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Rationality in Action: *Intentions, Interpretations and Interactions*



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Conclusion Formal analysis of compositionality and non-compositionality by means of a meta-language is limited by the compositionality of semantic categories and functions. I do not have a more general view on this issue. NC_1 has particular pragmatic functions which are duplicated by compositional expressions. As a pragmatic instrument, NC_1 is superfluous. It can explain why some of the possibilities of NC_1 are retained in language. All essential cases are done away with by generalization and compositionality. NC_2 plays a technical role, that is, it isn't used for any communicational goals. The goal of NC_2 is to raise the logical-semantic competence of an interpreter by creating radical interpretation conditions. NC_2 allows to obtain effective semantic tools (apparatus): compositionality in formal semantics, understanding of meaning as a procedure, the semantics of fixed points, theoretical-typical methods. NC_2 is a method of semantic provocation in logical semantics.

Why Participate in Projects? Towards an Ontology of Funding

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Abstract: *This paper develops in a practical direction the ontological concept of interest as groundless ground and is related to my previous discussion of Heidegger's treatise *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. It presents an attempt to uncover the ontological premises of modernity and analyze its projective character in terms of fundamental ontology. In trying to answer a special question «Why participate in project?», it moves towards an ontology of funding.*

Key words: *Heidegger, fundamental ontology, transcendence, freedom, interest, funding*

The triple mode of grounding Funding¹⁴⁹ (fundraising, crowdfunding are examples) is usually understood as the act of providing financial resources to support programs and projects. It has, *prima facie*, nothing to do with the very difficult and unique question of Being as being. This typical activity, however, is strictly connected to a specific understanding of the meaning of Being which is temporally. Heidegger argues that we are defined not by what we are, but by our way of existing, our «*existentiell* possibilities». It can refer to the basic understanding of Being that gives sense to all of our comportments in the world, the proper/improper modes of existence, or even the possibility of existing at all rather than not. After all, according to Heidegger, fundamental ontology needs «an ontic foundation» and such foundation is provided by a special entity that is at the center of the hermeneutic situation and is called *Dasein*.

The problem of ground discussed in Heidegger's treatise is related to the conceptual structure: ontological difference-transcendence-freedom. I introduce the term «*interest*» in

¹⁴⁹ Funding from fund (n.): 1670s, «a bottom, the bottom; foundation, groundwork,» from French fond «a bottom, floor, ground» (12 c.), also «a merchant's basic stock or capital,» from Latin fundus «bottom, foundation, piece of land,» from PIE root *bhudh- «bottom, base» (cognates: Sanskrit budhnah, Greek pythmen «foundation, bottom,» Old English botm «lowest part;» see bottom (n.)). Meaning «stock of money or wealth available for some purpose» is from 1690s; sense of «store of anything to be drawn upon» is from 1704. Funds «money at one's disposal» is from 1728.

order to explain how transcendence as the finite human freedom can be the origin of «grounding»¹⁵⁰.

Transcendence becomes the ground for all comportments of Dasein, fundamentally because Dasein has no relation with beings if it does not transcend beings toward their being. This new concept of transcendence seeks to characterize Dasein's relation with beings in terms of a «surpassing» from beings to being, or a «going beyond» beings toward their being. In *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, Heidegger defines transcendence as meaning «something that properly pertains to human Dasein, and does so not merely as one kind of comportment among other possible kinds that are undertaken from time to time. Rather, it belongs to human Dasein as the fundamental constitution of this being, one that occurs prior to all comportment. [...] Transcendence [...] is that surpassing that makes possible such a thing as existence in general»¹⁵¹.

Heidegger also develops an ontological concept of freedom as the groundless ground that stands at the basis of transcendence. Heidegger clarifies the relation of freedom to ground by identifying three ways of grounding. This triple mode of grounding (Gründen) is as follows: establishing (Stiften), grounding as taking ground (Bodennehmen), and grounding as a grounding of (Begründen)¹⁵². The first way, *grounding as establishing*, is the project of being „for the sake of» a possibility of Dasein's own Being, i.e. projection

¹⁵⁰ Михайловский А. В. Почему мы интересуемся причинами? О трансцендентальном истоке основания у Хайдеггера // Вестник Самарской гуманитарной академии. Серия: Философия. Филология. 2014. № 1 (15). С. 52-65; Mikhailovski A. Heidegger et l'origine transcendante de l'acte de fonder // Revue Philosophie. 2015. No. 127

¹⁵¹ Heidegger M. Wegmarken. Frankfurt a.M., 1976. S. 137.

¹⁵² Heidegger M. Wegmarken. Frankfurt a.M., 1976. S. 165.

of world as practical integrity of all possible relations of Dasein toward the beings. The second way, *grounding as taking ground*, means that we are captivated by beings, and this absorption in beings seems to be a precondition for termination of Dasein's possibilities as real ones. But we are not only involved with beings but we have also an active relation to beings. That's why two previous ways provide the transcendental possibility of intentionality. The third way of grounding, grounding as *grounding of*, uncovers the how-being and the what-being of a specific being so that this being becomes manifest and we may rely ourselves to it. This way of grounding particularizes the first two ways into a relation with a being and can be conceived as motivation. These three ways are not a linear process but happen simultaneously and build a co-original unity.

Ontology of funding As H. Lübke argues, the main purpose of existence in modern culture is «generating meaning from freedom»¹⁵³. It demands from us more serious forms of self-activity and self-determination than classical leisure pastime (skhole). While a competence level doesn't stop growing, it is extremely improbable that the worker in the world of labour (Jünger) will be interested in reducing its expectations and restricting his career options and abilities to achieve sustainable existence.

In particular, funding (such as donations, subsidies, and grants that have no direct requirement for return of investment) is vital in ensuring sustainability of scientific and social projects. The start-up funds are also essential to promote a business idea, without it, entrepreneurs wouldn't have the ability to carry out their concepts in the business world. But the sustainable funding itself can not be granted automati-

¹⁵³Lübke H. Im Zug der Zeit, Berlin & New York, 1992. S. 339-340.

cally. Universal funding schemes¹⁵⁴, which are essentially open, aim generally at expanding social activities or facilitating researchers and research teams to build capacities in research areas. The reason why funding is provided is primarily not an «objective reason», but it is «derived» from motivation (and expectations about results), in so far as the essential aspect of interest lies in grounding by ceaseless motivating human actions. It is, therefore, imperative «to become who you are» — the proposition that is not to be understood ontically as «Realize your potential!» but ontologically, that is, who you are, you can only «become it». The groundless of freedom as expressed in Dasein's projection is the only safe ground to stand on. Dasein's interest is the ontological precondition for the ontical activity of projecting / funding.

Thus, this paper presents a contribution to the ontology of modernity. Traditional ontology based on categories of Truth, Good and Beauty is incapable of understanding the phenomenon of human activity in the mobilized world of modernity. Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology reflects the profound revolution of the modernity and provides analytical tools for understanding the challenge of the modernity and its new formula «Truth, Finance, Efficiency».

¹⁵⁴ For example: <http://erc.europa.eu/funding-schemes>

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