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POLITICAL MACHINES AT WORK: VOTER MOBILIZATION AND ELECTORAL SUBVERSION IN THE WORKPLACE

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POLITICAL MACHINES AT WORK: VOTER MOBILIZATION AND ELECTORAL SUBVERSION IN THE WORKPLACE

We explore how modern autocrats win elections by inducing employers to mobilize their employees to vote for the regime and thereby subvert the electoral process. Using two original surveys of employers and workers conducted around the 2011 parliamentary elections in Russia, we find that just under one quarter of employers engaged in some form of political mobilization. We then develop a simple framework for identifying which firms engage in voter mobilization and which workers are targeted for mobilization. We find that large, financially dependent firms in sectors characterized by asset immobility or slack labor markets whose managers are "core" supporters of the regime can offer their votes to the regime at the lowest cost and therefore are especially likely to mobilize their workers. By identifying the conditions under which workplace mobilization occurs in authoritarian regimes, we contribute to the longstanding debate about the economic bases of democratization. In addition, we explore an understudied means of subverting elections in contemporary autocracies: the use of economic coercion to mobilize voters. Moreover, our research finds that clientelist exchange can thrive in the absence of deeply embedded political parties when it is brokered by employers.

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Introduction

Autocrats permit semi-competitive elections in order to coopt opponents, garner legitimacy, gather information on society, and gauge the performance of subordinates (e.g. Magaloni 2006, Svolik 2012, Blaydes 2011). Most contemporary electoral authoritarian regimes limit their use of ballot-box stuffing and widespread repression precisely so that they can obtain these benefits (Magaloni 2006). How, then, do autocrats win those elections?

To be sure, autocrats increase government spending before elections in an effort to buy public support, but sharing rents with the public is costly and efficiently targeting spoils to the right constituencies is difficult (Magaloni 2006; Wright 2011). Divide and conquer tactics are also used to pit regime opponents against each other, but, in many instances, the opposition remains united (Lust-Okar 2005, Howard and Roessler 2006). Moreover, whatever tactic authoritarian leaders use to generate support and divide the opposition, they still face daunting collective action problems in getting voters to the polls. Just as in democracies, some authoritarian leaders rely on party organizations to mobilize voters, but many, if not most, of the world's electoral authoritarian regimes lack strong ruling party organizations at the grassroots level.

Another option is to use economic coercion to mobilize voters and thereby subvert the electoral process. Building on classic works in political sociology (Gerschenkron 1962; Moore 1966), Baland and Robinson (2006) examine how landlords induced their tenants to vote for conservative parties in Chile in the first half of the 20th century. Ziblatt (2008; 2009) finds that wealthy landowners in highly unequal regions of Imperial Germany pressured their workers to vote for the Conservatives. Using data similar to that of Ziblatt, Mares and Zhu (forthcoming) reach different conclusions, finding that industrialists in slack labor markets rather than wealthy landowners subverted the electoral process by putting pressure on workers. For all their insights, these important works are mostly silent on the question of how autocrats win elections, because they focus primarily on the incentives of economic elites to pressure workers, and pay less attention to both the preferences and behavior of autocrats, and to the logic of interaction between autocrats and economic elites. Moreover, they exploit historical rather than contemporary cases of authoritarianism and use indirect rather than direct measures of mobilization and electoral subversion.

In this paper, we explore how modern autocrats win elections by coopting employers and inducing them to mobilize their employees to vote for the regime. Using two original surveys of employers and workers conducted around the 2011 parliamentary elections in Russia, we find that

the workplace is a key locus of voter mobilization for the regime. Twenty-four percent of firm employers in our national sample report engaging in political activity at the workplace during the parliamentary election campaign, while 25 percent of employees noted that their employers tried to influence their decision to turnout to vote. In addition, using a list experiment to ensure more valid responses about specific inducements offered to employees, we find that 15 percent of respondents believed that their job security, salary, and/or benefits depended on their decision to turnout in the elections.

We then develop a simple framework for identifying which firms engage in voter mobilization and which workers are targeted for mobilization. We argue that variation in workplace mobilization is largely driven by bargaining between rulers and employers. Firms that are able to offer votes to the autocrat at the lowest cost are most likely to mobilize their workers.

We find that despite the increased difficulty of monitoring turnout, firms with large numbers of workers are especially likely to engage in political mobilization, as they can take advantage of economies of scale in rallying voters. In addition, firms that depend on state support, such as state-owned firms and those that sell to the state, are more likely to rally their workers at election time. Similarly, firms that receive financial or organizational support from the state prior to elections are more likely to mobilize. Thus autocrats use both carrots and sticks in inducing employers to mobilize their workers. More generally, these results suggest the importance of examining relations between the employer and the autocrat when studying workplace mobilization.

We also find that workplace mobilization is determined by the extent of the asymmetric relationship between employers and employees. Employees who receive significant non-wage benefits from their employers are especially dependent on their place of employment. This allows employers to mobilize their votes at a lower cost. We find that firms providing non-wage benefits are more likely to mobilize their workers. Finally, managers who are "core" supporters of the ruling party and thereby face lower ideological costs when pressuring voters on behalf of the regime are more likely to mobilize their workers (Cox and McCubbins 1986).

In line with existing literature, we find mixed evidence for the proposition that tight labor markets make the mobilization of workers more likely (Mares and Zhu forthcoming) Finally, firms in sectors characterized by immobile assets—i.e. firms that are vulnerable to regulatory sanction or expropriation—are more likely to mobilize their workers. This finding is consistent with existing literature on the economic bases of democratization, but our framework suggests that elites in sectors characterized by immobile assets may subvert democracy because they are vulnerable to

pressure by the autocrat. This mechanism differs from existing literature which argues that holders of immobile assets will subvert democracy because they fear redistribution after free and fair elections (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).

Our findings contribute to a range of debates in comparative politics that we discuss in greater detail in the conclusion, but preview here. By identifying the conditions under which workplace mobilization occurs in authoritarian regimes, we contribute to the longstanding debate about the economic bases of democratization. More specifically, we show how the structure of the economy influences incentives for autocrats and employers to subvert elections by mobilizing voters in the workplace (Moore 1966, Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ziblatt 2008; 2009; Mares and Zhu forthcoming). In addition, our work advances the recent literature on electoral fraud by exploring an understudied means of subverting elections in contemporary autocracies: the use of economic coercion to mobilize voters (Hyde 2006; Myagkov and Ordeshook 2009; Beber and Scacco 2012). Moreover, our research adds to the burgeoning clientelism literature by demonstrating that clientelist exchange can thrive in the absence of deeply embedded political parties when it is brokered by employers (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008). Finally, we add to the discussion of elections under autocracy by finding that one's occupation shapes the quality of representation in Russia's electoral authoritarian regime.

Elections and Voter Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes

In recent years, scholars have paid far more attention to why autocrats hold elections than to how they win them. Extensive use of ballot-box fraud and repression deprive autocrats of the benefits that semi-competitive elections provide (e.g. coopting the opposition, generating information and garnering legitimacy). Both fraud and repression are also costly as they risk radicalizing the opposition and require loyalty from the agents of malfeasance. Empirically, as several studies have pointed out (Magaloni 2006, Blaydes 2012, Colton and Hale 2009), many contemporary electoral authoritarian regimes do not need to engage in electoral fraud to win elections by large margins, as citizens often turn out in large numbers to vote for the regime. An important question, then, is how autocrats win those elections without relying heavily on ballot-box fraud?

One way that authoritarian leaders generate support is through patronage spending. Autocrats increase government spending before elections, strategically targeting social transfers to key constituencies (e.g. Magaloni 2006, Wright 2011). But such political budget cycles are costly to

the autocrat because they require sharing rents broadly with society. Moreover, given that transfers can be targeted to potential supporters with only minimal precision (usually at the level of administrative units), it is a costly method of generating support. Authoritarians also may bolster their position by using control over the media to influence how citizens view the regime (e.g. Geddes and Zaller 1989). Opposition forces are cast in a negative light while the achievements of the regime—real and imagined—are trumpeted.

To be sure, authoritarian regimes generate support through patronage spending and control over the media, but support does not translate automatically into votes. Since Downs (1957) scholars of democracy have recognized that the act of voting is costly. Winning elections requires not only winning supporters, but mobilizing them to vote. Electoral authoritarian regimes are no different in this regard; they must devise ways of translating support into actual votes on election day.

In democracies, political parties are the typical vehicles of mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Aldrich 1995). In authoritarian regimes as well, parties may play this mobilizational role. In Leninist regimes, the communist party engaged in perpetual mobilization and ensured universal electoral participation. Perpetual mobilization can be dangerous, however, in electoral authoritarian regimes. Electoral authoritarian regimes tend to fear a politically sophisticated citizenry that might make ideological investments in opposition parties, so they instead seek to sow political apathy among voters. This is one of the reasons why most electoral authoritarian leaders seek to cultivate clientelist linkages with voters.[4]

But party organizations may also contribute to clientelist mobilization in electoral authoritarian regimes by helping to solve the commitment problem inherent in clientelist exchange (Stokes 2005). The commitment problem in clientelist exchange can be stated in the following way: if a political machine offers inducements to a voter in exchange for his vote, then what is to prevent the voter from accepting the inducement and then reneging on his promise to vote for the machine by voting for some other party that he prefers? The secret ballot makes the commitment problem more severe because defecting voters are harder to identify, which means they cannot be excluded from future benefit streams or targeted with selective punishment.

In one of the most influential treatments of machine politics, Stokes (2005) argues that political parties with tentacle-like organizations can penetrate the social networks of voters and effectively monitor vote choice. Socially-embedded party cells acquire detailed information about

[4] We do not deny that many authoritarian leaders also include programmatic linkage in their mix of strategies. In Russia, Colton and Hale (2009) find that many pro-regime voters identify with the ideological stance of the ruling party, United Russia.

the political inclinations of voters, allowing them to both efficiently allocate inducements and to monitor vote choice. This is plausible, but such an argument requires strong assumptions about the monitoring capacity of political parties at the grass roots level. Nichter (2008) argues that simply inducing voters to turn out ("turnout buying") is more effective than inducing them to vote for a specific candidate("vote buying"), because individual turnout is easier to monitor than individual vote choice. Yet, Nichter retains a focus on political parties as the agents of monitoring, organization, and mobilization. And yet, in much of the developing world, political parties lack such grassroots organization (e.g. Mainwaring 1999, Hale 2006). Indeed, the weakness of political parties in developing democracies has been loudly lamented just as scholars of advanced industrial democracies have noted the decline of grass-roots party organizations in the developed world (Dalton 2002).

Another way that authoritarian leaders can mobilize voters is by inducing existing authority figures—governors, strongmen, caciques, landlords, chiefs, warlords, effendi, bosses, clan leaders, employers—to mobilize votes on behalf of the regime.[5] Such elites are a ready-made corpus of effective vote brokers. As opinion leaders, they have the authority to influence voters, and, in many settings, they sit atop pre-existing political machines that can be fused with the autocrat's machine.

Mobilizing votes via the pre-existing clientelist networks of existing patrons is less costly than building local party organizations from scratch. After all, grass-roots party building comes with significant costs to regime leaders, including the possibility that a rival leader or erstwhile ally could use the party organization to challenge the leadership (Migdal 1988, Hale 2006; Haber 2007). Moreover, building such a party is difficult over a short period of time, as local party cells take time to become entrenched.

Among the set of elites that can facilitate clientelist exchange, employers are especially well-positioned to be effective turnout brokers. Inherent asymmetries in the employer-employee relationship give employers myriad levers of influence over workers and the density of interactions between management and workers provides the former with ample opportunities for monitoring and enforcement.[6] Recent works in political economy have begun to study the use of economic coercion by employers in historical settings. Baland and Robinson (2006) highlight how Chilean landlords mobilized peasants to vote for conservative parties until the secret ballot limited their ability to

[5] Many of the classic works on clientelism focus on clientelist exchange that is brokered by such elites (e.g. Lemarchand 1972, Scott 1972, Schmidt 1980)

[6] Mobilization of voters can of course occur without coercion and not be an example of the subversion of election. However, given unavoidable power differentials between managers and workers, even seemingly innocuous forms of mobilization carry an implicit threat and carry an underlying hint of coercion.

monitor compliance. Using data from Imperial Germany, Ziblatt (2008, 2009) makes a similar argument and finds that electoral fraud was more prevalent in areas where landholding inequality was high, presumably because landlords used their leverage over tenants to subvert the democratic process. Mares and Zhu (forthcoming) come to different conclusions about the causes of electoral fraud in Imperial Germany, arguing that fraud was most likely in areas with slack labor markets where employers could exploit their workers' lack of exit options, forcing them to vote for preferred parties.

Building upon these insights, we argue that one important way authoritarian leaders win elections is by coopting employers and inducing them to mobilize their workers to vote for the regime. In contrast to recent work on the economic coercion of voters, we theorize this practice in a modern authoritarian regime, focusing on the interaction between an autocratic state and employers. This framework allows us to show how workplace mobilization depends both on the relationship of workers to management and management's relations with the state. Further, in contrast to existing work, we theorize modern workplace mobilization as a special case of clientelism, highlighting the unique effectiveness of employers as brokers of clientelist exchange in modern authoritarian regimes. In the next section, we describe how employers facilitate such clientelist exchange.

Clientelist Exchange in the Workplace

Employers are one elite group that is especially well-placed to mobilize votes for the regime.[7] By employers we mean individuals closely engaged with the management operations of an economic enterprise, including possessing authority over personnel decisions, contracting, and policy directives. Employers may be firm directors or owners, landlords, school principals, hospital directors, or agency heads. There are several reasons that a general theory of elite-based vote mobilization can profitably start with employers. First, voters in every country must go to work, while other types of patrons, such as chiefs, landlords, political bosses, caciques, or governors, are specific to certain regions and countries. Second, from the autocrat's perspective, employers are more reliable than political bosses or elected politicians who often have political ambitions

[7] The workplace is also a hub of political activity in advanced democracies like the US and some legal scholars have expressed concern about politically motivated pressure from employers on employees in the wake of the Citizens United Decision (Verba et al. 2005; 369-391; Secunda 2010). For example, see this recent story, http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/08/coal_miners_lost_pay_when_mitt.html,Yet the lack of legal protections in autocratic settings leaves employees and employers far more vulnerable to pressure to mobilize in support of regime goals. Thus we expect that are findings are most relevant for non-democratic regimes.

themselves and an independent power bases that make them more likely to resist the incumbent. Finally, as we describe below, employers are particularly well positioned to deliver voters at low cost.

There are several reasons why employers can deliver turnout for autocrats efficiently. First, to the extent that authorities rely on clientelist exchange with voters, employers are well positioned to dole out significant selective inducements. Scholars of clientelism have noted that one way to reduce the severity of the clientelist commitment problem is to make inducements persuasive to voters. In Stokes' (2005) model of vote buying, the potential for vote-buying increases "as the value of the private reward…relative to the value of voting in accordance to one's policy or ideological preferences increases" (321). One important implication is that when the machine can offer more to buy votes, they will be more successful at securing voter support. Conversely, the more severe the punishment the machine can threaten, the more effective the machine will be at mobilizing votes. In most existing models of clientelism, political party activists are the brokers who offer such selective inducements (e.g. Dunning and Stokes 2012). Studies that focus on positive inducements usually describe how party activists exchange petty cash or small gifts for votes (e.g. Corstange 2011, Blaydes 2011, Schaffer 2007) With respect to negative inducements, political party activists, by virtue of their position, rarely have the ability to mete out substantial negative inducements.

Employers, on the other hand, have at their disposal multiple consequential levers of influence (e.g. Baland and Robinson 2007). They can offer the carrot of increases in salary or fringe benefits in exchange for votes, but also wield powerful sticks. They can threaten cuts in salary or benefits, shame workers on the job, delay promotions, or dismiss workers who do not cooperate. Press reports of such threats during the 2011 parliamentary elections in Russia were widespread. In just one example, workers at the Kolsk Mining and Metallurgical Company in Murmanskaya Oblast were required to vote with absentee ballots at work under threat of firing.[8]

Second, employers are engaged in repeated, long-term interactions with their employees.[9] Repeated play is one of the best studied solutions to the commitment problem. Repeated interaction mitigates the commitment problems associated with clientelism by instilling in voters an understanding that defections will result in punishment or exclusion from future benefit streams (Stokes 2005, Hicken 2011). For workers, the certainty of future interaction with management

[8] "Analytical Report of GOLOS on the Elections of December 4, 2011" GOLOS. Moscow. Accessed online at http://www.golos.org/asset/5878 27 April 2012, Chapter 8, p1.

[9] If sectoral incentives are especially strong, workers and employers may share similar preferences. However, even where they have similar preferences, they still face a collective action in mobilizing voters to the polls. Thus, employer-based coercion may still be needed even where workers and employers have similar preferences.

makes promises of rewards and threats of punishment more credible. Outside of the nuclear family, there is perhaps no set of social relationships that are more iterative than those in the workplace.

Third, employers are well-positioned to monitor turnout and potentially violate the secret ballot to discover how their employees vote. From the perspective of the regime, overcoming the secret ballot is one of the most significant obstacles to successful clientelist exchange (Baland and Robinson 2006). The opportunities for employers to gather information on their employees are legion. Given the amount of time voters spend at work, their vote decisions are likely to be discovered by co-workers and supervisors. What is more, employers in many countries offer housing, in-kind benefits, and social services to their employees, extending the informational reach of the employer outside the traditional workplace. In Russia, which inherited the Soviet legacy of firm-based social provision, many enterprises provide housing, transportation, access to recreational facilities, pre-schooling, and on-site health care to their employees (e.g. Cook 2007). Such services bind the social lives of employees to their workplace. In sum, repeated interaction and the breadth of workplace-related social interactions make it relatively easy for employers to monitor workers' political behavior.

Indeed, in a survey conducted by the authors just after the March 2012 Russian Presidential elections, 33 percent of workers in Russia thought that it was possible that their employer could find out how they voted.[10] In the 2011 Russian parliamentary elections, the Russian vote monitoring organization GOLOS collected hundreds of reports of employers requiring employees to vote at work with absentee ballots and report back to management.[11] In one example, the head doctor at the 7th City Hospital in Bryansk asked that employees take absentee ballots and vote in the clinic attached to the hospital.[12] Employers also managed to monitor voting outside the workplace. In the republic of Marii El, representatives of the Mari Energy Company sat in the precinct recording which of their employees came to the polls.[13] In myriads of other instances, employers provided workers with transportation to the polls on election day. This practice is so widespread in Russia that it is often not even perceived as insidious. For example, the administration of Vologdskaya Oblast posted a video news report on its official website outlining how management provided free transportation to the polls for those employees of the city utility company whose work schedules

[10] The nationally representative survey included 1600 respondents in 45 regions and was carried about the Levada Center as part of their monthly survey of residents of Russia. Interviews were conducted face to face in the home of rhe respondent with 20 percent call backs to ensure veracity. The margin of error was less than 3.4 percent.
[11] Accessed online at http://kartanarusheniy.org. 27 April 2012.
[12] "Analytical Report of GOLOS on the Elections of December 4, 2011" GOLOS. Moscow. E online at http://kartanarusheniy.org. 27 April 2012. Complaint # 9044
online at http://kartanarusheniy.org. 27 April 2012. Complaint # 9044

overlapped with voting hours.[14] At the extremes, employers organized so called "carousels" in which the firm provided transportation to voters, ferrying them to multiple voting stations over the course of the day in order to vote multiple times with absentee ballots.

The above discussion suggests that coopting employers and mobilizing voters through the workplace is a cost effective strategy for authoritarian rulers. Regime leaders can appeal directly to employers or they can coordinate them within the confines of an elite-based hegemonic party. Either is more cost-effective than investing in extensive grass-roots party organization. In Russia, both strategies are pursued as many business leaders are in some manner affiliated with the ruling party, United Russia. Those that are not affiliated with United Russia may deal with party and regime leaders directly.

One anecdote from Russia illustrates the process of how employers are coordinated and voters mobilized. In a secretly recorded video that went viral on Youtube shortly before the parliamentary elections, the mayor of Novokuznetsk, a major industrial city in Siberia, can be seen addressing a gathering of the directors of the city's largest enterprises. The mayor, Valerii Smolevo, can be seen asking business leaders to encourage their workers to vote for United Russia and to discredit opposition parties. In this semi-public setting, Smolevo does not mention specific sanctions that enterprises would face if they fail to mobilize the vote for UR, but the message was clear to all: "We need to carry out these elections in the proper manner so it won't be painful or uncomfortable. You are all smart people; you are all directors. You saw the recent United Russia congress; you saw that, on Friday, the governor gathered a team to discuss preparations for the parliamentary elections on December 4. It's clear to everyone that United Russia should win." The video is also remarkable for the detail in which Smolevo outlines the message that enterprise directors should convey to their employees: "It [UR] is the only real force, actually a ruling party, that is actually doing something real. If you look at other opponents currently in the Duma, no one should expect any sort of real help or deeds from them. Everyone should understand that. Everything that is done by the authorities in the country, and in the city, needs to be tightly connected to United Russia. It's very simple what you need to tell your workforce: "You might hear about the LDPR today, but, honestly, as soon as the elections are over, you won't hear a peep out of them"[15]

Survey data from the 2011 elections in Russia show that such practices are widespread. During the 2011 election campaign, we conducted a survey of 922 Russian firms in 15 regional

[14]Accessed online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=73o_hwIjcrA. 27 April 2012.
[15]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kD4W5zAKlCg&feature=player_embedded. Accessed 28 April 2012.

capitals.[16] According to the survey, 24 percent of firms reported that they had sanctioned some type of political mobilization—endorsing a specific party, inviting workers to join a political party, distributing campaign materials, providing meeting space to candidates, or holding campaign events—to take place in the workplace.

Surveys of voters paint a similar picture. From December 16-20, we commissioned a series of questions about voter mobilization in the workplace that were placed on a post-election survey of 1600 Russian citizens carried out by the Russian polling organization The Levada Center.[17] We asked employed voters "Did your employer try to influence your decision to turn out in the December 4 parliamentary elections?" Twenty-five percent responded in the affirmative, and as Table 1 shows, the incidence of vote mobilization was much higher among government employees.

Tab. 1. Voter Mobilization in the Russian Workplace

Sector	***Did your employer attempt to influence your decision to vote?***
Federal Government	37%
Regional and Local Government	32%
Military/Police	28%
State Enterprise	30%
Private Enterprise	22%
NGO/Social Org	11%
Other	16%
All Employees	**25%**

[16] The surveys were conducted by the VTSIOM polling organization. For details see appendix 1

[17] For details see Appendix 2. Carried out in 45 regions across the country, the nationally representative survey reached respondents at a large variety of settlement points in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were carried out in person at the home of the respondent, with random follow-up telephone calls, mailings, and visits used to ensure the authenticity of the responses.

Further, eleven percent said that their employer had tried specifically to influence their choice of party. This indicates that turnout mobilization is much more prevalent in Russia than is vote-buying. For this reason, and because our firm-survey does not provide precise measures of vote-buying, we focus on firm-based turnout mobilization in this paper.

The direct question above does not identify the use of inducements (positive or negative) by employers to encourage turnout among their employees. Since paying people to vote is illegal and since employees may fear reprisals if their employers discovered that they divulged to a pollster the practices of turnout buying or vote buying in their workplace, a direct question on inducements to vote may not yield truthful answers. To address this issue, we implemented a list experiment in our survey. We asked respondents "How many of the following things will affect your job security, benefits, and/or income in 2012?" As is customary with this form of survey experiment, interviewers emphasized that the respondent should only tell the interviewer *how many* of the items would have an effect and not to indicate the specific items. Respondents in a randomly selected control group were given the list of innocuous items in column 1 of Table 2, while respondents in a randomly selected treatment group received the same list with the addition of the sensitive item, "Your decision to vote in the 2011 State Duma elections." Under randomization assumptions, similar proportions of respondents should select the innocuous items in both the treatment and control groups, such that any increase in the mean number of items selected in the treatment group is attributable to respondents who are selecting the sensitive item. In our list experiment, the mean number of items selected in the treatment group is 1.91, compared to 1.76 in the control group for a difference in means of .15 (p =.016). This indicates that 15 percent of respondents felt that their job security, benefits, or income would be affected by their decision to turnout to vote in the 2011 elections. In other words, roughly one in seven Russian workers expected that they would receive some reward or sanction from their employers for voting or not voting in the 2011 State Duma elections.

Tab. 2. List Experiment on Clientelistic Exchange in the Russian Workplace

How many of the following things will affect your job security, benefits, and/or income in 2012?	***Control***	***Treatment***
	1. Your job performance 2. Performance of the	1. Your job performance 2. Performance of the

	Russian economy 3. Change in trade with China	Russian economy 3. Change in trade with China **4. Your decision to vote in the 2011 State Duma elections**
Mean # Items	1.76	1.91

The Political Economy of Firm-Based Vote Mobilization

There are good reasons to think that workplace mobilization is an efficient means for autocrats to win elections, and it appears that it is common practice in Russia. But clearly there is variation in the incidence of workplace mobilization across countries, regions, historical periods, and workplaces. Why is this? What allows autocrats to dominate semi-competitive elections through workplace mobilization in some settings, but not in others? To provide insight into this question, we examine variation in workplace mobilization across Russian firms.[18] In the paragraphs below, we develop a simple set of arguments to explain this variation.

Mobilizing voters in the workplace comes with costs and benefits to both the autocrat and employers. For employers, mobilizing voters on behalf of the regime puts them in the good graces of the regime, and good relations with the state translate into a host of benefits for the firm. At the same time, workplace mobilization may be costly to employers for several reasons. First, firm output may be negatively affected if the firm's resources and time are diverted to political uses. Second, workplace morale may be damaged if management is seen to be exerting political pressure on employees. Third, if management's political preferences diverge from those of the autocrat then management incurs costs associated with acting in a manner that is not consistent with their principles.

For the autocrat, mobilizing in the workplace is beneficial because it increases the number of votes that the autocrat receives. Yet it also brings costs to the autocrat who must induce employers—with state contracts, subsidies, regulatory exemptions, privileged tax policies, threats of punishment etc—to engage in this mobilization. There are also significant transaction costs.

[18] Following Stokes (2005) we assume that only the incumbent regime has the ability to engage in clientelist exchange and mobilize voters in the workplace. This assumption is justified for contemporary Russia, but clearly not appropriate in many more competitive settings (e.g. Corstange 2011).

Identifying the firms where political mobilization will be most effective, bargaining with employers, and coordinating the vote mobilization effort across multiple firms are all costly endeavors.

Our argument begins with the premise that autocrats seek to mobilize workers efficiently. Autocrats bargain with employers and target those who can be mobilized at the lowest cost. Consider an autocrat who makes an offer to an employer to provide a benefit (or withhold a sanction) if he mobilizes voters, and an employer who decides whether to accept the offer. The benefit promised by the autocrat must be at least as great as the costs of mobilizing or the employer will reject it. In this way, we can conceive of employers "selling" the support of their workers to the autocrat. The value of the vote to the autocrat must be greater than the cost to the autocrat of providing the benefit. Autocrats will then seek to mobilize workers in firms that value the benefits of good relations with the state highly and for whom the cost of mobilizing each additional worker is low.

This simple framework yields multiple implications. First, because many types of mobilization efforts yield economies of scale, autocrats find it cheaper to mobilize voters from firms with more employees. For example, the costs of transporting an additional voter to the polls via bus (a common practice in Russia) decline with each voter until the seats on the bus are filled. Similarly, the cost per voter of contacting a voter is lower in large firms than in small firms. These insights accord with research on campaigning in American politics, which suggests that candidates spend less per voter in large states (e.g. Abramowitz 1988). Thus, autocrats should favor mobilizing firms with more employees compared to those with fewer employees. Note that to the extent that monitoring voters and turnout is more costly in large firms, this prediction is at odds with the clientelist literature which emphasizes that monitoring is likely to be more effective in small communities (Stokes 2005). This also suggests that large "vote-rich" firms have some power in bargaining with the autocrat and should receive some benefits in exchange for mobilization. So our first hypothesis is as follows.

H1: Large firms will be more likely to mobilize workers.

Second, employers who benefit from close relations with the state can sell the votes of their workers more cheaply to the autocrat. For example, autocrats have significant leverage over the directors of state-owned enterprises, so these directors can be induced to mobilize at a low cost to the autocrat. Similarly, employers whose firms are financially dependent on the state, such as firms that sell their output to the state can be coopted more cheaply than other firms. Alternatively, employers who are less able to shift their lines of production (to other countries, regions, or

municipalities) are more vulnerable to potential expropriation and regulatory sanction and thus willing to offer a low price to autocrats for mobilizing workers. In addition, autocrats may induce voter mobilization by distributing various types of organizational and financial support to firms prior to elections. This leads to several hypotheses.

H2: State-owned firms will be more likely to mobilize workers.

H3; Firms in sectors characterized by immobile assets will be more likely to mobilize workers.

H4: Firms that sell to the state will be more likely to mobilize workers.

H5. Firms that receive benefits from the state will be more likely to mobilize workers.

Finally, firm directors whose ideological views are easier to predict and are closer to those of the autocrat may be less costly to mobilize. Following Cox (2006) and Nichter (2008), this suggests that autocrats should mobilize "core" employers rather than "swing" employers. Core employers whose economic fate is tied to the incumbent's may also be cheaper to monitor as failure to mobilize may result in electoral defeat (Oliveros 2012). We can make no strong claims about the direction of causation as being a "core" versus a "swing" supporter is likely endogenous to deeper factors, such as processes of socialization and personal experiences with the party.

H6: Firm directors who support the ruling party will be more likely to mobilize workers.

Yet voter mobilization is not just shaped by bargaining between rulers and economic elites. It is also strongly influenced by bargaining between employers and their employees. Even where they are vulnerable to state pressure to mobilize their voters, employers vary in their capacity to deliver turnout and votes. Autocrats will target firms that can mobilize their workers at lower cost, because these firms will sell their employees' votes to the state at a lower price.

We can think of employers offering some inducement to their workers in exchange for turnout. This inducement may be positive (e.g. increased wages) or, more likely, negative, such as a threat of withholding benefits or in many cases, dismissal. Some types of workers may be induced to turnout at lower cost than others. Workers who are highly dependent on their firms not only for wages, but also for the provision of social goods at below market prices fall into this category. Management has more leverage over these employees, because any disruption in relations with their employers would have severe negative repercussions for the employee. Moreover, when the firm provides workers with multiple fringe benefits managers have a broader menu of potential inducements to choose from. For example, in addition to wage inducements, management may have the option to limit access to a vacation facility or limit access to the firm's health clinic. In Russia,

many employees are reliant on their employer for goods that are hard to get elsewhere at low cost, such as housing, access to health care, child care, access to summer resorts, transportation, and pension premiums. Employees in these firms are embedded in a web of social dependency on the firm that leaves them highly vulnerable to the whims of employers. This leads to our sixth hypothesis:

H7: Firms that provide their employees with significant non-wage benefits will be more likely to mobilize workers.

Similarly, employees who would find it difficult to find alternate work are easy targets for employers seeking to mobilize their workers. For these workers, job loss would have catastrophic consequences and so they are likely to be highly responsive to management's inducements to vote (Mares and Zhu forthcoming). For example, workers whose livelihood is dependent on skills specific to their place of work or who live in single company towns are likely to be especially receptive to pressure from employers to engage in political activity.

H8. Employees in slack labor markets are more likely to report being mobilized.

Data and Variables

We use two data sources to examine these hypotheses about voter mobilization. Both are surveys from the parliamentary election in Russia which took place on December 5th 2011. The first is a survey of 922 firm directors in 15 regional capitals conducted in November and December 2011.[19] Interviews were conducted with the firm's top management: Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer or Chief Legal Officer. These are the individuals responsible for firm operations and have the authority to carry out political activities. Our measure of workplace mobilization is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if a director reported engaging in any of the following political activities: endorsing a specific party, inviting workers to join a political party, distributing campaign materials, providing meeting space to candidates, or holding campaign events. This measure directly captures electoral subversion via workplace mobilization by asking respondents about their behavior during electoral campaigns. Ziblatt (2008; 2009) and Mares and Zhu (forthcoming) use disputed election results which may capture only some portion of electoral fraud. Baland and Robinson (2006) use changes in vote shares after the introduction of the secret ballot in regions controlled by landlords using repressive labor practices, but changes in vote share over time

[19] For details on the survey, please see Appendix 1.

may capture factors other than employer intimidation as well. Moreover, we are able to gather data at the level of the firm or the individual rather than rely on data that is aggregated to the level of the administrative unit.

We test our hypotheses using several questions from the firm survey. With respect to Hypothesis 1, we measure the size of the firm by taking the logarithm of the reported number of employees. To examine Hypothesis 2, we use a binary variable coded one if the respondent reported that the government had a minority or majority stake in the enterprise. To assess the impact of variation in asset mobility (Hypothesis 3), we use the self-reported sectoral classification of the enterprise. Firms in sectors characterized by immobile assets—industry and natural resource extraction—should be more likely to mobilize voters than firms engaged in trade and services, construction, transportation, financial services, real estate, transportation, or communications.[20] We also employ two more direct measures of firm dependence on the state: a binary variable indicating whether the firm sells its products or services directly to the government (Hypothesis 4) and a binary variable indicating whether the firm received financial support from the federal or regional government (Hypothesis 5). Almost 1 in 8 firms reported receiving government support in 2010 or 2011.

We measure the ideological preferences of the director (Hypothesis 6) with a question about whether the firm director supported United Russia, an opposition party, or no party at all. From this, we construct a variable equal to 1 if the firm director supported United Russia. In the firm survey models, we measure the dependence of employees on the enterprise (Hypothesis 7) with a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the firm reported that employees received non-wage social benefits. Typical benefits include supplemental medical insurance, subsidized transportation, day care, or housing subsidies. To measure slackness in the labor market (Hypothesis 8) we asked directors to tell us how difficult it was to find qualified workers. Their responses were coded on a 1-4 scale, ranging from easy to very hard. Finally, we control for the age of the firm (measured by the logged number of years in existence) as well as its recent performance (measured by the change in volume of investment in 2011 compared with 2007).

The firm survey offers an unprecedented glimpse into the practice of workplace mobilization, but we can be more confident if the results are validated using a separate data source. Thus, we also rely on a nationally representative survey of adults conducted after the December 4th 2011 parliamentary elections. Of the 1600 respondents, 961 were employed. Of those employed, 23

[20] In the survey, directors of enterprises involved in trade and services made up the largest category of those interviewed. See appendix.

percent worked directly for various levels of government or the security services, 2 percent found it difficult to report their place of employment and 1 percent worked for non-governmental organizations. The remaining 703 employed respondents who do not work in government constitute our sample here.

The dependent variable in the employee survey models is an individual's response to a question about whether their employer attempted to influence their decision to turnout to vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections (the same question described in Table 1, above). This binary variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent noted an attempt by their employer to apply pressure on them to vote.

We construct independent variables to examine our hypotheses using responses from the employee survey. Firm size is measured with an ordinal variable on a 1-4 scale, which is constructed on the basis of a question asking respondents to identify whether their firm had 1-10 employees (1), 10-100 employees (2), 100-1000 employees (3) or over 1000 employees (4). Respondents were also asked to identify the ownership structure (1 if state-owned, 0 if private) of their firm and to identify its sector when presented with a list of choices. We measure the slackness of the labor market (Hypothesis 7) with a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the respondent lives in a single-company town.[21]

In line with existing literature, we also include several control variables, including the population of the settlement as measured in a categorical variable: (1) Less than 20 thous., (2) 20-99 thous., (3) 100-249 thous., (4) 250-499 thous., (5) 500-999 thous., (6) more than 1 mln., and (7) more than 10 mln. Demographic control variables include age (logged in years), education level, total income (logged in rubles per month), whether the individual voted in the 2007 election (a binary variable), and whether an individual resides in an ethnic republic of Russia.

Empirical Analysis: Employer Survey

We discuss our analysis of the firm survey data first. All analyses use logit models because the dependent variable is binary. We include region fixed effects and apply heteroskedastic-robust standard errors that are clustered at the region-level. Results are given in Table 3. Model 1 employs

[21] In Russia, a single company town, or *monogorod*, is defined as any municipality where a single enterprise or group of inter-linked enterprises provide more than 50 percent of the city's industrial output. The Russian federal government has identified 337 such towns in Russia, which together constitute more than 25 percent of the country's gross domestic product. To code this variable, we matched the place of settlement from the national survey to the federal list of *monogorods* that was created in 2009.

only predictors that are largely exogenous. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, larger firms are more likely to have mobilized workers; the coefficient on this variable is positive and significant. As Figure 1 shows, a firm director in a firm with 600 employees is more than twice as likely as a director of a firm with 10 employees to report sanctioning a political event in the workplace. Autocrats specifically target directors of large enterprises because they know that these directors can sell take advantage of economies of scale and "sell" their votes to the autocrat at a cheaper price.



Fig.1. Predicted Probabilities, Firm Survey

Tab.3. Employer Campaigning – Firm Survey Models

VARIABLES	(1) Mobilized Workers	(2) Mobilized Workers	(3) Mobilized Workers
Firm Size	0.0620***	0.0481***	0.0473***
	(0.0114)	(0.0127)	(0.0140)
Firm Age	-0.0287	-0.0283**	-0.0195
	(0.0178)	(0.0133)	(0.0132)
State-Owned Enterprise	0.128**	0.101**	0.0951***
	(0.0570)	(0.0470)	(0.0355)
Investment Change in 2011	0.0369	0.0116	0.0176
	(0.0289)	(0.0305)	(0.0363)
Energy	-0.106	-0.0865	-0.114
	(0.122)	(0.0862)	(0.0720)
Oil and Gas	0.0355	-0.0215	-0.0846*
	(0.0899)	(0.0740)	(0.0511)
Heavy Industry	0.182**	0.156**	0.127**
	(0.0743)	(0.0659)	(0.0534)
Forestry	0.189**	0.141**	0.180*
	(0.0747)	(0.0663)	(0.103)
Light Industry	0.0959*	0.0541	0.0666
	(0.0540)	(0.0507)	(0.0549)
Construction	0.0588	0.0208	0.0109
	(0.0572)	(0.0557)	(0.0635)
Transportation	0.0351	-0.0325	-0.160*
	(0.0466)	(0.0642)	(0.0951)
Communications	0.0971	0.0855	0.0833
	(0.0764)	(0.0664)	(0.0695)
Financial Services	0.0687	0.0480	0.0658
	(0.0835)	(0.0615)	(0.0797)
Real Estate	0.0286	0.0314	0.0303
	(0.0962)	(0.0880)	(0.100)
Firm Sells to State		0.144***	0.131***
		(0.0345)	(0.0436)
Firm Offers Benefits to Workers		0.0549**	0.0662*
		(0.0265)	(0.0366)
Firm Receives Government Support		0.0660**	0.0590
		(0.0282)	(0.0422)
Firm Experiences Difficulties Finding Workers			-0.000166
			(0.0186)
Director Age			-0.00349**
			(0.00146)
Director Education			0.0376
			(0.0732)
Director Supports UR			0.159***
			(0.0446)
Observations	751	706	528

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Average Marginal Effects from Logit Models. Dependent variable is binary: 1 if Firm mobilized workers to vote; 0 - otherwise.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models use Region FE and cluster errors on region.
Model (1): Basic Firm Characteristics and Sectoral Information
Model (2): Same as Model 1, but adding data on the firm's relationships with the state and its employees.
Model (3): Same as Model 2, but adding variables that result in lost observations: manager characteristics and labor market measure.

This finding is intriguing in light of the literature on clientelism which suggests that clientelist exchange is more prevalent in small settings and tight-knit communities because brokers find it easier to monitor compliance in those settings. Monitoring is likely easier in smaller settings, but our findings remind us that autocrats consider more than just monitoring costs when they decide how to mobilize voters: they also take into account the economies of scale associated with mobilization. Moreover, it is possible that monitoring costs are mitigated by the hierarchical nature

of firms, whereby directors can deploy a chain of supervisors to monitor compliance. This suggests that the costs to monitoring may be only marginally higher in large firms.

State-owned enterprises are also more likely to have mobilized workers in the run-up to the elections.[22] Turning again to Figure 1, we see that the probability of a state-owned enterprise holding a political event in the workplace is 38 percent, while the probability for non-state-owned enterprises is 14 percent. Autocrats have a great deal of leverage over the directors of state-owned enterprises, so these directors sell the support of their workers "cheaply."

The coefficients on the sectoral dummy variables indicate support for the hypothesis that firms with immobile assets are more likely to engage in workplace mobilization. As Figure 1 shows, firms in heavy industry are 20 percentage points more likely than firms in trade and services to engage in workplace mobilization.[23] The coefficients on *Light Industry* and *Construction* are positive as predicted, but their rates of mobilization are not statistically distinguishable from the rate of mobilization in the *Trade and Services* sector. Appendix 3 shows the share of firms in each category that mobilized workers.[24]

These findings are consistent with our argument that firms with immobile assets will be more likely to mobilize for the autocrat, because they are more vulnerable to expropriation and regulatory sanction by the autocrat. At the same time, however, some existing theories of democratization would predict that economic elites with immobile assets will subvert democracy because they fear redistribution of their assets by the poor under democracy (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Under such a scenario, economic elites are independently motivated to subvert democracy, absent any pressure from the current autocrat. We accept this as a possibility, but doubt that this mechanism explains our findings in the case of contemporary Russia. Even if enterprise directors with immobile assets were independently motivated to mobilize in order to prevent redistribution under democracy, these firm directors face a collective action problem in bringing about that result. There are thousands of firms with immobile assets in Russia, and, absent some

[22] There is the risk of endogeneity between ownership type and vote mobilization as autocrats may keep reliable vote mobilizers in state hands, but the great wave of privatization in Russia crested by 1996 and the rate of privatization has fallen considerably since then, which suggests solid grounds for considering state ownership as largely exogenous to vote mobilization in 2011.

[23] Perhaps surprisingly, we do not find a significant coefficient on the oil and gas sectoral dummy. However, only 11 oil and gas firms entered the survey due to the fact that there are relatively few of these firms and due to the fact that most such firms are based in Moscow or in one of only a handful of oil producing regions. Appendix 1 shows that mobilization was much higher than normal in this sector. It is also noteworthy that energy sector firms, which have immobile assets, do not mobilize at a high rate.

[24] It is intriguing that firms in the *Electricity* sector, which is characterized by immobile assets are unlikely to mobilize. This is likely due to a quirk of Russian political history, whereby, from 1998-2008, the Russian state electricity monopoly, RAO-UES was headed by Anatoly Chubais, a liberal politician and market reformer closely affiliated with the Union of Right Forces opposition party. During his tenure as Chairman of RAO-UES, Chubais filled regional director positions with like-minded, liberal colleagues (Reuter 2010). These individuals were noted for independent political positions in the 2000s, and many of them were still in positions of power in regional electricity companies as of 2011.

third party to enforce compliance, many of these firms would doubtlessly elect to free ride on the vote mobilizing efforts of other firms rather than pay the costs of mobilization. Thus, at the very least, the autocrat must play the role of a third party that can provide selective incentives to induce collective action on the part of enterprise directors in subverting democracy. In sum, it seems more likely that autocrats want to assure high vote totals and induce directors in asset immobile sectors to mobilize votes on their behalf.

In Model 2, we add several measures of firm dependence on the state that to varying degrees are less exogenous than the indicators used in the first model. The positive and significant coefficient on *Sell to the State* indicates that firms that sell to the state are more likely to mobilize their workers. In substantive terms, a firm that sells to the state is 16 percentage points more likely to mobilize than a firm that does not. We suspect that the decision to sell to the state is largely driven by economic reasons, but do not rule out the possibility that firms that sell to the state also mobilize workers to ingratiate themselves with state officials – an interpretation that raises the prospect of endogeneity bias. Yet, this interpretation supposes a high level of coordination among state officials in different branches of the Russian state to organize this exchange which is at odds with much existing literature (c.f., Easter 2012).

The positive and significant coefficient on *Receives Government Support* indicates that such firms are more likely to mobilize their workforce. Looking at Figure 1, firms that receive government support are roughly 8 percentage points more likely to have engaged in mobilization activities than firms that do not receive anything The direction of causality is again difficult to establish for these findings, but it is worth noting that firms were asked whether they received government support in 2010 and 2011, well before the State Duma election campaign had begun. This goes some way toward suggesting that firms first received government support and then were induced to mobilize. In any event, this result indicates an exchange of economic benefits for political support between autocrats and employers,rather than the capture of one side by the other. Existing literature does not predict that vote mobilization should be higher in firms that are dependent on the state (e.g. Mares and Zhu 2012). More generally, these two results demonstrate the value of exploring the relationship between autocrats and employers for studies of political mobilization and clientelism.

A variable measuring worker dependence on employers—*Worker Benefits*—is also introduced in this model. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant: firms that provide valuable social services to workers have more leverage with which to induce employee

compliance and thus more likely to mobilize their workers to vote. From a substantive standpoint, firms that offered benefits to their workers were 8 percentage points more likely to mobilize them to vote than were firms that did not provide these benefits.

In Model 3, we add a series of variables that tap the individual characteristics of directors to account for their propensity to mobilize their workers. First and foremost, we add our measure of director partisanship. Controlling for other firm director characteristics (individual age and level of education), we find that directors who claim to support the ruling United Russia party indeed mobilize their workers to vote at a higher rate. The coefficient on *Firm Director: UR Supporter* is positive and statistically significant beyond the conventional level. It is interesting to note that older firm directors are also less likely to mobilize for the regime, which perhaps provides evidence of greater ability to resist pressure from above through accumulated connections or personal ties. Alternatively, younger directors may have longer time horizons and thus attach a higher value to maintaining good relations with the authorities.

Non-response rates were higher for questions about director characteristics so including these variables causes us to drop a large number of observations. We also added a binary variable – *Firm Experiences Difficulties Finding Workers* - indicating whether a given firm identified the problem of finding qualified workers for hire as pressing for its operations.[25] The coefficient is negative but not statistically significant, indicating mixed support for the claim that firm directors are more likely to mobilize workers in slack labor markets. Nonetheless, almost all of the primary variables of interest (firm size, ownership structure, asset mobility, worker benefits, and state dependence) remain statistically significant in this model.

The Workers' Point of View: Analyzing the Employee Survey

In addition to analyzing the survey responses of employers, we examined workplace mobilization from the employee's point of view. Table 4 shows the results of models using data from the survey of employees described above. We again use a logit model with fixed effects at the 'okrug' level and standard errors clustered on the primary sampling unit.[26] Overall, the findings from the

[25] This variable also resulted in the loss of many observations, leading us to include it in Model 3 alongside manager-level characteristics.

[26] There are eight federal 'okrugs' within Russia which join geographically adjacent regions into a second-level administrative structure: Region level fixed effects would be preferable, but because the individual level survey only covers 45 regions, and the sample size in some regions was very small, including region fixed effects leads us to drop a large number of observations.

population survey confirm our findings from the firm survey. As Model 1 shows, employees of larger firms are more likely to have experienced pressure to turn out; the coefficient on firm size is positive and statistically significant. Voters in large firms are 13 percentage points more likely to report that their employers pressured them to vote than voters in the smallest of firms. Asset mobility also predicts voter mobilization in these models. Employees in the heavy industry and mining sectors are more likely to report having been pressured by their employer. We also find that respondents living in single company towns (*monogorods*), an indicator of dependency and a lack of labor mobility, are more likely to be mobilized. Figure 2 shows that respondents living in a *monogorod* are twice as likely to have been mobilized than those who live in other types of cities (41.3 percent vs. 20.2 percent). Recent literature on clientelism also predicts greater mobilization in smaller towns and settlements, as monitoring problems may be alleviated there. The evidence here supports this finding, but the coefficient is only significant at the 90% level.

Notably, no other demographic characteristics are significant predictors of employer pressure on employees. The non-finding on income is particularly intriguing given the near consensus in the literature that poor voters are more susceptible to clientelist appeals (e.g. Wantchekon 2003, Stokes 2005, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). One of the possible explanations for why poor voters are more susceptible to clientelist appeals is that they are less mobile and thus more dependent on patrons. If such an indirect effect were at play in our data then removing our measures of firm dependence from the model should increase the coefficient on *Income.* In the appendix, we test for such an indirect effect and find that the effect of *Income* is not being channeled through labor mobility; the coefficient remains virtually unchanged and is not statistically significant in a model that includes only demographic controls.

Another explanation for the association between economic development and clientelism is that the marginal utility of income is higher for poor voters, which makes it cheaper for politicians to buy the votes of poor voters. Our findings could be interpreted as lending support to this view, because firm managers rely more on negative inducements (e.g coercion backed by implicit or explicit threats of dismissal) than they do on the material exchange of cash for votes. Under this view, we should not expect a strong association between the income of workers and workplace clientelism. What matters more, as we find, is the dependence of the worker on the firm.

Tab. 4. Employee Campaigning – Individual Surveys

	(1) Mobilized to Vote	(2) Mobilized to Vote	(3) Mobilized to Vote
Single Company Town	0.179***	0.177**	
	(0.0694)	(0.0731)	
State Owned Enterprise		0.0123	0.0754**
		(0.0392)	(0.0364)
Firm Size	-0.0441**	-0.0445**	
	(0.0180)	(0.0180)	
Government Employee			0.0978**
			(0.0417)
Opposition Supporter			0.0662**
			(0.0306)
Voted in 2007 Parl. Election	0.0660**	0.0659**	0.0540*
	(0.0299)	(0.0298)	(0.0314)
Heavy Industry	0.183**	0.183**	
	(0.0749)	(0.0752)	
Light Industry	-0.105	-0.105	
	(0.108)	(0.108)	
Oil and Gas	0.0738	0.0747	
	(0.0862)	(0.0857)	
Mining	0.204**	0.205**	
	(0.0930)	(0.0938)	
Utilities	-0.00941	-0.0142	
	(0.0858)	(0.0829)	
Construction	-0.0220	-0.0224	
	(0.0674)	(0.0670)	
Transportation	-0.00312	-0.00608	
	(0.0518)	(0.0543)	
Communications	-0.252	-0.256	
	(0.170)	(0.171)	
Agricultre	0.0367	0.0360	
	(0.119)	(0.117)	
Other Sector	0.0397	0.0349	
	(0.0671)	(0.0681)	
Male	-0.0298	-0.0292	-0.0169
	(0.0322)	(0.0318)	(0.0248)
Age	0.00160	0.00158	0.000286
	(0.00165)	(0.00164)	(0.00128)
Education	0.00392	0.00376	-0.00136
	(0.00948)	(0.00960)	(0.00893)
Income	-0.00583	-0.00586	-0.000644
	(0.00514)	(0.00513)	(0.00481)
Town Size	0.0195*	0.0195*	0.0224**
	(0.0112)	(0.0111)	(0.0104)
Lives in Republic	0.109	0.109	0.0942*
	(0.0739)	(0.0738)	(0.0516)
Observations	559	559	871

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Average Marginal Effects from Logit Models.

Dependent variable is binary: 1 if Respondent was mobilized to vote; 0 - otherwise.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models use Okrug FE and cluster errors on primary sample unit.

Model (1): Basic Model with Firm Characteristics, Sectors, and Individual Demographic Information

Model (2): Same as Model 1, but adding State-Owned Enterprises.

Model (3): Includes Government Employees and Political Preferences. Firm characteristics excluded.



Fig.2. Predicted Probabilities, Individual Level Survey

In Model 2, we add an indicator variable for state ownership of the firm where the respondent is employed. This variable is highly collinear with the indicator variable for single company towns and the coefficient does not achieve statistical significance when included in the same model with the *Single Company Town* variable. We interpret the positive sign however as evidence that state-owned enterprises tend to mobilize their workers more frequently. We also find in robustness checks that dropping *Single Company Town* from the analysis results in a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the state ownership variable.

In Model 3, we expand the sample to include employees in governmental and state security sectors. Adding these variables however requires dropping the firm-level characteristics such as size and sector from the analysis. Confirming the descriptive impressions in Table 1, the multivariate analysis here shows employees in both government offices and state-owned enterprises are more likely to have been mobilized than their counterparts in the private and non-governmental sectors. We also find that opposition supporters experience greater pressure from their employers. This could either be due to greater sensitivity to employer pressure and thus a higher rate of reporting of attempts to pressure by employers, or due to specific targeting of dissenting voters. Our data unfortunately does not allow us to distinguish between these two patterns.

Conclusion: Caveats and Implications

We report a number of useful results, but it is also important to identify the limits of our analysis and how they can be addressed in future research. First, we have identified the advantages to autocrats of engaging in political mobilization via the workplace, but have not explored the interaction between political parties and firms. Whether party-based and employer-based political mobilization are complements or substitutes is an open question. Second, we have not incorporated institutional or regional variables into the analysis. We control for unit specific fixed effects, but do not take advantage of how regional variation in political competition, social structure, or party strength may shape workplace mobilization. As we show in Appendix Tables 3 and 4, our results are robust to dropping these unit specific fixed effects from both the firm survey analysis (at the regional level) and the individual survey analysis (at the okrug level).

We have also not examined the extent to which these results are specific to contemporary Russia. Systematic studies of workplace mobilization are scarce, but there is evidence that it also occurs outside of Russia and we suspect that our arguments may have some purchase in other settings as well. Finally, our findings are limited to a dominant party regime setting. We do not explore how the incentives to mobilize in the workplace may differ in the presence of dueling machines (Ziblatt 2008; 2009; Mares and Zhu 2010; Corstange 2011). These are topics for future research.

In this essay we have found that the workplace is a key site of political mobilization in contemporary Russia. Employers are especially well placed to translate their economic power over workers into political mobilization. Indeed, as noted in Appendix 5, workers who were mobilized by employers reported higher rates of turnout than those who did not. To a considerable extent the quality of representation via elections depends on place of employment rather than formal political rights. Using two original surveys that directly tap voter mobilization, we have also identified the features of the workplace that make electoral subversion via economic coercion more likely. Large, financially dependent firms in sectors characterized by asset immobility or slack labor markets whose managers are "core" supporters of the regime are especially likely to mobilize their workers.

Our findings contribute to several bodies of research in comparative politics. First, our analysis provides some micro-foundations to arguments about the economic bases of transitions from autocratic rule by identifying the types of firms and workers most likely to engage in electoral subversion via political coercion in the workplace. Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)

identify asset-immobility as a key obstacle to democratization, but do not provide micro-level tests of their arguments. Using individual-level data, we find that firms whose assets are immobile are especially likely to engage in attempts to subvert the electoral process via voter coercion. Yet we identify a different mechanism by which asset immobility may influence democratic transitions. Firms in sectors with low asset mobility may subvert democracy not just because they fear redistribution under democracy, but also because they are vulnerable to pressure from the autocrat.

Our analysis also suggests that when economic production is concentrated in relatively few large enterprises, autocrats will find it easier to mobilize workers, win elections, and extend the lifespan of their regime. Finally, our findings suggest that autocracies may be more stable when labor is highly dependent on their employers for social provision.

Second, we add to the recent literature on clientelism, which emphasizes the role of parties in facilitating clientelist exchange, but largely overlooks the role of firms in mobilizing voters (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008). The findings suggest that electoral intimidation via the labor market may play a more important role in voter behavior than the positive inducements frequently identified in the clientelism literature. For example, we find that employees in firms who are especially dependent on their employers—for social benefits—are more likely to be targeted for mobilization than are other workers.

In addition, the evidence indicates that even where political parties are not deeply embedded in society, politicians can organize political clientelism by relying on employers to mobilize voters in specific economic sectors. Thus, industrialization need not reduce political clientelism. Indeed, political clientelism is likely to flourish in industrial sectors where fiscal dependence on the state is high, assets are immobile, and labor markets are slack.

Moreover, larger firms are especially likely to mobilize voters despite the higher costs of monitoring because they generate economies of scale in turning out the vote. This finding sits uneasily with the existing literature, which finds that that clientelism is more likely in small-scale settings where personal networks can monitor voter behavior. In contrast, our findings suggest that autocrats also take into account economies of scale in mobilizing voters, and so seek to mobilize in large firms where monitoring costs may be higher.[27]

Third, our work also adds to recent studies of electoral fraud in modern autocracies by exploring the use of economic coercion to subvert the electoral process. In contrast to studies of electoral subversion that explore the practice of ballot-box stuffing (Hyde 2006; Myagkov and

[27] At the same time, when controlling for firm size, we also find that voter mobilization is more likely in small settlements.

Ordeshook 2009; Beber and Scacco 2012), we highlight a different mechanism by which elections can be undermined: the use of economic pressure against employers and workers. In this respect we contribute to the emerging literature that explores how economic elites have undermined elections in a variety of historical and geographic settings (Baland and Robinson 2006; Medina and Stokes 2007; Ziblatt 2008, Mares and Zhu forthcoming).

Yet our work differs from these studies of voter intimidation by employers in several respects. Whereas existing literature primarily examines the coercive relationship between employers and voters, we theorize both the relationship between workers and employers and the latter's relationship with the state. This allows us to derive a number of original hypotheses about workplace mobilization and paint a richer portrait of voter coercion in the workplace. We also explore voter coercion by employers in a contemporary rather than a historical setting. And rather than relying on formal reports of vote fraud and intimidation or vote totals, we use survey data directly from employers and workers to identify instances of political mobilization in the workplace.

Fourth, our study emphasizes the importance of fiscal dependence for electoral subversion by employers. Firms that are especially dependent on the state engage in political mobilization far more frequently than their more economically independent counterparts. Similarly, state-owned firms and firms that sell to the state are especially likely to mobilize their workers, as are firms that receive organizational and financial support from the state prior to elections.

Taken together, these insights suggest some micro-foundations for why we have seen economic and political liberalization go hand in hand in the postcommunist cases (Jackson et al. 2005; Frye 2010). Economic liberalization that increases the autonomy of employers from the state and employees from employers raises the costs of subverting elections via voter intimidation and thereby facilitates political liberalization. More generally, these results suggest some micro-level reasons why countries whose economies are dominated by state-ownership, immobile capital, fiscal dependence on the state, and slack labor markets may be especially prone to autocratic rule.

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Appendix 1: Firm Survey

We employed VCIOM, a Moscow-based polling company to survey 922 firms drawn from 24 sectors in 15 regional capitals in Russia from November 15 to December 22nd 2011. Firms were stratified by size and sector and then sampled randomly from within these strata. Only top managers, the CEO, CFO or the Chief Legal Officer of each firm took part in the survey. Twenty percent of respondents were called after the survey to verify their responses. Of 1240 firm managers contacted, 318 refused to take part in the survey for a response rate of 74 percent. Interviews were conducted face to face in the employers' place of work.

The 15 regional capitals included at least one regional capital drawn from each of Russia's 7 federal districts. Regional capitals included: Voronezh, Ekaterinburg, Kemerovo, Kursk, Moscow,Nizhnii Novgorod, Novgorod, Omsk, Rostov, Smolensk, Tula, Ulyanovsk, Ufa, Irkutsk, and Khabarovsk.

Summary Statistics: Firm Survey

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Mobilized Workers to Vote	828	0.2428	0.4290	0	1
Firm Size (Log)	893	4.0583	1.8417	0	8.7796
Firm Age (Log)	890	2.1776	0.9982	0	5.273
State-Owned Enterprise	922	0.0358	0.1859	0	1
Investment Change in 2011	864	1.5394	0.6965	1	3
Energy	922	0.0130	0.1134	0	1
Oil and Gas	922	0.0119	0.1086	0	1
Heavy Industry	922	0.1453	0.3526	0	1
Forestry	922	0.0271	0.1625	0	1
Light Industry	922	0.1952	0.3966	0	1
Construction	922	0.1063	0.3084	0	1
Transportation	922	0.0531	0.2244	0	1
Communications	922	0.0434	0.2038	0	1
Financial	922	0.0694	0.2543	0	1
Real Estate	922	0.0727	0.2597	0	1
Trade	922	.2624729	.4402171	0	1
Firm Sells to the State	895	0.4458	0.4973	0	1
Firm Receives Government Support	904	0.1327	0.3395	0	1
Firm Offers Benefits to Workers	892	0.5135	0.5001	0	1
Firm Experiences Difficulties Finding Workers	891	2.862	1.4253	1	5
Firm Director: Age	900	44.3378	9.7686	20	73
Firm Director: Education	873	0.8912	0.3116	0	1
Firm Director: UR Supporter	702	0.3875	0.4875	0	1

Appendix 2. Survey of Employees

We added questions to the monthly nationally representative survey of residents of Russia conducted by the Levada Center, a Moscow-based polling company. Levada's Courier survey asks a wide range of questions of 1600 residents in 130 primary sampling units in 45 regions. Interviewers conducted face to face in the home of the respondent. Twenty percent of respondents received follow-up telephone calls, mailings, and visits used to ensure the authenticity of the responses. The margin of error is less than 3.4 percent. Nine regions representing less than 4 percent of the sample are not included in the survey, including regions that are difficult to access for a variety of reasons, including Chechnya, and regions in the far north. For details on the survey design in Russian see http://www.levada.ru/omnibusnyi-opros

Summary Statistics: Individual Survey

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Mobilized to Vote by Employer	800	0.2534	0.4352	0	1
Lives in Single Company Town	1600	0.1588	0.3656	0	1
State-Owned Enterprise	944	0.1250	0.3309	0	1
Firm Size	601	2.5890	0.8539	1	4
Voted in 2007 Parl. Election	1600	0.5269	0.4994	0	1
Heavy Industry	633	0.0932	0.2910	0	1
Light Industry	633	0.0521	0.2225	0	1
Mining	633	0.0142	0.1185	0	1
Oil and Gas	633	0.0269	0.1618	0	1
Utilities / Energy	633	0.0553	0.2287	0	1
Construction	633	0.1627	0.3694	0	1
Transportation	633	0.1311	0.3378	0	1
Communications	633	0.0395	0.1949	0	1
Agriculture	633	0.0348	0.1833	0	1
Other Sector	633	0.1422	0.3495	0	1
Trade	633	0.2480	0.4322	0	1
Male	1600	0.4494	0.4976	0	1
Age	1600	44.1050	16.4849	18	88
Level of Education	1600	5.2900	1.8959	1	8
Household Income (log)	1600	8.4014	3.1874	2.079	12.899
Town Size	1600	4.9650	2.1010	1	7
Government Employee	944	0.2383	0.4263	0	1
Opposition Supporter	1600	0.2150	0.4110	0	1
N	1600				

Appendix 3. Mobilization Across Sectors

The table below shows the percentage of firms in the listed sectors that held a political activity in the workplace. With a few exceptions that are discussed in the main text, firms in sectors characterized by immobile assets are much more likely to report holding a political activity.

Industry	**Percentage of Firms Engaging in Political Activity**	**Percent of Sample**
Heavy Industry	48	15
Oil and Gas	40	1
Forestry	38	3
Light Industry	26	20
Communications	22	4
Financial Services	21	7
Electricity	20	1
Construction	20	11
Real Estate	16	7
Transportation	16	5
Trade and Services	13	26

Appendix Table 3. Alternative Specifications

We present a range of robustness checks first for our firm survey models, as presented in Appendix Table 3. Columns 2-9 of Appendix Table 3 tables also presents results from systematically dropping each independent variable one at a time from Model 2 from Table 3 in the main text (the original results are reproduced in Column 1, Appendix Table 3 for comparison). Column 10 of Appendix Table 3 presents the original Model 2 specification without region fixed effects for the firm survey. The signs and statistical significance on our variables of interest remain robust to the random effects approach.

Appendix Table 3: Employer Campaigning - Firm Survey Models (Dropping Variables)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Firm Size (Log)	0.374***		0.291***	0.377***	0.341***	0.442***	0.406***	0.410***	0.389***	0.309***
	(0.107)		(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.0985)	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.100)	(0.0954)
Firm Age (Log)	-0.220**	0.0532		-0.202*	-0.192	-0.151*	-0.230**	-0.219**	-0.194*	-0.247***
	(0.105)	(0.124)		(0.109)	(0.117)	(0.0838)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.101)	(0.0766)
State-Owned Enterprise	0.786**	0.802**	0.668*		0.817**	0.511	0.657*	0.931**	0.844**	1.161**
	(0.356)	(0.373)	(0.353)		(0.384)	(0.398)	(0.356)	(0.402)	(0.337)	(0.480)
Investment Change in 2011	0.0901	0.230	0.0931	0.0929		0.0471	0.169	0.116	0.159	-0.137
	(0.239)	(0.232)	(0.247)	(0.240)		(0.237)	(0.227)	(0.232)	(0.242)	(0.247)
Energy	-0.672	-0.318	-0.608	-0.557	-0.631		-0.562	-0.798	-0.781	0.312
	(0.667)	(0.670)	(0.627)	(0.626)	(0.619)		(0.751)	(0.669)	(0.716)	(0.698)
Oil and Gas	-0.167	0.330	-0.0866	-0.122	-0.0338		-0.271	0.117	-0.113	0.793
	(0.575)	(0.634)	(0.607)	(0.536)	(0.491)		(0.644)	(0.551)	(0.550)	(0.608)
Heavy Industry	1.216**	1.434***	1.182**	1.185**	1.242***		1.128**	1.213**	1.293**	1.208**
	(0.521)	(0.482)	(0.481)	(0.514)	(0.465)		(0.536)	(0.504)	(0.537)	(0.478)
Forestry	1.094**	1.331***	1.168**	1.054**	0.907*		1.281**	0.972**	1.177**	1.073***
	(0.501)	(0.421)	(0.494)	(0.508)	(0.541)		(0.618)	(0.468)	(0.484)	(0.398)
Light Industry	0.420	0.379	0.477	0.405	0.434		0.580	0.409	0.468	0.615
	(0.397)	(0.396)	(0.347)	(0.401)	(0.353)		(0.380)	(0.392)	(0.385)	(0.406)
Construction	0.162	0.375	0.177	0.162	0.107		0.158	0.235	0.321	0.0796
	(0.436)	(0.451)	(0.411)	(0.437)	(0.393)		(0.444)	(0.444)	(0.394)	(0.465)
Transportation	-0.253	-0.181	-0.217	-0.168	-0.401		0.118	-0.207	-0.257	-0.391
	(0.499)	(0.504)	(0.486)	(0.481)	(0.475)		(0.344)	(0.455)	(0.520)	(0.530)
Communications	0.664	0.522	0.639	0.630	0.641		0.499	0.652	0.790	0.653
	(0.526)	(0.519)	(0.519)	(0.521)	(0.545)		(0.505)	(0.546)	(0.531)	(0.524)
Financial	0.373	0.316	0.506	0.322	0.225		0.283	0.386	0.505	0.356
	(0.479)	(0.464)	(0.505)	(0.486)	(0.436)		(0.590)	(0.473)	(0.507)	(0.457)
Real Estate	0.244	0.0503	0.222	0.208	0.365		0.0828	0.239	0.298	0.529
	(0.684)	(0.634)	(0.629)	(0.682)	(0.613)		(0.695)	(0.686)	(0.675)	(0.597)
Firm Sells to the State	1.121***	1.256***	1.069***	1.112***	1.177***	1.052***		1.092***	1.137***	1.106***
	(0.283)	(0.254)	(0.268)	(0.284)	(0.262)	(0.268)		(0.277)	(0.300)	(0.210)
Firm Receives Government Support	0.513**	0.628***	0.613**	0.602***	0.407**	0.595***	0.565**		0.453**	0.384**
	(0.216)	(0.232)	(0.257)	(0.232)	(0.206)	(0.204)	(0.253)		(0.195)	(0.191)
Firm Offers Benefits to Workers	0.426**	0.630***	0.496**	0.441**	0.408*	0.514**	0.464*	0.441**		0.471**
	(0.209)	(0.187)	(0.224)	(0.210)	(0.216)	(0.207)	(0.243)	(0.209)		(0.190)
Constant	-4.444***	-3.832***	-4.606***	-4.445***	-3.965***	-4.532***	-4.014***	-4.652***	-4.562***	-3.254***
	(0.644)	(0.504)	(0.621)	(0.647)	(0.448)	(0.593)	(0.590)	(0.642)	(0.640)	(0.632)
Observations	706	719	726	706	733	706	722	717	720	706

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Logit Models. Dependent variable is binary: 1 if Firm mobilized workers to vote; 0 - otherwise.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Region Fixed Effects (except for Column 10); Errors Clustered on Region.

Appendix Table 4. Alternative Specifications

Appendix Table 4 presents similar robustness checks for the individual survey models. Columns 2-10 of Appendix Table 4 drops independent variables one at a time from Model 1, Table 4 from the main text (original results reproduced in Column 1, Appendix Table 4 for comparison). Our main results remain robust to this check as well. Column 11 of Appendix Table 4 presents the model specification without okrug fixed effects for the individual survey. The signs and statistical significance on our variables of interest remain robust to the random effects approach.

Appendix Table 4: Employee Campaigning - Individual Survey: Dropping Variables

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Single Company Town	1.168**		1.220***	1.135**	1.115**	1.176**	1.169**	1.170**	1.161**	1.267***	1.168**
	(0.473)		(0.460)	(0.467)	(0.491)	(0.470)	(0.474)	(0.473)	(0.480)	(0.464)	(0.473)
Firm Size	0.281**	0.322**		0.286**	0.470***	0.280**	0.281**	0.279**	0.268**	0.267**	0.281**
	(0.115)	(0.125)		(0.114)	(0.141)	(0.114)	(0.118)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.115)
Voted in 2007 Parl. Election	0.490**	0.429**	0.404*		0.491**	0.496**	0.538**	0.492**	0.493**	0.552***	0.490**
	(0.215)	(0.218)	(0.228)		(0.220)	(0.209)	(0.213)	(0.215)	(0.213)	(0.185)	(0.215)
Heavy Industry	1.167**	1.233**	1.536***	1.191**		1.108**	1.227**	1.168**	1.190**	1.095**	1.167**
	(0.495)	(0.524)	(0.503)	(0.494)		(0.456)	(0.485)	(0.496)	(0.501)	(0.471)	(0.495)
Light Industry	-0.639	-0.566	-0.361	-0.559		-0.685	-0.590	-0.631	-0.632	-0.664	-0.639
	(0.715)	(0.698)	(0.745)	(0.716)		(0.714)	(0.719)	(0.719)	(0.722)	(0.707)	(0.715)
Oil and Gas	0.454	0.293	0.661	0.364		0.379	0.491	0.464	0.426	0.576	0.454
	(0.615)	(0.630)	(0.682)	(0.608)		(0.617)	(0.592)	(0.622)	(0.610)	(0.595)	(0.615)
Mining	1.345**	1.179	1.962***	1.570***		1.294**	1.309*	1.352**	1.355**	1.560**	1.345**
	(0.631)	(0.784)	(0.625)	(0.609)		(0.613)	(0.679)	(0.622)	(0.651)	(0.616)	(0.631)
Utilities / Electricity	-0.123	-0.0329	0.0637	-0.0743		-0.180	-0.0190	-0.116	-0.138	-0.0499	-0.123
	(0.562)	(0.511)	(0.557)	(0.552)		(0.533)	(0.507)	(0.557)	(0.557)	(0.546)	(0.562)
Construction	-0.108	-0.0468	0.0157	-0.0570		-0.185	-0.0597	-0.101	-0.119	-0.0969	-0.108
	(0.430)	(0.414)	(0.438)	(0.417)		(0.380)	(0.422)	(0.424)	(0.427)	(0.429)	(0.430)
Transportation	-0.0705	0.114	0.255	-0.0198		-0.132	-0.0133	-0.0622	-0.0643	-0.0755	-0.0705
	(0.342)	(0.360)	(0.386)	(0.349)		(0.323)	(0.316)	(0.336)	(0.346)	(0.341)	(0.342)
Communications	-1.593	-1.626	-1.469	-1.607		-1.662	-1.516	-1.583	-1.575	-1.662	-1.593
	(1.066)	(1.154)	(1.052)	(1.087)		(1.047)	(1.074)	(1.066)	(1.064)	(1.037)	(1.066)
Agriculture	0.182	0.120	0.148	0.209		0.113	0.272	0.167	0.201	0.297	0.182
	(0.755)	(0.774)	(0.730)	(0.787)		(0.707)	(0.711)	(0.766)	(0.764)	(0.758)	(0.755)
Other Sector	0.269	0.205	0.491	0.282		0.259	0.303	0.279	0.274	0.298	0.269
	(0.432)	(0.471)	(0.426)	(0.436)		(0.427)	(0.421)	(0.423)	(0.431)	(0.439)	(0.432)
Male	-0.166	-0.208	-0.0786	-0.183	-0.185		-0.194	-0.173	-0.166	-0.154	-0.166
	(0.218)	(0.204)	(0.215)	(0.216)	(0.186)		(0.220)	(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.211)	(0.218)
Age	0.00972	0.00976	0.00948	0.0139	0.00838	0.0105		0.00936	0.00900	0.0101	0.00972
	(0.0105)	(0.00999)	(0.0106)	(0.0105)	(0.00940)	(0.0103)		(0.01000)	(0.0103)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)
Education	0.0240	0.0292	-0.00675	0.0280	0.0110	0.0280	0.0171		0.0276	-0.00571	0.0240
	(0.0601)	(0.0590)	(0.0598)	(0.0600)	(0.0592)	(0.0585)	(0.0574)		(0.0591)	(0.0579)	(0.0601)
Income	-0.0328	-0.0267	-0.0246	-0.0342	-0.0398	-0.0328	-0.0293	-0.0337		-0.0354	-0.0328
	(0.0330)	(0.0383)	(0.0363)	(0.0324)	(0.0322)	(0.0327)	(0.0323)	(0.0328)		(0.0318)	(0.0330)
Town Size	0.119	0.160**	0.107*	0.135*	0.115*	0.117	0.120	0.114	0.120		0.119
	(0.0753)	(0.0696)	(0.0638)	(0.0692)	(0.0658)	(0.0743)	(0.0749)	(0.0739)	(0.0750)		(0.0753)
Constant	-2.097	-2.052*	-2.999**	-2.096*	-1.141	-2.207*	-1.758	-1.925	-2.453*	-1.454	-2.097
	(1.304)	(1.113)	(1.210)	(1.264)	(1.067)	(1.295)	(1.236)	(1.360)	(1.325)	(1.212)	(1.304)
Observations	559	559	585	559	560	559	559	559	559	559	559

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Logit Models. Dependent variable is binary: 1 if Respondent was mobilized to vote; 0 - otherwise.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Okrug Fixed Effects (except for Column 11); Errors Clustered on Primary Sampling Unit.

Appendix Table 5: Effect of Employer Mobilization on Turnout

Appendix Table 5 presents the results of two logit models using the dependent variable "Turned Out to Vote in the 2011 Parliamentary Elections." Here we are interested in whether mobilization by employers has any impact on the likelihood of an individual going to the polls. Because of the strong collinearity between many of our original set of covariates, we present reduced form models on turnout propensity. Model 1 utilizes the full sample to compare how likely an individual that mobilized by his/her employer is to vote compared to all others, comparing for employment status. We find a point estimate that is positive and significant at conventional levels in favor of our hypothesis that mobilization is effective. Similarly, when we subset the sample to only those who are employed in Model 2, we find a positive coefficient on the variable Mobilized to Vote by Employer. This point estimate is significant at the 10% level, we believe largely due to reduced sample size.

Appendix Table 5: Effect of Employee Mobilization on Voter Turnout

	(1) Turned Out to Vote	(2) Turned Out to Vote
Mobilized to Vote by Employer	0.305**	0.294*
	(0.156)	(0.174)
Employed	0.151	
	(0.183)	
Male	-0.427***	-0.353***
	(0.121)	(0.103)
Age	0.0343***	0.0267***
	(0.00454)	(0.00673)
Education	0.116**	0.109***
	(0.0453)	(0.0387)
Income	-0.0443**	-0.0345
	(0.0177)	(0.0235)
Lives in Ethnic Republic	1.388***	-0.317
	(0.0550)	(0.448)
Constant	-0.774**	-0.228
	(0.350)	(0.567)
Observations	1,440	879

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Logit Models. Dependent Variable: 1 if Respondent Voted in 2011 Parl. Elections; 0 - otherwise
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered on Primary Sampling Unit.
Model (1): Full Sample, Controlling for Employment Status. Region Fixed Effects used
Model (2): Sample is only those currently employed. Okrug Fixed Effects used.

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