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**ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY  
POLITICAL SCIENCE:  
A READER**

Учебное пособие  
по академическому чтению на английском языке

Санкт-Петербург  
2014

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**Никитина Н.А., Данилова О.А.** Issues in contemporary political science: A Reader. Учеб. пособие по академическому чтению на английском языке [Текст] / Авт.-сост.: Н. А. Никитина, О. А. Данилова. — СПб.: Астерион, 2014. — 114 с.

ISBN 978-5-00045-233-2

Настоящее пособие предназначено для студентов 3 курса бакалавриата, обучающихся по направлению 030200.62 «Политология» для развития навыков чтения, а также говорения и академического письма на английском языке и посвящено работе с жанром академической статьи. Пособие состоит из трех частей, выделенных по тематическому и методическому принципам, и включает тексты статей и систему упражнений, направленных на формирование и контроль навыков чтения, говорения и письма, а также лексико-грамматических навыков в области английского языка для специальных целей.

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## FOREWORD

The book is composed for the 3<sup>rd</sup> year students of Political Science studying the English language. The main purpose of the course is to develop the students' skills in EAP and ESP. The main focus of the book is on reading, although it also covers vocabulary and some areas of grammar. The questions that follow each text not only check understanding but also encourage students to express and support their personal views on the issue, thus providing material for developing speaking and writing skills.

The articles which have been selected for the students to read come from leading modern American political science journals and reference books and are written by both native and non-native speakers of English. They are grouped into three sections, *Challenges in Modern Politics*, *Political Communication* and *The History of Political Science*. The course thus starts with more inspiring 'hot' everyday issues and ends with more challenging and abstract topics. The tasks are also introduced basing on the previous sections, so it is advisable to study the sections as they are organized in the book. However, the order may be broken and the texts may be studied separately if this is required by the teacher's / students' goals.

The original texts have been shortened and divided into parts followed by tasks. This is done to facilitate reading and in-class work. The tasks may require skimming, scanning or close reading, so the time of working with each part will vary. Some parts are to be read for subsequent pair- and group-work. The full versions of the texts are recommended for reading at home to prepare summaries and presentations and/or use the information in discussions and debates in class, as well as the students' course essays.

Special attention is given to the structure and style of an academic article. The students will analyze the typical parts of an article: Introduction, Methods, Results, Discussion and Conclusion. The Abstract, its role, contents and structure are also discussed. The tasks cover the ways of presenting a point of view in an academic text, expressing certainty / uncertainty, persuading the reader, referencing and other important functions. It is desirable that after reading a certain passage students should practice doing the same in their own writing.

Vocabulary section at the end of the book revises the central terms of each article, so this section should be consulted regularly. The vocabulary lists can later be used for testing and self-testing. The section also provides the list of linkers from the articles for the students to learn. It is important that students should try to practise using the vocabulary in their own communication, both oral and written.

## 1. CHALLENGES IN MODERN POLITICS

### 1.1 Corruption

#### Text 1

(Adapted from: Dahlström, C., Lapuente, V., and Teorell, J. (2012) The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(3), 656-668).

#### 1.1.1 Read the abstract of the article “The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption.”

##### Abstract

Comparative studies of corruption focus on the selection and incentives of policymakers. With few exceptions, actors who are in charge of implementing policies have been neglected. This article analyzes an original data set on the bureaucratic features and its effects on corruption in fifty-two countries. Two empirical findings challenge the conventional wisdom in literature. First, certain bureaucratic factors, particularly meritocratic recruitment, reduce corruption, even when controlling for a large set of alternative explanations. Second, the analysis shows that other

allegedly relevant bureaucratic factors, such as public employees' competitive salaries, career stability, or internal promotion, do not have a significant impact.

##### Keywords

Corruption, Bureaucracy, Meritocratic recruitment, Public administration

- 1) What will the article be about? What is the object / the aim of the scholars?
- 2) What is the main result of the research and what is new about it?
- 3) Define the keywords.

#### 1.1.2 Read the first part of the article.

Jesus Gil, the mayor of Marbella, Spain, from 1991 to 2003, replaced a professional bureaucracy with political appointees. The result of this absence of bureaucratic checks of elected officials' activities was a corruption network in which some individuals accumulated hundreds of millions of euro. By contrast, during the summer of 2009 the politically appointed county governor in Gotland,

Marianne Samuelsson, granted permission to an important businessman to build by the seashore, which is normally protected by law in Sweden. Samuelsson justified her decision by referring to the businessman's importance. Her actions were exposed by a professional bureaucrat in Samuelsson's staff, and media accused her of setting aside the fundamental legal principle of impartiality. As a consequence, Samuelsson was forced to resign. These examples illustrate the important role professional bureaucrats may play in curbing corruption. The actions and choices of public employees have nevertheless often been overlooked in the comparative literature on corruption. This article argues that the employment terms of public employees and, in particular, the extent to which they are dependent on their political masters are essential for understanding why some states have been able to establish non-corrupt institutions while others are stuck with corruption and bad government.

The current literature on deterrents of corruption focus mainly on the political side of the state, for example, the effect of democracy, electoral systems, or veto players (Andrews and Montinola 2004; Keefer 2007; Montinola and Jackman 2002; Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003; Treisman 2000). There are however only a few examples of studies that consider the bureaucratic side of the state and its role for controlling corruption (e.g., Rauch and Evans 2000). Moreover, despite indications that both political and bureaucratic factors have an impact on controlling corruption, they have rarely been tested together.

This article first develops three hypotheses taking the bureaucratic side of the state into account and second, aims at bridging the gap between the two institutional approaches by testing which political and bureaucratic factors do matter for curbing corruption. To fulfill the second goal, this article uses a unique data set based on a survey completed by 520 experts from fifty-two countries, which, to the best of our knowledge, represents the most encompassing data set on bureaucratic structures at the cross-country level. While the previous literature on bureaucracies relies heavily on socialization of bureaucrats into well-functioning units (e.g., Rauch and Evans 2000), this article suggests a more institutional mechanism, namely, the separation of careers between politicians and bureaucrats. In short, we argue that whereas Marianne Samuelson in Gotland was checked by a professional body of public servants, Jesus Gil in Marbella was able to coordinate his corrupt intentions with the bureaucrats he had himself selected. This mechanism does not require any assumptions about higher competence, higher morals, or in any way a "better" nature of professional bureaucrats as compared to political appointees. Professional bureaucrats are just required to be held accountable differently from politicians: whereas the latter are held accountable before the electorate, the bureaucrats are held accountable to their peers. When politicians and professional bureaucrats thus have different interests to cater to, and their future careers are not intertwined, collusion for taking bribes becomes a more strenuous collective action problem, and thus less likely.

- 1) Make the plan of the introduction by summarizing each paragraph in one sentence.

- 2) Underline the sentences giving information about
  - the lack of knowledge in the sphere
  - the aim of the research
  - the description of the research
  - the main result
- 3) What is your opinion of the scholars' explanation of the bureaucrats' role in corruption?

### **1.1.3 Work in pairs. Student A scans "Existing Political Explanations for Corruption", while Student B scans "Existing Bureaucratic Explanations of Corruption". Share the information you learn from these parts.**

#### **Existing Political Explanations for Corruption**

Although the positive effects from non-corrupt government institutions seem fairly undisputed today, the unanswered question is still why some states have been able to establish non-corrupt institutions while others cannot get rid of corruption and bad government. Generally speaking, the institutionalist literature has focused on political factors as the main explanation. First, numerous cross-country studies deal with the impact of the type of political regime on corruption: are democratic states more or less corrupt than authoritarian states? In particular, many authors have explored what Harris-White and White (1996, 3) or Sung (2004, 179) define as the "contradictory" relationship between democracy and corruption. There seems to be a significant, albeit nonlinear, relationship between democracy and corruption, characterized as either U-shaped (e.g., Montinola and Jackman 2002), J-shaped (e.g., Bäck and Hadenius 2008), or S-shaped (e.g., Sung 2004). One recurrent finding is that in terms of control of corruption and quality of government, younger democracies perform worse than authoritarian regimes and much worse than older democracies (Keefer 2007). Thus, we would expect the level and the years of being a democracy to impact the level of corruption

A second political factor explaining corruption involves the members of the political elite. In particular, empirical studies show that the more women in the national parliament, the lower the level of corruption in a given country (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001). Although the causal direction of this relationship is unclear, the significant effect of the number of women in parliament for the development of certain public policies is a reason to take this relationship seriously (Wängnerud 2009). *Ceteris paribus*, one should expect that women in political positions may matter for reducing corruption.

A third important political factor follows from the virtues associated with separation of powers and, specifically, from Tsebelis's (1995) veto player theory. Along those lines, Andrews and Montinola (2004) predict that the greater the number of veto players, the more difficult it will be for them to achieve the coordination required for engaging in corruption and will thus result in lower levels of corruption. Using a similar argument, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000) maintain that as elected officials in presidential systems cannot make credible commitments to each other, rent-seeking and corruption will be lower than

in parliamentary regimes. Another political determinant of corruption to consider is thus the number of veto players and other political constraints.

A fourth group of political factors is the characteristics of the electoral system. According to comparative studies, the impact of the classical distinction between majoritarian systems and systems with proportional representation (PR) on corruption must be qualified and its different components analyzed separately. One feature linked to PR systems, the existence of large voting districts, has positive effects on controlling corruption as larger voting districts lower the barriers of entry. At the same time, one feature peculiar to majoritarian systems, namely, a higher share of Members of Parliament (MPs) elected in single-member districts, also results in lower levels of corruption as candidates who are elected from party lists have less individual accountability and are thus more prone to engage in corrupt activities (Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003; cf. Kunikova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Chang and Golden 2006). The size of districts and the share of MPs elected in single-member districts thus also need to be taken into account.

In sum, the comparative literature has found that all these political institutions have a significant impact on corruption and this article will therefore include them as alternative explanations in the empirical analyses that follow. This literature has however neglected how the design of the administrative apparatus differs between countries. We therefore now turn to the literature of bureaucratic structures to develop our main hypothesis.

### **Existing Bureaucratic Explanations of Corruption**

The past decade was said to be a “time to rediscover bureaucracy” (Olsen 2005), and numerous authors have defended the Weberian bureaucratic organization (Suleiman 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, ch. 8). Contrary to the view among scholars and international organizations in the 1980s and 1990s, Weberian bureaucracy does not seem to be an “organizational dinosaur helplessly involved in its death struggle” (Olsen 2005, 1). It has in fact been found to have positive effects in terms of good governance— especially in small-*N* studies (Wade 1990; Evans 1995). The Weberian bureaucratic ideal type contains a very large set of structural characteristics: a formalized, standardized, hierarchical, and specialized bureau with professional administrative staffs that enjoy merit-based, lifelong employment and organized careers. However, the diverse components of Weberian bureaucracies may not necessarily occur together in practice (Hall 1963; Olsen 2008). We are thus left with the intriguing question of which characteristics of Weberian bureaucracies may contribute to the control of corruption. Rauch and Evans’s (2000) address that issue in a pioneering study of thirty-five developing countries. They test the impact on corruption of three Weberian components: the level of meritocratic recruitment, the existence of competitive salaries, and the degree of internal promotion and career stability. While the effect of the latter two could not be clearly established, the level of meritocratic recruitment seemed to reduce the level of corruption in the sample of countries that were analyzed. It is however important to note that Rauch and Evans use a formal definition for meritocratic recruitment, as they define it as the existence of competitive formal

examinations and the possession of university degrees among the employees of core economic agencies.

Despite the innovative nature of Rauch and Evans’s (2000) analysis, several reasons justify further study of the relationship between bureaucratic features and corruption. First, Rauch and Evans do not control for the standard political variables of the institutionalism literature. The relationships they find between merit-based bureaucracy and control of corruption might therefore simply be spurious. Second, their sample of thirty-five mostly “semi-industrialized” countries is dominated by countries that are at a critical stage of economic development, which is precisely when bureaucratic characteristics might be more necessary according to the “developmental state” literature (see, e.g., Amsden 1989; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990). As the influence of bureaucratic structures might subsequently have been overestimated, this result needs to be replicated in other contexts. Third, Rauch and Evans do not offer clear causal mechanisms through which the Weberian characteristics deter corrupt behavior among state bureaucrats. This motivates the theoretical contribution of this article: to detect the particular bureaucratic characteristics that are relevant for tackling corruption and identify the causal mechanisms through which they act.

#### **1.1.4 Read the next part of the article and answer the questions after it.**

#### **How Does Bureaucratic Structure Affect Corruption?**

As mentioned, the Weberian bureaucratic ideal type has many characteristics. This article focuses on the group of features that are most often claimed to deter corruption, namely, the characteristics of staff policy. Similar to Evans and Rauch (1999, 749), this article therefore looks at “the relevant determinants of recruitment and career patterns for bureaucrats.”

[...] According to the literature, the first bureaucratic deterrent of corruption is its closedness. Bureaucracies can be grouped or classified according to how closed or open they are (Bekke, Perry, and Toonen 1996, 5; Læg Reid and Wise 2007, 171). Contrary to open bureaucracies (e.g., Netherlands, Denmark, New Zealand), closed bureaucracies (e.g., France, Greece, Spain, Belgium) are characterized by career stability, lifelong tenure, and special laws that cover the terms of employment for public sector employees that differ from the country’s general labor laws. In closed bureaucracies, civil servants have self-managed organizations, generally known as Corps, which enjoy a great deal of autonomy and whose legal status differs from their counterparts in the private sector. It is reasonable to assume that an esprit de corps is created through long-term socialization in closed bureaucracies. This esprit de corps would generate a set of common norms within the bureaucracy, fostering impartial and noncorrupt behavior. According to Rauch and Evans (2000), this is the most decisive mechanism of a Weberian bureaucracy. They maintain that the formation of stronger ties among public employees reinforces the adherence to codified rules of behavior, and “ideally, a sense of commitment to corporate goals and ‘esprit de

corps' develop" (Rauch and Evans 2000, 52). The first hypothesis we will subject to empirical testing is thus that a closed bureaucracy will prevent corruption.

The second bureaucratic deterrent of corruption would simply be a well-paid bureaucracy. The causal mechanism of this second hypothesis (i.e., "temptation") is based on the classical assumption in the economics literature that public servants maximize expected income. Economic incentives, carrots and sticks, should be established so that public servants are not tempted to engage in corrupt behavior (Becker and Stigler 1974). Studies disagree whether the relative level of wages compared to the private sector or their perceived fairness might ultimately deter corrupt behavior. Yet the general idea, while inherently difficult to subject to empirical scrutiny, is that public servants' incentives may be affected by, on the one hand, their wages and, on the other, the probability of detection and the penalty for corruption (Van Rijckeghem). This second hypothesis will also be put to an empirical test. [...]

This article offers a third hypothesis based on an overlooked Weberian characteristic. We borrow the label *bureaucratic professionalism* from Silberman (1993), who distinguished between organizationally oriented and professionally oriented bureaucracies. This article claims that a professional bureaucracy reduces corruption not by selecting more competent agents, but by introducing agents whose interests are known to differ from those of politicians; that is, through a mechanism of *separation of interests*.

A meritocratic recruitment of bureaucrats separates the careers into two different professional groups: elected officials on one side and professional bureaucrats on the other. This results in two groups with different chains of responsiveness and subsequently with different careers. On the one hand, the general implication of this mechanism is well known (for an overview, see Svava 1998, 52). Ever since Frank Goodnow's (1900) statement that some aspects of the bureaucracy may be harmed by politics and should be shielded from it, students of public administration have warned against the negative effects of merging the roles of politicians and bureaucrats (e.g., Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Peters and Pierre 2004; Weber 1978).

Scholars from transaction-cost economics have also noted the potential negative effects of a uniform provider of public goods. Miller and Hammond (1994) formally show that any provider of public goods has incentives to maximize the "residual" inherently generated by the supply of any public good at the expense of social efficiency. For example, the Leviathan in charge of providing public information to a community can lie about the costs of construction to extract higher contributions from the taxpayers. Citizens therefore face the problem of how to "constrain the political leader from giving in to incentives for abuse and inefficiency" (Miller and Hammond 1994, 24). Miller and Falaschetti (2001) stress that while there is no perfect solution to this dilemma, one way to minimize its consequences is to transform the residual-owner into a team of agents with "known different interests." In our case, this conforms to professional bureaucrats and elected officials. As a result of their heterogeneous nature, these agents will face a collective action problem if they want to collude in corrupt activities. In effect, as a

most preferred example of a "residual-minimizing" polity, Miller and Hammond (1994, 23) propose establishing a "professional bureaucrat" who counterbalances the more homogeneous interests of elected politicians.

Applying that reasoning to this article, unlike the prevailing view in the corruption literature that tends to see autonomous bureaucrats as superior, corruption according to our view is prevented not because merit-recruited bureaucrats are "better types" than the political appointee, but simply that they are "different types." Our main point is that both politicians and the professional bureaucracy need to be involved to undermine, and hence deter, corrupt behavior. Relatively high levels of corruption may thus also be expected from an administration that consists exclusively of merit-based bureaucrats without control by agents with a different (e.g., political) nature.

Several empirical examples illustrate this point. For one, there were frequent complaints about corruption and opacity in the most autonomous administrative corps of some bureaucratic authoritarian states such as Franco's Spain (Lapuente 2007, 221-24). Similarly, in Japan, merit-recruited bureaucrats have traditionally been regarded as powerful actors who are autonomous not only in policy implementation, but also in policymaking (Connors 2000, Nakamura 2001). Japan is a clear example of the lack of separation of interests between elected politicians and bureaucrats as they frequently share similar career patterns (Dahlström and Lapuente 2011).

According to the third hypothesis presented here, this integration of careers, and thus the lack of effective internal checks and balances, should lead to opacity and abuse of power. As a matter of fact, the press has blamed the highly autonomous Japanese bureaucracy—a "foggy fortress" wielding "enormous power"—for the "depth of corruption and bad governance" in Japan since the 1980s (*The Economist* 2010). In-depth studies of corruption in West European countries, such as De Graaf and Huberts's (2008) analysis of ten Dutch corruption cases, also point out the negative consequences of closed and enduring relationships among civil servants. One constant finding in the corruption cases in the Netherlands is that "because of loyalty and solidarity, colleagues are hesitant to report suspicions of another's corrupt activities" (De Graaf and Huberts 2008, 646). In other words, in contexts as diverse as Spain, Japan, and the Netherlands, isolated civil servants—irrespective of their "merit" when selected for their positions—may engage in corrupt activities. Autonomous public employment by itself does not seem to have been enough to deter corrupt behavior.

On the micro level, there are two reasons why separating the interests of politicians and bureaucrats, or what we refer to as a *professional bureaucracy*, may hamper corruption. First, introducing bureaucratic agents whose interests differ from those of their principals makes opportunistic actions such as accepting bribes or organizing kickbacks more difficult. While either elected officials or professional bureaucrats may engage in corrupt behavior, this requires coordination with actors who have different interests. Weakening the ties between politicians and bureaucrats generally diminishes the opportunity of collusion between these two types of actors. Second, recruiting individuals from two

different constituencies, one political and the other professional, establishes two parallel hierarchies of accountability. As Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 169-70) point out, “the main difference between top-level politicians and top-level bureaucrats lies in the ways in which they are held accountable. Politicians are held accountable, by voters, at election time. Top-level bureaucrats are accountable to their professional peers or to the public at large, for how they have fulfilled the goals of their organization.” As a result, the careers of professional civil servants are independent from the careers of political incumbents. The future prospects of civil servants, inside or outside the administration, will therefore depend on their professional status and not on following the instructions of politicians. This in turn increases the chances for both types of actors to reveal and expose corrupt acts by the other type. In other words, creating different lines of accountability enables whistle-blowers on either side of the divide to take action against corruption.

These two reasons combined provide the microfoundation for the separation of interest mechanism. Contrary to a political appointee, professional bureaucrats will not have much to gain from playing along if they observe corrupt behavior among politicians. For example, they have no interest in rewarding the supporters of any particular politician because their career is not dependent on the reelection of any political sponsor, but on the judgment of their professional peers. They have, however, much to lose by not exposing corrupt behavior. Their career will be seriously damaged if they are revealed to have known about corruption and failed to expose it. Basically the same argument applies to elected officials or political appointees when they discover a potentially corrupt behavior by merit-recruited civil servants.

- 1) How are bureaucracies classified?
- 2) What are the three hypotheses of the impact of bureaucracy on corruption mentioned in the article?
- 3) Why is separation of bureaucrats and politicians vital? How does it work?

**1.1.5 Read the full version of the article and summarize the main points concerning the data, method and the results of the research.**

**1.1.6 Read the conclusion of the article. Insert the word which have been extracted from it into their proper places.**

“closed”	esprit de corps	meritocratic recruitment	temptation
“different”	fifty-two	separation of interests	

**Conclusion**

The literature on corruption has focused on either political or bureaucratic determinants. By contrast, this article attempts to bridge this gap by testing both types of explanations simultaneously, drawing on an original data set on the administrative structures of \_\_\_\_\_ countries. The empirical results show that first, some bureaucratic factors (most notably the \_\_\_\_\_ of public

employees) exert a significant influence on curbing corruption even when controlling for the impact of most standard political variables. We believe that these variables capture the effect of the bureaucratic professionalism. Second, the results also indicate that another set of bureaucratic characteristics that constitutes the backbone of what the literature defines as \_\_\_\_\_ bureaucratic structure (career stability and formal exams for bureaucrats) do not have any relevant effect. The second finding is surprising since such bureaucratic structures have previously been praised as key deterrents of corruption. The positive effects of separating the bureaucracy from political interferences have been emphasized by influential scholars in public administration since the classical works of Weber (1978) and Goodnow (1900) and have more recently been fueled by the empirical work of Evans and Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Evans (2000). However, the literature on “Weberian bureaucracy” presents some shortcomings. As pointed out by several authors (e.g., Olsen 2008), most important among these shortcomings is that different parts of a Weberian bureaucracy do not necessarily go together. This has limited the ability to analyze which particular features traditionally associated with a Weberian bureaucracy actually matter for deterring corruption. This article contributes to this literature by disentangling the causal relationship between a Weberian bureaucracy and low levels of corruption. We identify two causal mechanisms from the literature, \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_, and add a third one, which we call the \_\_\_\_\_. Our argument is that the essence of a professional bureaucracy is not that merit-recruited employees are “better” compared with politically recruited, but simply that they are \_\_\_\_\_ from elected officials. When it comes to fighting corruption, it is very important, as the two different groups will monitor each other. We interpret the empirical results as an argument against the esprit de corps and temptation mechanisms. Instead, a recruitment process based on the skills of the candidates, which creates a professional bureaucracy, appears to be the most important bureaucratic feature for deterring corruption.

**Text 2**

(Adapted from McKay, A. (2012) Buying Policy? The Effects of Lobbyists’ Resources on Their Policy Success *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(4), 908-923).

**1.1.6 Read the abstract of the article “Buying Policy? The Effects of Lobbyists’ Resources on Their Policy Success.”**

**Abstract**

This study tests the common assumption that wealthier interest groups have an advantage in policymaking by considering the lobbyist’s experience, connections, and lobbying intensity as well as the organization’s resources. Combining newly gathered information about lobbyists’ resources and policy outcomes with the largest survey of lobbyists ever conducted, I find surprisingly little relationship between organizations’ financial resources and their policy success—but greater

money is linked to certain lobbying tactics and traits, and some of these are linked to greater policy success.

**Keywords**

interest groups, lobbying, policymaking, money and politics, Congress

- 1) What will the article be about? What is the object / the aim of the scholar?
- 2) What are the two major achievements of the research?
- 3) How does this abstract differ from the previous one?

**1.1.7 Read the introduction to the article and fill in the table.**

*Types of unfair influence on policy*

	Definition	Examples	Effectiveness
Insider advantages			
Campaign contributions			
Financial resources			

- 1) How does the scholar evaluate previous works on the subject?
- 2) Why was this research carried out?
- 3) How do you think the research was conducted?

*If lobbyists for well-heeled interests in Washington are setting the Agenda on the farm bill, in the energy bill, on health care legislation, and if we can't overcome the power of those lobbyists then we're not going to get serious reform in any of those areas. That doesn't mean they don't have a seat at the table. We just don't want them buying every chair.*  
—Presidential Candidate Barack Obama, August 6, 2007

Both casual and professional observers of politics take for granted that the more money an interest group has, the more likely it is to get what it wants. This study relies on new data about the resources of a broad sample of interest groups

and the outcomes of seventy-seven policy proposals, combined with interviews of 776 Washington lobbyists conducted by Heinz et al. (1993). In examining a wide range of variables at the individual, group, and issue level, the study goes beyond previous examinations of mostly organization-level financial resources. The analysis shows that resources in general have little effect on the probability that lobbyists realize their preferred policy outcome—though some significant relationships do emerge. The data suggest that money alone does not buy success, but how it is spent may matter. While further research on the effects of money in policymaking is needed, the present study indicates that observers who note powerful effects of money on policy outcomes should take a more cautious and nuanced approach.

**Previous Studies of Money in Politics**

Concerns about unfair influence of certain interest groups have pervaded the history of interest group research. In the mid to late twentieth century, a divide emerged between those who thought American interest groups comprise a pluralist system in which every group's unique interests are balanced out by competing groups (Truman 1951; Dahl 1961; Lindblom 1965) and those who believed some interests unfairly influence government by pushing competing groups aside (Schattschneider 1960; Olson 1965; Lowi 1969; Wilson 1973). At least three types of unfair influence have been studied in the literature and are considered here: insider advantages, campaign contributions, and financial resources.

First, the resource of personal connections—the “insider” advantage—has been the subject of democratic concern. The theory of iron triangles, or subgovernments, describes an impenetrable relationship among bureaucrats, congressional subcommittee members, and interest groups who work together exclusively to create mutually beneficial policies to the detriment of the general public (e.g., Freeman 1955; Cater 1964; Gais, Peterson, and Walker 1984). Later work on the supposed “revolving door” (see Bó 2006 for a review) examines the extent to which people work for business and then leave for government, or vice versa, while maintaining their knowledge about, or sympathy toward, their former employer. This possibility has led to a federal law restricting the ability of new lobbyists to pressure their former colleagues in government. Still, the effects of an insider advantage appear to be limited. Heinz et al. (1993) find that more prominent lobbyists (so called notables, as well as lobbyists who know more notables) report significantly more success than non-notable lobbyists— but the difference is small. Nixon, Howard, and DeWitt (2002) show that trade associations, companies, and self-regulatory organizations—“arguably insiders”—were *less* likely than the whole set of commenters to receive favorable decisions by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

A second means of influencing politics with money is campaign contributions to political candidates. These contributions are generally aimed at one or more of three goals: changing the composition of the legislature (by increasing the odds that some candidates will defeat others), buying access to the politicians' precious time and effort (Kau and Rubin 1982; Langbein 1986; Hall and Wayman 1990; Austen-Smith 1995), or buying legislators' votes (e.g., Magee

2002; Wright 1985, 1990). The loose consensus is that campaign money does not usually buy legislators' votes, but may be able to buy a greater level of access for contributors or greater effort by legislators on contributors' behalf (but see Chin, Bond, and Geva 2000).

Finally, many political observers, both in the popular media and in academia, have asserted that interest groups that possess greater financial resources have unfair advantages in policymaking. Schattschneider (1960, 35) referred famously to the "upper-class accent" in the pluralist heaven, and a wealth of scholarship has followed that addresses the extent of "bias" in the interest group system (e.g., Lowery and Gray 2004). In particular, the often greater financial resources of corporations and business associations may give them the ability to influence politicians more easily than groups without comparable resources. Baumgartner and Leech's (2001) inventory of all federal lobbying disclosure reports filed in 1996 revealed that among in-house lobbyists, businesses and trade and professional associations represented 65 percent of all registered lobbyists, lobbied on 70 percent of issues, and spent 85 percent of all reported expenditures. In Yackee and Yackee's (2006) data set of four agencies and forty rules, 57 percent of the comments received came from business interests. And federal data show that between 1990 and 2006, political action committees (PACs) in the corporate and trade/health/membership categories together comprised 58 percent of all PACs and supplied 65 percent of all PAC candidate contributions. Thus, in addition to employing more lobbyists than other types of groups (i.e., nonprofit and citizen groups, government organizations, and labor unions), business interests also dispatch more lobbyists per issue, lobby on more issues, and spend more money per group than other group types.

Considerable work has been conducted to test the proposition that greater spending by organizations results in greater policy success, with mixed results. Most of this research focuses on PAC contributions as the explanatory variable, rather than informational lobbying efforts (Kau and Rubin 1982; Welch 1980; Wright 1985; Evans 1996; Langbein 1986; Humphries 1991; Chin, Bond, and Geva 2000). At least two studies include lobbying expenditures as a predictor of policy outcomes (Drope and Hansen 2004; Baumgartner et al. 2009) and find them to be modestly effective. But other studies of the effects of lobbyists' financial resources on their ability to get what they want out of Washington policymaking find no real relationship. Heinz et al. (1993) treat the number of lobbyists from a single organization as a proxy for the organization's resources and find this number to be insignificant in predicting self-reported success. Mark Smith (2000) finds that despite being one of lobbying's biggest spenders, the Chamber of Commerce is generally ineffective at achieving its policy goals. Kasniunas' (2007) study of interest group congressional testimony finds that an organization's budget and membership size or number of employees does not increase the likelihood that the organization is invited to testify. Even among interest group members, only 3 percent say a large budget is one of the group's two most important resources, and 56 percent said it was one of the two least important (Schlozman and Tierney 1986).

Baumgartner et al. (2009) recently put forth a landmark study similar to this one, using entirely different data. Their interviews of 315 lobbyists and other political actors on ninety-eight issues can be compared to the Heinz et al. (1993) data set of 776 interviews of lobbyists and seventy-seven issues. Among other phenomena, the authors examine whether money may buy policy advantages for the "side" of an issue that has greater organizational wealth. To do this, they create an index of financial resources using the quantity of lobbyists, contract lobbyists, and "covered officials" (lobbyists who recently worked for the executive or legislative branch and therefore may not lobby their former employers for a period), as well as lobbying and campaign expenditures. The authors find "surprisingly low correlations between monetary resources and policy outcomes" (p. 212): the side with a higher value on the resources index wins just 8 percent more often than the lower-resourced side (223). Baumgartner and colleagues do find that resources may matter in indirect ways, such as by increasing the number of high- and midlevel government allies and having lobbyists on staff who recently worked in government, both of which make it more likely that the group will realize its preferred outcome.

The present study builds on this and other work by more fully considering the nature of the lobbying that greater resources might buy—more experienced or more educated lobbyists, better paid lobbyists, more time spent lobbying, more actions taken by lobbyists, greater access to congressional offices, and other lobbyist-specific factors. While these individual-level data were not generally included in the Baumgartner et al. (2009) evaluation, they are potentially quite important in explaining the effects of organizational resources on policy outcomes.

**1.1.8 Read the full version of the article and summarize the main points concerning the data, method and the results of the research.**

**1.1.9 Read the last part of the article and summarize its main points.**

- 1) How sure is the scholar about her claims? Find in the text expressions denoting high degree of certainty / low degree of certainty / argument.
- 2) Are you persuaded with the research results? Explain your position.

### **Discussion and Conclusions**

This study goes beyond previous work focused on interest groups' financial resources to consider the benefits such resources might buy, such as higher quality lobbyists spending more time lobbying in more venues. It builds on the original Heinz et al. (1993) study by adding variables that objectively measure policy success and that capture organizations' overall financial capacity. The evidence suggests that some traits specific to the lobbyist, to the organization, and to the issue are associated with both greater organizational wealth and greater success. While the general picture shows little measurable effect of organizational wealth on groups' policy success, the data suggest that how that money is spent can affect groups' ability to get what they want.

The evidence that some groups' greater wealth buys them higher quality, more successful lobbyists is weak but present. Some indicators of experience and connections are indeed associated with greater self-assessed success (i.e., previous experience as lobbyists or on Capitol Hill), while some indicators of experience or connections reduce the odds that such lobbyists are on the winning side of a proposal (i.e., lawyers, contract lobbyists, and firms that have been in D.C. longer). Lobbyists representing business interests report significantly more success than public interest lobbyists, though business interests are no more likely than public interests to achieve their desired outcome. Similarly, higher income lobbyists report greater individual success, but they are not more likely to achieve their desired outcome nor share in greater success for their side of a proposal.

We see compelling evidence that greater lobbying intensity enhances success. But less often does greater financial wealth makes greater lobbying intensity possible. Some indicators of lobbying intensity are linked to greater financial resources and predict greater success (i.e., contacting Congress, contacting agencies, lobbying in more venues, contributing to a PAC, and making decisions about how PAC contributions are distributed).

Greater resources allow interest groups to lobby in more venues and participate in their employer's PAC, and these factors are associated with greater success. Other variables describing lobbying intensity are linked to greater lobbyist success but are not associated with greater organizational wealth (i.e., having contacts on Capitol Hill or in the administration, working more hours per week, living in D.C., spending more days in D.C. per month, and a greater percentage of time spent on federal matters).

Likewise, composite indices of both experience/connections and lobbying intensity predict greater success as reported by the lobbyist; however, these indices are not significantly associated with greater organizational wealth. Thus some interest groups do more lobbying without more money and achieve success through greater lobbying intensity. But the results are not strong enough to significantly link interest groups' financial resources to their policy success.

Some caveats should be noted. First, the sample selection mechanism means that very low-salience proposals that attract few or no lobbyists are not included. Previous scholars have suggested that low-visibility issues may be more likely to be the subject illicit pressure from campaign contributors than are issues attended to by the American public (Frendreis and Waterman 1985; Grenzke 1989). But the present study addresses lobbyists' resources, not direct donations to politicians. Moreover, the number of lobbyists active on an issue and the level of conflict surrounding it are indicators of salience, and these variables do not have a consistent effect on the dependent variables. Further analysis of the effect of money performed at each level of conflict, and interactions between lobbyists per issue and the two measures of money, provide no evidence that the effect of interest groups' money depends on the salience of the issue. In addition, some previous work links greater interest group influence to *higher* salience issues (Kingdon 1989) or has found little evidence that groups' resources determine their

success in a sample of issues that varies greatly in salience (Baumgartner et al. 2009; but see Lowery 2007).

A similar concern is that the sample of lobbyists and groups is not the universe of all lobbyists employed and active on these issues. As Baumgartner and Leech (2001) show, in 1996 the most salient issues mentioned in lobbying disclosure reports attracted many hundreds of lobbyists; in these data the maximum number of lobbyists working on a single proposal is 263. However, it is clear that interest group lobbying activity has increased notably since the 1970s and 1980s (see Petracca 1992 for a review; Berry and Wilcox 2007), suggesting that 263 was a relatively high number in 1981. Moreover, with nearly eight hundred lobbyists representing more than four hundred employers, the Heinz et al. (1993) data set covers more lobbying groups than any other study before or since, and it is striking how little the variance in resources matters in the groups' success. Heinz and his colleagues (1993, 351) wrote that their most interesting finding was how *little* variation in policy success could be explained by their many variables. Indeed, the highest  $R^2$  presented here is .16, suggesting that policymaking continues to be an idiosyncratic process fraught with normative concerns and unanswered questions. Yet this study adds to the respected body of research that indicates that for lobbyists, money alone does not buy success—but how that money is spent can affect interest groups' ability to get what they want.

#### 1.1.10 Compare the two texts. How do they differ

- in the aim of research?
- in the data and methods?
- in the position of the scholar?
- in style?

### 1.2 Gender Issues in politics

#### Text 3

(Adapted from: Tolleson-Rinehart, S., Carroll, S. J. (2006) "Far from Ideal:" The Gender Politics of Political Science *The American Political Science Review*, 100(4), 507-513).

#### 1.2.1 Read the abstract of the article "Far from Ideal:" The Gender Politics of Political Science.'

1) Political science has mirrored the political culture even as it has explained it, and 2) at critical times the gendering of political science has left it unprepared to explain notable changes in political life. Here, 3) we examine political science as a gendered institution across three critical time periods: the founding era of the discipline, the 1970s and 1980s, and the present. For each period, we assess the presence, position, and experiences of women in the profession; the norms of gender within the discipline; and the way political science deals with women and

gender as subject matter. In general, the position of women in the discipline has improved dramatically over the course of the discipline's first century, and gender-related research has become more institutionalized. Nevertheless, political science has not yet developed a full appreciation of gender as an analytical construct.

- 1) What do you think "gendered institutions" are? Why do they become "gendered"?
- 2) Do you agree that political science is one of them?
- 3) What can be the role of gender as "analytical construct"?

**1.2.2 Read the introduction of the article. Which of the six gaps are most suitable for sentences 1) -3) from the abstract? Where would you expect to find the other sentences?**

\_\_\_\_\_. Nowhere is the power of the culture's influence on what and how the discipline knows more evident than in the gender politics of political science. \_\_\_\_\_ By "gender politics of political science," we mean the processes through which the discipline has itself been shaped by prevailing beliefs about the intersection of biological sex, socially constructed gender, and political life.

Dating back to the classical texts of Western political philosophy, those who have written about politics have assumed a fundamental division between public and private life. Political science has located its most central concepts, particularly power and the state, in the public, and like society generally, has aligned what it means to be a man or woman with public and private. Men have been viewed as public, and thus political, actors; women generally have not. Given these assumptions and the fact that most of its practitioners have been male, it is not surprising that the discipline itself would be gendered. \_\_\_\_\_ As a result, political scientists would be unlikely to see questions of gender until the numbers of women in the discipline increased and events external to the discipline caused a reexamination of the assumption that women are not political. Appreciating changes in the gender politics of political science is necessary to a comprehensive understanding of the discipline's evolution over its first century. The position of women in the profession is an important part of that evolution, but our view of the gender politics of the discipline is broader, requiring an analysis of political science as a gendered institution, albeit one that over the years has experienced a dynamic interplay between changes inside and outside the discipline.

\_\_\_\_\_ Earlier scholarship analyzing the relationship between gender and politics was the foundation for the work of those who have begun to articulate theories of gendered institutions and a gendered state (Acker 1992; Kenney 1996; Duerst-Lahti 2002, 2006; McBride Stetson 2002), and various political scientists have implicitly or explicitly employed this perspective to analyze institutions including legislatures, the executive branch, campaigns, and social and foreign policy (e.g., Duerst-Lahti, 2002,2006; Josephson 1997; Leatherman 2005; Thomas 2005). Although the framework of gendered

institutions has not been used before to look at political science itself, it provides an excellent lens through which to analyze gender in the discipline.

Sociologist Joan Acker theorized that institutions are gendered because gender is "present in the processes, practices, images and ideologies, and distributions of power in [them]" (1992, 567). Institutions inevitably take on the characteristics and preferences of their founders and of powerful external actors (Duerst-Lahti 2006); in this case, the characteristics and preferences are those of masculinity. All actors within an institution have gender; members' experiences within the institution vary according to gender; and most important, gendered institutions "produce, reproduce, and subvert gender," according to Sally Kenney (1996, 456-57). \_\_\_\_\_.

**1.2.3 The abstract mentions "three critical time periods: the founding era of the discipline, the 1970s and 1980s, and the present". Make your predictions about the change of women's role in political science from one period to another. Explain your opinion.**

**1.2.4 Which of the above mentioned periods do these phrases come from?**

- 1) "Politics an Unnatural Practice: Political Science Looks at Female Participation"
- 2) "Although I was given the Ph.D. degree magna cum laude,... no position in political science or in Economics was offered me. The men... went off to positions in College and University faculties"
- 3) "Because political science has long been, and remains, a male-dominated profession at the top, the discipline has a distinctive culture and organizational structure"
- 4) "The wife is very likely to follow her husband's opinions, however imperfectly she may have absorbed their justifications at a more complex level"

**1.2.5 Scan the article and check your guesses. Answer the questions after it.**

THE FOUNDING ERA: THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

Political science became institutionalized as a discipline during the Progressive Era, a period when women were very active in social reform movements ranging from settlement houses to temperance to child labor reform.

Although women did not achieve national suffrage in the United States (despite local exceptions) until the Nineteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution in 1920, the suffrage movement itself had been active since 1848 and was very visible by the time the American Political Science Association was founded in 1903 and the American Political Science Review published its first issue in 1906.

The magnitude of women's activism outside the academy stood in stark contrast to the roles and views of women within the newly forming discipline. Not only were women absent from the list of those commonly considered as the founders of political science, but also women were nearly absent from the discipline. Only 10 women received Ph.D.'s in political science between 1890 and

1919, an estimated 5.5% of all doctorates awarded across the three decades. Women Ph.D.'s increased in number to 27 in the 1920s and to 51 in the 1930s, but those totals represented only 9% of all Ph.D. recipients in each decade (Cook 1983, Table 1). Perhaps more significant than the small number of women who earned Ph.D.'s, women with doctorates found scant opportunities to pursue careers within the discipline. A small number flourished in the more welcoming environments of women's colleges, but overall, very few of these early women Ph.D.s had life-long, academic careers in political science (Cook 1983).

The experiences of Sophonisba Breckinridge, the most famous woman to receive a doctorate in political science in its formative years, illustrate the barriers that capable women faced. Breckinridge earned her doctorate from the University of Chicago in 1901, but, "Although I was given the Ph.D. degree magna cum laude,... no position in political science or in Economics was offered me. The men... went off to positions in College and University faculties" (quoted in Fitzpatrick 1990, 82). Instead, she worked as an assistant to the dean of women and as the assistant head of a women's dormitory. When Chicago opened a law school in 1902, Breckinridge enrolled in its inaugural class and became its first woman J.D. Her former employer, the dean of women, was instrumental in securing an instructorship at Chicago for her after she graduated from law school, but not in political science: it was in the new Department of Household Administration.

Breckinridge went on to have a major impact on the field of social work, teaching the first course in public welfare administration, introducing the case study method of social work, founding the journal *Social Service Review*, and writing and editing more than 30 books (Fitzpatrick 1990). One of them, *Women in the Twentieth Century* (1933), included four chapters on women's involvement in politics, making it the first major book on women to be written by a political scientist. This book was largely ignored by the discipline until recently. It was not cited in such noteworthy works as V.O. Key's *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* ([1942] 1964), David Truman's *The Governmental Process* (1955), or *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960). Its first citation in a political science journal came in 1980, according to the Social Science Citation Index.

One of the most successful and well published of the cohort of women political scientists to follow Breckinridge was Louise Overacker, a student of Charles Merriam at Chicago, who spent her career at Wellesley from 1925 until her retirement in 1957 (Department of Political Science at Wellesley College). Following Breckinridge's advice, Overacker initially tried to find a position at a Ph.D.-granting institution. Although the chair of the political science department at a major state university did offer her such a position, he later retracted it on the grounds that sharing an office with a male professor would be inappropriate for a woman (Cook 1983, 16-17). Like Breckinridge and Overacker, the less renowned women of their cohorts also had careers that were shaped and constrained to a large degree by their gender.

The gender politics of political science in its early years also was evident in its published scholarship. Before the *Review*, the *Political Science Quarterly* was the major journal in the field. Despite women's heightened public involvement

during the Progressive Era and the importance of a massive expansion of suffrage to the structure and processes of American politics, *Political Science Quarterly* published only 10 articles dealing with women (out of 1038) between 1886 and 1925 (Nelson 1989, 6). Similarly, the *Review* published only three articles (out of 406) on women in the years between its birth in 1906 and 1924 (Shanley and Schuck 1974).

John Burgess, who has been called the father of political science in the United States (Somit and Tanenhaus 1967, 3), founded both *Political Science Quarterly* and one of the first two graduate programs in political science (at Columbia University). By all accounts, Burgess was an opponent of women's suffrage (Nelson 1989; Dietz and Farr 1998), but he was hardly alone. His anti-suffrage views were widely shared by other political scientists (Dietz and Farr 1998). For example, the authors of three of the four major text books used in the early 1900s, as identified in 1916 by the Haines Committee of the APS A, opposed women's suffrage (Nelson 1989, 7-8; Shanley and Schuck 1974, 634-35). Women could hardly have felt welcome in a discipline whose leading figures publicly rejected even their right to vote.

In an analysis of the four major textbooks identified by the Haines Committee, Barbara Nelson found them to take a "state-centered construction of politics," emphasizing masculine domains (1989, 8). Early political scientists focused on the state as their central theoretical and analytical construct (Somit and Tanenhaus 1967), and Dietz and Farr (1998) have demonstrated convincingly that the state was conceived in distinctly masculine terms, even to the point of referring to the state as a "man." Their state-centric focus and masculine biases prevented the first generation of political scientists from seeing or understanding the lasting political relevance of women's public involvement in the period; instead, it was left to be unearthed and explained decades later - largely by historians (e.g., Baker 1984; Cott 1987).

The seeming loosening of some gender role strictures during the 1920s and the 1930s and the full mobilization of men's and women's energies during World War II were followed, not by continued change, but by a return to views of the differences between the sexes as extremely deep and broad. The number of women earning doctorates in political science increased in the 1950s and 1960s, but the proportion of female Ph.D.'s fell from its "peak" of 10% in the 1930s to less than 6% of all political science doctorates in the 1950s (Schuck 1969).

In political science scholarship, which had never understood women's mobilization during the Progressive Era, the extant masculine biases entered a comfortable marriage with the flourishing new behavioralism of the 1960s. With few exceptions, the bias took the form of relatively unquestioned assumptions about relationships between biological sex and political behavior - notably, that women were politically disengaged, unsuited to political life, and predisposed to conservatism. The discipline was satisfied to leave these assumptions untested, or tested badly, in ways that the energetic young behavioralists would not have accepted in their other research. Sex was frequently employed as an independent demographic variable in the survey research of the period, but not yet evident was

any idea of gender as an analytical construct that "... illuminates areas of inquiry, frames questions for investigation, identifies puzzles in need of exploration, and provides concepts, definitions, and hypotheses to guide research" (Hawkesworth 2005, 144).

Philip Converse's noted essay, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" (1964), provides a classic example of the absence of gender as an analytical construct. Converse "explained" away women's political engagement (or lack thereof): "The wife is very likely to follow her husband's opinions, however imperfectly she may have absorbed their justifications at a more complex level" (233); his only evidence for this assertion came from dividing his sample by sex and assuming that aggregate results for women reflected their general "opinion follower" status. Later work illuminated the continuum of interactions between gender roles, ideology, belief systems, and political engagement (e.g., Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Carroll 1989; Tolleson Rinehart 1992). At the time, though, the omission of gender as a theoretical and analytical construct left the discipline unprepared to explain what was about to happen.

#### DECADES OF CHANGE: THE 1970s AND 1980s

The contemporary women's movement erupted in the 1960s, and by 1969, political science was beginning to feel the effects of feminism outside and within the discipline. Women entered political science in much larger numbers in the 1960s; the number of doctorates awarded to women in 1967 and 1968 alone reversed the decline begun in the 1950s and brought political science's proportion of women with Ph.D.'s closer to that of other fields. Women who had established successful careers during the 1950s despite the obstacles they faced, like Victoria Schuck at Mount Holyoke, Marian Irish at Florida State University, and Roberta Sigel at SUNY-Buffalo and later Rutgers, were role models for their students in the 1960s. New women political scientists, many of whom were active in the women's movement, began to demand and capitalize on professional opportunities their predecessors never knew, and the discipline as a whole became more reflective about its position as a gendered institution. Major scholarly breakthroughs would follow the transition from using "sex" as a demographic variable to using "gender" as an analytical and theoretical construct in both qualitative and quantitative research.

By the late-1960s, feminist women political scientists were using their growing understanding of the influence of gender to change the discipline. Concerned political scientists, men as well as women, petitioned the APSA to study the status of women in the discipline, and in response the APSA established the Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession (CSWP) in the spring of 1969 (Mitchell 1990). Later that year, at the APSA conference in New York, women scattered handwritten notices around the halls, announcing a meeting to create an organization of women political scientists to apply external pressure on the APSA. That meeting marked the beginning of the Women's Caucus for Political Science (WCPS) - replete with the "consciousness raising" stories with which women resocialized themselves in the women's movement of the day.

Kirsten Amundsen offered a resolution at the business meeting condemning the Roosevelt Hotel, where the meeting was held, for denying her entry into the Men's Bar, the only place in the hotel where food was available by the time the business meetings had concluded. Virginia Gray told of going to the University of North Carolina Press booth to examine new scholarly works, only to be given a copy of the *Wildflowers of North Carolina*, which the press representative had brought along for the "little ladies" (Glad 1979).

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the WCPS, usually in coalition with the CSWP, demanded of the APSA Council that women be placed on all committees, for warded recommendations of women for APSA offices and committee posts, supported open job listings, and pressured the association to provide child care at its meetings (Glad, 1979). The WCPS also spearheaded a successful effort to prevent the APSA from meeting in states that had failed to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment, forcing the association to move its 1979 conference out of Chicago.

Female political scientists did not just craft an agenda of change for the discipline; they were also filling scholarly lacunae. The emergence of "women and politics" scholarship in the 1970s sought to make visible women's political lives and political roles, and to correct the distorted picture of women depicted in the earlier literature. Exemplars of this work illustrate the synthesis of a new critical perspective with a kind of feminist praxis. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick named her path breaking book *Political Woman* (1974), Jane S. Jaquette called her anthology *Women and Politics* (1974). Susan Bourque and Jean Grossholtz directly challenged the discipline in their essay "Politics an Unnatural Practice: Political Science Looks at Female Participation" (1974), and Marianne Githens and Jewel L. Prestage titled their edited volume *A Portrait of Marginality* (1977) as rebuttals to earlier assumptions that women's political roles were inconsequential and their political identities moribund. Similarly, Susan Moller Okin exposed the gendered biases of the Western canon in *Women in Western Political Thought* (1979).

As the women's movement was reaching its peak of effectiveness in the 1980s, changes in the profession and its scholarship were also accelerating. In the 1980 election, men and women appeared to cast their votes for different candidates, and the "gender gap" was born (Mueller 1988). By no means did all of political science acknowledge the gender gap or its significance to electoral and policy outcomes, but this external event brought greater interest and visibility to women and politics research. So, too, did the battles waged over issues associated with women's movements, such as the Equal Rights Amendment and reproductive rights, and the increasing numbers and influence of women public officials in the United States and elsewhere.

Although political science as a discipline had not anticipated these developments, a host of new research projects examining and explaining them were pursued by some of the steadily increasing numbers of women who earned doctorates and joined faculty ranks throughout the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Carroll 1985; Randall 1987; Gelb and Palley 1982; Katzenstein and Mueller 1987; Mansbridge 1986). The journal *Women & Politics*, first published in 1980, served as an outlet for some of this new scholarship, and other new work began to find its

way into the "mainstream" political science journals. More women political scientists and more published scholarship helped the discipline grasp the significance of and analyze feminism's influence on political life to a much greater extent than had been true decades earlier, when the discipline failed to explore the suffrage movement and women's activism in the Progressive Era.

In 1986, after years of organizing the gender politics panels at APSA meetings, the WCPS appointed a committee that established an Organized Section on Women and Politics Research, thus separating the activities of professional advocacy from those of scholarship on gender (Aragon 2003, 38). The name of the Organized Section notwithstanding, one of the most important developments of the late 1970s and 1980s was the transition from the earlier "women and politics" scholarship that attempted to make visible women's political involvement to "gender politics." Gender politics research neither replaced nor displaced the earlier women and politics work but, rather, explicitly introduced gender as an analytical and theoretical framework. Gender politics work also opened new opportunities to explore within-sex differences as well as between-sex differences - for example, by analyzing intersections of race and gender and ideology and gender, or by plumbing the still largely unexamined influence of gender on men's political orientations. Gender politics research emerged in virtually all subfields of political science by the mid-1980s, and became a formal field of doctoral study when Rutgers University created the first women and politics graduate program within a department of political science.

#### THE VIEW FROM MIDSTREAM: ONE CENTURY AFTER THE FOUNDING

As the Review observes its centennial, political science is midstream in the process of becoming a gender inclusive discipline. The glass is half full when viewed against the backdrop of the founding era, but half empty when judged against the objectives of gender parity in professional life and seamless incorporation of gender politics scholarship into the canon.

Women certainly have far more professional opportunities and occupy a more central role in the discipline today than they did in the early 1900s or even the 1970s and 1980s. Perhaps the major sign of progress for women is their presence in leadership positions in the APSA. Year after year, the WCPS, frequently in alliance with the Committee on the Status of Women, advocated for the nomination of women to the APSA Council and to the position of President of APSA. Eventually their efforts paid off. After choosing a succession of 84 male presidents, the association chose Judith N. Shklar as the first woman president of APSA in 1989. In 1996, Elinor Ostrom became the second woman to hold that office. Susanne Hoerber Rudolph was elected as the fourth woman to head the organization the year that APSA celebrated its centennial anniversary, 2003. Rudolph followed Theda Skocpol into office (2002) and was succeeded by Margaret Levi (2003), the first time that APSA had had three women presidents in succession. APSA also is moving in the direction of gender parity among its other officers and council members; two of seven officers and six of 16 council members serving in 2006 are women (APSA 2006).

Women have made progress at the entry level of the discipline as well, earning larger proportions of Ph.D.'s than in the past. They earned 37% of political science doctorates in 2000, 33% in 2001, and 42% in 2002 (APSA 2005a, 3). Women are now as likely as men to be hired at major research institutions (Lopez 2003). Despite that progress, however, women still constitute less than one-fourth of all political science faculty across the country, and they are concentrated in the lower ranks.

In 2006, women were 37% of assistant professors and instructors, 29% of associate professors, and only 18% of full professors in American political science departments; women currently chair approximately 20% of baccalaureate and masters departments, and 17% of Ph.D.-granting departments (Brintnall 2006). Perhaps most troubling however, women are more likely than are men to be hired into non-tenure-track jobs as full time or part-time instructors (APSA 2005a, 4); they held 40% of adjunct positions and 30% of visiting positions in 2006 (Brintnall). Women of color are especially underrepresented on political science faculties (APSA 2005a, 11).

Substantial evidence suggests that the experiences of women in political science still differ from those of men and that the dominant culture of political science is still less comfortable for women than for men - in short, that political science is still very much a gendered institution. The climate for women in political science remains, in the words of Judith Shklar, the first woman president of APSA, "far from ideal" (quoted in Hoffmann 1989, 833). The APSA convened a National Science Foundation-funded workshop in 2004 to consider the status of women in academic political science in the United States. The official report (APSA 2005a), presenting the findings and recommendations of those in attendance, identified major problem areas contributing to the continued underrepresentation of women in political science, including an inhospitable institutional climate, a culture of research that devalues collaboration, and the chronological overlap between the demanding pre-tenure years and the years when family responsibilities are greatest.

The graduate school experience clearly remains influenced by gender. Although women are not significantly more likely than men to leave graduate school before completing a degree, their reasons for leaving differ. For men the most common reason is the lack of employment opportunities; for women the most common reason is their perception that the work environment is unfriendly or unsupportive. Among graduate students, women are less likely than men to report encouragement to publish or assistance in publishing, and they are more likely to report receiving no help in initial job searches (APSA 2005a, 4, 29, 30).

Women faculty also face a gendered work environment, although one where gender dynamics vary from one department to another and are generally more subtle than in the past. The 2005 APSA report observes, "Because political science has long been, and remains, a male-dominated profession at the top, the discipline has a distinctive culture and organizational structure" (APSA 2005a, 6). The effects of this culture are difficult to document because women may not speak out about gender-related difficulties for fear of sanctions. Some departments still have

only one or two women, and given the small proportion of women political scientists who are full professors, it is not uncommon for junior women faculty to be without senior women in their departments, leading Committees on the Status of Women at both national and regional levels to urge departments to implement career mentoring programs for junior faculty. Balancing work and family responsibilities is another problem that needs attention; easing conflict between the two will benefit both female and male faculty (Ackelsberg et al., 2004).

As with the status of women in the profession, there are signs of recent improvement in the position of gender-related scholarship within the discipline. In general, gender-related scholarship has become more institutionalized, and women and politics has become more securely entrenched as an enduring subfield within political science. Two new journals have joined *Women & Politics* (recently renamed *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* and redefined as more interdisciplinary in focus) in publishing gender-related scholarship. The *International Journal of Feminist Politics* has published work on gender politics since 1999, and the first issue of *Politics & Gender*, the official journal of the Organized Section for Women and Politics Research, appeared in 2005. The Organized Section has grown into one of the largest APSA sections, with more than 600 members (APSA 2005b). Scholars have organized around more specialized interests as well; one example is the Feminist Theory and Gender Studies Section of the International Studies Association (ISA), which has more than 200 members and sponsors more than 20 sessions at ISA conferences (Feminist Theory and Gender Studies Section 2005). Finally, centers that conduct research, education, and programming related to women and politics have been established on campuses across the country in recent years (e.g., American University, Iowa State University, University of Massachusetts-Boston, and Nicholls State University), joining the Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP) at Rutgers University, the first such center founded in 1971.

The production of scholarship focused on women, gender, and feminism has grown considerably over the past several decades. Whereas in the mid- to late-1970s a scholar could conceivably read everything that had ever been written or published on women and politics across the entire discipline, in 2006 the same scholar would have difficulty merely keeping abreast of gender related research and writing in her or his specific subfield (e.g., American politics, political theory, comparative politics, or international relations). At the 2005 Annual Meeting of the APSA, by our count, nearly 80 papers focusing on gender and politics were presented on 21 different panels, with 16 panels devoted exclusively to gender-related topics. More gender related research is finding its way into disciplinary journals as well. For example, the *Review* published only 24 articles on women between 1906 and 1991, including three articles in the 1970s and seven in the 1980s (Kelly and Fisher 1993, 544-45). In contrast, in the five years between 2001 and 2005, the *Review* has by our count published seven gender-related articles, equal to the number published in the 1980s, plus a response to one of these articles. Since 1991, the journals that Kelly and Fisher (1993) identified as the "top 15"

have published more than 370 articles, catalogued by key words "women, gender, or feminism" in *Worldwide Political Science Abstracts*.

The scope as well as the quantity of gender politics scholarship has grown. Building on the research of the 1970s and 1980s, some scholars have continued to expand our understanding of women's political roles and influence across a variety of contexts both inside and outside the United States. Others have raised new questions and moved research in new directions, including recent work that focuses on under-studied subgroups of women, especially women of color (see Cohen 2003); on the significance of constructions of masculinity (e.g., Beckwith 2001); on the importance of new concepts such as gender consciousness and feminist consciousness (e.g., Tolleson Rinehart 1992); on broadening our conception of the "political" by examining grassroots activism or challenging the public/private split (e.g., Ackelsberg 2003); on analyzing state feminism (e.g., Lovenduski 2005); on contesting fundamental theoretical assumptions and political concepts such as "power" (e.g., Hawkesworth 2005); and on challenging conventional epistemological assumptions and approaches (e.g., Phelan 1994).

- 1) How has the women's role in political science changed since it was formed? What were the reasons and the main spheres of this change?
- 2) How has the change influence political science?
- 3) Do you think the tendency will continue? Why? What changes may it bring about?

#### **1.2.6. Read the conclusion of the article. Compare it with the last part of the abstract.**

#### **CONCLUSION**

Political science, as a gendered institution, has shown itself to be capable of change over its first century. The status of women has improved, the professional environment has in many ways become more women friendly, and scholarship on gender has expanded in scope and quantity. Nevertheless, gender parity remains an elusive goal. Women are underrepresented at virtually every level of the discipline, from graduate school to APSA leadership, and they continue to face gender-related obstacles in their professional lives. Moreover, women and politics scholarship remains somewhat marginalized in the discipline.

Scholars of women and politics maintain that no aspect of politics can be understood without an understanding of the ways that gender influences underlying assumptions and dynamics, just as the history of political science in its first century cannot be fully understood without an examination of its own gender politics. Although the study of gender and politics poses important epistemological, theoretical, and empirical challenges for the discipline (e.g., Carroll and Zerilli 1993; Flammang 1997), many political scientists remain unfamiliar with gender politics research, even in their areas of expertise. We hope it will not take another century for the discipline fully to appreciate just how critical gender is to our understanding of both politics and political science.

### 1.2.7 Answer the questions.

- 1) What other 'gendered institutions' can you think of? How are they similar to / different from political science?
- 2) What is the difference between the terms 'sex' and 'gender' in the context of political science?
- 3) Do you agree with the idea that "no aspect of politics can be understood without an understanding of the ways that gender influences underlying assumptions and dynamics, just as the history of political science in its first century cannot be fully understood without an examination of its own gender politics"? Explain your opinion.
- 4) Comment on these phrases from the article:
  - All actors within an institution have gender; members' experiences within the institution vary according to gender; and most important, gendered institutions "produce, reproduce, and subvert gender," according to Sally Kenney.
  - In political science scholarship, which had never understood women's mobilization during the Progressive Era, the extant masculine biases entered a comfortable marriage with the flourishing new behavioralism of the 1960s
  - Female political scientists did not just craft an agenda of change for the discipline; they were also filling scholarly lacunae.
  - The glass is half full when viewed against the backdrop of the founding era, but half empty when judged against the objectives of gender parity in professional life and seamless incorporation of gender politics scholarship into the canon.

## 1.3 Authoritarianism

### Text 4

(Adapted from: Solt, F. (2012) The Social Origins of Authoritarianism *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(4), 703-713).

### 1.3.1 Reassemble the sentences to make the abstract of the article "The Social Origins of Authoritarianism."

#### Abstract

1) Elaborating on the social learning approach to authoritarianism, this article argues that economic inequality within countries shapes individuals' feelings toward authority.

- 2) As a result, regardless of their incomes, individuals' experiences are more likely to lead them to view hierarchical relations as natural and, in turn, to hold greater respect for authority.
- 3) Despite much attention to the problematic consequences of authoritarianism, little research focuses on the causes of such unquestioning respect for "proper" authority.
- 4) Multilevel models of authoritarianism in countries around the world over three decades support this relative power theory.
- 5) As differences in condition increase, so does the relative power of the wealthy.

#### Keywords

authoritarianism, social learning, economic inequality, relative power

### 1.3.2 Read the first part of the article. Answer the questions after it.

Why do some people so often just do as they are told? In their unhesitating obedience to orthodox authorities—and indeed, their demands that their fellow citizens similarly obey—such authoritarian individuals are thought to have provided a crucial base of mass support for some of the worst political disasters of the past century, from aggressive war to genocide. The extent to which a country's citizens prefer simply to conform to the pronouncements of "proper" authority or instead are inclined to think for themselves is therefore a matter of great importance.

The many undesirable consequences of greater deference to such authority have been well established empirically over more than a half-century of study. A few examples will suffice. Individuals who are more authoritarian have been repeatedly demonstrated to be more intolerant of ethnic, religious, sexual, and political minorities (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988; Stenner 2005; Mockabee 2007). Greater respect for authority yields ready support for the aggressive use of military force (e.g., Herzon, Kincaid, and Dalton 1978; Kam and Kinder 2007; Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). And higher levels of authoritarianism make individuals much more likely to condone and even endorse illegal and blatantly undemocratic government behavior (e.g., Altemeyer 1981; Geddes and Zaller 1989; Canetti-Nisim 2004).

In contrast, the *origins* of respect for authority are far from certain. This article elaborates on the social learning approach to explaining authoritarianism by arguing that contexts of greater economic inequality shape experiences with authority in ways that should be expected to increase authoritarianism. Multilevel models that bring together data on authoritarianism from the five waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted over more than two decades in dozens of countries around the world, with inequality data from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) provide impressive support for this hypothesis. These findings constitute important contributions to our understanding of both the origins of authoritarianism and the political effects of economic inequality.

## **Economic Inequality and Authoritarianism**

To date, studies of the causes of authoritarianism have taken one of two theoretical approaches; unfortunately, neither provides satisfactory explanations for the wide variations in the extent of deference to authority found across countries and over time. The first approach maintains that respect for authority is innate and genetically determined: some people by their very nature are simply more authoritarian than others (e.g., McCourt et al. 1999; Stenner 2005). If authoritarianism is simply inborn, then large cross-national variation must reflect great differences in the genetic endowment of the populations of different countries, a possibility that is extremely unlikely. As has been observed with reference to other behavioral phenomena, wide variation across countries “precludes a deterministic biological account” (Penner 2008, S140).

The second approach casts authoritarianism as the product of social learning, the result of one’s individual experiences with authority (e.g., Altemeyer 1988, 1996). However, this explanation is ultimately unsatisfying: people may be more authoritarian when they have had experiences with authority that lead them to be so, but the question of why such experiences are more common in some countries and times than others remains unaddressed.

The relative power theory suggests that the answer to this question is economic inequality. It maintains that when economic resources are distributed more unequally, power is distributed more unequally as well (see e.g., Solt 2008). Societies with higher levels of economic inequality are concomitantly more hierarchical, making experiences that reinforce vertical notions of authority more common and so authoritarianism more widespread.

This is perhaps most easily seen with regard to economic relationships. Money is by definition power in the market; a higher level of economic inequality therefore constitutes a more hierarchical distribution of market power. Everyday economic life provides people with a continuous stream of cues about the shape of this hierarchy and their own position within it. When inequality is greater, poorer individuals are more often in positions of subservience. At work, the greater threat posed by unemployment means that they must increasingly submit to the demands of their employers. In the marketplace, they must accept that they have no access to goods and services that others enjoy or risk incarceration. For richer individuals, on the other hand, greater inequality means that it is easier to find someone who will promptly and unquestioningly fill their orders—whether to deliver a new luxury automobile or tend to their lawns and gardens. For both richer and poorer individuals, greater economic inequality makes market relations with others much more likely to be characterized by obedience and deference. Such experiences with authority in the economic sphere should be expected to affect people’s attitudes toward authority more generally. It is difficult to view, for instance, one’s employer as a superior whose orders must be obeyed without question without viewing government officials similarly (cf. Goodin and Dryzek 1980). Conversely, to continue this example, as greater equality erodes the extent to which employers can demand strict compliance from their workers, the habit of obedience to other authorities also fades. This is an observation that de Tocqueville (1990) made

repeatedly: the relative economic equality he saw in the United States in the early nineteenth century led the people there to insist that they were equal in all ways and so to refuse to be deferential to anyone. As economic inequality increases, people are more and more trained by the market to expect command and obedience, and these lessons are then applied in other settings as well.

The relative power theory further suggests that the increased direct exposure to hierarchical experiences just described is complemented by more complete cultural domination. When economic inequality is greater, those among the relatively rich who believe that established authority must always be respected not only are more numerous, they also have more resources to spread this view in the public sphere. Poorer citizens, on the other hand, have fewer resources to resist these efforts in such circumstances, and their greater relative powerlessness leads to “a greater susceptibility to the internalization of the values, beliefs, or rules of the game of the powerful as a further adaptive response—i.e., as a means of escaping the subjective sense of powerlessness, if not its objective condition” (Gaventa 1980, 17). Whether through direct experience or cultural domination, people’s views toward authority are not mere projections of some innate tendency; instead, they reflect the actual social worlds in which they live (see Gabennesch 1972).

The relative power theory is not the only argument linking economic inequality and authoritarianism, however. Insecurity theory provides an alternate understanding of the relationship. In this view, reflexive deference to traditional authority should be understood as a coping mechanism that is adopted when individuals doubt their ability to provide themselves and their families with the necessities of survival and inclusion in their societies (see e.g., Inglehart and Baker 2000). The psychologically damaging effects of feared or actual deprivation and social isolation are countered by clinging to the refuge of unquestioning obedience to authority: one cannot be faulted, much less stigmatized, if one “plays by the rules” laid down by traditional authorities. Because economic inequality increases the insecurity of a society’s poorer members, they should be expected to become more authoritarian as inequality increases. But because greater economic inequality means not only that the poor are poorer but also that the rich are richer, more inequality should reduce authoritarianism among the more affluent. In other words, the insecurity theory predicts that the effect on one’s attitudes toward authority of the distribution of economic resources varies depending on where one falls within the distribution: more inequality should increase authoritarianism among the poorer members of a society but decrease the authoritarianism of richer members.

Whether greater economic inequality increases authoritarianism among all members of a society, as suggested by the relative power theory; only among the poor, in accordance with the insecurity theory; or not at all, as deterministic arguments for innate and genetic causes would have it, has yet to be examined empirically. This article provides a first test.

1) What is authoritarianism? What are its effects on the society?

- 2) What are the four explanations of the origins of authoritarianism mentioned in the introduction? What are their drawbacks?
- 3) What is the aim of the research? How do you think it was conducted?
- 4) What is the scholar's hypothesis? Do you consider it reasonable? Why?

### **1.3.3 Read the full version of the article and summarize the main points concerning the data, method and the results of the research.**

### **1.3.4 Read the conclusion of the article. What information does it give?**

#### **Conclusion**

Despite a resurgence in research on authoritarianism and its consequences in recent years, relatively little progress has been made in explaining its causes. Building on the social learning approach to understanding why some people are so willing to uncritically obey the directives of orthodox authorities, I have argued that the context of economic inequality shapes individuals' experiences with authority and so their attitudes toward it: people will be more likely to simply defer to authority when they live in societies that are in fact more hierarchical. The evidence presented by this study provides powerful support for this relative power theory. Across the countries and over time, where economic inequality is greater, authoritarianism is substantially more widespread among all citizens, regardless of their incomes.

The vast literature on the authoritarianism's effects suggests that this finding has a number of important implications. Research into authoritarianism began as an effort to find the roots of widespread intolerance for Jews in Nazi Germany (Adorno et al. 1950), and the powerful relationship between authoritarianism and intolerance for minorities of virtually all kinds has been well established since then (see e.g., Stenner 2005). That economic inequality stimulates authoritarianism, then, suggests that redistributive policies should be an effective means of reducing tensions across lines of ethnic or religious difference, curbing discrimination against sexual minorities, and gaining greater respect for advocates of uncommon political views. Conversely, failure to address rising levels of inequality should be expected to yield more intolerance.

Authoritarianism has also long been linked to xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment (see e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 2009); this work therefore sheds additional light on the conditions that promote the acceptance and incorporation of immigrants. Crepez and Damron (2009) recently found that in a cross-section of fifteen advanced democracies, people living in countries with social-democratic, decommodifying welfare policies are less likely than those where benefits are residual and means-tested to believe that immigrants reduce wages, take jobs away from native-born workers, and are a drain on public services. That higher levels of inequality induce more authoritarian attitudes in countries around the world, most of which have limited welfare spending of any

sort, suggests that it is not merely the universalistic form of such social-democratic policies, as Crepez and Damron (2009) argued, but also their inequality reducing economic consequences that lead to a greater acceptance of immigration. If economic inequality rises despite universalistic welfare policies, xenophobic responses to immigrants can be expected to increase as well (cf. Jesuit, Paradowski, and Mahler 2009).

Another and perhaps even more alarming implication relates to the risk of international conflict. A long line of research has demonstrated that more authoritarian individuals are much more likely to prefer the use of military strength over diplomatic means and to advocate the aggressive use of military force (see, most recently, Kam and Kinder 2007; Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Because they spur authoritarianism, then, higher levels of economic inequality can be seen as a potential threat to the peaceful resolution of international disputes.

Finally, the results presented here underscore the importance of a sophisticated understanding of genetic influences on political phenomena like authoritarianism. By examining twins reared together and apart, McCourt et al. (1999) sought to isolate the genetic and environmental influences on authoritarianism and concluded that genes accounted for about 50 percent and environment just 35 percent of the variation observed. But as Charney (2008) pointed out, biologists and geneticists generally reject such efforts to separate "nature" from "nurture." They instead recognize that genes and environment interact to generate complex characteristics: the environment influences the action of genes and genes influence an individual's sensitivity to the environment. In other words, due to differences in their genetic inheritance, some individuals will exhibit a given trait when the relevant environment is even mildly stimulating, but others will manifest that trait only in a much more stimulating setting, if ever. In any given environment, the trait will exhibit considerable heritability—that is, those who display the trait will tend to differ genetically from those who do not—but in mildly stimulating environments the trait will be much less common than in very stimulating ones (see e.g., Wahlsten and Gottlieb 1997; McClearn 2004). Viewed against the backdrop of the finding by McCourt et al. (1999) of substantial heritability, then, the sharply increasing frequency of authoritarian attitudes with rising economic inequality found here is powerful evidence of gene-environment interaction: genes alone do not predestine one to authoritarianism regardless of context.

This, in turn, has profound implications for democracy. Reasoning from the proposition that the heritability of authoritarianism renders it fixed and immutable, Stenner (2005) concluded that nothing can be done to ensure the survival of democracy but give in to the demands of the most authoritarian individuals. Mincing no words, she recommended discouraging open dissent, insisting that minorities conform, and demonizing foreigners. One might reasonably question to what extent democracy could possibly survive these "hopeful" but "clear-eyed" prescriptions (Stenner 2005, 329).

In the presence of gene-environment interaction, however, heritability does not imply immutability at all (see e.g., Wahlsten 1997). It is well established, for example, that height is extremely heritable: relatively tall people in any society are very likely to have had relatively tall biological parents, even if they were adopted. But height is also well understood to be the result of the interaction of genes with certain manipulable aspects of the environment, and so its heritability does not put it beyond the reach of policy. In fact, the effects of improvements in public health and in the availability of nutritious food are readily observed in increased heights from one generation to the next as well as changes in cross-national differences in height over time (see e.g., Charney 2008).

By demonstrating that authoritarianism is profoundly shaped by the level of economic inequality in a society, therefore, this article suggests a very different set of recommendations than those Stenner (2005) offered to avoid the dangers to democracy posed by authoritarianism. Redistributive policies, by shrinking economic inequality, erode the hierarchies that make holding an uncritical respect for authority appear reasonable among those who may be genetically predisposed to be especially sensitive to this part of their environment. The resulting declines in authoritarianism would reduce intolerance of minorities, acquiescence to unlawful government action, and aggression against outsiders. The democracy so preserved would indeed be worth saving.

- 1) Do you find the conclusion typical? Why / Why not?
- 2) Do you think the scholar means to be persuasive? What language does he use?
- 3) Does he persuade you? Why / Why not?

### **1.3.5 Do you agree with the main points of the article? Discuss the origins / consequences of authoritarianism and the suggested solutions to overcome it.**

#### **1.4 Religion and politics**

##### **Text 5**

(Adapted from: Wald, K. D, Wilcox, C. (2006) Getting Religion: Has Political Science Rediscovered the Faith Factor? *The American Political Science Review*, 100(4), 523-529).

#### **1.4.1 Read the first part of the article “Getting Religion: Has Political Science Rediscovered the Faith Factor?” Have you read scientific articles about religion in politics / political science. If you did, share your experience. If no, think why you have not.**

*To judge by the absence of religion from the pages of the American Political Science Review in its first century, most political scientists have embraced a secular understanding of the political world. We explore the*

*evolving status of religion in the discipline by examining patterns of scholarly inquiry in the discipline's flagship journal. After finding religion an (at best) marginal topic and rejecting some plausible hypotheses for this outcome, we examine the major reasons religion has received so little attention - the intellectual origins of the discipline, the social background of practitioners, the complexity of religious measurements, and the event-driven agenda of political science. Despite the resurgence of scholarly interest in religion during the 1980s, the status of the subfield remains tenuous because of the intellectual isolation of research on the topic.*

Rooted in moral philosophy, modern social science owes much to the reformist zeal of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The many pioneers in sociology, economics, and political science who had strong religious backgrounds, who often were themselves clergy or children of clergymen, attest to the influence of the Social Gospel in the early behavioral sciences (Blum 1956; Fox 1993; Reed 1981; Ross 1991). As political science became a professional academic discipline, responding to the imperatives of the academy and scientific specialization, the religious and missionary zeal that characterized the early years waned (Somit and Tannenhaus 1967). Although political scientists in fields like political philosophy and public law continued to explore religion and public order, there was much less interest in religion among the profession as a whole, especially when the behavioral approach gained ascendance after World War II. Work on religion was largely relegated to the margins of the discipline, not to return until the 1980s. Using the Review as a case study, we examine the trajectory of scholarship on religion in politics.

#### **THE TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN THE REVIEW**

Apart from economics and geography, it is hard to find a social science that has given less attention to religion than political science. Unlike most social sciences, political science has no specialized journal of religion and politics, although such a journal is currently being organized. To see how religion has been treated by the mainstream of the discipline, we thus turn to the flagship journal of the profession. The American Political Science Review has long been the most selective and influential journal in the discipline, the agenda-setter for political science (Garand and Giles 2003). Access to its pages has provided an imprimatur available from no other outlet.

Utilizing the Jstor archive, we initially conducted a title search for articles using a comprehensive list of religious terms. The search yielded a total of 35 articles that used one or more of the terms. A record of one article with religious content every 3 years seems to illustrate inattentiveness. Even that estimate overstates the recognition of religion because it includes articles in which the religious term was purely descriptive rather than analytical. For example, though ostensibly a religious study, Modelski's "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World" (1964) used "Hindu" largely to locate the study geographically rather than as an important element in the analysis. By contrast, Sarkar's "Hindu Theory of International Relations," published in 1919, was much more anchored in Hindu religious texts and centered on the

transmutation of religious ideas into the political realm. Of the 35 articles with a religious term in the title, we judged that 21 were strongly concerned with religion – a rate of one such article every 4-plus years.

Relying on title alone might underestimate the representation of religion in the pages of the Review. From abstracts that became available only in 1978, we found an additional 27 articles with one of the designated religious terms. This additional set of articles does not indicate a commensurate growth in centrality of religion to political science research. Articles with a religious term in the abstract alone were much less likely to evince a strong interest in religion than studies with a religious term in the title. Specifically, just four of the 27 articles with religious terms in the abstract alone were strongly concerned with religion as a political factor. The use of a more liberal search strategy reaffirms religion's marginal status in the discipline's flagship journal.

The marginality of the topic is further evident in the subfield concentrations of articles with a religious term in the title and/or abstract. Religion was most likely to be a central concern in articles classified as normative/political philosophy and public law, with much smaller representation in the other subfields. Half of the 62 articles with religion in the title and/or abstract were concentrated in public law or political philosophy. Narrowing the range to just those 25 articles in which religion was the central intellectual focus, these two fields alone supplied more than 80% of the religious articles, leaving religion largely absent from other subfields. Indeed, prior to 1960 only a single Review article sought to use religion as a variable to explain empirical phenomena. Six studies were published during this period exploring religion and political theory, and four that investigated church-state issues in constitutional law.

With the upsurge in religiously-based political conflict in the United States and the Muslim world in the early 1980s, we expected greater coverage of religious themes in those fields. But from 1980 on, just one article in American Government put religious factors at the center of analysis; and just two, in comparative politics. One article so identified was Lijphart's seminal comparison of electoral cleavages in four multicultural societies. Tellingly, Lijphart explained the strong religious differences in contemporary vote choice as remnants of a "frozen" cleavage structure inherited from the nineteenth century rather than the reflection of a vital conflict with a future.

The inattention to religion in the Review might reflect a general lack of interest in cultural variables, a dearth of publishable research on the subject, or the same indifference to religion exhibited by other social sciences. We can reject these plausible scenarios with data based solely on title terms. Prior to 1960, the Review had published as few articles about race ( $n = 6$ ) and gender ( $n = 10$ ) as about religion ( $n = 10$ ). During a period of global identity politics from 1960 to 2002, when the Review allocated space to just 25 articles with a religious term in the title, it published 22 articles about gender and 38 on race, suggesting that the problem was not lack of interest in cultural variables per se. Nor does the explanation for the scarce appearance of religion in the Review appear to be an absence of publishable work. During the 1960-2002 period that produced just 25

Review articles titled with a religious term, the Journal of Politics found room for 42 articles and Political Theory, which began only in 1973, published 47 such pieces. In just 3 years when it was edited by a political scientist, the interdisciplinary Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion published more articles on religion by political scientists (28) than the Review managed in the entire post-1960 period. The hypothesis that inattention to religion in the Review typifies the social sciences is undermined by publication patterns in sociology. From 1906 to 2002, the American Journal of Sociology and American Sociological Review each printed four times the number of articles with a religious title term as their political science counterpart. The openness of the Review to cultural variables and the publication of so much research on religion by other top-flight journals in political science and sociology suggest that something militated against the representation of religion in the pages of the discipline's flagship journal.

- 1) What is the aim of the research?
- 2) What are the scholars' suppositions concerning the reasons for the lack of attention to religion in political science?
- 3) Does religion get scientific attention in Russia? Why / Why not?

**1.4.2 Work in pairs. Look at the three reasons of scientific neglect mentioned in the article. Write three questions concerning every reason. Discuss them and try to predict the answers**

- 1) Disciplinary Origins
- 2) Social Background
- 3) Complexity of Subject and Measurement
- 4) The Issue Attention Cycle in the Discipline

**1.4.3 Work in groups of 4. Read about each reason. Sum up the information for the rest of the group.**

#### SOURCES OF NEGLECT

If religion has been relatively neglected by the discipline's major journal, there were doubtless a number of reasons. For some critics of the academy, the underrepresentation of religion reflects an antireligious bias said to permeate academe in general and political science in particular (Rothman, Lichter, and Nevitte 2005). We believe the answer is far more complex and originates with the nature of political science as an academic discipline, specifically the intellectual development of the field, the social backgrounds of scholars, obstacles to empirical research on this subject, and the agenda-setting process in political science.

#### **Disciplinary Origins** (*Student A*)

Had political science drawn as heavily on classic European social theory as did sociology, it might well have paid more attention to religion as a vital force. Although they differed considerably, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim shared a strong interest in the role of religion in society and politics. Coming from

politics with strong confessional parties, they took for granted the political significance of the religious factor in a way that American political scientists did not. To the extent that these classic thinkers influenced subsequent scholarship in American political science, Marx's reductionist approach to religion captured most of the interest. Consider Stuart Rice's oft-quoted characterization of elections as the democratic expression of class struggle. Perceiving class as the "real" underlying force in electoral behavior, political scientists seldom recognized the religious dimensions of mass politics so ably chronicled by other social scientists. Even when recognized, as Lijphart's comment (above) suggested, religious forces were perceived as epiphenomenal, fossilized remnants of an *ancien regime*.

Perhaps the religious factor was relatively neglected in the Review because it fit neither the legal institutional framework that dominated the early years of the discipline nor its later positivist turn to behavioralism and empiricism. An extra-legal component of a liberal political order, religion was not central to the institutional realm of government except insofar as it impinged on law, thus confining early work on religion to church-state matters. The empiricist/behavioral approach similarly offered relatively limited scope for religious inquiry, perhaps because of data issues but also because political science paid attention to a narrower range of dependent variables than did sociology.

Even had they been disposed to recognize the significance of religious conflict in politics, the overwhelming commitment of American political scientists to liberal values and the democratic ethos (Crick 1967) may have deterred academic investigation. From the founders onward, institutional religion was widely perceived not as a constituent element of the democratic order but as a potential threat to it that needed to be tamed. This reflexive Madisonian orientation is perhaps most visible in the "modernization" approach in post-World War II comparative politics. Modernization theorists treated religion as part of the traditionalist order destined to be swept away (secularized) or compartmentalized (privatized) by the inexorable march of urbanism, science, and the market economy. In the realm of governance, students of political development defined modernization as "separation of the polity from religious structures, substitution of secular modes of legitimation and extension of the polity's jurisdiction into areas formerly regulated by religion" (Smith 1974, 4). By definitional fiat, religion was conceptualized as an obstacle to effective development, capable of a positive contribution only in its capacity to promote social mobilization.

### **Social Background Student B**

The Carnegie national surveys of college faculty in 1969, 1975, and 1984 confirm that most political scientists have little interest or involvement in religion. With little exposure to religion and few colleagues or friends who were religious, political scientists naturally accepted that religion was of little and declining importance to politics. One certainly does not have to be religious to study religious influences in politics, but a lack of familiarity with religion is likely to discourage inquiry.

Although nearly all political scientists in these surveys reported having been raised in a faith tradition, nearly a third in 1969 and 45% in 1984 reported "none" as their current religion. The 1969 survey included enough political scientists to explore differences across faith traditions. Between 27% and 33% of those raised in a Christian or Jewish faith reported no current religion, as did 20% of those raised in an "other" faith tradition. Political scientists (and other social scientists) are significantly less likely to have a religious attachment than are faculty outside the social sciences.

Political scientists also show low and declining levels of personal religiosity. In 1969, more than 61 % attended church a few times a year or less, and most of these selected once a year or less (the survey did not have a "never" option). In 1984, only 6% of political scientists reported being deeply religious, compared with 53% who were indifferent or hostile to religion. Indeed, more than twice as many political scientists reported being hostile to religion in 1984 as were deeply religious. But political scientists are far more likely to be indifferent to religion than hostile. Hostile scholars might investigate the impact of religion on politics, whereas the indifferent merely underestimate it.

Moreover, in each survey, those who were the most professionally active - who attended the most professional meetings, published the most articles and books, who thought of themselves as researchers more than teachers, and who taught at top-ranked Ph.D.-granting universities-were more likely to be secular than other political scientists. In the 1969 survey, scholars who spent more time on research, who considered research to be their top priority, who published the most articles, and who worked at the most prestigious institutions were all less religious than others in the discipline. Among those who were affiliated with top- or medium quality universities or top colleges, who spent an hour or more a week on research, who made research their top priority, and who had published 11 articles or more in their career, nearly 90% attended church a few times a year or less, nearly 80% were indifferent or hostile to religion, and nearly two-thirds listed "none" as their current religion.

Thus, those who set the research agenda for the profession were almost universally uninvolved in organized religion and indifferent to it more generally. Almost certainly their colleagues, and most likely their friends and neighbors as well, were nonreligious. It is not surprising that they largely ignored the role of religion in explaining politics.

### **Complexity of Subject and Measurement Student C**

For scholars with little exposure to religion, its sheer complexity and the challenges of measuring it constitute a barrier to entry to the topic. Scholars have shown that it is important not merely to know how religious one is, but also how one is religious (Leege and Kellstedt 1993). And how one is religious can be conceived of and measured in many ways (Leege 1996).

Consider briefly the complexity that faces scholars seeking to incorporate religion into models of voting in the United States. Early studies distinguished among Protestant, Catholics, and Jews, but the National Election Study in 2004

had 135 categories of religious affiliation, including 18 for Baptists alone. And growing numbers attend nondenominational megachurches and worship outside the Judeo-Christian tradition, which make denomination complicated. Denomination is even more complicated in settings outside of the United States, for the same faith tradition may take on radically different political configurations in different countries.

Over the years the NES has asked about religious affiliation, behavior and practice, doctrine, and identities, exposure to elite communications from televangelists or groups that pass out voter information in churches. From this, scholars have operationalized groups like "evangelicals" using denomination, doctrine, or self identification, and drawn distinctions among theological groups with more obvious similarities than differences.

Religiosity is more complex than frequency of attendance at services; some faiths have more regular private and semipublic rituals, and in many traditions private devotionism may be associated with different political attitudes and behaviors than public involvement in religion. Religious beliefs also matter, as doctrine helps some people form and prioritize political opinions, but the implication of the same doctrine may differ according to race, gender, region, and other factors. Doctrinal differences have been extensively studied among conservative Protestant Christians, with inconsistent terminology and differing operational definitions, but less studied among Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and others, and far less studied outside of the United States.

Individual congregations form cohesive political communities, which can have an influence beyond that of denomination and doctrine. Some churches become more political than others, even within the same faith tradition and the same community, as religious elites or communities of congregants come to see connections between their faith and politics. Some faith traditions are centered in a text, which may provide resources for religious elites to mobilize adherents; others are based on accumulated doctrine or ecstatic experience. And the meaning of each of these varies within the same tradition across nations, and across cultures within nations. To add yet more complexity to the measurement challenge, some traditions cohere primarily not around doctrine but around common sacraments that affirm predominantly communal, quasi-ethnic bonds of loyalty.

#### **The Issue Attention Cycle in the Discipline *Student D***

The Review's relative indifference to religion may also have owed something to the dynamics of the discipline's agenda. A flagship journal is likely to reflect real-world developments and headlines that intrude on the attention cycle of political scientists, driving the academic agenda and structuring grant opportunities.

For most of the postwar era, religion did not command headlines or become the basis for lucrative grant research. Federal agencies that sponsored broad ranging programs of academic grants were leery of religion because of the church-state boundary. The inclusion of a religious preference question in the 1957 Current Population Survey occasioned a ferocious counterreaction that precluded

such queries in subsequent surveys (Foster 1961). Private foundations did invest heavily in academic research to reduce intergroup tension and promote religious tolerance, but they funded mostly psychologists and sociologists. When religion briefly came to public attention in the 1960s with the issue of John Kennedy's Catholicism most commentators read the election as evidence that religiously based electoral conflict had been put to rest.

In the late 1970s, several developments forced even the most resolutely secular of academics to recognize the importance of religion. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was a particularly telling blow to secularization theory in political science. The Shah's Iran was often cited as an exemplar of Third World modernization and Reza Shah Pahlevi himself, more so than any candidate since the arch-secularist Attaturk, seemed the prototype of the modernizing leader. Whereas few might have been surprised had a Khomeini-like figure emerged in other societies, this was altogether unexpected in Iran.

As Iran became an Islamic republic, the United States developed its own theopolitical social movement, the Christian Right. The sudden emergence of Christian conservatism as an organized political force surprised observers who were unaware of the constancy of religiously inspired political activism in American history (Lienesch 1982). Observing the prominent role of clergy in liberal campaigns for civil rights, peace, and social justice causes, scholars were prone to overlook the portents in grassroots campaigns against the Equal Rights Amendment, gay rights laws and "godless" textbooks (Crawford 1980). Hence few political scientists anticipated the emergence of a conservative Christian movement calling for a return to traditionalist Biblical values.

As if more stimulus were needed, scholars also observed the growing power of religion in political conflicts around the globe. In Bosnia, where religioethnic tensions were thought to have been successfully managed by Tito's Yugoslavian regime, ambitious politicians seized the mantle of religious nationalism as a path to power. The consequence was a bloody civil war. The officially secular Indian state was rocked by several outbreaks of religious violence that culminated in the electoral victory of a Hindu nationalist party. Various European states are now grappling with a new series of church-state issues that have arisen with the Muslim influx. In the Americas, the rise of evangelical Christianity has re-defined some political alliances while the United States has experienced the increasing salience of religion to candidate and party mobilization. With such ferment in American, comparative, and international politics, how did the discipline react?

#### **1.4.4 Answer the questions.**

- 1) Which reasons for neglect of religion are considered by the scholars universal and which – typically American?
- 2) In which subfields of political science are religious questions most complicated?
- 3) What is "issue attention cycle in the discipline"?
- 4) Why cannot academic politology keep the pace with political reality in the sphere of religion?

5) What are the disadvantages of underestimating religion in political science?

**1.4.5 Read the last part of the article. Answer the questions after it.**

**THE REDISCOVERY OF RELIGION**

From 1980 on, the Review still published few studies about the subject, but scholarship on religion and politics was institutionalized in several key domains. Perhaps the most important development was the formal establishment of the Religion and Politics section within the American Political Science Association. The section grew out of the "Caucus for Faith and Politics," a group of Christian political scientists, predominantly Americanists, who did not want to segregate normative faith and academic scholarship. An affiliated group of the APSA, the Caucus received a few coveted slots for research presentations at the APSA annual meeting. When the Association chose organized sections as the principal means for allotting panels, sectarian affiliated groups had an incentive to transform themselves. After reformulating itself as a nonreligious organization devoted to scholarship, open and welcoming to all APSA members, the Caucus petitioned for section status, obtained such recognition in the late 1980s, and dissolved as a separate organization. The resulting Section on Religion and Politics has thrived, with a recurring membership of approximately 500 political scientists.

Recognition of the subfield owed much to encouragement from senior scholars not affiliated with the Caucus and not generally considered specialists on religion and politics. Their support arose because their own research turned up persuasive evidence of the significance of religion in contemporary American political life. Some of the major works included Miller and Shanks' *The New American Voter* (1996), Verba, Scholzman, and Brady's *Voice and Equality*, (1995), and Wildavsky's (1984) studies of political leadership in the Jewish tradition. The work of these disciplinary stalwarts and APSA leaders helped confer legitimacy on research about religion and politics outside of normative political theory.

The emerging research field received further impetus from the American National Election Studies. (ANES). Supported by National Science Foundation grants, ANES produced large biennial surveys of the American population that played a central role in studies of mass politics. Although the scholars who created ANES recognized the importance of religion in their scholarship (Converse 1966), the religious questions on the survey were limited and afflicted with severe measurement error. Students of religion in American elections often turned to alternative datasets because of these flaws. Prompted by the ANES staff and the research community, the ANES Board improved and expanded religious coverage (Leege and Kellstedt 1993), making it easier for scholars to explore religious influences on participation and vote choice. Empirical research also progressed thanks to the periodic religious module in the General Social Survey, specialized surveys on religion and politics conducted by the Pew Center, and the development of cross national surveys like the World Values Study and the Eurobarometer.

Notwithstanding these developments, we are not confident that the subfield of religion and politics can take for granted its centrality to the discipline. The failure of the Review to publish more articles about this subject despite propitious circumstances in the world emphasizes just how tenuous the field's newly found popularity may be. With the discipline's agenda subject to fashion and events, the subfield of religion and politics may lose interest as quickly as it was attained - the fate of political socialization research. To avoid that, scholars in the subfield must demonstrate scientific payoff and eschew scholarly isolation. Yet review essays about religion in American politics argue that the subfield has paid insufficient attention to the intellectual significance of its work for the larger discipline (Jelen 1998, Leege and Kellstedt 1993, Wald et al. 2005). Whether dealing with the Christian Right in the United States, Muslim politics following 9-11 or other topics, much research on religion in politics has adopted a "current events" perspective that does not tie inquiries to broad questions that engage the discipline. Such work suggests that religion in politics is of interest only to people with strong religious values, not to political scientists generally.

Patterns of membership in the organized section on religion and politics provide some evidence of scholarly isolation. Scholars from religiously affiliated colleges and universities constitute about a fifth of the section, a percentage we suspect is far higher than in the entire APSA membership. Although these members come from a wide variety of institutions, often received their training in nonreligiously affiliated institutions, and vary widely in terms of interests and focus, the large proportion of such faculty at least suggests the possibility that the Section has an identity politics flavor.

More significant, members of the Religion and Politics section are unusually concentrated in their scholarly interests. The Religion and Politics section has the lowest rate of organized section cross-membership of any of the 36 organized sections. Although there are concentrations of Religion section members in a few other sections, the largest cases of overlapping membership are in fields where research on religion has been traditionally enconced, public law and political philosophy, rather than fields where religion would represent a new line of inquiry. As a comparison, consider the Race and Ethnicity section, which is close in size to the Religion and Politics group. A fifth of the members of that section also belong to the Women and Politics section and an equal percentage are affiliated with the Urban Politics organized section. If we assume that section membership tells us something about patterns of disciplinary communication, these differences suggest that research on race and ethnicity is more likely to be informed by the insights from other subfields and less likely to be self-referential than work on religion and politics.

The data also speak to the exposure of other fields to scholarship on religion and politics. In the other section to which they are most likely to belong, Foundations of Political Theory, scholars of religion and politics constitute just 13% of the membership. By contrast, researchers from the Race and Ethnicity section make up nearly a third of the membership of the Urban Politics section and a fifth of the membership in the section on Women and Politics. We should thus

expect the insights and findings of work on race and ethnicity to be disseminated broadly among related subfields, whereas scholarship on religion and politics is appreciably less likely to attract attention in its cognate fields.

- 1) What differs researchers of religion from other political scientists? What, in your opinion, may explain this difference?
- 2) Do you think American political science will rediscover religion? Prove your opinion.

#### 1.4.6 Read the conclusion of the article and choose the appropriate word

##### CONCLUSION

The current interest in religion and politics among political scientists developed in the face of serious *obstacles / prejudices* due to the social background of professional political scientists, the intellectual *origins / specifics* of the discipline, the sheer *reluctance / complexity* of mastering religion as a field of inquiry, and the issue-attention cycle in the discipline. Although the last of these factors has been *neutral / favorable* to the growth of scholarly research, even in the pages of the Review, albeit in a somewhat diluted form, the trend is *likely / unlikely* to persist unless specialists in the subject tie their work to *broader / more objective* theories of political behavior and change.

#### Text 6

(Adapted from: Tepe, S. (2012) Moderation of Religious Parties: Electoral Constraints, Ideological Commitments, and the Democratic Capacities of Religious Parties in Israel and Turkey *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(3), 467-485).

#### 1.4.7 Read the abstract of the article “Moderation of Religious Parties : Electoral Constraints, Ideological Commitments, and the Democratic Capacities of Religious Parties in Israel and Turkey” and insert the verbs back into the correct place.

*bolster   emerge   examine   questions   shows   thwart   view   yield*

##### Abstract

Whether religious parties’ inclusion in electoral competition moderates or polarizes their positions remains an enigma as deductive accounts \_\_\_\_\_ contradictory results. This analysis \_\_\_\_\_ the institution- and ideology-centered approaches to party change and \_\_\_\_\_ that dichotomizing religious parties as moderate or extreme and moderation as a monolithic process obscures religious parties’ role in democracy. When scholars \_\_\_\_\_ moderation as consisting of *behavioral* and *ideological* dimensions and \_\_\_\_\_ it through an inductive analysis of Israel and Turkey’s religious parties, several modes of moderation \_\_\_\_\_ with different

democratic outcomes. While some \_\_\_\_\_ procedural democracy, others \_\_\_\_\_ the expansion of liberal democracy.

##### Keywords

moderation, elections, party transformation, democratization, religious parties, liberal rights, religion and liberal democracy, Israel, Turkey

#### 1.4.8 Read the opening paragraph of the article. How would you answer the questions in it?

The growing electoral success of religious parties and the establishment of their roles as pivotal agents in countries ranging from Japan to India pose some crucial political science puzzles with important policy implications. Are religious parties Janus-faced agents of democracy? Does their ascendancy undermine democracy in their respective countries and the expansion of liberal democracy in the broader world? Is electoral competition a cure for the radicalism of religious parties? Does their participation in electoral competition moderate their political views or induce them to adopt more extremist positions? Can the inclusion of religious parties into the electoral process be seen as strengthening democratic capital globally in general and that of the Middle East in particular?

#### 1.4.9 Read the first part of the article and fill in the graph.

\_\_\_\_\_ vs \_\_\_\_\_ vs \_\_\_\_\_

thick vs \_\_\_\_\_ **Religious parties** \_\_\_\_\_ vs \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ vs \_\_\_\_\_ vs \_\_\_\_\_

While these questions have become more critical to understanding politics in many countries, beneath the plurality of views, two competing frameworks have emerged to explain how religious parties change and affect their respective democracies. One such prevalent approach contends that religious parties’ primary commitments are to their respective doctrines and thus their role in a democracy hinges on the role of democratic ideas in their respective religions; religious parties are more likely to maintain uncompromising positions on issues informed by their religious doctrines even when they accept the basic rules of democracy. Such analyses ask if a given religious doctrine is compatible with democracy, and some warn that allowing religious parties to participate in electoral competition can

amount to tolerating undemocratic actors for the sake of democracy, thereby endangering the very future of democracy (Tibi 1996; Kramer 1996). On the other hand, the second framework contends that democratic bargaining and strategic actions induced by external actors and institutions, not ideological commitments, force religious parties to become tamed agents of democracy. Beneath this argument lies the assertion that all participants in a democracy, once they are engaged in electoral competition, change one way or another and come to accept not only the procedures but also the principles of democracy (Kalyvas 1996; Przeworski 1991). Democracy can happen without democrats, and democratic ideologies are often not the main ingredient but rather a by-product of democratic electoral competition.

A review of the extant debates reveals that two dominant hypotheses inform our analyses:

*Hypothesis 1:* It is the ideologies of religious parties (internal factors) that define whether these parties can be moderate or not; because of their unquestionable commitment to religious ideas, many religious ideologies are not easily amenable to democratic interpretation (ideology-centered analyses).

*Hypothesis 2:* It is the strategic bargaining of the elite, the positions of the contesting actors, and the political opportunity structure (external factors) that define whether religious parties can be moderate after entering electoral politics (institution- and behavior-centered analyses).

The following discussion probes into the prevailing ideology- and institution-centered hypotheses and questions their ability to capture the intricacies of religious party transformation. More specifically, the point of departure in this analysis is the argument that treating religious parties as homogeneous and moderation as a dichotomous position (moderate vs. immoderate), an externally induced or an *automatic* process (or as an impossibility for a given party), only thwarts our attempts to understand the interface of religious parties and democracy. The parties that are often subsumed under the label “religious party” and presumed to have similar dispositions actually span a broad ideological spectrum. Likewise, in each country external constraints translate to an opportunity structure in which religious parties respond in distinctive ways. As a result, the general term *moderation* does not easily lend itself to a single definition and, unless consistently defined and applied, risks yielding contradictory and misleading results. Such misidentification is especially important as *moderate* is not only an analytical but also an honorific term with important domestic and international political implications. Careful definitions of these terms are long overdue and can be achieved by inductive studies that carefully test these hypotheses and weigh various dimensions of religious parties (e.g., their ideologies, institutions, interactions with other agents) by locating them within their respective political contexts.

In an effort to create a nuanced and empirically grounded understanding of religious party transformation, this study both builds on the existing studies of party competition and change that are rarely applied to religious parties and seeks to advance their analyses of religious parties in several ways. For instance, even a

cursory look at the studies on parties reveals that disproportional attention has been paid to party systems (limited pluralist vs. polarized pluralist systems) at the expense of the individual parties’ roles in their electoral politics (Sartori 1966; Blondel 1968; Siaroff 2000). Although religious parties are critical parts of their respective political systems, there is a tendency in the literature to treat them as *sui generis* or in isolation. Limited accounts of individual parties or clusters of parties often focus on their behaviors or chosen strategies (e.g., antisystemic or protest) and classify parties based on broad institutional characteristics and political orientations. Emphasized in these broad analyses are the nature of the party’s organization (e.g., thick vs. thin, elite based or mass based), the programmatic orientation of the party (e.g., ideological, particularistic, or clientele oriented), the overall approach to other parties (e.g., tolerant and pluralistic (or democratic) versus proto-hegemonic (or anti-system); Gunther and Diamond, 2003). Neglected in many such accounts, however, is a systematic inclusion of the ideologies and convictions of religious parties beyond simple dichotomization such as non-particularistic versus ideological. Detailed behavioral approaches, on the other hand, tend to pigeonhole parties as *policy oriented* (i.e., parties that prioritize programmatic commitments over others), *vote seeking* (i.e., parties that strive to maximize their vote share without committing to concrete policies), or *office seeking* (i.e., parties act to hold onto power to secure patronage benefits for their supporters; e.g., Budge and Laver 1986; Laver and Schofield 1990). However, despite the important insight of these typologies, parties rarely fit neatly into such categories; instead, many adopt these goals simultaneously or alternately (e.g., Katz and Mair 1995; Müller and Strom 1999). Persistent shortcomings in the discussion of parties in general and religious parties specifically confirm that parties’ organizational structures, goals, and transformation cannot be viewed in a vacuum (Schwedler 2006; Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008). A careful contextualization of these parties emerges as a necessary step to map out how the political system’s demands, party-specific organization, and ideological traits shape the intricate ways in which religious parties compete and change (Strom 1992; Tsebelis 1995; Tezcur 2010).

Given the marginalized role of religious parties in the party politics literature and the increasing importance of moderation to assess the democratic capacity of religious parties at the conceptual level, this article seeks to accomplish two goals: carve out a new space among institutionalist, behavioralist, and ideology-centered approaches and disentangle the different transformations that are subsumed under the term *moderation*. To this end, the subsequent analysis shows that moderation can be viewed as a two-layered *process* that consists of the dimensions determined by the degree to which a party (1) accepts the rules of power sharing, electoral competition, and government formation, which we can call *behavioral moderation*, and (2) recognizes and delegates authority to other agents especially in areas where religious doctrines have claims to being the sole authority, which we can refer to as *ideological* or *substantial moderation*. Although behavioral moderation centers on *whether* and *how* the parties accept the main rules of political contestations and negotiations and engage in pluralistic competitions, ideological or substantial

moderation focuses on the parties' ideational transformation and whether and how they recognize the *legitimacy* of secular institutions or agents (e.g., the state and nation) or the *political claims* of contending political actors (e.g., ethnic, religious minorities).

It is important to note that behavioral moderation cannot be reduced to an either-or position. Instead, the religious parties' approach to the existing institutions, acceptance of the basic rules of power sharing (e.g., electoral rules), and responses to the main institutions (e.g., parliament, courts, etc.) form a spectrum. As a result, the scope and degree of religious parties' acceptance of the existing institutions vary remarkably. Likewise, ideological moderation does not form an inherently binary position. Neither does it refer to a complete reconfiguration of a party's ideology. Instead, it draws our attention to critical changes in a party's ideas and ideological premises. It is often these critical changes that amount to inclusion (or exclusion) of agents and ideas that have been formerly rejected. As a result, the institutional and ideological processes represent two separate but interrelated spectra, which enable us to identify how parties can be located at a different point on each spectrum. More important, the two processes subsumed under moderation are affected differently by two sets of constraints. External institutional constraints are mainly defined by (1) the political position of religion in a given state system (general-systemic constraints), (2) the electoral rules of the political competition (electoral constraints), and (3) the judiciary's position vis-a-vis religion (judicial constraints). Internal constraints are defined mainly by the party's ideology and electoral goals.

The above-described lacuna created by the dearth of nuanced, comparative approaches to religious parties calls for a multidimensional and dynamic model of moderation. As a means of developing such a model, this analysis offers a detailed account of moderation in three sets of religious parties in Israel and Turkey. The discussion questions not only how different institutional constraints affect religious parties but also why different religious parties react to the same set of institutional constraints in distinctive ways. More specifically, the following discussion consists of four sections: The first section explains the case selection and the importance of cross-religion and -country comparisons to analyze the ways in which religious parties are formed and change. In contrast to the narrow scope of single-case studies that are often used to create models of party moderation, the comparisons made in this article allow us to gauge the role of ideologies and institutions without attributing religious parties' characteristics to their religious doctrines and unique settings. The second section focuses on institutional explanations and tackles the question of *how* and *to what extent institutional settings* can shape religious parties' positions and transformations. The different roles of religion in the Turkish and Israeli states, divergent electoral rules, and varying capacities of supreme courts to review religion's public expressions illustrate that institutional settings alone do not determine religion's political manifestations; thus, reductionist arguments that attribute religious party change to their reaction to external constraints and opportunities remain insufficient.

To expose the ideological plurality among religious parties, the third section analyzes the core ideas and behavioral patterns of six prominent religious parties in Israel and Turkey. Challenging studies that treat religious parties as one unified block, this section offers a heuristic typology of religious parties drawing on the distinct and shared ideological positions and electoral strategies of religious parties within and across Israel and Turkey. To map out the complex process of party transformation, the fourth section illustrates why a *one-dimensional* application of moderation yields contradictory results and how deterministic accounts that expect behavioral moderation to lead to a full-fledged ideological moderation can be misleading. A comparative look at the changes of religious parties shows that party moderation cannot be captured in binaries (moderate or immoderate), and they exhibit different levels of moderation based on their ideological and behavioral commitments. Given the importance of ideological change, the concluding section offers a model to explain intricate ideological revision processes where opportunity structure and conducive environment (external institutional factors) initiate change only when a party's leadership forges theologically consistent positions that gain the constituency's endorsement (internal factors). The conclusions detail why despite the tendency of the literature to focus on external or internal factors, how these factors interact and more important whether they initiate an ideological change play a critical yet often neglected role in party moderation.

- 1) What gaps are indicated in the research on the topic? What are their reasons?
- 2) Which of the 2 hypotheses of the role of religious parties in modern democracies do you agree with? Explain your choice.
- 3) Do you agree with the phrase "Democracy can happen without democrats, and democratic ideologies are often not the main ingredient but rather a by-product of democratic electoral competition"? Why / Why not?
- 4) What is 'moderation'? Explain the meaning of the term 'moderate when applied to a religious party.
- 5) What are the aims of the research? What does it seek to add to political science?

**1.4.10 Discuss Texts 5 and 6. What is similar / different about them? Suggest some further topics for research in the sphere of religion and politics.**

## 2. POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

### 2.1 Globalization and Political Communication

#### Text 7

(Adapted from: Uğur, G. (2012) Americanisation of Political Communication Practices *Canadian Social Science*, 8(3), 1-7).

#### 2.1.1 Read the abstract of the article. What is the paper's principal claim? What political sphere do you expect to read about in the article?

##### Abstract

Globalisation, referring to an interconnectedness and interdependence across the world, creates a challenge for national states, localities and individuals. In the past, people used to define themselves with strong ties with political parties, trade unions, and churches. However, modernisation process decreased the importance of these institutions, and individualistic values became more important. As a result of that process, ties between people and political parties are weakened. Meanwhile, media played a very important role, and the mass media gained a centrality in the world. Moreover, technological developments changed the interaction between people, and "visibility" became important for politicians: The more visible politicians are on television, the more dominant they are. Therefore, these changes forced political parties to change their political discourse and new communication techniques emerged with "catch-all" parties. The U.S. was the first country, which used new techniques in political communication. Because of dissemination of information, these new techniques are globalised.

**Key words:** Modernisation; Americanisation; Centrality of Media; Political Communication

#### 2.1.2 Read the Introduction and find the Key Words mentioned in the abstract. What other key words could be included in the list?

##### INTRODUCTION

Today as mass media gain more and more importance, political communication methods of parties get similar all over the world and that similarity

increases day by day. Therefore, it is possible to talk about global homogenisation of media systems across the world which causes countries to get closer in their political communication practices despite of the great differences in their political systems. Hence, the term "Americanisation" is used to explain these changes under "Globalisation" debates because we can see the influence of America on the common political communication practices. Those obvious changes have been argued for a long time and they are still a subject for recent debates.

Nowadays, different countries use the same themes in their election campaigns and for some scholars; it is an obvious sign of "Americanisation". However, "Globalisation" and its implications refer to a more complex interaction between countries. Therefore, this study aims at studying the implications of the terms "Globalisation" and "Americanisation" in detail, and in what terms they differ from each other.

To understand "Globalisation", we must know what it really means; therefore, in the first part, general definitions of the term "Globalisation" will be given to make it clearer. In addition to that, for many people the term "Americanisation" emerged as a problem because of its destructive influence on cultures rather than being a necessary process for democratisation that must be experienced by those cultures. Hence, it is of high importance to clarify meaning of "Americanisation". Since the main purpose in this paper is to examine the new political communication practices, especially in election campaigns, the term "Americanisation" will be analyzed in this context in the first part.

On the other hand, in social life, which also contains political life, every process creates some values in itself and leads to other processes. The terms "Globalisation" and "Americanisation" can be understood in a better way if they are viewed not just as a single and independent process but as a result of previous processes. That is, the cause and effect relationship between each political process must be taken into account to understand these terms. Therefore, in that case it is important to study modernisation process and its results closely. Moreover, technological developments affect our social lives and may trigger other social processes. Because of that reason, the focus of the second part is modernisation, centrality and expansion of the mass media.

A comparative and multi-dimensional study can provide us with a comprehensive explanation in understanding "Globalisation" / "Americanisation" process in communication practices. Therefore, the political communication in Turkey and America is compared in the last part of the study in order to render our argument clearer.

#### 2.1.3 Scan the next part of the article and complete the list:

##### The characteristics of American campaigning model

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

- 5.
- 6.

## 1. GLOBALISATION AND AMERICANISATION

The term “Globalisation” has always been controversial in social science studies since the beginning of the 1990s and that concept has become an important discussion about sociocultural transformation in modern cultures (Featherston, Lash, & Robertson, 1997). In its overall meaning, globalisation refers to both “the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson, 1992, p.8). According to Axford, the core of globalisation idea is that the world experiences a process in which there is an ever intensifying interconnectedness and interdependence and because of these reasons we cannot talk about “separate national economies and separate national jurisdiction” (Axford, 1995, p.27). Hence, the idea of globalisation suggests that this interconnectedness and interdependence create a challenge for national states, localities and individuals to identify themselves without “reference to more encompassing structures and flows” (Axford, 1995, p.27).

For some scholars that globalisation process triggers a homogenisation process in which some cultures are dominated by powerful countries’ cultures. That homogenisation problem is emphasized in cultural imperialism theory and according to Schiller cultural imperialism refers to a process by which a society is dragged into the modern world system and it is forced into shaping its social institution to correspond to “the values and structures of the dominating center of the system” (Schiller, 1976, p.9). On the other hand, in some studies, this explanation is viewed as a very simplistic way of definition because of the theory’s heavy dependence on the external influences; thus, as Axford (1995) puts it, understanding the complexity of the global system requires a multi-dimensional approach. Therefore, globalisation is a term for multi-dimensional process and by that process the global system is being made.

Contemporary scholars tend to explain cultural imperialism theory, which refers to a specific dominant culture over other cultures, under the broader and more complex concept of globalisation. The term “Americanisation” is used for the definition of that process. Although the term “Americanisation” was first used in the 1890s as a term of abuse (Rose, 1974, as cited in Negrine, 1996), it became an important discussion in social sciences especially after media’s center-staged position in political life. Since this study’s main topic is transformation of political communication and life, here the term “Americanisation” is valid for a limited meaning. Therefore, when we use this term, we have to remember that it refers to particular type of elements of election campaigns in political communication practices which were first developed in the U.S. and spread to other countries. In that limited concept, the American model of campaigning is marked by six characteristics (Kavanagh, 1995): Firstly, political campaigns in the U.S. are based on a single issue and candidate-centeredness. In the U.S., issues or international problems are not mainly part of campaign strategies. Secondly, the importance of money, especially in the pre-nomination presidential campaigns, is increasing because of the media advertising. Moreover, in that case, presidential fundraising

became an important element (nowadays often using direct mails). Thirdly, there is an increase in the number of professional communicators, who use effective, new communication technology, in the United States. Nowadays, during the campaigning in the U.S., the strategies are conducted by public relation experts, fundraisers and opinion pollsters. Fourthly, it is needless to say that the role of the mass media has increased since it is a very effective tool for candidates to be recognised and to evaluate the campaign performance of their parties. As professional communicators and media are more important nowadays, the connection between citizens and political parties is weakened. Therefore, the fifth characteristic of American campaign system is the weakness of political parties. Finally, “growing concern about the influences and activities of the consultance” is the last characteristic (Kavanagh, 1995, p.220).

As quoted many times by different scholars “around the world, many of the recent changes in election campaigning share common themes despite great differences in the political cultures, histories, and institutions of the countries in which they have occurred” (Swanson & Mancini, 1996, p.2). However, is it possible to argue that these surface similarities may prevent us from seeing deeper differences? Or does “Americanisation” simply refer to an importation/exportation, adaptation/adoption process? Here an exact definition of “Americanisation” has not been given, as Negrine (1996) says, and that renders the term ambiguous. To understand the issue, it is necessary to generate more light on the problems. Hence, in the next chapter, the results of modernity, expansion of media into politics and centrality of media will be examined to make the concept clearer.

**2.1.4 Can the characteristics from the list in 2.1.3 be observed in Russia? Give examples illustrating your point of view.**

**2.1.5 Read the next part of the article. Which other key words could be added to the list in the Abstract? Why do you think they are not included? Why does the author choose to write about them?**

## 2. MODERNITY, SECULARISM, CENTRALITY/EXPANSION OF MEDIA

As it has been mentioned in the first part, in many democracies political communication practices have been changing very quickly, especially in the last decades and election campaignings share common themes in spite of the great differences in political culture and traditions of different countries (Swanson & Mancini, 1996). We can observe these common practices as political commercials, technical experts, media professionals, mounting campaign expenses and media-centered campaigns. We can see these changes across the world; therefore, it can be said that both media systems and political communication worldwide are getting more and more similar.

According to some scholars, these changes in political communication practices refer to an Americanisation process in which candidates, political parties, and news media are using the same communication patterns as the United States does (Swanson & Mancini, 1996). In that suggestion, meaning of Americanisation

contains an easy characterisation of innovation (Elebash, 1984, as cited in Swanson & Mancini, 1996). Although American influence is obvious on some cases, there are some questions which have not been answered. According to Negrine (1996), there is still a lack of clarity about the term Americanisation and Americanisation has to be defined and described more clearly in this respect. In order to understand the present condition in political communication practices, it is necessary to analyse the processes they have gone through so far. To be clearer, the term ideology and its nature should be enlightened. In that case, Marxist and Althusserian aspects of ideology are significant and will be explained.

The term ideology, invented by Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy and his friends, is defined as “system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group” by Marx (Althusser, 1971, p.158). Marx explains societies in a topographic way, envisaging that the structure of every society consists of levels, meaning that every single society has an infrastructure and the superstructure. While the former refers to economic base, the latter contains politico-legacy and ideology. In his metaphorical way of explaining society, Marx depicts the structure of every society as a building, containing a base (infrastructure) on which two floors of superstructure (politico-legacy and ideology) are constructed. This envisagement of society renders infrastructure (economic base) as the initial determinant, that leads us to the idea of what happens in the upper floors is determined by what happens in the economic base (Althusser, 1971). In his book *German Ideology*, ideology is considered to be a pure illusion and that is why, ideology is an imaginary construction. This aspect of ideology in Marxian view resembles what writers before Freud asserted (Althusser, 1971). For them, the dream is just a remnant of our daily lives, the imaginary remainder of the real world, presented arbitrarily and in disorder; and these qualifications of dream also show us the status of ideology in *German Ideology*. Like dreams, ideology emerges from reality, but it exists in imagination; it is the imaginary representation of the real world and since it appears in our imaginary world, it has no history and it is an illusion (Althusser, 1971). It is Althusser, who reaches this conclusion, and in order to identify ideology, he asserts two theses focusing on the nature of ideology. Firstly, ideology is a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence. <...>

If ideology is a representation of imaginary relationship of people to the real world, just like dreams are reflection of the outer world in our imagination, it may be assumed that men reflect the real conditions of existence –the world- in an illusionary way in ideology, and the real world can be found in that reflection.

The second thesis asserted by Althusser on ideology is that ideology has a material existence (Althusser, 1971). Actually, the latter is the natural consequence of the former: If we assume that ideology is the reflection of imaginary relationship of individuals to the real world, so the reflection actually comes from reality, i. e. from a material world. Moreover, ideology exists in an apparatus, which is called Ideological State Apparatus by Althusser (ISA), and this existence is material (Althusser, 1971).

To get a clearer picture of what Althusser means by Ideological State Apparatus, the term must be explained in an elaborative way. According to Althusser, ISA should not be confused with Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) because in Marxist theory, State Apparatus consists of “the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc.,” which function by violence (Althusser, 1971, p.143). However, if ISAs are in question, a number of institutions should be considered (i.e. Churches, Schools, Family, Political Systems, Trade Unions, Mass Media, Literature, etc.). There are two major differences between RSA and ISA: Firstly, RSA refers to singularity, in other words, there is only one RSA, whereas ISA refers to plurality. Secondly, RSA occupies public domain while ISA occupies private domain (Althusser, 1971). Althusser (1971) applies Gramscian approach to render the vagueness between public and private spheres clearer:

But someone is bound to question the second, asking me by what right I regard as Ideological State Apparatuses, institutions which for the most part do not possess public status, but are quite simply private institutions. As a conscious Marxist, Gramsci already forestalled this objection in one sentence. The distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law and valid in the (subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its ‘authority’. The domain of the State escapes it because the latter is ‘above the law’: the State, which is the State of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private. The same thing can be said from the starting point of our State Ideological Apparatuses. It is unimportant whether the institutions in which they are realized are ‘public’ or ‘private’. What matters is how they function. Private institutions can perfectly well ‘function’ as Ideological State Apparatuses. A reasonably thorough analysis of any one of the ISAs proves it. But now for what is essential. What distinguishes the ISAs from the (Repressive) State Apparatus is the following basic difference: the Repressive State Apparatus functions ‘by violence’, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses’ function ‘by ideology’ (p. 144).

As the last sentence in the quotation suggests that Ideological State Apparatuses function insidiously; is not as visible and concrete as RSA and it has some insidiousness in its nature. That is why, in Althusserian aspect, what seems to happen outside ideology, actually takes place in it, and vice versa: “ideology never says, ‘I am ideological’ (Althusser, 1971, p.175). However, to understand the present political practices, we suggest a different way of explaining the past. In order to clarify this point, the term modernism will be explained.

The term modernisation, which carries an evolutionist meaning and refers to a necessary and unilinear process, is often used as an alternative to Americanisation. In this necessary process, the idea of importance of group solidarity and organised social centrality is declining while importance of individualism is increasing. When we look at the past of the European political order, we can see that political parties, trade unions and churches used to define themselves ideologically, and group loyalties were related to social class and religion. Individuals used to identify themselves with these groups with very strong

ties and that individualistic relation was showing people's material well-being. Moreover, the institutions, as mentioned above, were central to the public sphere organisation. However, in the modernisation process, it can be seen that the importance of individual values increased and people started defining themselves as individuals instead of groups, so that rendered the ties weaker. Moreover, during the process, another term, called Secularisation, emerged. In the past, church used to control society and the behaviour of populations, but that institution is no longer able to maintain its power and, undoubtedly, it lost its control over the society. Therefore, these institutions cannot hegemonise course of citizens' community life which causes a weak connection between important social institutions and people. The number of hesitant people in election time increased because they no longer identify themselves with a specific party and that change forced political parties to generate new techniques and explain themselves differently to attract people. Therefore, modernisation/secularisation process transformed political life and, as a result, the importance of mass parties and their ideological stances (and the other dominant institutions) declined and they were superseded by catch all or electoral-professional parties. In other words, in that transformation, psychological and sociological ties between parties and citizens weakened and party membership loyalty and the number of people, who attended election, declined in many countries which experienced that transformation. Consequently, while traditional parties are becoming less effective and weakened, the number of professional staff, whose main purpose is to attract the hesitant voters, has increased. Moreover, we can say that the importance of ideologies was atrophied while individual/charismatic leaders, who attract people, emerged. It is so obvious that mass media played a very important role during the political change process.

Because of that reason, centrality of mass media is an important element of Americanisation/modernisation discussions. In the twentieth century, although there was a decrease in the number of newspapers, there were bigger enterprises and more journalists. That expansion of media caused a political change, in which individual citizens are less dependent on party because of availability of political information. As Dalton and Wattenberg (2002) put it, political parties change their approaches to media in the media expansion process and they devote "more attention to campaigning through media" (p. 12). Technological innovations and developments, meanwhile, affected the form of interaction in public and political sphere. Newspapers accelerated dissemination of information and that development created a new kind of interaction which was different from the traditional one (Thompson, 1995). Prior to the mass media, publicness of individuals and state affairs were related to co-existence. Hence, an event could be a public event after being staged in front of people and that traditional kind of publicness used to require sight, sound, visual appearance and spoken words (Thompson, 1995). Technological developments and innovations in communication practices increased the importance of visibility, and politicians became more visible via television and newspapers. Moreover, visual appearance of political leaders became an important feature in political communication (Thompson, 1995). As a result of that process, for Butler and Ranney (1992, as

cited in Negrine, 1996), politicians started and sought to communicate with people via media, and television was the primary tool for that purpose. That change created a new practice in political life and it was the practice of politicians and media, exploiting technical innovations and marketing approaches that have altered the appearance of elections. Consequently, politicians and broadcasters developed some techniques using marketing approach in order to make the image of political figures dominant and that created a competitive struggle to control people's perception (Negrine & Papathanassopoulos, 1996) and media's ability to carry messages to all population changed political communication. Political parties started using the mass media to target citizens (audiences). That fact created a transformation of political communication, which is more professionalised and individualised, consisting of polling, direct mail marketing and the internet.

**2.1.6 Read the last part of the paper. Find different means of expressing personality and impersonality and comment on their use.**

### **3. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO TURKEY AND THE U.S. IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION**

Although political communication practices are becoming more and more alike, that superficial similarity in the practices can mislead us because there can be dissimilarities at a deeper level, as well. In that sense, a comparative approach can provide us with different dimensions to analyse the issue, therefore we can find out problems, generalize theories and show how communication is organised (Blumler, McLeod, & Rosengren, 1992, as cited in Negrine & Papathanassopoulos, 1996).

In this case, Turkey can be an interesting example to focus on due to its three military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980 in its eighty-nine years old history and still working modern institutions. Furthermore, after the revolution in 1923, Turkey accepted a secular state concept in its constitution, so the importance of individualism is becoming more and more visible in Turkey. Hence, I think it is beneficial for us to compare Turkish political communication to the U.S. practices.

Turkish modernisation changed rapidly and dramatically after the 1980s and the 1990s; that change created a paradox in Turkish society. The paradox is that while there is an obvious economic globalisation tendency in economic life, there is also a traditionalist movement in the Turkish society. This new condition shows us the globalisation is not just limited to economic life but at the same time cultural globalisation is working hand in hand with the economic globalisation despite of the different results and impacts of it (Özbudun & Keyman, 2002).

We can also see the reflections of those rapid changes in political communication practices, and in that case there are some factors in Turkey that make people think that Turkish campaign communication is shifting toward the U.S. model. For instance, popularism and catch all approaches are increasing in every election period. Nowadays the number of parties, which define themselves by their ideological side, is decreasing. Meanwhile, after softening their discourses, central parties created strong ties with the main stream media and that also

triggered an approximation between opposition parties and parties in power. As a result of that transformation, the importance of opinion polling and professionalism of Turkish parties' approach to the mass media increased. Central parties are conducting news management professionally and that shows that all forms of political communication are organised carefully.

Furthermore, Turkish journalism intervened more effectively during the period of last elections and some journalists declared their "color of votes" trying to manipulate their readers. Moreover, again, during election period, journalists appeared on television more often than ever and they revealed their predictions about election and its possible results. In addition to that, campaigning expenditure is increasing in every election. For example, AKP's estimated advisement expenditure in 2011 general election is 50 million dollars. ...

As it has been emphasized in the previous chapter, centrality and expansion of media changed political communication practices and in that sense media have very important role in creating a modernisation process in a country. Turkish modernisation process, which changed very rapidly and dramatically after the 1980s and 1990s, also confirms this view. ...

Nonetheless, there are some different characteristics in Turkish campaign communication that can not be included in Americanisation. Firstly, although there is an increase in the number of magazine/entertainment programs, and soap operas, Turkish journalism (and new emerged Turkish television journalism) is still active and sensitive about main issues in Turkey. It seems that it is the main difference from the U.S. journalistic approach because during election time, television programs and newspaper articles are more personalised and leader-centered in the U.S. Furthermore, during/pre- election period volume of coverage about election is very high. According to Blumler and Gurevitch, during the 1996 election, the U.S. news networks were almost closed (Blumler & Gurevitch, 2001, as cited in Bennet & Entman, 2001). However, especially after the 1990s, it is possible to find lots of programs, newspaper articles and researches about the main issues in Turkey. Moreover, different television channels support different political parties, although it is banned to show party advertisements on television and that proliferates the number and variety of programs and articles about the social problems in Turkey (Political parties were given advertisement right on television in 2011 by RTUK.). Although talk-show-democracy is a political force in the U.S. (Blumler & Gurevitch, 2001, as cited in Bennet & Entman, 2001) Turkish program producers try to generate more light on the issues.

Briefly, it is undeniable that America has an enormous influence on political life but other countries have also an inevitable effect on that process and they have always been very important. In the present world, there is a hybridization that forces countries to change their values and practices. However, it is a reciprocal process which encompasses every country. As it has been discussed in that section, in the new Turkish campaign practices, it is possible to see the reflections of these changes: While countries become more American -- in terms of affluence, life style and communication technologies- their campaign techniques are getting more similar (Kavanagh, 1995). But our comparison shows that the results of this

process are moulded by countries' specific cultures and tradition, and we can say that Turkish campaigns and its methods have changed a lot but they are still different from the methods of the U. S.

**2.1.7 Underline all the transition signals that you can find in the last part. Give their synonyms.**

**2.1.8 Can the ideas of the article be applied to Russia? Why ? Why not? What differences between the situations in Turkey and Russia can you think of?**

## 2.2 Political Communication and Public Relations

### Text 8

(Adapted from: Lileker, D. (2006) *Key Concepts in Political Communication* In Lileker, D. Key Concepts in Political Communication (pp. 1-17). SAGE Publications Ltd).

**2.2.1 Look through the text. How would you define the genre of the article? Where are you likely to find it? How does it differ from the other texts that you have read in terms of the structure and style?**

**2.2.2 Read the text again. Choose one of the following methods and use it to take notes of the appropriate part of the text:**

- a spidergraph
- a flow-chart
- a time line
- a table
- two columns

Communication between the ruling organisations of a society and the people is central to any political system. However, in a democracy, political communication is seen as crucial for the building of a society where the state and its people feel they are connected. Political communication must, therefore, perform the role of an activator; it cannot simply be a series of edicts to society from the elite, ruling group but must allow feedback from society and encourage participation. While some may argue that a regular vote is sufficient for a nation to be termed democratic, this could also be described as a dictatorship with a finite term. Modern democracies need to be increasingly responsive to their publics, and at the heart of responsiveness is a dialogue. Classic definitions of political communication focus on the source and the motivation; political communication flows out from the political sphere and must have a political purpose. However, such definitions would not be completely appropriate for many modern states, particularly given the role of the media. Therefore modern texts focus on three

actors, some of whom operate beyond the boundaries of any single state, each of whom produce political communication. These are, firstly, the political sphere itself: the state and its attendant political actors. Their role is to communicate their actions to society in order to gain legitimacy among and compliance from the people. Secondly, there are the non-state actors, where we would include a range of organisations with political motivations as well as corporate bodies and, of course, the voters. Each of these organisations and groups communicate messages into the political sphere, in the hope of having some level of influence. Finally, there are the media outlets, the media communicates about politics, influencing the public as well as the political spheres. In a free, open and pluralist society, on which the majority of texts concentrate, each of these communicates independently but synergistically with one another. In other words, they say what they want when they want but are influenced by one another and may well be led by one particular group when formulating arguments, opinions, policies, perceptions or attitudes.

Despite the academic study of political communication being a fairly young discipline; the actual practice is as old as politics itself. Just as Pope Innocent III ordered his minions in England in 1213 to nail what was known as a papal bull, a poster bearing the seal of the pope, to church doors informing the English of the excommunication of their king, John; modern politicians use all the available media to deliver messages to the people. The example of King John's excommunication is pertinent, albeit dated, as this was one of many times when there were forces competing for the support of the people. The Catholic Church used the best method for disseminating a message among faithful churchgoers, the majority of English society at that time, informing them that their king, and therefore kingdom, was no longer recognised by the Church: keep the king and go to hell was the inference. The message was also designed as a warning to King John that another, more suitable, ruler, Philip Augustus, king of France, was allowed sanction to invade. Such communication is prevalent across the world today, between states and within states, at the heart of which is persuasion: that the receiver should act in a way desired by the sender.

Within modern democracies the people elect a person, and usually their party, to run the country for a defined period of time, usually between four and five years. In order that the people can make the choice of who to elect, each competitor must communicate to them effectively. Each competitor tries to persuade the public that they, at whatever level they are standing, from national president to town mayor, are the best for the job. Subsequently, when one or another individual or party is elected, it is essential that they continue to communicate. Some would argue that this communication is central to encouraging democratic culture; it is the provision of information that is required by the people (Denton and Woodward, 1990). However, there are more cynical accounts which argue that the majority of communication from the elected is designed to retain support among the electorate for their policies, what has been termed as 'manufacturing consent' (Herman and Chomsky, 1998). Therefore political communication is often placed central to debates on the health and well-being of our democracy and the styles and levels of interaction are often used as a measure

of the strength of public approval and engagement in the political system (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). ...

### **THE HISTORY AND METHODS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION**

Political communication is as old as political activity; it was a feature of ancient Greece and the Roman Empire as well as across diverse political systems in the modern age. It is hard to think of a time, under any political system, where political leaders have not had a requirement to communicate with other groups in society, or have not had to persuade the people to support them, often as opposed to rivals for their power and position. ...

Democratisation of the majority of the political systems changed the nature of political communication and political activity moved into the public sphere. The people became involved in politics because they were expected to have a political role. Equally, with increased access to information and greater levels of education, came a demand for greater political involvement and influence. The voter was not content with the simple act of voting, the voter became an active citizen, one who could join an anti-state cause, the fight against apartheid in South Africa for example, as easily as a recognised political party. Communication between the various groups, electoral and non-electoral, became competitive ...

The greater the number of voices competing, the more intense the competition, the better communicators groups must be in order to be heard. Thus we hear of the professionalisation of political communication, that it has become better in some way in order to be heard by more groups and individuals (Mancini, 1999). Some attribute developments purely to learning from practice in the United States (US), others shy away from the Americanisation thesis; however, most agree that the process by which political communication is carried out has evolved, become more technically and technologically sophisticated and adopted techniques from the worlds of corporate advertising and marketing in order to compete in the modern information-rich society.

An early and effective form of direct, or non-mediated, political communication involved public meetings; political campaigners would go out and meet the workers and deliver speeches to them. ... Such meetings are now few and mainly limited to countries where technology does not allow for the message to be delivered directly to homes: the only comparable types of event are the mass rallies held around US presidential elections, or mass meetings of party members.

Technology, however, not only effected political communication in the 20th century. The invention of the printing press allowed Thomas More to attack the inequality in 15th-century England. Since then, every political activist has published pamphlets and often delivered them by hand door to door or placed them in venues where the masses may be reached. While still the preserve of weakly-funded, often radical or underground movements, or those with little access to mass communication media, such activities still take place. ... But, largely, political communication has become an activity aimed at a mass audience using the mass media of television across the majority of the states in the world today. Hence direct political communication has become less of a feature in recent

elections, despite research that indicates the importance of face-to-face interaction between politician and public (Jackson and Lilleker, 2004).

As communications technology allowed mass communication, communication necessarily changed. Many politicians took an instant dislike to the constraints of television: war leaders Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle found it hard to adapt their styles and appeared awkward and aloof in front of the camera (Scammell, 1995). They, and many politicians of their era, had learned how to use radio effectively. In fact, during the Second World War, a secondary communication war took place with national leaders transmitting to their own people, to rally support, while enemies attempted to undermine their efforts by broadcasting into other states. ... Few political communicators still use radio as the main means of dissemination, though it still offers politicians potential to reach the people. In the modern age, politicians across the globe have adapted to television and use it in the same way as previous generations used mass rallies. During the 2003 Iraq War, the US government set up a dedicated Arabic-speaking television news service in order to gain support within the Middle East, as this was deemed the most appropriate way to reach this audience. Television, however, is independent in most democratic nations and so is able to mediate political communication, and the political communicator cannot ensure that their message reaches the public unaltered or without editorial comment.

The only groups who appear able to circumnavigate the editorial are those groups whose message is so shocking that the public receive it in such clarity that editorial is wasted. Hence it is appropriate to discuss direct action as the most powerful form of political communication. The crashing of two planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9 September 2001, which has become known as 9/11, demonstrated the power of direct action. The events, transmitted live as they unfolded, delivered the message of the terrorists to a global audience (McNair, 2003: 182–4) and spoke of the determination of a small cell of activists to make their voice heard, of the powerlessness of the global community to silence them, and brought to the fore debates surrounding US policy within the Middle East. ... Such events surpass the marches organised by activists against nuclear weapons and a range of causes, the activities of pressure groups such as Greenpeace or the actions of the average terrorist. However, all these events rely on reaching a mass audience. Few in the world knew of the massacres exacted by Saladin against the crusaders during the 12th century, but television brings modern day equivalents into everybody's homes and lives. Thus the action is perhaps of lesser importance than the attention it draws from the media: it seems all too obvious to state that political communication is usually measured by its ability to receive the right media coverage by whatever means possible.

The media, thus, play an important role in political communication. Media outlet's editors not only choose what to broadcast as news, or how that is reported, but also choose the way it portrays groups in society. Popular culture not only reflects society but also has the power to shape people's political views. ... In an era when it is argued few pursue political information, the blending of politics and

popular culture becomes an important source of political knowledge (Street, 1997; 2001).

Political communication has then moved from being a direct, personal, face-to-face, activity to being conducted indirectly via the media of mass communication. However, in many ways, the style of communication has come full circle. One British candidate for parliament recalled that people liked public meetings because 'when they asked an awkward question they liked to see if you sweated or not', he claimed, 'because on television everyone is very prepared and it's staged.' However, debates between US presidential candidates, programmes like the BBC's *Question Time* or the appearances of New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark on talk shows, provide the same scrutiny. ...

However, <...> the political communication audience, defined often as both citizens and voters, is able to communicate to political groups, sometimes through membership or lobbying, and to and via the media. Direct action is one powerful method the public use, and in forming political groups to further causes increases the scope of pluralism. The Internet has allowed groups to communicate effectively, stage highly effective and visible events and so gain significant media attention (Rodgers, 2004). However, other and more ordinary methods are used. The letters to the media can lead an agenda as well as fit within the news values (Franklin, 2004: 168–9). But the most reported form of public political communication are opinion polls (Moon, 1999), which are used to gauge support for causes, political parties, groups and policies as well as predict election results. They are also used by politicians, to some extent, to determine what courses of action can be pursued and those that cannot.

#### **THE FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN CONTEXT**

So, political communication is conducted through every channel and media available, it is multifarious and multifaceted, and it is inescapable. But what is the purpose of this continual bombardment of information, views, opinions and debates? At the most simplistic and obvious level, political communication is all about winning over others (Moloney, 2001). We know that electoral candidates want to win votes, but also dictators want to win the love of their people, cause groups and activists want to win attention; the public want a say, it is perhaps as simple as that. However, this can suggest a somewhat cynical view of politics and really means that all political communication is nothing more than propaganda. Political communication is reduced to 'winning over' or persuading others, and solely concerned with the acquisition of power: whether governmental power or power over the media agenda. Even so, there are a range of contextual factors that alter the role that the message plays.

If we firstly take the organisations seeking electoral support, the parties and candidates, their communication has a different role for different circumstances. If any group or individual seeking election could separate out groups of people in society, and talk to each group on an individual basis, electoral political communication would be simple. However, a speech by a presidential candidate in any country is transmitted to anyone and everyone. Therefore, that piece of

communication must serve a range of functions: make the candidate appear in touch with the majority of voters; heal rifts between social groups or classes; show that groups will not be excluded; make the candidate appear to identify with the people. This means it cannot be purely cynically produced propaganda, particularly as the 21st-century voter in the majority of liberal democracies is a sophisticated political animal and cannot be fooled easily. Political communication is further complicated in nations where coalition governments are common. Party leaders in Germany, for example, find that a priority is to communicate the right message not only to their own supporters or voters but to potential coalition partners and their supporters and voters (Lees, 2005). This makes the above list of roles longer and, of course, the communication much harder to design.

These functions are appropriate within the confines of the state; however, communication is rarely locked within national borders. Austrian presidential candidate Jorge Haider capitalised on populist nationalism and opposition to immigration to openly campaign for repatriation of 'non-Austrians' during his 2000 election campaign. This won him a landslide victory, but following his election he found that relations were strained with Austria's partners in the European Union and that leaders openly discussed whether economic sanctions should be placed against his regime. While the crisis for Austria ended without sanction, helped by (as well as helping) the Haider government's quick collapse, this was caused by a lack of consideration for the international reception of communication aimed at one segment of the Austrian electorate. A translator employed by a European state during a state visit by Russian President Boris Yeltsin recalled an alternative example. Prior to Yeltsin's arrival, and when he was not around, Yeltsin was referred to by the insulting moniker that roughly translated as 'the drunken tramp'. In stark contrast every official statement commended his bravery during the demise of the Communist regime, his statesmanship and any other attribute that would nurture a long and friendly relationship between the two countries. The latter is a common form of interstate political communication of course: diplomacy.

While we can clearly see an argument for describing these examples as intending to gain support, there is an additional informative function. The public have to be informed of new legislation, how they are affected, and how they can comply. There are also a range of other forms of informative communication that come under the heading of 'public information', where the attention may well be to persuade but not for political motives. Here we include information regarding social benefits, health campaigns, public awareness of dangers and any communication

designed to inform rather than influence politically. There is of course a blurring of boundaries here (Franklin, 2004). New legislation can be communicated in such a way that government also promotes itself, as caring, competent or proactive, hence we hear of the permanent campaigning of the public relations state (Davis, 2002). Similar comments can and are often made regarding public information; however, the key function of this form of communication should not be to gain support.

Of course any new legislation may be received differently by the range of audiences, both internal and external. Economic policy announcements by any member of the European Union, or the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), may well have repercussions upon partners within the organisations as well as trading partners globally. Thus such policies have to be communicated in a way that allays fears so avoiding a loss of economic confidence. Equally, as any government often operates within utilitarian parameters, constructing policies that will have the best long-term effects for the majority of citizens, these benefits must be communicated and again fears allayed, particularly towards stakeholder groups, whose support is important, but also to minority groups that may feel marginalized. All these contextual issues must be considered when communication is constructed, thus when we study political communication we have to consider all the intended functions across all the different audiences that will receive the message.

The different levels of politics, local, national and supranational, may compete for power and influence. The European Court of Justice has found member states' governments to have acted unlawfully, causing competing claims for justice by state nationals on the one hand and debates regarding state sovereignty on the other. Equally, national and local governments can come into conflict over taxation powers for example; as can different arms of government. Nations where there are two houses, a bicameral system, both elected as in the USA, France or Russia, or one elected and one appointed as is the case in the UK and Israel, can find conflict between the houses. <...>

Beyond the realm of government there are other various tiers in the political hierarchy, each of which communicate to the public. Regional levels of government, such as the German *Land*, the US State government, the UK local and municipal councils or the tribal councils across many African states, often use communication to promote their representative function. This function is also one that is important to members of parliaments who represent distinct geographical areas, such as UK MPs, or Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Their communication is designed to show that they fulfil a representative function; however, most communication from political actors shares one central feature: the direction of communication is one way from the political to the public. Evidence suggests that this is in contrast to the desires of the people. The global attraction of audience interest and participation in real-life shows has led some to argue that this is the kind of interaction the public want with the political sphere (Coleman, 2003): that they want to be able to shape governmental activity and have direct input to the legislature. This has led to discussion of the emergence of the political consumer, a voter who seeks to have their personal requirements and needs met by government before offering support (Lees-Marshment and Lilleker, 2005). This suggests moving towards a two-way style of communication favoured by public relations theorists (Grunig and Hunt, 1994; Jackson and Lilleker, 2004), where the organisation and the public have an open relationship founded on communication. This currently does not seem to be a function of much political communication.

But what of those who are outside the electoral political system? Pressure groups such as Greenpeace suggest that they talk for ‘the future of the world’, and their activities are designed to stop the current political and industrial sphere from destroying the earth. The function of their communication, whether direct action reported by the media, the press releases they send to the media or the direct mail or leafleting they engage in, is designed to make people think. It is an accepted notion that no amount of campaigning can directly drive public opinion, but it can influence what the public think about. Many non-electoral groups act in this way, as do other public figures. U2 singer Bono’s call for Live Aid 2, what became Live8, a music event to raise awareness of the suffering in the Third World, put the issue on the agenda, as did the original work of musicians Bob Geldof and Midge Ure when organising Live Aid in 1984. It can be argued that because it is a non-electoral actor taking the initiative that it has more credibility and that it is not seen as a cynical manoeuvre for electoral gain. Although it is no bad career move, it would seem that some of these figures act for political and economic motives through non-political channels (Marshall, 1997). This is the function of many groups; however, their communication function is the same – to influence the news agenda.

We could then argue that all communication has one core function: to gain media attention. This would, perhaps, be a fair assessment, but many non-political communicators also seek to control the media reporting of events; thus competition becomes fiercer and media management techniques more sophisticated. However, there is a fine line between informing the public or highlighting an issue and attempting to influence public opinion directly. The former will allow the public to decide for themselves, the latter will largely try to offer no choices. This behaviour is largely the preserve of electoral competitors, it is not something uniform to all those who engage in political communication.

### **RECEIVING POLITICAL COMMUNICATION**

Yet we must not assume that all this communication is received without question or in its entirety. The people are argued to have a lot more power than is realised. They can select what to believe and disbelieve, what to accept or reject, what to view and what to ignore. The people also do not operate in isolation. While they may not all join political groups they socialise, and socialisation can incubate certain political views (Graber, 2001). Within the minds of the citizen voter, then, there are lots of competing views. This is often equated to constant noise reverberating around our brains. Noise is anything else that influences the way the public think about a piece of communication they receive from a political organisation. It can be broadcast political satire, the opinions of workmates and friends, the headline of their newspaper, perhaps even their own ideology. All these can alter the way that the communication is received and whether it is trusted or believed. Noise acts like someone whispering in your ear ‘politicians always lie’ as you watch a leader’s speech on television. Of course some political communication filters through unchecked by the media and may slip beneath the noise of other influences. Which bits filter through and which do not depend on various factors. For example, any news on the 2003/4 conflict in Iraq received a

great deal of media attention across all the world’s media. Within the minds of each member of the public an opinion developed, influenced possibly by conversations with family members, friends and by their own attitudes to Iraq, war in general or a range of other factors – often whether friends or family could become embroiled in the conflict is important. The point is that little political communication regarding Iraq would have reached the public without being filtered by both the media and by other noise.

Government leaflets, an often used form of direct communication, may grab attention, be trusted as information only and not become distorted by the media, similarly with websites, e-newsletters or other campaign communication that fall under the radar of the media. However, noise is less easy to remove from political communication. Some people are cynical of all political communication; the noise they hear is much greater when listening to a politician speak and will sound like someone screaming ‘la la la’ to block out the words. At the end of the speech they will not remember anything about it yet happily state ‘it was all the usual lies’. Most people are not that mistrustful of politicians, but largely little gets through to the public directly. In fact the usual assumption is that it is only 1 per cent of all communication that reaches the public unfiltered, and of that only about 25 per cent, so 0.25 per cent overall, is remembered. This does not mean that the people remember little about politics, more that they only remember the bits they see as relevant to them. When we consider how much political communication is directed at the audiences, perhaps 0.25 per cent is quite a lot.

The complexities faced by any political organisation when trying to communicate to the public has led to an increasing sophistication and exploitation of any and every communication method and route. However, in many democratic nations, it is argued that politics is in crisis. Apathy rules, the public do not want to listen; politics is viewed as detached from society and politicians often regarded as self-seeking and power hungry egotists. This crisis centres upon the issue of communication. Communication does not only fulfil the practical functions discussed above, communication also projects an image. In this context, politicians try to create a personality for themselves, to be more than just a ‘grey man in a grey suit’. Thus US television viewers witnessed presidential candidate Bill Clinton playing saxophone on mainstream television, Russian President Yeltsin playing the spoons alongside prominent pop bands, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair appearing on the family-oriented and apolitical UK chat show *Des O’Connor Tonight*. These are all examples of image creation. However, communicating political values is more difficult. How can you show you are trustworthy? This is a question that is fundamental within discussions surrounding the future of government, and its communication strategies and organisations, within the early years of the 21st century.

The crisis faced by governments and electoral parties or candidates is not shared by the non-electoral organisations. Despite their single-issue politics, and their clear bias surrounding an issue, they appear to be trusted and more able to communicate their messages to the public. However, those argued to make an impact are figures on the periphery of politics, with celebrity status, who promote

political causes. Over the last 50 years television personalities, actors and musicians have taken an increasing role within politics. Few, outside of the USA, actually stand for election, and it is more usual for the celebrity who proclaims political views to have a more subtle role: they create noise people want to hear that could influence the way they think about political issues of the day. Internationally recognised pop stars like Sting or Bono often publicly endorse political campaigns, acting as a lever upon national governments (Marshall, 1997). While effects are often difficult to attribute to one artist or one promotional event, their impact is significant and one that can counter the power of a government. Under circumstances where politicians are mistrusted, the power of the celebrity is increased and the problem exacerbated.

Political organisations try to compete with popular culture and cut through the noise. They produce a range of communication in an attempt to reach their target audiences and nurture support for their views and policies. They use techniques of advertising, marketing and public relations to these ends, but largely are never sure exactly what worked and what failed. It remains almost impossible to understand or measure communication effects in a pluralist democratic society.

**2.2.3 Work in pairs. Exchange your notes and render the information. Make sure your partner uses all the notes.**

**2.2.4 Find in the text sentences which contain the writer's attitude. How is it expressed? Do you share this attitude?**

### Text 9

#### Public Relations Democracy

(Adapted from: Lileker, D. (2006) *Public Relations Democracy*. In Lileker, D. Key Concepts in Political Communication (pp. 168-172). SAGE Publications Ltd).

**2.2.5 Look through the text. How would you define the genre of the article? Where are you likely to find it? How does it differ from the other texts that you have read in terms of the structure and style?**

*Public relations democracy is a term used to describe a pluralist society with a free media and where much of the communication that comes out of the political system is designed to persuade the public that policies are correct, that laws and procedure are legitimate and that one organisation is better at representing groups of voters than its competitors.*

#### ORIGINS AND LINKS

Where there is a close parallel between a party of government and one or several media organisations, such as the US Republican Party's links to Fox TV or Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi's ownership of several commercial television stations, political communicators have an easy task. They are able to get their

message across to the public in the manner, style and in the format they want. It is within nations where there are limited controls over the media, whether through partisanship or legal constraint, that parties and governments must exercise persuasion, first, towards the media and secondly, over the people. Therefore it can be argued that every democracy must use persuasive communication, if not the only way to ensure the public obey laws is by threat of punitive action. However, the term public relations democracy has emerged to describe a situation where all communication has persuasive overtones: that all governmental information is tinged with a party political message, and every statement is designed to say something positive about the messenger.

While often conflated with the notion of spin or marketing, the differences relate to the fundamentals of public relations. The core aim of public relations is to present an individual or organisation in a positive light, to enhance the public's perception of that individual or organisation and, perhaps but not always, to get the public to do something for that individual or organisation. This means that public relations is about **image** creation and **branding, news management** and **campaigning**, it is not necessarily about legitimising a political system. It is argued, however, that this is the function it is being used for; or rather it is being used to legitimise the power of one party through the various governmental communication channels.

#### KEY FEATURES

The Chartered Institute of Public Relations' Code of Conduct sets out core functions of public relations. ... The first observation is that public relations is normally employed to represent a single interest or cause. As hinted above this could be the state; however, it is suggested that actually the state has been redefined to be embodied in the party of government and its leader. It could be argued that in a democracy the elected bodies represent the legitimate parts of the state and should be supreme; however, this ignores the checks and balances that exist within a democratic society. When a single party, by dint of being elected, is able to control communication for its own purpose it could be seen to be an elected dictatorship .... While other groups are able to employ public relations to represent them also, the resources of government enable one group to have the upper hand in reaching the masses through a multiplicity of channels.

Public relations tools are used in order to gain a profit for the individual or organisation being represented. While the concept of profit is alien to the democratic process, clearly the whole concept of **electoral professionalism** and **permanent campaigning** is geared towards maximising support. This links to a further feature which is that public relations enforces a single perception of reality upon its audience, in other words that it will attempt to impose an ideology upon the masses on behalf of the single interest or cause. Again, within a pluralist system, this would be expected; equally the fact that multiple interests and causes all employ public relations means that no single voice is permanently louder than all competitors. However, when related to the government of a nation, it is argued that governmental public relations is able to 'shout the loudest', drowning out the

voices of competitors, and so the incumbent gains an unfair, and perhaps undemocratic, advantage.

Public relations also deals with the world of appearances, not with the world of fact. While we can argue that the promotion of style and image has few negative consequences in the context of an election campaign, and that it is indeed necessary, critics posit that such a trend leads to a restriction of access to real information. Franklin (2004: 90–5) uses the example of the launch of the UK's National Year of Reading in 1998 to highlight the insidious use of public relations tools to present a perception of the government. The then Education Secretary David Blunkett embedded storylines into popular dramas, such as *EastEnders* and teen favourite *Hollyoaks*, while taking part in stunts with the stars of the programmes designed to boost the image of himself and his government as well as the policy. In spite of the fact that this could be seen as a worthwhile venture, given the levels of illiteracy that exist in the UK, the dual promotional purpose led to critics describing the campaign as propagandistic because of the partisan messages contained within the messages. The policy was clearly 'New Labour's', it was personalised by Blunkett's appearance and presented figures to suggest that the problem had not been addressed by the previous Conservative administration. Therefore it reinforced party perceptions, blending fact with a political message: projecting a biased appearance that had party political overtones.

Therefore, within a public relations democracy, we would expect to see a vast amount of governmental communication that promotes the party elected to govern, designed to earn that party future support through promoting its ideology and political programme, and every policy launch will include overtly political messages embedded amongst the facts. There are many instances of such practices, ranging from the German Green Party's attempts to claim ownership of environmental policies through the speeches of their leader Joschka Fischer to flamboyant Dutch politician Pym Fortuyn's arguments that were clearly aimed at image enhancement. However, Tony Blair is seen as the master of the public relations democracy due to the centrality of such promotional tools to New Labour's political programme.

### THE ACADEMIC AND PRACTICAL DEBATES

The norm is to argue that such practices are wrong, they are antidemocratic, reduce civic participation and lead to an inactive public sphere and create a cynical public disengaged from the democratic process. Yet they continue to be used. We may well argue that normatively, or in an ideal world, governments should quite simply inform and never ever attempt to persuade the public. But would that work? Certainly it would allow the media the opportunity to control the agenda completely, attach their own spin to a story and control public perceptions through their own partisan bias. This would be countered if we had free, objective and impartial news organisations, but few nations have, and those who claim to often have flaws. ...

Realists argue that much of what is referred to as public relations is actually weak propaganda: communication with conviction. As Kevin Moloney (2004)

argues, it is all about self-presentation for attention and advantage, it is unashamedly self-interested; but it is also a necessity for any group in power or wishing to attain power. Why then is it necessary if it is anti-democratic? First, it is important to note that the critics seem to offer a linear effects model for political communication; it is transmitted, it is accepted, it is acted upon. Yet this is not the case: accelerated pluralism mediates against the acceptance of any one propaganda message.

Accelerated pluralism describes a situation where no piece of communication goes uncontested. The fact that each individual audience member has the power to decode a message, process and evaluate it in relation to their personal experiences and ideology and then choose to accept or reject its logic, automatically suggests there is no unitary voice. There may well be voices that are 'louder', yet healthy cynicism means they do not always get attention and are disbelieved in the same way as the words of the opinionated man or woman in the bar, queue or classroom are shrugged off as uninformed ramblings.

However, this does not mean that the use of public relations is not damaging to the democratic process. Neither does it mean there are no alternative uses of public relations. The symmetrical model of communications suggests a form of democracy where public and political spheres have a communicative synergy; they talk to one another and so persuasion is two-way and decisions are made with the public. This suggests a revised version of public relations democracy that is hotly contested in terms of its practicability. At present such notions are an ideal, a chimera, which some scholars argue are required in order that the public feel represented and perceive power as being exercised legitimately; this cannot happen if all communication is weak propaganda and thus it is argued that new forms of communication are necessary, that political organisations need to bypass the media gatekeepers and open a dialogue with the public.

**2.2.6 Find the definition of public relation. What is special about PR in political communication? Give your own examples of successful and unsuccessful PR in politics.**

**2.2.7 What are the arguments for and against the use of PR in politics? Can you add any more arguments to each group? Do you agree that PR in politics cannot be avoided at present?**

**2.2.8 Define the words in bold.**

### Text 10

Adapted from: Lileker, D. (2006) *Political Marketing* In Lileker, D. Key Concepts in Political Communication (pp. 151-157). SAGE Publications Ltd).

**2.2.9 Skim the text. What are the main reasons for using marketing tools in politics? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this?**

*Political marketing refers to the use of marketing tools, concepts and philosophies within the field of policy development, campaigning and internal relations by political parties and organisations. It is seen as a reaction to the rise of political consumerism, and the collapse of partisanship, in western democratic societies as well as emergent democracies.*

Ever since Downs (1957) discussed the sovereignty of consumer culture in his *Economic Theory of Democracy*, there have been studies of the similarities and differences between our consumption of a range of consumer goods and of political outputs. Kotler and Levy (1969) noted the fact that political candidates are 'marketed as well as soap'; however, more recent work has progressed to focus on the role of marketing in the stages of policy design and applying what are known as the 4Ps of marketing: product, promotion, place and price. Product equates to policy, party and image, including the tangible and intangible aspects. Promotion and place refer to the design and delivery of the communicational aspects. Price, though less applicable, relates to the transaction of the vote which, normatively, is exchanged for a party carrying out the promises it communicated (Wring, 2004).

The driving force behind the adaptation of marketing to politics is linked to the phenomenon of *dealignment* that has forced parties to move from simply offering their 'product', what some refer to as the 'offering', and relying on this to be wanted by the voter, to selling themselves in a similar way to fast-moving consumer goods. As more parties use increasingly sophisticated techniques of salesmanship, so the competitive edge is lost, leading them to proceed to what is referred to as a market orientation; they allow the market, or electorate, power to design parts of the product. This conception of a market orientation, is distinct from the corporate concept of a marketing orientation where marketing becomes the central philosophy, which would be inappropriate for a political organisation as there is more to their operation than the management of a brand and a single set of products. Parties must also govern, which means determining the right course for a nation long term and not pandering to short-term goals in the name of quick profits.

As part of **professionalisation**, and particularly **Americanisation**, political marketing underpins many of the recent developments of political communication. With it demanding that political actors offer that which the voters desire (or need), politicians use tools such as **image** creation through **aestheticisation** and **emotionalisation**, the appearance of **authenticity**, and relevance and **segmentation** of the electorate to target messages. It can also, however, mean degradation to **populism** providing policy is not developed with any real understanding of long-term, rather than short-term, needs.

## KEY FEATURES

As noted, there are two factors driving the use of political marketing: first, are the trends towards political disloyalty and *political consumerism* among the

electorate; second, is the need to retain a competitive edge over electoral challengers. Parties meet these by going through a number of strategic stages, all of which are geared towards the electoral cycle. While these stages may not be discrete and non-contiguous in reality, it is useful to separate out the orientations and the stages that each type of party go through for ease of understanding.

... The use of market intelligence to design party behaviour, so to gain a competitive edge, is the fundamentally new aspect that market orientation introduces to politics. Party behaviour will include the leader, for example the construction of the image of UK Prime Minister Tony Blair; party policy and promises, as developed for the New Zealand Labour Party prior to the 2002 general election; or what is becoming known as the party's brand image. The latter is key to establishing an image of competence, but is difficult to change, yet a diverse array of parties and candidates have rebranded themselves in line with voter opinion. Some examples would be Brazil's APRA, formerly a radical revolutionary party now looking to be the party of government after the 2006 election; the Republic of Ireland's Sinn Fein, as it moves away from its terrorist past and builds a nationalist socialist agenda there are clear increases in support in both Northern Ireland and the Republic; and the USA's George W. Bush who beat Al Gore in 2000 in part by launching himself as a compassionate conservative Republican, rather than the candidate of the 'rich and white Texan'.

*Rebranding* clearly changes the behaviour of the party. Adjustment looks at four key elements: achievability, internal reaction, competition analysis and support analysis. Simply put, can that which the new image promises be delivered, will it divide the party, does it differentiate the party from its competitors, will it lose the party support among the loyal. It is argued that the APRA, Sinn Fein and Bush have been successful here, so far, UK's New Labour less so as it has lost supporters who see it as too close to the Conservative Party politically. While this could be a problem in the adjustment, it could also indicate a failure in implementation. Party members and supporters may well agree to changes in the name of electoral success; however, they may assume the changes are purely cosmetic. Thus if a rebranding strategy is only conducted around the leadership, not through all elements of a mass party, there will clearly be conflict as each section pulls in opposite directions. This may not be a problem for the first election campaign; however, subsequent campaigns may witness division, low turnout among supporters and general dissatisfaction for a 'product' that did not live up to expectations.

Communication is important to the success of a market-oriented party, and should feature a number of key elements. It should:

- be like any other organisation's marketing strategy, centralised, professional and uniform;
- be directed internally as well as externally, both selling the new direction of the party;
- stress competence and image above policy, as the latter should be known desires of the voters;

- feature branded symbols that have resonance with the voter, for example a picture of the leader/candidate, party logo, key messages;
- be both broadcast to the masses and narrowcast to target segments through key media modes;
- be designed and tested through strategic market intelligence;
- be ongoing, and not limited purely to periods of election campaigning.

## THE ACADEMIC AND PRACTICAL DEBATES

Political marketing is a phenomenon that has become controversial on both practical and normative grounds. A key issue for both aspects is the role of the public in designing aspects of party behaviour, and in particular, policy. In practical terms, because much policy development is a secretive process, it is difficult to identify the role of market intelligence. Lilleker and Negrine (2005) argue that much intelligence is used for salesmanship, rather than having input into design, and that even those involved in the policy development process are unclear of the extent to which the public voice is heard. This, however, may stem from the Burkean tradition that exists among the political elite. Traditionally, politics is an elite activity, conducted by those who know best on behalf of the masses: to relinquish control is to negate their own role in the political process. Therefore many politicians, when interviewed, are hostile to the notion of marketing concepts and reject suggestions of parties becoming market-oriented. While this is not uniform, and some politicians and strategists highlight the importance of being, or at least being seen to be, market-led, evidence suggests there are divisions over the use of marketing. Evidence from the research of O’Cass (2001) in Australia, and Lilleker and Negrine (2005) in the UK, show there are elements of a marketing philosophy that are adopted, but that it is difficult to identify any party with a pure market orientation. However, it is also questioned whether such a strategy is correct anyway. Politics, to some, is about ideology and values: to follow public opinion, however strategic the collection, leaves a party rudderless, constantly shifting at the mercy of knee-jerk reactions. While market intelligence suggests the areas of importance, and ideology can suggest the political response, it is noted that marketing draws parties to the centre ground, that which is occupied by the non-aligned or floating voter. Thus parties are difficult to differentiate from one another, and voter engagement is reduced.

There are also broad questions, raised elsewhere, regarding the communicational aspects: aestheticisation and emotionalisation, spin, packaging, designer politics, all of which are described as being the result of parties using marketing. While these are heralded and criticised equally, it is difficult to determine where the advantages lie for parties. Yet as voters become increasingly volatile in their electoral choices, and parties seek increasingly sophisticated methods of reaching out to the electorate, it seems that marketing will be used more and more. At each election more consultants are introduced into the political arena, what Wring (1991) describes as a *colonisation of politics*, each one bringing

ideas from the corporate environment. Thus it seems that political marketing is to have a long history, despite the questions regarding its appropriateness.

### 2.2.10 Answer the questions:

1. What do the following words mean in the context of the article: dealignment, political consumerism, rebranding, colonisation of politics?
2. Do you agree that political marketing is a part of Americanization? Prove your opinion.
3. Is there political marketing in Russia? Give examples.

## Text 11

(Adapted from: Simon, A. F., Iyengar, Sh. (1996) Toward theory-based research in political communication *Political Science & Politics*, 29(1), 29-33).

### 2.2.11 Read the abstract. How is the aim defined? How do you think it could be achieved?

#### Abstract (summary)

Simon and Iyengar seek to raise political communication's collective sensitivity to the pursuit of theory-building through pluralistic methods of research. The use of formal models, experiments and large-scale content analysis to study the effects of political communication should address this problem. Political communication has emerged as a coherent and energetic subfield of political science. Research is burgeoning, papers appear regularly in established scholarly publications, professional meetings feature multiple panels devoted to the subject, and specialized journals and newsletters have appeared. Despite these signs of institutionalization, practitioners would do well to pause and reflect on the field's theoretical aspirations and methodology. Our aim is to raise the subfield's collective sensitivity to the pursuit of theory-building through pluralistic methods of research.

### 2.2.12 Read the first part of the article. What methods of model building are analyzed? Which model do the writers finally choose and why?

#### Model Building in Political Communication

Rational choice models are especially attractive because they come equipped with a well-developed set of analytic and mathematical tools from which to derive specific research propositions. The core concept of "equilibrium" is defined as the outcome from which no participant has an incentive to deviate. In the context of electoral campaigns, where candidates invest considerable time, money, and effort in order to maximize their own "utility," namely, their vote share, an equilibrium

can be thought of as the strategy by which the candidate maximizes his chances of electoral victory. The mathematics for identifying equilibria (or lack thereof) are well developed. Once established, the equilibrium concept translates directly into prescriptions for political action; candidates who choose to deviate from the equilibrium strategy are more likely to lose.

In their generality, formal models provide insights that go beyond those based exclusively on empirical methods. Models encompass the entire range of behavioral outcomes, including those that may never appear in the real world. Assume, for instance, that it is not optimal for candidates to engage in a particular form of campaign communication (e.g., taking credit for the length of one's service in Washington). As scholars, we would never observe such counterfactual behavior (unless it occurs by mistake), let alone be able to explain it. By specifying the complete set of outcomes and identifying those that are most advantageous to the actors, rational choice theory leads directly to testable propositions.

Game theory, with its emphasis on strategic interactions, provides a powerful tool for describing the behavior of rational candidates. A game is a mathematical model in which players individually make choices that jointly determine the final outcome and payoff to each player. Many everyday situations can be seen as games, of which the "prisoner's dilemma" is the most familiar example. This model has been applied to a variety of broad problems. The relationship between citizens under government regulation, for instance, has been compared to a prisoner's dilemma, in that the use of state power to force cooperation can achieve a better (Pareto optimal) joint outcome than would occur from purely voluntary choices.

Two-candidate elections can readily be described in game-theoretic terms. Campaigning is the process of planning strategy, allocating resources, and executing activities in an attempt to win votes. This problem resembles the formation of a coalition government in a multiparty system; however, the important difference is that the battle takes place in a psychological space, the voter's mind. Thus, instead of bartering and compromise among rational actors, the candidate faces an exercise in heresthetics - the art of political manipulation via the transmission of information (Riker 1986). The candidates go about creating and disseminating their campaign "message" by advertising, staging media events, debating their opponent, etc. The empirical relationship between these activities and the electoral outcome defines a utility function. The campaign strategist's task is to maximize utility by carefully weighing the costs and benefits of each communication-related decision. The task is complicated because the candidates are interdependent players in the sense that the impact of any one candidate's actions conditions the impact of the opponent's actions. Candidates are not "soloists" who can maximize their positions vis-a-vis the electorate without regard for their opponent's campaigns (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995).

The model we discuss below (taken from the first author's dissertation) focuses on the candidate's choice of messages as the key feature of campaign strategy. Any campaign has a range of themes on which communication can occur. The rational candidates select the theme or set of themes that maximizes their vote share. Voters choose between the candidates by performing a weighted aggregation across all the themes, so candidates' relative advantages along any theme increases as their position moves closer to the median voter's ideal point.

The "play" of the game occurs in three stages. First, candidates face a distribution of voter ideal points and initial weights. Given this state of public opinion, the candidates must determine their optimal messages, allocating their budget accordingly. The themes they select are based, in part, on the proximity of their position to the median voter and on beliefs about the effectiveness of their messages. Candidates might, for example, decide that spending 60% of their budget discussing the economy and the remaining 40% on their personal integrity would maximize their vote share. These choices, in turn, influence the weights voters assign to the economy and integrity and their perceptions of candidates' positions. Thus, the election is modeled as a contest between rational communicators.

Under certain assumptions, most notably that messages increase the weight of themes in voters' decisions (the so-called "priming" effect) and that voters are fully informed as to the candidates' positions, the model yields a clear equilibrium--candidates will never converge on the same theme. Thus, "dialoguing"--the situation in which both candidates address the same theme or issues a dominated strategy. Put starkly, the full and open debate often regarded as the mainstay of democratic decision making will never occur if candidates behave as the model dictates (for further details, see Simon 1996).

The major objection to this family of models, of course, is their limited descriptive validity (see Green and Shapiro 1994; Lohmann 1995). In the case of the model described above, the underlying assumptions can be relaxed substantially to include more appropriate accounts of voter behavior. For instance, the model can be extended to the domain of "incomplete information" (Austen-Smith 1992; Banks 1990; Ledyard 1989) in which voters are unaware of the exact positions taken by the candidates. More generally, the advantages accruing from formalization remain in the face of subrational behavior, which can itself be examined fruitfully using rationality as a benchmark or heuristic.

In our view, the more cogent criticism of formal models is that practitioners typically ignore relevant empirical literatures, preferring instead to demonstrate mathematical sophistication. In the ideal world, good empirical research would be supported by elegant formal models to create maximally meaningful accounts of the phenomena under investigation. Predictions derived from formal models must be tested. Our advocacy centers on the notion that formal models must serve empirical research, rather than the other way around.

**2.2.13 Read the rest of the article. What methods are mentioned? What are their strengths and weaknesses in comparison with formal models?**

**2.2.14 Compare the part on *Experimentation and Content Analysis*. Do they follow the same logic and principles of description? Can you suggest a way of improving these sections?**

**Experimentation**

The scientific benefits of experimental design are well known (see Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995 for a recent discussion). Experiments are the only way to unequivocally establish causation.<sup>(1)</sup> Subtle advantages of resorting to experiments follow directly from the fact that experiments enable researchers to place political messages under the microscope and isolate their effects.

As suggested above, the ability to control the message makes experiments especially useful tools for investigating the behavior of rational actors. If a candidate always minimizes his vote share by ignoring the opponent's attacks, real candidates would never behave in this manner, e.g., they would always counterattack. In a correlational design, the researcher is confined to the counterattack strategy; the "ignoring" strategy never occurs. With the experiment, however, the researcher is capable of observing the effects of suboptimal behavior. The effects of all potential strategies (or combinations of strategies) can be estimated. In effect, experiments enable researchers to fill in the empty cells of correlational designs and address counterfactual questions.

In terms of the model discussed above, the experimental test creates conditions in which some subjects view campaign advertisements corresponding to the "ignore" strategy while other subjects see advertisements corresponding to the "respond" strategy. In this arrangement, any difference in the sponsoring candidate's vote share can be attributed to the difference in strategy. We administered such a test during the 1994 California gubernatorial race between incumbent Republican Pete Wilson and Democrat Kathleen Brown. The design was realistic: the experimental participants represented a fair cross-section of the electorate, the experimental setting was casual and designed to emulate "real life," and our study took place during an ongoing political campaign characterized by extensive television advertising.

We relied on a "two-advertisement" design in which subjects watched a videotape recording of a recent local newscast. Subjects had been told that the newscast had been selected at random and that the purpose of the study was to assess "selective perception" of local news. (Of course, we were really interested in the effects of advertising and the hypothesis that the respond strategy was inferior to the ignore strategy.) Depending upon the condition to which they had been assigned, subjects were exposed to either no campaign advertisement, one advertisement from each of the competing candidates, or two advertisements from the same candidate. The first spot was inserted into the first commercial break of the local newscast and the second spot was inserted into the next break. ...

The results from this experiment proved consistent with the equilibrium-based prediction. For both candidates, the ignore strategy increased their vote share over the baseline condition (in which subjects saw no campaign advertisement) by 4.5%, a difference that was statistically significant ( $< .08$ ) after controlling for subjects' party affiliation and race. Conversely, the respond strategy did not elicit any observable increase in the sponsor's electoral support relative to the control condition. Candidates were better off when they talked past their opponent. ...

Of course, experimental methods have well-known weaknesses including nonrepresentative participants, settings that are less than faithful to "nature" and manipulations that must take the form of short and controlled rather than prolonged and continuous exposure to political information. In addition, the small number of subjects limits the statistical power of experimental designs. For these reasons, researchers must strive to replicate experimental results using alternative sources of evidence. Here we discuss recent developments in content analysis as a means of replication.

**Content Analysis**

Traditionally, content analysis has been used to describe characteristics of messages. From our perspective, the value of content analysis is that it provides data to complement experimental manipulations and survey-based research. In the past, the method was sufficiently tedious and labor-intensive to discourage most researchers. Early attempts to increase the rate of return by using computers to interpret human language have yet to succeed; nevertheless, technological developments have introduced impressive increases in efficiency. As we discuss below, these developments can lead to superior measurement of political messages and greater ability to monitor message effects in the real world.

Content analysis can be applied to any "text." Here, we focus on newspapers for purely pragmatic reasons. Until recently, researchers attempting to content-analyze news coverage would have to subscribe to a representative set of newspapers from across the country. Since this is generally not feasible, researchers would rely

instead on one or two "prestige" outlets. Either approach required vast amounts of labor, storage capacity, and organization. The process was expensive and subject to considerable human error.

Today, most newspapers can be accessed through electronic databases offering full-text retrieval of articles that can be searched and transferred to digital storage in a matter of minutes. On-line services such as Nexis, Westlaw, and DataTimes include major national and regional newspapers as far back as 1984 and, in some cases, back even further.

By subscribing to these archives, the researcher has access to virtually every newspaper published in the United States. What once would take months and years to collect and compile can now be accomplished in a week. In our research on the effects of U.S. Senate campaigns, we compiled over 14,000 newspaper articles bearing on 50 senatorial races between 1988 and 1992. The initial data set was compiled within a period of six weeks.

Technology has also revolutionized the coding process--the building block of content analysis. The days of the hash mark on the coding sheet clipped to a tattered piece of paper are long gone. With a computer or, even better, a small network of computers, text can be either systematically or randomly assigned to coders at the time they log on. Their work is instantly stored and organized in proximity to the original text. Software interfaces guide the coders through their tasks, maximizing coder involvement and reliability.

Using this approach, we have been able to carry out several replications of experimental findings. In an earlier study, we examined newspaper coverage of 1992 Senate races in order to obtain articles dealing with campaign advertising. Based on these articles, we were able to classify the tone of the advertising campaign in each race as either positive, mixed, or negative. Our news coverage-based measure of advertising tone was then used to predict voter turnout, so as to replicate experimental results on the demobilizing effects of negative advertising (see Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino 1994).

### 3 THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

#### Text 12

(Adapted from: Dryzek, J. S. (2006) Revolutions without Enemies: Key Transformations in Political Science *The American Political Science Review*, 100(4), 487-492).

**3.1 Read the first part of the article. What gap does the author indicate? What is his main claim?**

**3.2 Characterize the style of the paper as tentative / assertive. Comment on the possible reason to choose the style.**

American political science is a congenitally unsettled discipline, witnessing a number of movements designed to reorient its fundamental character. Four prominent movements are compared here: A the statism accompanying the discipline's early professionalization, the pluralism of the late 1910s and early 1920s, behavioralism, and the Caucus for a New Political Science (with a brief glance at the more recent Perestroika). Of these movements, only the first and third clearly succeeded. The discipline has proven very hard to shift. Despite the rhetoric that accompanied behavioralism, both it and statism were revolutions without enemies within the discipline (other than those appearing after they succeeded), and therein lies the key to their success.

Many have tried to change the character of American political science, but few have succeeded. The revolutionaries in question are those who have sought in a group enterprise to set the agenda for the discipline in conscious rejection of most or all of what has gone before. In these terms, the discipline has seen five revolutionary movements. (Proclamation and establishment of a new research program, such as structural functionalism or biopolitics, does not qualify, and "paradigm shift" in Kuhn's [1962] sense is generally not an appropriate frame.) First came those who founded the discipline in the late nineteenth century as a professionalized state-building science in a seemingly recalcitrant polity - and against amateur political analysis. Next came the pluralists, who in the early twentieth century took up arms against the monistic state and its disciplinary handmaiden. Third came the behavioralists of the mid-twentieth century, who revolted on behalf of the study of actual behavior,

science, the political system (as opposed to the state), and (again) pluralism. Fourth came the Caucus for a New Political Science in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which rejected behavioralism's alleged complicity in the status quo of American politics in favor of a politically committed political science oriented to the social crisis of the times. Fifth came the Perestroika movement of the early twenty-first century, targeted against perceived hegemony of formal and quantitative approaches, in favor of methodological pluralism, qualitative inquiry, and again an orientation to pressing public problems.

Because Minerva's owl has yet to take flight over Perestroika, I will say little about it, but of the previous four movements, only two succeeded. A successful revolution may be defined in terms of resetting the discipline's agenda, as validated by the recognition of practitioners, whether or not they shared the movement's commitments. Practitioners then have to position themselves in relation to the new understanding, even if they do not share it. Success must be recognized as such; this may seem like an obvious criterion, yet it rules out at least one alleged revolution, as we will see. What is most striking about the two movements that did succeed, the statism of the disciplinary founding and behavioralism, is that they did not have any serious enemies inside the discipline who could articulate opposition to the rise of the new persuasion. These enemies only appeared after the movement's success, and so paradoxically validated the transformation in question. Although one should be cautious about generalizing on the basis of four cases, these are the only cases we have. The lesson would seem to be that the discipline can be transformed in revolutionary fashion only by movements with no existing enemies prepared to resist. To put it another way, in a century and a half of American political science, no reform movement has ever succeeded if it opposed the actual practice of the discipline in a way that met with explicit resistance from practitioners. American political science may be just as hard to reform in fundamental ways as the American political system that has so often frustrated reformists from within our discipline's ranks, from Francis Lieber to Theodore Lowi.

I focus here on developments in the study of United States politics, sometimes integrated with, though more recently separated from, political theory. Much could be said about comparative politics and international relations, but it is orientation to the study of American politics that defines the American discipline's basic identity and normative purpose.

### 3.3 Look though the rest of the article and fill in the table:

	What was special about the period?	What was the attitude to the previous approach?	Was it a revolution? Why / Why not?
The first decades			
Pluralism			
Behavioralism			
The Caucus			
The Modern Situation			

#### IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE STATE

The concept of "the state" was cemented into American political discourse by figures who were to become central to the new discipline of political science in the late nineteenth century (though the concept had found mention as far back as the arguments of the Federalists in the constitutional debates; Farr 1993, 69). From Francis Lieber, appointed to the first American professorship in history and political science at Columbia in 1857, to Woodrow Wilson and well beyond, the main practical task of political science was seen as the establishment of a unitary national state accompanied by a virtuous national citizenry. Wilson was far from alone in envisaging a political system with disciplined parties presenting well-reasoned policies to informed voters, enacted by Congress, and implemented by an expert bureaucracy practicing the best in administrative science. This administrative state would "breathe free American air" (Wilson 1887). Such normative advocacy was linked to a host of empirical studies of American

institutions exposing fragmentation, sectionalism, parochialism, and corruption. Wilson's (1885) own Congressional Government exemplified this genre.

For over half a century, the central purpose of political science was seen as the establishment of a unified state, supported by a unified and competent nation. In the first presidential address to the new American Political Science Association (APSA), Frank Goodnow (1904) spoke of the role of political science in assisting the "realization of State will." Occasionally political allies could be found for this project - especially in the Progressive Movement. More often the project foundered in the face of the corruption, patronage, party machines, parochialism, and regionalism that the statist sought to supplant, and the recalcitrance of the Madisonian system that the discipline's leaders believed was inadequate for a dynamic modern industrial economy and society. Some, though not all, opposed federalism in the name of a unified national state.

The discipline was, then, founded not only to study politics but also to advance a political agenda - and all subsequent revolutionary movements share this feature (though in the case of behavioralism it was not initially admitted). The founders were of course engaged in establishing the discipline rather than changing it, but they consciously rejected a particular kind of amateur political analysis; they were in this sense intellectual revolutionaries. The amateur approach to the study of politics was manifested in the American Social Science Association (ASSA), founded in 1865 and finally put to bed by the establishment of APSA in 1903 and the American Sociological Association in 1905. ASSA was largely reformist, Christian, activist, and oriented to public welfare (Seidelman and Harpham 1984, 20), and not conducive to the serious study of politics that asked hard questions about the fundamental character of American political reality. The founders of the professional discipline of political science did, then, establish a radically new intellectual agenda, and the concept of "the state" was professionally central in establishing the new discipline's identity (Gunnell 1995, 21). There was no resistance to this project from inside the nascent discipline because those supplanted remained firmly on the outside.

## THE PLURALIST REVOLT

The United States had always been a more plural polity than the discipline's statist desired; they recognized pluralism as a fact, but were likely to call it fragmentation, a problem to be overcome rather than a condition to be valued. This was true even of Arthur Bentley, whose 1908 book *The Process of Government* was treated as a precursor by behavioralism's pluralists. In his later unpublished work *Makers, Users and Masters*, Bentley actually condemned the domination of American politics by groups (Seidelman and Harpham 1984, 11-ill). The same was true of that other ancestor of behavioralism, Charles Merriam, who in the 1920s still sought "national democratic consolidation and social control" (Gunnell 1993, 105). Though stripped of its more organic associations, the centralizing state remained alive as normative aspiration in the 1920s.

Normative pluralism arrived with Harold Laski (1917), Mary Parket Follett (1918), and their sympathizers. Laski and Follett were influenced by the philosophy of William James, who stressed the variety of ways in which individuals could

experience the world; so their pluralist ethics was rooted in diversity of experience rather than in diversity of interest. Follett valued the organization of society from the bottom up in groups, not the social engineering from the top down that the discipline's statist always favored. Follett (10) famously asked, "What is to be done with this diversity?" The statist answer was clear: erase it. Beyond valuing it, her own answer was less clear in its implications for political reform.

According to Gunnell (2004), the rise of pluralism in the 1920s constituted the only true revolution in the history of American political science. Gunnell's key figure is George Catlin (1927), not Laski or Follett. Catlin was influenced by Laski, but rejected Laski's ethics in favor of disinterested science. Unlike Laski and Follett, Catlin's pluralism was based on the self-interest of groups, not on their diversity of experience - and in this he was followed by the pluralists of the behavioral era, who to Gunnell were not revolutionaries at all, but mere successors to Catlin's paradigm shift.

Yet if we look at the substance of Catlin's work, we see an explanation of politics that the statist could accept without too much difficulty - remembering that they had often recognized plurality, but saw it as a problem to be overcome. Thus Catlin's pluralism as empirical reality was hardly revolutionary. Even William Yandell Elliott, identified by Gunnell as the leader of the statist opposition to pluralism in the 1920s, could accept pluralism as explanatory theory, as Gunnell himself admits (Gunnell 1995, 36). It was only normative pluralism that Elliott opposed. Thus it is only in its normative aspects that pluralism could be truly revolutionary - and in this sense Laski and Follett were better placed to lead a revolution than Catlin. But clearly their work did not reorient the discipline - which adopted normative pluralism explicitly only in the 1950s, and then in very different terms, stressing interest rather than experience as the root of plurality (see Schlosberg 1998 on differences across generations of pluralism).

The main reason we cannot categorize the dispute of the 1920s as a revolution is that it was not validated as such by disciplinary practitioners in the after math, and so was not in a position to orient the work of the discipline thereafter. Can a revolution happen without anyone noticing? Gunnell's (2005) solution to this problem is to quote Kuhn (1962) on the "invisibility" of revolutions as the new understanding comes to dominate. But here Kuhn is referring to the tendency of adherents of a victorious paradigm to rewrite the past so as to recast their predecessors as precursors in a cumulative history; and nothing like this actually happened in political science between the 1920s and 1940s. Moreover, on Kuhn's account those responsible for the breakthrough would be recognized and praised for their achievements, elevated to the disciplinary pantheon. Catlin was not recognized in these terms. The only attempted revolution of the 1920s was that of the normative pluralists; and that did not succeed. Resistance within the discipline was stiff, including Charles Beard, Walter Shepard, Francis Coker, and William Yandell Elliott, among others. Laski was stigmatized as a radical socialist, and pluralism itself was characterized by Elliott (1928) as related to Italian fascism. Normative statist aspirations remained, though they were subsequently to diminish (before revival in Theodore Lowi's [1969] *The End of Liberalism*, linked to the earlier statist in what Seidelman and Harpham [1984] call

the "third tradition" of centralizing and reformist political science). Language changed, and by midcentury "the state" had almost disappeared from the disciplinary lexicon, except in international relations.

## BEHAVIORALISM

Behavioralism may be defined in terms of its commitments to "(1) a research focus on political behavior, (2) a methodological plea for science, and (3) a political message about liberal pluralism" (Farr 1995, 202), as well as the organizing concept of a political system (Easton 1953). Although behavioralism emphasized the individual, there was no problem in studying "... individuals acting in groups to realize their collective interests" (Farr, 204). The two most prominent group theorists of the early behavioral era, Robert Dahl and David Truman, were also committed behavioralists (Truman chaired the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Political Behavior in the 1950s). The pluralism in the political message was based on economic interest rather than on experience, and on an underlying consensus on fundamentals across different interests that in the United States could be assumed, rather than struggled for (see, notably, Dahl 1956). By the early 1960s many works were appearing that celebrated behavioralism's triumph (notably Dahl 1961). This certainly felt like a revolution, recognized as having reoriented the disciplinary agenda - by those who eventually criticized behavioralism, as well as those who supported it.

But what exactly did behavioralism oppose? The rhetoric of the revolutionaries was directed against for mal, historical, and, in Easton's (1953) words, "hyper factual" work, defining something called "traditional" political science. But who exactly was practicing traditional political science, and what was it? The behavioralists were strangely silent on the identity of their opponents and the actual content of specific pieces of work. Garceau's (1951) Review manifesto contained no references at all, positive or negative. The most sustained attack on the alleged status quo was Easton's (1953) self-consciously revolutionary *The Political System*, characterized by Farr (1995, 207) as "the single most important manifesto lodged against traditional political science during the behavioral revolution." Easton is lauded by Gunnell (1993, xi) as "the movement's most significant theoretician." Chapter 2 of *The Political System*, "The Condition of American Political Science" (with a section on "The Malaise of Political Science") is the most polemical. The chapter contains 28 footnotes, none of which names a contemporaneous American political scientist guilty of the alleged sins of hyperfactualism and failure to theorize. Names that do figure in these footnotes are Key, Simon, Merriam, Herring, Appleby, Lasswell, Gosnell, and Eldersveld, praised for being exceptions. In the section of Chapter 3 on "Hyperfactualism," the only sustained critique is of the writings of James Bryce, works by then half a century old. In Chapter 10, Easton criticizes political theorists for retreating into the history of political thought; but of his main references, only George Sabine remained active.

Much later, Easton (1993, 292-93, originally published 1985) describes "traditional political science" of the 1920s to 1940s as focusing on parties and pressure groups (NB: not on the state). His references on pressure groups are

Bentley (1908) and Pendleton Herring (1929). By 1953 Bentley had passed from the scene - and was also revived as a protobehavioralist, especially by Truman (1951). Herring was alive and well, and had in 1949 been instrumental in establishing the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social Science Research Council (of which he was president), one of the institutional sponsors of the behavioral revolution. Easton (1993) reiterates the behavioralists' contention that the traditionalists mixed facts and values, had too much description and too little explanation, and offered few overarching theories. But Easton then identifies Merle Fainsod's "parallelogram of forces" as the main "latent theory" of the traditionalists. In this parallelogram, policy decision was explained as the resultant of the various forces pulling in different directions. If this is the essence of "traditional political science" of that era, there should have been no reason for its practitioners to object to anything in behavioralism; and they did not. Fainsod himself became president of the APSA in the behavioral era, and as president in 1968 was instrumental in defending the discipline's establishment against the Caucus for a New Political Science by restricting access to the Annual Conference's program.

Nor could any hostility to behavioralism be found in any alleged practitioners of formal institutional analysis as opposed to science. Criticism of excess formalism and advocacy of science had been in place since the discipline's founding. Formalism had been attacked by Bentley and Wilson, among others (Seideman and Harpham 1984, 75). And nobody was against science. Throughout the discipline's history, criticism of the preceding generation for its want of science is a constant refrain. The constitution of the APSA adopted at its founding in 1903 proclaimed its main objective as "the encouragement of the scientific study of politics."

If the behavioral revolution's main tenets are behavior, science, pluralism, and system, then "traditionalists" had little reason to oppose it. Research on behavior at the individual level was already being done in the 1930s and 1940s (by Herring, Gosnell, Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, and others) - and those who did not do it had little objection to those who did. The commitment to science was of long standing, though as Easton (1991, 209-10) points out, an emphasis on basic science as opposed to social problems served the discipline particularly well during the McCarthy era of political witch-hunts. (This consideration may also help explain the lack of traction of Lasswell's policy science approach, developed in that era.) Pluralism as empirical theory was hardly new - indeed, the "latent theory" of the traditionalists as characterized by Easton sounds a lot like pluralism. Easton's own "political system" concept was more novel - though its main function was to provide a new vocabulary (inputs, outputs, and feedback) rather than a comprehensive theory of politics.

What, then was the behavioral revolution? The answer is that it was a selective radicalization of existing disciplinary tendencies, especially when it came to behavior, science, and pluralism as description and explanatory theory. Behavioralism led to more survey research being funded and published, an increase in the relative frequency of quantitative studies in the discipline's top journals, and a relative decline in work addressed to public policy. The emphasis on science

facilitated access to new funding sources such as the National Science Foundation. Behavior overshadowed institutions, though institutions were never forgotten. Most of these changes involved shifts in emphasis rather than radical novelty.

The kind of work that behavioralism was most clearly a shift from was a relatively new sort of political theory, which had the effect of crystallizing political theory as a separate and marginalized subfield. Prior to the behavioral revolution, theorists (pluralists and statist alike) were central to the discipline and debates about its identity. But by the early 1950s, emigre scholars such as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Eric Voegelin were lending a decidedly antiliberal cast to political theory. The solution, on Gunnell's (1988) account, was a divorce between political theory and the new main stream that suited both sides. Behaviorists could distance themselves from any political critique of American liberal democracy. The only kind of broad-gauge political theory that could stay within the mainstream was the liberal democratic work of scholars such as Dahl (1956).

Beyond shifts in disciplinary emphasis, the only truly novel aspect of the behavioral revolution came in interest-based pluralism as normative theory (despite the ostensible commitment to value-neutral inquiry). By the 1950s the old normative theory of the state had few disciplinary advocates. Even Elliott, who in the late 1920s had on Gunnell's (2005) account organized resistance to pluralism and in the 1950s remained an important presence in the discipline, did not come to the state's defense. The state, it seems, had withered away (at least in the discipline). In a political context defined by the recent defeat of two absolutist states in a World War, and a Cold War against a third, it was hard to argue for anything that looked like an overhaul of American politics along statist lines.

None of this meant that behavioralism had a completely easy ride. Easton (1991, 208) complains that in the late 1950s behavioralists still felt excluded from the Review and the Association - though that may have been a matter of institutional inertia rather than policy. The complaints should not have been too loud, for in 1951 the Review had published Oliver Garceau's (1951) behavioral manifesto, and by 1955 Angus Campbell, James C. Davies, Samuel Eldersfeld, Heinz Eulau, V. O. Key, Avery Leiserson, Warren Miller, William Riker, and Herbert Simon had all published in the Review.

Behavioralism did have its critics, but these did not arrive until the 1960s; indeed, their arrival confirmed behavioralism's success in setting the discipline's agenda, as recognized even by those who opposed it. Contra Farr (1995, 216), the opponents were not "those stigmatized as 'traditionalists'" (Farr provides no names). One set was composed of Straussian theorists (Storing 1962). The Straussians did not represent any prebehavioral disciplinary orthodoxy; their school developed alongside the rise of behavioralism, and was doubly isolated as a minority sect within the newly marginalized subfield of political theory. The other set was composed of those on the discipline's left (Charlesworth 1962, Bay 1965) whose heat was turned up in the late 1960s. The left critics did not defend any "traditionalism" (though historians of political thought were among their number). Rather, they sought a more critical and committed political science as an alternative to behavioralism's alleged ideological complicity in an unjust status quo in politics in the United States.

## CHILDREN OF THE REVOLUTION: THE CAUCUS FOR A NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE

The left's criticisms of behavioralism coalesced in, and helped define, the next movement that tried to reorient American political science, the Caucus for a New Political Science. The Caucus was organized at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Prominent members included Peter Bachrach, Christian Bay, Theodore Lowi, Michael Parenti, Alan Wolfe, and Sheldon Wolin. Room was also found for the international relations realist Hans Morgenthau (who opposed the Vietnam War), the Caucus candidate for APSA president in 1971. Among their number were political theorists keen to bring the critique of U.S. liberal democracy into the disciplinary center from the margins of the subfield to which it had been exiled in the early 1950s. In step with the dissident politics of the late 1960s, the Caucus demanded everything that behavioralism was not: an orientation to the social problems and political crises of the time and a discipline that would take collective stands on controversial political issues (Bay 1968). The Vietnam War, race, and poverty loomed especially large at the outset, and environmental and feminist concerns were soon added. Though not unanimously opposed to the scientific study of politics, Caucus members believed that science should take a back seat to commitment and relevance and that the explanation of political behavior was definitely not the proper center of gravity of the discipline. Like its three predecessor movements, the Caucus combined intellectual and political aims, though its political aims were much more explicit than those of behavioralism.

Much of the energy of the Caucus was devoted to reform of the APSA itself. It ran candidates against the official slate for both President and Council, and although never successful in electing a president, did get several members on the Council. (After the passage of several decades, erstwhile Caucusistas such as Theodore Lowi and Ira Katznelson could become Presidents via the official slate.) Resistance from the now mostly behavioralist APSA hierarchy could be fierce: at the 1968 Annual Conference, panels proposed by the caucus were frozen out. David Easton in 1969 was more conciliatory, offering in his presidential address a "New Revolution in Political Science" that would essentially put behavioral techniques in general and his systems model in particular in the service of social problems. But the new set of dependent variables offered by Easton did not assuage the Caucus or heal the split (though it did help legitimate the development of the subfield of public policy in the 1970s; see Torgerson 1995, 229-30). The behavioralist hierarchy was still firmly in place (even if its confidence was shaken), resolutely opposed to politicization of the discipline. As Eulau (1972, 438) put it in his presidential report, "we are not set up or organized for political action, or the propagation of political points of view." Upon completing his term as editor of the Review in 1971, Austin Ranney recalls that in helping to appoint his successor "I was very clear in my mind that it wasn't going to be any caucus type" (Ranney 1991, 230), and it was not.

Rather than develop links with the social and political movements of the counter-culture, the Caucus soon invested most of its energies in more professional

endeavors. As Lowi (1973, 43-44) lamented, it became "the Caucus for a New Political Science Association." Its assault on the commanding heights of the APSA having failed, the Caucus settled down to life as one of the APSA's ever-proliferating Organized Sections, sponsoring its own (eventually quite small) set of panels, and publishing a journal, *New Political Science*, largely ignored by the rest of the discipline (it did not appear in the ranking of 115 journals in political science compiled by Garand and Giles [2003]). Many of the younger members of the Perestroika e-mail list in the early 2000s were apparently unaware of this last attempted reformation of the discipline, and needed reminding that once there was the Caucus, and indeed that it lived still (Swidorski 2004).

The Caucus carried out a full frontal attack on behavioralism, but met substantial resistance. Applying the test for a successful revolution with which I began, the Caucus did not re-set the discipline's agenda in a way recognized by all practitioners. In particular, those who rejected the Caucus program could simply and safely ignore it.

#### PROLIFERATING RESEARCH PROGRAMS, BUT NO FURTHER REVOLUTION

Much has changed in the discipline in the postbehavioral era. During the 1980s, the state was brought back in (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), suggesting a cycle within the discipline (for an explanation of such cycles in terms of changing political problems, see Dryzek 1986). However, the state returned in a form far different than that in which it left. Gone was the comprehensive normative statism of the discipline's founding. Reacting against alleged societal reductionism of the behavioral era, the new statist saw the state as an independent variable in the sense that public officials could have interests of their own that did not simply reflect social forces. This was no revolution, just a highlighting of particular kinds of actors and motivations; behavioralists such as Truman happily recognized public officials with interests determined by their institutional home as participants in pluralist interaction. As Almond (1988, 858) put it (referring to the work of Eric Nordlinger, but the point is more generally applicable) "... there is no change in paradigm here but rather a research program of considerable promise intended to distinguish among polities according to which state (governmental) personnel take the initiative in the making of public policy..." This new statism could be ignored by non-practitioners of its program, and the language of "the state" still does not come easily to most American political scientists.

By the 1990s it was much harder for American political scientists to avoid taking a view on rational choice theory. This approach had been present for a long time, beginning in earnest in the 1950s with work by Kenneth Arrow, Duncan Black, Anthony Downs, and William Riker. Its territory, and share of the Review's pages, subsequently expanded to the point where it appeared to constitute the discipline's most popular research program. But rather than revolutionizing political science as a whole, rational choice stood alongside established sorts of behavioral scholarship, the new statism, cultural analysis, new institutionalism (of the nonrational choice variety) and other research programs in an increasingly

diverse discipline. Some rational choice practitioners presented their approach as an advance on a theoretical behavioralism, ignoring the sorts of theory that were present in behavioralism (such as Dahl's liberal democracy and Easton's systems theory). And even if they fell short in practice, behavioralists had always proclaimed a belief in cumulative explanatory theory.

#### 3.4 Read the Conclusion. How many revolutions were there in the history of American Political Science? Do you agree with the writer's view?

##### CONCLUSION

Reorientations of the American discipline of political science have been rare, with only two clear episodes in a century and a half. This rarity has not been through want of trying. The discipline has been very hard to shift. If a movement takes direct aim at established practices and understandings and meets with explicit resistance, history suggests it does not succeed.

Because successful revolutions re-set the discipline's agenda, they define the terms of their opposition, which appears only after the movement has succeeded. (It is in this sense that the Caucus was constituted by children of the behavioral revolution.) But even successful revolutions can find their agenda-setting ability fading with time. So by 1950 the normative statism that dominated the discipline in its early decades was exhausted. Behavioralism's legacy of methods, techniques, and research topics persists to this day, perhaps most strongly in the subfield of political psychology. But its capacity to set the disciplinary agenda has faded since the 1970s in the face of a proliferation of research programs, as confirmed by the laments of prominent behavioralists such as Eulau, Almond, and Easton about disciplinary drift, fragmentation, and loss of purpose (Farr 1995, 220). Indeed, it has become harder even to speak of an agenda for the discipline that could be re-set.

Perhaps with Thomas Kuhn (1962) in mind, many scholars view disciplinary history in terms of eras set apart by revolutions. However, pervasive evolution may matter just as much. Gradual change produced the slow decline of the state from the 1900s to the 1940s and the proliferation of approaches that characterized the postbehavioral era.

The success of the early focus on the state owed less to its normative commitments, always anomalous in the American political system, than to its association with professionalism and science. Behavioralism could reset the discipline's agenda because it entailed the selective radicalization of existing commitments and practices. Both were revolutions without enemies, and to date that seems to be the only kind of revolution that can succeed in reorienting American political science.

### Text 13

(Adapted from: Parenti, M. (2006) Patricians, Professionals, and Political Science *The American Political Science Review*, 100(4), 499-505).

#### 3.5 Read the first part of the text. What is the central idea of the article? Paraphrase the fragments *in italics*.

This essay sketches the strictures put on political scholarship from the early days of patrician amateurs to modern academic professionals, with special attention given to the emergence of political science and the methodological and ideological issues that developed within that discipline. It is argued herein that although some degree of ethno-class variety was eventually achieved in academia, there has been a lag in ideological diversity. Political heterodoxy often has been discouraged and suppressed. Nevertheless some modest democratic advances have been made in academia in the last half century.

*For centuries, writing about political events was largely the avocation of clergy and persons of private fortune. There were church scribes and court chroniclers who recorded developments in a manner pleasing to their overlords. And there were gentlemen amateur scholars who wrote for a like-minded audience of gentlemen readers. The accounts they produced were of a patrician literary genre, much like epic and tragedy, concerned with the monumental deeds of great personages, depicting a world in which the lower classes played no role other than an occasionally troublesome one.*

Antiquity gave us numerous upper-class chroniclers - Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius, Josephus, Tacitus, and others, none of whom thought very highly of the common people, if they bothered to think about them at all. The wealthy Roman senator Cicero was part of an already established aristocratic tradition when he described the plebs urbana as the "city dirt and filth," "the unruly and inferior." When ever the Roman people agitated for land redistribution, debt easement, rent cancellation, bread subsidies, and work projects, they became in Cicero's mind that most odious of all creatures, the umob." (Cicero 1967: 1.16, 11 and 1.19, 4; Cicero 1989: XI.7.1) What is remarkable is that this view of the Roman poor has been embraced by most classicists down through the ages even into the modern era (Parenti 2003).

A century after Cicero, the noted chronicler Josephus, a man of high lineage, blamed the rebel lion in Judea not on the boundless rapacity of the ruling Roman imperialists but on the base emotions of the rebels themselves, whom he characterized as "the mob," "mischief-makers" and "factious folk" who were "by temperament addicted to change and de lighting in sedition." Josephus actually led the first Jewish rebellion against Rome in A.D. 67. Surviving that, he showed little sympathy for the uprisings that followed. As a Pharisee, he switched to the Roman imperial cause, recognizing it as less threatening to his own privileged priestly caste that was a rebellion of down-and-out, class-leveling Jews. He is an early example of a lukewarm patriot-cum-comprador collaborator. As with Cicero,

Josephus remains a favorite among classics scholars, his repeated expressions of class supremacy evoking little critical notice (Josephus 1966: 28, 39-41, 87-88; and Josephus 1960: II, IV, VI, passim).

A prototypical patrician scholar was Edward Gibbon. Born in 1737, as heir to a considerable estate, Gibbon, in his own words, enjoyed "the luxury and freedom of a wealthy house." While attending Oxford he wore the velvet cap and silk gown of a gentleman which enabled him to hobnob with students of noble genealogy. Serving later as an officer in the militia, he soured in the company of rustic fellow officers whom he described as "alike deficient in the knowledge of scholars and the manners of gentlemen." Gibbon abhorred the "wild theories of equal and boundless freedom" of the French Revolution. And while serving as a member of Parliament he voted against extending liberties to the American colonists (Gibbon 1984, 65, 75, 86, 128, 173). Saturated with his own upper-class prepossession, Gibbon was able to look admiringly on ancient Rome's violently acquisitive aristocracy. He might have produced a much different history of Rome had he been a self-educated cobbler, sitting in a cold shed, writing into the wee hours after a long day of unrewarding toil. Gibbon himself was keenly aware of the material realities behind scholarly effort. As he remarks in his memoirs: "A gentleman possessed of leisure and independence, of books and talents, may be encouraged to write by the distant prospect of honor and reward: but wretched is the author, and wretched will be the work, where daily diligence is stimulated by daily hunger" (Gibbon, 157, 175).

*In a word, for all their differences in epoch, culture, religion, and nationality, patrician scholars have seen things through rather similar ideological lenses, in an age-old unanimity of upper-class bias that is often mistaken for objectivity.*

#### 3.6. Work in groups of five. Choose a period, read about it and summarize the main ideas of the passage in 10 sentences.

##### *Student 1.* PROFESSIONALS AND PURGES

By the mid-nineteenth century in Western Europe and the United States, the growth in trade and industry brought a noticeable increase in university populations and a commensurate professionalization of intellectual pursuits. The self-trained patrician scholar was replaced by more formally schooled individuals explicitly certified to conduct the requisite scholarship. These newly minted professionals drew salary and rank from established institutions of higher learning, mostly in exchange for teaching duties. The gentleman amateur gave way to the gentleman academic (Hamerow 1987; Holt 1967).

A leading light of Germany's professionalized scholarship was the renowned Leopold von Ranke, whose unflinching devotion to absolutism won him the favor of German monarchs. In 1831, Professor Ranke agreed to edit a political journal sponsored by the Prussian crown, from which position he launched a series of attacks against parliamentary democracy (Ranke 1973, 102-3). For Ranke, the recording of political events was to be grounded on facts that were to be

ascertained in documents produced mostly by the state. Hence, "objective" scholarship tended to be that which was heavily refracted through the official lenses of an autocratic state. In 1841, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV anointed Ranke official historiographer of the Prussian state. Ranke's other royal admirer, King Maximilian II of Bavaria, appointed him chair of the newly formed Historical Commission of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences (Gilbert 1990, 11-45; Iggers and Moltke 1973, xxviii-xxix, xxx-xxxv).

Nota bene, the German monarchs of Ranke's day took academic scholarship seriously as an instrument of ideological propagation. They financed chairs, commissions, journals, and professional societies, taking care that these be staffed by men like Ranke who shared their own views about how past and present should be perceived. In 1885, undeterred by Ranke's pronouncedly antidemocratic sentiments, the newly formed American Historical Association elected him as its first honorary member, on which occasion George Bancroft dubbed him "the father of historical science" (Holt 1967, 20).

Within German universities of that day could be found some dedicated democrats, but they were not likely to be granted awards, editorships, or special funding. While heaping honors on Ranke, Friedrich Wilhelm IV launched a campaign to root out "the dragon-seed of Hegelianism," including such dissidents as Bruno Bauer and Arnold Ruge. A close companion of both Bauer and Ruge was Karl Marx. Though endowed with a doctoral degree and exceptional capabilities, Marx never got his foot in the university door. In Britain, too, university scholars who strayed down iconoclastic paths usually saw their careers come to a sorry finish. There was the prominent case of Thorold Rogers, who brought forth a monumental study, the abridged version of which, entitled *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, served as a political text for the British socialist movement well into the twentieth century. To shore up his professional acceptability Rogers repeatedly injected disparaging comments about socialism into his writings, just as many modern-day academics insert negative - and often inapposite - swipes against Marxism. But these precautionary disclaimers were not enough to prevent him from being run out of his professorship at Oxford (Samuel 1981, xxvi xxvii).

As in monarchist Germany and aristocratic Britain, so in republican America, professionalization grew apace - but without ushering in any conspicuous change in political perspectives. Outspoken radicals had a markedly low survival rate. There was the no table case of Daniel DeLeon, who received the prized lectureship at the fledgling School of Political Science at Columbia College in 1882. DeLeon was a member of the Academy of Political Science, which was first established in 1880 as an adjunct of Columbia's law school and Columbia's newly created political science graduate school. When the Academy selected DeLeon as its president for 1884-1885, the young political scientist seemed launched on a promising career.

Then one day, while DeLeon sat with some of his colleagues, a crowd of workers trundled by in the street below. They were celebrating their victory after a hard fought strike. DeLeon's colleagues expressed such utter contempt for the laborers as to infuriate him. In short time, he threw his support to Henry George,

the radical single-tax advocate, whom the labor unions were backing for mayor of New York. DeLeon began campaigning publicly for George, identified as "Professor DeLeon of Columbia College." Columbia's president, Frederick Augustus Porter Barnard, condemned DeLeon's radical views and his participation in the mayoralty election. Ever alert to the dangers of class leveling, Barnard condemned Henry George's rather modest electoral campaign as a "monstrous agitation" that threatened to "overthrow the entire structure of civilized society" (Seretan 1979, 13-15). Despite DeLeon's considerable talents as a scholar and teacher, his political activities prevented him from ever being offered a professorship on Columbia's political science teaching staff. In 1889 he left the faculty in disgust.

By the 1880s, wealthy and conservative business leaders came to dominate the governing boards of most universities and colleges, in what has proven to be an enduring reign. These trustees seldom hesitated to take action against faculty members with outspokenly heretical politico-economic opinions, including anyone who was known to have championed anti-monopoly causes, opposed U.S. imperialism in the Philippines, or defended the rights of labor leaders and socialists. Among those dismissed were such accomplished scholars as Edward Bemis, Thorstein Veblen, and E. A. Ross. The purging of faculty escalated around World War I. University officials such as Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, explicitly forbade faculty from criticizing the war. Butler maintained that such heresy was not tolerable in times of war. It was the patrician Butler who said that "an educated proletariat is a constant source of disturbance and danger to any nation" (Nearing 1972). The prominent scholar, Charles Beard, was grilled by Columbia's trustees, who suspected that his views might "inculcate disrespect for American institutions." A furious Beard resigned his professorship, declaring that Butler and the trustees sought "to drive out or humiliate or terrorize every man who held progressive, liberal, or unconventional views on political matters" (Hofstadter and Smith 1961, 883-92).

Another celebrated academic who came under fire was the renowned economist Thorstein Veblen. Common lore has it that a stormy divorce and illicit liaisons with various women were the cause of his checkered career. Max Lerner, who edited an anthology of Veblen's work, sets the record straight; what really upset Veblen's academic employers "was less his unstable ménage than his dangerous thoughts. They got back at him in many ways. He was 'not sound,' they said; 'not scholarly.'" They froze his meager salary and delayed his promotions. Despite his productivity and wide readership, his choice of teaching posts shrank, and he was never awarded a grant for any research project he submitted. In 1925, no longer able to ignore his scholarly contributions and his growing celebrity among a literate public, the American Economic Association tendered Veblen the nomination for its presidency. Even then the invitation was extended only after heated clashes within the AEA. In the end, Veblen refused the offer, remarking with some bitterness that it should have come years earlier when he needed it (Lerner 1948, 9-10, 19).

## *Student 2. TWILIGHT OF THE ANGLO-PATRICIANS*

As a formal academic discipline, political science seems to have branched off from history, law, and philosophy. By the late nineteenth century, political science departments had emerged as separate entities from history - though often partly stocked with recycled historians. Even into the 1980s one could still find stray historians lodged in one or another political science department, including rather prominent ones such as Howard Zinn at Boston University and Raul Hilberg at the University of Vermont. Sometimes the distinction between a historian and a political scientist was a blurry one. In the late 1950s the jest was: "If you're writing about events before the New Deal, you are a historian. If you're writing about events after the New Deal, you are a political scientist." And the New Deal itself seemed to be fair game for both disciplines.

Into the early decades of the twentieth century, the political science and history departments of leading universities were populated largely by relatively well-off males of northern European descent and politically conventional opinion. Most of them entertained a solicitous view of the "captains of industry" and a rather negative opinion of labor unions and antiwar protestors. Many were tireless boosters of the established order. Samuel Flagg Bemis, for instance, so zealously trumpeted the virtues of U.S. foreign policy that his students dubbed him "American Flagg Bemis." As befitting their lineage, American gentlemen scholars often were endowed with toney

Anglo-patrician trinomina: James Truslow Adams, Worthington Chauncey Ford, Archer Butler Hurlbert, Wilson Porter Shortridge, Ulrich Bonneil Phillips, Harold Underwood Falkner, Henry Eldridge Bourne, Moses Coit Tyler, Wilbur Fisk Gordy -one could go on. As is said of the patricians, they own 80% of the wealth and 90% of the names.

After World War II, the G.I. Bill and other federal and state funding for higher education brought a commensurate growth in student enrollments, and with this a greater diversity in ethnicity and class background among students and scholars. The conservative Anglo-patrician grip on the political science and history professions was not broken but definitely loosened. People of more varied ethno-class background were making their way into what were once patrician graduate schools. The changes that took place did not go unnoticed by the patricians themselves. In 1957, at Yale, the chair of the Yale history department vented his concerns in a remarkable letter to the university's president, noting that although the English department "still draws to a degree from the cultivated, professional, and well-to-do classes, by contrast, the subject of history seems to appeal on the whole to a lower social stratum." Far too few of the doctoral applicants in his department, he complained, "are sons of professional men; far too many list their parents' occupation as janitor, watchman, salesman, grocer, pocketbook cutter, bookkeeper, railroad clerk, pharmacist, clothing cutter, cable tester, mechanic, general clerk, butter-and-egg jobber, and the like" (Novick 1988, 366). That same year, 1957, I myself - coming from a working-class family of the kind deplored by Yale's history chairman - was a stipend-supported graduate student in the Yale political science department. Typical of departments at other elite schools, the Yale

political science faculty was all-male, all-white, and largely (but not exclusively) Euro-Protestant, featuring such notables as Robert Lane, Robert Dahl, Frederick Watkins, and Bradford Westerfield. To their credit, none of these faculty appeared troubled by the budding ethno-class diversity of the department's graduate student population. However, diversity did not extend into the political realm. As I recall, not one of us students or faculty were involved in what might be considered radical scholarship. Indeed, radical scholarship probably would have been considered an oxymoron in those days - as it still is in some quarters.

## *Student 3. POLITICAL SCIENCE WITHOUT THE POLITICS*

The 1930s, the New Deal, and the ensuing war against the fascist powers produced a generation of political and social scientists whose liberalism placed them well to the left of anything that would have been welcomed by Frederick Augustus Porter Barnard and his peers. But with the advent of the Cold War there came a heightened repression of campus heterodoxy. Instructors who trod a politically deviant path were hounded from their positions by administrators who often concerted with conservative faculty, trustees, and state legislators (Schrecker 1986).

In addition to ideological purges, the late 1950s saw the emergence of a depoliticizing methodological approach known as "behavioralism." Up until then the predominant orientation in political science, and to a lesser extent other social science disciplines, might be described as nontheoretical and nonsystematic. Attention was directed to specific institutions rather than to the processes that cut across them. For this reason, practitioners of this approach were sometimes described as "institutionalists" and even "traditionalists." Institutionalists focused on the ideographic rather than on the nomothetic. To be sure, some years earlier there had been political scientists like Arthur Bentley, Charles Merriam, and V O. Key, and sociologists like W. I. Thomas who attempted to be systematically empirical in approach and somewhat theoretical in scope. But they were among the exceptions.

Although composing less than a majority of the profession, the behavioralists came to occupy the high ground in the discipline, with their outside funding and consequent control over many areas of graduate research. Now political phenomena were to be studied primarily for the purpose of extracting scientific hypotheses and theories. Cross-disciplinary approaches were encouraged. Political scientists learned to place greater emphasis on quantification and the rigorous testing of hypotheses. Suddenly it seemed that every political science department had to have a "quantifier." Meanwhile, questions about the normative worth of the phenomena studied were to be left to the moral philosophers.

It would be wrong to assume that the swift ascension of behavioralism was achieved purely through intellectual discourse. Other factors having nothing to do with scholarly dialogue exercised an influence, most notably the enormous financial support given to the behavioral persuasion by foundations, government, and corporations. A vast array of centers and institutes mustered cross-disciplinary teams of behavioralists who honed elaborate studies on such

subjects as social deviancy, urban riots, the lures of communism, consumer habits, military recruitment campaigns, and insurgency and counterinsurgency. The task of these social science teams - with political scientists among them - was not to change the world, but to assist authorities in getting a firmer grip on the existing social order. As the Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences proudly reported in 1968: "The behavioral sciences are an important source of information, analysis and explanation about group and individual behavior, and thus an essential and increasingly relevant instrument of modern government."

In the early 1980s, writing in PS, Joseph LaPalombara noted that political scientists could help overseas investors determine how political conditions in foreign lands might affect the safety and profitability of their investments. Within the burgeoning field of "political risk analysis," political scientists could apply their theories to help "intelligent, harried bankers and corporate managers . . . keep the restless natives in line." For such services the transnational corporations were willing "to spend hard cash." "It is a heady challenge," LaPalombara breathlessly announced (LaPalombara 1982). Corporations and banks were not the only ones interested in controlling "the restless natives." In the January 1983 APSA Personnel Service Newsletter, the Central Intelligence Agency advertised for analysts to work in Third World areas. "They should have an interest in social change, revolutionary organizations and regime responsiveness and capabilities" (see also Diamond 1992).

#### Student 4. THE POST-BEHAVIORAL CHALLENGE

During the ferment of the late 1960s, numbers of political scientists began complaining that important happenings were being ignored by the discipline. The critics were labeled (sympathetically) by then-APSA president David Easton as "post-behavioralists." These post-behavioralists organized themselves into the Caucus for a New Political Science under the leadership of Christian Bay and Mark Roelofs. Among the political scientists of note who proffered a critical post-behavioral viewpoint were Charles McCoy, Peter Bachrach, James Petras, and Sheldon Wolin. Some, including myself, complained that most of the discipline's scholarship was removed from the imperatives of political life or inaccurate in its depiction of a benevolent democratic pluralism. Here is a summary of criticisms I first offered years ago (Parenti 1983):

1. In their search for the nomothetic, behavioralists tended to place undue emphasis on process and show a disregard for the content of events and systems. Process abstracted from its substance tends to be treated in an ahistorical reductionist fashion. Hence, it may be true that both Napoleon and his valet engaged in the decision-making process, one for the Empire and the other for the Emperor's household. Both organized staffs, set priorities, and allocated scarce resources. Perhaps one might come up with a model that could apply to the activities of both, but it would obscure differences in historical substance that were more important than the generalizable patterns of process. A theory of decision-making abstracted in this fashion would be a somewhat meaningless

accomplishment. Indeed, we might wonder if the process itself were being properly understood when so utterly divorced from its context of interest and power.

2. As the behavioral methodologies became increasingly elaborate, the problems studied seemed to get increasingly insignificant. Quantifiable precision imposed limits on the kinds of subjects that could be addressed. So it seemed that the methodological mountain brought forth an intellectual mouse.

3. In pursuit of scientific neutrality, behavioralists often selected uncontroversial subjects to study. Hence, instead of neutralizing the investigator, they succeeded in neutralizing their subject matter. They seemed to overlook the difference between (a) injecting value judgments into the study of empirical phenomena and (b) studying value - charged political activities in an empirical way. The laudable desire to eschew (a) should not lead us to avoid (b).

4. Although the behavioralists claimed a value-free scientific posture, there were all sorts of value judgments hidden in their research. For instance, their eagerness to place their science at the service of government, military, and business rested on the unexamined value assumption that the overall politicoeconomic system was essentially a benign one.

In 1981, Evron Kirkpatrick, who served as director of the American Political Science Association for more than 25 years, said, "I have always believed that the knowledge we gain as scholars should provide a basis for others or for ourselves to play an active, effective and sound role in government and politics." (Kirkpatrick 1981, 597) He referred to the many political scientists who occupied public office, worked in electoral campaigns, or served officialdom in various capacities. His remarks evoked no outcry from his mainstream colleagues on behalf of value-free scientific detachment. It seemed there was nothing wrong or biased about political partisanship as long as one played a "sound role in government" rather than a dissenting role against it. Establishment academics like Kirkpatrick never explained how they were able to avoid injecting politics into their science while so siduously injecting their science into politics.

Not long after the Caucus for a New Political Science was formed, it became clear that the postbehavioral critique was really a radical one, directed less at a particular research mode than at the centrist or "main stream" orthodoxy shared by many behavioralists and traditionalists alike (Lindblom 1982; McCoy and Playford 1967; Parenti 1983). In foreign policy analysis, the centrists never challenged the assumptions about the benevolent intent of U.S. interventions. In regard to domestic issues, it was assumed that "democratic capitalism" had an actual empirical referent and was not an ideological or propaganda term. But what really was the relationship of democracy to capitalism? And of economics to political power? That these kinds of questions were themselves ideologically inspired was irrelevant, I argued at the time, for they still could lead to empirical investigations that carried theoretical import. The centrists claimed to be nonpartisan, but the determination of what is nonpartisan is itself a highly partisan matter. They failed to acknowledge that husbanding the status quo was no less partisan than struggling to alter it.

## Student 5. AND TODAY?

The 1950s purges of academia were followed by the suppression of New Left radicalism in the late 1960s, a campaign that continued into the following decades and to some extent obtains to this day, targeting out spoken leftists and campus activists in political science and just about every other discipline. The political motive behind these purges usually have been denied. Most of the people who were refused a contract were declared to be deficient in scholarly performance. Sometimes budgetary exigencies were declared to be the deciding factor. No doubt such explanations must have been true in some cases. Still one had to marvel at how often the career path open to main stream academics was so much less rocky than the one trod by equally qualified radicals. In some instances, the political motives behind the firings and nonhirings were openly pronounced, usually by conservative trustees and administrators, or right-wing legislators and other off-campus ideological gatekeepers (Meranto, Meranto, and Lippman 1985, 73-87; Parenti 1995, 175-96; Parenti 1996, 235-52).

Consider one of the better publicized cases. In 1978 Bertell Oilman was offered the chair of the political science department at the University of Maryland. After accepting the position, he came under fire in the media and from some trustees who explicitly opposed having a Marxist as chair. The administration could find nothing deficient in Oilman's academic credentials, yet it buckled under the pressure and withdrew the offer. As one security-minded corporation president put it to the university president, "We can't let a Marxist get hold of a department of government so close to the White House" (Oilman 2004, 34).

In contrast, one can point to those academic denizens whose writings are polemical and partisan, and who yet have done quite well: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Daniel Boorstin, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, to name a few. Far from being politically neutral, such individuals have been explicit proponents of American military-industrial policies at home and abroad. Despite this - or because of it - they enjoyed meteoric academic careers and subsequently were selected to serve in prominent public posts. We might gather that outspoken advocacy is not a hindrance to one's calling as long as one advocates in the right direction.

Regarding the current state of political science, one senses that the discipline is stuck in a time warp. The behavioralists have evolved into "rational choice" specialists whose highly abstracted model-building seems to be something of an end in itself, valued for the elegance of its mathematical configuration. When critical questions about the political science discipline are posed, they seem to be the same ones that were put about in my salad days a half-century ago: What are the promises and limits of the scientific method as applied to political science? Does the more methodologically rigorous work have a commensurate payoff? Or does it come at too high a cost to understanding political reality? Is there an incremental gain in knowledge? Or do changing events, paradigmatic shifts, and other intellectual tides reduce past research to shambles? Have we developed any reliable middle-level theory regarding political life? (for example Hill 2004, and subsequent exchanges by Ozminkowski, Strakes, and Hill 2005).

There is an additional problem for those who teach political science. What is to be done about student skepticism in regard to the more indecipherable forms of research and scholarship? In a "Mr. Boffo" cartoon, appearing in the San Francisco Chronicle (March 7, 2005), and other newspapers around the country, a student sitting in the office of a course advisor is saying, "I want to specialize. I want to learn more and more about less and less, until I know absolutely all there is to know about nothing." And the advisor responds, "Okay, that would be political science." To see one's discipline treated as a bad joke in a syndicated news paper cartoon is an unkind cut. People are trying to tell us something.

Today there are right-wing critics who would have us believe that institutions of higher learning are hotbeds of "politically correct" leftist orthodoxy, propagated by liberals, feminists, Black militants, Marxists, and gay/lesbian-rights promoters, a place where conservative opinion cannot find light of day. On the average college campus, it is said, a decent conservative who refuses to bow his head to the tyranny of campus liberals dare not hope for a career. In fact, no university is under leftist rule, and conservatives remain a regular fixture in many academic departments. The university's corporate-oriented board of trustees and extravagant monetary compensations for top administrators, its heavy exploitation of adjunct teachers, steep student financial indebtedness, increasing corporate arrogation of institutional functions, and overall growing dependence on private funding all militate against anything resembling a radical predominance (Soley 1997; White and Hauck 2000). If anything, in political science the spectrum has moved somewhat to the right since the 1970s, mirroring the climate of opinion in the wider society.

For years mainstream political scientists scorned antiwar radicals and Marxists of every stripe. Now, ironically, emboldened conservatives are accusing these same mainstreamers of being ideologically driven liberals. More recently, conservative students, often abetted by right-wing organizations and political bounty hunters like David Horowitz, have complained that exposure to liberal ideas, that is, ideas they disagree with, deprives them of their right to academic freedom and ideological diversity, and constitutes "possible indoctrination" (Horowitz 2006). What they really are protesting is not the lack of ideological diversity but their first encounter with it, an encounter with perspectives other than the one they regularly embrace.

Conservative students also grumble about being denied their First Amendment rights by being required to read leftists such as Howard Zinn. "Where are the readings by Sean Hannity, Ann Coulter, and Bill O'Reilly?" complained one (Meranto 2005, 221). They do more than grumble. Under the guise of protecting academic freedom, conservative campus activists police the class rooms of faculty who teach things that the students disapprove of, "outing" and confronting teachers sometimes to the point of harassment, accusing them of conducting unbalanced and politically motivated classes. It should be noted that conservative professors are not subjected to such treatment. Even more intimidating, the conservative students register their complaints with college administrators, trustees, and outside conservative pressure groups; and disseminate

their disclosures in right-wing publications and Web sites. Thus they act as self-appointed censors whereas themselves claiming to be victims of censorship.

To summarize the major points in this article: All scholarly work needs material support to achieve actualization. Such support must come either from personal fortune, patronage, or institutional and governmental sources. What we have seen through the ages is a link between research and professional formations, on the one hand, and the emergence of formal institutional and governmental power and resources, on the other. Specifically in our own time and profession, the inter action between scholarly proliferation and institutional and governmental funding is illustrated in one salient instance by the rise of behavioralism and in the subsequent eagerness of supposedly value-free scientists to serve the powers that be.

Overriding all these developments is the age-old control that institutional elites exercise over personnel selection, and the ideological conformity thereby propagated. Of course, ideological coercion is usually more implicit than overt. It becomes a painfully visible issue during times of crisis (World War I, the Cold War, the sixties, etc.). In less critical times, hegemony is maintained through a socialization process that is structured within the profession itself and is a component of the dominant ideological paradigm. Some might dismiss this whole matter, telling us there is no reason to act surprised that the discipline has been influenced by elite forces. But if it be such a commonplace idea why do so many continue to deny and dismiss it as a shopworn radical notion?

In the face of growing economic inequality, reactionary rollback, unaccountable political power, and potentially catastrophic environmental crises, the pre dominant intellectual product in political science remains bereft of any critical approach to society's compelling issues. Not everything written by mainstream political scientists serves the powers that be, but very little of their scholarly output challenges such powers. Let it be said that although orthodoxy no longer goes uncontested, it still rules. The repression of heterodoxy is more than just a passing phase. The use of institutional and material resources to effectuate ideological compliance within the ongoing politicoeconomic structure goes back well before Ranke and even beyond Cicero, an old story with an ever-changing cast of characters, from the patricians of yore to the plutocrats of today. Scholarly inquiry may strive to be neutral, but it is never conducted in a neutral universe of discourse. It is always subjected to institutional and material constraints that shape the way it is produced, funded, distributed, and rewarded.

Still, even progressives would have to admit that there have been some real, albeit limited, advances within the narrow confines of the political science discipline. The Caucus for a New Political Science never managed to turn the profession in a genuinely radical direction, but it did produce a fairly decent journal of its own and offers a section of panels at the annual meetings. And even some of the discipline's more liberal mainstream members do occasionally create light and space where, in an earlier age, there had been almost none.

**3.7 Find someone who has summarized the same passage. Compare your summaries and make sure they reflect all the main ideas of the text.**

**3.8. Return to your group. Together, use your summaries to share the information from the article. Work together to write a summary of the whole text in no more than 20 sentences.**

**3.9. Choose one of the periods described in Texts 11 and 12. Write 2 paragraphs about it making references to the both Texts.**

**3.10 Prepare a presentation about the chosen period. Use the information from the whole reader as well as any other academic sources you can find. Do not forget to make references.**

## VOCABULARY

Give definitions and translate the terms and key words taken from the above articles.

### 1.1.1 Corruption

word	definition	translation
accountable		
actor		
administrative apparatus		
appointee		
authoritarian states		
bribe		
bureaucracy		
civil servant		
collusion		
constituency		
corruption		
curb corruption		
democratic states		
deterrent		
elected official		
electoral systems		
electorate		
esprit de corps		

word	definition	translation
government institutions		
impartiality		
incentive		
institutional		
kickback		
large voting districts		
majoritarian system		
merit		
meritocratic		
non-corrupt institutions		
parliamentary regime		
party list		
peers		
policymaker		
political elite		
political regime		
politics		
polity		
presidential system		
professional body		
public administration		
public policy		

word	definition	translation
public servant		
single-member districts		
systems with proportional representation/ PR systems		
veto player		

### 1.1.2 Buying Policy

Word	Definition	Translation
campaign contributions		
contract lobbyist		
financial resources		
inhouse		
insider advantages		
legislature interest group		
lobbyist		
notables		
caveat		

### 1.2 Gender Politics

word	definition	translation
feminism		
formative years		
gender gap		

word	definition	translation
gender parity		
gender politics		
institutionalize		
magna cum laude		
Progressive Era		
public welfare		
rebuttal		
suffrage		

### 1.3 Authoritarianism

word	definition	translation
authoritarianism		
economic inequality		
genocide		
hierarchy		
incarceration		
internalization		
intolerance		
relative power		
social learning		
subservience		
xenophobia		

#### 1.4 Religion and politics

word	definition	translation
adherent		
church-state		
clergy		
congregation		
devotionalism		
faith		
nondenominational		
religiosity		
religious affiliation		
sacraments		
secular		
secularized		
services		
televangelist		
theological group		

#### 2. Political Communication and Public Relations

word	definition	translation
biased		
campaigning		
dealignment		
dissemination of information		

word	definition	translation
homogenisation		
ideology		
incentive		
incumbent		
multifaceted		
multifarious		
non-mediated		
persuasive		
political communication		
political marketing		
rally		
stakeholder		

#### 4. The History of Political Science

*Fill in the Table with the new words which you find useful*

word	definition	translation



*Учебное издание*

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Оксана Алексеевна ДАНИЛОВА

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ЦНИТ «АСТЕРИОН»  
Заказ № 311. Подписано в печать 20.12.2014 г. Бумага офсетная  
Формат 60x84<sup>1</sup>/<sub>16</sub>. Объем 7,5 п.л. Тираж 100 экз.  
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