peasant Justice in Post-Emancipation Imperial Russia', *Journal of Social History*, 21, 2.
- Zherebtsov, I. L. & Taskaev, M. V. (1994) *Komi kraï v gody grazhdanskoi voiny: naselenie i vlast'* (Syktyvkar, Rossiiskaya akademiya nauk, Ural'skoe otdelenie, Komi nauchnyi tsentr).
- Ziemann, B. (2003) 'Germany after the First World War—A Violent Society? Results and Implications of Recent Research on Weimar Germany', *Journal of Modern European History*, 1, 1.