



# 11 National identity and anti-immigrant attitudes

## The case of Russia

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According to the UN report *Trends in International Migrant Stock* (2013), Russia, with its 11 million migrants, holds second position in the world in terms of the number of migrants after the United States (United Nations, 2013). This number is increasing every year. The ethnic diversity of Russia has two sources: ethnic minorities, living mainly in the national republics, and both internal and external immigrants, living mainly in bigger cities. According to the Federal Migration Service (FMS), the largest immigration flows are coming to Russia from the former USSR countries: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kirgizia in Central Asia, and Ukraine and Moldova in Eastern Europe. China, Turkey, and Vietnam are among the non-former-USSR countries with large immigration flows to Russia. According to Volokh (2013), from about 10 million migrants in Russia, about 1.5 million every year are working legally, 1 million are in the process of getting permits for work, and 2.5 million are working illegally.

What is interesting about Russian attitudes to immigrants is that the most negative attitudes are constantly found to be toward people from the Caucasus region, most of which is actually part of Russia. So internal immigrants who have come from southern Russia to more central regions, and who are usually labeled “Caucasians”, are the most stigmatized group of migrants. When Russians say “Caucasians”, they usually mean Chechens, Ingushs, Dagestanians, and other ethnic groups located in their national republics in the North Caucasus Federal Okrug (region) of Russia. Often also Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and Armenians coming from Trans-Caucasus are mixed with this group as well, though the latter are external migrants from independent countries (Badyshtova, 2003; Leonova, 2004).

Overall, three groups of migrants can be distinguished in Russia that are perceived differently by Russians: Slavic, Asian, and Caucasian. A survey by the Public Opinion Foundation in 2011 demonstrates the differences in attitudes toward these groups. Russians (total N=24,500) were asked how they would react if a regular family from a certain place were to become their neighbors. Slavic immigrants were welcomed the most: only 15% of people in Moscow were opposed to Ukrainians as neighbors, while 25% were opposed to Moldovans. Caucasian and Asian immigrants were perceived much more negatively: 53% of people did not want to have Trans-Caucasian immigrants



1 (Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Armenians) as neighbors, while 56, 58 and 60%,  
2 respectively, did not want to have Middle Asian (Tajik, Uzbek, Kirgiz), East  
3 Asian (Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese), or North Caucasian immigrants (Chechens,  
4 Dagestanians, Circassians) as neighbors (FOM, 2012).

5 As studies show, immigrants contribute positively to a country's economy  
6 (Bennett, 2013; Bulin, 2013). Perceived tolerance or prejudice and discrimina-  
7 tion can encourage or discourage immigration to a country (Bandey & Rather,  
8 2013; Sattorov, 2013). The level of prejudice is rather high in Russia (according  
9 to OECD data from 2010, Russia is ranked 39th of 42 countries studied in a per-  
10 ceived tolerance index of minority groups) (OECD, 2011). In addition, Russia  
11 was the country with the largest decline in perceived tolerance from 2007 to  
12 2012 (OECD, 2014). Thus, it is very important to study the factors of anti-  
13 immigrant attitudes in Russia.

14 Social identity is one of the most important predictors of attitudes toward  
15 members of outgroups (Brown, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Considering that  
16 citizenship is a criterion to separate immigrants from the host population,  
17 national identity as a feeling of belonging to a country is the most relevant form  
18 of social identity to predict anti-immigrant attitudes. The literature on national  
19 identity and outgroup rejection is rich and diverse. There are different ways of  
20 defining national identity, and different aspects of national identity can be related  
21 to attitudes to outgroup members in different ways (Blank & Schmidt, 2003).  
22 Russia as a multicultural state is a fertile ground for exploring national identity,  
23 but no studies have been done using data from Russia as yet.

24 The present study aims to reveal the structure of national identity in Russia,  
25 and to test the effects of different components of national identity on attitudes to  
26 immigrants. *Study 1* aims to test the structure of national identity in Russia. In  
27 *Study 2* I will construct scales from the components of national identity, as  
28 revealed in *Study 1*. *Study 3* will test the effects of each of the dimensions of  
29 national identity on anti-immigrant attitudes. *Study 4* will explore the mecha-  
30 nisms that connect specific forms of national identity to anti-immigrant attitudes.

### 31 32 **Forms of national identity**

34 One of the first attempts to define the meaning of belongingness to the nation  
35 was made by Adorno and colleagues in 1950. The main criterion they used to  
36 differentiate between different ways of identification with the nation was the  
37 presence of critical evaluation of the nation. They defined two forms of attach-  
38 ment to the nation: *pseudo-patriotism* as a "blind attachment" and "uncritical  
39 conformity with the prevailing group ways" (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levin-  
40 son, & Sanford, 1950, p. 107), and *genuine patriotism* as love of country, with  
41 the ability to evaluate it critically. A similar distinction was made by Bar-Tal,  
42 Staub, and Schatz, who suggested the concepts of "*blind*", or uncritical, and  
43 "*constructive*" patriotism (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997; Schatz & Staub, 1997; Schatz,  
44 Staub, & Lavine, 1999). Hinkle and Brown (1990) suggested differentiating  
45 between "*relational*" and "*autonomous*" social orientations to emphasize that



identity can be based on comparison not only to other groups, but also to some absolute standards.

Common distinctions between *nationalism* and *patriotism* (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) have some similarities with all the differences described above. If we define national identity as a “basically positive, subjectively important bond with the nation” (Blank & Schmidt, 2003, p. 290; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), then nationalism and patriotism are more specific, attitudinal manifestations of national identity (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). The main criterion for differentiating between nationalism and patriotism is the ability to compare one’s own country with other countries. Thus, according to Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), patriotism is a positive evaluation of one’s belonging to the country, regardless of its comparison with other countries (“genuine”, “constructive”, or “autonomous” patriotism), whereas nationalism is a positive ingroup evaluation based on comparison of one’s country with other countries and on the belief that the home country excels and consequently has the right to dominate other countries (“pseudo”, “blind”, or “relational” patriotism).

Why do certain individuals in certain situations tend to prefer nationalistic or patriotic forms of attachment to a country? There are a number of stable individual differences, as well as a number of situational factors, that might foster these differences. Individual characteristics such as authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950), social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), low openness to experience (Onraet, Van Hiel, Roets, & Cornelis, 2011), and high importance of conservation values (Vecchione, Caprara, Dentale, & Schwartz, 2013) are prerequisites for a preference for nationalism. Among the situational factors, belonging to the dominant group in the society (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003), realistic group conflict (Campbell, 1965; De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003), or identity threat (Barnes, Brown, Lenex, Bosson, & Carvalho, 2014) may lead to a preference of nationalism over patriotism.

Sentiments directed to the nation are an inseparable part of national identity. In many studies, both patriotism and nationalism are sometimes defined through the notion of “national pride” (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997; Blank & Schmidt, 2003). Billig (1995) and Hjerm (1998) argued that it is important to distinguish between nationalism and national pride. Hjerm (1998) gives two reasons to separate nationalism and national pride: the negative connotation of the first, and its ideological hue. National pride is “free” from these connotations, which brings this concept very close to what is called patriotism, or constructive patriotism in the “nationalism–patriotism” tradition (Davidov, 2009). The concept of national pride allows us to take into account the content of identity, and develop domain-specific measures of national identification. Hjerm (1998) suggests two dimensions of national pride: natio-cultural (related to people within a society, common history, cultural background, etc.) and political (related to the civic side of a society, political institutions, economy, etc.).

The results of public opinion polls in Russia show this distinction between political and cultural patriotism very clearly. Surveys conducted by the Levada-Center from 1996 to 2012 using items from the International Social

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1 Survey Programme demonstrate a stable gap between the items measuring what  
2 Hjern (1998) calls natio-cultural patriotism and those measuring political patriot-  
3 ism. In all cases, less than 50% of respondents tend to agree or somewhat agree  
4 that they are proud of the way democracy in Russia works, Russia's political influ-  
5 ence in the world, economic achievements, social security system, and fair and  
6 equal treatment of all groups in society. The lowest percentages were obtained for  
7 the item "proud of the fair and equal treatment of all groups in society" in 1996  
8 (7%), and "proud of the Russian social security system" in 2012 (23%). At the  
9 same time, in all cases, more than 50% of respondents agree or somewhat agree  
10 that they are proud of scientific and technological achievements, achievements in  
11 sports, Russian history, and achievements in the arts and literature. The highest  
12 percentage across all three surveys was obtained for the pride in history item (75%  
13 in 1996, 72% in 2003, and 80% in 2012) (Levada-Center, 2012).

14 In 2014, a different question was asked: "What, above all, makes you feel  
15 proud of Russia?" The top five most popular responses included national  
16 resources (38.5%), history of Russia (37.8%), achievements in sports (28.9%),  
17 Russian culture (28.3%), and geographical size of the country (28%). The least  
18 popular answers were the Russian health care system (2%), Russian system of  
19 education (5.2%), and economic achievements (5.4%) (Bruk, 2014).

20 These large differences in the level of pride for specific aspects of the coun-  
21 try's past and present suggest that patriotism in Russia is not a single construct  
22 but, rather, is represented by two distinct forms of patriotism that reflect Hjern's  
23 (1998) two dimensions: natio-cultural and political pride.

24 To capture all these differences in one theoretical framework, we combine in  
25 this study the nationalism-patriotism dimension with the natio-cultural vs. polit-  
26 ical pride dimension. As the latter does not imply any group comparison and is  
27 basically a positive evaluation of one's country/nation, I (following the psycho-  
28 logical tradition) will further refer to it as *patriotism*. Thus, based on this over-  
29 view, I expect to find three distinct forms of national identity in Russia:  
30 nationalism, cultural patriotism, and political patriotism. I will test the three-  
31 component model in Studies 1 and 2.

### 32 33 34 **National identity and anti-immigrant attitudes**

35 The basic assumption of social identity theory (SIT) is that people want to have  
36 a positive image of the ingroup, and this is reached through a favorable compar-  
37 ison of the ingroup with outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The theory assumes  
38 that ingroup identification leads to ingroup favoritism, which, as many studies  
39 argue, automatically leads to outgroup rejection.

40 De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) argue that the experiments of Tajfel and  
41 Turner did not show a direct link between ingroup favoritism and outgroup hos-  
42 tility. Though this assumption was readily made in a number of earlier studies  
43 (Adorno et al., 1950), it was based on the idea that comparison between groups  
44 is the central component of identity (Festinger, 1954; Merton, 1968). De Figue-  
45 iredo and Elkins (2003) give conclusive evidence showing that this assumption



is not true. Based on the ideas of Allport (1954) and studies by Gaertner and Dovidio (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1986; Gaertner, Van Hiel, Roets, & Cornelis, 1993), Mummendey, Klink, and Brown (2001), Brewer and Campbell (1976), and others, many researchers have come to the conclusion that positive feelings toward one's own group lead to outgroup rejection only under certain circumstances. Among the moderators of the link between national pride and prejudice toward outgroups, authors mention the higher status of the ingroup (Sidanius et al., 1997; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), realistic conflict among groups (Campbell, 1965), personal frustration (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), and personality traits (Adorno et al., 1950; see also de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003).

The described clarification of the identity–outgroup attitude link can be supplemented by the views of non-psychologists. Social psychologists were repeatedly criticized for ignoring the complexity of the national identity/nationalism concept, and for simplifying the identity–attitude relation (Billig, 1995; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As Reicher and Hopkins claim, “the attempt to find generic relationships between the level of identification ... and behavior will fail if, as happens all too often, the situated historical and cultural context is ignored and specific meanings are not incorporated into analysis of process” (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 36).

A number of multidimensional models of group identification have been developed lately to address this issue. Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe (2004) proposed a multidimensional model of collective identity that describes different aspects of identification with the group: self-categorization, evaluation, importance, attachment and sense of interdependence, social embeddedness, behavioral involvement, and content and meaning. Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, and Eidelson (2008) suggested differentiating only four aspects of identification with groups, namely importance, commitment, superiority, and deference. Huddy and Khatib proposed a multidimensional model of national identification, dividing national identity itself “as a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation” (Huddy & Khatib, 2007, p. 65) from different forms of patriotism, such as symbolic, constructive, and uncritical patriotism.

In linking national identity to attitudes to outgroups, it is important to determine the aspects of national identity that make the links between identity and attitude different. As the above discussion shows, the presence of group comparison and the content of national identification can help to predict this link.

If group comparison is involved, then according to SIT, national identity will lead to negative attitudes toward outgroups, and if group comparison is not involved, then there should be no connection between the two. This is best captured by the nationalism–patriotism dichotomy in the way that nationalism represents identification, which involves group comparison, and patriotism represents identification, which does not involve such comparison. Thus, I predict that nationalism leads to anti-immigrant attitudes, whereas patriotism does not.

Studies on the relationship between these two dimensions of national identity and attitudes to outgroup members show that nationalism has a negative effect

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1 on tolerance (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, &  
2 Schmidt, 2012), whereas the role of patriotism is not completely clear. Some  
3 studies have reported a positive effect of patriotism (Blank & Schmidt, 2003;  
4 Wagner et al., 2012), while others did not find any relationship (Citrin, Wong &  
5 Duff, 2001). In all of the cited studies, nationalism (referred to as “chauvinism”  
6 in Citrin et al., 2001) was controlled. The content of patriotism can help to  
7 understand why these mixed results occur.

8 As I discussed in the previous section, patriotism can be divided into two spe-  
9 cific aspects of pride in one’s country: cultural patriotism and political patri-  
10 otism. I expect that only political patriotism has a positive effect on attitudes to  
11 immigrants. Cultural patriotism as an appreciation of a country’s past and  
12 achievements in science, the arts, literature, etc. should not necessarily lead to  
13 specific attitudes to immigrants. On the other hand, political patriotism can be  
14 connected to anti-immigrant attitudes through one of the two mechanisms.

15 The first mechanism is related to the position of people in society; if we are  
16 dealing with citizens who are, in general, satisfied with what they have achieved,  
17 who have high socio-economic status, and therefore do not compete for  
18 resources with immigrants, they are likely to be more positive, both about the  
19 political system in the country and about immigrants.

20 The other mechanism is based on the argument of Sniderman and Hagen-  
21 doorn (2007), who claim that xenophobia and conformity are closely connected.  
22 This connection, however, is not as simple as is thought. Although there is a  
23 direct negative effect of conformity on attitudes to immigrants, conformists may  
24 actually demonstrate higher scores both on the political patriotism scale and the  
25 attitudes to immigrants scale as a result of social desirability. The other possi-  
26 bility is that those conformists who are proud of the political situation in the  
27 country tend to “obey” the “rule of tolerance”, if this is the official position of  
28 the government.

29 To conclude, I predict that (1) nationalism is connected positively with anti-  
30 immigrant attitudes; (2) cultural patriotism is not connected with anti-immigrant  
31 attitudes; and (3) political patriotism is connected negatively with anti-immigrant  
32 attitudes. The negative effect of political patriotism on anti-immigrant attitudes  
33 may be due to the socio-economic status of the respondents, or to their conform-  
34 ity level. I will test these predictions and rival hypotheses in Studies 3 and 4.

## 36 Method

### 37 *Participants and procedure*

38 Surveys were conducted in four Russian regions in 2011: the Central (N=321),  
39 North Caucasus (N=129), Volga (N=183), and Far East (N=223) regions. The  
40 sample (total N=859) includes representatives of the Russian host population of  
41 these districts (ethnically self-identified as “Russian”). Respondents were aged  
42 16 to 71 (Me=36) and 51.2% of the total were female. Of the respondents,  
43 48.5% had higher education (bachelor’s degree and higher), while 51.5% had  
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secondary, special secondary, or incomplete higher education. The sample exhibited a substantial heterogeneity regarding occupations. The sample was collected as part of a larger study conducted by the International Laboratory for Socio-Cultural Research, HSE, Moscow.

A questionnaire in Russian was administered to respondents individually or in small groups in the presence of the interviewer. The percentage of missing values of the items used in this study ranged from 1.2% (“When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be Russian”) to 22.6% (“The number of immigrants to Russia nowadays should be...”, with the response scale from “Reduced a lot” – 1 to “Increased a lot” – 5). Pairwise deletion of missing values was used.

As the purpose of this study was to test first the factorial structure of national identity measures, then construct scales from these items, and finally use them as predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes, I randomly split the sample into two parts. This was done in order to be able to test the factorial structure found using exploratory factor analysis on a different sample. In Study 1 (revealing the structure of national identity), I use one of these two samples (Sample 1), while in Studies 2–4 another sample is used (Sample 2). Sample 1 (N=465) includes respondents aged from 16 to 68 (Me=34.5), of whom 52.3% were female. Forty-eight percent of them have higher education. Sample 2 (N=394) includes respondents aged from 16 to 71 (Me=36), of whom 50.5% were female; 49.8% of them have higher education.

**Measures**

Only the measures of the components of national identity are used in all four studies. Measures that are used only in some of these four studies are presented in the relevant sections.

*Nationalism, cultural and political patriotism.* To evaluate the different components of national identity, we employed two sets of items from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP-2003, questionnaire in Russian). Smith and Kim (2006) describe these two scales as two facets of national pride: one, domain specific, which is “nationally affirming without being necessarily hegemonic” (p. 128), and the other, general national pride, which “places one’s nation above other countries” (p. 128). We treat the first scale as a measure of patriotism, and the second scale as a measure of nationalism.

To measure nationalism, respondents were asked “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” (5-point scale), and then offered six statements about being Russian. Exemplary items are “I would rather be a citizen of Russia than of any other country in the world” and “Generally speaking, Russia is a better country than most other countries”.

To measure patriotism, respondents were asked “How proud are you of Russia in each of the following?” (4-point scale), and 10 different options were given, such as “Proud of the way democracy in Russia works” or “Proud of Russian achievements in the arts and literature”. This list is based on previous

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1 studies on national pride, nationalism, and patriotism (Davidov, 2009; Hjerm,  
2 1998; Smith & Jarkko, 2001), and includes both cultural (e.g., “Proud of Russian  
3 scientific and technological achievements”) and political (e.g., “Proud of Russian  
4 social security system”) domains of national identification.

## 6 **Study 1: revealing the structure of national identity in** 7 **Russian sample**

### 9 *Analysis*

10 Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to identify the structure of national  
11 identity in Russia. The extraction method used is the principle components, rota-  
12 tion method – direct oblimin with Kaiser normalization (delta=0).

### 15 *Results*

16 The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is 0.848, and  
17 Bartlett’s test of sphericity shows a significance level <0.001. Thus, we can con-  
18 clude that the correlation matrix of items is adequate for factor analysis. The  
19 pattern matrix is presented in Table 11.1. Only factor weights higher than 0.40  
20 are shown.

21 As Gorsuch (1983, p. 208) argued, “Indeed, proper interpretation of a set of  
22 factors can probably only occur if at least **S** [the factor structure coefficient  
23 matrix] and **P** [the factor pattern coefficient matrix] are both examined”. So  
24 before interpreting the results, we should examine the structure coefficient  
25 matrix. This matrix reveals the same factor structure; only in this case do three  
26 items demonstrate cross-loadings. The items “When my country does well in  
27 international sports, it makes me proud to be Russian” and “Proud of Russian  
28 political influence in the world” correlate with Factor 1, and item “Proud of the  
29 Russian armed forces” correlates with Factor 2.

30 The decision to exclude certain items from the scales was based on the ana-  
31 lysis of both matrices, and on the content of the scales. The item “There are  
32 some things about Russia today that make me feel ashamed of Russia” was  
33 excluded, as it was supposed to measure nationalism, but fell into a different  
34 factor. The item “Proud of the Russian armed forces” was excluded as well, as  
35 according to structure matrix it correlates well with Factor 2 (correlation with  
36 Factor 1 is 0.59 and with Factor 2 is -0.48) and does not fit well into the rest of  
37 the items in Factor 1 by its content. The other two items that demonstrated cross-  
38 loadings were not excluded as they represent the respective scales quite well.

39 Examination of the content of the three obtained factors shows that the  
40 nationalism scale worked as expected. All items except one (“There are some  
41 things about Russia today that make me feel ashamed of Russia”) formed one  
42 factor. The patriotism scale split into two factors, as expected: pride in Russia’s  
43 cultural background (i.e., scientific and technological achievements, achieve-  
44 ments in sports, arts and literature), and pride in the political system in the  
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Table 11.1 Results of exploratory factor analysis for national identity items (the factor pattern coefficient matrix)

	Factor		
	1	2	3
I would rather be a citizen of Russia than of any other country in the world			0.650
There are some things about Russia today that make me feel ashamed of Russia		0.635	
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Russians			0.521
Generally speaking, Russia is a better country than most other countries			0.755
People should support their country even if it is in the wrong			0.756
When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be Russian			0.559
Proud of the way democracy in Russia works		-0.792	
Proud of Russian political influence in the world		-0.522	
Proud of Russian economic achievements		-0.728	
Proud of the Russian social security system		-0.629	
Proud of Russian scientific and technological achievements	0.748		
Proud of Russian achievements in sports	0.782		
Proud of Russian achievements in the arts and literature	0.840		
Proud of the Russian armed forces	0.463		
Proud of Russian history	0.454		
Proud of Russian fair and equal treatment of all groups in society		-0.730	

country (i.e., democracy, political influence, social security system, etc.). At this stage we can conclude that empirical evidence from the Russian sample supports the hypothesized three-component structure of national identity. In the next stage I will test the discriminant validity of these three components, and the reliability of the scales built based on the results of EFA.

## Study 2: testing the structure of national identity using CFA

### Analysis

In order to test the discriminant validity of the constructs and develop scales from the factors revealed in Study 1, I conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on Sample 2. CFA enables us to test the reliability and consistency of the scales, taking into account cross-loadings and error correlations.



## Results

I tested the CFA model with three correlated latent factors (nationalism [five items], cultural patriotism [four items], and political patriotism [five items]). As some items have linguistic or semantic similarities, in addition to the similarity with the latent factor, some error correlations were specified. Thus, all items that contain the word “achievement” are allowed to correlate. As the structure matrix in EFA showed, the item “When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be Russian” correlates well with Factor 1. We assume that the source of this correlation is the item “Proud of Russian achievements in sports” in Factor 1, as both items ask about sports. So we allow these two items to correlate as well. The error terms of items “Proud of Russian achievements in the arts and literature” and “Proud of Russian history” are also expected to correlate, as they both refer to Russia’s history. Finally, there are some items within the political patriotism scale whose error terms may correlate negatively as besides the shared meaning of identification with the country, they contain some value conflict. These items are “Proud of Russian political influence in the world” and “Proud of Russian economic achievements” on the one hand, and “Proud of the Russian social security system” and “Proud of Russian fair and equal treatment of all groups in society” on the other. The first two items would be more important for people who value hierarchy and power in society, while the other two would be more important for people who value equality and equity. We expect, therefore, that the error terms of these items will correlate negatively.

Overall, the model fit was assessed using Bentler’s (1990) comparative fit index (CFI), Steiger’s (1990) root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and Bentler’s (1995) root mean squared residual (SRMR). Values of 0.90 or above for the CFI and values of 0.08 or lower for the RMSEA and SRMR are taken as evidence of adequate fit (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). The chi-square was disregarded owing to its well-known sensitivity to sample size and data non-normality (Tanaka, 1987).

The tested model demonstrated a good fit with  $\chi^2/df=1.645$ , CFI=0.960, and RMSEA=0.041. Three components of national identity correlate with each other significantly: nationalism correlates with cultural patriotism ( $r=0.495$ ,  $p<0.001$ ), with political patriotism ( $r=0.397$ ,  $p<0.001$ ), and two forms of patriotism correlate with each other ( $r=0.611$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). All the expected error correlations are significant, and have predicted directions. The standardized regression weights for all of the items are given in Table 11.4 in the Appendix.

Study 2 shows the discriminant validity of the three identified forms of national identity and the reliability of the developed scales. Therefore, these measures of national identity can be used further as scales for measuring the three distinct forms of national identification.



### Study 3: national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes

In this study, we test three hypotheses: (H1) nationalism is connected positively to anti-immigrant attitudes; (H2) cultural patriotism is not connected to anti-immigrant attitudes; and (H3) political patriotism is connected negatively to anti-immigrant attitudes.

#### Measures

Besides the scales to measure the different components of national identity, in this study we used the measure of attitudes to immigrants. The *Anti-immigrant attitudes scale* contains four items, taken from ISSP-2003. The full wordings of items together with the results of scale testing using CFA are given in the Appendix (Table 11.5). Cronbach's alpha for the scale with four items in Sample 2 is 0.725.

#### Analysis

In order to test the effects of the different components of national identity on anti-immigrant attitudes, I used structural equation modeling (SEM). The results are presented in Figure 11.1.

#### Results

To assess the model fit, we used the same indices as in Study 2. Overall, the model fit is good ( $\chi^2/df=1.565$ , CFI=0.949; RMSEA=0.038), so I can conclude that it reflects the structure of our empirical data well.

The analysis shows that nationalism leads to anti-immigrant attitudes ( $\beta=0.278$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), political patriotism leads to positive attitudes of immigrants ( $\beta=-0.292$ ,




Figure 11.1 The effects of the different forms of national identity on anti-immigrant attitudes.



1 p<0.01), and cultural patriotism is not connected to anti-immigrant attitudes  
2 ( $\beta=-0.113$ ,  $p>0.05$ ). Thus, hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 of Study 3 are confirmed.

3 Given that the study was conducted in Russia, a country that has never been  
4 fully democratic, it is questionable whether people with a higher level of polit-  
5 ical patriotism in Russia would have more positive attitudes to immigrants  
6 because they value openness, civil rights, or equality more. According to the  
7 Economist Intelligence Unit (Democracy Index, 2012), which takes into account  
8 five indicators such as electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the func-  
9 tioning of government, political participation, and political culture, Russia has  
10 shown a noticeable decline in the level of democracy in last years. From 2006 to  
11 2012 the Democracy Index in Russia dropped from 5.02 (“hybrid” regimes) to  
12 3.74 (“authoritarian” regimes). The social inequality index (Gini coefficient) is  
13 0.42, which is higher than the average of all OECD countries (0.31) (OECD,  
14 2014). Public social expenditure as a share of GDP is also lower than in most  
15 OECD countries (15.6% in 2009, compared to 21.9% for the average in OECD  
16 countries) (OECD, 2014). These indicators prompt a question: who are the  
17 people that are proud of “the way democracy in Russia works” or of “Russian  
18 fair and equal treatment of all groups in society”? And why should these people  
19 have more positive attitudes to immigrants? These are the questions that I will  
20 address in Study 4.

#### 21 22 **Study 4: explaining the effect of political patriotism on** 23 **anti-immigrant attitudes**

24 In Study 4 I test two rival hypotheses to explain the mechanism that connects  
25 political patriotism and anti-immigrant attitudes.

26 The first hypothesis is partly based on the realistic group conflict theory  
27 (Campbell, 1965). According to this theory, negative attitudes to immigrants will  
28 occur if immigrants pose a cultural or economic threat to an ingroup. In this  
29 case, those who are fighting over resources with immigrants should have more  
30 negative attitudes toward them compared to those who are at a different level of  
31 the socio-economic hierarchy. It is also likely that those who are satisfied with  
32 their economic achievements will be more proud of their country’s political  
33 system and have more positive attitudes toward immigrants. Thus, I expect that  
34 only among the respondents with higher material well-being (which is an indic-  
35 ator of socio-economic status; Singh-Manoux, Adler, & Marmot, 2003) will  
36 political patriotism lead to more positive attitudes to immigrants.

37 Hypothesis 4a: Political patriotism negatively affects anti-immigrant attitudes  
38 only in the group of people with high subjective material well-being.

39 The second hypothesis is based on the assumption that people with a higher  
40 level of conformism will demonstrate higher scores both on the political patriot-  
41 ism scale and attitudes to immigrants scale. This might be the result of social  
42 desirability affecting the respondent’s answers in both cases: “being a patriot”  
43 and “being tolerant” – both are normative expectations of the society that people  
44 might not want to violate. The other possibility, based on the ideas of Sniderman  
45



and Hagendoorn (2007), is that those conformists who are proud of the political situation in the country tend to “obey” the “rule of tolerance” if that is the official position of the government (which is the case in Russia). As an indicator of conformism I use conservation values (Schwartz, 1992), which are defined as the importance of “self-restriction, order and resistance to change” (Roccas & Amit, 2011, p. 899).

Hypothesis 4b: Political patriotism negatively affects anti-immigrant attitudes only in the group of people who score high on conservation values.

**Measures**

*Conservation values* are measured using the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS-57). The score is calculated as a mean of centered scores on conformity, security, and tradition values. The questionnaire is validated in hundreds of studies (Bardi, Buchanan, Goodwin, Slabu, & Robinson, 2014), so I use it as an index without additional testing.

*Subjective material well-being.* To measure participants’ level of satisfaction with their material (economic) situation, we asked them to agree or disagree (using a 5-point scale) with the following statement: “I’m satisfied with my financial situation”.

**Analysis**

To test two rival hypotheses about the role of conservation values and subjective material well-being (SMW) in the effect of political patriotism on anti-immigrant attitudes, I conducted a multi-group SEM (MGSEM), separating people with different levels of conservation values and SMW into four groups: high conservation values and high SMW, high conservation values and low SMW, low conservation values and high SMW, and low conservation values and low SMW. This allows me to control for all the possible hidden correlates that these two variables may have.

To compare the regression weights in these four groups, the full or partial measurement (or metric) invariance should be established. Analysis showed that one of the items in the anti-immigrant attitudes scale (“Immigrants are generally good for the Russian economy”) has very different loadings for the different groups, so we freed the item and established partial metric invariance in these four groups (CFA=0.960, ΔCFA=0.006, RMSEA=0.027, ΔRMSEA=0.001). Figure 11.2 represents the standardized regressions coefficients of the impact of political patriotism on anti-immigrant attitudes. The effect is significant only in groups of people with high SMW, regardless of if they score high or low on conservation values.

The MGSEM showed that political patriotism affects anti-immigrant attitudes only among those participants who have high SMW, irrespective of the importance of conservation values for them. So hypothesis 4a is confirmed while hypothesis 4b is rejected.

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


Figure 11.2 Standardized regression weights of political patriotism on anti-immigrant attitudes in four groups of people with different scores on conservation values and subjective material well-being (SMW).

### General discussion

This chapter addressed the issue of national identity structure and its effect on attitudes to immigrants. Based on the analysis of different approaches to national identity, I identified two aspects of the national identification process that should lead to a different association of national identity with attitudes to immigrants. One of these aspects is the presence or absence of group comparison in the identification process (and following from it openness to criticism directed to the ingroup), and the other, a specific domain of patriotism as pride in the nation.

Following the nationalism–patriotism tradition, I call national identity *nationalism* if it involves group comparison, and *patriotism* if it does not. Based on the extensive literature on patriotism and nationalism, I predict positive correlation of nationalism with anti-immigrant attitudes (Adorno et al., 1950; Blank & Schmidt, 2003; De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Weiss, 2003), and negative (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Wagner et al., 2012) or no correlation (Citrin et al., 2001) of patriotism with anti-immigrant attitudes. I assume that the inconsistency in the results of studies on patriotism is due to disregard of the content. Following the literature on natio-cultural and political national pride (Hjerm, 1998), as well as the results of public opinion surveys in Russia, I differentiate *cultural* and *political patriotism*, and predict no correlation between cultural patriotism and anti-immigrant attitudes, and negative correlation between political patriotism and anti-immigrant attitudes.

Results of Studies 1 and 2 confirm the three-component structure of national identity on the Russian sample. In Study 1 I conducted an EFA to examine the factorial structure of national identity scales, and revealed the three expected



factors reflecting nationalism, cultural, and political patriotism. In Study 2 I tested the three-component model using CFA on a different sample and confirmed this structure. By modifying the tested model, I developed three distinct scales for measuring three components of national identity that are used further in Studies 3 and 4.

Though the three components of national identity are distinct, they all positively correlate. The highest correlation is observed between the two forms of patriotism (0.612<sup>\*\*\*</sup>) with the correlation between nationalism and cultural patriotism being 0.492<sup>\*\*\*</sup> and with political patriotism being 0.393<sup>\*\*\*</sup>. This shows that although the three constructs can be identified, they all are linked through the common sense of attachment to the country. As expected, the two facets of patriotism have a stronger correlation with each other than with nationalism. At the same time, a stronger link between nationalism and cultural patriotism (compared to political patriotism) suggests that pride in cultural heritage is a more relevant source for Russian nationalism than pride in democracy, economic development, or development of the social security system.

In Study 3 I tested the effects of the three components of national identity on anti-immigrant attitudes in Russia using SEM. As predicted, I found positive correlation of nationalism (0.278<sup>\*\*</sup>), negative correlation of political patriotism (-0.292<sup>\*\*</sup>), and no correlation of cultural patriotism (-0.113<sup>n.s.</sup>) with anti-immigrant attitudes. As Russia cannot be considered a democratic country with a solid social security system and civil rights, I then address the question: why

Table 11.2 Confirmed and rejected propositions of the studies

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Confirmed/rejected</i>
Basic proposition: There are three distinct forms of national identity in Russia: nationalism, cultural patriotism, and political patriotism.	Confirmed
Hypothesis 1: Nationalism is connected positively with anti-immigrant attitudes.	Confirmed
Hypothesis 2: Cultural patriotism is not connected with anti-immigrant attitudes.	Confirmed
Hypothesis 3: Political patriotism is connected negatively with anti-immigrant attitudes.	Confirmed
Hypothesis 4a: Political patriotism negatively affects anti-immigrant attitudes only in the group of people with high subjective material well-being.	Confirmed
Hypothesis 4b: Political patriotism negatively affects anti-immigrant attitudes only in the group of people who score highly on conservation values.	Rejected



1 should people who are proud of the political situation in Russia be more tolerant  
2 toward immigrants?

3 In Study 4 I tested two rival hypotheses regarding the negative effect of political  
4 patriotism on anti-immigrant attitudes. In the first hypothesis I assume that  
5 political patriotism leads to more positive attitudes to immigrants because it is  
6 associated with higher socio-economic status, and in the second, that the under-  
7 lying mechanism is conformism. I conducted MGSEM with four groups of  
8 people with different levels of SMW as an indicator of socio-economic status  
9 and conservatism values as an indicator of conformism. The results supported the  
10 first hypothesis; the negative effect of political patriotism on anti-immigrant atti-  
11 tudes is significant only in the groups of people with high SMW, regardless of  
12 the importance of conservatism values for them.

13 The reason why SMW is the key to positive association of political patriotism  
14 with attitudes to immigrants is that people who have higher income are both  
15 more proud of the existing political system and more positive toward immigrants  
16 because they do not compete with them in the labor market. A number of studies  
17 have shown that concerns about labor-market competition are associated with  
18 anti-immigrant attitudes (Mayda, 2006; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). Alterna-  
19 tively, this moderation effect may be explained through the higher self-esteem  
20 and general well-being that respondents with higher material well-being are  
21 likely to have. Higher self-esteem and higher SMW are usually associated with a  
22 higher level of ethnic and national identification and a lower level of prejudice  
23 (Dinh, Holmberg, Ho, & Haynes, 2014; Smith, Walker, Fields, Brookins, &  
24 Seay, 1999). These alternative explanations can be tested in future studies.

25 The findings discussed in this study seem not to be unique to Russia. The  
26 analysis of 12 European national samples from the ISSP-2003 survey demonstrated  
27 that in 8 out of 12 countries the factorial structure of the national identity scales  
28 observed is very similar to that in our Russian sample (Grigoryan, 2014). The  
29 three forms of national identity found and described in this study can take studies  
30 in the field of national identity one step further in understanding the circum-  
31 stances under which national identification promotes negative or positive atti-  
32 tudes toward others.

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Appendix

Table 11.3 Pearson correlations of all items in the overall sample

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
I would rather be a citizen of Russia than of any other country in the world	-0.13**	0.35**	0.46**	0.30**	0.34**	0.26**	-0.25**	0.23**	0.16**	0.23**	0.27**	0.16**	0.31**	0.15**	0.22**	0.04	-0.06	0.02	-0.01
There are some things about Russia today that make me feel ashamed of Russia	1	-0.15**	-0.14**	0.03	0.04	-0.31**	-0.21**	-0.25**	-0.34**	-0.11**	-0.17**	-0.03	-0.23**	0.07	-0.32**	0.22**	0.09*	0.04	-0.30**
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Russians	1	0.44**	0.22**	0.17**	0.24**	0.31**	0.27**	0.16**	0.27**	0.16**	0.16**	0.15**	0.23**	0.16**	0.27**	0.03	-0.05	0.06	0.04
Generally speaking, Russia is a better country than most other countries	1	0.30**	0.30**	0.30**	0.22**	0.27**	0.25**	0.17**	0.20**	0.20**	0.21**	0.12**	0.20**	0.15**	0.19**	0.02	-0.08*	0.06	-0.02
People should support their country even if it is in the wrong	1	0.30**	0.10**	0.10**	0.10**	0.15**	0.12**	0.12**	0.12**	0.17**	0.06	0.02	0.10**	0.13**	0.11**	0.13**	-0.02	0.07	-0.06
When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be Russian	1	0.10**	0.10**	0.10**	0.19**	0.12**	0.12**	0.05	0.24**	0.36**	0.19**	0.24**	0.17**	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.05	-0.09*
Proud of the way democracy in Russia works	1	0.48**	0.50**	0.40**	0.21**	0.24**	0.11**	0.42**	0.09*	0.55**	-0.08*	-0.13**	0.06	0.10*	0.06	0.10*	0.06	0.10*	0.10*
Proud of Russian political influence in the world	1	0.49**	0.27**	0.35**	0.29**	0.23**	0.40**	0.23**	0.40**	0.23**	0.37**	-0.08*	-0.17**	-0.07	0.12**	0.12**	0.12**	0.12**	0.12**
Proud of Russian economic achievements	1	0.45**	0.37**	0.29**	0.16**	0.34**	0.16**	0.34**	0.12**	0.40**	-0.11**	-0.11**	0.00	0.16**	0.16**	0.16**	0.16**	0.16**	0.16**
Proud of the Russian social security system	1	0.22**	0.25**	0.06	0.33**	0.04	0.41**	-0.10**	-0.11**	-0.11**	-0.11**	-0.11**	-0.00	0.24**	0.24**	0.24**	0.24**	0.24**	0.24**
Proud of Russian scientific and technological achievements	1	0.48**	0.43**	0.35**	0.24**	0.22**	-0.04	-0.11**	-0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Proud of Russian achievements in sports	1	0.46**	0.41**	0.21**	0.25**	-0.07	-0.06	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
Proud of Russian achievements in the arts and literature	1	0.32**	0.30**	0.07	0.01	-0.13**	-0.07	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05

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Proud of the Russian armed forces	1	0.22**	0.39**	-0.07	-0.10**	0.07*	0.11**
Proud of Russian history							-0.04
Proud of Russian fair and equal treatment of all groups in society		1	0.10*	0.10**	-0.02	-0.02	0.14**
Immigrants increase crime rates							
Immigrants are generally good for Russian economy (R)			1	0.14**	0.41**	-0.41**	
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Russia				1	0.24**	-0.34**	
The number of immigrants to Russia nowadays has increased a lot					1	-0.41**	
							1

Notes

\*\* p<0.01; \* p<0.05.

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Table 11.4 Standardized regression weights of the items measuring the different components of national identity

Items	$\beta$
<i>Nationalism</i>	
I would rather be a citizen of Russia than of any other country in the world	0.709***
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Russians	0.490***
Generally speaking, Russia is a better country than most other countries	0.634***
People should support their country even if it is in the wrong	0.445***
When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be Russian	0.477***
<i>Political patriotism</i>	
Proud of the way democracy in Russia works	0.701***
Proud of Russian political influence in the world	0.690***
Proud of Russian economic achievements	0.710***
Proud of the Russian social security system	0.618***
Proud of Russian fair and equal treatment of all groups in society	0.710***
<i>Cultural patriotism</i>	
Proud of Russian scientific and technological achievements	0.657***
Proud of Russian achievements in sports	0.313***
Proud of Russian achievements in the arts and literature	0.574***
Proud of Russian history	0.375***

Notes

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table 11.5 Standardized regression weights of the items measuring anti-immigrant attitudes

Items	$\beta$
Immigrants increase crime rates	0.613***
Immigrants are generally good for Russian economy (reversed)	0.420***
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Russia	0.700***
The number of immigrants to Russia nowadays should be increased a lot	-0.697***

Notes

Model fit:  $p = 0.419$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 0.870$ , CFI = 1.000, RMSEA = 0.000. \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

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