

ternatives. However, current Chinese debates seem to have been caught in the binary logic of party state ownership versus private ownership, while the distinctions among public ownership, state ownership, and party ownership remain extremely murky and sensitive.

8. The reform program was inaugurated in the aftermath of a popularly endorsed military coup that saw the suppression of the “ultraleftists” of the “Cultural Revolution” era within the party soon after the death of Mao in 1976.

9. “The preliberation era” refers to the period before 1949, the year the Communist Party came to power in China.

10. I attended the premiere of the play on the evening of October 27, 2006, in Beijing.

## Media, State, and Responses to Globalization in Post-Communist Russia

*Olessia Koltsova*

News media are usually seen as agents of globalization in academic discourse on global change. While globalization would hardly be possible without the media, Russia exemplifies not only the ways in which historical context and the particular process of state (trans)formation shape the media's contradictory roles in society, but also the extent to which society's response to globalization overdetermines the courses of state and media (trans)formation. This chapter examines the complicated intersections between the Russian media system and major challenges of postsocialist development: state transformation, globalization, and rapid changes of popular opinion. For this purpose, I draw upon primary research on the Russian news media between 1997 and 2001, secondary literature on Russian media developments since 2001, and public opinion polls conducted by VCIOM—the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Research, the leading polling organization in Russia.<sup>1</sup> My primary research, which provided the bulk of the main data for this chapter, included over seventy interviews with media officials, journalists, media sources, and other external agents of influence on the media as well as large-scale secondary data analysis (for more details see Koltsova 2001, 2006a, 2006b).

My goal here is not to give final answers, but to contribute to the debate on state and media roles in relation to globalization, and present some evidence that may challenge traditional visions of this relation. I will adopt broad and relatively simple definitions of the media, democracy, and globalization. Although here I draw most of my examples from television, the media in general are understood as institutions that carry out centralized production of symbolic goods and disseminate them to anonymous dispersed audiences.

Democracy as an auxiliary concept is defined as the ability of all people to take part in making the most important decisions concerning the development of their society. Globalization is seen as the increasing role of those social phenomena (institutions, networks, groups, processes) that transgress national boundaries and make previously relatively isolated entities (societies, states, nations) more interconnected and interdependent.

The central and the most problematic concept of this chapter is the state and its multifaceted roles and constitutive dimensions. Too often scholars who have written on media and globalization within the liberal framework tend to view globalization as opening new opportunities for processes of democratic transformation, while positing the state as the last fortress of resistance to these democratic processes, and national identity as an ideological mechanism used by national political elites to retain power (Price 2000, 51, 72–73, 91). Cultural imperialism theorists, beginning with Herbert Schiller (1976), have a differentiated approach to states: while Western states are seen as agents of imperialism, all the rest are analyzed in terms of their potentials and limits to protect their citizens from cultural intrusion. However, as Curran and Park (2000, 3–11) have convincingly shown, the relationship between the state and the global forces is more complicated. The Russian state has traditionally been the major agent of modernization and global integration, and it surely cannot be seen as the only agent of post-Soviet neo-isolationism and nostalgia for a romanticized past. The latter trends reflect the popular reaction to the intensity of globalization of the 1990s. In this context, the mass media have supported an isolationist perspective as much as they have promoted globalization.

I believe that the ambivalent role of the Russian state in globalization can be explained if two propositions are accepted. First, the state must be seen as a constitutive element of globalization: global integration can only exist as long as there remain boundaries between states, nations, and societies, making possible the distinction between the global and the local, the foreign and the domestic, the external and the internal. Second, we must recognize that the state is not one concept, but a “family” of related concepts describing a range of social phenomena, each of which may have a different contribution to globalization. Roughly, approaches to the state may be divided into two broad groups. A first one, which I will here conventionally term institutional, stems from the Weberian definition of a state as “a group that has managed to gain the monopoly for legitimate violence over a given territory” (Weber 1968, 53). This particular term has, of course, become insufficient: modern states have a range of functions much wider than just the exercise of violence; in a globalizing environment they also have to compete for legitimacy with various local and global groups. But what is central for this cluster of approaches is that it places the state within a society among its other institutions and foregrounds its coercive element in its integrative activity.

A second group of approaches, on the other hand, sees the state as a framework within which society operates and underscores the symbolic component of its integrative function. These approaches are centered around the notion of the nation-state. Though sometimes this understanding of the state is in fact close to the “lay” word *country*, most of the time these theories presuppose the coincidence of the territorial, political, ethnic, and cultural boundaries of the entity they seek to describe. However, this is a predominantly Western European phenomenon and this particular notion of the nation-state has proven too narrow to account for modern state formations. In much of the “non-first” world (Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia—and Russia), there is no necessary correlation between the nation and the state. In fact, the Russian language—either spoken or academic—does not have the term of nation-state. The word *nation* (*nazia*) mostly means a group of people of the same “nationality/ethnicity,” which is united by common language, traditions, and “blood.” Thus, *nazia* includes the Russian diaspora outside contemporary Russia but excludes, for example, Turkic peoples living within the Russian Federation. Of special importance here is also the word “Russian,” which in fact has two translations in its native tongue: *russky* and *rossiysky*. The first refers to ethnicity, and it would be used together with the word *nazia* to mean “Russian nation” as defined above. *Rossiysky* is an attribute of Russia as a country or a state (*rossiysky* citizen, economy, president, etc.). Since the closest Russian equivalent to “nation” as community united by common citizenship and territory is *narod* (the people), “Russian nation” in its nonethnic meaning is spoken as *rossiysky narod*, which has no linguistic connection with anything national. It is also not surprising, then, that the word *nazionalizm* in Russian is very close to ethnocentrism and, implying belief in the superiority of one’s *nazia* over others, is usually associated with Nazism and racism. It is in this context that Russian (*rossiysky*) intellectuals raise concerns about the rise of nationalism in Putin’s Russia.

Besides the listed above “individual” limitations, both approaches also share some common shortcomings. The point most relevant for my work is that, based on the experience of stable Western societies, these approaches have seen states as static, coherent, and operating within formal institutional frameworks. This is absolutely inapplicable for periods of state transformation, of which recent Russian history is a vivid example. But, once we recognize the difference between the two groups of approaches and their different roles in globalization, both turn out to be equally important in accounting for the complicated processes of media, state, and social transformation in Russia.

In this piece I will first show how the disintegration and later reconsolidation of the Russian nation-state and “institution-state” influenced the “size of the window” through which global winds could blow into the country, and what cultural and social tensions it produced. Then I shall demonstrate how popular reaction (reaction of the “nation”) to these tensions had an impact on

institution-state formation and the changes in the media system. In particular, I will show how the euphoria surrounding open markets and global integration in the 1990s gave way to what former presidential advisor Andrey Illarionov called the "Iranization" of Russian society (Sokolov 2005).

### WESTERNERS VERSUS SLAVOPHILES: GLOBALIZATION IN RUSSIA

Even after the collapse of the USSR, Russia remains a vast country with eleven time zones, ten climatic zones, and disparate socioeconomic realities. Industrial and postindustrial enclaves centered around megalopolises contrast with economically depressed rural areas that suffer from high unemployment and the remnants of gigantic Soviet farms and heavy industrial enterprises. Urban Christian (or rather post-Christian) postmodern lifestyles of Russian-populated cities, rural Muslim societies in northern Caucasus, and indigenous communities in the tundra—all coexist within one state. This diversity is one of the reasons why the modern state has historically reinforced the symbolic work of sustaining a unified national identity, that is, creation of an "imagined community" (Anderson 1991) out of disparate cultural experiences. However, centralized Soviet propaganda failed in promoting the socialist "melting pot." National identity always had to compete with local and later with global, or more accurately transnational identities.

This competition, along with the broader globalization of Russia, did not begin with Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power in 1985. In fact, awareness about the growing impossibility of ignoring international changes and foreign pressures came to Russia quite early and is usually connected with the name of the famous reformist czar Peter the Great, who ruled in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Peter's radical reformism divided the political elite, and later the whole class of intellectuals, into "Westerners" and "Slavophiles." The latter's heated discussions about "the Russian way" have not ceased in today's world but appeal to increasingly larger parts of the nation's citizens. Despite this simple binary opposition, what unites the two groups is the obligatory reference to Western influence, which should be either absorbed and assimilated, or resisted, but cannot be ignored.

Soviet leaders did not avoid this agenda either. In fact, the first generation of revolutionaries, led by Vladimir Lenin, ascribed Russia a central role in the global history: the victory of the formerly exploited working class over its oppressors was to catalyze similar revolutions worldwide. When these hopes failed, both Soviet policy and rhetoric became focused on the idea of constructing a socialist alternative modernity to outrun the West. The obligations of the state-owned media, then, were twofold: First, the media were just one of the spheres of national development in which the USSR was to outrun the West; they thus had to become an exemplary institution of enlightenment,

"cultured leisure," and press freedom in a particular understood way. Second, at the same time in this outrunning game the media were to visualize Soviet victories and Western failures along with the struggle of the oppressed foreign workers against capitalists. Thus, although Soviet media of course filtered, carefully measured out, and reinterpreted global influences, they tirelessly kept them on the agenda. In the Soviet symbolic universe the individual was placed not only into his or her immediate environment but also into the global space organized in a certain way by various state propaganda agencies (Grushin and Onikov 1980; Hopkins 1970).

Ironically, even the so-called epoch of *glasnost* ("openness," "publicness," 1985–1991) started as a policy planned "from above." Moreover, the Soviet elite did not seem to foresee the globalizing consequences of this policy: the party-government's intention then was to promote internal *glasnost*, as opposed to opening up to global information flow. But the doctrine of *glasnost*, once introduced, immediately made the situation uncontrollable: the society was already "cultured" and "enlightened" enough to demonstrate the unplanned level of criticism and to engage in unforeseen activities. The causes of *glasnost* are still much debated in scholarly accounts. Some writers (Rantanen 2002, 50–55; Hopkins 1983; Alexeyeva 1983) underscore the role of various alternative (and often Western-provoked) media during the Soviet time, but the impact of these media is questionable. Others point to the fact that the social change in the USSR owed more to general global competition than to "free global flow of information" and dissident media (e.g., Shlapentokh 2000). Most agree, however, on the significance of international factors in the late Soviet change and the eventual collapse of the USSR. More generally, the development of local-to-global relations in Russia may be seen as a pendulum-like or, perhaps, spiral movement in which periods of more or less intensive absorption of international influences were followed by times of relative isolation or even political, military, and cultural expansion. The Russian history of the last two decades is a good illustration of this. In this period both the Russian state and Russian national identity have passed through two clear phases: disintegration/opening to the global (late 1980s–late 1990s), and reintegration/closure (since the late 1990s). Mass media institutions, and the television industry in particular, have had to respond to these dramatic changes.

### "PARADE OF SOVEREIGNTIES": MEDIA AND THE SPATIAL DISINTEGRATION OF THE RUSSIAN STATE

The disintegration of the Soviet state was more than the mere geographical decomposition of the USSR. First, the latent spatial disintegration of the post-Soviet Russian nation-state continued after the collapse of the USSR, dividing the country into "89 different political regimes" corresponding to the

number of Russian provinces (Yakovenko 2000). Second, and perhaps, more importantly, Russian society kept going through a painful structural disintegration that affected all of its major institutions, with the state undergoing the most dramatic decomposition. The media entered this situation mostly as junior partners of more powerful institutional actors.

Eighty-nine (since 2005, eighty-seven) post-Soviet "subjects of federation" are the messy heritage of Soviet and Imperial Russia: their establishment was arbitrary and combined ethnic and territorial principles of province formation, while the contemporary legislation and practice of federative relations are contradictory in terms of provinces' rights and obligations. In the early 1990s many regions, from Chechnya<sup>2</sup> to "inland" Russian-speaking provinces, declared their sovereignties (this phenomenon is known as the "parade of sovereignties"), so the federal elite had grounds to fear that Russia would soon follow the pattern of the Soviet Union. However, the events in Chechnya became a "bloody vaccine"<sup>3</sup> against radical separatism, and most regions preferred to make deals with the federal center, exchanging personal loyalty of their leaders with the president for various benefits. The terms of these deals depended on regional resources, including the potential mobilization of ethnic, national, or other local identities. In turn, the central role of the local media in such mobilization stimulated regional leaders to gain control of these media while simultaneously cutting local inhabitants off from discrepant messages from the "central" (federal) media. Many regional leaders used to block out the signals of federal TV channels during unfavorable broadcasts. Discriminative price policies in delivery service for federal newspapers were also a common practice. Provinces where non-Russian-speaking populations prevailed experienced an outburst of media in local languages, lavishly supported by regional elites and promoting regional identities (Petrulevich 2004, 5). Some republics—first of all, Chechnya—tried to carry out autonomous foreign policies, to integrate into the external world aside from the federal center and to develop transboundary identities—for example, of Chechnya as a natural part of the Islamic world, bypassing Russia.

Thus the spatial-political disintegration of Russia, often called the "feudalization" of the Russian state, promoted the disintegration of Russia's common informational/media space, making some regions quite isolated. Furthermore, since the styles of political leadership varied greatly from one region to another, a great variety of local media landscapes emerged. As Yakovenko et al. (2000, 107) have put it, "Traveling through contemporary Russia, one also travels in historical time: from year 2000 one can get into 1930s and 1950s. Within one state medieval *khanates* neighbor Chicago of gangsters' times." While the metaphor of "khanate" in the 1990s applied mostly to the northern Caucasian traditional provinces, Russian-speaking regions dominated by one agent of power increasingly resembled the classical Soviet media system with its institutionalized paternalism and diversified

propagandist approach to various target audiences. In both cases the "state," in its local embodiment, experienced much less disintegration than the Russian state on the federal level. In other regions, however, as at the federal level, the state went through a dramatic decomposition into a number of competing actors, supplemented with the formation of entirely new centers of power (the majority of which were cross-institutional groups that are discussed further below). In these regions media content became much more diverse and resembled, in the words of one of my interviewees, "free competition of unfree media" (Interview with "Nikolai," editor in chief of a national newspaper, Moscow, January 2001).

### GIANTS' FIGHTS: MEDIA AND INSTITUTIONAL DISINTEGRATION OF THE RUSSIAN STATE

While the spatial disintegration of the state is a relatively easily grasped process, its institutional disintegration is a less obvious and a less visible phenomenon. When the Soviet state developed to its maturity, it became institutionalized so profoundly that it started to resemble a gigantic corporation: a well-consolidated institution of party-state was the only owner, employer, distributor, and decision maker, while the people were subordinate employees, and the media—one of the corporation's departments (for such a vision see, e.g., Zassoursky 1999, 20–21). It is not difficult to imagine, then, what a dramatic change this all-embracing corporation had to go through with the introduction of private property and a multiparty system, the abolishment of centralized distribution and price formation, and the dismantling of official censorship. First shrinking from an omnipresent entity to an institution whose size was to be comparable to Western states, the corporation then split into a number of relatively autonomous agents and groups. In the case of the media, some of them were entirely new players, such as advertisers (advertising hardly existed in the USSR and had no impact on media survival); others, such as private owners, for the first time emerged as actors separate from the state. Still others, such as journalistic sources, were for the first time left face to face with their media counterparts without any state mediators. Finally, both rank-and-file journalists and media executives became autonomous enough to exercise their own power (Koltsova 2006).

All of these diverse actors suddenly found themselves in an unpredictable environment without any clear rules of interaction and without relevant skills. Thus this period, between 1990 and approximately 1996, became a time when these new actors themselves got a chance to create and introduce their own rules, and many did not hesitate to do so. It is not surprising then that the level of conflict in all spheres of social life, including the media industry, became quite high. Since resources were far from being evenly distributed among

various actors, and since each actor tended to possess only one or a few types of resources, strategic alliances between actors were quickly formed.

When a leading actor(s) managed to unite agents with different resources and effectively coordinate their interaction, such groups grew into large and internally complex entities. Typically, they included individuals from different social institutions. Since different institutions tend to produce different kinds of resources, if one seeks to combine resources, then it makes sense to look for partners in a multitude of institutions: that is why I have termed such teams "cross-institutional groups" (CIGs). They consolidated by cutting across traditional institutions, and cleavages between CIGs sometimes were deeper than boundaries between formal institutions (Koltsova 2006). The struggle and cooperation between CIGs against the background of weakened formal institutions (especially those of the state) constituted the life of the Russian politico-economic elite in the 1990s, while relations with the rest of society and with the outside world receded into the periphery of institutional attention.

A typical CIG was usually centered around a personality of any institutional affiliation, but it necessarily included state representatives with their access to public resources, economic actors with enterprises or other economic capital, enforcement bodies—whether "legal" (corrupted police members or registered private "security" businesses) or "criminal" (unregistered "gangs")—and propaganda tools embodied in journalists, producers, or media organizations. For example, in a well-known case from the city of Krasnoyarsk the leading local CIG, headed by a former racketeer and centered around the Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant (*KrAZ*), also included its "security" service, several dozen legal business units, and a leading regional TV channel and other media, working together to support a weak candidate for governor by censoring competing candidates from airtime on local television.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, what often looked like repression of independent media/journalists by the state or by "bandits" at a closer look turned out to be an attack of one CIG on the media resources of another. However, it would be misleading to conclude that CIGs were using bandits just to get rid of rivals and their media—rather, CIGs, acting in the situation of state failure, included their own quasi-police enforcement bodies and thus became protostate entities competing with what was left of the "official" state for all its power. Additionally, although for most CIGs media resources were an auxiliary concern, some CIGs were centered around their media industries. The most prominent example was Media-MOST holdings—a giant media empire that grew from the first and the most successful private national television company, NTV. Despite its media-centric character, Media-MOST seemed to have no other choice than to include all other CIG components: it was strongly supported by the mayor of Moscow and police bodies controlled by him (later also by its own powerful security department); it cooperated with Yeltsin's team and

had a strong business component from the banking sector which had been central at its initial stage.

At that stage it looked as if Media-MOST leader Vladimir Gussinsky, unlike most of his "oligarchic colleagues," viewed his media resources not as tools to support other activities but as a primary source of income. Therefore, he needed a vast loyal clientele (audience), and in the first half of the 1990s perhaps the most demanded media product was "objective" news—or rather a discourse of news objectivity, freedom of the press, and criticism of authorities. In this respect NTV's timing was propitious, as its launch in 1994 coincided with the start of the first unsuccessful military campaign of the federal center against the separatists in Chechnya. However, later events, such as Media-MOST's initial close collaboration and subsequent electoral rivalry with Yeltsin's team and other cross-institutional groups meant that it would still be a CIG struggling for power rather than for normative goals. Nevertheless, Media-MOST was a somewhat unusual CIG that unintentionally contributed to more pluralistic and, as we shall see further on, more global media content in Russia.

### MEDIA WARS: INTRA-ELITE COMMUNICATION VERSUS MASS COMMUNICATION

Why would CIGs buy or establish new media outlets and why would established media "surrender their freedom" to them? While there are multiple explanations, the predominant ones are economic. The period of "euphoria,"<sup>5</sup> when production costs were low and old levers of state power were no longer in place, was very brief and covered approximately the years 1989–1991. But from 1992 until the end of the decade the economic situation changed so much that the media's expenses grew dramatically, while "legitimate" sources of media revenues—advertising, sales/subscriptions, and foreign investments—were virtually unavailable.

In place of "legitimate" clients (audiences and advertisers) media time and space were purchased retail and wholesale for hidden interests or open propaganda by various "wrong" sources, ranging from individual businessmen and "bandit groups" to full-size CIGs. Strictly speaking, these players can also be seen as advertisers, but advertisers of a specific kind, whose objective was not to increase sales of their goods and services but instead to gain access to symbolic capital that could later be converted into political capital. The first type of capital was needed to influence arbitrary decision making on the large-scale privatization of huge state properties launched in the early and mid-1990s. The second, targeting volatile post-Soviet voting, brought loyal congresspeople, mayors, and governors to power, again strengthening CIGs' ability to influence decision making.

As a result, a typology of sociopolitical media that had emerged by the mid-1990s could not be conceptualized as private versus state/public, or as independent versus state, or as commercial versus public interest, or in any other commonsense Western terminology. The criterion that really mattered and that could help observers separate media into meaningful groups was their proximity to these less-than-“legitimate” clients, which was related to permanency of cooperation, number of clients, and the ability to voluntarily change their composition. The most successful were the media that were established, legally owned, or informally supported by CIGs and other external agents on a permanent basis. I have termed this formation “domesticated media,” since having once sold out to a client who they could not maintain editorial autonomy. It is important that the success of such media did not presuppose profitability, as their masters valued them not for their profitability but for propaganda effectiveness. Another group of less sustainable but slightly more autonomous media were those that would change their main “strategic partner” (backer/wholesale hidden advertiser) from time to time—either because their former partner had refused to cooperate, or because media executives tried to preserve some degree of autonomy. Since this autonomy was limited by the constraints of having to choose between CIGs with hidden agendas, I would call these media organizations “nomadic.” Finally, there were what I call the “disposable” media outlets, that is, media organizations that published or broadcast any propaganda material that “flowed” to them by anyone who offered money—that is, they traded their time and space retail.

According to the estimates of the Russian Union of Journalists, in 2000 only about 30 percent of the aggregate income of the Russian media came from legitimate sources (advertising, sales/subscriptions, and legal state funding). The other 70 percent came from those hidden agents of power who used media to wage political battles. In this context, the role of the audience turned out to be that of a silent witness of the media wars between the consortia of private-public backers. In other words, the “mass” media became the means of intra-elite communication. As one of my interviewees put it, the media wars were a precaution “to avoid a real war, with bloodshed, shooting rivals in the streets” (Interview with “Galina,” head of department of work with clients at a PR agency, November 2000, Moscow). It is thus not surprising that, neglecting mass audiences, media organizations paid only secondary attention to content aimed at them. For example, according to Kachkaeva (2001), the CIG backing of the leading national TV channel ORT did not invest a penny into its development during the whole period from its privatization in 1995 to its renationalization in 2001.<sup>6</sup> Because of the Russian audience’s poverty and the resulting low interest of advertisers in the media, domestic TV production was modest and mostly consisted of in-studio talk and quiz shows, while cheap foreign products were imported in abundance to

fill air time. This explains why, for instance, the 1979 Mexican telenovela *The Rich Also Cry* was extremely popular in Russia in the early 1990s.

Thus, the disintegration of the state that resulted in the media’s CIG-orientation and the audience’s impoverishment led to both the unregulated inflow of “secondhand” international media products into Russia and the absence of international media investors. The forgotten silent audience, fed on a mixed menu of media wars and cheap foreign entertainment, had little influence on this situation in this period. But very little time would pass until the public’s irritation and fatigue, coupled with high oil prices, would lead to very important changes in media policy and the broader processes of state and nation rebuilding.

#### “VERTICAL OF POWER”: MEDIA AND RECONSOLIDATION OF THE RUSSIAN STATE (1999–2006)

Changes since the beginning of the new millennium show that in the era of globalization, states may reconsolidate as rapidly as they disintegrate. By reconsolidation I mean the return of the ability of the state to create coherent policies, formulating laws and implementing decisions over the claimed territory. Conventionally the start of this new period may be ascribed to the accession to power of the new prime minister and later president, the former secret police (KGB) officer Vladimir Putin, in mid-1999. The president himself termed the process “construction of the federal vertical of power.”<sup>7</sup> Putin started a large-scale reconfiguration of power, using support within enforcement bodies and the contradictory character of Russian legislation. First, he forced out the two CIG leaders who owned Russia’s largest media networks, including Media-MOST, and in effect nationalized all three national TV channels. This led to a weakening of the CIGs in general and to the strengthening of all kinds of more traditional formal institutions, including first of all state enforcement bodies and more generally the state itself.

Second, Putin put an end to regional “feudalism” by removing governors from the upper chamber of the Russian parliament and by abolishing gubernatorial elections. A central part of his regional policy also included the military suppression of separatism in Chechnya. Putin’s team did not reach social or economic stability in this province, but it managed to eliminate separatists’ slogans from official Chechen media and forced separatists underground by bringing to power a Chechen clan loyal to the federal center. Although these moves led to the launch of several illegal newspapers and TV stations, the situation was a radical departure from the earlier period when the separatist regime had the whole Chechen media system at its disposal. Thus Putin effectively removed all official rivals challenging the state’s monopoly of power. These radical changes, which have had profound implications for

the role of the media in Russian society, met very little resistance anywhere, with the exception of Chechnya.

In this second (post-1999) time period, I characterize the changes in the Russian media industry as marked by centralization, standardization of structure, and selective isolation from global influences. I use the expression "selective isolation" to avoid the impression that Russia firmly cut itself off from the rest of the world; rather there was more control over the inflow of global media content. Thus the term presupposes not decrease in content importation but its more deliberate filtering out and adaptation. It also means the ability to decide which world players can participate in the domestic media game. Earlier I mentioned that scant presence of foreign players in the Russian media market had been its constant trait throughout the entire post-Soviet period. While in the 1990s it happened spontaneously without the insiders' deliberate effort, later, in mid-2001, the Russian parliament adopted an amendment to the Law on Mass Media prohibiting legal entities with more than 50 percent of foreign capital as owners of media organizations in Russia.<sup>8</sup> This decision might appear redundant, but the event took place at the peak of the battle between Putin's team and the Media-MOST CIG. While the new political elite was struggling to replace the owner of Media-MOST, which owns the popular NTV, Gussinsky, the head of Media-MOST, began hastily looking for a foreign company that could buy his share of NTV and thus secure some independence from the authorities. As soon as U.S. media mogul Ted Turner expressed interest in the deal, the restrictive amendment was introduced and quickly passed. It is revealing that in practice this has never hindered the activity of some other media organizations such as Russian MTV, but in the end neither Turner nor any other foreign company bought NTV. In this way, just as economic interest in the Russian media industry by foreign investors started to grow, a political barrier was implemented to anyone targeting the nonentertainment media, especially the public affairs and news sector. At the same time, high costs for satellite TV and Internet access meant that the majority of Russian audiences continued to have access only to domestically produced news and sociopolitical commentary.

The *standardization of the structure* of the media industry means that the typology of domesticated, nomadic, and disposable media gave way to less exotic and more recognizable structures such as are found in many other countries. Private domesticated media conglomerates were partly expropriated from their backers by the state, and partly shifted to the new sector of entertainment media. Media nomads either ceased to exist or (mostly) settled with state bodies of different levels and thus, together with previously domesticated media, formed the core of the new media system. The always modestly successful retail propaganda traders (disposable media) were pushed to the margins of the system and turned into its "underclass." The peripheral position was also now occupied by a few small oppositional media

and by relatively independent high-quality analytical periodicals for intellectuals. This latter group was successful but reached a very small proportion of the overall population. Between the political core and the margins, we can trace the emergence of an enormous media sector that closely resembled U.S.-based commercial entertainment media—catering to specific audiences and sold to advertisers—posing almost no challenge to the Putin regime. This outcome was possible because of the improvement of the general economic situation<sup>9</sup> and was speeded up by the regime's deliberate effort to push the media out of the sociopolitical niche earlier occupied by the CIG model.

The *centralization* of the media system was a part of a broader consolidation process described above. In addition to gaining control over all three national TV channels, the state reunited the regional subsidiaries of one of them (Channel 2), widely used in the 1990s by regional leaders for their interests, into one state holding company; a system of terrestrial transmitters able to carry their signal was included in the holding as well. Furthermore, regional media conglomerates controlled by the governors also became centralized as local "feudals" were replaced by figures loyal to Moscow. The general decline of the CIGs and the predictability of elections at all levels also cut the budgets of informational wars, depriving the nonnationalized media of a significant part of their income. The federal political elite increasingly controlled sociopolitical media, especially at the national level. At this point, as the mass media were less and less a forum of intra-elite communication, their vector became directed from elite to mass. Mainstream media now carry less material advertising the interests of particular groups or discrediting these groups' political opponents and were therefore now able to provide public support to the president. Unlike its Soviet predecessors, Putin's team understood that, to mobilize public support, it needed to appeal to a wider mass media audience by going beyond the mere provision of pro-regime news and commentary to include more human interest stories, soft news, and infotainment. Thus the Soviet policy of propaganda plus enlightenment was replaced by post-Soviet propaganda and entertainment.

In public discussions in Russia, this period of Russian media development is often perceived as an authoritarian backlash, as compared with the relatively democratic situation that existed during Yeltsin's time. I would be cautious about this conclusion. It is questionable that the new media system with its rapidly developing commercial sector and relatively diverse oppositional margins is farther from democratic ideals than the media of competing CIGs alien to ordinary citizens. In fact, the new media structure is closer to that of so-called developed democracies.

Furthermore, it is important to note again that Putin came to power not by a military coup but through elections at which people voted for him. He then met only very limited public resistance when he unconstitutionally reduced the governors' authorities, or jailed leading CIG leaders, or when a protest by

ten thousand people against the capture of NTV was ignored by the government. In contrast to his predecessor Yeltsin, Putin did not lose public approval ratings because of the start of a Chechen war; quite the opposite, the war made Putin's rating.<sup>10</sup> It is true that Putin had not initially been the public's favorite—actually, not a public figure at all—and could not have emerged as a candidate without the help of the leading CIG, closest to Yeltsin (the so-called “Family”). And it is true that the 1999 parliamentary elections were not fair, as they were shaped by the last of the fiercest media wars. But why did the Family choose Putin? Before appointing him prime minister and declaring him his official successor, Yeltsin had changed three prime ministers because all of them were rejected. The answer is that the Family had found Putin to be the most likely to gain enough support—which was confirmed by the rapid growth of his rating in 1999. The next question is, of course, why would people who strongly opposed the anti-reformist coup in 1991 and supported “liberal-democrat” Yeltsin ten years later become ready to vote for the representative of the most notorious ministry, known for enforcing Stalin's repressions back in the 1930s? Let me return to the early 1990s to trace some processes that then were not central, but later played an essential role in these puzzling political shifts.

### MEDIA GLOBALIZATION AND WOUNDED NATIONAL IDENTITY

Back in the euphoric period of late 1980s and early 1990s the hopes of the active part of the population for improvement were connected with reforms and associated with Westernization. According to VCIOM polls, even though the vast majority of Russians met the collapse of the USSR with regret, they were adamantly critical about the Soviet regime and society and largely welcomed demilitarization, withdrawal of the Soviet army from Eastern Europe, glasnost, disintegration of the Party, and retreating from “communist ideals” (Gudkov 2004, 147, 538–39). Based on their previous experience people knew that the media had lied to them about Soviet victories and Western failures, and they merely assumed that the situation was quite the opposite. Many people in Russian society believed that all one had to do to achieve a better life was just to copy Western models, particularly economic models. The enthusiasm with which Soviet reformist leaders were accepted in the West created a feeling that the change was not only welcomed but would be vigorously assisted—this was not only a popular belief, but partly a belief of the political elite as well. Everything labeled Western suddenly became prestigious and aroused interest; imported goods were consumed as hungrily as people could only afford to buy them (see also Rantanen 2002, 113–15). “West” was a sign of higher quality; such expressions as “Eurostandard” or “truly American” were enough to advertise a good or a service. Russian

words or earlier borrowings from different languages were replaced by newly borrowed English equivalents, or even pseudo-equivalents; in the sphere of the media, for instance, *boyevik* turned to “blockbuster” (*blokbaster*), *film uchastov* to “thriller” (*triller*), media “genre” (*zhanr*) to “format,” *plakat* to “poster,” *listovka* to “flyer,” and so on.

Therefore, imported content and formats were assumed to increase media popularity, although, of course, the spread of imported products owed much to the economic crisis that affected domestic media production along with other branches of the economy. Moreover, Western media products, unlike other consumer goods, not only meant a higher degree of quality but also implied greater truth and more information about the previously unknown. Solemn news announcers slowly reading from their papers were replaced by Western-style energetic anchors reading from teleprompters, thereby creating an atmosphere of up-to-date-ness and truthfulness (Mickiewicz 1997, 79). American movies and shows copied from American TV filled the screens. First Latin American, and then U.S. soap operas aroused nearly hysterical attachment; the whole villages stopped working when popular serials began (Dubitskaya 1998, 101). The discrepancy between beautiful Western images and everyday painful experience also made everything labeled Russian or Soviet the synonym of poor quality with a sense of general failure. It not only produced a phenomenon that may be called a national inferiority complex but was coupled with the rapid delegitimization of old Soviet rules, symbols, and values. This led to a sense of deprivation of the cultural symbols required to build a new national identity, creating what can be thought of as a “symbolic deficit” (Oushakine 1999). Russian ethnic (or national?) identity in this period was reconfigured to evoke a notion of Russians as passive, patient, and nonefficient (Gudkov 2004, 136). In the first years of the reforms both symbolic deficit and negative identification were almost fully compensated by hopes for rapid “recovery” from the Soviet “disease.”

The engagement of the media into intra-elite communication and their decrease of interest in the wider audience left media producers with the above described vision of audience interests; however, these interests kept changing and, upon a closer look, had never been so straightforward as they seemed at first glance. First, some viewers watched imported serials out of pure curiosity about something they had never seen before; since such motivation gets exhausted quite quickly, they soon became critical of and estranged from this type of programming (Dubitskaya 1998, 85–92). Second, the new reliance on advertising also increasingly aroused irritation as people saw their favorite movies interrupted by stories about detergents and other banal consumer goods during the most dramatic scenes. Furthermore, TV commercials intruded quite brutally into the spheres of life that in Soviet culture had been considered private, such as topics connected with the human body—sweat smell, constipation, and especially menstruation (Levinson 2000, 58–62).



Economic hardship, which generally diverted people from any leisure activity, including media consumption, also invoked the public's irritation with glossy images of the rich West presented in ads following imported movies (Levinson 2000, 52–57; Rantanen 2002, 119–24). Moreover, the economic crisis had a deeper effect that brought disenchantment with the ideals of the market and democracy associated with the West and thus disappointment with the West itself. According to VCIOM polls, the percentage of respondents expressing “rather bad” and “very bad” attitudes to the United States grew from 8 percent in late 1991 (collapse of the USSR) to 23 percent in late 1998, a figure that, despite some fluctuations, has virtually never gone below the 1998 level (Gudkov 2004, 506). Anti-Western sentiments reflected the fact that hopes for a quick recovery were gradually vanishing and giving way to frustration and hopeless envy. As opinion polls demonstrated, throughout the second half of the decade respondents with negative attitudes to life prevailed over “optimists” (Gudkov 2004, 277), and the wider social situation was mostly perceived as catastrophic both in public opinion and news.

#### FROM NATIONAL INFERIORITY COMPLEX TO NAZIONALISM

By the mid-1990s, the thirst for national symbols was so immense that President Yeltsin created a special commission of scholars to “elaborate the national idea”—which ultimately failed to accomplish this goal. Meanwhile more spontaneous explorations of identity were taking place in the media and in the broader context of popular culture. First, the emptiness of the category of *rossiysky narod* and the dominance of ethnic Russians led to the merging of Russian ethnic and national identity. Public opinion firmly associated the inhabitants of Russia with ethnic Russians, and the idea of “Russia for [ethnic] Russians” was increasing in popularity at the turn of the new century (Gudkov 2004, 193). Second, given the deficit of positive symbols, the search for identity took the form of negative self-identification in contrast to an alien and hostile other, and this identity itself was constructed not as a set of particular features, but in binary opposition between universal categories of “us” against “them.” Along with the domestic power elite, the obvious other became the West. Western media formats by no means were an obstacle to anti-Western content. This merging—a case of what Robertson (1995, 29–31) called glocalization—was manifest in some media forms more than in others. And below I consider two of the media forms that have been touched on before—news and commercials.

Throughout the 1990s advertisers in Russia were mostly foreign. It was they who, acting through their associations and advertising agencies, gave a start to Russian commercial audience research and the rating system on TV.

In the late 1990s, standardized polls conducted by the advertising industry showed that the most highly rated products were, along with news, old Soviet comedies and songs. Media-MOST was the pioneer in recognizing this trend by introducing Soviet movies and music into its schedule—as energetically as it had been introducing Western-style news and imported movies in the mid-1990s. The discovery of interest in Soviet-made media led professionals to attempt domestic production, and producers of commercials to hurriedly seek domestic images. Initially, attempts to introduce “authentic” Russian images were clumsy in their ironic use of Soviet historical characters and ideological clichés. Very quickly, however, a nostalgic use of symbols associated with Soviet everyday life became a great and stable success. Brands with Russian names, including archaic ones, had broad appeal as well. Moreover, the opposition between Russian and foreign became a marketable symbolic mode of address. In one TV ad for domestic juice, a grandfather in a traditional Russian setting preaches to his grandson: “What’s good of *their* apples? Only chemicals. Have you ever seen me fertilizing *my* apples with any trash?” This change in public opinion led to a radical and almost overnight swing in the strategies adopted by foreign advertisers. Siemens launched the slogan “Going the way of progress together with Russia.” But perhaps the champion was Philip Morris, with this slogan for its Peter the Great cigarettes: “Return blow—our reply to America” (Gudkov 2004, 797).

This change in popular media taste might not have appeared without a brief wave of political mobilization in the late 1990s in response to NATO’s campaign against Yugoslavia,<sup>11</sup> an event that was quite global in its origin. This military action coincided with Yeltsin’s first attempt to try a candidate with both journalism and KGB experience as prime minister, which brought about important changes to Russian news production. Yevgheny Primakov, an elderly candidate associated with the Soviet Union when it was one of the world’s two superpowers, tried to play an active role in the Yugoslav conflict after many years of passive Russian foreign policy. It was perhaps this sharp contrast that made many media organizations join those controlled by Yeltsin’s team to form a patriotic chorus. As one could judge from media coverage in 1999, especially at the very beginning of the bombings, the heroes of the conflict were the Russian prime minister and his assistants bravely defending a helpless Slavic victim-state from a shameless aggressor. Although such “home-centered” coverage of international issues is typical, for instance, of American news, for post-Soviet Russia it was a novelty. Images of victims in Russian and Western media also resembled inverted mirrors of each other: Europeans and Americans were shown images of the endless sufferings of Yugoslav Albanians (including stories on concentration camps and mass murders, later questioned by many scholars, journalists, and public figures [see, e.g., Collon 2002, 24–79]). Russian viewers saw destroyed buildings in Belgrade and stories about Albanian terrorism against Kosovar Serbs; “pro-Yugoslav” stories

outnumbered “pro-NATO” items by three to four times (Lieberman 1999). The rise of hostility in public opinion in Russia and the United States to each other was also quite symmetrical.<sup>12</sup> Public opinion polls showed that the proportion of those critical of the United States in Russia had grown from 8 to 23 percent during the 1990s; in May 1999 (the period of the NATO bombings) criticism reached its peak with 54 percent; the proportion of those regarding the United States “rather well” and “very well” dropped from the 65 to 71 percent it had comprised in the previous decade to unprecedented 32 percent (Gudkov 2004, 506). Although later Russians’ attitude to the United States improved, it never reached the level of the 1990s.

Thus the Yugoslav story had a number of important consequences for the articulation of Russian national identity. Despite the failure of Primakov’s policy, the political elite learned a useful lesson: the event showed how mobilization against an external enemy could become a basis for national consolidation. It is not surprising that in mid-1999 Putin’s presidential “pre-electoral” campaign began with a military action in Chechnya similar to the one which five years earlier had ruined Yeltsin’s public approval. Although Putin’s first steps were cautious, the scale of the operation gradually grew from the withdrawal of armed Chechen separatists from the neighboring province of Dagestan to the advance of the federal troops deep into Chechnya, to heavy bombings of its capital in early 2000. The increasing violence was not spontaneous: the deeper into the campaign, the more the Russian population supported a military solution to the conflict increasing Putin’s popularity in polls (Zadorin 1999).

This evolution of public opinion can be partially explained by changes in the structure of the media. First, the decisiveness of the pro-Putin team revealed itself in its ability to mobilize resources in all spheres, not only in the Chechen conflict, but also in its struggle against competing CIGs, most notably Media-MOST and its partner presidential candidates. Therefore, by fall 1999, Media-MOST was significantly weakened and could not offer large-scale oppositional coverage. What is more interesting is the fact that public opinion shielded itself from nonofficial viewpoints. Thus, although at that time stories about atrocities of the federal troops in Chechnya still could find their way to national media, about two-thirds of the population refused to believe in them. The resonant story of Russian colonel Budanov, who had raped and murdered a Chechen girl, aroused the disbelief of about a third of the respondents; the majority of the rest thought he deserved at least leniency (Gudkov 2004, 337). This defensive reaction revealed the depths of the nation’s fatigue with the negative national images that bombarded audiences during the 1990s. This fatigue in its turn was used by political elites in their policy to reduce critical coverage of all spheres of contemporary Russian life and to substitute it with stories of success and infotainment. Along with economic improvement, this fatigue is one of the major factors that explain the growth of entertainment production in the next decade.

Second, the Yugoslav conflict gave political elites grounds to accuse the “West” of double standards when it criticized Russia for its brutal intrusion into Chechnya. Furthermore, the West was regarded as hypocritical on a more general level: it is now blamed for not assisting Russia in its sincere attempts to build a market economy and, moreover, for imposition of models that were inappropriate in Russia. From a teacher and missionary the West reverted back to its earlier role of an agent of economic and cultural imperialism, responsible for Russia’s internal problems. Conversely, the Soviet past turned from a historical mistake to an object of nostalgia. It is now associated not with goods shortage, bureaucratic stagnation, and absence of truthful news, but with “order,” stability, paternalistic protection, modest well-being, and egalitarian justice. By the end of the millennium, opinion polls registered that Russians increasingly believed that their country was under the threat of being robbed by hypocritical foreigners and that, instead of Westernizing, it should seek its own path to development. In this context it is very important to recognize that Putin offered an image of a leader to the nation that was not completely negative. In contrast to the aged and sickly Yeltsin, the young, energetic Putin was associated with long-expected “order,” paternalistic protection, stability, and, as the world oil prices went up, with economic well-being. In fact, Putin fulfilled the Soviet-nostalgic expectations of the Russian people. For these reasons, Putin’s KGB background not only was seen as non-threatening but symbolically confirmed the probability that such expectations would come true. However, Putin was much more polysemic and offered Russians a skillful blend of symbols of past and present: thus, he approved Yeltsin’s choice of the new national flag (the tricolor borrowed from pre-Bolshevik imperial Russia), restored the melody of the Soviet anthem, and supplied it with new post-Soviet lyrics. Reclaiming its (mythologized) historical past along with the good news about the (mythologically) improving present, the nation regained an abundance of material for the creation of its identity, symbols, and other cultural goods, including media products. In 2004, the proportion of domestic serials on national TV exceeded 50 percent and a Russian-produced film outperformed all its foreign competitors in terms of revenues for the first time since 1991.<sup>13</sup>

## CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM RUSSIA

When in 2005 Andrey Illarionov talked about the “Iranization” of Russia, he pointed, in an alarmed manner, at some commonalities in people’s reaction to globalization in both countries. Whether the Iranian case should be necessarily viewed as a danger is beyond the scope of this article, but the intention to compare Russia to others and to find its place in the external world is important both as a new tendency of the Russian public discourse and as a question

for comparative media studies. Generally, we may discern several levels of the relevance of international (media) experience for Russia and, correspondingly, the significance of Russia's experience for the rest of the world.

First, the feeling of humiliation connected with the loss of high international status may be found in all postimperial societies as a potential source of nationalism. More broadly, *nazionalism* may emerge from any feeling of deprivation or defeat, and here Russia displays many similarities to Germany's frustrations after World War I that resulted in the rise of fascism. While the fear of such an outcome led the international community to cushion the consequences of deprivation for Germany, Italy, and Japan after World War II, half a century later Russia's hopes for such interventionist policies were in vain. Perhaps a reason is that Russia's contemporary weakness is thought to guarantee the world from its expansionist ambitions, forcing it to remain in a state of defensive isolation.

Second, a wary attitude to globalization combined with the desire to import Western economic success is typical for many "developing" countries, because of their history of modernization as external "intrusion." Virtually everywhere in such countries attempts to resolve this tension lead to what in Russia is called the "Westerners-Slavophiles" dispute and to searches for the country's "own way." Given these tensions, it is not surprising that many countries make pendulum-like movements to and from openness to international influences: both the Russian and Iranian cases fit into this scheme. The striking difference in Iran is, however, that the sources of its traditionalization and isolation were global in origin and literally came from abroad with illegally imported small media (see, e.g., Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994), while Russian nationalism more trivially emerged from within the Russian media mainstream. However, the general path of both countries indeed has much in common. So it is not a unique Russian trait that after opening a new media market to global winds a country becomes flooded with imported media production, but after a while domestic products return supported both by revived popular interest and protectionist barriers. To be fair, Russia's 50 percent limit for foreign ownership in the media is relatively mild—milder than in such countries as France, Greece, and Japan.

Third, the most general anxiety about national identity and fear of external threats may be found everywhere, not only at the margins of the globe, but also at its core; for example, Schlesinger (2002, 644–46) points at the spread of such phenomena in Europe. The study here does not provide enough data to decide whether this is a universal effect of globalization or a tendency only remotely connected with globalization. What is more obvious from the Russian example is that a popular feeling of threat does not necessarily mean that globalization threatens nation-states and/or the institution of statehood. Rather, the Russian experience shows that only certain types of states fail to adapt to changing conditions, and even they may return very quickly in a better-

adjusted form. As long as the legitimacy of the state's monopoly on rule making and violence is not questioned by people within given territories, states may enforce their will without much resistance. Furthermore, although the initial push toward the collapse of the Soviet Union might have been global, the first post-Soviet decade demonstrates that major threats to the state have been rather domestic than international. In the geographical dimension the Russian state was threatened by the loss of loyalty of certain local elites and/or populations. In the institutional dimension it was threatened by privatization of the state, as an extreme form of clientelism and corruption. The chaotic inflow of foreign influences was thus not a cause of state disintegration but its by-product, which later was not stopped but taken under domestic control.

Fourth, different dimensions of a country's development (globalization-isolation, state disintegration-consolidation, and authoritarianization-democratization) appear to be not necessarily closely connected, and again here Russia is a vivid, though not a unique example. As I have tried to show in this chapter, an analysis of Russia's movement along the first two axes explains Russian transformation much more adequately and profoundly than the conceptualization of recent Russian history in terms of democratic theories. Despite the widespread clichés about Putin, the characterization of his regime as more authoritarian than Yeltsin's is disputable. Understanding the changes in the degree of state consolidation and of the country's integration into global systems reveals a much richer picture of the ongoing social change. Finally, another "independent" dimension here is that of the media, which have played an absolutely ambivalent role in this multifaceted development. Depending on the situation, media could contribute to diversification and unification of public discourse, play to the hands of those subverting the state or those struggling for its consolidation, and promote international influences or nationalism. After all, the media are equally necessary to construct both national and global identities, as well as loyalties both to the state and to separate interest groups—all of them are bases for different types of imagined communities that should be maintained across space and time.

## NOTES

1. VCIOM is the oldest (and therefore state-owned) research polling institute in Russia, founded in 1987; its reliability is confirmed by correspondence of its major results to those of other (nonstate) leading polling organizations, such as FOM, ROMIR, and Levada-Center. In its regular poll system, Omnibus, VCIOM uses multistep stratified territorial random samples ranging from 1100 (in the early 1990s) to 1600 (in 2006) respondents. VCIOM was chosen here because it is the only polling organization that covers the period of the early 1990s. Results of its numerous polls concerning Russian national identity and attitudes to key issues of Russian life are collected and analyzed in the volume *Negative Identity* by a well-known VCIOM expert, Lev Gudkov (2004), on which I rely in later sections of my chapter.

2. Chechnya is a rural Moslem republic at the Russian-Georgian border; with few of its own oil beds left, it has a crucial significance as a transit region that links Caspian oil with the Black Sea and Europe. It is the only Russian region that on the way to its sovereignty went as far as having its own military forces, ignoring federal taxes, and introducing Shariat law. As a result it was almost completely destroyed during the two wars with the "Federal Center" (1994–1996 and 1999–?).

3. A Russian journalistic expression, often used in reference to Chechnya.

4. The governor got rid of his criminal promoter two years after his victory, although in another year he himself perished in a strange helicopter catastrophe.

5. As many media professionals I interviewed termed it.

6. In 1995 Boris Berezovsky, the leader of the CIG closest to President Yeltsin's family, or, more precisely, a CIG merged with the family, lobbied a plan for the privatization of Russia's best national channel according to which 49 percent of it would be distributed among a narrow number of private shareholders, while 51 percent would stay with the state. Later Berezovsky acquired the whole privatized stock, but independently of his official share he was the one who determined all policies at the channel, which, though, were nearly identical or at least quite close to those of the Kremlin.

7. The Russian word *vlast* used by Putin, besides "power," also means "authorities."

8. The "Law of the Russian Federation On Mass Media," N 2124-1, December 27, 1991, was amended by the law "On amendment of the Law of the Russian Federation 'On Mass Media,'" N 107-??, April 8, 2001, after its passage article 19.1 reads: "A foreign legal entity, as well as a Russian legal entity with a foreign participation, wherever the share (input) of the foreign participation in the stock (joint) capital equals or exceeds 50 percent, a citizen of the Russian Federation with a dual citizenship, may not act as founders of television, video programs." To understand this clause correctly it is necessary to know that notion of "founder" is the only substitute for "media owner" in Russian legislation on media, and television and video programs are the only possible kinds of broadcast visual mass media.

9. While from 1990 to 1998 the Russian GDP dropped by approximately 45 percent, from 1999 to 2006 it almost returned to its initial level, comprising, by the preliminary estimates of results of the year 2006, about 96 percent of the GDP of year 1990. See numerous materials of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation at its website, [www.economy.gov.ru](http://www.economy.gov.ru): for example, the extended interview of the minister of economic development and trade with RIA Novosti, June 5, 2006, at [www.economy.gov.ru/wps/portal/!ut/p/cmd/cp/c/6\\_0\\_3T1/ce/7\\_0\\_92P/p/5\\_0\\_7DH/pm/H?helpMode=Detail\\_default.jsp&documentId=1149588523406](http://www.economy.gov.ru/wps/portal/!ut/p/cmd/cp/c/6_0_3T1/ce/7_0_92P/p/5_0_7DH/pm/H?helpMode=Detail_default.jsp&documentId=1149588523406).

10. During the second half of 1999, when the second Chechen war started and reached its culmination by the New Year, Putin's rating grew from 2 percent in July, when he was appointed, to 48 percent in December—an unprecedented level for any politician of that time (see e.g., Zadorin 1999). It happened against the background of overwhelming popular support of the Chechen campaign, which contrasted so much with negative attitudes to the first war (see, e.g., Gudkov 2004, 328–38). Many social scientists, including Zadorin, directly connect these facts.

11. Expressing discontent with the human rights of the Albanian population of the then Yugoslav province Kosovo, the U.S. administration insisted on military interference that culminated with bombings of Belgrade in May 1999 and with international occupation of Kosovo. Russia was against this plan, which led to extreme tension between it and the United States, actually, the first serious tension after the Cold War. Russia lost, and Yugoslav president Milosevic was overthrown the same year.

12. The general level of hostility of Americans toward Russia was higher both before and after the crisis, but its maximum during the conflict was nearly equal, so the rise was not as sharp as in Russia (Gudkov 2004, 504).

13. The fact that the Russian fantasy movie *Night Guard* became an absolute post-Soviet box office best-seller, outperforming in Russian cinemas such films as *The Lord of the Rings: Return of the King*, *Spiderman 2*, and *Troy*, was widely reported—see, for example, stories on the leading online daily Utro.ru at [www.utro.ru/news/2004/08/03/336352.shtml](http://www.utro.ru/news/2004/08/03/336352.shtml) or on the fantasy website Olmer at <http://olmer.ru/book/2004filmkom.shtml>.

**Critical Media Studies**  
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE

*Series Editor*

**Andrew Calabrese, University of Colorado**

*Advisory Board*

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <b>Patricia Aufderheide</b> , American University                                 | <b>Vincent Mosco</b> , Queen's University                           |
| <b>Jean-Claude Burgelman</b> , Institute for<br>Prospective Technological Studies | <b>Janice Peck</b> , University of Colorado                         |
| <b>Simone Chambers</b> , University of Toronto                                    | <b>Manjunath Pendakur</b> , Southern Illinois<br>University         |
| <b>Nicholas Garnham</b> , University of<br>Westminster                            | <b>Arvind Rajagopal</b> , New York University                       |
| <b>Hanno Hardt</b> , University of Iowa   | <b>Giuseppe Richeri</b> , Università Svizzera<br>Italiana           |
| <b>Gay Hawkins</b> , The University of New South<br>Wales                         | <b>Kevin Robins</b> , Goldsmiths College                            |
| <b>Maria Heller</b> , Eötvös Loránd University                                    | <b>Saskia Sassen</b> , University of Chicago                        |
| <b>Robert Horwitz</b> , University of California at<br>San Diego                  | <b>Dan Schiller</b> , University of Illinois at<br>Urbana-Champaign |
| <b>Douglas Kellner</b> , University of California at<br>Los Angeles               | <b>Colin Sparks</b> , University of Westminster                     |
| <b>Gary Marx</b> , Massachusetts Institute of<br>Technology                       | <b>Slavko Splichal</b> , University of Ljubljana                    |
| <b>Toby Miller</b> , University of California,<br>Riverside                       | <b>Thomas Streeter</b> , University of Vermont                      |
|   | <b>Liesbet van Zoonen</b> , University of<br>Amsterdam              |
|   | <b>Janet Wasko</b> , University of Oregon                           |

**Recent Titles in the Series**

- Democratizing Global Media: One World, Many Struggles*  
Edited by Robert A. Hackett and Yuezhi Zhao
- The Film Studio: Film Production in the Global Economy*  
Ben Goldsmith and Tom O'Regan  
*Raymond Williams*  
Alan O'Connor
- Why TV Is Not Our Fault: Television Programming, Viewers, and Who's Really in Control*  
Eileen R. Meehan
- Media, Terrorism, and Theory: A Reader*  
Edited by Anandam P. Kavoori and Todd Fraley
- Digital Music Wars: Ownership and Control of the Celestial Jukebox*  
Patrick Burkart and Tom McCourt
- Culture Conglomerates: Consolidation in the Motion Picture and Television Industries*  
William M. Kunz
- Community Media: A Global Introduction*  
Ellie Rennie
- Urban Communication: Production, Text, Context*  
Edited by Timothy A. Gibson and Mark Lowes
- Empire and Communications*  
Harold A. Innis
- A Fatal Attraction: Public Television and Politics in Italy*  
Cinzia Padovani
- A Violent World: TV News Images of Middle Eastern Terror and War*  
Nitzan Ben-Shaul

For a complete listing of series titles, visit [www.rowmanlittlefield.com](http://www.rowmanlittlefield.com).

# Global Communications

## Toward a Transcultural Political Economy

Edited by  
Paula Chakravartty and Yuezhi Zhao

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.  
Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

Published in the United States of America  
by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.  
A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.  
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706  
www.rowmanlittlefield.com

Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom

Copyright © 2008 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.  
First paperback edition 2008

*All rights reserved.* No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

**The hardback edition of this book was previously cataloged by the Library of Congress as follows:**

Global communications : toward a transcultural political economy / edited by Paula Chakravartty and Yuezhi Zhao.

p. cm. — (Critical media studies)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Communication in politics. 2. Mass media—Political aspects. 3. Communication, International. I. Chakravartty, Paula. II. Zhao, Yuezhi, 1965—

JA85.G56 2008

327.101'4—dc22

2007005570


ISBN-13: 978-0-7425-4044-6 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-7425-4044-8 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN-13: 978-0-7425-4045-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-7425-4045-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)

Printed in the United States of America

™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

For Aisha and Linda