

## Two Decades of Post-Soviet and Post-Socialist Stateness\*

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*The collapse of the socialist system prompted the former USSR countries to “re-invent” their stateness. The paper focuses on factors that impede or smooth stateness transformations in post-Soviet countries. First, the paper examines internal and external factors of state formation in selected countries. Next, it introduces empirical research tools and empirical findings that present alternative patterns of stateness and outcomes of state formation. The paper concludes with a detailed review of certain cases that may be considered prototypes of state formation for post-Soviet countries.*

In December of 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was effectively dissolved and one of the world’s superpowers ceased to exist. Its rights and obligations, according to international law, as well as its nuclear power status were assumed by the Russian Federation. This has dramatically changed the entire structure of the international community of states. The urgent need to avoid a collapse of world order and to maintain at least its semblance led states and nations to accept the emergence of post-Soviet states. Instantly and in effect automatically, Russia was recognized as the legal successor of the USSR, and its union republics as new independent states.

Recognition of fifteen new members to the international family of states was momentary and unreserved. Their stateness, or ability to fulfill basic state functions, was taken for granted. All the post-Soviet states were presupposed to fit neatly into internationally recognized patterns and standards of stateness, both by outside observers and the majority of their citizens.

Soon, however, it turned out that the new members of the world state family were by no means just *tabulae rasae* for political engineering from scratch or instantaneous projections of their authorities’ imaginations. Their institutional designs and histories did matter. Each of them differed from the other members of the global family and even from each other. Nevertheless, common history and the impressive institutional and cultural impact of the Soviet heritage made them into an independent group. The emergence and

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further development of the new states were ambiguous. Their divergences and similarities did not fit one pattern, but instead produced assorted options for their further transformation.

The events of the last two decades imply two important political inferences. First, despite all their similarities, the group of post-Soviet states was not homogenous and consisted of specific types and variants of state-building. Second, the gradual divergent in-state-building within the group allowed individual trajectories of institutional transformation to move beyond the post-Soviet phase, allowing individual states to develop their own domains within the global family of states. Both of these assumptions need to be empirically checked.

The first hypothesis—that post-Soviet states initially display similar stateness patterns (specific combinations of functional abilities of a state)—is to be tested using evidence from the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 1990s. The second hypothesis—that new independent states gradually develop new or modified stateness patterns beyond the initial phase of their post-Soviet development—is to be tested using evidence from the next decade, the 2000s.

The cases selected for analysis include several post-socialist countries. The reason is a simple one. We wanted to find out whether post-Soviet and other post-socialist countries combined then divided into clusters indiscriminately, or post-Soviet polities tended to flock together in the first post-Soviet stage then subsequently drifted apart and formed clusters with other post-socialist countries in the 2000s. This question constitutes our third hypothesis.

### **Duality of Stateness and Statehood**

Stateness and statehood reflect two different aspects of being a state. *Statehood* connotes the statutory properties of a state consequential to its recognition by other states and its own citizenry. *Stateness* conveys the idea of state compliance with its own status and statehood and its capacity to fulfill its functions and expectations of fellow states and its own citizenry.

Stateness and statehood are very closely linked characteristics. A high degree of polity efficiency and consolidation is one of the most important factors in gaining status in the family of nations. External and internal recognition of a state is vital for measuring stateness. Perhaps the only clear criterion for external recognition is membership in the United Nations. With respect to internal recognition, it is important that the population consents to the state's "founding questions" (the nature of the state and nation, the criteria for membership in the nation, etc.) and the specificity of political identification.

Our major analytical tool is stateness, defined here as the capacity of a state to exercise its fundamental functions as well as to meet the practical im-

plications of its recognition as a member of a state community or communities. On that basis, and taking into account a few existing examples of conceptual analysis and measurement of stateness,<sup>1</sup> we have chosen a limited number of correlated indicators because the concept we are studying has no direct or unique empirical equivalent. Also, our choice of indicators is due to gaps in existing data.

The evaluation of stateness and its various aspects (state capacity, state efficiency, administrative performance, etc.) has been highly problematic ever since John Peter Nettl introduced the concept.<sup>2</sup> His scale describes levels of intensity, ranging from the prototype model of *stateness* (Germany and France) to *statelessness* (US and UK), aimed to demonstrate conceptual variability of states rather than serve as a proper empirical research instrument. Despite all the stateness research and important empirical findings to date,<sup>3</sup> the task of measuring stateness and its various aspects (state capacity, state efficiency, administrative performance, etc.) persists.

One major factor that complicates the evaluation of stateness is the conceptual and empirical variability of states. If a polity develops a state structure in order to claim membership in external state communities and to meet the membership claims by the citizenry inside, the very nature of such a state structure is prone to vary significantly from case to case. The fluctuating functional abilities of such constantly changing units to fulfill their functions and respond to international and domestic challenges would naturally change the composition and resulting configuration of those abilities. To compare them one has to drop some highly individualized and country-specific abilities and instead develop a set of standards which will hopefully include measurable abilities that are common to all respective states or to a group of the states.

As we mentioned before, the concept we are studying and its components have no direct or unique empirical equivalents. For example, there have been several attempts to measure state capacity through GDP per capita.<sup>4</sup> However, equating state capacity with GDP per capita fails to address the issue of

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Stefano Bartolini, *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980: The Class Cleavage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Bartolini, *Restructuring Europe. Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Vetena Fritz, *State-Building. A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and Russia* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> John Peter Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20, no. 4 (1968): 559–92.

<sup>3</sup> Bartolini, *Political Mobilization*; Bartolini, *Restructuring Europe*.

<sup>4</sup> P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 50, no. 4 (1998): 563–73; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

the relationship between those two variables, which is certainly of great academic interest. For this reason, we avoid using any proxy variables to study stateness and look for a measurement model appropriate for our understanding of the concept's structure.

For this study we have used the percentage of state revenue and expenditure of GDP as indirect indicators of the size of public goods. The indicators of the state's infrastructural capacity were taken from the World Bank Governance Indicators (Control of corruption and Government effectiveness indices). In addition, we employed expert evaluations to measure the instability of game rules (specifically, changes in founding constitutional norms), and the use of the state in personal and group purposes (state capture or "privatization" of the state). We have also used the variables that characterize the role of the state throughout the country (civil war, the presence of paramilitary groups, terrorist acts) and indirectly characterize the public's consent on the "founding questions," i.e., agreement among elite and masses on the fundamentals of constitutional order as a characteristic of internal recognition of the state.

### Factors of State Formation

Both a shared Communist past and a set of nation-specific factors influenced the development of our units of analysis. In their common historical context, state-building is a process of consolidating centers and borders of different kinds (political, judicial, cultural, economic, etc.). Any discrepancies regarding borders may change "exit" or "voice" options,<sup>5</sup> or adjust the scope of "political production."<sup>6</sup> As empirical research of the European experience has shown, the existence of many "internal" centers or intense relationships with "external" centers had complicated the state-building process. This is why the first factors we use in our research are the quantity and characteristics of internal and external centers and the level of tension in the relationships between centers and peripheries.

The importance of these factors results from the fact that most post-socialist countries have emerged from the disintegration of larger states (the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, etc.). Some of these countries have had features of an imperial power organization. Moreover, the majority of post-socialist countries were included in other states or depended on them until the end of the nineteenth century or the First World War.

New independent states of the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslavian space had to resolve problems of the consolidation of their territorial, ethnic, cul-

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<sup>5</sup> Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

<sup>6</sup> Bartolini, *Restructuring Europe*.

tural, and political borders to the strengthening of the centers of new polities. The former historical centers of empires to which new independent states previously belonged are still centers of influence. Their authority tended to affect the development of their traditional zones of influence by offering economic and cultural links, helping national minorities, etc.

The deconsolidation of borders in new independent post-Soviet and post-Yugoslavian states has been shaped by administrative-territorial organization in the USSR and SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and their national politics. Due to the repression and resettlement of ethnic groups, policies of indigenization (*korenizatsiia*), and the positive discrimination of titular ethnic groups in national Soviet republics, as well as the arbitrary determination of ethnic borders of republics in Yugoslavia, the new independent states have had mixed populations prone to disagree on “founding questions.” These disagreements are coupled with intensified regional and ethnic antagonisms.<sup>7</sup> In contrast, other post-socialist countries experienced independent development in the interwar period. However, not all the issues of state formation and nation-building were resolved in that period. These problems were partially preserved in the communist era and have sharpened after the disintegration of the socialist camp. From this perspective, the existence of many centers competing for influence in the internal political process is a factor complicating the consolidation of boundaries and the achievement of agreement on founding questions.

Due to the complications involved in expert evaluation of the quantity and intensity of competition between centers of influence, we decided to use an index of ethnic fragmentation. It has been calculated according to Herfindahl’s formula and based on statistical data.<sup>8</sup> This index indirectly indicates the existence and share of national minorities potentially capable of representing the interests of external centers. We argue that a high level of fragmentation would complicate the state-building process in the post-socialist countries, with their weak tradition of representative institutions and democratic governance.

An important factor influencing state-building is a country’s tradition of stateness. The majority of post-socialist countries have a problematic history of independent existence. We have tried to take this into account; however, we have also taken into consideration different institutional forms that shape state traditions. As Philip Roeder has convincingly shown, the existence of

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<sup>7</sup> Elena Meleshkina, “Democratization in the Post-Soviet Countries of Eastern Europe and Nationalizing Politics,” in *Nationalism and Democracy*, eds. Andre Lecours and Luis Moreno (New York: Routledge, 2010), 149–69; Meleshkina, “Alternativie formirovaniia naci i gosudarstv v usloviiah etnokulturnoy raznorodnosti,” In *Metod: Moskovskiy yezhegodnik trudov obshchestvovedcheskikh distsiplin* (Moscow: INION RAN, 2010), 123–45.

<sup>8</sup> Alberto Alesina et al., “Fractionalization,” *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2003): 155–94, at 159.

“segment-states” (e.g., dependent self-governing territories) in the compound states (e.g., empires and federations) has been a key factor in determining the success of secession.<sup>9</sup> For many post-Soviet countries, their development in the USSR as subjects of a federation was a necessary condition for future independent existence within their contemporary borders. This experience influenced the formation of infrastructural bases and traditions of government, as well as shaping the limits of political communities. In polities that experienced independent state-building within their contemporary borders, the conditions of state development were more favorable than in other countries. The same is true for other post-socialist states that experienced independent development during the interwar period and after the Second World War.

We have measured state traditions between 1920 and 1990 using a scale from 0 to 2. We have assigned 2 for one year of independent existence and 1 for existence as a segment-state. We have assigned 0 to the polities that existed neither as segment-states nor as independent states or lost their state institutions and autonomy under fascist occupation.

Another important factor influencing state-building is the international context (e.g., European integration and the influence of international norms and practices on internal political development). For example, membership or candidacy in the European Union has been very important in determining the dynamics and results of state-building.<sup>10</sup> We have used an expert evaluation of “adaptation to external audit” and a 4-point scale to evaluate this factor. A score of 1 indicates the absence of the attribute and a score of 4 indicates the highest level of manifestation of the attribute.

The influence of the international environment raises the question of how institutions of the modern state in post-socialist polities adapt to the environment’s norms and demands. The success of this adaptation depends on the institutional legacy of these countries. Institutional legacies, including different forms of power organization, cause differences between countries. As Eric Hobsbaum has noted, some institutional practices remain stable even in cases of dramatic external events like wars, revolutions, etc.<sup>11</sup>

It is difficult to formalize the effect of institutional legacies using appropriate hard data, which is why we have examined the character of institutional reforms, a factor that indirectly demonstrates institutional legacies. This factor may be very influential during periods of political changes and at

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<sup>9</sup> Philip G. Roeder, *Where Nation-States Come from: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

<sup>10</sup> David Galbreath, *Nation-Building and Minority Politics in Post-socialist States: Interests, Influence and Identities in Estonia and Latvia* (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2005).

<sup>11</sup> Eric J. Hobsbaum, “The End of Empires,” in *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union, and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires*, eds. Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 209–10.

other critical junctures (such as the disintegration of states, regime change, wars, etc.) where indeterminacy increases and actors are motivated to make institutional changes. We have assumed that any institutional change increases the gap between formal and informal norms. However, the level and duration of their conflicts as well as the possibility of overcoming them are both related to reform strategies. Closing the gap between formal and informal norms is often considered an optimal reform strategy.

One reform strategy involves the radical change of old institutions, systems of government, and rules from the socialist period. This strategy requires significant resource investments and transactional expenses in the beginning. However, this strategy can also decrease the future costs of overcoming contradictions between old and new institutions. Another reform strategy includes the preservation of institutional legacy between old and new institutions. This parsimonious strategy saves resources for reform. It helps to decrease transactional costs for actors accustomed to former understandable and usual norms. However, contradictions between old institutions and new requirements often emerge. This may increase uncertainty, transactional costs, and the gap between formal and informal norms.

An unfortunate path for state-building is marked by inconsistency of institutional reforms. The coexistence of old and new norms, rules, and mechanisms that often contradict each other increases uncertainty between formal and informal norms and procedures. Actors may have to utilize these contradictions in order to achieve their personal or collective goals. As an empirical indicator of the character of reforms, we have used the average annual index of reforms, calculated by Timothy Frye on the basis of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development data.<sup>12</sup>

An additional factor in state-building is the extent a country's resources can be invested in government system formation and/or reforms. This factor is especially important in transitional countries, especially in new independent republics. The disintegration of old institutional structures in post-socialist countries has been coupled with the resource deficiencies of new state centers. The collapse of the USSR and the socialist camp has been accompanied by economic difficulties, crises, and the breakdown of governmental infrastructures. These conditions have been unfavorable to state infrastructural capacity because the formation of a new governmental system demands many resources. In our research, we have used GDP per capita as an indicator of resources.

Another influential factor is the consolidation of the political regime. This includes factors such as confidence in the stability of main institutions, orientation toward receiving long-term benefits, and the existence of checks on the arbitrary use of the state apparatus for personal or narrow group goals

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<sup>12</sup> Timothy Frye, *Building States and Markets After Communism: The Perils of Polarized Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 77.

which are very important in the formation of the modern state and for the formalization and the standardization of the rules of the game or institutions.

Regardless of its nature, a consolidated regime is likely to impel actors toward long-term subsistence and adjustment to existing rules. Clear and stable rules motivate actors to invest in public goods that can provide long-term benefits. An unconsolidated political regime is marked by the absence of agreement among actors about the rules of the game and power configuration. It is also characterized by a high level of uncertainty. Thus, such a regime largely promotes orientations toward immediate material and political benefits. As a result, government structure may be used for personal or narrow group interests, including those of combating political opponents. The phenomenon of “state capture”<sup>13</sup> hinders the standardization, unification, and depersonalization of rules and practices. In this case, the state ceases to be an “embedded autonomy.”<sup>14</sup>

Both democratic and autocratic consolidated regimes have their own risks. An autocratic regime depends on the qualities of the autocrat, his understanding of the political process, and his intentions. There is often a danger of state capture by one person and his immediate environment. A democratic regime carries the potential danger of an escalation of populist promises for the sake of electoral victory.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, one cannot compare these dangers to those of unconsolidated regimes. As an indicator of political regime consolidation, we have used values of the Polity IV project, which includes valuations of our countries in both the 1990s and 2000s.

## Methods and Data

As long as stateness has no direct or unique empirical equivalent, it is a kind of latent variable that can be measured with correlated indicators. This latent variable encompasses several dimensions inherent in stateness; however, we do not impose a given stateness structure. On the contrary, we let the data reveal the structure of stateness by extracting principal components from the whole set of state capacity indicators. There are many factors extracted, as

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<sup>13</sup> Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann, “Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition Economies,” *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 2444 (September 2009), accessed from [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=240555](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=240555).

<sup>14</sup> Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1995).

<sup>15</sup> Fritz, *State-Building*.



Kaiser's rule<sup>16</sup> suggests (the number of factors equals the number of eigenvalues of the correlation matrix greater than 1).

With the structure of the concept suggested by the dataset, we provide its theory-driven development and carry out principal component analysis using "confirmatory" logic. In other words, indicators of state capacity are divided into groups that reflect separate dimensions of the concept according to "exploratory" principal component analysis. Then, the first principal component is extracted from each subgroup. This combination of two analyses verifies the results and provides a deeper interaction between data and theory. Thus, a vector index that reflects the multidimensional nature of state capacity has been constructed with separate sub-indices for different aspects of the concept. The principal components in the final index are correlated as they are produced separately.

It should be noted that we did not use structural equation modeling (SEM) here because the majority of the methods related to SEM, being flexible and capable of adapting to numerous peculiarities inherent in data, require large datasets. Their application to small-N analysis like ours is both statistically undesirable and technically impossible. For this reason we chose principal component analysis as an alternative. Simulations and studies of asymptotics<sup>17</sup> show that principal components are frequently proximate, though not identical, to factors extracted in exploratory factor analysis, and principal components are more difficult to generalize on confirmatory factor analysis. The main reason for using principal component analysis is its low sample size requirement.

The set of indicators subject to principal component analysis consists of three types of variables coded for two decades (the 1990s and 2000s):

1. Our expert judgments on a 4-point scale (likelihood of secession, presence of paramilitary groups, border indeterminacy, territorial claims to the country, aggression towards the country, propensity to civil war, extent of terrorist attacks, state capture, consensus on constitutional design fundamentals, and dynamics of founding constitutional norms);
2. World Bank indices (Government effectiveness and Control of corruption from the World Bank's World Governance Indicators);

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<sup>16</sup> Henry Kaiser, "The Application of Electronic Computers to Factor Analysis," *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 20, no. 1 (1960): 141–51.

<sup>17</sup> P. M. Bentler and Yutaka Kano, "On the Equivalence of Factors and Components," *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 25, no. 1 (1990): 67–74; Wayne F. Velicer and Douglas N. Jackson, "Component Analysis Versus Common Factor Analysis: Some Issues in Selecting an Appropriate Procedure," *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 25, no. 1 (1990): 1–28; Keith F. Widaman, "Common Factor Analysis Versus Principal Component Analysis," *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 28, no. 3 (1993): 263–311.

3. Statistical data (government expense and government revenues as share of GDP, pooled from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Economy Watch Portal).

The estimation was carried out jointly for the two decades. This approach allowed us to analyze dynamics in state capacity, as there were no differences in normalization of the two subsets.

Having revealed the structure of the latent variable and estimated corresponding sub-indices via principal component analysis, we proceeded with building a typology of state capacity. It was based on clustering states in the space of vector indices. Therefore, we treated each state as a point in a three-dimensional space and looked for natural groupings of points. We employed hierarchical cluster analysis using squared Euclidean distance and Ward's method of agglomeration. We choose Ward's method of agglomeration due to its superiority to other methods of hierarchical clustering.<sup>18</sup> Also, we used squared Euclidean distance because it is needed when using Ward's method. The resulting cluster solutions were visualized using both dendrogram and spider-webs (radar charts). The latter is a valuable tool for visualizing multi-dimensional spaces in two-dimensional planes and provides useful information about similarities and differences in the stateness of different post-communist countries. If there are any changes to stateness in a country through both decades, these are caught by spider-webs, as the web's shape changes from one decade to another. We also used mean values to single out general tendencies in the influence of factors on state-building in groups of countries and interpretive analysis to show country-specific variations.

### **Outcomes of State Formation and Patterns of Stateness**

Our analysis reveals three principal components with eigenvalues greater than 1 (Kaiser's rule). Thus, we have found three key aspects of stateness that are further explored in a "confirmatory" way. Table 1 shows the results of the "exploratory" principal component analysis of stateness indicators with promax rotation. Components have been rotated in order to show the correspondence between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" logics of the principal component analysis. Additionally, the orthogonality of components assumed if oblique rotation is not used is not plausible, as different aspects of state capacity are interrelated.

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<sup>18</sup> Dieter Scheibler and Wolfgang Schneider, "Monte Carlo Tests of the Accuracy of Cluster Analysis Algorithms: A Comparison of Hierarchical and Nonhierarchical Methods," *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 20 (1985): 293–304.

**Table 1.** Factor Loadings for Principal Component Analysis of the Joint Set of Stateness Indicators

	Factor loadings		
	1st PC	2nd PC	3rd PC
<b>Indicators:</b>			
Propensity to civil war	0.85		
Consensus on constitutional design fundamentals	-0.82		
Paramilitary groups presence	0.92		
Extent of terrorist attacks	0.85		
Dynamics of founding constitutional norms	0.46	-0.42	
Aggregated value of the expenditure (% of GDP)	0.47	0.94	
“Privatization” of the state		-0.71	
Control of corruption by WB		0.92	
Government effectiveness by WB		0.83	
Territorial claims to the country		-0.45	0.65
Likelihood of secessionism			0.89
Aggression towards the country			0.95
Border indeterminacy			0.69
<b>Model fit:</b>			
Rotation sums of squared loadings	5.37	4.85	4.31
<i>N</i>	55	55	55

*Note:* Promax rotation. Factor loadings less than 0.4 are not shown.

The three principal components displayed in Table 1 account for about 76 percent of the total variance present in the data. Taking into account the diversity of indicators we used in the study, this is a good result. Furthermore, the pattern of factor loadings displays a clear picture of the interrelationship between the indicators and state capacity dimensions. All loadings less than 0.4 are assumed to equal zero and are not presented in Table 1.

Table 1 suggests that the first dimension of stateness can be interpreted as a lack of internal integrity or weakness of internal sovereignty. It includes the propensity for civil war, consensus on constitutional design fundamentals, the presence of paramilitary groups, the dynamics of founding constitutional norms, the extent of terrorist attacks, and the aggregated value of a state's total combined expenditure (percent of GDP), though the latter is more related to the second dimension. Thus, the aggregated value of expenditure is treated as an indicator of the second dimension when "confirmatory" analysis is performed. The set of indicators with a high loading score on the first dimension allows us to treat the first principal component as weakness of internal sovereignty. Signs of loadings support such an interpretation. The component takes on high values if a country is highly prone to civil war, is menaced by terrorists, has no stable founding rules, and has no capacity to provide for the state's monopoly on the use of coercive power (factor loadings are positive). On the contrary, the higher the consensus on constitutional design fundamentals, the lower the component (factor loading is high in absolute value and negative).

The second dimension of stateness is interpreted as infrastructural capacity, as it comprises government expenses as a share of GDP, state capture, and two indicators of governance provided by the World Bank (Control of corruption and Government effectiveness indices). Territorial claims to the country are a variable with low factor loading and are substantively extraneous, so we do not include this in the second dimension when "confirmatory" logic is used. Except for territorial claims to the country, the only indicator with negative loading is state capture, which reflects an intuitive understanding of how the weakness of the state is linked to its infrastructural capacity.

Finally, the third component consists of four indicators with positive factor loadings. These indicators reflect the likelihood of secession, territorial claims to the country, border indeterminacy, and aggression towards the country. This component is interpreted as weakness of external sovereignty.

Confirmatory analysis was then conducted, producing the results given in Table 2. Here, each dimension was captured by a principal component extracted from the corresponding subset of indicators. All three sub-indices are approximately equal in their explanatory power. The pattern of interrelationships between indicators and components remains the same, allowing us to preserve the labeling of components proposed in the "exploratory" analysis.

**Table 2.** Factor Loadings for Principal Component Analysis of Subsets of Stateness Indicators

	Factor loadings		
	Weakness of internal sovereignty	Infra- structural capacity	Weakness of external sovereignty
<b>Indicators:</b>			
Propensity to civil war	0.91		
Consensus on constitutional design fundamentals	-0.79		
Paramilitary groups presence	0.93		
Extent of terrorist attacks	0.79		
Dynamics of founding constitutional norms	0.62		
Aggregated value of the expenditure (% of GDP)		0.67	
“Privatization” of the state		-0.91	
Control of corruption by WB		0.97	
Government effectiveness by WB		0.93	
Territorial claims to the country			0.81
Likelihood of secessionism			0.91
Aggression towards the country			0.77
Border indeterminacy			0.89
<b>Model fit:</b>			
% of explained variance	66.36%	76.83%	71.59%
<i>N</i>	58	56	56

*Note:* Principal components are extracted by subsets of indicators separately.

Table 3 displays product-moment correlation coefficients for state capacity sub-indices. First, their absolute values are quite high, implying that orthogonality was correctly refused. Furthermore, the signs of correlation coefficients correspond to our intuitive expectations: that is, infrastructural capacity is negatively related to weakness of sovereignty (both internal and external).

**Table 3.** Product-Moment Correlations between Sub-Indices of Stateness

	<b>Weakness of internal sovereignty (A)</b>	<b>Infrastructural capacity (B)</b>	<b>Weakness of external sovereignty (C)</b>
Weakness of internal sovereignty (A)	1.00	-0.56** (56)	0.60** (56)
Infrastructural capacity (B)		1.00	-0.48** (55)
Weakness of external sovereignty (C)			1.00

*Note:* \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Number of observations in parentheses.

These results provide a natural basis for building a typology of stateness in post-socialist countries, which was done through cluster analysis, as described above. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results of the cluster analysis with two and four group partitions.

### *Two-Cluster Division*

Cluster 1 (Table 4) consists of states that we have identified as polities with problematic stateness. This cluster contains Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan in the 1990s. These are mostly post-Soviet countries, with some post-Yugoslavian states and the poorest country in Europe, Albania. Some post-Soviet countries (Belarus and the Baltic states) and post-Yugoslavian countries as well as other states of Eastern Europe appertain to the second cluster, which is composed of states with relatively successful or at least less problematic state-building than in the first cluster.

The number of states in Cluster 1 in the 2000s is smaller than in the 1990s because some of the states improved their values in relation to their variables of stateness (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Ukraine).

**Table 4.** Clusters of Countries with Different Types of Stateness<sup>19</sup>

Decade	Cluster 1	Cluster 2
1990s	Albania	Belarus
	Armenia	Bulgaria
	Azerbaijan	Czech Republic
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Estonia
	Croatia	Hungary
	Georgia	Latvia
	Kazakhstan	Lithuania
	Kyrgyz Republic	Macedonia
	Moldova	Mongolia
	Russia	Poland
	Tajikistan	Romania
	Turkmenistan	Slovak Republic
	Ukraine	Slovenia
Uzbekistan		
2000s	Armenia	Albania
	Azerbaijan	Belarus
	Georgia	Bosnia and Herzegovina
	Kazakhstan	Bulgaria
	Kyrgyz Republic	Croatia
	Moldova	Czech Republic
	Russia	Estonia
	Serbia	Hungary
	Tajikistan	Latvia
	Turkmenistan	Lithuania
	Uzbekistan	Macedonia
		Mongolia
		Poland
	Romania	
	Slovak Republic	
	Slovenia	
	Ukraine	

<sup>19</sup> Two-cluster solution, by decades.

*Four-Cluster Division*

A more exhaustive account of stateness can be achieved by dividing the countries into four clusters (see Table 5). In contrast to the binary division, four clusters have become more homogeneous in their stateness characteristics. At the same time, the groups are large enough for substantive interpretation.

**Table 5.** Clusters of Countries with Different Types of Stateness<sup>20</sup>

Decade	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
1990s	Albania	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Czech
	Armenia	Bosnia and	Bulgaria	Republic
	Kazakhstan	Herzegovina	Estonia	Hungary
	Kyrgyz	Croatia	Latvia	Poland
	Republic	Georgia	Lithuania	Slovak
	Turkmenistan	Moldova	Macedonia	Republic
	Uzbekistan	Russia	Mongolia	Slovenia
		Tajikistan	Romania	
	Ukraine			
2000s	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Albania	Czech
	Kazakhstan	Georgia	Belarus	Republic
	Kyrgyz	Moldova	Bosnia and	Estonia
	Republic	Serbia	Herzegovina	Hungary
	Russia		Bulgaria	Latvia
	Tajikistan		Croatia	Lithuania
	Turkmenistan		Macedonia	Poland
	Uzbekistan		Mongolia	Slovak
		Romania	Republic	
		Ukraine	Slovenia	

Let us begin with Cluster 2. Many countries in this cluster are impeded by civil war, secession, or the threat of secession. This cluster includes Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine in the 1990s and Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Serbia in the 2000s. In this group of countries, secessionist projects have been successful and have led to the emergence of unrecognized or semi-recognized states. As members of a single cluster, those countries have common features of stateness that prevail over the other characteristics differentiating them.

<sup>20</sup> Four-cluster solution, by decades.



Cluster 1 (Table 5) consists of states without serious problems with consolidation of territorial boundaries or coercion monopolies. However, the infrastructural institutional capacity of these countries is not very developed, and threats of state capture persist. For the 1990s, this cluster includes Albania, Armenia, and Asian countries other than Mongolia and Tajikistan. For the 2000s, Russia and Tajikistan have joined the cluster, while Albania has left it. The changes in the composition of the cluster reflect improvements in state capacity in Albania, Tajikistan, and Russia.

Cluster 4 (Table 5) includes polities that are relatively successful in state-building. These include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia for the 1990s. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have joined the cluster for the 2000s. The last three countries have improved characteristics for the 2000s because of their admittance into the European Union, the consistency of their reform strategies, and democratic regime consolidations.

Cluster 3 (Table 5) includes countries with some success in state-building: Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, and Romania for the 1990s. These countries did not experience serious problems, save some like the high level of corruption in Ukraine, the threat of political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc. The change in this cluster in the 2000s is caused by an improving situation in several countries. The Baltic states have become “members” of the “club of successful states.” However, some additional countries are included in the third cluster for the 2000s (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Ukraine).

### *Two-Dimensional Four-Cluster Set*

Is there a better structured and more coherent way to present our clustering? If we interpret the first and the second step in clustering as inaction of substantive parameters then yes. The first step in dividing our sample into two groups required us to make rough distinctions between “successful” and “unsuccessful,” or perhaps “lucky” and “unlucky,” countries. This distinction is evidently too imprecise. It would be better defined as the opposition between countries with relatively advanced (advantaged, unimpeded) stateness and those with deficient (disadvantaged, constrained) stateness. Such an interpretation is less impressionistic and more lucid.

The second step divides each of the two clusters further into two subgroups. What might be the real meaning of this division? Feeble stateness mobilization that is both unsteady and staggering is in opposition to more resolute mobilization that is persistent and solidifying.

Using this double distinction, we can draw a table based on two dimensions: the first one being *advancement-deficiency* and the second one *feeble-resolute*. Let us make the first one into a vertical column of a table and code it as A and D. Then the second dimension would make a horizontal row coded

F and R. Within the table, our four clusters could be coded respectively as 1—DR (deficiency-resolute), 2—DF (deficiency-feeble), 3—AF (advancement-feeble), and 4—AR (advancement-resolute). Each cluster would fit into a cell of Table 6.

**Table 6.** Upgrading and Downgrading of Stateness

1990s		
Stateness	F—feeble, unsteady, and staggering (16)	R—resolute, persistent, and consolidating (11)
<b>A</b> —relatively advanced (advantaged, unimpeded) (13)	<b>AF 3</b> Belarus Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania Macedonia Mongolia Romania	<b>AR 4</b> Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic Slovenia
<b>D</b> —relatively deficient (disadvantaged, constrained) (14)	<b>DF 2</b> Azerbaijan Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Georgia Moldova Russia Tajikistan Ukraine	<b>DR 1</b> Albania Armenia Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Turkmenistan Uzbekistan


2000s		
Stateness	F—feeble, unsteady, and staggering (13)	R—resolute, persistent, and consolidating (15)
<b>A</b> —relatively advanced (advantaged, unimpeded) (17)	<b>AF 3</b> <b>Albania</b> [↑ ←] Belarus <b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b> [↑] Bulgaria <b>Croatia</b> [↑] Macedonia Mongolia Romania <b>Ukraine</b> [↑]	<b>AR 4</b> Czech Republic <b>Estonia</b> [→] Hungary <b>Latvia</b> [→] <b>Lithuania</b> [→] Poland Slovak Republic Slovenia
<b>D</b> —relatively deficient (disadvantaged, constrained) (11)	<b>DF 2</b> Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova Serbia	<b>DR 1</b> Armenia Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic <b>Russia</b> [→] <b>Tajikistan</b> [→] Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

The two-dimensional four-cluster sets help to better visualize and comprehend states' "migrations," or rather, the upgrading or downgrading of their stateness from the 1990s to 2000s. In Table 6, the states that moved are marked in **bold** with arrows showing the direction of the change (↑, →, or ↑ ←). The last "double arrows" symbol denotes Albania's contradictory trek from DR (deficiency-resolute) in the 1990s to AF (advancement-feeble) in the 2000s. In all other cases there is a clear upgrading of stateness. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Ukraine move up from DF to AF. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania move right from AF to AR. Finally, Russia and Tajikistan also move right from DF to DR. As a result the "worst" lower-left cell of DF has decreased from eight members in the 1990s to four in the 2000s (in fact, even to three, since Serbia is addressed only in the 2000s). The "best" higher-right cell of AR has also increased from five to eight members. The intermediate and "transitory" AF and DR cells retain their size, though not their composition (Table 6).

### *Radar Charts (Spider-Webs) for Individual States*

Distinctive and even unique configurations of stateness profiles for individual countries of our sample are provided with the help of three-dimensional radar charts consisting of (1) infrastructural capacity, (2) internal sovereignty, and (3) external sovereignty. Such radar charts present the crucial dimensions and resulting configuration of stateness in a visual way. The very size of the ensuing figures is informative. The smaller it is, the more rudimentary is an individual country's stateness, and vice versa. The closer the figure is to the limits of the background triangle, the more confirmed and full-fledged is the stateness of a country. The shape of the figure is also informative. Since the triangle is formed clock-wise by three respective angles, the lower left angle highlights internal sovereignty, the top angle highlights infrastructural capacity, and the lower right angle indicates external sovereignty. It is no wonder that the configurations of individual spider-webs of the countries that make up the cluster of A-D-F-R coded groups look fairly similar. Let us review the groups as they stand in the 2000s.

The AR group for advanced and resolute stateness is made up of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The triangles we see are rather large and balanced. The Czech triangle is nearly maximal for both the 1900s and 2000s. Hungarian stateness looks very much like the Czech triangle in the 1990s but shrinks at the lower right corner (internal sovereignty, or consolidation of the state) in the 2000s. Polish stateness is nearly maximal and steady with a very minor reduction at the top (infrastructural capacity) and negligible increase in internal sovereignty in the lower right. The Slovak triangle is very much like the Polish one and is extremely steady with virtually no change from one decade to the next. Finally, Slovenia is represented by a virtually perfect triangle with small progress in both kinds of sovereignty.



**Figure 1.** Stateness Radar Chart, the Czech Republic




Figure 2. Stateness Radar Chart, Hungary






Figure 3. Stateness Radar Chart, Poland



**Figure 4.** Stateness Radar Chart, the Slovak Republic



**Figure 5.** Stateness Radar Chart, Slovenia

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania comprise one specific sub-group. Their triangles for the 2000s are approaching a perfect triangle, although their growth is evident compared to the 1990s. While the Lithuanian triangle moved in all directions, Latvia and Estonia enhanced internal sovereignty and infrastructural capacity.




Figure 6. Stateness Radar Chart, Estonia





Figure 7. Stateness Radar Chart, Latvia



**Figure 8.** Stateness Radar Chart, Lithuania

Next, the AF group for advanced but feeble stateness brings together Belarus, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Mongolia, and Romania as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Ukraine. Their triangles for the 2000s are also large and solid but visibly “flattened” with obtuse angles at the top. Their institutional capacity is relatively less advanced. Novices to the group clearly show an extraordinary increase. Particularly impressive is the success story of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It boosted stateness from a tiny and practically negligible triangle with some infrastructural capacity with neither internal nor external sovereignty to a fairly solid triangle. Ukraine also extended the figure of its stateness but mainly in the lower right direction. Croatia’s progress is very similar to the Bosnian example but is somewhat less radical. Albania could have stood out in the group due to the odd curve of “migration” from the 1990s to 2000s, but its initial lower right pointed shape of stateness developed into a triangle typical of the group.






Figure 9. Stateness Radar Chart, Belarus







Figure 10. Stateness Radar Chart, Bulgaria




**Figure 11.** Stateness Radar Chart, Macedonia




**Figure 12.** Stateness Radar Chart, Mongolia




**Figure 13.** Stateness Radar Chart, Romania




**Figure 14.** Stateness Radar Chart, Bosnia and Herzegovina



**Figure 15.** Stateness Radar Chart, Albania




**Figure 16.** Stateness Radar Chart, Croatia




**Figure 17.** Stateness Radar Chart, Ukraine


The DR group for deficient but resolute stateness includes Armenia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as Russia and Tajikistan. Their triangles are visibly more “leveled” and obtuse than those of the other transitory AF group. The triangles for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are probably typical for the group. The shapes of newcomers Russia and Tajikistan are pointed to the lower right towards external sovereignty, but lack the solidity of the typical shapes of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Russian and Tajikistan triangles are smaller and their shapes for the 1990s and the 2000s noticeably differ from each other. The triangle of the Kyrgyz Republic clearly stands out. It has shrunk from the 1990s to the 2000s and is pointed more sharply to the lower right.




**Figure 18.** Stateness Radar Chart, Armenia




**Figure 19.** Stateness Radar Chart, Kazakhstan




**Figure 20.** Stateness Radar Chart, the Kyrgyz Republic




**Figure 21.** Stateness Radar Chart, Turkmenistan



**Figure 22.** Stateness Radar Chart, Uzbekistan



**Figure 23.** Stateness Radar Chart, Russia



**Figure 24.** Stateness Radar Chart, Tajikistan

The most problematic group is the DF cluster for deficient and feeble stateness. It includes four countries: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Serbia. These are all pointed to the lower left (Georgia changed its lower right incline of the 1990s for a lower left incline for the 2000s), not because of great internal security, but rather due to the relative weakness of the other two parameters. The figures themselves are rather small, particularly that of Azerbaijan. The Moldovan triangle looks comparatively larger, as does the Serbian one.






Figure 25. Stateness Radar Chart, Azerbaijan






Figure 26. Stateness Radar Chart, Georgia



**Figure 27.** Stateness Radar Chart, Moldova



**Figure 28.** Stateness Radar Chart, Serbia

Thus, spider-webs for individual states visually corroborate identified clusters. The clusters reflect certain combinations of factors influencing the stateness of post-socialist countries and vary in different national contexts. Nevertheless, their impact is revealed in specific configurations characterizing national peculiarities of stateness.

## Conclusion

Our findings support all three hypotheses:

- 1) post-Soviet states initially displayed similar stateness patterns,

- 2) they gradually developed new or modified stateness patterns beyond the initial phase of their post-Soviet development,
- 3) post-Soviet polities tended to flock together and not mix with other post-socialist states while drifting apart and forming clusters with other post-socialist countries in the 2000s.

Already in the 1990s, fifteen post-Soviet states displayed three distinct stateness patterns while the post-socialist states displayed a fourth distinct stateness pattern. This fourth group includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, an exceptionally prosperous republic of Yugoslavia.

In the next decade, the Baltic states developed the pattern post-Soviets had missed thus far and joined the more advanced countries of East-Central Europe. The Baltic states initially had relatively strong stateness traditions and were particularly consistent and dynamic in consolidating them during the 1990s. In contrast, the group of countries with deficient and staggering stateness diminished to four. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Ukraine moved into the transitory cluster of advancing but still staggering stateness. Russia and Tajikistan drifted into the transitory cluster of still deficient but resolute stateness. Thus, all post-Soviet countries display a degree of improvement in their institutional or performance properties. The only ambiguous case combining upgrading and downgrading of stateness is Albania—the country least integrated into the socialist camp, an exceptional case even prior to the collapse of the USSR.

Our spider charts demonstrate that with the possible exception of the leading cluster, there is still great divergence in stateness patterns and configurations. This finding has confirmed the validity of the Tolstoy dictum, “All happy families resemble one another, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way,” for post-socialist states. It has also proved that war, conflict, and zest for exceptionality are demolishers of stateness.

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