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In This Issue:

V. Makarov: "Leonid Kantorovich's profound interest in the meaning and content of the optimality criterion stemmed from the wish to understand the philosophical meaning of a person's life goals. Apparently, he was not content with the primitive interpretation of targets that underlie the classical market economy model: maximization of profits for companies or individual utility for consumers. A planned economy which Kantorovich believed could be improved in various ways in principle made it possible to take into account the diversity of human life more fully."

L. Tsedilin: "This article examines the protectionist policy of Russia before the 1917 Revolution and during the time of the Soviet Union. A look back on the history of the problem is warranted by the fact that protectionism in current Russian economic policy has inherited many features of the approaches and prejudices of the Soviet period. Institutional memory is not notable for selectivity: present-day institutions are taking shape under the impact of the institutional environment of the recent rather than the more distant past."

Yu. Kudrina: "The reign of Alexander III was marked by major successes in the strengthening of Russia's might and by outstanding achievements in the development of Russian culture and science for which he claims much of the credit. He was directly involved in the creation in Russia of the Russian Opera, the Russian Museum in St. Petersburg, he headed a vibrant Russian Imperial Historical Society and presided over the opening of the Imperial Historical Museum and the foundation of the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society."

S. Klimova: "...the problem of national self-consciousness as a concrete idea was anchored above all in the framework of ideological (authority) and intellectual (artistic-critical) worldview and can be demonstrated by concrete examples of creative communication between the intelligentsia and the authorities."

A. Guseynov: "An action expresses, embodies and imprints on Being the very individual. An action is not rational to the extent that Being precedes cognition and to the extent that Being in its unique manifestation cannot be an object of knowledge... Moral knowledge and skills, like any other knowledge and skills, are attached to the act *post factum*, after it has been performed... The mission of moral rationality consists in fitting an act into the moral ideas both of the acting individual and the surrounding people, society."

V. Pastukhov: "None of Russia's state forms are fully analogous to Western or Oriental political practice."

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A. Yurevich, D. Ushakov: “...when society gets more freedom it releases in society and in man not only the best but also *the worst...* Apparently, this is what happened to Russian society... it creates serious obstacles in the way of innovative economy which calls for *predominance of creative and not aggressive and greedy attitudes* in order to be successful, obstacles that are clearly underestimated by the strategists of Russian reforms.”

M. Yadova: “...in the process of modernization of Russian society a particularly important role belongs to young people whose views and behavior were shaped under the influence of post-Soviet transformations. The most interesting cohort of Russians are those born in the early 1990s because they represent a generation that has had no experience of life in the Soviet Union and has grown up in the ‘new Russia.’”

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From Great Mathematician to Outstanding Economist (*The Centenary of Leonid Kantorovich's Birth*)

Valery MAKAROV

This year sees the centenary of the birth of Academician Leonid Kantorovich, so far Russia's only winner of a Nobel Prize for economics. When they claim that Simon Kuznets, Leonid Hurwicz and Wassily Leontief, who won Nobel Prizes in economics at various times, also come from our country, that is a bit of a stretch. The first two were only born in Russia while Leontief, though he did study at Leningrad State University, only developed into an economist in Germany and the USA. Kantorovich spent all his life in the USSR. The Soviet economy was a planned economy with features that were often unknown to foreign economists. That is why among all the Nobel laureates in economics he is the only one who managed to go far beyond the study of the purely market mechanism.

Kantorovich was such a versatile personality that no description of his life and scientific achievements can be complete. I propose to trace how he turned from a brilliant abstract mathematician into an economist who had a deeper and more nuanced insight into the essence of things than others. It has to be said that evolution from the abstract to the concrete is not so uncommon. There are many outstanding scientists who have undergone such evolution. John von Neumann, a scientist of a stature comparable to Kantorovich, also began with the most abstract problems of the theory of sets and dealt with abstruse problems of mathematical physics. In the second half of his life he made an important contribution to the theory of games, mathematical economics and finally to applied areas: the finite-state machines, the structure of computers and even the creation of multiple warheads for missiles. A similar path was traversed by our outstanding compatriots Mikhail Lavrentyev and Mstislav Keldysh.

Leonid Kantorovich began scientific activities at a very early age immediately showing promise in areas that call for abstract thinking, in the first place in mathematics. He entered Leningrad State University in 1926 at the age of 14. In

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V. Makarov, Full Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, director of the RAS Central Economic-Mathematical Institute. The article was first published in Russian in the journal *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 1, 2012.

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his second year at university he started studying abstract areas of mathematics. The most notable result he achieved in those years was the study of analytical operations connected with projective sets. That work was represented at the First National Mathematical Congress in Kharkov in 1930.

After finishing university that same year Leonid Kantorovich remained at Leningrad University and, alongside with teaching, began his studies in the field of less abstract mathematical problems. In 1934, at the age of 22, he became the youngest professor at the university, and a year later a degree of Doctor of Sciences was conferred on him without his defending a doctoral dissertation.

Kantorovich began his career in big-time science as a highly promising mathematician. In his books *Functional Analysis in Semiordered Spaces* (jointly with Boris Vulikh and Aron Pinsker, 1950),[1] *Functional Analysis in Normed Spaces* (jointly with Gleb Akilov, 1959)[2] he presented the main results obtained in the 1930s when he was quite young.

Beginning from 1939 Kantorovich was publishing works on computational and applied mathematics. These early works were notable for the close and intimate interconnection between modern theoretical mathematics and the issues of computational mathematics and applications.

A salient example of such applied work was the solution of the famous Monge transport problem known as the Monge-Kantorovich distance. Back in 1781 the French mathematician Gaspard Monge set the problem of the most efficient way of transporting soil in earthworks. The theorem he originally formulated was yet to be demonstrated (QED), the task was only fulfilled in 1889 by Paul Emile Appell. The proof of the theorem occupied about 200 pages. Kantorovich used a new approach to the proof of the Monge theorem which occupied only a few lines.

Kantorovich was the first to apply some theories of abstract spaces to various problems in computational mathematics. His works bring out the organic link between these sections of mathematics that appear to be so different at first glance. A key role in this was played by the so-called semiordered spaces, a concept Kantorovich introduced into science.

Yet already in those years Leonid Kantorovich felt that he could achieve important results not only in mathematics. In his autobiography prepared for the Nobel Committee he writes: “In 1936-1937, when I was completing my work on semiordered spaces I felt a sort of dissatisfaction with mathematics. It was not that the work was uninteresting or unsuccessful, but the world faced the terrible menace of the brown plague, German fascism. It was clear that a cruel war threatening civilization was only several years away. I felt a sense of responsibility realizing that outstanding people must do something about it.”

Economics was the area to which Leonid Kantorovich was particularly drawn. He writes in the same autobiography: “I attended with great interest the lectures on political economy delivered when I was in my third year by Aleksandr Voznesensky, later the rector of the University, brother of the prominent economist, chairman of *Gosplan* and member of the *Politbureau* Nikolay Voznesensky. I often approached him with questions after the lectures. Marx’s theo-

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ry of the capitalist economy, especially as presented in the third volume of *Capital,* looked scientifically valid and helpful. I do not think there were any lectures on the economics of socialism at the time." And elsewhere he writes: "I even did a stint working as an economist. We were supposed to have on-the-job practice after finishing the third year, in the summer of 1929. For mathematicians such practice consisted in counting from one to ten: the clouds in a geophysical observatory or using an abacus at a savings bank. I found the only place that suited me, working as a statistician in Tashkent <...>. There was no position of statistician and I was assigned to the position of junior economist. It is interesting that my superior there was Mariya Spiridonova, a left-wing Socialist Revolutionary Party member who was working there as an exile."

"I spent half my time studying economic materials, the description of the conditions of irrigation, the use and distribution of water resources. I worked at the Chu and Talas Transboundary Basin System which straddled two republics, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The other half of my time I devoted to my own business, I was writing some paragraphs from a memoir co-authored with Levinson about analytical and projective sets which were later partially put to use. But that was more in the nature of an episode. As I said, the choice of topics for research, along with my own interests and mathematical aspirations, was to some extent influenced by external factors, the overall situation."[3]

It is not surprising that when Leonid Kantorovich was approached for consultations in Leningrad by a representative of a Plywood Trust seeking to reduce the amount of waste, he enthusiastically took up the problem. The problem of cutting plywood in a way that minimized waste turned out to be surprisingly beautiful. At the time mathematicians were only starting to tackle the problem of looking for an optimum. The French mathematician Emile Borel formulated the simple problem of a game between two persons in which each player seeks to maximize his result. Later that problem came to be regarded as initiating a vast area of mathematics called the games theory. The great 20th-century mathematician von Neumann described a simple model of an expanding economy for which an optimum growth rate had to be found. But it was Kantorovich who formulated and proposed an effective solution of the overall problem that came to be known as linear programming. That 1939 work later became famous. It was mentioned as one of the grounds for awarding Kantorovich the Nobel Prize.

When the Second World War began Kantorovich was drafted into the Army at the Higher Naval Engineering Technical School and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. He delivered lectures to the cadets and solved the problems that the command put before him. Among other things he lectured on the theory of probability and wrote a manual for second-year students containing some interesting examples from the military field (*Integrals and Fourier Series, 1940).*

In January 1942 the Higher Naval Engineering Technical School was transferred from Leningrad to Yaroslavl and, as Leonid Kantorovich recalled, his lecturing and research work picked up. It was during that period that he wrote a major manuscript *Mathematical Methods Ensuring the Optimal Use of Resources.* The initial version of the book was completed on September 20,

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1942, but its further destiny was checkered. It was first published in 1959 under the title *Mathematical Methods of Organizing and Planning Production.* It has to be noted that Leonid Kantorovich, who wrote many books during his lifetime, considered this one to be his most important book. It has been translated into many languages and published in many countries.

In the postwar period Leonid Kantorovich paid more attention to applied problems. Computational mathematics became his main occupation. The government appreciated Kantorovich's contribution to this field: he was decorated with the Badge of Honor (1944), three Orders of the Red Banner of Labor (1949, 1950 and 1975) and the Order of Lenin (1967). In 1949 he was awarded a State Prize for Outstanding Achievements in Computational Mathematics.

And yet Kantorovich's ideas in the field of economics met with little understanding and support on the part of the government or the scientific community. Leonid Kantorovich realized that his ideas were too difficult to be quickly understood and that a consistent training and propagation of the optimization approach to the economy were needed. At Leningrad State University where Leonid Kantorovich taught for many years, he organized special courses for the study of optimization methods in the economy. In 1960 the so-called sixth-year group was enrolled that in time became legendary. Its graduates later played an important role in promoting the optimization methodology. Aleksandr Anchishkin, Stanislav Shatalin and Nikolay Petrakov were elected full members of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It was then that the terms "optimal planning" and "optimal plan" gained wide recognition.

The economic-mathematical area of economic science headed by Kantorovich could no longer be ignored. A Laboratory for the Application of Mathematics to Economics, headed by Academician Vasily Nemchinov was created at the Academy of Sciences. Nemchinov was one of the first older-generation economists to support the new area of study. Officially, Kantorovich was a co-organizer of the laboratory although he lived in Leningrad. At that time the USSR Academy of Sciences made the historic decision to open its Siberian Branch. Its initiators were major scientists and members of the Academy Mikhail Lavrentyev, Sergey Sobolev and Sergey Khristianovich. The mathematician Sobolev, a long-time friend of Kantorovich, suggested that he go with them to Siberia to create a new island of science. Leonid Kantorovich agreed without hesitation hoping to organize at the Siberian Institute of Mathematics a special department dealing with the application of mathematics to economics.

It has been suggested that Kantorovich agreed to go to Siberia because he was elected Corresponding Member for the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Incidentally, he was elected to the Sector of Economics, which is somewhat odd considering that his recognized achievements were in mathematics and not in economics. In reality being elected to the Academy did not influence Leonid Kantorovich's decision. He went in order to support an important idea of enthusiasts who had decided to actively promote science in Siberia. It is worth noting that this proved to be an effective way of creating a scientific center. Skolkovo has chosen a somewhat different path. History will tell which path is better.

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In 1960 Leonid Kantorovich founded the Economic-Mathematical Department at the Institute of Mathematics of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Siberian Branch which was headed by Academician Sobolev. The Economic-Mathematical Department *(MEO)* became the sole heir of the Nemchinov Laboratory and the first important structure in the field of the use of mathematical methods in economics. The core of the new department was formed by young researchers that came from Leningrad, including the graduates of the abovementioned "sixth year group." The author of the present article joined the *MEO* in 1960 and remembers well the prevailing mood of enthusiasm concerning the development of theory and new algorithms and practical use of optimization methods. It was then that computer programs were created for solving transport problems and those of linear and integer (discrete) programming for domestically made computers that were successfully used to address a number of practical problems.

Leonid Kantorovich worked in Siberia for more than ten years. During this period he became a full member of the Academy (1964) at the Sector of Mathematics, a winner of the Lenin Prize (1965) together with Nemchinov and Valentin Novozhilov. The Lenin Prize was not merely a recognition of a major scientific result, it also played a kind of ideological role. In this way the country's leadership sent a signal that the economic-mathematical trend in economic science did not contradict Marxist-Leninist political economy and could be useful in developing socialism in the USSR, in particular, improving the planning principles of the socialist economy. The numerous attacks on the economic mathematical trend and on Kantorovich personally diminished dramatically after the award of the Lenin Prize. Candidate's and doctoral dissertations began to be defended on this theme. As early as 1963 the Central Economic-Mathematical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created which quickly became the flagship of economic mathematical studies in our country.

The new scientific journals *Ekonomiko-matematicheskiye metody* (founded in 1965) and *Optimizatsiya* issued by the Institute of Mathematics of the USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Branch regularly published articles on mathematical models of the economy, optimization methods and optimal planning. The number of works on practical application of mathematical methods in the economy increased markedly.

Among the areas of economic studies that particularly attracted Leonid Kantorovich was optimal planning at all levels, but especially at the level of the national economy. Back in the wartime period he sent to *Gosplan* his main work on the optimal use of resources having enlisted the support of Academician Sobolev, who was a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR at the time. However, the reaction of the then deputy chairman of *Gosplan*, Vladimir Starovsky and Grigory Kosyachenko, to Kantorovich's proposals was lukewarm, to put it mildly.

In the 1960s—1970s the situation changed partly due to the authority that the Lenin Prize and the title of academician conferred. The key figures in the management of the Soviet economy, Nikolay Baybakov (Chairman of *Gosplan* of the USSR), Veniamin Dymshits (Chairman of *Gossnab*) and Vladimir Kirillin

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(Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology) agreed with Kantorovich that optimal planning methods had to be universally used. Yet even they did not have enough clout to introduce the optimization approach in practice, the main reason being the reluctance of the middle and lower-level managers to use optimization methods. In a planned economy where an approved plan had the force of law its fulfillment (or overfulfillment) was the key criterion of success. An optimal plan was by definition challenging and therefore difficult to fulfill. There was no room in it for hidden reserves that enterprise managers deliberately created to make their lives comfortable.

Even so, some of the principles ensuing from the optimal planning theory came to be used in practice. The comprehensive approach, variants, consideration of the postplanning period and an extended set of efficiency indicators became part of the methodology of planning.

Further development of linear programming led to the creation of stochastic programming that takes into account uncertainty by mathematical methods. Kantorovich proposed adopting several variants of the state plan: for example one plan for a droughty year and another plan for a rainy year. However, the *Gosplan* executives thought that changing planning methodology in that direction was too complicated. At present the planning principles proposed by Kantorovich are widely used by major corporations. Strategic planning which is experiencing a revival in our country after a long break (since the preparation at the USSR Academy of Sciences of a Comprehensive Program of Scientific Technical Progress in the 1980s) will undoubtedly rely on Kantorovich's methodological principles.

Leonid Kantorovich was particularly interested in the transport sector. The transport problem he formulated before the war (think of the Monge problem) as well as the simple and understandable algorithm of solving it won many people over. Kantorovich convinced the transport people of the need to introduce the flag-down fee in the taxi cab tariff and calculated its size. The transport sector adopted optimization methods earlier than any other sectors. It has produced many major scientists.

For example, Academician Abel Aganbegyan in the 1960s was calculating the optimal plan of transport haulage with hundreds of suppliers and customers *by hand.* He had a huge sheet of paper with a table of cargo deliveries with suppliers forming lines and consumers columns. He marked the volume of shipments at their intersection with pencil.

Kantorovich was interested in developments in the transport sphere until his death. Now we understand that correct location of productive forces, a dense and high-speed transport network are key factors that ensure the country's integrity.

Another important theme that interested Leonid Kantorovich all his life was pricing. As a young man when he wrote his famous 1939 work, Kantorovich discovered that decisive multipliers he used to search for an optimal solution were similar to prices. Later he referred to them as objective assessments, i.e., optimal prices. These multipliers go under different names depending on the specific nature of the problem in hand. The simplest problem is to find the maximum of

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the so-called Lagrange function, i.e., Lagrange multipliers. The problem of linear programming has dual variables. In the optimization problem that arises in a market economy it is called shadow prices and in the market equilibrium state, equilibrium prices. But in any case the nature of these indicators is the same and Kantorovich insisted that there could be several mechanisms of searching for these prices, and not the one that is popular among Western economists, i.e., finding an equilibrium between demand and supply.

It is widely believed, especially among foreign economists, that Kantorovich's optimal planning theory can only be applied in a strictly centralized economy, in a totalitarian state: *Gosplan* is obliged to know everything down to the tiniest individual demands. But as early as 1939 when Kantorovich developed his decisive multipliers method to find an optimal plan in the linear programming problem, he was thinking of decentralization. To obtain the core plan the decisive multipliers (prices) are calculated and then it is found out whether there are production options that yield greater profits than those used in the current plan. If such a variant is found a new core plan is built and so on until the optimum is arrived at. Therefore in the discussions on this topic Leonid Kantorovich stressed that profitable variants are more likely to be found locally than at the *Gosplan* level. Moreover, in 1969 he wrote a work in collaboration with the author of this article and Viktor Bogachev[4] in which the method of assessing the effectiveness of capital investments was built on that idea.

The idea of decentralization in building an optimal plan was elaborated with the use of the well-known Danzig-Wolfe decomposition method. It is based on the idea that in natural blocks an optimal plan is found separately and then the plans are dovetailed. Such natural blocks are regions, major enterprises and finally periods of time. The Hungarian economist Kornai János became particularly interested in this idea and wrote several works on this topic.

Leonid Kantorovich repeatedly stressed that in the optimal planning problems multipliers (prices) crop up and are computed not only for ordinary "products" of the market economy in the broad sense of the word. Any factor is assessed: not only land, labor, quality, popularity, and intellect that the modern market economy has mastered, but also social norms, ethical and moral categories, etc. It is only now becoming clear that Leonid Kantorovich had greater vision and deeper insight and was above the widespread ideological principles of the time.

The problem of numerical assessments of the role and significance of various factors involved in the formulation of this or that problem is closely linked to the target function whose maximum or minimum is to be found. The term "optimality criterion" that was current in the 1960s—1970s reflects the meaning of the optimization task. It defines what is good and what is bad in the economy and in life in general.

Leonid Kantorovich's profound interest in the meaning and content of the optimality criterion stemmed from the wish to understand the philosophical meaning of a person's life goals. Apparently, he was not content with the primitive interpretation of targets that underlie the classical market economy model: maximization of profits for companies or individual utility for consumers. A

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planned economy which Kantorovich believed could be improved in various ways in principle made it possible to take into account the diversity of human life more fully.

Unfortunately, few people realized it at the time. The conventional wisdom was that the classical market economy best takes into account human needs while a planned economy, on the contrary, imposes these needs top down; a "top down" plan does not take into account the things that man needs. Kantorovich interpreted a plan as a product created collectively by the whole society and not just by the ruling elite.

The theory of the economics of well-being going back to Arthur Cecil Pigou assumes that an ideal economy maximizes a certain (mythical) function of general well-being. According to Pigou, general well-being is achieved through the integration of individual functions of well-being. By now a host of works have been written about the integration of individual functions (goals) into one, starting from Jeremy Bentham to John Rawls. However it was Kantorovich who first drew attention to the fact that this approach had no future and in fact led into a dead end. It is now becoming clear that there are certain social (group) interests that cannot be reduced to individual interests. The mechanism of the formation and accounting of public interests has not been sufficiently grounded in theory.

At present the discussion of optimality criteria has come to the fore. Various indexes that have to do with the meaning of human life are being developed: the human capital index; the quality of life index; the life satisfaction index; the happiness index, the health index, etc. However, Kantorovich's central idea about the need to take into account the wisdom of society, and not only of individuals, still waits to be elaborated.

Not surprisingly such a thinker could not remain unnoticed internationally. In the early 1970s suggestions were made that he should be awarded the Nobel Prize, but the economic community could not agree at once which scientific results achieved by Kantorovich should be presented as grounds for awarding him the prize. As a result our compatriot Leontief got the prize in 1973 and Leonid Kantorovich two years later, in 1975 for the "contributions to the theory of optimum allocation of resources." The prize was shared with him by the prominent American economist Tjalling Koopmans. It has to be noted that there is a widespread opinion among mathematicians that Kantorovich got his Nobel Prize for formulating the problem of linear programming and proposing a method for its solution. That, of course, is only part of the truth if only because the American scientist George Danzig who invented the Danzig simplex algorithm (or simplex method) did not receive the prize.

Many rightly consider Leonid Kantorovich to be the author of the theory of optimal planning. The latter must form the basis of a planned economy, although this was not the case during the Soviet period. In a mixed economy preached to varying degrees by all countries, the planning and market mechanisms coexist. If only for that reason Kantorovich's name will not be forgotten. The memory of that great man lives on the minds and hearts of many people, especially his disciples, not only in Russia but in many other countries.

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NOTES

1 L. Kantorovich, B. Vulikh, and A. Pinsker, *Functional Analysis in Semiordered Spaces,* Moscow—Leningrad, 1950, *MR,* 12-340, [MR = *Mathematical Reviews*].

2 L. Kantorovich and G. Akilov, *Functional Analysis in Normed Spaces,* second ed., Nauka, Moscow, 1977 (in Russian); *MR,* 22, #9873; Translation: *Functional Analysis in Normed Spaces,* (Pergamon, Oxford), 1964; *MR,* 35, #4699.

3 *Leonid Kantorovich: Man and Scientist,* vol. 1, Novosibirsk, 2002, pp. 49-50 (in Russian).

4 L. Kantorovich, V. Bogachev, V. Makarov, *Assessment of the Effectiveness of Capital Spending,* Moscow, 1988 (in Russian).

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

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Russian Protectionism: Problems of the Institutional Heritage

Leonid TSEDILIN

Protectionism is defined in the Russian segment of the Internet basically as the policy of protecting the domestic market against foreign competition through a system of restrictions.[1] The frequently mentioned dual character of protectionism consists in that it may both contribute to the development of national production and slow it down by strengthening the positions of domestic monopolies in the internal market. The *New Soviet Encyclopedia* (3rd edition) defined the protectionism of capitalist states in approximately these terms, and claimed that this phenomenon was characteristic of the capitalist mode of production.

By contrast, the protectionism of the so-called "developing states" was defined as a "progressive phenomenon" because "their foreign economic policy is aimed at protecting the emerging sectors of the national economy against the expansion of the imperialist powers."[2] This interpretation of protectionism as a progressive measure is embraced by the majority of economic actors and by Russia's economic policy as a whole.

Protectionism, especially in the context of sweeping globalization, is not confined to the sphere of foreign trade: protection against foreign competition must by definition apply not only to the flow of goods and services, but also to the movement of capital and labor. However, the protectionist policy of states has been and remains for the most part selective and of "varying speed," that is, the measures to protect some flows may differ in scale from the measures concerning other flows. Moreover, restrictions of the import of goods and services are often accompanied by stimulation of foreign investment in the "protected" sectors. However, the creation of incubators for selected sectors and trends of the economy to protect them from exposure to international competition has always been a key issue.

This article examines the protectionist policy of Russia before the 1917 Revolution and during the time of the Soviet Union. A look back on the history of the problem is warranted by the fact that protectionism in current Russian economic policy has inherited many features of the approaches and prejudices of the Soviet period. Institutional memory is not notable for selectivity: present-day

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institutions are taking shape under the impact of the institutional environment of the recent rather than the more distant past.

Customs Protectionism and "the Opening of Doors"

Protectionism in Russia as a consistent political and economic strategy is associated above all with the name of Sergey Vitte, who was at the helm of the Russian economic policy in 1892-1903. The "Russian national doctrine" proposed and to a large extent implemented by Vitte can be described as "catch-up development on the basis of speedy modernization," to use modern terminology. It was based, on the one hand, on the experience of the preceding period linked with the name of the Russian Finance Minister Aleksandr Vyshnegradsky and, on the other hand, the theoretical provisions of Friedrich List, a classic of the German historical school. The latter was an ardent advocate of hard protectionism for the purpose of industrialization and the so-called "positive nationalism."[3] Vitte apparently found in List what he was looking for, namely, "healthy nationalism," that did not have the drawbacks of the cosmopolitanism of the English school and appeared to provide a solid foundation for erecting the edifice of capitalism in Russia.

As Vitte noted, the foreign trade strategy of protecting the national industry was initiated by Vyshnegradsky, who "introduced a strictly protectionist and systematic customs tariff"[4] in 1891, his last year in office. The rates for most types of industrial and agricultural products were significantly higher than the 1868 tariff rates, thus making the majority of the duties effectively prohibitive.

The tariffs on goods (metals and products of mechanical engineering) needed for such rapidly developing sectors of the economy as railway transport and mechanical engineering also increased substantially. Obviously, the emphasis was above all on domestically produced goods. At the same time the tariffs for consumer goods—cotton textiles—remained practically at the same level, which probably kept Russian textile producers on their toes.[5]

The goals and tasks of protectionist policy were formulated in the program of the development of industry and trade in Russia that was proposed in the fall of 1893. It argued that protectionist measures were necessary because the Russian industry that had just emerged from "embryonic state" could not hold its own against the industry of the Western countries that were "well organized in technical, economic and social respects." It pointed to the need to overcome the excessive reliance on the raw materials orientation of the Russian export: "Our exports are still concentrated primarily on raw materials, i.e., the least profitable good in international trade." Therefore, "it is necessary to gradually prepare a transition for comparatively larger export of manufactured products owing to which people's labor will derive more benefits from exports which up until now have been paying largely for our natural wealth."[6] (Regrettably, one has to admit that the goals formulated under Vitte and the arguments in favor of protectionism are still relevant today).

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Customs protection measures turned out to be effective in combatting competitors from some European countries which during that period had almost closed their markets and openly supported the foreign expansion of their producers. One thinks above all of Germany with which Russia had to wage, according to Vitte, a "ruthless customs war." By applying what was virtually prohibitive customs duties Russia eventually managed to conclude a mutually beneficial agreement with Germany. Similar agreements were later signed with other countries, notably France and Austro-Hungary. "The system of trade agreements turned customs duties into an instrument and even one of the aims of the relations between states."[7]

A new customs tariff that did not change the rates as radically as in 1891 was adopted in 1903. In practice its introduction meant continued adherence to the former foreign economic policy.

At the same time, being aware of the one-sidedness of the protectionist policy and following List's concept, Vitte considered high customs barriers to be a temporary phenomenon. As the national industry grew stronger, the trade and economic policy was to become more and more liberal. The protectionism of the late 19th—early 20th centuries hurt both the broad masses of the population, which had to buy inferior domestic goods at higher prices, and some sectors of the national economy. Professor Mikhail Sobolev of Tomsk University, who studied the Russian customs policy, believed that the main fiscal goal was brilliantly achieved at the cost of immense overstrain of the capacity of the mass of the people to pay.[8] According to his estimates, in the second half of the 19th century, the Russian people brought to the "altar of the domestic industry" 14-15 billion rubles because of the excessive customs tariffs.[9]

It is hard to judge exactly how much customs protectionism contributed to Russia's burgeoning economic growth in the early 20th century. The trouble is that practically simultaneously an opposite strategy was being implemented which can be described, to use modern terminology, as a "policy of the opening of doors" to foreign companies. Thanks to the measures of the Vitte government—the monetary reform of 1895-1897 and the strengthening of the Russian currency, the adoption of the 1891 customs tariff, new government loans aimed at modernizing the army, building railways and modernizing the heavy industry—foreign capital flowed into Russia. *The Vitte administration, like the following governments, steadily adhered to the policy of encouraging "foreign presence" in the Russian economy in spite of all the changes of the political and economic course.* In February 1899 Vitte submitted a secret report to the Emperor in which he argued, among other things, that the influx of foreign capital would create a competitive environment for Russian industrialists and force them to reduce prices of manufactured goods.[10] In effect, the proposal amounted to creating a playing field on terms of equality for domestic and foreign industrialists.

In the early 20th century foreign capital was present in the shape of Russian subsidiaries of foreign enterprises; of foreign enterprises created specifically for work in Russia; Russian joint-stock companies through participation in equity;

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joint-stock companies established with foreign capital and registered in Russia (see Table 1).

Table 1

Foreign Participation in the Russian Economy in the Early 20th Century

Sector of the national economy	Capital of joint stock companies with a Russian charter (statute)					Capital of foreign enterprises (million rubles)	Total (million rubles)	Share of foreign capital (%)
	Domestic		Foreign		Total			
	Million rubles	%	Million rubles	%	Million rubles			
Mining and metal-lurgical, metalworking, machine-building	363.3	70.2	154.0	29.8	517.3	242.8	760.1	52.0
Other sectors	648.7	85.3	111.5	14.7	760.2	38.6	798.8	18.0
Banks, insurance companies	745.9	98.2	13.7	1.8	759.6	83.5	843.1	11.0
Total	1757.9	86.3	279.2	13.7	2037.1	364.9	2402.0	26.8

Source: V. Bovykin, *The Emergence of Financial Capital in Russia*. Moscow, 1967, p. 295 (in Russian).

Other authors site other data on the amount of foreign investments and their share in the total investments in the Russian economy (see Table 2).

Table 2

The Share of Foreign Capital in the Total Investments in the Russian Industry (in %)

1880	1890	1893	1900	1915	1916/1917
15	55	41	31	41	45

Source: L. Eventov. Foreign Capital in the Russian Industry, Moscow-Leningrad, 1931, p. 76 (in Russian).

At the same time there are no differences as regards the preferences of foreign investors: the largest amount of foreign investments has always gone into the mining (extractive) industry. It accounted for 32.7% of total foreign investments in 1890, 41.1% in 1900 and 39.5% in 1915.[11] Then followed metalworking and machine-building, credit institutions, textile and chemical industries.[12]

Foreign capital played a particularly important role in the development of the mining industry in the south of Russia. The pioneer among foreign investors was John James Hughes, who founded the New Russia Company Ltd, or the New Russia Society of Coal, Iron and Rail Industries. Cast iron began to be produced

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in 1872. The plant had the full metallurgical cycle, pioneered 8 coke furnaces and introduced blast furnaces. The plant founded by Hughes became one of the industrial centers in Russia and later Ukraine.[13] Later, capital from Belgium and France took an active part in the development of the Russian metallurgy sector and before long gained the dominant position. In 1913, ten enterprises in southern Russia founded by the French accounted for 60.7% of the total cast iron output in Russia.[14] Foreign capital played an equally significant role in the development of southern oilfields. In 1879 Robert Hjalmar Nobel founded the Petroleum Production Company Nobel Brothers Limited, or Branobel. The concern's share in Russia's oil output was 3.8% in 1898, 12% in 1902, and 10.8% in 1903.[15]

Foreign presence in machine-building and metalworking was particularly noticeable in such sectors as the production of farm machinery, the defense industry, the building of power generators, steam engines and the railway industry.

The leader in the production of agricultural tools was the American International Harvester Company in Russia. In steam engine building five companies out of eight had links with the French capital accounting for 86.5% of all steam locomotives produced in Russia in 1911. The production of power generating equipment was dominated by the German companies Siemens and Halske & Schuckert. In 1910-1914 the share of Russian capital in the electrical equipment production was one third of the total investments, and it was even less in the electrical power industry.[16] German capital predominated in the chemical industry with the exception of the production of rubber goods where the French gained ascendancy. In the defense industry and shipbuilding the English engineer Wacker headed the Joint-Stock Company of Nikolayevsky Plants and Shipyards (in which the main capital was French). He owned stakes in other enterprises of this type. English capital was active in gold extraction. The English Society of Lena Goldfields was the largest gold mining enterprise in Russia producing one fourth of all gold.[17]

One should note foreign presence in the credit and finance sector in prerevolutionary Russia. Soviet scientist Samuil Ronin has calculated that at the beginning of the First World War the share of foreign capital in the total capital of 18 major Russian banks was 42.6%. Of these 21.9% were French capital, 17.7% German capital and 3% English capital.[18]

Beginning from 1898 the issue of foreign capital in Russia became the subject of fierce debate. Influential politicians and military commanders, including Ivan Durnovo, Vyacheslav Pleve and Pavel Lobko were critical of Vitte's course for attracting foreign investment.

The ideological background was provided by the Slavophiles, writers and journalists leaning towards nationalism, and not only because they represented the interests of the landowners but because of their own "native soil" conservatism. Not surprisingly, many representatives of the trade, industrial and banking circles, in the first place Moscow financial groups and the Urals industry that were most exposed to competition, spoke about the "harm and threat to Russian interests."

Journalists and scientists of the liberal conviction, as well as industrialists in southern Russia, advocated active use of foreign capital in the Russian economy. At the start of the debate, when a fundamental decision on foreign participation

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was to be made at the highest level, the support of the great Russian scientist Dmitry Mendeleyev played a key role. In a letter to the Emperor in November 1898 he argued in favor of the inflow of foreign capital into Russia in the context of a toughening of the customs regulations. The combination of foreign trade protectionism and the opening up of the country to foreign capital would, in Mendeleyev's opinion, ensure for the future generations "a flourishing of industry that one can only dream of today and that can be achieved… by our highly talented and perceptive people."[19] The main provisions of Mendeleyev's letter were incorporated in Vitte's report and approved by a meeting of the Government ministers.

The idea of foreign presence in the economy was backed by major Russian economists Pyotr Struve, Ivan Yanzhul and Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky. The latter wrote the famous lines that are still relevant today: "Our advocates of Russianness' speak with horror about the capture of the natural wealth of Russia by foreign capital... They calculate the future dividends that foreign capital will derive and that will leave Russia. But they forget that these profits would not have existed if foreign capital did not fertilize our industrial soil. They forget that capital, once invested, remains in the country and feeds the working masses. All our modern-day industry has developed on the basis of foreign capital."[20]

During the First World War German capital lost its positions in Russia, above all in the production of electrical machinery. However, these vacant niches were filled mainly not by Russian, but by foreign, especially American, capital.

After the Bolshevik (October) Revolution of 1917 Soviet scholars gave a mixed assessment of the presence of foreign capital in the economy of prerevolutionary Russia. While some works published during the New Economic Policy and in the later Soviet period are tolerant and point out the positive role of foreign participation,[21] during the Stalin era the theory of "denationalization" claimed that before the revolution the country was a "semicolony." It claimed that foreign capital had turned Russia into a semicolony of more developed powers and that it had to provide raw materials for foreign capitalists to the detriment of the national interests.

Let it be stressed that the above accusations are nothing but political and ideological declarations: the advocates of the "semicolony" theory were unable to provide any arguments to support it other than the statistics of participation of foreign capital in some—though undoubtedly critical—sectors. They found no proof of bondage or brutal exploitation or "anti-Russian activities." Moreover, in the 1960s Valery Bovykin, Valentin Dyakin, Aleksandr Dongarov and others proved that foreign capital in Russia was a natural and an inalienable part of its economy serving the domestic industry and not the needs of foreign investor countries[22] and playing the role of catalyst of national economic development.[23]

Economic internationalization of Russia undoubtedly was in the interests of European investors, but not because they wanted to colonize it, but because it paved the way for profitable and sustained business in the country. Characteristically, foreign investments tended to grow in the periods not of upsurge, but of decline in the Russian economy before the 1917 Revolution.[24] However, in the Soviet period the country could not benefit from the results of the "open doors"

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policy of the prerevolutionary period as the whole industry, including industries with foreign participation, was nationalized.

1920s—1930s: Protecting Socialism in One Country

Upon coming to power the Bolsheviks first of all—before "governmentalization" of the main industries and domestic trade—nationalized foreign trade. Under Article 1 of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of April 22, 1918 all foreign trade was declared to be the domain of the state. "Trade transactions of the purchase and sale of all kinds of products (mining, manufacturing industry, agriculture, etc.) with foreign states and individual trade enterprises abroad shall be effected on behalf of the Russian Republic by specifically authorized agencies. Apart from these agencies, any trade deals with overseas for export or import shall be prohibited."[25] Practically at the same time, in April 1918, the RSFSR introduced state monopoly on currency transactions, although officially it was not until the October 6, 1921, Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR that the People's Commissariat for Finance was authorized (while all the other organizations, institutions and individuals were forbidden) to buy gold, platinum and foreign currency.

According to the New Soviet Encyclopedia, the main task of the foreign trade monopoly was "to secure the interests of the state in foreign trade relations." It also mentioned the protectionist function by stating that monopoly "guarantees independent development of the people's economy of the USSR and the planned character of its foreign trade" and "acts as an effective instrument of protection against economic expansion in the relations with the capitalist countries."[26]

The use by the Bolsheviks, immediately after they seized power, of such a potent protectionist mechanism as foreign trade monopoly was not only a forced but also an inevitable measure. Any other tools obviously could not ensure the strengthening, survival and existence of the socialist system with a nationwide planned economy. When Nikolay Bukharin in 1922 proposed a softening of foreign trade regulations and introducing "containment" customs tariffs Lenin categorically rejected the idea. Such "liberalization," he argued, would have dire consequences, "for in the present epoch of imperialism the only system of protection worthy of consideration is the monopoly of foreign trade. ... In practice, Bukharin is acting as an advocate of the profiteer, of the petty bourgeois and of the upper stratum of the peasantry in opposition to the industrial proletariat, which will be totally unable to build up its own industry and make Russia an industrial country unless it has the protection, not of tariffs, but of the monopoly of foreign trade. In view of the conditions at present prevailing in Russia, any other form of protection would be absolutely fictitious; it would be merely paper protection, from which the proletariat would derive no benefit whatever."[27]

The fundamental importance of the monopoly of foreign trade as the only possible protectionist measure under Soviet-style socialism has been vindicated by the history of the Soviet system. The monopoly of foreign trade was introduced shortly after the establishment of the Soviet system and was cancelled

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immediately after the transition to the free market. For more than 70 years it protected the socialist economy from the "deleterious" influence of international competition, and in the absence of internal competition, made it possible to structure the economy in accordance with ideological premises and not actual demand. The monopoly on foreign trade in fact made it possible to exclude the consumer from the process of economic decision-making asserting the role of the state as the sole (in the USSR) or dominant (in the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe) economic agent. In other words, the key function of monopoly as a protectionist system was to protect Soviet socialism, the structure of its national economy and the system of institutions against the influence of the external world, international comparisons and competition.

Economic liberalization during the NEP period had a considerable impact on foreign trade although it was undoubtedly not as extensive as on the domestic economy. In October 1922, exchange trade in foreign currency was allowed and beginning from February 1923 the State Bank had a monopoly only of the purchase of gold and silver coins. However, in reality the state fully controlled currency transactions. The new legal tender, the *chervonets*, was introduced in 1922. It was supported by gold (1 *chervonets* = 10 prerevolutionary gold rubles = 7.74 grams of pure gold). In 1924 Soviet banknotes, quickly ousted by the *chervonets*, stopped being printed and were withdrawn from circulation. Starting from April 1, 1924, the exchange rate of the *chervonets* was published at the New York Stock Exchange. Throughout April the *chervonets* prices exceeded its dollar parity. In 1924-1925 unofficial *chervonets* deals were struck in London and Berlin. In late 1925 the issue of its price at the Vienna stock exchange was solved in principle. The *chervonets* was also officially traded in Milan, Riga, Rome, Constantinople, Teheran and Shanghai. The Soviet *chervonets* could be exchanged or acquired in practically all countries, but its convertibility was relative and in many ways token because private enterprises could not use the acquired currency in foreign trade settlements.

The Soviet Government pinned great hopes on the active use of the institution of concessions, especially for attracting foreign capital and technologies into the economy. The issue of renting out enterprises to foreign capitalists was already raised in the period of War Communism, in the spring of 1918 at the 1st All-Russia Congress of the National Economy Councils. An official political statement designed to orient members of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-German economic talks, noted that Soviet Russia could get "foreign products necessary for Russian production" only by taking out loans. That could be achieved only by concessions "for the creation of new enterprises needed for the systematic development of still untapped productive forces of Russia in accordance with the general plan." However, tough restrictions were imposed: concessions could not turn into "spheres of influence of foreign states." The Urals, the Donetsky and Kuznetsky coalfields and the Baku area were excluded from the territories where concessions were allowed. Concessioners had to obey Soviet legislation; the Soviet Government was entitled to get a part of the products at market prices and a part of the profit if it did not exceed 5%.[28] Although the document was related to links with Germany its provisions were treated as fundamental

directives. In effect it was a rough draft of the concession policy in the NEP period. Lev Trotsky, who headed the Concession Committee, was charged with implementing this policy.

The scale of concession cooperation with foreign entrepreneurs turned out to be quite modest, however: in 1926-1927 there were 117 concession and lease agreements; the enterprises functioning along these lines employed 18,000 workers and accounted for a little over 1% of industrial output.[29] The obvious failure of the initiative was attributable to two main causes.

First and most important, the Bolsheviks renounced restitution of the property expropriated from foreign owners; given such framework conditions there was no question of a new "reservoir of trust." Secondly, the restrictions under the abovementioned document were in force: they excluded key sectors and regions from the concession sphere. Furthermore, as the concession strategy was being implemented the Soviet-style pragmatism was becoming more and more evident: the concessions were used above all to strengthen the government, i.e., socialist, sector. Apparently, there were no plans to expand international cooperation on the concession basis and become integrated in the world economy. *De facto*, once foreign equipment and technologies were installed and Soviet specialists learned to use it, the government terminated the concession and other cooperative agreements with foreign companies.[30]

The liberalization of foreign economic activities during the NEP period was tightly controlled and dosed: the economy only opened up as long as the liberalization did not threaten the political, economic and ideological foundations of the Soviet regime. This conclusion is supported by the attitude of the supreme authorities to the foreign trade monopoly. Some Soviet leaders proposed to renounce it and not to limit free trade by state borders. In addition to Bukharin, such proposals were made by Grigory Sokolnikov, who believed that the country's economy could only develop successfully if it managed "to become part of the world market economically." The monopoly of foreign trade, in his opinion, made it impossible to use the country's export potential to the full because the peasants and artisans got only Soviet money and not hard currency for their products.[31]

All the attacks on the foreign trade monopoly were eventually repelled by its supporters led by Lenin. During the NEP period the importance of monopoly as a "commanding heights," which the state had to control in any case, even increased in some ways compared with the War Communism period. The resolution of the RCP(B) Conference in December 1923 red in part: "The foreign trade monopoly has fully justified itself, notably in the conditions of NEP and as an instrument for preventing the riches of the country from being looted by native and foreign capital and as a means of socialist accumulation. Only by preserving the entire system of foreign trade monopoly could we achieve a trade surplus and concentrate revenues from foreign trade in the hands of the state... The foreign trade monopoly must be preserved fully in the future as an important element of the Party's economic policy, especially in the NEP period."[32]

In the 1920s the structure of foreign economic ties was being rapidly transformed in accordance with the principles of state monopoly. The People's Com-

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missariat of Foreign Trade created in 1923 received funding for trade, i.e., it ceased to be an intermediary and became a procurement and trade apparatus. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade was authorized to issue permits to individual institutions to purchase goods, but only if the Commissariat approved these contracts. Although the *Tsentrosoyuz* was allowed to sell its products abroad to cooperative organizations under the control of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade in accordance with the 13 March, 1922 Decree of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, the main agents in foreign trade relations were the trade missions under its direct jurisdiction.

The preservation of the commanding heights in the economy made it possible to quickly curtail the NEP and pass on to total governmentalization of the economy and industrialization according to the recipes of Marxism-Leninism, i.e., through the development of heavy industry. In this context the socialist state's foreign trade monopoly turned out to be a very effective means of implementing the above principles. It was not merely "the shield and breast-plate of our young socialist industry."[33] It had become the most effective instrument of foreign trade expansion because it made it possible to adhere strictly to the chosen policy disregarding its consequences for the national economy or foreign trade. The dramatic change of foreign economic policy in the late 1920s—early 1930s (and that of course included the whole foreign policy) marked a transition from the semiopen (or semiclosed) NEP policy to the policy of self-reliance which effectively meant self-isolation. The new course proceeded from the ideological thesis about the antagonism between the two systems and the (allegedly temporary) period of existence in a hostile environment. "The iron curtain" that became a cliché in the late 1940s, was actually rung down in the 1930s, when a peculiarly Soviet type of xenophobia took hold in the country: the mentality of a "besieged fortress."

When the ruble ceased to be convertible (in 1928) its real value quickly plummeted. Although nominally the "gold content" of the *chervonets* remained unchanged between 1922 and 1947, in reality it became devalued by 2.5-3.5 times in the second half of the 1930s against the American dollar.[34] With the transition to self-isolation a shortage of consumer goods of mass demand immediately ensued. Their import was fast shrinking (accounting for a mere 1% in 1938) and so did domestic production. Some industrial goods and foodstuffs were only available at *Torgsin* shops (1931-1936) in exchange for "currency values" (gold, silver, gems, antiquities and hard currency cash). That period saw a gap developing between the so-called "currency" ruble used as the accounting unit in foreign trade statistics, and the domestic ruble with which citizens could obtain a limited list of goods and services determined at the discretion of the powers that be. Food rationing was introduced. Considering the hidden inflation due to the shortage of most goods and services, the real purchasing power of the domestic ruble dropped by at least 6 times in the period of collectivization and industrialization compared with the NEP period. Because the nominal incomes remained practically the same it can be assumed that the living standards dropped by the same amount. Such was the real price of socialist industrialization.

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Thanks to the dramatic cheapening of labor, partly due to the devaluation of the ruble, the Soviet regime could start active dumping in foreign markets to which free-trade countries could not find an effective response. Foreign entrepreneurs for the first time had to turn a blind eye to massive supplies of products produced by cheap labor or even requisitioned, and to deal with the "trading state," a partner that had unheard-of mobilization potential.

A series of publications about the threat of "Red dumping trade" in the *New York Evening Post* in the 1930s marked the start of a campaign against "Soviet dumping" and the use of "forced labor" in the USSR. Thereafter the USA passed some administrative and customs legal acts expressly aimed against Soviet goods coming from the areas where forced labor was used (including the labor of those kept in a prison). In France a decree issued on October 3, 1930, introduced licensing of the import of the main Soviet goods. In April 1933, England imposed an embargo on 80% of Soviet exports.

And yet, as Soviet authors of the period rightly argued, the Soviet Union countered every attempt to discriminate our foreign trade relying on the state foreign trade monopoly. The Soviet countermeasures—restriction or ban on the import of goods from countries "discriminating" against Soviet goods—had a much more powerful impact on the Western democracies. Suffice it to mention just one manifestation of such unequal forces: the governments of those countries, unlike the Soviet government, had to assume responsibility for any radical decisions, especially in the context of the crisis that broke out. At the same time the Soviet Government in designing and implementing its economic policy, including foreign trade, could afford to disregard not only the opinion of the population, but to ignore the people's basic needs.

During the Soviet period the outcome of socialist industrialization in the 1930s in terms of foreign trade was receiving lavish praise. An entry in the New Soviet Encyclopedia written by Vladimir Alkhimov, the Deputy Foreign Trade Minister in 1960s—1970s, read in part: "Important changes took place in the structure of foreign trade. In 1937-1938 the share of imported machinery to domestically produced equipment was already less than 1%. While before the October Revolution of 1917 Russian industrial exports accounted for 30% and agricultural exports for 70%, in 1938 industrial exports accounted for 63.6% and agricultural exports for 36.4% of the entire Soviet exports... At the same time foodstuffs needed to increase domestic consumption were excluded from export."[35]

A comparison of statistical data characterizing the structure of foreign trade cited in Alkhimov's article with the prerevolutionary statistics does not, in our opinion, warrant such unequivocally optimistic conclusions. The conclusion that socialist industrialization did not result in a removal or even lowering of the structural barrier to foreign trade is obvious: raw materials and semiprocessed goods were still traded for finished goods in 1938. The share of machines and equipment in Soviet export (5%) was even less than the share of "manufactured goods" in the export of prerevolutionary Russia (5.8%).[36]

The cut of the export of foodstuffs "necessary to raise the level of domestic consumption" deserves special comment. Apparently the entry referred to the export of grain which was indeed cut dramatically beginning from 1934 as a

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result of the drop of world prices (due to the world crisis) and in order to correct the "excesses" that occurred in the previous years. There was a crop failure in 1931, and yet grain exports continued. This despite the fact that in 1932-1933 between 4 million and 7 million people starved to death. Let us stress that Soviet grain exports were replaced to a large extent with the export of other commodities, mainly timber and minerals, compared to which grain is thought to be a product with a higher "added value," a product that does not belong to the category of nonrenewable resources.

As a result of the policy of industrialization at the cost of incredible effort and human sacrifice, a powerful and in many ways modern industry was created in the country. The state monopoly of foreign trade and currency operations played an important role in that. However, Soviet industry was not developing under the influence of domestic demand of free producers and households. Nor was it exposed to foreign competition. The policy of self-isolation and "claustrophilia" involving active use of nonmarket methods, including a powerful protectionist regime, led to the creation, strengthening and growth of a huge nonmarket sector geared primarily to military needs.

Foreign Economic Policy in the 1970s—1980s

During the period known as "stagnation" the state monopoly of foreign trade remained a reliable shield of the Soviet economy from the influence of the external environment and, moreover, was an effective instrument of economic consolidation of the political regime. The shortages that were generated by the planned economy, both in the consumer and investment spheres, were offset to a large extent by foreign purchases. This was aided by the favorable world market conditions, i.e., the positive dynamics of world prices for Soviet exports beginning from the early 1970s until the mid-1980s.

The General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev, who said in one of his speeches that "bread for the people and security of the country" would always be his chief concerns[37] gave a concise and accurate definition of the economic priorities of the period. The tasks set were undoubtedly solved, not least due to the centralized purchases abroad, albeit with varying degrees of success.

Owing to the inherent logic of the socialist planned system oriented towards upholding ideological principles, the second of the priorities mentioned—"the security of the country"—was always far more important. Besides, diversifying the offer of goods and services available to the consumer was never the target, while excessive diversity in that sector in the countries with a free economy was dismissed by Soviet propaganda as the abuses of market competition and a manifestation of unproductive use of social labor. So the population of the socialist state was confined to a mandatory ration: there was no hunger, like in the times of collectivization and industrialization under Stalin, but there was a constant shortage of various goods and services which could only be "obtained" but not bought.

Import played a special role in delivering "bread to the people." Beginning from 1963 the Soviet Union was a constant grain importer. The problem of the

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so-called "food security," i.e., self-sufficiency in the main types of food, grew worse over time. The import of grain, and of meat, occupied a key place in the food balance, although hard currency was above all used to buy machinery.

Machines and equipment have always been the main Soviet import items. Throughout its existence the Soviet Union pursued an intensive industrial policy. The planned economy, monopoly of foreign trade and currency transactions would seem to permit the socialist state to resort to any large-scale economic maneuver and achieve at least a parity with the West in the technological sphere. However, the structural barrier in our foreign trade did not diminish although such a target was set. In cost terms, the import of machines and equipment was at all times multiples of the volume of exports, and the technological lag in the civilian sector was widening year in and year out.

Technological breakthroughs in some sectors connected with the defense industry made no difference to the overall trend: owing to the closed nature of that sphere the achievements were not used outside that sphere, unlike, for example, the sharing of the solutions and ideas generated in the military-industrial complex with the civilian sectors practiced in the US. Accordingly, the nature of the economic system could not but affect the technological standard of the machinery produced in the Soviet Union. The Soviet economy undoubtedly got from outside stimuli for development, but competition between the two systems could not replace commercial competition. Indeed, it often produced dubious results even in terms of technology.[38] Most importantly, the competition between the two systems often made it necessary to find solutions at any cost: the considerations of economic efficiency were either disregarded[39] or disoriented the decision makers owing to the distorted price structure. In the 1970s—1980s the country's warehouses routinely accumulated 4-5 billion convertible rubles worth of imported equipment which was practically useless for the enterprises that had ordered that machinery. In some years the value of absolutely useless equipment purchased abroad reached hundreds of millions of convertible rubles.

The technocratic tendency, generated and constantly reproduced, partly due to lack of competition on the international scale, became a typical feature of the socialist planned economy. As the founder of the theory of ordoliberalism Walter Eucken noted, in an administrative economic system the key role belongs to the engineer whereas in a market economy the merchant is the central figure.[40] Technocrats dominated even the sphere that required a special training in commerce, such as foreign trade.

The technocratic approach, combined with ideological premises, determined the Soviet interpretation of the state's economic security. The latter was interpreted as the maximum degree of independence from foreign sources of development. The highly diversified structure of the Soviet economy, its leadership in terms of the gross output of some products and, finally, the achievements of the military-industrial complex—a seemingly isolated sphere of production immune to foreign influence—created an illusion that the goal of economic security was within reach or had already been reached.

Seeking to build a self-sufficient economy the Soviet leadership tried to get rid above all of foreign economic dependence on the ideological adversary, forever

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fearing an economic blockade. Simultaneously there was no fear of "dependence" in the economic relations with the developing and especially the "fraternal" socialist countries. That sphere was dominated by other criteria and approaches.

With the emergence of the world socialist system the defense frontiers of Soviet protectionism moved away from the USSR borders. The Soviet planned economy "opened a chink" for the national economies of most other socialist countries. The degree of openness depended on the closeness or otherwise of political relations. Thus, until 1960 the Soviet Union's main trading partner was the People's Republic of China, but after the Sino-Soviet rift in 1961 and until the liquidation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in the early 1990s the biggest trade partner of the USSR was the GDR whose population was about 1.5% of that of China.

In relations with the countries with which an atmosphere of political trust prevailed fairly deep economic interpenetration was allowed which eventually was institutionalized in the form of "socialist economic integration." One of its features should be mentioned in particular and that is, the primacy of political considerations in building up the integration system and its institutions. In that respect socialist economic integration is an exceptional case, although in some formal terms it may be seen as a possible model of economic integration.

The political interest of the Soviet leadership consisted in tying the satellite countries, most of which were members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, more closely to the USSR economically. The Soviet Union needed the COMECON above all to assert its political and military domination in the buffer states. The interest of the leadership of the "small" COMECON countries obviously was to use the special economic relations with the "dominant partner" to keep the internal social and political situation under control and compensate, if only partially, for the systemic weaknesses of the model of socialist development that was imposed on these countries.

The one-sided nature of the privileges that tied the satellite countries to the "dominant partner" was based on a system of settlements, more precisely planned mutual offsets, on the basis of the transferrable ruble and the special method of pricing within the COMECON. While in the relations with the less developed COMECON countries whose exports were dominated by commodities (raw materials) and semiprocessed goods (Cuba, Mongolia) the Soviet Union offered overt preferences and the scale of assistance could be more or less accurately assessed, in the relations with the European socialist economic integration partners the one-sidedness of the privileges was not so noticeable.

In the last 25 years of the COMECON, prices for products were based on the information on the dynamics of prices of that product in the world market in the preceding five years. The arithmetical average of the "world price" over a five-year period was the basis for prices in mutual exchanges. This method was thought to eliminate the impact of market fluctuations on prices and make it possible to adjust gradually to the changes in world trends, the drops and spikes of "world prices." Dynamic sets for a five-year period could only be established on the basis of the so-called "exchange traded goods," i.e., raw materials, fuel and

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food. But it could not be done for the majority of industrial goods because of the multiplicity of parameters and characteristics. To determine the price within the framework of socialist economic integration, contract prices in international trade in analogous products were usually used. For example, to determine the price of a machine tool from Czechoslovakia materials were used on the price of a similar machine tool produced in Great Britain, but not on the price of a Czechoslovak machine tool sold in the free market. Given this practice, the European COMECON countries that supplied manufactured goods to the USSR in exchange for commodities and energy benefited from the opportunities offered by a closed system of trade and pricing and inflated prices for their finished products. Alternately, if the subsidizing, for example, of Cuba by buying sugar at exaggerated prices (three times the actual price in the last few years) was obvious, the support of more developed countries such as the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary was disguised.

Accurate information on the level of subsidies to the European COMECON countries was lacking, but a general idea can be gleaned if one has access to "classified" statistical year books on COMECON foreign trade. The comparison of prices, say, of knitwear sold by the GDR to the East and West on the basis of that source revealed that the prices of supplies to the USSR were exaggerated by two or three times. To add to the picture of "mutually beneficial trade" within the COMECON one has to mention that the Soviet side totally ignored indirect, in particular transport, costs. The "fraternal countries" were invited to take part in integration projects on the territory of the USSR without any regard for their economic practicability, but proceeding from political expediency in accordance with the so-called "intersectoral specialization" of this or that country. Such participation subsequently ensured supply of scarce raw materials and semi-processed goods to a corresponding country making it less dependent on the imports from capitalist countries.

The import of commodities from the USSR, given the system of pricing and settlement, was so profitable that some European socialist countries requested, and, taking advantage of the benevolence of the Soviet leadership, obtained a lot more fuel and commodity goods than they needed for their domestic export-oriented and usually highly material-intensive production. The "surplus" was frequently resold for hard currency after some insignificant processing. Thus, the GDR needed about 11 million tons of oil annually for internal consumption, including for its export-oriented chemical industry. However, in the 1970s—1980s it was supplied with 17.1 million tons of oil under five-year trade agreements and additionally bought over 2 million tons in exchange for supplies of the so-called hard currency goods, including foodstuffs. The GDR, naturally, sold petroleum products to the West for hard currency. Sometimes it took the shape of direct re-export of Soviet commodities. Characteristically, the GDR secret services were directly in charge of "obtaining" hard currency by "nontraditional" methods.

And yet, in spite of the seemingly strong bonds, integration within the COMECON collapsed almost overnight when the national economies and indeed the system of relations within the COMECON opened up. After convert-

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ible currency settlements were introduced at world, i.e., contractual and not planned prices, the COMECON survived for only a few more months. The precipitous nature of its dissolution was undoubtedly influenced by the spate of decisions abolishing foreign trade monopoly both in the USSR and in the European COMECON countries. At the end of the day socialist economic integration collapsed because of the transformation of the social order and free economic relations that replaced centralized planning.

The Soviet Period of Protectionism. Summary

The most powerful protectionist system, typically used in world practice as a mobilization measure only for short periods and in extreme situations, was committed to defending the socialist system, its gains and institutions. But did that ensure the national interests in the foreign economic sphere? If one takes such a criterion as increased competitiveness of manufacturing sectors of the economy, one can hardly give a positive assessment of the results of foreign trade monopoly for the USSR. The creation of special conditions for the domestic industry by shielding it from international competition proved counterproductive. In the context of isolation, the Soviet economy received signals for progressive development with a big lag, and these signals reached industrial sectors and enterprises indirectly and usually in a distorted shape.

The foreign trade monopoly failed to solve the important industrial policy task of overcoming the structural barrier in foreign trade and increasing the share of high added value products in exports. The share of commodities and some primary processing products in the Soviet exports to the capitalist countries in the 1970s—1980s, like in the previous periods, was invariably above 90%.

The lifting of the monopoly created a host of problems. However, these problems would have cropped up anyway because a planned economy is always unprepared for opening up. Even if the consequences of the repeal of foreign trade monopoly had been studied in a thorough and timely manner, the only experience to fall back on in the early 1990s was that of the gradual opening up of China's economy. (The NEP experience in opening up the economy was not convincing, as noted above).

In China, the reforms in the foreign trade sector began a decade earlier than in the rest of the socialist world when COMECON was still at pains to demonstrate "the advantages" of socialist economic integration: independence from world price fluctuations, planned development and cooperation versus the spontaneous elements of the market and competition. China, by contrast, did not benefit from international socialist division of labor, certainly not on the scale comparable to the COMECON countries, beginning from the 1960s. The share of industrialized countries in its foreign trade was steadily growing: it was 73% in 1980, and 80% in 1986. Perhaps the constant exposure to the harsh realities of the world markets, the need to take into account comparative costs in determining the effectiveness of foreign trade prompted a much earlier start of reform in

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China. The post-Soviet space and the CEE countries had no time to reform the former system and, most importantly, no political prerequisites for preserving it even in a modified shape. In the situation that prevailed in those countries a different transformation scenario other than an abrupt change of the social and economic order with all the inevitable consequences was hardly possible.

In Russia, the burden of systemic flaws—institutional and structural—was probably heavier than in other postsocialist countries. It is weighing heavily on the country's economy to this day. The challenge at the present stage is to get rid of that heritage as soon as possible. It is important to understand to what extent protectionism as a basic policy of protecting domestic business against foreign competition accelerates or slows down the introduction of a new economic order.

NOTES

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38 One striking example is the creation of the Soviet Buran spaceship by analogy with American manned systems. The 15-billion ruble project ended up with the spaceship being put on display on the territory of Gorky Park in Moscow. There was no transfer of technologies to the civilian sector.

39 This was most vividly manifested in the relations with the socialist countries, of which more below.

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Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

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Emperor Alexander III and Musical Art in Russia

Yuliya KUDRINA

Emperor Alexader III left a big imprint in the development of musical culture in Russia. As the newspaper *Russkaya muzykalnaya gazeta* wrote on November 11, 1894, after his death, his memory "will forever be cherished by the Russian musical world."

In the mid-1850s major changes took place in the country's musical life as chamber and symphonic music left the confines of aristocratic salons and reached out to a wider audience. The Russian Musical Society was formed in 1859 in St. Petersburg and a year later in Moscow.

In 1862, the composers Mily Balakirev and Gavriil Lomakin founded the first free music singing school which was patronized first by Grand Prince (Crown Prince) *(Tsesarevich* in Russian) Nikolay Alexandrovich and later by Crown Prince *(Tsesarevich)* Alexander Alexandrovich. The school taught chor singing, playing orchestra instruments and introduced pupils to the basics of musical and methodological knowledge. *Tsesarevich* Alexander Alexandrovich and *Tsesarevna* Mariya Fyodorovna often attended the school's concerts at the invitation of Nikolay Rimsky-Korsakov who would later become the school's director.

Next to St. Petersburg and Moscow music schools were opened in Kiev, Kharkov, Kazan, Tiflis, Omsk, Odessa, Saratov, Riga and other provincial capitals. The number of Russian music teachers, orchestra musicians and singers was growing year in and year out.

The first Russian Conservatoire was opened in St. Petersburg in 1862 and another was opened in Moscow in 1866.

In 1872, on the initiative of *Tsesarevich* Alexander Alexandrovich, the Society of Wind Music was formed. It was initially called "The Choir of Heir Apparent to *Tsesarevich* Alexander Alexandrovich" and the *Tsesarevich* was its member. Konstantin Kolokoltsov, who published an essay on the Choir of Wind Music Amateurs in 1897, wrote: "The beginnings of the choir should be traced

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to the first meeting at the Marine Museum. The august founder of the choir by his personal participation and example inspired all the members for fruitful and selfless service to art from the very beginning of the newborn and initially small institution which nevertheless was united by one common cherished idea. Thanks to this, the members of the choir dedicated their energy in the name of art being encouraged by the imperial leader who followed the development of the choir at all the subsequent periods in its existence."[1]

The choir included five personalities from the imperial court. The *Tsesarevich's* diary entries constantly refer to musical classes: Dagmar at the piano, Alexander Alexandrovich the cornet. Musical evenings, or musical gatherings, as they were called at the time, began to be held at the Winter Palace since 1858 largely thanks to Adjutant-General Otton Richter, who was a member of the retinue of heir apparent *Tsesarevich* Nikolay Alexandrovich, the elder brother of Grand Prince Alexander Alexandrovich, who was a General Staff Colonel at the time. He was a passionate lover of music and he arranged musical evenings at the Winter Palace every week on Saturdays. Well-known musicians such as Anton Rubinstein, Adam Bekkel and many others took part in them. The musical gatherings took place in the presence of Grand Prince Alexander Alexandrovich, who himself played the cornet.

The Musical Circle, created by the *Tsesarevich* in the early 1870s, quickly came into its own and its classes became regular. According to Count Sergey Sheremetev, *Tsesarevich* Alexander Alexandrovich was at the centre of that circle.[2]

The sessions took place at Anichkov Palace and at the Admiralty. From the *Tsesarevich*'s diary: "1879. January 20. Monday. At half past eight set out for Mikhaylovsky Palace to the concert of our choir of amateurs and Count Sheremetev's singers in aid of the families of the members of the Foresters Lifeguards Regiment who were killed or wounded (during the Russo-Turkish War.—*Yu.K.*). The concert was a great success and the receipts [donations collected] promise to be good."[3]

The brother of Lev Tolstoy's wife, Colonel Aleksandr Bers, a member of the Musical Circle, recalled that Staff Captain Basilevsky, who had been killed near Telishev, served with that regiment and was a member of the circle: "The idea of staging a concert in memory of the deceased musical colleague came from the *Tsesarevich* himself. His Highness took an active part in arranging the concert; he distributed tickets among the Tsar's family, raised more than 1500 rubles which he brought to the Admiralty on one of the nearest Thursdays and surrendered them to Colonel Adelson, who was the superintendent of the circle's business affairs. The Grand Duchess Yekaterina Mikhaylovna offered us a wonderful hall in her palace and treated all those present to a sumptuous meal. The Tsar's entire family and the cream of St. Petersburg society attended the concert and a large sum of money was raised."[4]

The Russian and foreign musicians who were contemporaries of Alexander III had a high opinion of his musical gifts and performing skill. Aleksandr Bers writes in his reminiscences: "The Tsar, being a musician, always made correct judgments about music and was always a connoisseur of choral singing."[5]

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The American cornetist virtuoso Jules Levy, who had been invited to Russia by Grand Prince Aleksey Alexandrovich, the *Tsesarevich*'s brother, and took part in the concerts of the Court Orchestra, said in an interview with the *Brooklyn Eagle* magazine that the *Tsesarevich* was a wonderful amateur musician and the cornet was simply his instrument.[6]

A composer and theater critic Yury Arnold (1811-1898) in his 1895 essay on the Court Orchestra wrote: "He (Alexander Alexandrovich.—*Yu.K.*) loved music and listening to music was the favorite pastime in the narrow circle of the imperial family."[7]

The creation of the Musical Circle and the Choir of Wind Music Amateurs, and later the Court Orchestra under the patronage of the *Tsesarevich* and later Emperor Alexander III encouraged the creation of orchestras in various places: in military units, at enterprises, schools and universities. Interest in performing art and in playing in various orchestras was growing among representatives of different social estates in Russian society: "In military units, at factories, etc., everywhere their own orchestras sprang up and the Tsar was everywhere greeted with music and singing."[8]

Kolokoltsov wrote: "At the initiative of His Imperial Highness Heir Apparent *Tsesarevich*, playing orchestra instruments became fashionable... There was a felt need in society for organizing other amateur choirs in addition to the Choir of Heir Apparent *Tsesarevich*. And indeed by 1879 there existed several choirs... Societies of music lovers became widespread and gained a certain status."[9]

In 1882 the Musical Circle was granted the status of a Court Orchestra under the Imperial Court Ministry. Alexander III appointed Major General Baron Konstantin von Stakelberg as its chief and Cavalry Captain Peter von Albrecht as his assistant. Both were noted for their extensive musical knowledge. The orchestra was divided into a mixed orchestra and a brass band. There were 100 musicians in the orchestra most of whom played two instruments, one string and one wind, and were thus members of both orchestras.

From Arnold's memoirs: "In the summer of the last year I had the pleasure for the first time not only to hear this orchestra performing, but to learn its further disposition... I have to admit that on both counts the orchestra deserves the widest recognition, even outside the borders of our Empire."[10]

The Court Orchestra possessed old violins, one of which was a Stradivarius and another an Amati. Both used to belong to Emperor Alexander I and were in the custody of the Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg. Alexander III ordered that they be handed over to the Court Orchestra to be used in solo performances.

Also on the Emperor's instructions eight flutes of various shapes from Alexander I's legacy, including one made from cut glass and decorated with gems, as well as the flugelhorn-quartet (cornet-a-piston-quartet) of Alexander III and two trumpets he played himself were handed over to the orchestra.

Hanging on the walls of the Court Orchestra Hall were 54 tin horns of various sizes. The instrument-maker Nikolay Fyodorov was nominated as Supplier to his Imperial Majesty's Court for making brass trumpets, known as "Naryshkin Horns," for the choir. The craftsman used descriptions and drawings to restore

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original Russian musical instruments—historical horns—that had existed in Russia since 1757 but had been in oblivion for a long period.[11]

During the coronation of Emperor Alexander III these horns were used to play the finale of "Glory" in the epilogue of Glinka's opera *Life for the Tsar* performed for the general public at the Bolshoi Theater.

Pyotr Chaykovsky, whose music was inspired by these folk compositions, wrote in a letter to the Russian architect Vladimir Sherwood on January 15, 1891: "The horn players are in fact the Russian *muzhiks* who play a song instead of singing it. There is no doubt that Russian peasants, especially those who live away from the centers, when they get together for choir singing, display a remarkable ability to instinctively harmonize their wonderful melodies, sometimes so well as if they were intimately familiar with the science of harmony."[12] According to Chaykovsky, "the Russian folk music element with all its melodic harmony and rhythmic features, beginning with Glinka, has been taken up by all Russian composers."[13]

Upon becoming Emperor, Alexander III could no longer take part in the musical exercises and performances of the orchestra, but he continued to be actively involved in musical life rendering every kind of help to musicians in their concert activities. In 1882, immediately after enthronement, he issued a *Statute on the Court Musical Choir.* "Never before in the history of official musical theaters was there a better moment than 1882, wrote journalist Ivan Lipayev in the newspaper *Orkestroviye muzykanty,* 1904. "By the will of Emperor Alexander III a staff statute exclusively for orchestras was established. Remuneration was established for every pair of string musicians sharing the same music stand and for every individual orchestra instrument. Compared with the previous period, the salaries were more than doubled in 1882 and the number of orchestra players increased to 150."[14]

In 1818 Anatoly Lunacharsky, the People's Commissar for Culture, had this to say about the Imperial Court Orchestra:

"Among the items of the Tsarist court legacy that can be useful, we inherited the Imperial Court Orchestra. I do not know whether the Tsars and their company understood good music, but the title of Tsar obliges, therefore... the orchestra was well run."[15]

Emperor Alexander III and Empress Mariya Fyodorovna were frequent visitors to the Imperial Court Capelle in St. Petersburg, an educational institution which trained top-class singers, conductors, choirmasters and religious choir regents. The best voices from across the country were chosen for the choir. It was famous for the extraordinary beauty and harmony of its singing and was admired by the audiences. Singers joined the Capelle as children, they lived there and acquired musical and general education there. The performances of the Capelle choir were always attended by a select audience.[16]

The reign of Alexander III was a period of unprecedented success for the court Capelle choir. Sheremetev was appointed the chief of the choir, Mily Balakirev its manager and Nikolay Rimsky-Korsakov his deputy. During the decades of its musical educational and concert activities the Capelle produced a

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galaxy of talented composers and directors who became the pride of Russia's musical life.

In 1886 Alexander III, after visiting the Capelle, noted that musical classes had no wind instruments and proposed to introduce training in these instruments. In 1887 all the orchestra instruments were taught at the Capelle.

Within three years, 1886-1889, the complex of the Capelle buildings was renovated. During his last visit to the Capelle in February 1886 the Emperor ordered new buildings to be erected starting with the concert hall.

As a result of a contest in 1886 Academician Leonty Benois was appointed architect in charge of the reconstruction of the Capelle buildings. He was the author of the project. He supervised the construction and finishing of the buildings and made sketches of the interiors and furniture. The Capelle's concert hall embodied his brilliant ideas. During the reign of Alexander III the Imperial Court Capelle became one of the major musical centers in Europe.

Sheremetev attests that Alexander III preferred spiritual music to secular music. Sacred music and church singing occupied a very special place in the Emperor's life.

Many foreigners who visited Russia wrote about the grandeur of Russian church singing. Even such a fierce "Russophobe" as Marquis de Coustine admitted that he was shaken by the incomparable grandeur of Russian church singing.

Alexander III's favorites were *Thy Chamber* and *O taste and see that the Lord is good* by Dmitry Bortnyansky and.[17] He preferred Lvov whose music, especially *Cherubim Hymn,* came from the heart. He chose this hymn to be performed on the day of his coronation.

The Emperor had a special liking for chimes modeled on the Rostov chimes introduced by priest Aristarkh Izrailev, a well-known connoisseur of bell-ringing. Mily Balakirev wrote in a letter to Konstantin Pobedonostsev on February 20, 1884: "I have met Rev. Izrailev who is thrilled by the recent audience. The Emperor looked attentively and with obvious interest at the tuning forks and so did the Empress. The Rev. Izrailev demonstrated his chimes and as a result the Emperor expressed his wish and hope that he would tune the chimes at the Peter and Paul's Cathedral and in the newly-built church."[18]

Rostov chimes were introduced at the court church at Anichkov Palace. Sheremetev recalled: "Sometimes hurrying from my home to the Morning Prayer at the Winter Palace one would hear church bells, though not of the Moscow kind, everywhere. Passing by the Anichkov Palace one could not help listening to the beautiful chiming of the Tsar's chimes. They were not powerful, but there was an extraordinary and original harmony about them."[19]

Alexander III valued the music of Mikhail Glinka, the founder of the Russian national school as well as the composers belonging to the group of The Five (in Russian, *Moguchaya kuchka*)—César Cui, Mily Balakirev, Nikolay Rimsky-Korsakov, Aleksandr Borodin and Modest Musorgsky—whose works glorified the Russian people, love of the country and were imbued with the motives of Russian songs. The Emperor believed that the development of Russian musical art had a great educational mission to perform.

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The *Tsesarevich* was particularly interested in the Russian folk tunes. Upon becoming Emperor he gave every support to the expeditions of the Russian Geographical Society that collected Russian tunes. Some documents survived describing these activities. In 1884 the Society created a special "Song Commission." Based on the materials collected by the Society's expeditions *Songs of the Russian People* edited by Balakirev were published in 1886.

In 1880, Pyotr Sokalsky's monograph *Russian Folk Music, Great Russian and Small Russian, In Its Melodic and Rhythmic Structure* was published, and in 1889 Aleksandr Faminitsin's monograph *Skomorokhs in Old Rus* (Buffoons) saw the light of day. As one contemporary wrote, during the reign of Alexander III "Russian folk songs emerged from oblivion, swept across the Russian land and beyond its borders where they attracted general attention."[20]

Folk instrumental music became very popular. The *balalaika*, the most Russian of folk instruments, known in Russia since the early 18th century when it replaced the *domra*, was again heard in full voice. In 1888 the first public performance of the Great Russian balalaika orchestra conducted by Vasily Andreyev (1861-1918) took place in St. Petersburg, and in 1889 the orchestra of Vasily Andreyev and Nikolay Fomin enjoyed huge success at the World Exhibition in Paris. Together with instrument maker Semyon Nalimov, Vasily Andreyev improved the instrument so that the balalaika orchestra could perform major musical works together with the mixed orchestra.

Alexander III and Mariya Fyodorovna often attended the performances of choirs, as many contemporaries attest. In May 1887 the imperial couple visited the Army choir of the Don Army Capelle and praised the singing of the Capelle's Regent Fyodor Losev (1859-1916) (the father of the well-known philosopher Aleksey Losev), a consummate connoisseur of church music which he performed in the "strictly church spirit" lending "a special religious character to folk tunes." The Emperor presented Fyodor Losev with a gold diamond-studded ring with roses. Losev was later awarded a silver medal in memory of Emperor Alexander III.[21]

The Imperial couple enjoyed the performances of student choirs. On May 15, 1886, they attended a concert of the student choir conducted by Max Erdmannsdörfer at the Moscow University. When the performance ended the Emperor approached the podium, praised and thanked Erdmannsdörfer and the students wishing them as much success in science as they had in music. More than 600 students who packed the hall shouted "hurray" when the Emperor got into his carriage and the crowd ran after the carriage.

Alexander III and Mariya Fyodorovna liked to entertain various music groups, from choirs of peasant children, workers' orchestras of various factories to student choirs from Finland, Sweden and other countries.

On September 14, 1886, in a letter to his son Nicholas from Spala (the Imperial Russian Hunting Lodge near Warsaw.—*Yu.K.*), Alexander III gave an account of the visit by peasant children from neighboring schools and an orchestra of the workers of the Zyrardow textile factory in the city of Zyrardow, Warsaw *Guberniya*: "They all sang and played and it was very nice. The children—

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boys and girls—wore national costumes and the general picture was charming; there were more than 200 children. Then they danced a national dance to the strains of the same orchestra and made merry in a very genuine and diligent way... Then singers from Tamashevo, the local factory owners, came: Liedertafel (the male choir society) and they sang several excellent numbers, including *How Glorious Is Our Lord in Zion* (the Russian military anthem to the words of Mikhail Kheraskov.—*Yu.K.*).[22]

When the Imperial couple visited Finland it indulged its passion and listened to the performances of Finnish choirs, student choirs and the male Finnish choir Muntra Musikanter founded in 1878.[23]

* * *

The free musical school created under the tutelage of Balakirev, had the backing of the imperial family. Balakirev, who appreciated the role of the imperial family in developing musical activities in Russia, dedicated several of his works to the members of the imperial family. Among them were *The Hymn in Honor of the August Patroness of the Polotsk Women's School of the Religious Department in Vitebsk, Her Imperial Majesty Empress Mariya Fyodorovna.* The hymn was first performed by the graduates of this Polotsk religious school in 1898. During the reign of Alexander III the jubilee of the famous pianist and composer Anton Rubinstein was celebrated on a grand scale in Russia. In September 1887 during the celebration of the 25th jubilee of the Petersburg Conservatoire headed by Rubinstein, the Emperor received the composer at Gatchina and heard him present his plans of conducting performances and concerts for the poor. The Emperor approved Rubinstein's idea of the need to expand the Conservatoire building. In 1889 the Emperor ordered the building of the Bolshoi Theater in St. Petersburg, formerly belonging to the Court Ministry, to be handed over to the Petersburg Conservatoire. "It is heartening to think that this arguably preeminent artist belongs to Russia," the Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, K. Pobedonostsev wrote to Alexander III. "By his birth, education, family and social ties and relations, habits and way of life Anton Rubinstein is a Russian and remains in Russia in spite of brilliant offers frequently made to him abroad... Undoubtedly Anton Rubinstein today is the star of the first magnitude and the greatest authority in music, and he has no peers after the death of Wagner. In musical technique, polished performance no one, as is commonly recognized, has achieved such power and perfection... Besides, he is a highly educated person with a noble heart, as everybody admits. In all the big cities where he gave concerts he attracted great sympathy because, in spite of the effort that the prolonged and energetic performance requires, he repeats his concerts for free for the students of conservatoires and music classes. He is doing the same in Moscow and Petersburg now."[24] Rubinstein highly appreciated the development of musical culture in Russia during the reign of Alexander III.

Alexander III gave extensive financial support to the Moscow Conservatoire. When Minister of Finance Vyshnegradsky, at the request of his son-in-law

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Vasily Safonov, then director of the Moscow Conservatoire, asked Alexander III in 1893 to allocate money for the reconstruction of the Conservatoire building the Tsar immediately ordered that 400,000 rubles be disbursed for the Conservatoire.

Safonov, who was on friendly terms with Chaykovsky, informed him about it and wrote: "Now we shall have two halls." In his reply on July 3, 1893, Chaykovsky wrote: "My dear friend Vasily Ilyich. Your letter filled me with great joy and at the same time surprise and admiration towards you. You did a truly great service for the Moscow Musical Society. Bravo, no, not soli Deo, Gloria to you and the Tsar."[25]

With the Emperor's approval and assistance a nationwide fund-raising campaign was launched for a monument to the founder of Russian classical music, opera and symphony,—Mikhail Glinka—which was solemnly consecrated in Smolensk on May 20, 1885. In 1892, when the 50th jubilee of Glinka's opera was marked, one of the streets in St. Petersburg was named after Glinka with Alexander III's consent.

The Emperor donated 3000 rubles to the widow of composer Aleksandr Serov for the publication of the collection of her husband's critical essays. The monument to the great Polish composer Frederic Chopin was dedicated with the Emperor's approval.

During the reign of Alexander III famous musicians and composers from various European countries visited Russia. Thus in 1886, on the Emperor's orders a special invitation was issued to Franz Liszt to come to Russia on a concert tour. The Tsar offered the composer to stay at the Winter Palace. Liszt's sudden death prevented him from making that trip.

Alexander III was directly supporting the emergence of Russian opera. In the 1860s—1870s Italian opera held sway in Russia. According to Chaykovsky, "there was no refuge or time" for Russian art. The "Five" composers deemed it their duty to follow Glinka's behests in developing Russian national music. They believed that art had great educational significance. Alexander III repeatedly stressed that "the spread of art was an important state affair." Throughout his life he vigorously implemented that idea both in the field of fine and applied arts and in the field of music. Under the Emperor the personalities who determined the development of musical activities in Russia changed. In place of the former director of Imperial Theaters he appointed Ivan Vsevolozhsky, an admirer of Russian opera and Chaykovsky's music. At the head of the opera was Eduard Napravnik, a talented conductor and leader of symphony performances of the Russian Musical Society.[26] "Under the edict of Alexander III Italian opera was abolished," writes Prince S. Volkonsky, Director of Imperial Theaters in his reminiscences. "The Bolshoi Theater was put at the disposal of Russian opera. There are hardly many examples in the history of art when an external, purely mechanical measure exerted such profound influence. Promoted to top place and unchallenged by rivals, Russian opera developed into a value in its own right within a few years... Russian music used to be remote and alien, one had to mature to appreciate it. At that juncture a bridge from the old to the new appeared.

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Chaykovsky... Chaykovsky found a music form, that turned the past into a song and gave it such a natural ring."[27]

Before 1881 Napravnik produced three of Chaykovsky's operas: *The Oprichnik, Vakula the Smith* (later revised as *Cherevichki*) and *The Maid of Orleans;* between 1881 and 1893 he staged the remaining five operas: *Mazepa, Charodeyka (The Sorceress), Eugene Onegin, The Queen of Spades and Iolanta.*

In the spring of 1882 the Emperor endorsed a new budget for the Russian opera: 274,000 rubles instead of the former 169,000 rubles; the choir was increased from 88 to 120 singers, the orchestra (opera and ballet) from 124 to 165.

Alexander III and the Empress attended the dress rehearsals of Russian operas. Over the years Chaykovsky and Alexander III developed a respectful and very trusting relationship. While still a *Tsesarevich*, the heir apparent, Alexander III helped the composer financially and upon ascending the throne, he invariably responded to his requests for the production of operas at the Imperial Theaters of St. Petersburg and Moscow and continued to give him substantial financial assistance.

In 1881 Chaykovsky, who was constantly short of money, wrote a letter to Pobedonostsev: "It occurred to me to dare ask the Emperor to order lending me three thousand silver rubles out of the Treasury, that is, so that my debt to the Treasury would be gradually redeemed with the pay for performances due to me from the directorate of the Imperial Theaters... I must tell you frankly why I had the audacity to take this step. I have been told that the Emperor once spoke in very complimentary terms about my musical works. I have no grounds for giving no credence to this happy circumstance and, greatly encouraged by the flattering attention on the part of His Majesty to my music, I made up my mind to ask him for this favor."[28] The Emperor's reply was swift and brief: "I am sending you (Pobedonostsev.—*Yu.K.*) 3000 rubles to be conveyed to Chaykovsky. Tell him that he need not pay back this money. June 2, 1881. A."[29]

The composer greatly appreciated the Emperor's gesture. "I am deeply moved by the form in which the Emperor expressed his attention to my request. I am afraid my letter fails to express all that I feel in my heart," the composer wrote in a reply to Pobedonostsev.[30] For the coronation celebrations in Moscow Chaykovsky was commissioned a coronation march for orchestra and a cantata *Moscow* to the lyrics of the poet Apollon Maykov.

Chaykovsky was constantly aware of the Emperor's support and was deeply grateful to him for this. In August 1883, he wrote to Nadezhda von Meck: "Now, without any advances on my part, both directorates, the Petersburg and the Moscow one, are taking my opera up with incredible zeal... I do not understand the reason for this attitude to me in the theater sphere, but there must be some secret reason and I can think of nothing else than the fact that perhaps the Emperor himself has expressed the wish that my opera should be staged in both capitals as well as possible."[31]

The patronage of the imperial couple was particularly manifest in 1884-1885. In 1884 Chaykovsky was decorated with the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class and given a pension of 3000 rubles. In 1884 the opera *Eugene Onegin* was

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staged first in St. Petersburg and then in Moscow with Alexander III's support. Chaykovsky wrote to von Meck: "The Emperor ordered the production of *Onegin* next season. The roles have been distributed and the choirs are practicing."[32]

From a letter dated January 18, 1885: "After the wedding dinner I went straight to the Bolshoi Theater where the 15th performance of *Onegin* was being given in the presence of the Emperor, the Empress and other members of Tsar's family. The Emperor said he would like to see me, he had a very long talk with me, was extremely tender and kind to me, inquired about my life and musical affairs with the greatest sympathy and in great detail, whereupon he took me to the Empress who for her part bestowed very moving attention on me."[33]

Nine of Chaykovsky's religious musical pieces were written in response to the Emperor's wishes. They included the famous *All-Night Vigil* and *The Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom*.

In 1886, Chaykovsky wrote, assessing the Emperor's contribution to the development of Russian sacred music: "In general our sacred music has recently embarked on a good road forward. The credit for this movement goes to the Emperor himself who is very interested in improving it and is showing the path that it must follow. He talked with me twice about this matter and all my recent works have been written at his invitation and in the spirit that he wishes them to have."[34]

In connection with his work on sacred music the composer noted in his diaries: "The light of faith is penetrating deeper and deeper into my soul." "I have a totally different attitude to the church than you," Chaykovsky wrote to von Meck on November 23, 1877. "For me it has preserved much poetic charm. I often attend Liturgy; *The Liturgy of St. John's Chrysostom* is I think one of the greatest art works. If one follows service attentively trying to understand the meaning of every ritual one cannot but feel elated being present at our Orthodox liturgy."[35]

Alexander III always warmed to the Russian folk songs that Chaykovsky introduced in his operas. The composer stressed on many occasions that his music "has always belonged to the Russian people, to Russia." "...No matter how much I may enjoy Italy and how good it is for me today," Chaykovsky wrote to von Meck on February 9 (21), 1878, "I am still and will forever remain loyal to Russia... I have not yet encountered a person more in love than me with Mother Russia in general and its Great Russian parts in particular... I have a passionate love for the Russian man, for Russian speech, the Russian frame of mind, the beautiful Russian faces and Russian customs... That is why I am profoundly outraged by those gentlemen who are prepared to starve in some den in Paris, who revel in reviling everything Russian and can without the slightest regret live all their lives abroad on the grounds that there is less comfort in Russia. I hate these people; they pour dirt on what is dear and sacred to me beyond words."[36]

When a conflict flared up between the composer and the Directorate of the Moscow Opera Theater which objected to the intention of Chaykovsky's orchestra to give a first night *(début)* performance of his opera *Cherevichki* as his benefit celebration, Chaykovsky, through Grand Prince Konstantin Konstantinovich, tried to bring the Emperor in to resolve the conflict. Grand Prince Konstantin

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Konstantinovich wrote to Chaykovsky: "I personally asked the Emperor whether your wish could be fulfilled and received an answer that everything would be arranged unless some obstacles arose."[37]

In the spring of 1886 Chaykovsky wrote to Grand Prince Konstantin Konstantinovich asking for his help in securing approval for dedicating 12 of his romances to Empress Mariya Fyodorovna.

In the same letter Chaykovsky wrote: "I recently finished my new opera *Charodeyka* and I will orchestrate it during the coming winter. Hopefully the Emperor will not consider my ardent desire to dedicate to him what is probably my last and probably my best opera to be inappropriate, then I will some day again appeal to Your Highness and ask you for your patronage."[38]

The letters kept in Russian archives attest to a particularly trusting relationship between the composer and the Emperor. In a letter sent to Alexander III from Borzhomi in June 1887 Chaykovsky asks him to allocate money for completing the building of the Tiflis Theater. The letter reads in part: "Perhaps, Your Majesty, you will forgive me my arrogance if you consider that I, a Russian musician, cannot but have the greatest sympathy for everything that contributes to the development, spread and strengthening of Russian art... An excellent and magnificent theater is being built in Tiflis with government money... For the theater to be finished and opened a sum of 235,000 silver rubles is needed... The sooner that sum is made available to the Tiflis authorities the sooner the era of the flourishing of Russian art in the remote and beautiful borderland of Your country will arrive."[39]

Alexander III authorized the disbursement of money for early completion of the Tiflis Theater which was later named after Zakhary Paliashvili.

In 1888 Alexander III granted the composer a lifelong annuity of 3000 rubles. "Today, my dear friend, I received very important and joyful news," Chaykovsky wrote to von Meck from Germany on January 2 (14), 1888. "The Emperor granted me a lifelong pension of 3000 silver rubles. It did not only give me joy, even more, it moved me deeply. Indeed, one cannot but be infinitely grateful to the Tsar who attaches importance not only to military and bureaucratic activities, but also to art."[40]

The imperial couple attended practically all of Chaykovsky's opera performances. When in 1892 Chaykovsky's opera *Iolanta* and the ballet *The Nutcracker* had successful premieres, Chaykovsky wrote to his brother Anatoly about the success of the opera and ballet and stressed that the Emperor "was very pleased with my works": "Dear Anatoly, the opera and ballet had great success yesterday, everybody liked the opera in particular. On the eve there was a rehearsal with the Emperor present. He was thrilled, called me to his box and said a lot of words of sympathy to me. Both are staged magnificently, the eyes get tired of the luxury."[41]

From the memoirs of Sheremetev: "Once in 1893, the head of state was in a particular musical mood and demanded that one of Chaykovsky's pieces be played. The choir that day sang particularly well and the impression was powerful. The Emperor asked for a repeat performance and listened with evident pleasure... The party broke up later than usual with everyone being in a wonderful

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mood, and the following day we learned that at the very time when all this was happening in Gatchina, Chaykovsky was dying. It was as if we had heard his swan song. He who listened to it so attentively and with such enjoyment, did not survive him long."[42]

After Chaykovsky's death his brother Modest wrote to Grand Prince Konstantin Konstantinovich who was President of the Russian Academy of Sciences: "If my brother Pyotr, whose operas did not yet bring money, did not suddenly receive the means that enabled him to abandon the drudgery of teaching, if His Majesty the Emperor, then still the *Tsesarevich*, did not from time to time help him, the nervous disease that my brother had developed would have prevented him from accomplishing half of what he had accomplished until then; I can say more, he would hardly have survived until 53 under such conditions because during his tenure as Professor, in order to compose he had to snatch the time when work is particularly harmful for the health of nervous people, i.e., in the evening and at night. *Eugene Onegin* would never have been written if the livelihood of my brother had not been supported over and above what he earned at the Conservatoire. He would not be able or dare to write such an opera because during his work on it and long after it was finished he considered the opera to be *a fantasy of a well-to-do man,* something that would bring him no material benefits. It was only because he worked in such conditions that he managed to write this opera freely, like he wanted to, without fearing that it would not bring him money and it was this opera that brought him wealth subsequently. The pension granted to him by the Emperor further improved his well-being and enabled him to feel well provided for until the end of his life regardless of the success of this or that opera. This was a great good deed that he appreciated very much. Several days before his death he told me that he was not unduly worried about the absence of his operas in the repertoire because of the constant and loyal assistance bestowed on him by His Majesty the Emperor."[43]

Shortly before his death Chaykovsky, who always supported young talented composers, wrote a letter to the editors of the newspaper *Russkiye vedomosti* in which he drew attention to the young talented composer Georgy Konyus whose suite *From the Life of Children* was first performed on February 25, 1893, during a concert of the Imperial Russian Musical Society. For some reason the letter had not been sent. After Chaykovsky's death his brother Modest found the rough draft of the letter among his papers. He conveyed the content of the letter to Alexander III through Grand Prince Konstantin Konstantinovich. The Emperor took Chaykovsky's wish expressed in the final lines of the letter as "his last will" and ordered an annuity of 1200 rubles for composer Konyus.

Assessing Alexander III's activities, Chaykovsky wrote to von Meck on March 5, 1885: "...I have become convinced that the well-being of great political entities depends not on principles and theories, but on the personalities who find themselves at the top of government by the accident of birth or for other reasons. In short, it is a person and not the principle that person embodies that renders a service to mankind. Question: do we have a person on whom we can pin our hopes? Answer: yes, it is our Emperor. He produced a charming impression

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on me as an individual, but regardless of my personal impressions I am inclined to see him as a good Emperor."[44]

Aleksandr Borodin's opera *Prince Igor* was a tremendous success when it was performed on stage in 1890 with the Emperor's approval. The composer himself failed to finish the opera and it was completed and orchestrated by Rimsky-Korsakov and Glazunov, Borodin's pupil. The Petersburg millionaire and logging industrialist Mitrofan Belyayev did much to promote the opera and bring it to the stage. A passionate music lover and founder of a series of symphony concerts, the founder of a musical circle and of a publishing house that published only Russian music, Belyayev made a great contribution to the development of Russian music and its popularization. Seeking the Emperor's support for the staging of the opera *Prince Igor* Belyayev turned to Pobedonostsev. With his assistance a *Memorandum* for the Emperor was compiled seeking permission to stage the opera. It stressed that Borodin's work was based on the greatest monument of Old Russian Literature, *The Tale of Igor's Campaign.* The authors of the Memorandum noted that musical extracts from the opera had already been performed with great success abroad and that Borodin's opera was among "those works of art that bring great glory to our country."[45]

Under Alexander III's orders, a large sum of money was allocated from the Emperor's Treasury for the staging of the opera. In the Prologue to the opera up to 200 actors came on stage. Under a special resolution of the Military Governor-General lavish collections of Turkestan arms, decorations and costumes were sent to St. Petersburg from Central Asia and were then reproduced on stage. The stage sets based on the paintings by Vasily Vereshchagin and reflecting Central Asian life and landscapes were awe-inspiring in their luxury. In the opinion of cultural specialist Solomon Volkov the positive assessment of *Prince Igor* by the press owes much to "nationalism which became the common platform that led both traditional monarchists and pro-Western aesthetes such as Aleksandr Benois to admire Borodin's work."[46]

The reign of Alexander III was marked by major successes in the strengthening of Russia's might and by outstanding achievements in the development of Russian culture and science for which he claims much of the credit. He was directly involved in the creation in Russia of the Russian Opera, the Russian Museum in St. Petersburg, he headed a vibrant Russian Imperial Historical Society and presided over the opening of the Imperial Historical Museum and the foundation of the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society. It is not by accident that Moscow University Professor Ivan Tsvetayev, the founder of the Emperor Alexander III Museum of Fine Arts (now the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts) would describe Alexander III as "the supreme patron of the arts and sciences in our country."[47]

NOTES

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19 *The Memoirs of Count S. Sheremetev,* p. 510.

20 *Russia under the Scepter of the Romanovs. Essays on Russian History from 1613 to 1913,* St. Petersburg, 1914 (in Russian).

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34 “P. Chaykovsky to N. von Meck. February 21, 1886,” P. Chaykovsky *Corespondence with von Meck,* vol. III, 1882-1890, p. 409.

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Outlines of National Self-Consciousness. From *Sobesednik* to *Sovremennik*

Svetlana KLIMOVA

The title of this article refers to two periodicals which twenty years ago represented opposing points of view on the problems of Russian national consciousness and national identity.[1] However, this article is not about them, but about Russian journals published in the 18th—19th centuries: *Sobesednik lubiteley rossiiskogo slova (Interlocutor of Lovers of the Russian Language)* and *Sovremennik (Contemporary)* issued by Aleksandr Pushkin. The lessons of those historical debates far removed from us in time are no less instructive and in some ways no less significant than contemporary discussions. They are significant above all for Russian science as a whole and especially the humanities. Some basic clichés have still not been discussed although their discursive potential may prompt differing conclusions. Practically everybody agrees with the authoritative position of Nikolay Berdyayev who believed that the Slavophiles were the first to raise the issue of national self-consciousness. "Slavophilism was the first attempt of our national self-consciousness, our first independent ideology. Russia has existed for a thousand years, but Russian self-consciousness only begins from the time when Ivan Kireyevsky and Aleksey Khomyakov audaciously raised the question of what is Russia, what are its essence, its mission and place in the world."[2] This article will argue that "the first attempts and the first ideology" were articulated in the humanities field much earlier and will discuss the problem of the relationship between the authorities and the creative intelligentsia.

The significance and role of humanities knowledge is universally recognized today. And yet when it comes to its place in the system of sciences, epistemological and social status, functional and practical potential, opinions are divided.[3] This is particularly surprising with regard to Russian humanities studies because the works of Mikhail Bakhtin, Aron Gurevich, Aleksey Losev, Yury Lotman, Dmitry Likhachev and Leonid Batkin have set the standards in world science. At the same time this is not surprising if one recalls that practically all major poets and writers in the 18th—19th centuries were honorary members of

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the Academy of Sciences: Pyotr Vyazemsky, Nikolay Karamzin, Ivan Krylov, Vasily Zhukovsky, Aleksandr Pushkin, Aleksandr Sukhovo-Kobylin, Lev Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Vladimir Solovyov. This prompts an intriguing conclusion that our humanities knowledge was to a large extent created by writers and poets whose work formed the basis of all the subsequent studies: literary studies, linguistics, philosophy and history.

The philosophical digression on the specificities of the genesis of humanities studies in Russia in connection with the problem of the genesis of the Russian national self-consciousness were prompted by the publication of an article "The Russian Academy" in the second issue of Pushkin's journal *Sovremennik* in 1836. When the Academy of Sciences was founded in Russia on the order of Emperor Peter I on February 8, 1724 it had three departments: I—Mathematics, Astronomy plus Geography and Navigation, Mechanics; II—Physics, Anatomy, Chemistry, Botany; III—Rhetoric and Classicism, History, Law, i.e., the humanities. In 1747 the humanities were handed over to the university and that marked the beginning, in our opinion, of the history of a *special* relationship between the humanities (and later social sciences) and natural sciences in the Russian academic and intellectual milieu, many of whose features survive to this day. The Second Statute (1803) brought the humanities back to the Academy of Sciences with the exception of *the Russian language and literature* which became part of a new structure, the Russian Academy created in 1783 at the initiative and with direct participation of Empress Catherine II and Princess Yekaterina Dashkova "for the development of the Russian language and literature" "under the auspices of the Imperial Academy of Sciences." The Russian Academy survived until 1841, whereupon it was transformed into the Second Department of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, "the Russian Language and Literature."

The Imperial Academy of Sciences was genetically and logically connected with the development of physical-mathematical, natural (and later technical) sciences which from the very beginning (and up until now) have been oriented towards the achievements of West European science. The imperial ambitions for making Russia a European country (modernization, Westernization, globalization, innovative transformations, etc.) rested on "physical, mathematical and navigational" sciences. "Rhetoric, classicism, history and law," in other words, everything that is connected with national cultural and mental traditions, did not fit very well into this array of sciences.[4]

Thus, historically a covert opposition arose within the Russian academic community between Peter's and Catherine's Academies, between the natural sciences and the humanities. Society treated the former religiously and the latter in a condescending, and in the early 19th century, even in a cold and alienated manner. It is to this point in history that one can trace the beginnings of the huge problem which can be described as the issue of the relationship between the authorities, the humanities and society. On the one hand, the Russian Academy and its tasks were formed and set by the authorities; the government financed state orders, paid for studies of language and philology in general that had to meet the requirements of scientific competence and therefore was to be "above"

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society and its "opinions" and "approvals." On the other hand, the Russian Academy raised the issues that were constantly at the epicenter of the emerging historical and national self-consciousness in the 18th—19th centuries, were the subjects of public debates in literary circles and journals. From that point of view its tasks coincided with the public and literary intentions of the time. The Russian Academy turned out to be a legitimate channel for interconnection between the state (power) and society, science and criticism (first public and later professional) essentially performing a unique function of consolidating various intellectual and social strata (with the exception of the lowest strata) into a single whole for tackling specific problems.

We believe that the main task of the Russian Academy was to shape the national self-consciousness. The humanities evolved in the mainstream of Catherine's enlightenment programs: the development of education, the creation of state-owned schools, expansion of intellectual space through the epistolary culture which was aided by the development of postal service, etc.[5] The Russian Academy faced a very concrete task: to provide a definition of the concept "national self-consciousness" and that task was set by *power*. The development of national self-consciousness hinged on the scientific study of the system of language and literature, history, book publishing, gathering of collections of ancient material artifacts (which provided the basis for successful development of museums, ethnology, archeology, archives, etc.), i.e., on the body of sciences that belonged to the realm of the humanities.

The task of creating a Russian national humanitarian culture was given priority in the project submitted by princess Yekaterina Dashkova first to Catherine II personally and then in the report at the inauguration of the Russian Academy in 1783 when assuming the office of the Academy's president. "The Russian Academy, its charter reads in part, shall have as its goal the purification and enrichment of the Russian language; the establishment and use of words characteristic of the Russian language, rhetoric and poetry. To achieve that goal it is necessary to compile a Russian grammar, a Russian dictionary, rhetoric and the rules of versification... Along with the development of grammar and vocabulary, the academicians must initiate the study of the monuments of Russian history and immortalize in their work the famous events of the past and the present time."[6]

The core of the Russian humanities studies—language, history and material artifacts—was called upon to foster a sense of "national identity" or "national self-consciousness" (Dashkova's expression). The fact that the Russian Academy was organized at the initiative of one woman and headed up by another woman introduced a gender element in the relationship between the two scientific communities. Masculine brain—masculine sciences—masculine culture—the Imperial Academy of Sciences has been (and remains) Eurocentric; the feminine brain—feminine sciences—feminine culture—the Russian Academy was from the outset oriented towards Russia's national problems. Over time they came not only to mutually complement each other, but to challenge each other by creating intellectual grounds for various binary oppositions within Russian culture the underlying principles of which go back to the sophisticated centuries-

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old argument between different "nominations" of Slavophiles and Westernizers of all generations.

It is not by chance that Pushkin turned to the theme of the Russian Academy although at first glance he did so on a very trivial occasion: the article reports the visit to the Russian Academy by Prince Pyotr Oldenburgsky on January 18, 1836, and his election as its honorary member. In our opinion, the main thrust of the article, in spite of its descriptive character, is to send a message to society, a call not only to carry on the good deeds of the Academy "in the realm of language and literature," but to give thought to the issues which were somewhat casually mentioned in the article. Dmitry Yazykov, the Academic Secretary of the Russian Academy, in his speech gave a brief overview of the Academy's history and reminded those present of its initial and important tasks, including above all "the structure and order" that the Empress sought to confer on the Russian language. "May compiling a grammar and a dictionary be our first exercise," he quoted Yekaterina Dashkova after reminding his audience of the colossal academic work involved. Fifteen members of the Academy, including Yekaterina Dashkova herself, worked on the *Dictionary of the Russian Language*[7]; it was compiled within six years, whereas a similar dictionary in France took 60 years to make. Yazykov also invoked Nikolay Karamzin's impassioned plea that although we were late starters in development, we were developing ten times faster than the most advanced European nations. "The Complete Dictionary issued by the Academy is one of those Russian phenomena that surprises the attentive foreigner; our unusual speed is undoubtedly good fortune in every way: we are maturing not by centuries but by decades... we have presented a system of language that can rival the famous works of the Florentine and Paris Academies."[8] However, Dmitry Yazykov then went on to lament the decay of contemporary Russian language, which attests to the existence of problems that prevented rapidly developing science from progressing continuously and speedily. "Words are distorted, grammar is shaky. Orthography, that heraldry of language, is treated arbitrarily by all and sundry,"[9] he said identifying the contemporary problems and bringing his readers back to the initial tasks of the Academy: to liberate the language from foreign influence, to clean it up and create a new literary Russian language (the task that was successfully accomplished by Aleksandr Pushkin and his contemporaries). Thus the article reiterates the persistent demand originating from the authorities in the 18th century and elaborated by the creative intelligentsia (writers and poets) in the early 19th century, namely, to continuously develop the scientific basis of the Russian language and literature as the underpinning of Russian culture and national self-consciousness.

The theme of national self-consciousness informs every passage of the Academic Secretary's speech. Thus he recalled the journal *Sobesednik lyubitelei rossiiskogo slova* (Interlocutor of the Lovers of the Russian Language)[10] founded by the Russian Academy (by Princess Dashkova and Catherine II in 1783-1784) and specifically the publication in that journal of Denis Fonvizin's famous questionnaire. In its time the *Sobesednik* was one of the few journals that used the dialogue format to discuss various issues from all sides: the journal that

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included among its contributors the two Catherines, on the one hand, and Fonvizin, Derzhavin, Kapnist and Kheraskov, on the other hand. What standard consciousness traditionally separates—dialogue and monologue, power and the intelligentsia—coexisted organically in the literary and social activity of *Sobesednik.* It is important to stress that a readiness for critical dialogue came *from the very top.* Even the well known dissenter and rebel, Nikolay Dobrolyubov, had to admit the strength of that journal: "The literary exposures and mentorship came down from the height of the throne, it was *together with power,* it was strong, free and open, was merciless on vice and baseness at the highest social rungs, was unrestrained by any external circumstances that in other cases so often *seal the mouth* of the writer. On the other hand, it was not an official publication... it was a truly literary publication, vibrant and enjoying full freedom in choosing the subjects and methods of treating them. To this one should add that the entire literary activities of Catherine II were marked by lofty truth and selflessness that could not but influence other writers who were active at the time."[11] Thus, criticism, satire and irony printed in the journal often came from the publishers themselves, Princess Yekaterina Dashkova and Empress Catherine II, who provoked the public into discussing diverse topics chief of which was *the formation of the Russian (national) self-consciousness through language, moral behavior, cultural autonomy, genuine patriotism and the fight against the scourge of the time, the absurd and amoral imitation of everything French,* etc.[12] The structure of the journal encouraged dialogue and the anonymity of the articles contributed to freedom of discourse. "The publishers of this *Sobesednik* ask all those who love the Russian language and all members of the public, should they want to contribute criticism... to send it directly to the publishers of *Sobesednik* or to the address of Her Highness Princess Yekaterina Dashkova, ... because she wishes to see the Russian language cleaned up, thrive and as much as possible please and benefit the whole public, while *criticism undoubtedly is one of the best means* (italics is mine.—*S.K.*) of achieving this goal."[13]

Thus scientific and civil criticism as the basic element of dialogue was declared to be *the best means* of promoting thought and in that sense is an object of reinterpretation of the entire second issue of Pushkin's *Sovremennik* for 1836, for example, in Vladimir Odoyevsky's article *On Hostility towards Enlightenment Noted in Modern Literature.*[14] The role of criticism is defined in a somewhat ironic way: instead of promoting Russian culture it discovered a new business for itself: "that its own books should sell: and it is succeeding in this."[15] Ridiculing modern satire that attacks Russian enlightenment (emanating from government policy) Vladimir Odoyevsky draws attention to an important nuance: "They have attacked... wait for it. They have attacked education! As if this young plant sown by Peter's wise hand and supported to this day through strenuous efforts of the Government and—pardon me—only by the Government as if it has already achieved full development, has grown fat and is producing unnecessary sprouts that are noticed in old Europe. The examples of Fonvizin, Kapnist, Griboyedov, their profound knowledge of modern mores, their honest view of our shortcomings and their reasonable aspirations have all been forgotten."[16]

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So, the problem of national self-consciousness as a concrete idea was anchored above all in the framework of ideological (authority) and intellectual (artistic-critical) worldview and can be demonstrated by concrete examples of creative communication between the intelligentsia and the authorities. It is important to stress that the initial attempts to establish a common ground of mutual understanding between the authorities and the intelligentsia took the shape of literary texts which had the form of dialogue although their contents were basically monologues. Even so, what they had in common was linguistic culture and a high level of education and an interpretation of the custodian of national self-consciousness which was the intellectual nobility of the time. A vivid example of creative communication "with the authorities in a free and open way," the authorities being Catherine II, was the text by the well known satirist D. Fonvizin *Several Questions that May Attract Particular Attention of Intelligent and Honest People*[17] printed in *Sobesednik* in 1783 and mentioned by D. Yazykov in 1836. It may well serve as a model of complimentarity between the ruler and the writer in the 18th century highlighting the idea of national self-consciousness and the nature of requirements to its proponents and revealing an understanding of the nature of dialogue that is very different from the modern interpretation. The journal *Sovremennik* does not only restore Fonvizin's original title of the text but reproduces most of his questions (14 out of 21) alongside with Catherine II's "witty answers." Fonvizin's text reminds the readers of *Sovremennik* of the key problems of the time representing a metadialogue between Catherine's *Sobesednik* and Pushkin's *Sovremennik,* looking at the same themes diachronically, using similar methods to formulate problems and seeking to present methods of their solution in a historical succession. As Tatyana Krasnoborodko pointed out, the theme "literature and power" dominated the second issue of *Sovremennik* and was projected "onto real historical (Fonvizin, Catherine II, Karamzin, Alexander I, Arnaud and Napoleon, Napoleon's attitude to the work of Voltaire) and artistic situations."[18]

In the event the reference to Fonvizin's text is significant in more ways than one both in terms of understanding the attempts to describe "dialogue with power" that were characteristic of *Sovremennik* and in terms of another theme that runs through Russian literature, i.e., the search of *identity,* a determination of the *specificities of national self-consciousness.* That text provided Russian social thought with an algorithm of "eternal" questions and answers that characterized the discussions between the intelligentsia and power at all times. Tatyana Krasnoborodko drew attention to the fact that the article titled *Russian Academy* cites two examples of "dialogue with power": Catherine and Fonvizin in the 18th century and Alexander I and Karamzin in the 19th century. It first mentions Aleksandr Shishkov's famous essay *The Word (Slovo)* on Karamzin and then Pushkin adds for his own part the episode of the famous historian's stay in Tver in 1811 and his communication with Alexander I. "Karamzin's stay in Tver was marked by yet another circumstance that is important for those who cherish his memory and that is unknown to the contemporaries. At the behest of the Grand Princess, a woman of exalted intellect, Karamzin wrote down his thoughts about ancient

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and modern Russia, with all the sincerity of his wonderful soul, and the audacity of profound and strong convictions. The Emperor read these eloquent pages... read them and remained merciful and benign towards his outspoken subject. Some day posterity will appreciate the grandeur of the Emperor and the nobleness of the patriot."[19] In this *Note* Nikolay Karamzin, much earlier than the Slavophiles (who did not yet exist) raised the questions about Russia's destiny, its place in world history making them the subjects of reflection not only of a historian, but of the head of state.[20]

Comparing the two types of communication between the authorities and the creative intelligentsia in the 18th and 19th centuries Pushkin determines the array of possibilities for discussing that theme citing only Fonvizin's *Questionnaire* without commentary and in another place, commenting on the characteristics of the contemporary "type of dialogue" between Alexander I and Karamzin by using such words as "benign attitude," "will understand," "appreciate," etc. The theme of the two texts is essentially the same: what is the Russian nation, what is our identity, how to express national self-consciousness through theory (Fonvizin's philosophy) and practice (the history of Peter the Great as presented by Karamzin). The government's journal *Sobesednik* and Pushkin's *Sovremennik* agree on one thing: the most acute problems can and must be discussed with the authorities, not by giving prescriptions but rather proceeding from a common approach to national history, language and culture without which national self-consciousness cannot be understood.

Dialogues between members of the intelligentsia acquired a very different character when, setting themselves up in opposition to the authorities in principle, they upheld their ideas not only in their creative work, but claimed that they were entitled more (than the authorities) to changing reality in accordance with their creative goals. The tone of Fonvizin and Pushkin is different: it can be described as satire, irony akin to the Socrates' maieutic method designed to find answers to the questions raised and markedly different from acerbic and sarcastic one-sidedly negative "exposures" of the radical monologue texts of later times.

Fonvizin's questions (originally 21) published in *Sovremennik* have to do mainly with essential characteristic of the nobility (which was at least as relevant in Pushkin's times as in Fonvizin's) as well as the mores of the contemporary noble society including living beyond their means ("Why is everyone in debt?"), spiritual disunity of the nobles ("Why are there no more noble societies not only in Petersburg but even in Moscow?"), a question that became ten times more relevant after the tragedy of December 1825; concern about the careers and not the morality (decency) of their descendants and at the same time a lack of desire to distinguish themselves, to be a personality, i.e., the turning of a nobleman into a "gray mediocrity" (Why do most noblemen bend their efforts not to turn their children into real people but to have them promoted to corporal without serving in the guards?"); lack of interest in legal issues (laws) ("Why is it that in the age of law-making nobody seeks to distinguish himself in this sphere?"); the inability to carry any business to its end ("Why do we embark on any business with great zeal and passion, but then stop and often forget about it?"), indolence

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("Why doing nothing is not something to be ashamed of?"). This question, unwittingly skipped by *Sovremennik*, like the first question in Fonvizin's *Questionnaire* ("Why do we argue so passionately about truths that are not questioned elsewhere?") and the emotional thrust of Fonvizin's text bring to mind many places from Pyotr Chaadayev's famous *Philosophical Letter* (written in 1829) and printed in 1836 in the journal *Teleskop*. "You still have to look for something to fill not even your life, but your day... One lamentable feature of our original civilization is that we are still discovering the truths that have become truisms in other countries... Nobody has a definite area of activity, nobody has any useful skills, there are no firm rules for anything, there is even no family hearth..."[21] The text of the "Madman from Basmannaya [Street]" that became famous throughout Russia for all time has overt and covert references to the dialogue between Fonvizin and Catherine II; it does not only reiterate with new force the questions addressed to the authorities in Fonvizin's spirit, but it has the form of a dialogue, a letter addressed to a lady, Yekaterina Panova (who was also declared to be insane and confined to an asylum at the request of her husband in the fateful year 1836).[22] The message of the letter is addressed to Russian society combining the Fonvizin and Pushkin (contemporary with Chaadayev) epochs in one sentence: "We are miserable as it is, let us not add to all our woes one more by creating a false idea of ourselves, let us not imagine ourselves living the life of the spirit, let us learn to establish ourselves reasonably in this reality."[23]

The above questions create the type of nobleman that is criticized both by Fonvizin and Pushkin which became quite well established during the fifty years of "dialoguing": a good-for-nothing and a spendthrift, living a life of dissipation, without any spiritual impulses or a desire to join people close in spirit and ideology, not seeking the truth or spiritual freedom or political (legal) self-consciousness.

It can be argued that almost all the questions Fonvizin raised before the empress became Russian questions that "were eternally tormenting and never resolved," questions on the nature of the identity of the intelligentsia and the identity of the nation. What distinguishes these questions is that variations thereof (for example as formulated by Pushkin, Griboyedov, Chaadayev and later by Goncharov) and variations of answers would fill all our journalistic, literary and spiritual life to this day. One witnesses a certain "cyclization" of ideas (Yury Tynyanov's term) set forth in Fonvizin's text in the process of its repeated publication in journals: first in the government's *Sobesednik* and then in the literary-poetic *Sovremennik.*

One should note the replies of the Great Empress published in *Sovremennik* which demonstrate not only her genuine enlightened views, but a profound insight into the topic in hand and the specific features of dialogue upheld by the authorities. Many have assessed and still assess her answers in highly negative terms because their terseness and brevity seem to preclude a continuation of dialogue. "Only these answers are of a kind that most of them destroy the questions without resolving them; almost all of them imply that the matter is not worth discussing, that this is tongue loosening that has gone too far."[24] This idea is echoed

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by modern scholars: "...By her answers the Empress ruled out any possibility of further polemics."[25]

There must be certain specifics in communicating with the head of state. Let us try to be objective. All the answers have a confident and serious tone and steer clear of irritation or peremptory tone so characteristic of bureaucratic power, they reveal elements of satire and irony characteristic of many writing intellectuals. It was a dialogue of two people with an equally fine ear for language and the ability to reflect. But it was not a dialogue in the modern sense of developing ideas by creating a common hermeneutic field of universal understanding. "In general if we may marvel in this case at Fonvizin's audacity, we should marvel even more at the skill with which the Empress managed to deflect the most direct questions with her answers and in answering the most delicate of them to make it clear that they are irrelevant and cannot be expected to be resolved head on. There is only one question that she answers directly and resolutely without sidestepping the essence."[26] The Empress's answers reveal acuity and wit, the ability to distinguish the questions that apply to everyone and can be the subject of a public discussion from those that are better left for specialized scientific or professional discussion and removed from the broad discussion. I will not recapitulate her answers. Everybody can read them. But I would like to stress that her answers show *what* should be the object of discussion (be included in the category of "eternal" questions) and *what* should be removed from the dialogue between power and writer for all time. I think the line she draws between what is "permissible" and what is "not permissible" is more valid because we know only too well the outcome of discussions based on the arrogant dreams of poets and philosophers of being entitled to changing life on a par with and even more than the state. I will cite several examples that demonstrate the high bar of the discussion of equals presented by Catherine II. Consider the effective and laconic way in which she responds to Fonvizin's barb about nobody knowing and obeying laws: "Question: 'Why is it that in the age of law-making nobody seeks to distinguish himself in that sphere?' Answer: 'Because this is not every man's business.'"[27] Power seems to be sending a clear message to society not to interfere in spheres that are not its own, let the laws be studied and created by lawyers and not anyone who wants to. We discern a historical irony in these words: the legal sphere has become the favorite sphere in our intellectual discourse. There was not a single Slavophile or Westernizer who has not touched upon the issue of rights and laws in our country, although hardly anyone had a professional command of this theme. Catherine's answer to another acute question relevant to the times of Catherine II and Nicholas I is equally hard-hitting and ironic: '"Why was it that in former times clowns, naggers and jesters had no official ranks and have very high ranks today?'[28] Answer: 'Not all our ancestors were literate. N.B. The question is the result of loose tongues, which our ancestors did not have."'[29] One might think that she misunderstood the question or did not sense the questionnaire's irony, but her remark is an equally ironic answer. "Loose tongues did not exist in the previous age which is used as a takeoff point for asking questions about the current age. I would like to draw attention to the fact that Fonvizin, far

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from being satisfied with the answers, could not properly understand all of them and appreciate them because of the inherent differences between them.

But perhaps the main answer was to the question about the essence of the Russian national character which would be a good way in which to end this article. To the overwhelming question put by Fonvizin: "What is our national character?" the former princess Sophie Anhalt-Zerbst gave a laconic but exhaustive answer. "Sharp and quick understanding of everything, exemplary obedience and the root of all virtues bestowed on man by the Creator."

That answer is the precursor of the future official concept of national patriotism: intelligence, humility and faith. This is Catherine's triad of the Russian character that was elaborated in the official position of the state in the 1830s—1840s and its Slavophile interpretation: Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and National Character.

NOTES

1 The reference is to widely known publications: the ultrapatriotic *Nash Sovremennik* and the democratic-leaning weekly *Sobesednik,* a supplement to the newspaper *Komsomolskaya pravda.*

2 N. Berdyayev, *Konstantin Leontyev*, *Aleksey Stepanovich Khomyakov,* Moscow, 2007, pp. 229-230 (in Russian).

3 "The humanities and the scientist's calling," *Chelovek,* 2011, No. 3.

4 Peter's contemptuous attitude to literature and the arts is a commonplace, he did not cast them aside altogether because they existed in the West.

5 "...Under Catherine II... a conglomerate of elementary schools... was replaced by the first state school... The system constantly expanded... Towards the end of the reign of Nicholas I there were up to 10,000 schools and 50,000 pupils in the Russian Empire… Under Peter I the number of letters sent did not exceed several tens of thousands a year… By the mid-1860s it increased to 42 million, with most of the increase happening in the first half of the century." (A. Shipilov, "Great Literature As Big Business," *Chelovek,* 2005, No. 4, p. 172).

6 Quoted from: M. Sukhomlinov, *A History of the Russian Academy,* St. Petersburg, 1883-1887, pp. 14-15. National self-consciousness as reflected in the imperial project of the reign of Nicholas I—Autocracy, Orthodoxy, National Character—became the object of reflections of the Slavophile Russian intellectuals much later (the concept of Count Sergey Uvarov in the mid-1830s).

7 Sukhomlinov described the pains Yekaterina Dashkova took in writing articles about friendship, the virtuous man, reflectiveness, and reminded the reader that it was she who introduced the letter *Ё*; she wrote a series of entries for the letters *Ц, Щ, Ш, М*. (Sukhomlinov, "Yektarina Dashkova," M. Sukhomlinov, *A History of the Russian Academy...)*

8 "The Russian Academy," *Sovremennik,* 1836, vol. 2, p. 7.

9 Ibid., p. 9.

10 The full name is *Interlocutor of the Lovers of the Russian Language Containing Various Compositions in Verse and Prose by Russian Writers,* St. Petersburg, Imperial Academy, 1783-1784. Elsewhere referred to as *Sobesednik* (in Russian).

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11 N. Dobrolyubov, *"Interlocutor of the Lovers of the Russian Language*, Published under the auspices of Countess Dashkova and Catherine II, 1783-1784," *Sovremennik,* vol. 59, part 2, 1856, p. 41 (in Russian).

12 It is hard to imagine a more absurd compulsion to imitate than that described in the letter of a lady who asks the editors to influence her "backward husband who not only forbids her to 'order clothes from Paris' but, horror of horrors, forbids her to take a lover" (*Sobesednik,* p. 1, p. 85).

13 *Sobesednik,* p. 1, p. 160.

14 V. Odoyevsky, "On Hostility towards Enlightenment Noted in Recent Literature," *Sovremennik,* 1836, vol. 2, in *Sovremennik* the article is signed "B."

15 Ibid., p. 214.

16 Ibid.

17 In the journal's version: *Questions and Answers with a Preface.* The Preface gives the full title but without highlighting it as such (*Sobesednik,* p. 3, 1783, pp. 162-166).

18 T. Krasnoborodko, "The Theme 'Literature and Power' in the Second Volume of *Sovremennik," Pushkin: Studies and Materials,* vol. 13, Leningrad, 1989, p. 128 (in Russian).

19 "The Russian Academy," *Sovremennik,* p. 13.

20 Today everyone can read Nikolay Karamzin's *Notes on Ancient and New Russia from the Political and Civic Points of View* which lashes out at the historical behavior of many tsars, including Emperor Alexander I. It is hard to imagine our contemporary, a scholar or a historian, who would write in these liberal times a similar text about the new government and the new Russia or a "benign" wish of the present-day authorities to listen to the criticism coming from a humanities scholar (N. Karamzin, *Notes on Ancient and New Russia from the Political and Civic Points of View,* Moscow, 1991, in Russian).

21 P. Chaadayev, *Philosophical Letters,* Moscow, 1989, pp. 18-19 (in Russian).

22 For more detail see: A. Steinberg, "Pushkin and Ye. Panova," *Vremennik Pushkinskoy komissii, 1965*, Leningrad, 1968 (in Russian). These sad examples gave a hint to would-be brave men that only madmen could speak their mind openly in Russia.

23 P. Chaadayev, op. cit., p. 19.

24 N. Dobrolyubov, op. cit., p. 69.

25 T. Krasnoborodko, op. cit., p. 129.

26 N. Dobrolyubov, op. cit., p. 69.

27 *Sobesednik lyubiteley russkogo slova...* part 3, 1783, p. 163.

28 The intellectual public of the Pushkin times read the answer in Griboyedov's comedy *Woe from Wit* (the first edition saw the light of day in 1833).

29 *Sobesednik lyubiteley russkogo slova,* p. 165.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

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Morality as the Limit of Rationality

Abdusalam GUSEYNOV

The topic of my paper is the role of morality in identifying the limits of rationality. In discussing this issue the difference and interaction between theoretical and practical reason is essential. So I will start with this.

1

The metaphor of light is often used to give a vivid image of the cognizing reason. Just like light, spreading from its source, illuminates the space and thus separates itself from darkness, so the cognizing reason, in capturing the world as its subject, simultaneously limits it and separates the known from the unknown. That means that reason itself marks out and determines its limits and these limits are set by the potential of reason alone, only by the knowledge that it generates. If reason were the only human faculty the question of its limits would probably never arise and would certainly not be informed with inner drama. It would remain a strictly epistemological task. For reason itself the question of its limits and opportunities is solved just as easily and naturally as, for example, the sun solves the question of how brightly it shines. The issue becomes very acute and presents a challenge inasmuch as there is no opportunity to remain within the limits of reason itself. That opportunity is lacking not because reason encounters something impenetrable, such as modern astronomers' dark matter. It is lacking because man is not only a thinking but also a living creature. Moreover, humans are living creatures first and thinking creatures second. Man has reason as a living creature. This, in my opinion, is the main cause that turns the question of the limits of reason into a problem and lends it a dramatic character.

Man's life activity takes the form of goal-oriented activity. It is conscious in character. Before acting and in order to act man makes the decision to act. It is due to the decision and through the decision that reason becomes part of the living process. The decision to act becomes the limit of practical reason. If one assumes

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that knowledge that characterizes theoretical reason is its upper limit then the decision that indicates the inclusion of knowledge in the life process, in practice, is its lower limit. At this point, at the stage of the decision to act and in the process of making that decision, reason encounters irrational forces and separates itself from them. As Jacques Derrida put it, "a decision connects and separates reason and madness in a single gesture."[1] Reason is not the only source of man's activity, another source lies in his biology, the latter, unlike reason, acting spontaneously with blind persistence without transcending the framework of the action. Unlike theoretical use, unlike cognition where reason itself sets its limits, the limits for practical reason are set from outside as irrational forces constantly surround reason. The question arises: what is the role of reason in man's real life process?

This is not only about the proportion and quantitative ratio of the reasonable (conscious) element and irrational (extra-rational) impulses because it is quite obvious that with the exception of the organism's physiological processes that happen automatically, human activity, including the activity that makes it possible to support physiology itself, has a conscious character and is implemented through decisions sanctioned by reason. Human biology acts through cognitology. In quantitative terms the participation of reason in man's life process is as complete (hundred per-cent) as his extra-rational foundations; there is exactly as much consciousness as there is living matter. The problem lies in the qualitative role of consciousness, of reason. A person whose reason is switched off is incapacitated not only as a social, but also as a natural creature. The question, then, is as follows: does reason perform merely an auxiliary role in that it mediates the life process by putting through the head what in the case of other living creatures is realized directly, through inborn capabilities, or is it designed to direct the life activity in accordance with its judgments, towards goals that reason considers to be the best? The problem is one of the hierarchy of rational and irrational aspects. Is *cogito* in the service of biology as represented in the individual or does it play its own game seeking to subjugate it?

If reason merely mediated the life activity of man and its role were confined to proactive, anticipatory reflection and mere calculation of the possible consequences it would be just a natural faculty that distinguishes man from other living creatures no more than the latter differ from one another: reason would be an adaptive quality like the turtle's carapace or the giraffe's long neck. Basically, as Kant noted, in that case it would be unclear why nature needed reason at all because it could have achieved its goals through the mechanisms of instinct, a more habitual and reliable method. Reason is more than a mechanism of adaptation that ensures man's self-preservation as a biological species although of course that is one of its functions. It represents or at least claims to be man's highest faculty called upon to subjugate or transform all the other faculties. Its mission is to render man's being different—supra-natural—meaning and to transfer the very evolution of nature from a spontaneous into a conscious form. Practical reason is connected with theoretical reason and its role in decision-making is to ensure that the decision is made on the basis of a correct judgment and oriented towards a goal which is the best of all possible goals. The goal must

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meet epistemological criteria, i.e., must be indisputably true, absolutely true. Reasonable actions are conscious, meaningful actions. The problem is to make practical reason an extension (continuation) and an expression of theoretical reason and to have decisions implemented on the basis of knowledge in accordance with adequately represented goals thus investing man's life process with meaning. The role of reason in activity seen in this problematic way evolves into a veritable drama of human existence.

The first act of that drama is the conflict between instrumental use of reason as a calculating mechanism designed to cater to the vital needs and interests of the individual and its role in providing the meaning of activity. That conflict is inevitable and it will never go away. As all the individual's desires and interests are realized through reason, they seek to use reason for their own ends as if human desires and interests differed from the desires and interests of animals only in that they are conscious. Therefore reason as the supreme instance that lends meaning to human life activity simultaneously acts as a curb on desires and interests, performing the role of the driver to use Plato's well-known image.

Cognition and activity have different chronotopes and different scales. That is yet another cause for the inevitable and unremovable conflict between the theoretical use of reason that seeks to know the truth and its practical use in making conscious decisions. The cognition of the truth is not limited by anything except success in cognition itself, and it can last endlessly: there are mathematical problems that have been waiting for a solution for centuries and may wait for an indefinite time. The above refers not only to natural sciences, but also to the cognition of man whose nature and mission have been mooted over millennia. As for the practical application of reason, it cannot wait, its activity does not depend on availability of qualitative knowledge, it is determined by the continuous life process of the individual that has rigidly set spatial and temporal coordinates. The judgments of reason are involved in the decision-making process as if they were correct regardless of whether they are actually correct according to epistemological criteria. To put it in another way, one of reason's judgments on the subject of a decision must be recognized as correct even if none of the decisions can be preferred in terms of probability. The practical application of reason cannot be deferred, and it is oriented not to the truth, but to the goal of activity.[2] The practical application of reason, being relatively autonomous from the degree of its truthfulness, exerts a reciprocal (usually restraining and distorting) impact on its theoretical application because both are two aspects of one and the same living reasonable creature.[3] It is important to stress that determination in pursuing one's choice does not directly depend on how true the decision is. If there is a dependency, it rather goes in the opposite direction. Experience shows that people who espouse false and simply poorly thought out views, are more persistent in pursuing them as if they wanted to compensate the intellectual fallacy of their position by the firmness of will.

The limit of reason in its practical application is the reasonableness of practice as embodied above all in the goals. In considering the goals of human activ-

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ity and determining the degree to which they are reasonable, the crucial question is of the highest and ultimate goal that is the reference point, the focus and criterion of all the other goals. That belongs to the realm of ethics which has forever been focused on the question of the supreme good.

2

To understand how ethics is connected with epistemology, how knowledge of the world is transformed into the decision on activity it is important to look at the principle of the unity of truth and good. That principle is important both for epistemology and for ethics.

The opposition between truth and untruth is not a strictly epistemological fact. It definitely carries an axiological load. The truth does not merely say that what is, is, and what is not—is not. A delusion, on the contrary, claims that what is – is not and that what is not—is. The Russian philosopher Lev Shestov,[4] stressing the flaws of an ethically neutral epistemology, was indignant that for epistemology there is no difference between the death of Socrates and the death of a mad dog, that both are unquestionable propositions for it. Shestov believed, that man cannot be trammeled by an anonymous, impersonal truth. Shestov was right in criticizing the ethically neutral epistemology. But was he right in believing that the mainstream European epistemology is ethically neutral? In reality, it has always proceeded on the assumption that the truth is good and delusion is bad. It linked cognition to the search for worthy choices. The axiological foundation of European epistemology is revealed in the fact that it is forever concerned with the question of the truth of truths, of the absolute truth that is absolute not only because it is immutable and identical to itself, but in terms of the human quest of the truth which would provide a solid anchor in orienting oneself in the world. Epistemological quests have always been informed with moral pathos. Suffice it to mention two revealing episodes from the history of philosophy. In *Parmenides'* poem the boundary between the eternal kingdom of truth and the changeable world of opinions is marked by the Goddess of Truth who delivers a didactic speech addressed to a youth concerned with the question of how to lead a worthy life. The famous thesis that "thought and being are the same" (B3) is both the truth and God's way. Descartes' equally famous "cogito ergo sum" can also be related to his moral quests; it was the consequence of his decision to study himself in order to chose "the paths I ought to follow."[5] In short, the program of epistemology was not simply the truth but, so to speak, the truth of the truths, the true truth, the truth that becomes man's good if it is chosen as the goal for practical activities. This is the principle of the unity of the truth and good from the epistemological point of view.

Accents change in ethics. While epistemology looks for the truth that is good, ethics looks for good that is true. Human activity is increasingly diverse. Accordingly, the goals pursued by humans are diverse. Just like in nature nothing happens without a cause, so in human practice nothing happens without a

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goal. Just like causes interconnect to form cohesive entireties, so goals are linked in ordered chains. The world of goals is organized in such a way that it implies the existence of the ultimate goal. That statement, which opens Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, is actually the beginning of ethics as a science. Aristotle reasons in the following manner: different goals are interconnected in such a way that less general and important goals are subjugated to more general and important ones. What is a goal subsequently becomes a means with regard to another goal which in turn becomes a means with regard to another goal and so on. The result is a hierarchy of goals that is topped by the ultimate goal because otherwise a bad infinity results and the mechanism of goal-oriented activity cannot work. The ultimate goal is an end in itself and can never be reduced to being a means. One cannot question it. It is not the goal that exists for the sake of something, but on the contrary, all the other goals exist for its sake. It is the goal of goals, the ultimate and general foundation of all the other goals. The ultimate goal is supreme good, that is, the best goal that human activity is ultimately aimed at. The supreme good as the subject of ethics claims to be the true good. It has the same features of being absolute, unconditional, indubitable, clear, and self-evident that describe the truth of truths in epistemology which forms the basis of the cognitive image of the world.

Therefore ethics is considered to be practical philosophy: it performs in the sphere of activity a function analogous to that performed by theoretical philosophy in the field of cognition. While theoretical philosophy seeks the truth that is good, practical philosophy seeks good that is true, meaning good in the absolute, immutable and unconditional meaning of that concept.

The idea of supreme good as absolute good which looms like the ultimate goal behind all other goals and lends them a cohesion of subject by making them the goals of a given subject is not a philosophers' invention. It expresses the logic of morality, its place in the consciousness of the individual and society. However varied may be the concrete content of moral concepts (good, conscience, justice, etc.) in various epochs and various cultures, they are similar in that they are seen as the supreme sanction of the legitimacy of human actions. The moral qualification of actions is their final judgment. A final judgment both in the eyes of the actors and the people around them. That is why, incidentally, evil always wears the garb of good and there have never been dictators in the world who did not profess to be champions of justice, dignity and faith. For the same reason there have never been radical critics of morality who, while negating it, did not slip into the moral position themselves. It is this feature of morality with its absolutist claims that is the biggest problem for ethics. For it is not only about transforming knowledge into goals but about obtaining such knowledge and transforming it into such goals that have absolute meaning and serve as foundations for purpose-oriented activity as such. The best pages of European ethics are the results of an endeavor to provide an adequate and direct answer to the challenge of morality, to find a rational explanation of its absolutist claims rather than interpreting them as an illusion, fraud, etc. I will try to dwell on what I think are its most important pages.

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3

The first of these, as has been mentioned, is associated with the name of Aristotle. Aristotle inherited the ethical rationalism of Socrates who maintained that virtue was knowledge. Socrates reasoned in the following way: all people seek virtue because virtue, as is universally recognized, is the best for man. If, however, people are not virtuous, this is only because they do not know what virtue consists in and espouse false concepts. They are unable to make the correct choice because they do not know what choice is correct. Socrates determined the cognition of virtue as the goal of philosophy. Aristotle put forward two objections to Socrates. First, virtue is not exclusively a science, knowledge in a way, it also has an irrational component.[6] Secondly, and still more importantly, even if virtue were independent of the irrational foundations of the soul knowing it in itself would not make people morally virtuous.[7] In ethics, according to Aristotle, we are interested not in what virtue is in general, but what virtue is in every concrete instance. Ethics has to do not with concepts but with acts. Its main problem is not to define what virtue is, but to define how to become virtuous.

Aristotle of course does not question the task of understanding virtue. Much of his ethical study seeks to answer the question what moral virtue is. However, available knowledge in this case gives only “a broad outline of the truth” (EN.1094b; Transl. by H. Rackham) and cannot in itself guarantee virtuous acts. Moreover the definitions of virtue reflect their uncertainty. Thus, in characterizing virtue as the mean between two evil extremes, Aristotle stresses that it is different for different virtues and different for different individuals. It is no easy task to find the middle, it is a special art and an individual act.[8] Another important characteristic of virtuous deeds is their intentional character in that the individual is guided by right judgments. That in turn depends on the irrational part of the soul, i.e., whether or not affections oppose the voice of reason.[9]

Accordingly, virtue is not a body of knowledge, but a certain disposition, habit, a habitual state of the soul that emerges as a result of and in the process of performing virtuous deeds. As for virtuous deeds all we can say about them is that these are perfect deeds that have an intrinsic value and are performed exclusively because they are virtuous. There are no general and objectively certifiable characteristics whose presence or absence could be used to sort out deeds into virtuous and evil. Acts are always individual because they are performed in concrete circumstances and by concrete individuals. There are no set rules for acts. The virtuous man himself is the measure and the rule. In the end Aristotle comes to the conclusion that those acts are virtuous that are performed by a virtuous man and a virtuous man is he who performs virtuous acts.[10]

Aristotle says that the goal of ethics is not knowledge but action (EN 1095a). Actions are the ultimate givenness that reason achieves on its path to the particular. They are the other extreme compared with the first definitions which are attained by reason on the path to the general. The virtuousness of actions is understood by feeling, but not an ordinary feeling that perceives sensual objects, but a sense of the ultimate.[11] Aristotle also describes that sense as reason.[12] This

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can be interpreted that for Aristotle virtuous actions are the ultimate limit that reason reaches in its practical aspect.

Aristotle does not have a special class of virtuous actions, such as charitable actions of Christian moralists. Virtuousness is a certain qualitative characteristic of all actions. Virtues and vices have to do with the same environment of objects differing only in the degree and quality of acquiring them: vices are violations of the measure, a shortage or excess in passions and actions, and virtue is the golden mean. What determines the substance of an action and its success and what determines the virtuousness of an action differ: "The work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means" (EN.1144a; Transl. by W. D. Ross). The success of an action, its technical characteristics and moral qualities depend on who performs the action, but in various ways and to varying degrees: the former depends on his knowledge, agility, and luck and the latter on the virtuous disposition of his soul. While the success of an action has an objective basis and can be outwardly certified, the virtuousness of an action is generated and certified by the subject themselves. "The syllogisms which deal with acts to be done are things which involve a starting point, viz. 'since the end, i.e., what is best, is of such and such nature,' whatever it may be (let it for the sake of argument be what we please); and this is not evident except to the good man" (EN.1144a; Transl. by W. D. Ross).

4

The next page is associated with the name of Kant who proposed a concept of morality that is fundamentally different from that of Aristotle's. An action as a reasonable act can be described through a syllogism in which the general premise is its main principle and the particular premise is the special circumstances in which it is performed, the conclusion is the decision or act itself in the narrow sense of the word. Aristotle thought that particular circumstances were the most important in an action. His ethics tries to cover actions as concretely as possible. Kant associates morality not with the particular nature of the action but with its overall foundation. He believes that the moral value of an action depends solely on the principle of volition.

Furthermore, while for Aristotle the virtuousness of actions is materialized through their concrete substantive goals, for Kant the moral dimensions of actions and their matter, ethics and psychology are entirely separate. They are nourished by entirely different sources. In criticizing eudaemonism for reducing the motives of virtues and vices to the same class he opposes the moral motive to all other motives and accordingly separates virtues and vices between different object spheres.

According to Kant, the focus of morality is the moral law which differs from all other laws in that it possesses absolute necessity and in that sense is law as it is, embodies the idea of law consisting in its universality. This law consists in an

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unconditional demand that man be guided in his decisions by subjective principles that could be elevated to the level of a universal law. This is the famous categorical imperative which represents the moral law in the shape in which it is given to man as an imperfect creature endowed with reason.

What does the moral law arise from? How can it be justified? Theoretical reason, inasmuch as it deals with cognition, begins with contemplation and ends with foundations. Practical reason, on the contrary, begins with foundations because it has to do with the ability to reify objects. The moral law is the principle that man as a thinking creature finds within himself, within his will. The theoretical application of reason encounters incomprehensible objects and antinomies. In the case of practical application the reality of pure reason is proved by the fact that it has become practical, i.e., the foundation of the will. As we are dealing with an unconditional practical law, justifying the need for that law would require an indication of the condition that underlies it, but then the law would not be unconditional. To explain why the categorical imperative is possible one can suggest the idea of freedom and thus interpret morality as growing out of freedom. Morality is the autonomy of the will, and this is not only a philosophical thesis, but a principle of ordinary moral consciousness. But the very next step, namely, the explanation of how the proposition of freedom arose, takes us beyond the boundaries of human reason. The most reason can achieve in an attempt to understand freedom is the moral law for the sake of explaining which freedom has been postulated. In the work *Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals* the last paragraph is called *Concerning the outermost boundary of all practical philosophy*. Kant sees that limit in explaining "How can pure reason be practical?", and observes: "All human reason is wholly incompetent to explain this, and it is a waste of trouble and labor to try."[13]

We encounter the irreducibility of the moral law in attempting to answer the question of how it can be implemented. As for the effectiveness of the moral law, in that respect it turns out to be an unshakable wall that marks out the limits of the reasonableness of the human will in all its manifestations. It is embodied in the motive of duty which sanctions only those actions that do not contradict the categorical law. The motive consists exclusively in respect for the moral law and cannot be limited by anything else. Duty is commensurate with moral law in its being unconditional. It alone is the sole moral motive. Duty differs from all other motives and opposes all of them no matter how powerful and attractive they may be. It opposes inclinations in general and can be identified in its purest shape when it asserts itself contrary to inclinations. This is not to say that in Kant's ethics inclinations are under moral suspect. It merely means that they acquire a moral sanction from above, through their correspondence to duty. Duty is a special level of motivation that is not neighbored to other motives (maxims) of behavior but towers above them and accompanies them. Its only task is to establish whether an individual's intentions and decisions correspond to the moral law. Another feature of duty as a motive is that it cannot be and usually is not the only motive. Kant says, it is possible that not a single action in the world has been performed solely for the sake of duty. Duty remains duty, retains its beauty and

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value and perhaps even acquires them when it does not attain to the level of an action. This is not to say that there is no special class of concrete actions that would be preferable according to the moral criteria. It goes without saying. Such a class of actions is absolutely impossible within the logic of Kant's ethic. But there is no individual example of which one could say with confidence that an action has been motivated exclusively by duty.[14] Kant demonstrates that reason is pure as practical reason. But has it remained practical after becoming pure? While Aristotle's ethics, as we have seen, deals with virtuous actions but fails to find their general foundations, Kant's ethics is all about moral law and does not attain to actions. But the mystery of man as a moral creature and his task as a thinking creature consists in combining actions and the law.

5

Finally, one more page related to the theme I am discussing is associated with the name of the Russian thinker Mikhail Bakhtin.

Ethics has always associated morality with the responsibility of the individual. It perceived its task as (a) identifying the area of activity within the power of the acting individual, the area of his freedom and (b) exploring the possibilities of filling that area with moral content. Bakhtin also links morality with individual responsibility, but unlike others, he identifies these two concepts. Morality is not a characteristic of the responsible individual existence, it is such existence itself.

When we speak about an action, we have to distinguish its two aspects: the fact that an action has been performed and its content. When considered as a fact, activity is anchored in the concrete individual, is expressing the uniqueness of his life, on the content side the activity relates to the world and depends on it. In accordance with these two aspects of an action responsibility for it is also two-way: responsibility for the fact of the action and responsibility for its content. The first responsibility is moral, expressing as it does the moral essence of man, the second responsibility, according to Bakhtin, is a special one characterizing the person's knowledge and skills. Bakhtin calls the special responsibility area the theoretical world meaning everything that lends activity a rational and meaningful character and directs it along a considered and purposeful path.

What is most important is not the identification of two aspects of action and two types of responsibility, but the revealing of the nature of the connection between them, the comprehensive plan of the action as reflected in both directions. From Bakhtin's point of view, the original and basic thing is the fact of the action or moral responsibility. Special responsibility is derivative, being a consequence and something added. The decision to perform an action does not depend on its content. Or, as Bakhtin says, there is no transition from the theoretical world to the world of actions, one cannot derive moral responsibility from special responsibility. It is one thing what actions are possible and it is another thing what actions this or that individual resolves to perform. One cannot know

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from the train timetable where one should go and whether one should go anywhere. We can't get "Ought" from "Is." The autonomy of moral responsibility and its primacy with regard to the special responsibility has been summed up by Bakhtin in an aphoristic form: "It is not the content of the obligation that obliges me but the fact that I subscribe to it." There is no transition from special responsibility to moral responsibility. But the reverse transition is possible and obligatory. Moral responsibility is extended in special responsibility. After a decision to act has been taken further actions are determined by its content. Once a person has decided where to go he turns to the train timetable and, while remaining a moral individual, simultaneously becomes a passenger.

In the world that is the subject of special responsibility—the world of cognition, general definitions, aesthetic images, social norms, the decrees of power, scientific models, etc.—the individual functions as one of many, as one in a series, as a scientist, citizen, colleague, holiday-maker, spectator, athlete, etc., etc. He enters this world as a unanimity but not as a singularity. But man acquires singular individuality because he is included in being, and is there and at that time where and when nobody other can be because that place and time are already occupied. Moral responsibility is responsibility that one cannot shirk. Man cannot have an alibi from being ("non-alibi from being" is an important concept in Bakhtin's doctrine), he cannot avoid acting and that is responsibility within whose framework the individual answers with his very existence, its quality and meaning. Of course an individual may avoid making decisions, like the cunning slave from the Gospel parable who buried his talent in the earth instead of taking the risk and using it, but such shirking is a decision nonetheless, albeit a bad one.

The responsibility that coincides with morality is not outside rationality, it is neither irrational nor anti-rational. It is more than rational. It is rational in a special way as the rationality of Being itself. Bakhtin formulates the following aphoristic thesis: "An action in its entirety is more than rational. It is responsible."[15] An action is not identical with rational knowledge, it can only be experienced, it can only be seen from within because he who acts is within that act and the action is what is happening to him. The view from within, when the subject sees in the action not what he has done, but himself, is the only possible point from which an action can be viewed. An action is taken once and for all, it cannot be reversed and in that sense it is irreparable. A mistake made by one specialist can be corrected by another. But an evil act performed by Ivan cannot be rectified by Peter. Love that bonds me to one person cannot bond me to another. An action imprints itself on the individual's life, becomes an element of the personality. It is absolute as a fact of Being. It cannot be said about it whether it is true or false, it cannot be cognized, or studied because it has to be performed first.[16]

Thus, according to Bakhtin, an action is not the result of knowledge and skills, does not lend itself to generalization that would put it within some series. It cannot be a rationally weighed decision.[17] An action expresses, embodies and imprints on Being the very individual. An action is not rational to the extent that Being precedes cognition and to the extent that Being in its unique manifestation cannot be an object of knowledge. In order to make up the simplest sentence,

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"Blackie is a dog," one must, first, have a Blackie and second, have at least one other dog, for example, Brownie.

The question arises: what to do about moral concepts, norms and ethical knowledge? After all, they exist for some purpose. According to Bakhtin, they belong to the world of theory and to the sphere of special responsibility. This means that they are not immediately involved in the performance of an act. Just like one cannot derive the being of a thing from the concept of a thing, so one cannot derive an act from the moral norm. Moral knowledge and skills, like any other knowledge and skills, are attached to the act *post factum*, after it has been performed. It is exactly as it was during the Creation: God first created the heaven and the earth and the light and only then saw that this was good. God was creating according to Bakhtin. Or rather, Bakhtin reproduced the logic of Creation.

6

The mission of moral rationality consists in fitting an act into the moral ideas both of the acting individual and the surrounding people, society. Just like an individual mobilizes special knowledge and skills to make the act he has decided on more effective, so he mobilizes ethical knowledge and skills to make the act look good in his own eyes and in the eyes of other people. While leaving aside the analysis of the role of moral theory (concepts and norms of moral consciousness in its daily variety, as well as ethical knowledge), and merely stating that this role is controversial and often destructive with regard to morality itself, one has to make an observation that is exceedingly important in the context of the theme in hand.

Moral norms which form the basis of moral consciousness are divided into positive and negative, into prescriptions that say what needs (must, is worthy) to be done and proscriptions which say what categorically may not be done. There is a substantial difference between the two. The thesis whereby a moral act cannot be derived from a moral norm refers, strictly speaking, only to prescriptive norms. The requirement to love one's neighbor does not tell the passerby what to do when a beggar is asking him for alms. The requirement to love one's country cannot provide an answer to the question whether or not a state should obtain nuclear weapons. The duty to take care of one's children does not answer the question whether or not one should be strict towards them. This applies to any prescription that has a moral status: it is too abstract to provide sufficient grounds for a concrete action. The point is different with the norms that ban something. They act directly and are unambiguous in terms of their practical application. One of the conditions of the Pythagorean Union was the requirement not to eat legumes. They followed it religiously and the question of what a dedicated Pythagorean had to do and how in order to follow the ban did not arise. The same applies to all the morally sanctioned bans including such fundamental ones as "thou shalt not kill" and "thou shalt not bear false witness." The compliance with the latter, however difficult it may be, has two features: a) it is easily hundred

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per-cent certifiable and b) it is hundred per-cent dependent on the will and the determination of the individual to follow them. In that sense moral proscriptions are unconditional and absolute: these are the identifiable features of morality.

The proscriptions seen as morally binding make it possible to flesh out the idea of morality as the limit of rationality. Morality (and this is its essential and distinguishing feature) is always associated with situations of choice, which process and outcome does not lend itself to rationally considered calculation. It represents the individual's readiness to face the risk of uncertainty and to step into the unknown. A moral decision coincides with determination to act in accordance with one's own decision only because it is one's own, ignoring all the warning sensible voices. In the event of a moral choice man puts himself at stake. The choice is quite conscious, but it is conscious in a special way through what Aristotle described as "the eye of the soul," Kant "the spontaneity of the thing in itself" and Bakhtin "forcible obligation." Moral proscriptions represent that kind of choice and decision. They express the determination of the individual who has accepted them and has identified himself with them not to act in a certain way no matter what. Not doing that (not succumbing to the temptation of revenge, lies, etc.) the individual knows of course what he does not do, but he does not do it not because he knows, but on the contrary: he knows because he has decided not to do it. Moral proscriptions cannot be justified, otherwise they would not be moral. Pythagoreans could not say why legumes should not be eaten, and moralists cannot answer the question why one should never kill and lie, at least they cannot do it at the epistemologically acceptable level; we know that many did not agree with the Pythagoreans and happily ate legumes just like many in our day disagree with the moralists and argue that in some cases it is not only permissible, but necessary to kill and lie. But both the Pythagoreans and the moralists accept their proscriptions as if they were not just truths but sacred and supreme truths, the truth of the truths. Their determination to follow these proscriptions is not the consequence of these proscriptions being true, on the contrary, as they see it—the truthfulness of these proscriptions is the consequence of their determination to abide by them unconditionally.

NOTES

1 J. Derrida, *Cogito and the History of Madness*; see: D. Goloborodko, *The Concept of Reason in Contemporary French Philosophy*, Moscow, 2011, p. 109 (in Russian).

2 This is the feature that forced Descartes to assume temporary rules of morality until he was able to identify the true ones. "That I might not remain irresolute in my actions, while my reason compelled me to suspend my judgment, and that I might not be prevented from living thenceforward in the greatest possible felicity, I formed a provisory code of morals, composed of three or four maxims" (R. Descartes, *A Discourse on Method*, Part III:).

3 This is highlighted by the example of Descartes who, while sharing Galileo's opinion that the Earth moves, nevertheless, guided by his provisory moral rule "to obey the laws and customs" of one's own country (Ibid.) decided not to insist on the truth of his opinions "against the authority of the church" (Descartes to Marin Mersenne, April 1634, in

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R. Descartes, *Philosophical Essays and Correspondence*, Ed. by R. Ariew, Indianapolis; Cambridge, 2000, p. 44).

4 "We know from history that two and a half thousand years ago Socrates was poisoned in Athens. *Homo qui sola ratione ducitur* is trumped by this 'fact': it does not only coerce, but convince. And it will not rest until reason assures for him that no force in the world can destroy this fact, i.e., until he discerns in it an element of eternity and necessity… It soars into the realm where truth resides. And then it does not matter for him what message the truth carries, i.e., whether the best of humans or a mad dog has been poisoned" (L. Shestov, "Athens and Jerusalem," Id., *Writings*, vol. 1, Moscow, 1993, pp. 328-329, in Russian).

5 R. Descartes, *A Discourse on Method*, Part I: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/59/59-h/59-h.htm#part3.

6 "In making the virtuous sciences Socrates is doing away with the irrational part of the soul, and is thereby doing away also both with passion and moral character" (MM 1182a; Transl. by St. G. Stock).

7 "Neither was Socrates right in making the virtuous sciences. Because in the case of the sciences as soon as one knows the essence of a science, it results that one is scientific (for any one who knows the essence of medicine is forthwith a physician and so with the other sciences). But this result does not follow in the case of the virtues. For any one who knows the essence of justice is not forthwith just, and similarly in the case of the rest." (MM 1183b; Transl. by St. G. Stock).

8 "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us"; "For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle" (EN. 1104a, 1109a; Transl. by W. D. Ross).

9 "To act, then, in accordance with right reason is when the irrational part of the soul does not prevent the rational from displaying its own activity. For then only will the action be in accordance with right reason." (MM.1208a; Transl. by St. G. Stock).

10 "Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate man do them." (EN. 1105b; Transl. by W. D. Ross).

11 "That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident; for it is, as has been said, concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be done is of this nature. It is opposed, then, to intuitive reason; for intuitive reason is of the limiting premises for which no reason can be given, while practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of scientific knowledge but of perception—not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in that direction as well as in that of the major premise there will be a limit. But this is rather perception than practical wisdom, though it is another kind of perception than that of the qualities peculiar to each sense." (EN. 1142a; Transl. by W. D. Ross).

12 "And intuitive reason is concerned with the ultimates in both directions; for both the first terms and the last are objects of intuitive reason" (EN.1143a; Transl. by W. D. Ross).

13 I. Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals*, Transl. by J. Bennett; see , p. 51.

14 In general it should be noted that Kant's ethic is devoid of any deductive examples of moral behavior. He does not absolve anyone from the motive of duty because duty makes

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it possible to identify man as a thinking creature and embodies his dignity, but for that same reason it does not allow itself to be privatized by anyone. Not surprisingly, we do not find in Kant examples from real life and history worthy of being emulated. He shied away from the very thought that one should look to anyone in making a moral choice.

15 M. Bakhtin, "On the Philosophy of the Action," *Philosophy and the Sociology of Science and Technology*'1984, Moscow, 1986, p. 83 (in Russian).

16 Bakhtin's central idea of an action as the moral being of the individual can be illustrated by Aristotle's well-known dictum to the effect that man is the beginning of an action, like father gives issue to a child. First, a child is the father's action. It represents a change in the very being of the father and being in general. Such is the nature of any action, it changes the life of the actor. Second, an action is something as serious, relentless, fateful, eternal and troublesome as a child. A person cannot renounce his action, detach himself from it, just like the father cannot detach himself from his son because even if he renounces the son he is still attached to him more profoundly and tragically than before he has renounced him. Thirdly, the grounds (cause) for an action without which this singular action would never be possible, is the individual who has acted, just like the father is the determining cause of the child. Just like the father cannot say that it is not he alone that caused the appearance of the child, so a moral subject cannot say that it is not he alone that is to blame for an action. They cannot say so if they look at the action from within.

17 The idea of morals as the limit of rationality marking a transition to the suprarational sphere had been voiced by philosophers before Bakhtin when they linked morals with the reasonable essence of man although they did not conceptualize it. We have already cited Aristotle's dictum who described a virtuous act as an ultimate that is fathomed not by science, but by senses, and moreover, a sense similar to the mathematical sense. Kant's reasoning is also interesting in this connection. Kant says that if we could trace all the external and internal motives of man that would make it possible to predict his future behavior with the same accuracy as lunar and solar eclipses are predicted. But if we had a similar ability of intellectual contemplation then in our search for the paths of the moral law we would arrive at the "spontaneity of the subject as a thing in itself" (I. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, Ed. by M. J. Gregor, Cambridge, 1996, p. 219).

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

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Russia in Search of Modernity (Cycles of Russian Power)

Vladimir PASTUKHOV

The Russians have always had a strong sense of the uniqueness of their historical destiny, social experience, and their state whose ways of governance are unlike any patterns familiar to humanity. In a certain sense, their instincts did not deceive them: the Russian state is not like any other state. Whether one should be proud of the fact or regret it is a matter for discussion, but the fact of the matter is beyond dispute, even more so, today.

It is only natural for Russian statehood, which developed in a specific cultural environment, to look somewhat peculiar: Russia does not resemble any European and, the more so, Asian models. The Russian context is undoubtedly unusual. The "alogicality of Russian power" is a consequence of the "alogicality of Russian culture" which emerged and developed under conditions containing little hope for a successful civilization to emerge. It was all the more surprising to see a huge Empire develop, which for a time kept half of the world on edge. It should not be so surprising for a culture which bore fruit on such barren soil to have unique features.

The prerequisites for the development of Russia's statehood are therefore essentially different from anywhere else in Europe or Asia. In Europe, the state developed *in parallel with society*. In Asia, the state was *a substitute for a nonexistent society*. In Russia, it *complemented an underdeveloped society*. In Europe, the state developing alongside society has evolved from being *a class-state* via *a representative estate state* to *a bureaucracy state* in its various manifestations and eventually to *a nation-state*. In Russia, the statehood, which grew out of a semblance of society, evolved from *a patrimonial (votchina) state* ("a protostate") via *a zemsky state* (based on *boyars'* quasi-representative monarchy) to *a nobility state* and then to *an autocratic empire*. None of Russia's state forms are fully analogous to Western or Oriental political practice.

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Russian Peasant Commune *(Obshchina)* As a Unique of Russian Statehood

The foundation of Russian statehood is a unique phenomenon without parallel in other cultures—the Russian peasant commune. It is unique in that it "got stuck in history." What in other cultures was a transient thing, in Russia turned into the cornerstone of its civilization. There is a Russian saying that there is nothing more permanent than temporary solutions.

Social relations grow out of "natural" (patriarchal-tribal) relations, but to some extent, the former are the latter's opposite and negation. The development of civilization necessarily involves displacing "the natural" with "the social." In different cultures, this process occurs in different ways: as *displacement*, as *merger*, or as *augmentation*.

It is accepted that "natural" (patriarchal-tribal) relations were not displaced in Russia by social relations as fast and as fully as in Europe, and the former went on to influence the nature of social development for a long time (and, as it appears, to exert, to a greater or lesser degree, its influence today too). Yet, in Russia, the influence of "natural" (patriarchal-tribal) relations on the development of culture has not been as overwhelming as it has been in Asia, where social relations became imbedded in the existing patriarchal foundations rather than displacing them. Russia, therefore, never had an orderly system of social relations developed, capable of evolving entirely out of its own foundation, although the patriarchal order of Russian life was shattered over time. Freethinking in Russia has always combined paradoxically with a flagrant vestige of the patriarchal mentality.

The key social principle in Russia is not society, but *the peasant commune (obshchina)*. Many great scholars of the past noted its excessive influence on social and public life as the main peculiarity of Russia's historical path, and they appear to be right.

This would seem to create an affinity between Russian and Oriental societies. But the peasant commune in Russia differs from the commune in the Ancient East, which provided for stability of the patriarchal way of life for thousands of years. The Russian *obshchina* is a *"neighbors'* commune," a variant of the Slavic *zadruga* commune—an intermediate stage of social relations. Its stability varied depending upon the circumstances.

The peculiarity of the Slavic world, generally, and of Russia, specifically, does not appear to lie in the historical fact of the existence of the neighbors' commune. All Europeans have gone through this stage in one way or another. The Slavic world is distinct in the unique longevity of this commune in that the formation of social relations "got stuck" for quite a long time at this transitional stage.

The Slavic commune is a sort of a product of the "half-decay" of natural relations. But in the same way as radioactive isotopes have a different half-life, "products of the half-decay of natural tribal relations" have different lifetimes. The Russian commune was particularly stable. It would constantly reproduce itself in its peculiar semipatriarchal, semisocial form, without shifting either way for centuries.

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Russia is a country of "protracted social construction work." The commune-based mode of life in Russia is an uncompleted system of social relations, a *sui generis "protosociety,"* where natural (traditional) forces and bonds no longer dominate overwhelmingly, whereas the social mechanisms have not yet got into full gear. "Protosociety's" development markedly differs from society's development. At the same time, "protosociety" is distinct from the Asian commune, where social relations gradually merge into natural relations inherited from ancestors instead of displacing the latter.

In Europe, "protosociety" turned out to be a moment in the history of development of social relations. Social relations between members of the neighbors' commune were fairly quick in breaking up and displacing traditional, natural relations. The family, as an independent social unit, appeared quite early in the historic arena, leading to the emergence of private property and the state. However, this algorithm, as described by F. Engels, is a uniquely European way of forming a state and society. In Russia, it was quite different.

Russia is often viewed as an "Asian" society. But a closer look will reveal very significant distinctions. In Asia, the commune has always been a natural entity, part of nature. In Russia, it is a seminatural and semisocial entity. In Russia, it is a sort of "unfinished society," a precursor of more developed social relations.

In the Russian commune, social and natural relations between its members are on a par, but competing with each other, instead of complementing each other, as one can see in the Asian commune. It is this peculiar half-and-half feature of relations within the Russian commune that is the root cause of the Russian schism. A single society could not have taken shape in the "commune-based" Russia; neither could appear the emancipated individual. Instead, one saw the emergence of innumerable little social islets, which gravitated toward cohesion, and which did not have enough time to evolve into a single organic whole.

Within the Russian commune, a member was already sufficiently "socialized," had a partially autonomous individual will and at the same time was oppressed by tradition. "The social" and "the natural" paradoxically co-existed in the Russian soul, waging an eternal fight with each other without ever gaining a final victory.

"The Oriental" commune is immovable, resembling an inert gas. The commune in Russia is more like a radioactive isotope. Social life there would remind one of an infinite flow of alpha-decays, social "microexplosions" during which the commune would expel autonomous individuals from its nucleus along with its particles.

The stability of the peasant commune in Russia is a façade hiding an intensive process of individuation in social life, which brings it closer to the European institution of the commune. However, in Russia, unlike Europe, this process has never been consistent.

The Patrimonial *(Votchina)* State As the Initial Political Form of Life of the Russian Ñommune *(Obshchina)*

Having gone through its prehistory, the Russian state was born as the Muscovite Kingdom. Its first historical form was the "Patrimonial state"—a kind of

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protostate which arose from *protosociety*, that is, the community of Russian communes.

The historical role of the Russian commune is well known. It is believed that, among other things, the stability of community relations and, at the same time their ambiguity and inconsistency had a decisive impact on the formation of Russian statehood. On the basis of the Russian commune there has emerged the phenomenon of the perpetually adolescent *"teenager state,"* which cannot mature even in old age.

The patrimonial state is hardly a state at all, but only its embryo; it is stuck somewhere between the epic (heroic) era and the class-state. However, each nation has an "embryonic period" when its foundations are being laid. But not every state has gone through all the subsequent evolution, remaining frozen in "an embryonic pose."

"Immaturity" became the natural form of existence for the Russian state. In over a thousand years of its history, the Russian state has not severed the umbilical cord that connects it to archaic society. The blend, the innate lack of differentiation between society and the state in Russia, has been, to some extent, preserved to this day. The consequence of this is also a well-known quality of Russian power, that is, its inseparable bonds with property.

The patrimonial protostate did not possess the same independence in relation to society inherent in the European class-state. Yet there was more to it than the superficial resemblance to archaic Asian society. At the very least, Russia has always had one free man—the Czar. His personal emancipation from traditional relations became a harbinger of the future emancipation of the whole of Russia.

In Russia, the state emerges as a specific sociopublic entity. So I would define the "protostate" as a stabilization of an intermediate form of state formation, which already stood apart from society, but was not yet juxtaposed to it. It would be logical to assume that when the half-formed state appeared in Russia it would try as soon as possible to evolve into "the finished product." That is, the "protostate" would first become a "normal" class-state (in accordance with the European standard), and would then go along the same path which Europe has already trodden.

However, in reality, this half-formed state began an independent historical evolution, paving the way to modern statehood. That way, due to a whole set of objective and subjective factors was, as we now know, much more difficult than the European way: the Russian state was literally squeezing its way up to its highest form through the "thicket" of historical circumstances.

This *independent, yet asynchronous and parallel to Europe*, historical development contains the secret of Russian statehood. Its evolution goes through the same stages as European countries. Even so, the way the essence of the state manifested itself at each of these stages betrayed the *immaturity* of the respective forms of Russian society.

The specific progress of Russia towards modern statehood is comparable to an initially weak child's development, taking many years to catch up with the peers, and in adulthood, gain equivalent strengths, capabilities and opportunities

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(not that this inevitably happens). At the same time, the prerequisites of development of statehood in Russia contain a key inherent contradiction which defined both the destiny of the Russian state and its face. This contradiction is between the unresolved archaic *unity* of the state and society and their ever growing *separation* from each other. The uniqueness of this situation is in that in its evolutionary process, the Russian state, like European states, is moving further and further away from society, while at the same time, remaining identical with society, like Asian states.

"Zemsky State" As a Russian Version of European Estate-Representative Monarchy

During the heyday of Muscovite Russia, the patrimonial state transformed into a *zemsky* state, where the sovereign exercises his powers with the participation of the *Zemsky Sobor* and the council of boyars. Yet the main feature distinguishing the zemsky form of government is a fairly developed military and civil bureaucracy (*prikazy*, *streltsy*, etc.), which, however, did not yet take the shape of a class and was controlled by patrimonial landed aristocracy. The rule of Tsar Ivan III represents the peak of this form of statehood.

The place of the "*zemsky* state" in the series of successive state forms of Russian power appears to correspond to a point between the class-state and the estate-representative monarchy in the "evolutionary chain" of the European statehood. The *zemsky* state resembles both Europe and Asia, being neither of the two.

From the outside, the Russian state, no doubt, looked like an Oriental despotic state. "Russia's internal life," Konstantin Kavelin wrote, "represented a rounded and complete whole. The Muscovite state was an Asian monarchy in the full sense of the word."[1] It was a kingdom where the sovereign was the country's *absolute master*. But closer scrutiny makes this appearance deceptive.

It would be relevant to quote Georg Hegel: "The Oriental World has as its inherent and distinctive principle the Substantial (the Prescriptive), in Morality. We have the first example of a subjugation of the mere arbitrary will, which is merged in this substantiality. Moral distinctions and requirements are expressed as Laws, but so that the subjective will is governed by these Laws as by an external force. Nothing subjective in the shape of disposition, Conscience, formal Freedom, is recognized. Justice is administered only on the basis of external morality, and Government exists only as the prerogative of compulsion... The Constitution generally is a Theocracy, and the Kingdom of God is to the same extent also a secular Kingdom as the secular Kingdom is also divine."[2]

Russia is often described as a country which is European in form and Asian in essence. But it can equally be seen the other way around—Asian in form and European in essence. It depends upon the way one looks at it. Even a cursory look at the Russian history of the 15th—16th centuries from this perspective reveals a deep rift separating Russia from the Oriental world. In the former, one always discerns moral judgment, a subjective will with its inherent beliefs, con-

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science and formal freedom. Russian statehood took its shape primarily within the Christian paradigm, albeit distorted by Asian prejudices.

The *zemsky* state only appears to be stable and immovable. It is a sleeping volcano of human passions. Under no circumstance could the *zemsky* state have existed for thousands of years, unchanged, like Oriental despotic governments, even without any outside interference. The flywheel of moral quest and individual assimilation of historical experience had long been set in motion. The *zemsky* state, therefore, was destined "to explode" sooner or later from internal tensions.

The internal vector of the evolution of the zemsky state was set by a gradual growth of individuation in Russian society, by the formation of individual self-awareness, by accumulation in all spheres of social life of autonomous elements contributing ever more subjectivity to political life. Yet, the process of individuation in Russia's social life is far from straightforward.

- Firstly, it unfolded simultaneously on two planes. Since Russian society never evolved into a coherent system and represented a multitude of fairly isolated communes, individuation progressed both at the level of a specific commune (microenvironment) and at the level of the whole set of communes (macroenvironment).
- Secondly, individuation in Russia was *discrete* in character. This process was not even and smooth, as it was in Europe. Russia saw occasional discharges of "individual energy." Throughout its history, there have been alternating periods of intensive and slow growth of "the subjective element."
- Thirdly, Russian society tried to expel the individuated persons. "Independent agents" did not so much accumulate within Russian society, helping to transform it, as were squeezed outside it, forming "a parallel society" of their own. (This trait has been preserved to this day in a perverse form as emigration of the most industrious individuals settling in Europe).

  Thus, whereas in Europe, individuation and personalization of social life led to a weakening of traditions, in Russia, traditional structures, by expelling "individualists," became isolated, stale and even more aggressive.
- Fourthly, the process of individuation was one-sided. Its outcome was a semifinished product. Those Russians, who were to become building blocks for the new era, were uniquely *one-sided*. Having severed the umbilical cord linking them to archaic society, they never became complete persons. Active elements burst out of the communal way of Russian life like a shot from a gun, quickly and avidly assimilating a negative attitude toward traditional society, whose conventionalities stifled individual will, but those people failed to develop any self-regulation and self-organization skills.

When Russian society had accumulated too many "outcasts," i.e., independently (though "one-sidedly") thinking people, the "*zemsky* state" proved to be incapable of controlling their boundless energy. They continued to be expelled

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through inertia, but they would not disappear, remaining within Russian society. This served to prepare a crisis of the "*zemsky* state."

This is the way historian Sergey Solovyev described the situation: "Wide steppes... became a land of freedom for the Cossacks—people who were unwilling to earn their bread by the sweat of their brow—people who by their nature, by their abundance of physical energy, felt cooped up in town or village streets."[3] Were the authorities to display a hint of weakness, "free people" would shatter the state to the ground.

This rising tension was not visible for some time. More so, the government managed to use the Cossacks in its interests. Yet starting from the time of Ivan the Terrible the subjective principle in Russian history was making itself known. The revolution carried out by Ivan the Terrible is a major bifurcation point in Russian history. His tireless activity resulted in Russian power acquiring two prevailing traits surviving through the centuries. First, he laid the foundation of *"nomenklatura,"* i.e., started to turn bureaucracy into a special privileged order with rent rights. Second, he separated the power into "external" (institutional) and "internal (extrainstitutional). Both were born in the flames of *oprichnina* (a system of cruel reprisals against dissent.—*Ed.*). Ivan the Terrible thus undermined the very foundation of the "*zemsky* statehood," although its edifice did not collapse until after his death.[4]

Artificial stability achieved by removing the "antigovernment" (too independent) elements from the center to the periphery could not last forever. Sergey Solovyev rightly notes: "An opposition was formed between the *zemsky* person who toiled and the Cossack who made merry, an opposition that, necessarily, was bound to cause a clash, a fight. This fight was at its highest in the early 17th century in the so-called Time of Troubles, when Cossacks, under impostors' colors, came from their steppes to government-run regions and utterly devastated them: they were more ferocious to the *zemsky* folk than the Poles and Germans."[5]

One evident outcome of the reforms of Ivan the Terrible was that nobility—Russian bureaucracy—finally established itself as another distinct land-owning class competing with patrimonial landed aristocracy (it does not matter that nobility was recruited for the most part from that same old aristocracy).

Now that the mass and strength of the Cossacks (the "independent elements" who had already left traditional society) grew to critical levels, the conflict between nobility and the old patrimonial aristocracy acted as a detonator of the Time of Troubles—one of the severest political crises in Russia's history. Russia entered the Time of Troubles as a *zemsky* state and came out of it as a *nobility* state. The civil war did not eliminate the old aristocracy and the Cossacks, yet it undermined their strength forever. All lost in that war, yet the state lost least of all. The Russian state was becoming step-by-step a state of nobility, i.e., a state of *self-sufficient and self-contained bureaucracy* (which it sometimes appears to remain to this day).

The Nobility State As a State of Victorious Bureaucracy

The 17th century saw a rapid rise and fall of "the nobility state" in Russia. Located between the two great revolutions (of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the

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Great), it became a connective tissue between the Muscovite Kingdom and the Russian Empire. The role and significance of "the nobility state" as a particular form in the evolution of Russian statehood has not yet been fully clarified.

Appearances in Russia are deceptive, as nowhere else. Russian nobility, "blue blood," has actually little in common with European aristocracy, but it has a lot in common with European bureaucracy. Russian nobility is a bureaucracy elevated to the rank of aristocracy, a *sui generis* "secondary aristocracy" (hence, incidentally, "the secondary serfdom"). The nobility state is a kind of devolvement back to "the class-state," because in Russia, bureaucracy turned into a special privileged estate endowed with the right to own land and peasants. Yet, at the same time, it is a movement forward to a bureaucratic state in which power is exercised by a professional estate of administrators. Since nobility is an estate obliged to serve the state: he who does not serve, shall not eat.[6]

Russian nobility emerged in the bosom of the *zemsky* state, and *the nobility state* itself became a logical stage in the evolution of the forms of Russian statehood. But it did not last long, quickly giving way to the autocratic Empire. The nobility state got lost between the Kingdom and the Empire as something inessential. It was, nevertheless, a very important historical link, without which the overall logic of the development of Russian statehood cannot be understood. By the way, the same can be said about "the Soviet statehood."[7]

The nobility state was a bureaucratic compromise between the conservative patriarchal commune and the unrestrained newly-born individuality. It emerged in response to the challenge of the new culture inconspicuously grown in the depths of the dormant kingdom. On the one hand, Russia saw the emergence of individualistic culture. True, it was one-sided and deformed. In lieu of full-fledged self-awareness, Russian people had a vague sense of the need for the latter. To cover their "naked" mind, they had "to try on" foreign self-consciousness. The source of *"borrowing"* both now and then was the same—Europe (searching for self-awareness in Asia is a waste of time). Europeanism was for quite a long time the historically inevitable and solely possible form of existence of the Russian individual consciousness. "Europeanism" and dependence on European culture has been, for many centuries, its *"idée fix."*

On the other hand, Russia saw a conspicuous decline of the peasant commune *(obshchina)*, "the foundation of the Russian civilization." It was gradually losing the role of the custodian of traditions and the bearer of the moral principles. As the most active elements were leaving the peasant commune (primarily, through "the exodus" to the Cossacks), the latter was losing vitality. But the peasant commune did not vanish in the thin air of history, as was the case in Europe, but continued its conservative existence through inertia. The peasant commune at the time was not so much a social phenomenon, but rather a social phantom, a form that lost its substance.

The subsequent centuries gave birth to a myth of resilience and beneficial power of the Russian peasant commune as a unique phenomenon in world history. Virtually the entire Russian historiosophy has been based on either maintaining the myth or challenging it. One has to conclude, unfortunately, not only

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that there has been nothing unique in the Russian peasant commune, except that its dissolution dragged out for many centuries (almost all developed European nations "leapt through" this stage of development), but also that in Russia this "unique social unit" fairly quickly exhausted its potential.

By the time of the 16th century, Russian society faced a most complicated dilemma: the natural regulator of social life (the commune) was no longer working, and the social regulator, whose basis is the individual's developed self-consciousness, was not working yet. This created a cultural vacuum. Traditional culture was already unable to ensure a full-fledged development of Russian society, totally devoid of its "energy source," while the nascent individualistic culture was not yet capable of that, being one-sided and irrational.

A vacuum in such cases is to be filled by a third force. In Russia, such a "third force" was the state. Therefore, the reaction to the danger of a cultural split was *absorption by the Russian state of the peasant commune, and with the latter—of the entire society*. The state soon put the weakened commune to use: it adapted this form that had lost its substance, but which continued to exist through inertia—for the needs of the state. The *land commune* was inconspicuously degenerating into an *administrative* commune. "It is impossible for the state to deal directly with each property taxpayer separately," Konstantin Kavelin wrote, "and it entrusted this to communes, conferring upon them the oversight of each of their members."[8]

The commune gradually turned, from the basis of traditional society, into a primary unit of the Russian state being reconstituted, into the latter's main "financial-administrative body." (It is this transformation that forms the basis of the so-called secondary serfdom. This "etatization" serves to explain the subsequent unique longevity of the Russian commune). "The archaic" was thus not removed, but made the basis of the new statehood. Like in nature, the socium, during its evolution, adapts for its needs the material which is most easily available and is near at hand. In Russia, the evolution of Russian statehood had "at hand" the remnants of the neighbors' commune rapidly losing its former significance. It was those debris that were used as building blocks of history.

Thus, Russia saw an inconspicuous transformation of "a social-public entity," the former *zemsky* state, into "*a public-social entity,*" the eventual form acquired by "the nobility state." The country also saw a curious change in the exterior image of the Russian state: what used to appear as Asian outside and European inside, now came to appear European outside and Asian inside.

Having absorbed the peasant commune, the state at last had at its disposal what it had lacked for development for so long—*a resource* which allowed the professional state apparatus, i.e., *the bureaucracy*, to establish itself as a separate stratum. Handing out land became an in-kind form of payment to civil and military officials in a state which had a chronic shortage of cash. As in Europe, the emergence of bureaucracy in Russia was a qualitative leap in state up building. However, Russian bureaucracy proved to be a peculiar phenomenon.

In Europe, bureaucracy emerged as a self-reliant entity, "side by side" with the class-state. European bureaucracy is just a *distinct* class in society, having

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equivalent relations with all the corporations in the making of the society at large. In Russia, bureaucracy is a *distinct* class that was assigned properties of a *regular* class. Nobility aristocracy emerges in a *transformed (verwandelt) form* of a new landed aristocracy. In other words, being essentially a *distinct* social class having a specific status relative to all the other estates and society at large, the nobility bureaucracy, on the surface of it, appeared as a regular land owning class, part of landed aristocracy. But the aristocraticism of Russian nobility was deceptive, obscuring for some time its bureaucratic traits.[9]

Initially, the absorption by the state of the Russian peasant commune and the use of the latter as the resource base for the existence of nobility aristocracy appeared to have strengthened the state and to have allowed it, without much ado, to come out of the disastrous crisis of the Time of Troubles. The state not only did not disappear amidst the other corporations, but it very quickly turned into the only real corporation existing in Russia.

That did not last long, though. Stability turned out to be illusory, because the contradictions which hitherto had been external to the state, now became part of its internal life. The state absorbed society with all of its problems, and very soon, those problems became the state's own problems. Social conflicts now began to play out as conflicts between bureaucratic parties within government. All this led to a dramatic weakening of the state that appeared to have just overcome all the difficulties brought about by its split. Before it had time to establish itself, the nobility-state rapidly came to its end.

Autocratic Empire As a Leap into Modern Times

The bureaucracy-state in Europe was embodied in absolute monarchy. It was a strong police state having a powerful bureaucratic apparatus and claiming full control over society. In Russia, on the contrary, the bureaucracy-state in its initial form of nobility state proved to be very weak, unable to build its own "power vertical," let alone control society. The institutions of the state were rickety, the power apparatus was cumbersome and inefficient, and the overall governance system was tangled and confusing. Therefore, this period in the development of the Russian statehood was underestimated and was not often seen as a distinct stage spanning the interval between the first and second Time of Troubles.

Hardly had the nobility state become stabilized after the trials of the Time of Troubles when it became clear that it had exhausted itself. There was a rapid cultural change occurring in society, and the forms of government were behind that change. The Russians came out of the Time of Troubles as people of a different cultural formation. The newly-formed bureaucracy-state was no longer able to perform its functions in this novel cultural environment.

A similar overall picture was observed in Europe, generally, during the era of the crisis of absolutism. The new bourgeois milieu, individualistic in its nature, rejected—through revolution—the old absolutism with its self-contained bureaucracy and created in its place a new state where that same bureaucracy was

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put under society's control. The old time's bureaucracy was thus replaced by the bureaucracy of the Modern Times.

Instead of individualistic bourgeois culture, in the period prior to Peter's reforms, Russia saw the emergence of a *semiindividualistic (intermediate)* culture, which was figuratively described by S. Solovyev in the following way: "Two circumstances had a harmful effect on the civil development of the old Russian person: lack of education, which let him out to get involved in social activity being a child, and a long family guardianship keeping him in the status of a minor, a guardianship, which was necessary, though, because, firstly, he was a minor, indeed, and, secondly, because society could not provide him with moral guidance. But, it is easy to understand that a long guardianship, first and foremost, made him timid in the face of power, which did not, though, exclude childish self-will and petty tyranny."[10]

The Russian man of the late 17th century was equally ungovernable, lacking emotional self-control but, at the same time, lacking in initiative and independence. His self-consciousness was embryonic. Having escaped from the pressure of tradition, he still needed moral guidance. But it was not to be obtained either in the family or in the commune. This "semifinished product" could hardly undertake the accomplishment of the difficult mission of organizing control over bureaucracy. He himself needed guidance, therefore, the processes in Russia went in the opposite direction to the European way.

It was the state that assumed guardianship of the "teenager society." Yet, the old nobility state was incapable of any paternalism. Nobility was not so much "a class in itself," as "a class for itself," which prevented it from becoming "a class for the others." To be able to perform a paternalistic role, the state itself needed to be transformed, which did not take long to happen.

Thus, the contradiction which revealed itself in Russian society at the turn of the 18th century differed essentially from the contradiction which manifested itself in Europe a little earlier. In Europe, the strong, ubiquitous bureaucracy-state found itself in conflict with the developed, self-guided and freedom-seeking individual. Whereas in Russia, the weak, slow-moving state entangled in prejudice proved to be unable to take on the role of a moral guardian for the "semiformed," dependent individual who needed guidance. In Europe, the crisis of the state was due to an excess strength of bureaucracy, whereas in Russia, there was its "deficit."[11]

The ways of resolving those contradictions differed accordingly. In Europe, the bureaucratic monster collapsed under pressure from social movements. In Russia, it was the *monarch* who became the source of transformation, having the most "advanced" groups of the nobility bureaucracy to rely upon. The Russian autocrat became society's consolidated representative in the affairs of the state. He was one in two hypostases: as the sovereign, a real historic figure, on the one hand, and as the embodiment of the "idea of popular government," the bearer of people's sovereignty, on the other. This duality contains the mystery and mystique of Russian autocracy. The ruler is the incarnation of the idea of sublime power as such. Overall, Russian autocracy can be said to be "representative democracy" of sorts, in which the people have a sole representative—the Tsar.

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Thus, the idea of power in Russia was severed from power itself, mystified and identified with the supreme ruler. Power in Russia was thus accorded the religious value that law acquired in Europe over time. It is thanks to this design that Russia was able to come out of the crisis, having succeeded in combining "a weakness" with "a weakness," which produced a strength—the Empire of a new type. In Europe, the revolution from below aimed to subordinate bureaucracy to society, whereas in Russia, the revolution from above came to subordinate bureaucracy to the Tsar, who was then objectified as an independent center of power. In Russia, the Tsar was turning into a "surrogate" nation, the nation's mediator.

As it were, Russia made a giant leap forward in the evolution of her statehood: the *autocratic Empire* created by Peter I was nothing but a modified *(verwandelt)* form of the European *bureaucracy-state* of the Modern Times.

Russian autocracy was riddled with internal contradictions. Progress and education polarized its society, once again revealing the duality of Russian culture. On one pole, there was a surplus of unrestrained individual energy, devoid of responsibility: a great many people appeared who felt constrained by the established way of life. On the other pole, there was the entrenched, albeit withering commune, which succeeded in expelling almost all of its industrious members and in making passivity and lack of initiative a dominant psychological type (which, apparently, was the only type acceptable for them). Depression was its reactive state, the effect of the trauma inflicted by the "individual's aggression." It was this that centuries later appeared to have prevented implementation of Pyotr Stolypin's plans. By that time, there was nothing to extract from the commune, everything had flowed away long before.

Thus, by the end of the 17th century, Russia had a dual—*active-passive, aggressive-servile*—culture, i.e., a culture that could be described as something "between anarchic rebellion and slave habit." On the surface, this heterogeneous culture looked like a mixture of European and traditionalist principles. In reality, it was neither truly European, nor genuinely traditionalist. Both were mimicry, two modified forms (hypostases) of a single culture.

In that cultural milieu, the state made up for the shortage of individual energy in some and restrained its surplus in others—a truly fatherly, paternalistic task. In this way, Russian autocracy managed to combine the traits of the state of Louis and the state of Napoleon, being neither in reality. The idea of autocracy is a peculiar merger of the principle of the autocrat's absolute and unlimited prerogatives and the principle of responsibility of the rulers to the people.

The revolution in Europe destroyed the old bureaucracy in order to put new bureaucracy in its place. In the course of the "inverse revolution" in Russia, Peter I reorganized the old bureaucracy, i.e., nobility, making it perform new tasks.

The duality, characteristic of Russian nobility (as a bureaucratic class and a landowning class), was embodied in a concentrated way in the Empire created by Peter I. Autocratic Russia, which, by its nature, was a bureaucracy-state of the Modern Times, appeared in the modified form of a class-state, a state of medieval landed aristocracy. This peculiar combination of traits contributed to both the strength and the weakness of the Russian Empire.

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Having quite modern bureaucracy, as a distinct privileged class, imparted a unique stability to the autocratic state, enabling it to hover above society for a long time and exercise "guardian" functions (police functions, according to Aleksandr Lappo-Danilevsky) on a scale unthinkable for the European bureaucracy-state.[12] The Russian Empire anticipated the future totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. Having seemingly incompatible principles mixed in the foundation of autocratic statehood brought about a relatively viable state organism. However, being strong like a mule, this state, like a mule, turned out to be infertile—in a historical sense.

Unlike European bureaucracy-state transformed by the bourgeois revolution, Russian autocracy *would not lend itself to rationalization*. It would only borrow some rationalist ideas which in some cases could enhance performance of its complicated functions, but overall, it continued to be an irrational phenomenon, and therefore, it was unable to move to a higher stage of development in a logical and smooth way, without revolutionary leaps, and become a nation-state.

Since bureaucracy in Russia never took the shape of a *distinct* class in its pure form, but operated in a modified form as a landowning class, the contradiction between bureaucracy and society could not become *universal* within an autocratic Empire. This contradiction between bureaucracy and society also operates in the modified form of a particular, class contradiction between nobility as a landowning class and the other social classes.

Bourgeois bureaucracy-state is rationalized and transformed into a nation-state by means of Constitutionalism. Elements of Constitutionalism (i.e., rationalization of the life of the state) will emerge over time in Russia as well. But Russian Constitutionalism was aiming not so much at mastery over the state, as at its negation. And it is quite explicable, since the state continued to be a private corporation.

However, the main thing was that one part of Russian society developed constitutional ideas, and its other part, the overwhelming majority of the population, did not support this development, and did not strive for self-restraint of individual arbitrariness on the basis of recognition of the law. The paradox was that each step forward in rationalizing Russian statehood, resulting from continuous and increasing pressure on the part of the more "advanced" active minority, led to rising entropy and greater arbitrariness on the part of the passive majority.

Soviet Power As a Transition Form toward a Modernity State

Autocracy, which was a guarantor of stability during two centuries, turned out to be programmed for self-destruction around the mid-19th century. Until that time, Europe and Russia had developed along parallel paths. In Europe, the class-state transformed into a representative estate monarchy, which in its turn transformed into a bureaucratic absolutism replaced through the revolution by the bureaucracy-state of the Modern Age, which over time became the nation-state. In Russia, during the same stretch of history, the princes' *votchina* was

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replaced by the *zemsky* kingdom out of which grew the nobility bureaucratic state eventually absorbed by the autocratic Empire.

However, at that time, the Euclidean political geometry ends, and Nikolay Lobachevsky's geometry begins. The parallel lines of European and Russian statehood temporarily diverge. Fyodor Tyutchev writes in a letter to Pyotr Vyazemsky in March 1848: "What makes our situation very uncomfortable is that we have to call *Europe* what should not have any other name but its own: *Civilization*. This is the source of our endless misconceptions and inevitable confusions. This is what distorts our conceptions. In fact, I am getting increasingly convinced that all that *peaceful imitation* of Europe could do and give us—all of this we have received. Yet, in fact, it is not at all much. It did not break the ice, it only covered it with a layer of moss which imitates vegetation very well."[13]

Peaceful, "natural" transformation of autocracy into a nation-state was impossible because the bureaucracy-state in its pure form never emerged in Russia. This became an insurmountable barrier in the way of further evolution of Russian statehood. An additional link was to emerge between autocracy and modern nation-state—some intermediate state entity without analogues in European experience (where it was not needed).

The historic mission of this "intermediate" statehood, a buffer between the Empire and the nation-state, was the establishment of bureaucracy as a special class having distinct relations with all the other classes in society, and not covering itself with any deceptive status. The opposition between bureaucracy and society was to become, out of a particular problem, a universal problem, thereby creating prerequisites for the rationalization (known as Constitutionalism), which turns a bureaucratic state into a nation-state.

This *distinctive form of statehood* emerged on the remains of the Russian Empire as a result of the collapse of autocracy that lost its mechanical stability due to its inherent contradictions. Despite its ideological appearance, the *"Communist (Soviet) state"* was a necessary and logically justified link in the evolution of Russian statehood.

Now that the Communist state in Russia has become history, pessimists and optimists are divided in a peculiar way. Optimists speak of the birth of a Russian state, whereas pessimists—of the death of Russian statehood. For the former, history started in August 1991. For the latter, it ended in October 1917. Between October 1917 and August 1991, there is an *entity*, i.e., that very Communist or Soviet state, equally unpleasant for both optimists and pessimists (for the former, as an eerie prologue, for the latter—as an abominable epilogue).

In reality, the Russian state did not begin in August 1991, neither did Russian statehood end in October 1917. The Russian state is the outcome of the evolution of Russian statehood. The Communist (Soviet) state is a necessary link in this process. The roots of the Russian state are hidden deep in imperial and preimperial epochs, and today's state is the tree top grown out of the Muscovite Kingdom and the Petrine Empire. The so-called totalitarian state was but a trunk connecting the roots and the tree top.

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NOTES

[1] K. Kavelin, *Our Mental System. Articles on the Philosophy of Russian History and Culture*, Moscow, 1989, p. 229 (in Russian).

[2] G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History,* London—New York, 1900, pp. 111-112.

[3] S. Solovyev, *Readings and Stories on Russia's History,* Moscow, 1989, p. 136 (in Russian).

[4] One can see in the "experiments" of Ivan the Terrible, like in an embryo, all future traits of Russian power (the separation of power into "external" and "internal," establishment of bureaucracy as autonomous "ruling" class, etc.). Ivan the Terrible laid "theoretical foundations" to autocracy, Peter the Great put this idea into practice.

[5] S. Solovyev, op. cit, p. 436.

[6] Russia once again vividly demonstrated its ability to move forward stepping backwards. In today's terms it could be called "archaic modernization."

[7] The Nobility state lasted for slightly less than a hundred years (from the end of the Time of Troubles to Petrine Empire), i.e., approximately for as long as "Soviet power" three centuries later.

[8] K. Kavelin, op. cit., p. 229.

[9] Nobility is a forerunner of the future Soviet *nomenklatura*. With all their distinctions, they have a lot in common—both nobility and *nomenklatura* were the privileged estates.

[10] S. Solovyev, op. cit., pp. 346-47.

[11] Russia seemed to be doomed. Combining a weak society with a weak government cannot produce anything strong. As it turned out, it can.

[12] A. Lappo-Danilevsky, "The idea of the state and key moments of its development in Russia from the Time of Troubles to the epoch of reforms," *Politicheskiye issledovaniya (POLIS)*, 1994, No. 1, pp. 182-183.

[13] F. Tyutchev, *Poems. Letters,* Moscow, 1986, p.320 (in Russian).

Translated by Aleksandr Dron

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Expert Assessment of the Dynamic of the Psychological State of Russian Society: 1981-2011

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The new trend in social and humanities sciences that is manifesting itself simultaneously in various disciplines, is *quantitative* assessment of the characteristics of society on the basis of various indices rather than merely qualitative assessment. Various *social indicators*[1] are calculated by such authoritative international organizations as the UN, the European Union Statistical Office (EuroStat), OECD, the World Bank, and the European Commission and are used by practically all the European countries as well as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, Latin American countries and South Africa.

Psychological components play an important part in the structure of social indicators. Gennady Osipov notes that "the traditional approach has been supplemented by the subjective element that addresses the psychological well-being of people, and the concepts of the quality of life and capabilities have been introduced."[2] Sociologists calculate the indices of social moods, social optimism, satisfaction with life, social well-being of the population, etc., which have a significant psychological element.[3] Demographers determine such indices as a country's vitality coefficient[4] which also have a psychological tinge. Studies of the quality of life and related phenomena—subjective well-being, etc. in which psychologists take an active part have become widespread.[5] Happiness indices, the happy planet index, the gross national happiness index (introduced by the fourth king of Bhutan and used in that country *instead* of the GDP index) that quantitatively assess something that would appear to be impossible to quantify, i.e., happiness. It should be noted that such impulses originated in the *economic* science which has developed in the area of studies called "the economics of happiness." In particular, "the fact that economists were no longer satisfied with the potential of the premise of maximizing profits prompted the introduction of the concept of 'wellness' which has replaced the concept of 'wealth' as the aim of economic activity."[6] "The economics of happiness" in many ways overturns the tradition-

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al logic of economic and social assessments by stressing the subjective well-being and using it to assess the objective quality of life. The main difference between the so called "secondary" modernization from the "primary" modernization is usually thought to be that the main task is now not simply to develop the economy in order to meet people's material needs, but to improve the quality of life to meet their need for happiness and self-expression.

In psychology, similar approaches are used to assess the subjective quality of life, the psychological potential of the population,[7] social capital which essentially has social-psychological content.[8] As Georgy Zarakovsky notes, "the transition from understanding the essence of the individual's psychological potential to understanding the essence of society's psychological potential is of pivotal importance."[9]

In line with the above-mentioned trend, the RAS Psychology Institute has developed a composite index of the psychological state of society that combines six primary indicators, i.e., statistical indicators that are normalized, i.e., translated into scores:

1) suicides,
2) mental disorders,
3) deaths from mental disorders and organs of senses ailments,
4) murders,
5) divorces,
6) social orphancy. Indicators 1-3 are seen as indicators of *psychological stability* of society, indicators 4-6, of its *social and psychological well-being*.[10]

Fig.1 shows the dynamic of the psychological state of Russian society since 1991 assessed according to this Index.

Methodology

In accordance with the prevailing tendency in social and humanities studies of combining "hard" indices calculated on the basis of statistical data with the results of opinion polls,[11] the RAS Institute of Psychology carried out a *poll of experts* aimed at revealing the dynamic of the psychological state of society. Experts were asked to fill questionnaires to assess the psychological state of society in 1981, 1991 (before the collapse of the USSR), 2001 and 2011. The assessment used 70 parameters 35 of which expressed positive and 35 negative characteristics of society selected in preliminary consultations with the experts. Not all these characteristics were purely psychological, but in the opinion of experts, the psychological element was there. Every parameter was assessed on a 10-point scale in which "1" corresponds to the minimum and "10" maximum presence of a characteristic. The experts were 124 psychologists representing different regions, various research and educational centers in Russia who met the following requirements:

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

***Fig.* Dynamic of the Composite Index of the Psychological State of Russian Society in 1990-2009 (points)**

1) an age that allows the expert to assess the state of Russian society in 1981 (accordingly, young psychologists were not among the experts),
2) sufficient level of qualification, possession of the scientific degree of Candidate or Doctor of Sciences,
3) engagement in professional activities relevant to macro-psychological problems and having corresponding publications to one's name.

Naturally it was assumed that any expert is subjective, especially when the study touches upon emotionally "charged" problems such as the state of society of which one is a member who is influenced by the psychological effects being studied. Top among such effects to be taken into account are the following.

1) Nostalgia, as a result of which the past is often seen in a more favorable light than the present;
2) the ageing of respondents that may have a similar impact on their assessments;
3) the demise of the country in which the respondents have grown up and the demise of the corresponding society;
4) view of the overall state of affairs through the prism of the personal situation;
5) the growing personal achievements and status of respondents;

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6) the perception of the psychological characteristics of society in connection with its socioeconomic, political, etc., state.

It has to be noted that the societal characteristics assessed in the questionnaire were not defined (giving a definition would hardly have made any difference), did not appear totally unequivocal and, in spite of certain invariants of their interpretation, carried a different meaning for different experts.

Owing to these and similar effects, the assessment by experts of the dynamic of the psychological state of Russia represents in many ways their *subjective perception* of these dynamics and the corresponding societal characteristics and sheds only limited light on the real situation. But the same can be said of *any* expert survey aimed at assessing social situations. Even so they yield information on their objective character.

Results

Even with the above reservations the results obtained (Table) come as something of a surprise. If one compares the state of Russian society at the two extreme points of the time continuum—in 1981 and in 2011—all the negative parameters without exception have increased and the overwhelming majority of the positive ones have diminished. Only two positive parameters revealed increased values, they are rationalism and freedom, but even then the positive dynamic is not unquestionable. Rationalism was apparently interpreted by some respondents not as a positive but rather a negative characteristic of society reflecting greed, lust for gain, etc. The liberty index revealed a slight growth (0.4) during the period of record because it made a big leap in 1991 (from 3.6 to 6.9) before going down again.

Table

Dynamic of Psychological Characteristics of Our Society (1981-2011)

No.	Characteristic of the psychological atmosphere in Russian society	Value in points (1- min., 10 – max.)					
		1981	1991	2001	2011	2011/1981	1991/1981
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.	Aggressiveness	3.30	5.45	6.55	7.23	3.93***	2.15*
2.	Greed	3.07	4.94	7.19	8.29	5.22***	1.87**
3.	Altruism	5.97	5.48	3.32	2.61	–3.36***	–0.49
4.	Anomie	4.28	4.73	6.23	6.90	2.62***	0.45
5.	Apathy	6.13	3.23	5.35	7.10	0.97	–2.9***
6.	Irresponsibility	4.93	5.4	6.43	6.63	1.7	0.47
7.	Lack of ideals	4.90	3.97	6.23	7.03	2.13*	–0.93

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Table (continued)

No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8.	Selflessness	6.30	5.29	3.16	2.32	–3.98***	–1.01
9.	Rightlessness	6.03	5.19	6.81	7.55	1.52	–0.84
10.	Lack of moral principle	4.67	4.77	7.03	7.74	3.07***	0.1
11.	Unceremoniousness	4.33	5.77	7.06	7.42	3.09***	1.44*
12.	Mutual assistance	6.53	6.42	4.19	3.35	–3.18***	–0.11
13.	Mutual understanding	6.43	5.87	4.26	3.71	–2.72***	–0.56
14.	Mutual respect	5.83	5.19	3.71	3.06	–2.77***	–0.64
15.	Hostility	3.23	5.26	6.42	7.26	4.03***	2.03**
16.	Permissiveness	2.50	6.23	7.06	6.77	4.27***	3.73***
17.	Rudeness	4.27	5.06	6.71	7.19	2.92***	0.79
18.	Discipline	6.40	4.16	4.23	4.13	–2.27**	–2.24**
19.	Diligence	5.47	4.52	3.65	3.16	–2.31***	–0.95
20.	Kindness	6.30	5.19	3.81	3.23	–3.07***	–1.11
21.	Trust	6.33	5.74	3.71	2.81	–3.52***	–0.59
22.	Cruelty	3.63	5.45	6.74	7.48	3.85***	1.82*
23.	Law-abidance	6.27	4.32	3.55	3.39	–2.88***	–1.95**
24.	Malice	3.13	4.97	6.03	6.71	3.58***	1.84**
25.	Intellectuality	6.73	6.32	4.19	3.48	–3.25***	–0.41
26.	Being high-minded, sensitive and moral (intelligentnost)	6.28	5.40	3.30	2.73	–3.55***	–0.88
27.	Sincerity	5.37	6.13	4.10	3.13	–2.24**	0.76
28.	Conflict-proneness	3.77	6.1	6.71	6.97	3.2***	2.33**
29.	Creativity	5.60	6.39	5.16	4.26	–1.34	0.79
30.	Xenophobia	3.20	4.1	6.35	7.32	4.12***	0.9
31.	Culture	6.77	5.71	4.00	3.48	–3.29***	–1.06
32.	Lying	5.87	4.97	6.32	7.19	1.32	–0.9
33.	Mafia-style behavior	3.40	5.81	7.84	8.00	4.6***	2.41**
34.	Obsession with things material	3.53	4.52	7.29	8.32	4.79***	0.99
35.	Courage	5.30	5.97	4.52	3.94	–1.36	0.67
36.	Impudence	3.43	5.35	7.00	7.65	4.22***	1.92*
37.	Trustworthiness	6.45	4.87	3.53	3.03	–3.42***	–1.58*
38.	Stress	3.13	6.77	6.23	6.77	3.64***	3.64***
39.	Violence	3.27	5.58	6.87	7.29	4.02***	2.31**
40.	Bad manners	4.23	5.19	6.74	7.16	2.93***	0.96
41.	Hatred	2.97	5.06	6.00	6.90	3.93***	2.09*
42.	Unreliability	4.47	5.68	6.29	6.81	2.34**	1.21

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Table (continued)

No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
43.	Morality	6.21	5.33	3.73	3.03	–3.18***	–0.88
44.	Optimism	5.27	6.9	4.52	3.16	–2.11**	1.63**
45.	Ready sympathy	6.33	5.71	3.90	3.03	–3.3***	–0.62
46.	Patriotism	6.83	5.97	3.87	3.29	–3.54***	–0.86
47.	Wickedness	3.66	4.60	6.23	6.53	2.87***	0.94
48.	Suspiciousness	4.10	4.40	5.60	6.10	2*	0.3
49.	Decency	6.14	4.90	3.73	2.93	–3.21***	–1.24
50.	Psychological security	6.53	4.35	3.61	2.61	–3.92***	–2.18**
51.	Empty talk	7.27	6.9	6.81	7.68	0.41	–0.37
52.	Laxity	3.77	5.68	6.23	6.42	2.65**	1.91*
53.	Rationality	4.30	4.29	5.03	5.71	1.41*	–0.01
54.	Self-control	5.45	3.97	4.13	4.40	–1.05	–1.48*
55.	Freedom	3.60	6.9	4.97	4.00	0.4	3.3***
56.	Use of foul language	4.03	5.37	6.77	7.33	3.3***	1.34
57.	Modesty	6.55	4.63	3.27	2.70	–3.85***	–1.92*
58.	Empathy	6.57	5.52	3.90	3.13	–3.44***	–1.05*
59.	Calm	6.93	3.61	3.52	3.35	–3.58***	–3.32***
60.	Justice	4.37	4.19	2.77	2.45	–1.92*	–0.18
61.	Fear	3.17	5.48	6.03	6.42	3.25**	2.31*
62.	Tact	5.38	4.03	3.27	2.77	–2.61***	–1.35*
63.	Anxiety	3.50	6.13	6.32	6.94	3.44***	2.63**
64.	Industry	5.90	4.81	4.10	3.68	–2.22**	–1.09
65.	Familiarity	3.45	5.4	5.87	5.83	2.38***	1.95***
66.	Boorishness	4.21	5.67	6.70	7.07	2.86**	1.46
67.	Being civilized	5.47	4.68	4.13	4.13	–1.34	–0.79
68.	Humaneness	6.66	5.47	3.83	3.20	–3.46***	–1.19*
69.	Honesty	5.67	4.94	3.61	3.06	–2.61***	–0.73
70.	Egoism	4.17	5.16	7.23	8.03	3.86***	0.99

*Note: * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$.*

Among the negative characteristics the ones that revealed marked dynamics were aggressiveness, greed, anomie, lack of principle, unceremoniousness, hostility, permissiveness, rudeness, cruelty, malice, conflict-proneness, xenophobia, lying, mafia-style behavior, obsession with material things, impudence, stress, violence, bad manners, hatred, wickedness, the use of foul language, anxiety, familiarity, and egoism. The fastest growing characteristics were greed (5.22), obsession with material things (4.79) and mafia-style behavior (4.6).

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In terms of absolute indicators the most pronounced negative characteristics of Russian society turned out to be aggressiveness, greed, apathy, lack of ideals, rightlessness, lack of principles, unceremoniousness, hostility, rudeness, cruelty, xenophobia, lying, mafia-style behavior, obsession with material things, arrogance, violence, bad manners, empty talk, the use of foul language, boorishness and egoism. The most salient among these were obsession with material things (8.32), greed (8.29) and egoism (8.03).

Among the positive characteristics the greatest "losses" were sustained by: altruism, unselfishness, mutual assistance, mutual understanding, mutual respect, diligence, kindness, trust, law abidance, intellectuality, *intelligentnost,* culture, trustworthiness, morality, patriotism, decency, psychological security, modesty, empathy, calm, tact, honesty and humaneness. The biggest difference of values between 1981 and 2011 concerned the parameter of unselfishness (3.98), psychological security (3.92) and modesty (3.85). It is also indicative that experts have awarded more than the average score (5.7) to only one positive parameter in our society and that is rationalism which, as pointed out above, they did not interpret as an unequivocally positive characteristic. True, expert marks approach the average of some positive parameters such as discipline (4.13), creativity (4.26), self-control (4.40), liberty (4.00), being civilized (4.13).

It has to be noted also that with regard to some characteristics the experts assessed the dynamic of the psychological state of Russian society as *linear,* mainly as gradual worsening between 1981 and 1991 and then 2001 and 2011 (which of course does not rule out that the corresponding 10-year intervals may be non-linear) and as *non-linear* for other parameters. Among the latter are such characteristics as apathy, lack of ideals, rightlessness, permissiveness, discipline, sincerity, creativity, lying, courage, stress, optimism, empty talk, rationality, self-control, liberty, being civilized. In most such cases the common pattern of non-linear change of characteristics was an improvement between 1981 and 1991 with subsequent worsening. This trajectory reflects one of the main ways of perceiving the state of affairs in Russian society which is that in 1991 Russians *acquired hopes* which later proved unjustified as a result of which the situation in 1991, whatever its objective characteristics (the country was ungovernable, there were clear signs of an imminent collapse, an acute shortage of prime necessities, etc.), is seen in a more positive light than the state of affairs in 2001 and 2011. For example, in the opinion of respondents, in 1991 Russian citizens were less apathetic, disfranchised and prone to lie, more sincere, creative, courageous, optimistic and free than in the preceding and following periods.

At the same time, some characteristics, though they changed in a non-linear fashion, do not fit into the pattern of "nostalgia for 1991." Thus permissiveness reached its peak precisely in 1991 and diminished thereafter, which is reflected in the common cliché: "there is more order now." The level of discipline is thought to have diminished between 1981 and 1991, then increased somewhat by 2001, but went down again, though insignificantly. Stress is characterized as reaching a peak in 1991, which was natural on the eve of the events that followed, and then diminishing somewhat, but increasing again by 2011 to the same

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level as in 1991. The level of empty talk was assessed as going down in stages between 1981 and 2001, but increasing again by 2011 to above the 1981 level. Rationality has been assessed as diminishing by 1991, but gradually increasing thereafter. The same goes for the dynamic of self-control. As for being civilized, Russian society was seen by experts as being progressively less civilized between 1981 and 2001 when it hit a plateau.

One may also profitably discuss the data in terms of the traditional question "what country have we lost?" in the psychological sense. What immediately strikes one is that the answer to that question differs depending on whether we refer that question to our country in 1981 or 1991, to the relatively serene "era of stagnation" or to the much stormier period of "disintegration." In 1981 Soviet society, on the overwhelming majority of positive characteristics, gets higher than average scores and on the bulk of negative characteristics lower than average scores, in other words, experts describe it as by and large *psychologically comfortable society.* The only exceptions are assessments of such parameters as apathy, rightlessness, empty talk, rationality, freedom and justice, that is, while society was assessed as generally happy, it was also seen as fairly apathetic, rightless, unfree, unjust, irrational and prone to empty talk. The most positive characteristics of our society in 1981 were the relatively low points scored by *negative* characteristics, above all greed, obsession with material things, permissiveness, aggressiveness, anger, cruelty, proneness to conflict, xenophobia, mafia-style behavior, arrogance, hatred, stress, wickedness, laxity, familiarity and fear. These characteristics combine to describe the Soviet society of the time as fairly kind and not obsessed with material things or lust for money.

As for the psychological state of Russia in 1991, it looks like a transition from a "kind" to a "harsh" society. Compared with 1981 its positive characteristics have for the most part diminished and negative characteristics have increased. Most of the assessments, both of positive and negative parameters, hover around average values, i.e., between 4 and 5 points, while more radical assessments are rare for both groups. In other words, psychologically our society of the time is described as being not as kind" compared with its state in 1981, but not as "harsh" as in later periods. The most pronounced negative shifts compared with 1981 are observed for such parameters as stress, calm and familiarity. At the same time there is some improvement of such parameters as apathy, lack of ideals, rightlessness, sincerity, creativity, lying, courage, empty talk, optimism and freedom: our society in 1991 is more honest, free, optimistic, etc., compared with its state in 1981. Hardly any comment is needed.

Speaking about the comparison by experts of the psychological state of Russia in 1981 and 1991 one has to repeat that the state assessed in 1991 referred to the period before reforms. If one sees expert assessments as an expression of objective reality, they seem to refute the widespread view that the psychological atmosphere in Russia deteriorated dramatically *as a result of reforms* which are thought to have started in 1991. According to experts, radical psychological changes took place *before the start of reforms* (though they continued later), being a product of the sociopolitical, economic and macropsychological process-

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es that unfolded *not in the 1990s but earlier.* And indeed, the obvious symptoms of the start of the disintegration of our country, lack of governability, the aggravation of interethnic frictions, criminalization and legalization of criminal relations, moral degradation, the emergence of a new type of individual who cares only about money and seeks to earn it by any, including criminal, methods, and other similar phenomena were manifested at least in the late 1980s, while the reforms of the early 1990s were actively supported by the population which thought that they would change that situation. It is important to stress that the perception of growing freedom occurred before 1991 i.e., *still under Soviet government,* and began to wane subsequently.

In this context one may recall the suggestion made by many well-known political scientists that *revolutions and other radical social reforms, contrary to Marxist logic, represent a reaction not to lack of change (various kinds of "stagnation") but to failed reforms of an earlier period* (thus, the October Revolution in Russia was preceded by the February Revolution which made the country ungovernable). At the same time it has to be borne in mind that at such points of bifurcation of society's development it *always has a choice* and although such ideologists of Russian reform as Yegor Gaydar constantly stressed that Russia had no choice in 1991[13] and that the scenario they chose was the only possible one, in reality there were other options, positive options of the development of events, which was later admitted even by such foreign champions of radical market reform as Milton Friedman.

A similar trend in the psychological change of Russian society was registered by other scholars, including sociologists who have in recent years shown great interest in its social and psychological characteristics, which is highly symptomatic. Thus, in 2005 *VTSIOM* put the following question to respondents: "How, in your opinion, have the people around you changed over the past 10-15 years?" In the opinion of respondents, Russian citizens have become more cynical and "indiscriminate about the means used to achieve their aim," they have become less altruistic, less patriotic, less loyal to their friends, less benevolent, warm, less trusting, less honest and sincere.[14] Another *VTSIOM* poll conducted a year later, in 2006, demonstrated that in the opinion of two-thirds of the population, the moral and ethical climate in Russian society has worsened in recent years.[15] Another study asked the question "Do you believe that most people can be trusted?" In 1990, 34.7% of Russians answered that question in the affirmative, in 1999 the figure was 22.9% and it remained at about the same level in the 2000s, in other words, the level of interpersonal trust in Russian society dropped in the 1990s and then hit a low plateau matched by a similarly low level of trust in social institutions.[16]

The changes in *value orientations* among Russians studied by G. Zarakovsky are very similar. Dmitry Sochivko and Nikolay Polyanin gave the following description of the sociopsychological atmosphere in modern Russia proceeding from their findings: "Russia is in a state Durkheim described as "anomie," which accounts for the emergence of many current social problems: the crisis of morality and legal consciousness, social instability, political disori-

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entation and demoralization of the population, diminished value of the human life, loss of the meaning of life, existential vacuum, cynicism, value and legal nihilism. As a consequence one observes growing aggressive and criminal trends, progressive alienation, a high level of anxiety and deformation of legal consciousness among the youth."[17]

There are significant differences of value orientations between different social groups, in the first place the young people, "the children of the 1990s and 2000s" for whom these were the formative years and the "Soviet generations."[18] Thus, a study by Natalya Lebedeva has shown that the priority values for contemporary Russian students are independence, self-respect, freedom, success, independent choice of goals, etc., while for their teachers these are responsibility, social and national order, peace on Earth, honesty and respect for elders.[19] Other authors too have revealed major differences of value orientations between generations, noting that the present-day Russian youth is shaping its own morality which, for example, considers aggressiveness to be a positive quality while impudence, laxity, unceremoniousness, etc., come under the omnibus positive concept of "being uninhibited." That said, one can hardly challenge the statement that "the youth is like society as a whole," nor can one deny that "one cannot expect effective cultural fulfillment of the potential of the young generation in a sick society."[20]

Discussion of Results

The obtained data can be interpreted proceeding from two fundamental options (and combinations thereof). The first is to consider the dynamic of the psychological state of Russia as represented *objectively* through the perceptions of psychological experts. In this case one has to admit that:

1) the dynamics are generally negative;
2) the current psychological state of Russian society is highly unsatisfactory;
3) it is marked by such characteristics as aggressiveness, apathy, lack of ideals, rightlessness, lack of principle, unceremoniousness, hostility, rudeness, cruelty, xenophobia, lying, impudence, violence, bad manners, empty talk, foul language and boorishness;
4) the most negative characteristics of present-day Russian society are: greed, obsession with money and egoism.

Of course one has to make the reservation that even if one assumes this picture to be objective, "society as a whole" is an abstraction because any real society consists of specific individuals and various social groups and this picture is highly generalized and ignores individual differences and many other nuances.

The second option of interpreting the data obtained is to consider the actual "prism," i.e., the factors that may have shifted expert evaluations in the negative direction. One has to keep in mind that not all of the above mentioned psycho-

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logical effects, such as nostalgia, etc., are acting in this direction. For example, many of the respondents in 2011 undoubtedly enjoyed a much higher living standard than in 1981 and 1991 and owned status symbols (apartments, cars, country-houses, etc.)[21] that they did not have at the time. The effects of a "link" between psychological and socioeconomic assessments and generalization of the personal situation could have prompted a more optimistic view of the current state of affairs.

Of course one cannot deny that the personal tends to be projected onto the general. For example, many, if not all the respondents themselves, have been on the receiving end of rudeness, aggression, dishonesty and other manifestations of our society and are extrapolating their personal experience to the overall characteristics of society. But, first, they were not immune to all these things in the Soviet times too, and, second, making general assessments on the basis of such personal experience is a legitimate method of moving from the particular to the general. True, one can imagine that more recent negative personal experience influences these assessments more than the experience of 30, 20 or 10 years ago, but in that case it is hard to explain why the more recent *positive* experience does not exert a similar impact.

Perhaps this is a manifestation of an assessment similar to the one Russian society gets from some journalists and public figures: "Objectively life has become better, but it is less pleasant." One can also imagine that people's (and experts') sensitivity to and expectations from the psychological atmosphere in society increase as material needs are met. One has to bear in mind the pattern whereby with the growth of educational level satisfaction on various counts usually diminishes and society becomes more critical of what is taking place.[22]

These options fit with the theory of motivation by Abraham Maslow and correspond to the well-known fact that when the basic material needs are not satisfied people concentrate on them at the expense of psychological problems. A similar hypothesis can be advanced with regard to the sociopolitical state of society. When the material needs of the bulk of the population are by and large satisfied (let us leave aside for the moment the well-known facts of the huge gaps between wealth and poverty in Russia, and the existence of large social groups that live below the poverty line, etc.), it is not economic but social and psychological problems that come to the fore. That fits neatly with Maslow's theory and with the theory of needs developed on similar lines by Edward Deci and Richard Ryan[23] and others.

In this situation the fact that much of the population sees no meaning in life (specifically the absence of a coherent national idea) acquires paramount importance and that, too, may create widespread discontent with what is happening. When the meaning of life consists in survival and in meeting primary material needs, their absence, according to Maslow's theory, should be less acutely felt. G. Zarakovsky believes that "the quality of life depends more on personal growth and the existence of the meaning of life than on meeting the basic needs." He proceeds from quantitative analysis to formulate his conclusion that "the biggest contribution to the general life satisfaction index is made not by 'material,' but by 'psychophysiological' factors (relations within the family; friendship and

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communication; personal safety and the safety of one's family; the health of a person and his family members). The smallest contribution is made by such factors as: the economic and political situation in the country; creative fulfillment in and outside work; social infrastructure, and the environment."[24]

In this connection one should pay attention to the studies that reveal at least the absence of a direct link between, on the one hand, such indicators as quantified "happiness level," the perception of the quality of life, etc., and, on the other hand, material well-being. According to the Swedish company *World Values Survey* the subjective perception of the quality of life is the highest in Venezuela and Nigeria while the rich Western countries lag far behind. The majority of developed countries also have very low happiness indicators. For example, according to the happy life years index the members of G8 are distributed as follows: Italy is in 66th place in the world, Germany in 81st, Japan in 95th, Great Britain in 108th, Canada in 111th, France in 129th, the USA in 150th and Russia in 172nd place.[25]

Similar data were obtained in other studies that have demonstrated a paradoxical link between the objective and subjective quality of life.[26] The widely known Easterlin paradox and other similar phenomena which consist in subjective well-being not being proportional to the level of incomes owing to such mechanisms as the "hedonistic running in a circle" (growing incomes are accompanied by growing expectations), etc. As a result, while the level of incomes in the USA has been growing continuously since the Second World War the share of people who consider themselves happy has been constantly falling.[27] In all countries where the Index of Sustainable Economic Well-being and the Genuine Progress Indicator were measured, these indicators revealed a non-linear link with the size of GDP, giving rise to the so-called "threshold hypothesis" whereby the GDP and well-being grow in parallel up to a certain point beyond which the growth of GDP is not matched by the growth of well-being.[28] In some countries, for example, Switzerland, an inverse link between income and subjective perception of well-being has been revealed.

The above should not be interpreted to mean that the Russian population can achieve happiness by becoming a society of paupers, nor should the inference be made that Russia should emphasize noneconomic methods of making its citizens feel happy, which has occurred more than once during its history (by subjugating people to a common goal, etc.). But, first, this prompts a less straightforward view of the relationship between economic and psychological indicators and second, it is one more argument against "economic determinism" which was highly characteristic of Russian reformers in the early 1990s who were convinced that the main thing was to put the economy right and then all the rest would "take care of itself." The years that followed in Russia and in other countries show convincingly that "economic progress is not automatically accompanied by social, political and spiritual progress. The high level of material well-being in society is often accompanied by a growing spiritual vacuum, falling standards of morality and increasing social deviations." "Such categories as satisfaction with life, the quality of life, the human development potential depend on many factors and are not directly linked to the GDP."[29]

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Conclusions

Summing up the data and similar results of other studies it would not be irrelevant to recall that when society gets more freedom it releases in society and in man not only the best but also *the worst,* something that is constantly forgotten by reformers in their headlong rush to implement liberal reforms. Apparently, this is what happened to Russian society which has become more malicious, arrogant and loose and has acquired other negative psychological characteristics described above. Naturally (it bears repeating) *society as a whole* is an abstraction. Some of its members have become like this and others have not, but among those who have not succumbed to these negative trends such changes in many of the people who surround them have greatly affected their psychological state and robbed them of a sense of psychological security, etc. What is surprising, however, is that some positive qualities which would seem to have more chance to manifest themselves as a result of liberalization have been waning according to our data. For example, intellectuality and creativity which in other countries is generally stimulated by the market economy, have diminished in Russian society, according to expert evaluations. And yet this does not come as a surprise if one bears in mind the peculiar Russian version of the market economy, based as it is on speculation and trade in commodities rather than innovation. Apparently, it does not call for great intellect or creativity, although of course even the building of financial pyramids requires creativity, albeit of a very special kind. Nor is one surprised by the diminished level of perceived freedom after 1991: if freedom is combined with rudeness, malice, and impudence, it mutates into a freedom to be rude (as well as to use foul language in public, etc.) which has very little to do with genuine civilized freedom.

Discussing the data obtained one should also note that even the possibility that experts perceived the psychological state of Russian society in a negative way *because the economic state of society has improved* does not make the problem any less relevant, but merely suggests that it should be looked at from a different angle. One has to admit that:

1) positive changes in the economic state of society do not automatically improve its psychological state and may, on the contrary, worsen that state;
2) rising living standards and general stabilization in the country do not replace personal psychological comfort and often make its absence more painful;
3) it is the psychological problems of society that come to the fore when the economic situation improves;
4) considering all that, the solution of these problems must be a priority of state policy.

At the same time, as G. Zarakovsky has demonstrated, the Russian authorities practically pay no attention to the psychological state of Russia. Thus, "the ongoing national projects and other measures taken by the official institutions are unlikely to be very effective because they are not backed up by actions aimed at

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improving the psychological perceptions of the population—this despite the fact that the Russian President's speeches and the program of the de facto governing *United Russia* party speak a lot about man as the driving force of socioeconomic development."[30] At the same time it would be wrong and unfair to put all the blame on the authorities without considering *what we ourselves are like*, to what extent we have withstood the test by freedom and what qualities it has released in us, as well as whether the authorities are fostering the Russian's propensity to be rude, to use foul language, etc.

The outstanding Russian sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, who emigrated to the USA, divided the members of society into those who have "creative altruism" and those who have "aggressive egoism."[31] Judging from the data set forth in this article and other similar data, Russia is moving towards "aggressive egoism" in terms of the prevailing value orientation and the influence of this type of personalities. That is not only morally depressing, but it creates serious obstacles in the way of innovative economy which calls for *predominance of creative and not aggressive and greedy attitudes* in order to be successful, obstacles that are clearly underestimated by the strategists of Russian reforms. As a result, *a radical change of the psychological state of society is one of the key conditions for innovation-driven development of Russia.*

NOTES

1 The term "social indicators" was proposed in the USA in the early 1960s by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences which carried out a project commissioned by NASA. Since the 1970s the US Government has been regularly publishing the relevant data, the journal *Social Indicators Research* was founded and a similar approach was taken on board by international organizations such as the UN and the OEC. Later, in the 1980s, interest in these studies declined, but it picked up again in the 1990s. The reason was the adoption by the international community of the sustainable development program and the introduction of aggregated indices instead of disparate social indicators. See: S. Stepashin, *State Audit and the Economy of the Future,* Moscow, 2008 (in Russian).

2 G. Osipov, *Measuring Social Reality,* Moscow, 2011, p. 6 (in Russian).

3 Let it be stressed that the primary components of these indices are also "psychological" in many ways. For example, the life satisfaction index proposed by Yevgeny Balatsky includes such primary indicators as fulfillment of the creative potential, effective informal social contacts (friendship, communication, mutual understanding, sex, etc.): Ye. Balatsky, "Life Satisfaction Factors: Measurement and Integral Indicators," *Public Opinion Monitoring,* 2005, No. 4.

4 S. Sulakshin, *The Russian Demographic Crisis: from Diagnosis to Overcoming,* Moscow, 2006 (in Russian).

5 A. Biderman, *Social Indicators—Whence and Whither?* Washington, 1970; D. Keltner, K.D. Locke, P.C. Audrian, "The Influence of Attributions on the Relevance of Negative Emotions to Personal Satisfactions," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 1993, vol. 19.

6 G. Osipov, op. cit., p. 39. Well-being is usually assumed to be a combination of six factors: 1) physical and mental health, 2) knowledge and understanding, 3) work, 4) materi-

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al well-being, 5) freedom and self-determination, 6) interpersonal relations. See: E. Giovanini, J. Hall, A. Morrone, G. Rannuzi, *A Framework to Measure the Progress of Societies*, OECD Working Paper, 2009. It will readily be seen that this concept, which is of "economic origin," is heavily "psychologized."

7 G. Zarakovsky, *The Quality of Life in Russia: Psychological Components,* Moscow, 2009 (in Russian).

8 A. Tatarko, *Social Capital as an Object of Psychological Study,* Moscow, 2011 (in Russian).

9 G. Zarakovsky, op. cit., p. 132.

10 See: A. Yurevich, "The Dynamic of the Psychological State of Contemporary Russian Society," *Vestnik Rossiiskoy Akademii Nauk,* 2009, vol. 79, No. 2.

11 Thus, the commission for measuring economic efficiency and the quality of life created under French President Nicholas Sarkozy recommends to add to the existing indices the indicators of the psychological health of people, their perceptions and assessments revealed by opinion polls. J. Stiglitz, A. Sen, J.-P. Fitoussi, *Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress* ((http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf).

12 See, for example: M.S. Kimmel, *Revolution: a Sociological Interpretation,* Philadelphia, 1990.

13 Ye. Gaydar, *The Demise of an Empire. Lessons for Contemporary Russia,* Moscow, 2006 (in Russian).

14 "What is forbidden, but sometimes can be done?" *VTSIOM, Press Release, N 235* (http://wciom.ru/?pt=9article=1434).

15 http://www.izvestia.ru//obshestvo/article3101153/?print

16 A. Tatarko, op. cit.

17 D. Sochivko, N. Polyanin, *Russian Youth: Educational Systems, Subcultures, Correctional Facilities,* Moscow, 2009, pp. 182-183 (in Russian).

18 Let us note that the "generation gap" exists in every society in one way or another, but if it takes extreme forms it is a symptom that something is amiss with its psychological state.

19 N. Lebedeva, "Basic Russian Values at the Turn of the 21st Century," *Psikhologichesky zhurnal,* 2000, vol. 21, No. 3.

20 D. Sochivko, N. Polyanin, op. cit., pp. 200, 202.

21 Various studies show that on the whole Russian citizens have been increasingly satisfied with their material well-being since the early 2000s. However, the following observation is made: "Oddly enough, although, according to government statistics, the economic well-being of the population was growing steadily in 2004-2006, the perception of the quality of life by Russians has been diminishing, if slowly." G. Zarakovsky attributes this paradox to the fact that "apparently the people experience the negative impact of some objective psychological factor (G. Zarakovsky, op. cit., p. 98).

22 G. Osipov, op. cit.

23 E.L. Deci, R.M. Ryan, "The 'what' and 'why' of global pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior," *Psychological Inquiry*, 2000, No 11.

24 G. Zarakovsky, op. cit., pp. 105, 110. G. Zarakovsky makes a useful observation to the effect that between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s the statistics of stress-induced dis-

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eases, such as circulatory and digestive disorders, substantially deteriorated whereas the rate of infectious and parasite-caused diseases has diminished. Zarakovsky suggests two explanations to that phenomenon: 1) differences of adaptation to the environment at the conscious and subconscious levels, 2) psychophysiological effects of a more active way of life, in particular multiple employment, etc., that are necessary to adapt to the new economic conditions.

25 N. Marks, S. Aballah, A. Simms, S. Thompson, *The Happy Planet Index. An Index of Human Well-Being and Environment Impact*, London, 2006.

26 E. Diener, E.M. Suh, "National Differences in Subjective Well-Being," *Well-Being. The Foundations in Hedonic Psychology*, Eds. D. Kahntman, E. Diener, New York, 1999.

27 D.G. Blanchflower, A.J. Oswald, R. Janoff-Bulman, *Well-Being over Time in Britain and USA*, NBER Working paper no. 7487. Cambridge, Mass., 2000.

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Modernity and Tradition in the Values of Post-Soviet Youth

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The Russian intellectual community is again exercised by the idea of modernizing Russian society. Looking back at the results of the previous "catching-up modernization" one can safely say that this path of development does not suit Russia. But this does not mean that the idea of modernization is irrelevant to Russia. As Svetlana Matveyeva rightly points out, "the very idea of modernization—i.e., a constant renewal, uninterrupted dynamics of traditions and innovations which are dominated by the value orientation towards advancing along the path of qualitative improvement, reform and progressive development—has lost none of its allure."[1] This makes it important to find out whether Russian society can have a system of values, which, on the one hand, is in harmony with the realities of present-day life and, on the other, does not contradict the traditional Russian morality and mentality? Recent opinion polls indicate that traditional structures are building up in Russian society, indeed, there is something of a resurgence of traditionalism.[2] The Russian economist Aleksandr Auzan believes that if the country is to develop in an effective way "it is necessary to choose not the values that are ingrained in our way of life, but precisely the things that are missing." He cites the example of the USA: "It is wrong to consider Americans to be liberals, because if one looks at their behavior that arose from the country's development, they are extremely aggressive and authoritarian. So the nation needed liberal norms in order to survive." Thus, according to Aleksandr Auzan, the fact that certain contemporary norms are unpopular in Russian society does not mean that "one has to resign to this state of affairs."[3] (This brings to mind what Lev Tolstoy once said to the artist Nikolay Roerich: "Did you ever happen to cross a river with a strong current in a boat? You should always steer above the place where you want to go, otherwise you will be carried away. In the field of moral precepts you should always steer higher because life will carry everything downstream."[4])

Obviously, in the process of modernization of Russian society a particularly important role belongs to young people whose views and behavior were shaped

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under the influence of post-Soviet transformations. The most interesting cohort of Russians are those born in the early 1990s because they represent a generation that has had no experience of life in the Soviet Union and has grown up in the "new Russia."

In the late 2008early 2009 a team of the Institute of Sociology of Education of RAE conducted a sociological poll devoted to the problem of the relationship between "modernity" and "tradition" in the values of post-Soviet youth. The modern type of behavior was assumed to be the type of behavior corresponding to the main characteristics of the analytical model of a "modern personality" developed by American sociologist Alex Inkeles. In his time Alex Inkeles (jointly with David Smith) proceeding from intercountry research data discovered that all societies exposed to the processes of modernization tend to form a modern type of personality (elsewhere the terms "modern"/"traditional" and "modernist"/"traditionalist," etc. will be used without quotation marks in the meanings Inkeles ascribed to them). The modern man, according to Inkeles, is an active citizen with a developed sense of social responsibility, inwardly and intellectually independent, open-minded, tolerant of the people around him and law abiding.[5] In his opinion, the main prerequisite for successful functioning of modern society is the "modernity" of its citizens. An important advantage of the analytical model of a "modern individual" is that it is invariant and applicable to any type of society.

Sample. Inkeles' studies have shown that the degree and depth of *modernity* of a person depends on his/her level of education; that is way it was decided to include in the sample young men and women with different social resources, above all educational. The study focused on Moscow high school students and students of colleges as people with potentially different types of future labor careers (N=800+800). To maintain the homogeneity within the groups it was decided, if possible, to equalize both subgroups in terms of gender and age. Among the college students polled 52% were boys and 48% were girls. And among high school students that ratio is respectively 45% and 55%. The age of the respondents was between 15 and 18 and the average age in both groups was 16. Proceeding from empirical studies we assumed that pupils in grades 10-11, as a rule, intend to go on to acquire a higher education, but college students have no such ambition. Yana Roshchina comments: "The main 'watershed' of educational opportunities at school occurs after grade 9: those who want to go on to university go on to grade 10 and many among those who receive their high school education certificate are oriented only to the medium or initial stage of vocational training." Because "social differentiation in education is the result of the influence of differences of the families of young people and disposable family capital"[6] college students come for the most part from social strata with poor resources whereas those who go on to grade 10 and 11 as a rule have grown up in well-to-do families with considerable resources. Accordingly, we expected that there would be notable differences in the balance of the modern and the traditional in the value systems of students of different types of educational institutions.

In the first group (grade 10-11 pupils at Moscow schools raised in comparatively well-to-do families) 48.1% of respondents were grade 10 pupils and 51.9%

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were grade 11 pupils. Out of that number only 4.1% said their families' income was low. 74.6% said it was medium and high; 66.1% were raised in two-parent families; 75.9% said one or both parents had no less than a higher education. In the second group (young men and women in their first and second year at Moscow colleges) only those who entered college after finishing grade 9 at school were interviewed. Out of that number 83% study in accordance with the programs of the secondary vocational education and 17%, the primary vocational education programs. The trades members of that group are learning range from assistant electrical train driver to carpenter, to electrician, accountant, merchandiser, computer operator, primary school teacher, social worker, etc. The members of that subsample have much smaller social resources: 47.1% of them grew up in a two-parent family***; 71.2% have medium and high incomes and 9.9% said they were poor***; 42.5% have at least one parent with a higher education.[7]

The sample included only the residents of Moscow, which precludes extrapolating the data to all young Russians. Besides, we know from the results of mass surveys that the residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg have more *modern* views than Russians elsewhere throughout the country. Furthermore, living in a megalopolis as distinct from the province or rural areas, greatly increases the individual's chances to adapt to the ongoing social change in Russia and join the ranks of agents with strong resources who would later influence the key spheres of our society. Proceeding from the above, one can see that the concept of the amount of social capital is controversial. For example, compared with their peers in the provinces Muscovites with poor resources have a higher starting base simply by virtue of their place of residence. Young people as an age group are known to be generally more open to innovation and progress than other age groups, so it can be said that in polling young Muscovites we seek to study the values of those who are potentially the most modern part of Russian society. The results may become a kind of template, a "high" bar yardstick.

Methodology. To achieve the aims of the study a methodology was developed for studying the disposition of the respondents at the level of behavioral attitudes and normative value orientations. The methodology has two substantive blocks. The first consists of "projective questions" that bring out the overall direction of behavioral intensions of the respondents in day-to-day situations. The respondents were asked to choose one or other course of action in a proposed—imagined but fairly plausible—situation. Most of these situations have to do with the model of a "modern personality" proposed by Alex Inkeles: the behavioral choices correspond to the modern or traditional type of behavior and in some cases are neutral.

The other part of the methodology is based on questions that include pairs of alternative propositions, one modern and the other traditional in terms of values. We thought it was important that the questions in the "value" block of the questionnaire be related to the questions/situations in the "behavior" block. In formulating questions for both blocks certain conditions were set: the projective questions were concerned with the behavioral intentions of the respondents in concrete day-to-day situations. The pairs of alternative value judgments were of a more gen-

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eral character containing normative stereotypes characteristic of mass consciousness. To make the data more reliable both individual and group in-depth interviews were conducted with some respondents referred to as "modernists" or "traditionalists" based on the results of the poll. Thus, a semiformalized in-depth interview "The Life Principles of Modern Youth" seeks to obtain information on the life principles and norms of behavior that guide modern Russian young men and women.

The aim of the third methodology, a semistructured group interview (focus groups) "New and Traditional Values in Russian Society" is to find out not "personal" dispositions and motives of the respondents but more general"social"ideas of young Russians about society in which they live, its value system, what impedes or, on the contrary, propels the development of our country. It was decided to hold focus groups (FG) with "modernists" and "traditionalists" who answered questions in the course of individual interviews. Two FGs were held in each of the polar subsamples, one in the traditional form and another as an online discussion. The justification of the method of online focus group that is fairly new for Russian sociology is as follows. An overall "internetization" that has recently swept the developed countries changed the ideas about the methods and practice of sociological studies. According to American experts, one in every two opinion polls in the world will be held over the Internet.[8] Many sociologists and marketing specialists are sure that Internet studies have several advantages over traditional offline studies. First of all, online studies provide a broader access to the target audience, reduce the time and cost of the survey, ensure more sincere answers from respondents, clearly determine the group dynamics and minimize the impact of overly "active" participants; the convenient procedure of discussion can minimize the rate of refusals. Our study has applied a "virtual analogue of a traditional focus group in the chat format (the talk is conducted in real time; the participants get registered on the proposed website and engage in a discussion together with a moderator).

The factor structure of behavioral attitudes of youth. To reduce the number of variables in the behavioral block we have conducted a factor analysis of responses in both subsamples. Categorial Principal Component Analysis (CatPCA) was used to work with qualitative data. Statistical processing of data used the SPSS 13.0 program. There is a known shortcoming of the CatPCA method which lacks the procedure of rotation that yields a more simple and more readily interpreted data structure. So it was decided first to subject the primary data to categorial factor analysis, and then, using the classic PCA module, to carry out a factor analysis using Varymax rotation for the transformed variables.[9] As a result four factors that are germane to the model of the "modern personality" were identified: *factors of participation, ambition, law abidance and freedom* (see Table).[10] Thereafter pairs of propositions for each factor obtained were selected from the questions of the value block. Thus "modernists" and "traditionalists" were discriminated from the total body of respondents both in terms of behavioral intentions and value orientations.

The first factor, designated, for want of a better term, as the factor of *participation* (18% informative) included propositions connected with social responsibility and social commitment. A person who shares the propositions of that factor will def-

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initely intervene if he sees that another person is being robbed or an animal is being beaten and will return a lost wallet to its owner. He is considerate and tolerant: he would yield a seat to a sick or elderly person in the metro and ignores nationality in choosing his friends. Such actions are to a large extent in line with "helping behavior" which implies helping others without expecting anything in return.

It can be said that school and college students have a shared attitude to behavioral principles. In both groups a significant number of respondents share the components of this factor (41.3% of school students and 29.9% of vocational college students) although a third of high school students and their peers in colleges reject the norms of mutual assistance (30.1% and 36.6% respectively).***

The following pairs of value propositions were recognized as being consistent with the *participation* behavioral factor.

(1) People of certain nationalities may not deserve respect,

(2) A person of any nationality deserves respect;

(1) You cannot be equally responsive with your close ones and with strangers,

(2) One should try to be equally responsive to one's close ones and strangers.

The "modernists" in terms of value orientations ("views") were those who chose modern propositions in both cases, and the "traditionalists" were those respondents who supported the traditional value orientations.

Table

Correlation Coefficients between Behavioral Attitudes and the Main Factor Components**

Behavioral intentions	F- Participation 18%	F- Ambition 17%	F- Law Abidance 15%	F- Freedom 11%
If you see a street robbery will you try to stop the thief	.891	.140	.061	.085
Will interfere if witnesses cruel treatment of an animal	.843	.069	–.022	.207
If he finds a lost wallet he will do everything to return it to its owner	.810	.273	.315	–.084
Will yield his seat to a sick or elderly person in the metro	.573	.120	.381	–.117
In choosing friends does not care what their nationality is	.428	.220	.138	.054
Prefers a challenging job involving responsibility and requiring initiative to fairly simple and monotonous work	.045	.884	.049	.095

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Table (continued)

Behavioral intentions	F- Participation 18%	F- Ambition 17%	F- Law Abidance 15%	F- Freedom 11%
Prefers interesting work to highly paid work	.025	.798	.237	.099
Is ready (not afraid) to take part in talent contests among students	.213	.723	–.063	–.045
If problems arise in doing homework tries to cope with them himself/herself	.188	.641	.326	.100
Will not take part in a machination if money is urgently needed to pay for surgery on a close relative or friend	.038	.188	.725	.036
Will prevent relatives from bribing a teacher even if a bribe is openly solicited (may report to the school principal)	.072	–.114	.690	.353
Will not buy a stolen thing even at a low price	.084	.025	.687	–.206
Is ready to pay the fare on a commuter train regardless of whether the inspector is around	.134	.261	.676	–.112
If the teacher finds an alleged "mistake" in his/her work will argue with the teacher until he/she is able to convince him	.185	.104	–.026	.716
When choosing a career does not follow the opinion of the parents	–.158	–.036	.060	.695
Will join a political rally if his/ her rights are infringed upon	.203	.184	–.189	.693

** Confidence interval is **95%.** The value of Barlett's criterion (R-level, **.000)** indicates that the data are acceptable for factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin criterion (KMO) is **0.8**, which means that factor analysis suits the sample to a high degree.

Almost half of the high-school students (44.5%) and college students (43.1%) polled agreed with the proposition that "a person of any nationality may deserve respect" and that "one should try to be equally responsive with one's close ones and with strangers." However, there were those who divide the surrounding people into "us" and "them," but they were not many (8.2% *vs.* 12.9%).***

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The results of the survey indicate that the practice of helping strangers is not very widespread in modern Russia. Thus, Canadian journalists used surveillance cameras in various countries to determine whether people hold the door for the stranger who follows them at the shop entrance, whether the sales attendants thank customers for their purchase, whether they return an umbrella "accidentally" forgotten at a bus stop to the owner. It turned out that four out of five New Yorkers passed the "helping behavior" test, followed by Zurich and Toronto; the residents of Berlin, Zagreb and San Paõlo were not as helpful and the residents of Moscow were close to the bottom of the list. Another study, carried out by a group of Russian sociologists (Vladimir Yadov, Irina Shcherbakova and others) was devoted to passenger behavior in the metro: holding the door for the passenger following one is considered to be good manners. Passengers were observed *via* video camera at the entrance to the metro in Budapest, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod and St. Petersburg. The largest number of passengers who held the door for the next passenger was in Budapest (80-83% depending on the passenger flow), among Russian cities St. Petersburg (60-70%) and Nizhny Novgorod (about 70%) were closest to these indicators whereas in Moscow only about half of the passengers have "good manners" (43%-56%).[11]

The *ambition* factor (informative value equals 17%) comprised behavioral intentions that come with the values of self-fulfillment and professionalism. That factor includes the following propositions with high degree of support (score): "Interesting work is more important than highly-paid job" (a solution of Fromm's dilemma "to have or to be" in favor of the latter) and "if you have to choose between two jobs equally paid for, would you choose a challenging or monotonous job," the answer is to choose a challenging job. The respondents with a high individual score on that factor are not afraid to take part in a creative talent contest, and are inclined to try to cope themselves with the problems they encounter in doing homework. According to the obtained data respondents from poor resource social strata are not noted for *ambitious* behavioral attitudes. These are chosen as a rule by school students (47.6% *vs*. 18.7% of college students) and rejected by young people with lower education resources (42.4% *vs*. 24.9% of high school students).***

The respondents also expressed their attitude to the following propositions:

(1) one must show initiative in everything one does,

(2) it is better to live without sticking one's neck out;

(1) a person should seek to build a career and become a top-class specialist,

(2) many people are not obsessed with their work, and that is the right attitude.

The respondents who identify themselves with the first proposition were put in the category of "modernists" and those who chose the second proposition were included among "traditionalists." A little over half of the high-school students and college students supported the values of initiative and professional betterment, whereas the number of "traditionalists" in both subsamples was barely above 5%.

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It is interesting to compare the data with the results of mass polls of young people on similar themes. A survey of the RAS Institute of Sociology (2007) revealed that for many young Russians it is important not only to earn well (85%), but to have an interesting job (63%), to achieve professional recognition (26%), to display creative ability and initiative (16%). At the same time, there are a good many young people who do not link their life goals with work: 13% would like their job to leave them a lot of time for other pursuits (leisure, family, study). A further 6% of respondents (most of whom have a low level of education) want their job not to be tiring.[12] A poll conducted by the Public Opinion Fund (2009) found that today's 16-17-year-olds in Russia are much less given to the "collectivity" syndrome that characterized the Soviet generations. High school students like to stand out of the crowd, and to be different from the rest even more than young people in general (53% *vs*. 41%) (the polls compared were for Russian high school students and youth in general (aged 16-26).[13]

The divisive values of the *law abidance* factor (information value 15%) are as follows: will not take part in a machination if money is urgently needed for surgery on a close one; will not permit relatives to present a "gift" to a bribetaking teacher; will not buy a stolen thing even at a low price and will not avail himself of the opportunity to be a "deadhead" on a commuter train. It is noteworthy that each of the above propositions is connected with the traits of the so-called "Russian national character." The juxtaposition of the law and moral norms is a peculiarity of Russian mentality which puts a premium on acting "according to one's conscience" rather than "according to the law."[14] Incidentally, the results of comparative studies of Russian and West European legal attitudes show that while a Westerner thinks the function of the law is above all "to ensure justice and protect positive values," in Russian popular consciousness the law plays a "negative, punitive function."[15]

Among high school students high scores on the behavioral factor of law abidance were reported by 41.4% and among college students by 25.8% of respondents. The number of don't knows in the subsamples of high school students and college students was about equal, about one third (31.2% and 36% respectively).***

The behavioral factor of *law abidance* relied on the following pairs of value judgments:

(1) laws are largely a hindrance to people,

(2) laws mainly help people to live;

(1) many Russian laws are such that they are impossible to comply with,

(2) whatever the laws are they must be obeyed.

About a third of respondents in both subsamples pay lip service to abidance by the law. It is interesting that high school students are even less law-abiding "in words" than "in deed," in other words, to use Robert Merton's terminology, they act in the framework of the adaptive model of ritualism: while not recognizing certain social norms they try to follow them. Only a few respondents expressed

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demonstrative disrespect of law (13.4% of high school students and 16.8% of college students).

According to a mass survey conducted by Irina Staroverova, many young people are tolerant of various antisocial phenomena such as hooliganism, crime, prostitution, corruption, etc.[16] Another survey has revealed that many young people say they are ready to observe the law and moral norms only "if it benefits them to behave morally, when the laws that meet the requirements of a modern personality are elaborated and when these laws are consciously obeyed by the individual."[17] Scientists attribute the low level of legal consciousness among Russians to the widespread penetration of criminal subculture in every sphere of Russian society's life "from daily life to the rules of economic and political games, from interpersonal relations to social institutions."[18]

The respondents who have chosen the behavioral intentions of the *freedom* factor (informative value 11%) rely on their own opinion in making decisions and are not afraid to disobey their parents or teachers if they believe they are wrong. They are also active protestors and are prepared to take part in a political rally if their rights are infringed upon. Predictably, young people with greater educational capital are more strongly oriented towards freedom than young people from colleges (40.1% and 26.6% respectively), the situation being the reverse with the "traditionalists." There are more of them in the underresourced group (39.3% and 27.6%).***

On the positive side it has to be stressed that there are practically no respondents in either group who consciously reject the values of freedom. Many of the high school students interviewed (63.8%) and college students (52.6%) agreed with modern propositions about freedom when presented with the following alternatives:

(1) it is very important to be free in one's actions and judgments,

(2) being free in one's acts and judgments is not the most important thing;

(1) in the event your rights are infringed upon it is better to resign than to "kick against the pricks,"

(2) in the event your rights are infringed upon you must protect yourself by all legitimate means.

The number of "traditionalists" who would "resign to life's problems is within the statistical error margin (3% of high school students and 2% of college students).***

Our data largely tally with the results of an RAS Institute of Sociology study (2007, led by Mikhail Gorshkov) whereby 66% of young Russians believe that life is meaningless without freedom. At the same time the RAS Institute of Sociology scholars note that tolerance of unfreedom has somewhat increased among young Russians since 1997: earlier, 71% considered freedom to be an indispensable component of life.[19]

"Modernists" and "traditionalists" in the post-Soviet generation: main characteristics. Although modernist and traditionalist orientations are fanciful-

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ly intertwined in the minds of most respondents, two "pure groups" can be identified within the entire body of respondents: "modernists" and "traditionalists" both in terms of their behavioral attitudes and value orientations. "Modernists" are respondents who got the highest scores on at least three out of the four behavioral and value blocks' factors, and "traditionalists" are those with the lowest scores.

From the results of the survey statistically *significant differences* were found in the answers of respondents to projective *behavioral* questions. Among the high school students 22.9% demonstrate modernist behavioral intentions and only 7% belong to "traditionalists." Among college students there are very few "modernists," 5.2%, while there are 15% "traditionalists."*** Most respondents in both groups choose a mixed type of behavioral intentions. At the same time, the value orientations of representatives of social groups with different levels of resources turned out to be *similar. In words* 31.1% of high school students and 27.5% of college students are "modernists" whereas only a few (less than 1% in both subsamples) are "traditionalists." Clearly, respondents were more sincere in answering questions in the behavioral block, therefore elsewhere speaking about "modernists" and "traditionalist" we will refer above all to respondents with modernist or traditionalist behavioral attitudes.

The similarity of views and behavioral strategies among representatives of groups of young people with different levels of resources is probably due to some common worldview attitudes that are shared by the post-Soviet generation in general. But it is worth stressing that the share of "modernists" is higher in the group of respondents with strong resources than among "traditionalists" whereas in the weak resources subsample the situation is the reverse. Besides, as we had expected, "modernists" have greater personality and social resources compared with "traditionalists": they are more internal (86.2% *vs*. 65.3%,*** the number of respondents who regard success as a result of a person's efforts and not a lucky concatenation of circumstances). They seek to acquire a higher education or an academic degree (95.1% *vs*. 68.8%***), they have grown up in two-parent (64.4% *vs*. 46.6%***) families with average or high incomes (76% *vs*. 63.1%***) in which one or both parents have a higher education (72.9% *vs*. 55.1%***). This confirms the hypothesis that there is a link between an individual's modernism and his/her "resource capacity."

Initially we planned to isolate a group of the so-called *absolute* "modernists" and "traditionalists," i.e., young men and women whose modernist or traditionalist behavioral attitudes coincide with their value orientations. However, that procedure was complicated by the small number of respondents who held "traditionalist" *views.* Still, in the group of modern-oriented respondents there were enough *absolute* "modernists." There were 9.2% of them among high-school students and 2.9% among college students***; the number of *absolute* "traditionalists," as mentioned above, was negligible: less than 0.5% of respondents in both contrasting groups. It has to be noted that many "modernists," unlike "traditionalists," are very self-aware: their behavioral attitudes are not at odds with their values whereas "traditionalists" tend to declare one set of norms ("in word")

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while wishing to follow other norms. One should not forget however that there is no "rigid vertical dependence of lower level dispositions on higher and top-level dispositions (value orientations)." The mutually contradicting disposition attitudes are especially characteristic of societies in the process of transformation for, according to Vladimir Yadov, the relative autonomy of lower-level dispositions with respect to higher level ones is a way of adaptation to the social conditions,[20] including frequently changing social conditions. Given that the degree of awareness of a social disposition influences its strength, one can make an optimistic suggestion: "modernists" most probably will practice their behavioral intentions while less self-aware "traditionalists" may change their attitudes.

The life principles of "modernists" and "traditionalists." Let us review briefly the results of individual in-depth interviews conducted with some "modernists" and "traditionalists." The interviews took place in April-May 2009 in two groups: traditionalists and modernists (12 persons in each group) equalized in terms of social capital and gender. The interviewees included:

1) absolute "modernists" and "traditionalists,"
2) "modernists"/"traditionalists" in terms of behavioral attitudes + adherents to the "mixed" type of value orientations.

As follows from the studies carried out by Alex Inkeles, the "modern man" believes in social justice, in the possibility of influencing the country's life independently or jointly with others, therefore he voluntarily takes part in rallies, protest actions and elections. Young men and women who embrace modern views do not think it is futile to take part in protest actions even though they admit that they are not always effective. "Traditionalists" have a different view of these issues. They believe that *"claiming their rights"* is not just useless, but dangerous. Others are more optimistic. However, even active "traditionalists" are sure that common people are able to change the "local" situation but are hardly able to influence serious political decisions. Elsewhere in this text "T." stands for "traditionalists" and "M." for modernists.

"*Why stick your neck out?"* (T., college student, 16). "*Not big events but some small events. But the common man cannot influence politics"* (T., high school student, 16). Neither "modernists" nor "traditionalists" believe that Russian elections are honest and transparent. However, the "modernists" are ready, once they are old enough to vote, to take part in the elections on the off-chance that "*What if something happens and our vote is really taken into account"* (M., high school student, 18). On the whole, the majority of "modernists" believe that taking part in elections is the civic duty of every self-respecting person, but that it would be stupid to hope that your vote will be taken into account. "Traditionalists" reject the idea of taking part in such a "*futile exercise"* as Russian elections. "*Well, of course, you have to vote, it's your duty. But I think they have decided everything in advance. The point is to do it for your own sake so as to be honest with yourself and to know that you have done what you could. I would vote but I wouldn't think that my vote can bring some change."* (M., school student, 17). "*Elections are also nothing but lies"* (T., school student, 16).

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Speaking about the attitude of respondents to laws, the opinion of "modernists" is best expressed in the words: "You should try not to break the law, but it is not always possible." "Traditionalists" as a rule think that disobeying laws is inherent in human nature because "*that's the way humans are made. They always want to do what is forbidden"* (T., college student, 16). Many of them said that ignoring certain social norms in Russia is legitimized by social practice to such an extent that it is no longer considered an infraction: "*That's simply the way we live." "People don't even know that they are breaking some laws. This is the way we live. I visited my uncle in Germany. And I threw an ice-cream wrapper out of the car window. The uncle bawled me out. He said: 'You know what a huge fine they would serve on us if the police saw it?' And I was not aware that I was breaking the law. In this country we always throw things out of car windows"* (T., school student, 16).

"Modernists" and "traditionalists" are at one on certain topics: both have an extremely negative view of Russian politicians and journalists, look at social change in a very *modernist* way, i.e., without fear, and are prepared to adapt themselves to change: to change their job, upgrade their qualifications, etc.

We had expected that "modernists" would be better adapted compared with "traditionalists," but that did not turn out to be the case. About 60% in both groups displayed good adaptability, which prevents us from saying that only adherence to *modern* views, is the necessary condition of successful existence in Russia. We used the "Social Thermometer" method proposed by Olga Dudchenko and Anna Mytil.[21] The degree of adaptation was measured by comparing the respondent's assessment of his/her current and past situation. Those who believe that their life has improved over the past five years ("the gainers") have been assumed to be better adapted, others said that their life has not changed or that they used to live better than today ("losers").

"Modernists" and "traditionalists" about Russian society. This section reports the results of four focus groups (FG) conducted with "modernists" and "traditionalists" (in May 2009). The conversation was about the traditional and comparatively new values of Russian society that became widespread recently. The members of FGs were asked to identify the positive traditional Russian values, i.e., the values that are still important and necessary today and the negative ones, i.e., those that impede the country's normal development. Then a similar analysis was carried out with regard to the positive and negative values of contemporary Russian society.

Among the positive traditional social values both "modernists" and "traditionalists" named above not being fixated on material gain, industry, and spirituality of the Russian people. "*We have always been hardworking: people liked to work, they liked labor, decency, money was not the most important thing for them"* (M., school student, 15). *"A Russian just tries to survive. Most of them do not care very much about being rich"* (M., school student, 17). *"The sense of honor and duty are long lost traditional Russian values"* (T., college student, 16). *"People were kinder before"* (T., school student, 16).

The main negative feature of the Russian people, noted both by "modernists" and "traditionalists" is the notorious "Russian pastime"drunkenness.

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Speaking about the new social values, the members of FGs noted the major impact Western culture has exerted on the axiological-normative image of Russia. It was heartening to discover a fairly balanced attitude of the representatives of the post-Soviet generation to Russia and the West: the FGs members are inclined to view Russia and the Western countries in a critical way objectively assessing the merits and demerits of both "worlds." Many noted the unfortunate penchant of Russian society to ape the negative values of Western society and to ignore the good things that the US and European countries have to offer. They stress that *"fast food," "stupid Hollywood films"* and *"Halloween"* have easily taken root here, but the same cannot be said about cleanliness, order, law-abidance, respect for the older generation and the care of the authorities for the people. "*The older generation has a wonderful life there, and they enjoy great respect. Here it is total lack of culture, old people live like tramps and nobody wants to do anything about it"* (M., college student, 15). *"Fast food has taken root, but laws, decent living, like abroad are unlikely to take root and the state will continue to despise its citizens"* (T., college student, 16). *"What definitely is not taking root here is order and cleanliness"* (M., school student, 17).

The main positive value Russia has borrowed from the West, in the opinion of both "modernists" and "traditionalists," is freedom. "*Society has become more or less liberal and there is more freedom. There are no special norms of behaviorthough sometimes it does harm and sometimes it makes life easieryou don't have to march in formation and so on. Things are not as conservative as in old Russia or in the Soviet Union. If for example you showed up at work or at school dressed informally there would be a scandal, they would drag you on the carpet or issue a reprimand"* (M., school student, 15).

At the same time some respondents noted the flip side of freedom, the permissiveness whose fruits are very much in evidence in Russian society. However, the members of FGs rather "unpatriotically" put the blame for this "sin" on their own country and not on the "corrupt West." "*We ourselves crossed the line, we were so happy that everything is now allowed"* (M., school student, 17). Interestingly, this interpretation of "freedom Russian-style" is related to the specifically Russian concept of *volya (free will, or doing whatever you like)* while in the West freedom is an institutional phenomenon that presupposes an individual's obligations with regard to other people, *volya* is a kind of freedom that concerns only the individual and does not entail any social obligations.[22] The philosopher Georgy Fedotov wrote about the Russian *volya.* The word 'freedom' still sounds like a translation of the French *liberté.* But nobody would challenge that *volya* is a peculiarly Russian phenomenon <...> *Volya* is above all the possibility to live or living according to one's own will without being constrained by any social bonds, let alone chains <...>. Personal freedom is inconceivable without respect for other people's freedom; *volya* is invariably only for oneself."[23]

Conclusions. The results of the study show that the post-Soviet youth appears to have assimilated quite thoroughly the values of the *modern* civilization. Otherwise how does one account for the fact that "in words" few respon-

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dents in both contrasting social groups support such norms as contempt of the law, lack of initiative and the need to be free. At the same time many young people who share the norms of modern society are not at all prepared to stick to them in their day-to-day life. On that count, the representatives of the post-Soviet generation are truly the children of their society which often lives according to "undeclared rules." But one should not forget that under certain circumstances the internalized values also translate themselves into behavior. A person who is aware of the harm of smoking is more likely to quit smoking than a person who thinks otherwise.

NOTES

1 *Society in Crisis. Our Society in Three Dimensions,* Eds. N. Lapin, L. Belyayeva, Moscow, 1994, p. 46 (in Russian).

2 *Russian Identity in Sociological Dimension. Information-Analytical Bulletin of the RAS Institute of Sociology,* Moscow, 2008, pp.19-20 (in Russian).

3 A. Auzan, *The National Formula of Modernization. Public Lecture Polit.ru* (http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2009/10/16/auzan.html).

4 P. Belikov, V. Knyazeva, *Nikolay Roerich,* Moscow, 1973, p. 36 (in Russian).

5 A. Inkeles, D. Smith, *Becoming Modern,* Cambridge, MA, 1974, pp. 289-301.

6 Ya. Roshchina, "Social Differentiation of Youth in Russian Vocational Education," *Otechestvennye zapiski,* 2006, No. 3.

7 Here and elsewhere the statistical value of differences is indicated in the following way: *-$p \le 0.05$, **- $p \le 0.01$; *** - $p \le 0.001$.

8 A. Shashkin, "Focus Groups Online. New Marketing Studies Technologies." See: *Marketing Journal, 4p.ru* (4p.ru).

9 On the acceptability of this procedure see for example: M. Linting, *Nonparametric Inference in Nonlinear Principal Components Analysis: Exploration and Beyond,* Thesis, Leiden University, 2007, see: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/dspace/handle/1887/12386.

10 On the whole three groups of respondents were identified depending on high, medium and low values for each factor. We consider here mainly the groups with the highest and lowest values.

11 I. Shcherbakova, V. Yadov, "The Culture of Considerate Behavior in a Big City: Experience of Video Observation of Passengers at the Metro Doors in Budapest, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod and St. Petersburg," *Sotsiologichesky zhurnal,* 2007, No. 4, p. 138, 141, 146.

12 "Youth in the New Russia: Lifestyle and Value Priorities," *Information-Analytical Bulletin of the RAS Institute of Sociology,* Moscow, 2007, pp. 15-16 (in Russian).

13 For further detail see the official Internet site of the Public Opinion Fund *(FOM).* The project "A High School Student—2009: Profile Against the Background of the Crisis," http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/eco_cri/st210509) (in Russian).

14 See, for example, T. Stefanenko. "On Russian Mentality: Constants and Transformation," *Social Transformations in Russia: Theories, Practices, Comparative Analysis,* Ed. V. Yadov, Moscow, 2005, p. 290 (in Russian).

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15 A. Slavskaya, "Legal Perceptions in Russian Society," *Russian Mentality: Aspects of Psychological Theory and Practice,* Moscow, 1997, p. 77 (in Russian).

16 I. Staroverova, "Factors of Deviation of Consciousness and Behavior Among Russian Youth," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya (SOTSIS),* 2009, No. 11, p. 112.

17 N. Shustova, V. Gritsenko, "Sociopsychological Adaptation of Youth and Their Attitude to Social Norms," *Psikhologichesky zhurnal,* 2007, No. 1, p.50.

18 L. Presnyakova, "The Discreet Charm of Crime Versus Wasted Efforts of Prison," *Sotsialnaya realnost,* 2006, No. 1, p. 38.

19 *Youth in the New Russia...* p. 10.

20 *The Impact of Western Sociocultural Models on the Social Practices in Russia,* Ed. V. Yadov, Moscow, 2009, pp. 21, 22 (in Russian).

21 O. Dudchenko, A. Mytil, "Two Models of Adaptation to Social Change," *Russia: Society in the Process of Transformation.* Ed. V. Yadov, Moscow, 2001 (in Russian).

22 V. Zhuravlev et al., *Social Values of Contemporary Russian Youth: Current State, Dynamics, Direction,* Moscow, 2002, p. 66 (in Russian).

23 G. Fedotov, *Russia and Freedom.* See: *Vehi* electronic library site (http://www.vehi.net/fedotov/svoboda.html).

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

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С. ВАЖЕНИН, В. БЕРСЕНЕВ, И. ВАЖЕНИНА, А. ТАТАРКИН. Территориальная конкуренция в экономическом пространстве, Екатеринбург, Институт экономики, Уральское Отделение РАН, 2011, 540 с.

S. VAZHENIN, V. BERSENEV, I. VAZHENINA, A. TATARKIN. *Territorial Competition in the Economic Space*, Yekaterinburg, the Institute of Economics, Urals Branch of RAS, 2011, 540 pp.

The desire of regional authorities to make their region economically attractive can probably be described as an objective interest. This means that the monograph prepared by the Institute of Economics of the Urals Branch of the RAS dealing with the latest methods, forms and mechanisms of territorial competitiveness will be interesting not only to theoreticians but also those who deal with that in practice.

This monograph stands apart from many similar publications because it generalizes and systematizes theoretical knowledge and accumulated experience, including foreign experience, in making territories commercially attractive (Para 1.1, 1.2).

The authors have widened the already established ideas in this sphere. For example, they introduced a category "the competitive immunity of the territory" to describe the territory's ability to stand up to competitive challenges; an ability to oppose external and internal risks and to promptly recover after destructive events of various kinds (Para 1.3). This category obviously differs from the well-known "competitiveness of a territory" concept which stresses the territory's already existing abilities; the "competitive immunity," on the other hand, describes the territory's potential to be tapped to achieve greater economic attractiveness. The authors, however, have failed to suggest a methodology of quantitative definition of the "competitive immunity of the territory" concept without which this category is devoid of its instrumental character.

Chapter 6 deals with cluster initiatives and development of partnership between the state and private businesses in the context of territorial competition.

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Innovation clusters (in which the state, private research centers, higher educational establishments, state and municipal administrations, public organizations, etc. cooperate) are seen as the most efficient form of tapping the territory's competitive advantages. Such clusters make it possible to exploit the advantages of the most effective methods of coordination inside the regional socioeconomic system. This means that new knowledge, scientific discoveries and inventions are much faster and more efficiently transformed into innovations according to the market's demands (p. 333). Cluster initiatives can be described as a new project-oriented approach to the stimulation of R&D in all sorts of programs of local development and specific instruments of socioeconomic policy at the federal and regional levels.

The monograph looks at the partnership between the regional authorities and businesses through the prism of confidence-building as one of the conditions of economic activity as a whole. Partnership between the state and private businesses is a mechanism designed to remove administrative barriers and tap the administrative resources that previously stood idle. If and when realized, these measures will consolidate the territory's competitive positions (p. 414).

The authors invite the reader to look at a territory as a megaenterprise (quasicorporation) which produces and offers a definite set of benefits and services (p. 91). Their analysis allowed the authors to suggest strategies conducive to the territory's economic attractiveness. While accepting this approach, it is necessary, however, to point to the controversial nature of the attempts to confer on a territory the status of a certain specific commodity. The fact that the territory can satisfy its users' requirements does not mean that it has an exchange value. Consumer values created by the territory as a corporation, including its image and its reputation, possess an exchange value. Russian and foreign practice testifies that the right to administer a territory, rather than the territory itself, should be regarded as an object of buying and selling.

The authors deemed it necessary to stress that the topicality of the problem of corporate mobility (new companies' coming and old ones leaving) on the market of economic entities is explained by the fact that the territories compete between each other, in the first place, through national (regional) enterprises and organizations that produce commodities/services and pay taxes to budgets of different levels (p. 220). Today, efficient companies, rather than natural resources, have become the primary source of added value in the economically developed countries and regions; they ensure their success in global rivalry. Hence a conclusion: in otherwise equal conditions high mobility of companies on the market can be regarded as a sign of the territory's strong competitive immunity.

Regional differences as far as mobility of their companies is concerned are explained by several factors, including: specifics of the territory's economic potential (raw material and branch specialization, development of infrastructure, etc.), institutional milieu, the regions' place and role in the division of labor on the countrywide scale. An analysis of data related to the "mixing-up of organizations" reveals that, as a rule, in the dynamically developing regions with high competitive immunity, new companies join the market of economic entities

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much faster than elsewhere. To a great extent territorial mobility of business is ensured by the share of small enterprises, organizations with foreign capital and the intensity of processes of mergers and takeovers (Para 4.3).

The results of sociological studies (carried out in 2007 and 2010 in the territory of the Urals Federal District) are of great scientific and practical interest as going far beyond the "territorial framework." They were carried out with the participation of representatives of the authorities, businessmen and experts (who represented the academic community) (p. 508). The results demonstrated that the majority of the respondents (over 80%) supported the idea of competition between the territories (either between RF subjects or municipal units). At the same time, in 2010, despite an active propaganda of the course at modernization, leadership in innovations as a competitive advantage of territories was supported by less than 2% of representatives of the authorities; among the businessmen the share was slightly over 5%; among experts, about 11%. These figures came from the Federal District historically regarded as the country's "production-economic backbone."

Regrettably, some of the problems of territorial competitiveness were left beyond the book's scope: such as the negative aspects of territorial competitiveness whose mounting aggression leads to serious social repercussions.

The authors of the monograph under review have rightly pointed to the fact that more often than not regional competitiveness is reduced to the struggle for federal resources; however, the ca uses of this trend and its impacts remained undisclosed.

L. Makarov, D. Sorokin
Translated by Valentina Levina

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Л. ЕВСТИГНЕЕВА, Р. ЕВСТИГНЕЕВ. Новые грани ментальности: синергетический подход, М., ЛЕНАНД, 2011, 192 с.

L. YEVSTIGNEYEVA, R. YEVSTIGNEYEV. *New Facets of Mentality*: A Synergetic Approach, Moscow, LENAND, 2011, 192 pp.

This book develops and complements the previous publications by the same authors;[1] here they rely on their own integral theory of economic synergetics to considerably enrich the concept of mentality. Their scientific discovery can be described as inclusion of man and the socium into economic development or, in their own words, "into creation of an energy map of society's life activities" (p. 59).

Studies of mentality as an economic category help create a systemic picture of contemporary development of the economy and society in the context of globalization which includes not only the traditional components such as the state, production factors, institutions, etc. but also new philosophically comprehended anthropological and spiritual components. Man as a subject (participant) of the system of markets is regarded as an issuer, investor, producer and consumer, while revealing his properties related to the deep ethnic, social and spiritual roots.

The authors have offered a new anthropological system of development succinctly describing it by means of short and detailed formulas: "Man—Society—Socium" and "Man—Society—Socium—Being—God." Having brought together in economic synergetics the linear and nonlinear models of the Christian world (p. 135) the authors offered a solution of the problem of development by creating a market hierarchy combined with the phase arrangement of K-Waves ("the long Wave," or BKC, "the Big Kondratiev's Cycle").

The purely economic conditions are not enough; we also need a special personality type in which self-awareness prevails in the structure of consciousness and which is inevitably connected with the religious perception of the world. This human type is typical of an extended synergetic model (a synergetic scheme of economics—SSE, according to the authors) which brings together all spheres of society's life activities; economics is the core of the resultant entity (p. 136).

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The SSE includes the "market vertical" and the "state vertical," the former being an adaptive systemic subject of economics, which comprises the spheres of operation of financial capital and free market competition.

The authors look at the circulation of financial capital as moving of functional capital—financial, monetary, productive and social—in succession. The market of free competition operates in microeconomics as an investment territorial system of clusters.

The state vertical of SSE is formed by the sphere of operation of the state and the sphere of operation of a mass economic, social and political subject. The sphere of operation of the state consists of circulation of national income as a sum total of all branches of public production integrated in the tax base of the state budget. The sphere of mass economic, social and political subject reveals microeconomics as a multitude of circulations including individual ones integrated in the circulation of the national income.

In their earlier works the authors concentrated on economics (reproduction model, K-waves (BKS) and the market hierarchy), while in the book under review they discuss self-awareness as a component of consciousness and its mechanisms.

The authors proceed from the widening of the space covered by individual consciousness. The concept of "subject" concept, coupled with the idea of mentality receives a new content. The subject's new property is adequate to the SSE content. Man in the SSE space is part of a complicated structure of the socium as an elementary subject. His immersion in fractal similarity of the economic functions of an issuer, investor, producer and consumer (as physical or institutional economic subject and as society as a whole) is an object of consciousness (p. 16).

The object of economics as a subject of consciousness is not limited to the material factors of production; it is an adaptive systemic subject of SSE. The subject of economics as a subject of consciousness is not merely an individual market participant but also a goal-oriented systemic subject of SSE.

Having supplied the book with their definitions of the basic terms (socium, society, mentality, strategy, financial capital, etc.) the authors added to its academic value. They revealed the correlation between such terms as dynamics and development, development and formation, development and evolution, the importance of which for economic science cannot be overestimated (pp. 60-62). They proceed from the studies of man's mentality in his connection with society and the socium when unfolding the anthropological formula in the sum total of its elements. It is at this in-depth yet fairly concrete level of immersion into philosophy the authors discovered the ability of man to directly influence the powerful structures of society and the state.

This is substantiated by the studies of man not only as producer and consumer but also as a subject of strategic choice of the trajectory of social development. "Strategy requires more than a freedom of rational economic choice of the factors of economic growth; political freedom, likewise, is not enough. The same applies even to the social freedom adequate to an open democratic society.

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What we need is freedom at the level of anthropological boundary of man's existence" (pp. 59-61).

The authors were the first to offer a profound economic-philosophic analysis of mentality as an economic category; they have identified the "capital—income" system as the basis of mentality (pp. 66-74). They have also convincingly demonstrated that in a contemporary economy (both Russian and Western) the functions of capital are considerably limited: they are tied to private property and the market as a sum total of commodity—money and financial-monetary circulation.

Mass and academic consciousness alike are dominated by the formula—capital means future income, therefore income is capital of the past. In this way the "capital—income" problem is narrowed down to the problem of distribution of income and investment. This formula does not exhaust the functions of income by capitalization in the same way as the functions of capital are not exhausted by the production role of basic assets.

The authors disclose the function of capital in its entirety into which financial capital (understood as joint stock capital formed in the strategic market in the form of a system of strategic program investments), monetary capital and productive (fixed) capital are integrated.

Today, however, in the absence of a strategic market as a market of financial capital the circulation of national capital (as a sum total of the abovementioned capitals) is included as one of the phases in the circulation of income thus reduced to investment programs within the capitalization of income.

The world economy has come close to serious changes: constructive restructuring will move it away from a network market with a political center (the state) to a market hierarchy with the strategic market of financial capital as its center. The quantum of strategic investment (new potential of economic dynamics) will be formed within this center, together with a mechanism of internal convergence of financial capital and the state, as a task of developing economic synergetics and liberal mentality adequate to it. Together they will create adequate economic mechanisms and mass public consciousness.

As part of economic synergetics the communicative formula looks like a mirror reflection of present practices, namely, the subject—object relationships. The functions of thinking, goal setting and formulating the priorities of the state belong to all and everyone: each decision is taken after public discussions (p. 73). In these conditions identification of goals should not belong to one part of society—it should become a product of mass public consciousness.

The authors stress another important point: the nonlinearity of the coming world determined by its subjectivity, by which the authors mean that the subject will remain in the center of any system of object—subject relations.

Mentality is a complex systemic category, much wider than the concept of national character. As a system mentality comprises three different subsystems:

(1) social statuses of the individual (physical person, social subject, spiritual personality),

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(2) diverse functional components of individual consciousness (the collective unconscious, irrational thinking, rational thinking, creative thinking, religious self-awareness),

(3) various sectors of public mass consciousness (state ideology, the ideology of political elite, spontaneous ideology of groups of working people, etc.) (p. 120).

The mode of production and the mode of life are realized in mentality; in fact the authors treat mentality on a much wider scale, which cannot be squeezed into this necessarily short review.

The main conclusion is: economic synergetics, liberal mentality, Russia's strategy of ascending to the level of a highly developed economy and building a democratic state belong to the same range of questions. The authors show how these tasks can be realized stage by stage; the stages being specific tasks the fulfillment of which will finally create an efficient and successful economy.

The authors' books on economic synergetics constitute, as we see it, a breakthrough in economic theory completely adequate to the contemporary state of many-sided development in the globalization context. We should do everything possible to help the Russian readers and the public in other countries familiarize themselves with the works of Russian scholars Lyudmila Yevstigneyeva and Ruben Yevstigneyev.

NOTES

1 L. Yestigneyeva, R. Yevstigneyev, *Economic Growth: A Liberal Alternative,* Moscow, 2005; idem., *Economics as a Synergetic System,* Moscow, 2010 (both in Russian).

A. Shekhovtseva
Translated by Valentina Levina

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В. ЮНГБЛЮД, А. ЧУЧКАЛОВ. Политика США в Иране в годы Второй мировой войны, Киров, изд-во Вятского Государственного Гуманитарного Университета, 2011, 414 с.

V. YUNGBLYUD, A. CHUCHKALOV. *The US Policies in Iran during World War II*, Kirov, Vyatka State Humanitarian University Press, 2011, 414 pp.

The monograph of Valery Yungblyud and Aleksey Chuchkalov is another evidence of Russian historians' interest in the regional aspects of the prehistory of the Cold War rekindled by an access to recently declassified archival documents. The authors did not miss the chance to tap as many sources as possible: they used the still unpublished documents from the RF Foreign Policy Archives; documents from Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library published in the internet, publications of other documents, including speeches of US Presidents, congressional debates, the Big Three correspondence and the vast body of memoirs, the most important of which—those of Iranian statesmen and the military—are worthy of mentioning. The Introduction contains a detailed survey of Soviet and Russian historiography of AmericanIranian relationships divided into three periods according to the sociopolitical changes which took place in the Soviet Union and Russia (p. 8), and a specified survey of the trends and subjects of studies carried out abroad. This is not the only merit of the monograph under review: the authors repeatedly refer to academic historiographic discussions to familiarize the reader with the full scope of opinions and bring their own interpretations in bold relief.

Having formulated their aim as "presenting a consistent picture of evolution of the US Iranian policies during World War II and the US gradual involvement in Iranian political and economic processes" (p. 17), the authors begin with the USIranian contacts set up in September 1939. It was World War II, which started on 1 September of that year that intensified the trend of drawing both countries closer. Initially, the USA played the role of the not so much interested party as Iran in establishing such contacts. Iran, having shifted its foreign policy interests from Germany to the new "third force," displayed more enthusiasm than the United States (p. 34). Between 1941 (when Germany attacked the Soviet Union and Japan bombed Pearl Harbor) and 1943 (the year of the Tehran Conference)

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the United States gradually formulated a much more coherent Iranian policy. The USA developed its policy in two interconnected directions: lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union along "the Persian Corridor" and preservation of Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity threatened by the presence of British and Soviet troops on Iranian territory.

The authors made an important contribution to the Soviet and Russian historiography of lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union by examining the minutest details of the US key role in the consistent functioning of the Persian Corridor.

It should be said that the authors pay particular attention to the hitherto practically neglected issue: the failed talks between Washington (guided by pragmatic considerations) and Moscow (reluctant to aggravate its relations with Japan) on military deliveries to China via the Persian Corridor and the Soviet territory (p. 164).

The monograph also deals with several interrelated problems: mounting contradictions among the Allies; widening trade and economic relations between America and Iran; gradual shaping of specific American interests in the Middle East and their promotion, and the impact of the Iranian ruling circles on the "third force" policy.

The United States was involved in negotiations on a tripartite BritishSovietIranian allied agreement signed in January 1942; this was one of Washington's early efforts to help Iran preserve its independence. The authors deem it necessary to stress that the Tehran Conference (1943) proved to be an important landmark in America's active involvement in Iranian affairs which confirmed the idea previously formulated by the US Department of State (the Jernegan memorandum "American Policy in Iran" of 23 January, 1943) and approved by President Roosevelt: to use Iran, which had declared war on Germany and joined the Declaration of the United Nations in September 1943, as a testing ground for proving the principles of the Atlantic Charter (p. 54). In the wake of the Tehran Conference and the Declaration of the Three Powers on Iran America increased the number of its councilors in Iran to about 100 (p. 201). The authors describe the program of consultative assistance as the pivot of America's Iranian policy designed to strengthen Iran by maintaining stability for the sake of Iranian sovereignty and continued functioning of the Persian Corridor (p. 187). The monograph looks at the Millspaugh financial mission; the policing mission of Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and the military mission headed by Major General Clarence Ridley.

The authors have gone back to the sources of escalated tension in the Middle East between the Western allies and the Soviet Union by analyzing in detail American and British concerns caused by the policy of Soviet military authorities in the north of Iran and the separatist sentiments which began to flare up there and the mounting Soviet influence on the Iranian government. The Western allies had first shown their displeasure at the Moscow Conference of 1941 followed by an exchange of diplomatic notes in 1942-1943; it reached its peak in the form of the oil crisis of 1944. At the same time the authors believe that "the Polish question was one of the acutest in the relations between the Allies" (p. 105). They agree

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with their Russian colleagues that the initiative to move Wladislaw Ander's Army out of the Soviet Union to Iran was a collective decision prompted by the controversial British—Polish—Soviet talks in the fall and winter of 1941-1942. The authors, however, deem it necessary to readjust the opinion commonly supported by Russian historians that America's involvement was limited to weapons deliveries to the future Polish army. They rely on documentary evidence to demonstrate that Władysław Sikorski of the Polish government in emigration asked the United States to help evacuate, from the Soviet Union first to Iran and then to other countries, the Polish military and several thousands of Polish children with their mothers. For military, political and ideological reasons Moscow disapproved of America's efforts which, in the final analysis, strengthened America's influence in the Middle East.

The complication of relations between the Western allies and the Soviet Union were pushing America and the UK to adopt a common stand on a number of previously debatable issues, despite the disagreements between the USA and Great Britain which survived up to 1945: on the lend-lease deliveries *via* Iran; the policy of the British military in the British zone of influence and competition over access to Iranian oil. The question of the pull-out of the Allied troops from Iran was "further developed in the context of the oil crisis in the fall of 1944" (p. 164) and, together with the events in Iranian Azerbaijan, led to the Iranian crisis of 1945-1946; the United States and Great Britain were resolved not to allow the Soviet Union to delay the withdrawal of its troops from Iran.

On the whole, the authors have presented an integral idea of how the United States was fortifying its positions in Iran. When scrutinizing the US activities within the Anti-Hitler Coalition the authors point out that "the US increased involvement in the social and political life of Iran was caused, among other things, by the Persian Corridor prompted by military expedience and the need to supply the Soviet Union" (p. 173). The authors do not limit themselves to the "Persian Corridor" context to discuss the history of the USIranian relations and offer an analysis of bilateral economic cooperation. Washington viewed Iran as an important strategic factor; this explains why on 2 March, 1942, Iran was included in the lend-lease law. The monograph gives details of American aid to Iran in the form of food deliveries, means of transport, financial and trade assistance in 1941-1945 when Great Britain had already lost much of its former opportunities in the zones of its traditional influence in the Middle East.

The authors pay much attention to the preparations of the AmericanIranian trade treaty signed on 8 April, 1943; it is described as a "link" in the "program of mutual trade agreement based on the 'most favored nation treatment' principle," designed to build an economic foundation for the United States' future domination in international relations (p. 244). Since late 1943, America had been gradually shifting its economic involvement in Iran from support to the military efforts of the United Nations to fortifying its own positions in Iran which manifested itself in its competition with Great Britain and the Soviet Union for access to the Iranian oil. The authors supply some evidence testifying to the process of how the US was moving away, in 1944-1945, from military aims to the identifi-

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cation and consistent upholding of its national interests in Iran. The evidence was affirmed by the following facts: the status of bilateral diplomatic relations was raised from missions to embassies; corresponding sections of the US Department of State were reorganized; the contradictions between the Pentagon and the Department of State over Iranian policy were smoothed over; memorandums and political statements formulated Washington's new approaches to Iran and the Middle East which buried President Roosevelt's initial intention to "test in Iran the US disinterested foreign policy" (p. 304).

The authors analyze an interconnection between the US Iranian policies and the position of the Iranian ruling circles which greatly affected bilateral cooperation: the Americans failed to acquire a legal status for their troops stationed in Iran; in 1944 the Iranian government refused to grant oil concessions to the allies (even though it was basically an anti-Soviet move); the Iranian ruling circles and the parliament claimed that the US property in Iran was to be transferred to the Iranian government after the war. The situation was further affected by the complaints of the Iranian authorities about the entry of British and Soviet troops and the British and Soviet policies in Iran.

The book contains illustrations and 13 appendices of chronologically arranged Russian translations of memorandums of top officials of the US Department of State, letters which Secretary of State Cordell Hull and General Patrick J. Hurley addressed to Roosevelt, the text of the declaration of the three Powers on Iran, documents related to the Millspaugh mission, etc.

The monograph, however, is not free from shortcomings. Some of its sections are illogically divided into smaller parts while logic suggests that the material related to the 1942 debate on the currency issue, the talks on currency stabilization in 1943 and the financial responsibility for the use of the Trans-Iranian Railway should be treated in one larger section as dealing with closely related problems. It seems that the word "resentment" used to describe the Soviet response to Iran's refusal to grant oil concessions to the Allies is hardly informative (p. 258). The authors should have clarified the contradiction between what they have written about the US unwillingness to be used as a "buffer" and their own conclusion that the American advisors became an important part of a "political buffer" Iran built between London and Moscow (p. 311).

On the whole, the monograph is an important contribution to contemporary historiography of the genesis of the Cold War and globalization of the US foreign policies which go back to the expansion of America's positions in the Middle East.

N. Yegorova
Translated by Valentina Levina

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А. ВАРЛАМОВ. Андрей Платонов, М., Молодая гвардия, 2011, 546 с.

A. VARLAMOV. *Andrey Platonov*, Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya Publishers , 2011, 546 pp.

A detailed biography of Andrey Platonov, one of the major figures of Russian literature of the 20th century, which appeared 60 years after his death, is a welcome addition to our far from complete knowledge about Platonov's life and work. All previous biographies concentrated on certain periods of his life which made it next to impossible to arrive at a more or less integral idea of his development as a writer. The book under review, however, is not only gladdening but it also causes certain concerns.

The book is not a biography in the strict sense of the word—not only because the references to sources look accidental and not because its author tries to confer a rather novelistic style to the narrative. Aleksey Varlamov has undertaken the task to write a chronology of Platonov's texts accompanied by a story of his life taken as a background rather than concentrate on some or other events. This could have been an interesting novelty had not a third of the book been taken up by quotes from Platonov's texts and had not the author's commentaries been (far too often) reduced merely to retelling the contents of Platonov's works. The style of exposition, which balances, in a weird way, between a historical-philosophical discourse and a piece of popular publicist writing and which is not alien to subjective assessments and banalities neither can be described as one of the book's merits.

Despite an obvious bias toward descriptions of Platonov's texts, A. Varlamov has attempted to bring together the world of Platonov's fiction and facts of his life. The book consistently reveals how different spheres of Platonov's occupations (foundry worker, steam engine driver, specialist in land melioration and a war correspondent) found their reflection in his fiction. Aleksey Varlamov does not rely on new sources, yet in some cases he merely compared contradicting opinions to arrive at a clearer understanding of certain facts of Platonov's biography. Here are several examples: Varlamov has somewhat clarified the far from clear developments which accompanied the publication of Platonov's novella

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Vprok (For Later Use); the evolution of the far from simple relationships of the author of *Kotlovan (The Foundation Pit)* with Maksim Gorky and Aleksandr Fadeyev and the arrest of Platon, Andrey Platonov's son. The chronology of Platonov's works brings into bolder relief his remarkable capacity for work: his best books were written during the short spells out of his work as an engineer. One finds it hard to believe that *Sokrovenny chelovek (The Innermost Man)* was written in a month and a half, while *Chevengur* in less than a year. Significantly, after 1936, when he started living on what he earned as a writer, he slowed down his pace and never attempted to write novels.

The book under review invites the reader to revise some of the myths about Platonov's life: he was not a barely literate self-made person who worked *ex nihil* but a writer who read extensively Kant, Spengler and Rozanov. His avid interest in philosophy can hardly explain the phenomenon of a writer who stood apart from the ranks of "proletarian writers" and "aesthetically minded intelligentsia." Even though Platonov was tagged as an "accursed writer" his fate differed greatly from the fates of Vvedensky and Kharms: he was never arrested and exiled; his published works were enthusiastically appreciated by Valery Bryusov, Gyorgy Lukacs, Ernest Hemingway and Mikhail Sholokhov.

Varlamov has arrived at an important conclusion: Platonov's works defy unambiguous interpretation. "We can talk about Platonov's polyphony when each of his heroes has his own idea and his own view of the world. The author never tries to suppress these views but listens attentively to each of them" (p. 138). This inner polyphony allows us to get closer not only to the key antinomies of Platonov's prose—utopia/anti-utopia, progress/catastrophe, town/village, science/art—but also to the nature of many of his characters' dual views on being.

While dispersing the mist of some biographical inventions and readers' stereotypes, Varlamov seems to confirm some of the myths created by literary critics. Having identified the subject of a "double" as practically the main one which leads us closer to understanding Platonov's texts, Varlamov offers certain sadly primitive and unambiguous interpretations. He is especially attentive to the motive of "the abandonment of God" in Platonov: "Both in *Chevengur* and *The Foundation Pit* the author cruelly and unambiguously diagnoses the degodificated world" (p. 192). Varlamov treats the fact that Platonov mentioned the names of Communist Party leaders in his article *Tvorchestvo sovetskikh narodov (Creative Work of the Soviet Peoples)* as compassion with the people as a vehicle of the Bolshevik myth. Aleksey Varlamov identifies this compassion as the main (and practically the only) reason why the idea of socialism was present in Platonov's writings of the 1930s (pp. 421-422). The very idea of interpreting these works through an image of the soul "which abandoned God" follows, to a great extent, the philological stereotypes closely associated with Platonov. Varlamov, however, made an attempt to associate this with the writer's biography, a novel approach to the story of Platonov's life. The author uses "the abandonment of God" thesis as a starting point to move to the biography of the writer who came (or returned) to Orthodoxy by moving away from Communism: "In the war years Platonov's urge to be an ardent believer in the church became obvious" (p. 484).

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Varlamov's clearly Orthodox bias stirs up doubts about this hypothesis. First, when writing about the Christian motives of Platonov's works Varlamov should have pointed out that the writer was not so much interested in "official" Orthodoxy as in the teaching of the Old Believers and apocryphal tradition, which cropped up in his works and notebooks. Second, religious subjects in his works go beyond the limits of the Christian paradigm; his works abound not only in biblical allusions but also in pagan motives. Here is what Irina Spiridonova wrote about *The Foundation Pit:* "Nastya plays with 'the maternal bones' which revives the cultural memory of paganism: the maternal bones as a charm that protects against death while the play is a ritual which returns mother into the life of her child."[1] The "Orthodoxy" of Platonov's characters frequently allows them to talk to God as equals: "God is probably also a soldier; who else—there is a lot of cruelty in the world. Otherwise He is not God—that's what I think!"[2]

Varlamov's Orthodox interpretation of Platonov's works makes his analysis one-sided and contradicts his own idea of an ambivalent nature of Platonov's symbols. At the same time, ideological polyphony of Platonov's texts allows literary critics to discover great depths even in Christian interpretations of the writer's works. Yelena Proskurina is one of those who demonstrated this: "The idea of a vacant, free heart associated, first and foremost, with the death of the soul, runs through of all Platonov's creations. It actualizes a different, opposite, meaning: a pure soul and Evangelical spiritual 'poverty'... This is the meaningful core of the novella's main idea, the idea of a foundation pit which is an 'abyss,' that is, a grave, a symbol of death, and a 'womb matrix,' a symbol of birth and life."[3] Platonov himself brought together religion and atheism in a very special way: "There is God and there is no God. Both statements are correct. God became directly involved etc. He became divided among everything—and thus disappeared. His 'heirs' with a 'fire' of God in themselves say that there is no God and they are right. Others say that there is God and they are right, too. Here is atheism and religion for you."[4]

It was Platonov's ideological polyphony which explains why his works appeared during his lifetime—this happened not because the censors were too dull or the publishers too bold. His works differed in the most obvious way from what other Soviet writers frequently did: they buried their innermost thoughts in quotes from communist leaders. This is best illustrated by what Soviet literary critics had to say about Platonov's *For Later Use*: some insisted that certain episodes were purely proletarian while other interpreted them as counterrevolutionary and humiliating.[5] Per-Arne Bodin describes Platonov's works as "metautopia," a type of a deliberately open text in which utopian and antiutopian elements exist side by side and where none of them dominates.[6]

"New forces and new people might perish without completing, without living to see the building of socialism, yet their 'pieces,' their 'sorrows,' the flows of their feelings will join the world of the future."[7] This entry dated 1931 brings to mind the final pages of *The Foundation Pit;* it can hardly be interpreted as irreversible disappointment in the Bolshevik project mainly because the horror in the face of death of an entire generation when placed in Platonov's artistic uni-

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versum is inseparable from the faith in the salutary potential of socialism. Aleksey Varlamov quotes Yakob Rykachev, a writer and literary critic and a close friend of Platonov's, who pointed to an important feature of his texts: "There is no shortage of writers who can say that this smacks of counterrevolution. Platonov should be treated differently: his understanding of suffering is inordinately acute. He starts moving toward socialism and looks at it as something which may cure mankind's sorrows" (p. 335). Varlamov, however, looks at *The Foundation Pit* as a condemnation of socialism which could have been formulated as: "Their new and serious world proved to be, at least, not much better than the old one but much uglier and more frightening" (p. 320).

This verdict can hardly be accepted; a certain share of nostalgia in his books notwithstanding, practically none of his works could be described as nostalgic for the old times. Even the images of the village, forest and land and the related "peasant" undertones are inseparable from the subjects of machines and workshops. Platonov demonstrates even much more enthusiasm than the futurists when lauding them.[8] What his heroes of later stories say about the prerevolutionary period can hardly be described as nostalgic: "Life in the old times was like this: in the womb you know nothing; as soon as you get out you live under pressure of sorrows and troubles; you live in a hut which is like a prison and see no light; when you die—lie quietly in a coffin and forget that you've lived. We were squeezed everywhere, Nazar Ivanovich—in the womb, in prison and in the grave—there were no memories; everyone was a nuisance to everyone else!"[9] What amazes the reader in Platonov is the fundamentally unchangeable picture of the world: "The catastrophe has become a teacher and a leader of mankind, as always has been before."[10]

Platonov rarely looks back in search of a way out,[11] yet the subject of external danger to the cause which has not yet formulated its guiding principle regularly surfaces in his works; suffice it to mention *Chevengur* and his early stories *Peschannya uchitelnitsa (The Sand Teacher)* and *O potukhshey lampochke Ilyicha (About an Extinguished Ilyich Electric Lamp)*. During the war years this vision did not disappear, it became more acute: "Our land looked to me very kind and beautiful; it seemed that enemies some day would try to destroy it."[12] In the same way, the theme of a child's death in *The Foundation Pit* can be contemplated through a later short story *Vzyskanie pogibshikh (The Seeking of the Lost):* "It seems that it is still impossible to live on earth; nothing has been done for children: they tried to do something for them but haven't managed to do it in time!" A few paragraphs later an equally important phrase (soteriological and apocalyptical at one and the same time): "Let it be Soviet power again; it loves people; it loves work; it teaches people everything, it is very much concerned for all."[13] It is very hard to imagine Platonov being appeased with the finally achieved happiness (either because of the triumph of progress or the return to the golden age): far too often did he describe happiness as a triumph of unbearable philistinism: "This is like satisfied scratching of the left palm with the right thumb; this is like a self-complacent hardworking philistine. This is like munching a piece of sausage which one could finally procure."[14] Even a sparrow

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moved by a snowstorm from Tverskaya Square to a heaven of plenty very soon "feels ashamed and disgusted."[15]

One can hardly accept Varlamov's statement that "the war made the former revolutionary fall out with the communist project—there are practically no communists in Platonov's war prose" (p. 493). In fact, the heroes of the majority of Platonov's texts of the 1940s turned out to be (contrary to what Varlamov wanted to see) staunch communists, if we do not narrow down the term to party functionaries, while a "big portrait of Lenin"[16] in a hut still shared the wall with icons. Varlamov's persistent desire to interpret all references to communists as a "latent polemics" with the regime and the phrase "in Lenin I see my revived mother, for me he is even more than mother"[17] as his yearning for "the lost purity of the revolution" (pp. 491, 494) are hasty and ill-considered.

The political myth survived in Platonov's prose at a much deeper level. Indeed, during the war of 1941-1945 Soviet ideology moved much closer to reconciliation with tradition while the communist slogans gave way to national-patriotic rhetoric. The images of the "Russian soldiers" and "toilers of the war" as opposed to "frightened" and "stingy" fascist "halfwits" were part of the mythological symbolism of the time. To be sure, Platonov's works were not squeezed into the ideological frameworks. Just as before, his stories ran counter to the main course of the Communist Party; his unconventional heroes steeped in metaphysics who attached plywood wings to their huts and hoisted their own severed hands as banners did not fit the format of Soviet war stories. However, they looked much more realistic than any other "realistic" versions of World War II. In his war prose the problem of Platonov's relationships with ideology is no less complicated than in his works of the 1930s.

In fact, the history of the relationships between Platonov and the Communist project permits another approach. At the ideological level his works are extremely interesting as an example of nonemigrant prose whose main feature is criticism of Bolshevism from the left. Platonov's *pro et contra* vectors are much harder to delimit than the creative evolution of Evgeny Zamyatin or Victor Serge. Varlamov has practically avoided the subject except pointing to the writer's strange position: "With hardly understandable suicidal persistence he asserted the cooperative ideas as opposed to total socialization and depersonalization" (p. 254). The author lavishly cites numerous accusations against Platonov by blaming him for "anarchic sentiments," declaration of "the Bakuninist ideas" and closeness to "anarchic individualism" (pp. 143, 258, 366) which were hurled at Platonov in his lifetime to confirm that these accusations were not totally unfounded. Platonov cooperated with a circle of neo-Marxist Gyorgy Lukacs[18] and published his texts in the *Literaturny kritik* magazine which was close to the circle.

The writer's political views obviously transcended the ideological boundaries of Bolshevism (even though he described them as Bolshevist) yet *par excellence* they remained within the left tradition. "The plants that have barely blossomed out were pulled up, petty seeds of bureaucracy were planted instead. ...The clearings of the destroyed garden of the revolution were abandoned to wild self-seed grass."[19] These passages from *Chevengur* and leftist forebodings from

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Platonov's articles ("We are living on the eve of an offensive of the masses; just masses without representatives, parties or slogans"[20]) read like slogans of the Kronstadt munity rather than cheap Bolshevist propaganda. Significantly, the hero of *V poiskakh budushchego (In Search of a Future)* is an enthusiastic fan of not only Bebel and Marx but also of Kropotkin.[21] "There is no need to fight to exterminate whole countries. It is enough to fear one's neighbors; to build up the war industry; to maltreat one's own population and to concentrate on accumulating war resources to kill people by economically useless labor. The mountains of foodstuffs, clothing, machines and shells will remain in the place where mankind was as a grave mound and a monument," Platonov wrote in his notebooks.[22]

In order to prevent the creation of a new myth about the writer let me quote from the same source: "Soviet power is absolutely right: in the past there was a moment (before and during the war) when people, all sorts of motherf.. who defied collectivism (because of the specifics of this 'collectivism') needed a great leader."[23] This cannot and should not be treated as a blind devotion to ideological phantasms: they were too close to the author's graphic descriptions of the "entire passive mass of history... all excrements which fertilize centuries and eras."[24] "You know, life is hard here; socialism is our only hope; our road, a road of construction and the road of fast pace is the correct one," Platonov wrote to his wife a year after he had completed *The Foundation Pit.*[25]

This means that the writer's relationship with the ideology and power were extremely contradictory. His works are too socialism-biased to be counted as "dissident prose"; too gloomy to be counted as a "hymn to the revolution," too ambiguous and permeated with absurdist aesthetics to be taken for an "Orthodox sermon." At the same time, these antinomies create an illusion (shared in many respects by Varlamov) that Platonov's texts can be deconstructed through an analysis of ideological discourses of his time. Indeed, one is tempted to treat his work as an attempt to comprehend the evolution of the Bolshevist myth brimming with inner contradictions, subjected to numerous corrections and constantly opposed to other ideological concepts ranging from the Trotskyite to liberal. It seems, however, that the ideological context will hardly explain how the writer Andrey Platonov developed from the clash of political myths (if indeed from it) and why there is in his books a crazy *mêlée* of fearless Red Army men, staunch Stakhanovites, enthusiastic builders of socialism and the motives of gradual dying out, chaos of war and ruthless cruelty of power.

The attempt to tie Platonov's texts to the time when they were written is the greatest fault of such an approach. Concentrated on the political wrapping the critics miss the deeper layer of human existence permeated with the metaphysics of death. Indeed, Voshchev would have been hardly detracted from his infatuation with the dark void of the mysteries of life by the changing of political scenery. In this sense Platonov used the image of the foundation pit to describe human existence *per se*. In his works, very much like in the works of Samuel Beckett and Maurice Blanchot, the endless dying of his heroes is possessed by the idea that death can supply mysterious experience. Varlamov's conclusion that in the final

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pages of *Chevengur* despite the symbolism of the hero's immersion in the lake "death of the living rather than resurrection of the dead triumphs" (p. 164) looks like a literal (albeit unintentional) interpretation of the plot of the novel. This is highly regrettable: elsewhere Varlamov writes that the suicides of Platonov's heroes contain the so far "undeciphered message" (p. 248). Platonov was invariably fascinated with the inscrutability of innermost meaning: in his books the terrible experience of death is, at the same time, an experience of immortality.

Aleksey Varlamov has put this in a nutshell: "For him, death was much more important, much more consequential and much more intimate than even the revolution" (p. 196). This can be extended (probably contrary to the biographer's intention) and much more intimate than God: "We know that the dead sustain the living in all senses. There is God—deceased, dead."[26] In this context what Vladimir Polyakov has written about Platonov's hopes "to resolve, in the process of revolutionary transformation of the world, certain questions signally important for man's existence which, Platonov was convinced, remained unresolved by Christianity"[27] seems very important. As could be expected, in Varlamov's Orthodox discourse "the void pierced by the disturbing wind of the world undescribed and unexplained"[28] can be filled only by the Creator. Does Platonov's philosophy fit the habitual scheme or do his texts point to the gaping holes of the Void which the Creator could never fill in completely? Are Platonov's heroes probably trying to discover in the Void an ability to become a cementing core? Here is a fragment from the manuscript version of *The Foundation Pit:* "...there are small holes in clay and scattered voids and the eternally compressed darkness... without this concealed cracked emptiness clay would not be molded and able to survive—it would burst and crumble to become a disunited nothing to be completely destroyed by wind, time and water."[29] One cannot but wonder whether Platonov treated death, love, revolution, God, and progress as something indivisible, as an attempt to move closer to the Void which obliterates opposition and the language which his heroes tried to use.

When writing about Platonov's fiction Varlamov says next to nothing about the language. His explanation speaks volumes: "By paying attention only to the writer's language you simplify Platonov; no matter how original, the language was never an aim in itself but always a means."[30] This calls for a resolute objection: in case of Platonov lack of attention to the language is a much graver mistake than relying on literary parallels, artistic and biographical repercussions or ideological deconstructions for the sake of analysis. In Platonov the existential and the linguistic are intertwined. None should be ignored: the texts are immersed to the deepest level where existence formulates man rather than man pronounces words. The shopworn communication models which describe the language as "merely a means" cannot be applied to Platonov's works permeated with the idea of inexpressible. Platonov uses the word not so much as an instrument of communication but as a chance to touch Being and Naught at one and the same time. Here it is advisable to turn to the philosophy of the language of Wilhelm von Humboldt and Martin Heidegger, to say nothing of the Orthodox tradition of *Imiaslavie* (onomatodoxy) which Varlamov has obviously forgotten.

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By way of conclusion let me say that so far this book is the only source of systematized knowledge about Platonov's life. At the same time, it may create an alarmingly one-sided idea about several vectors of his creative work. The book, however, can be described as a timely step toward a better understanding of interconnection between Platonov's life and work, which has shown the road to be followed.

NOTES

1 I. Spiridonova, "Platonov's Story *Inspired People*: The Text and Context," *Creative Work of Andrey Platonov: Research and Materials,* St. Petersburg, 2008, Book 4, p. 230 (all quoted works are in Russian unless otherwise stated).

2 A. Platonov, "Nikodim Maximov," A. Platonov, *There Is No Death!,* Moscow, 2010, p. 195.

3 Ye. Proskurina, "Mystic Aspects of Poetics of *The Foundation Pit,*" *"The Country of Philosophers" by Andrey Platonov: Problems of Creative Work,* Moscow, 2000, Issue 4, pp. 595, 598.

4 A. Platonov, *Notebooks. Biographical Materials,* Moscow, 2006, p. 257.

5 See "Verbatim Report of a Meeting of Working Editorial Council of the State Publishing House *Khudozhestvennaya literatura,*" *Archives of A.P. Platonov,* Moscow, 2009, Book 1, pp. 599-619.

6 P.-A. Bodin, "The Biblical, Mythical, Utopian: an Analysis of Platonov's Novella Džan," *Creative Work of Andrey Platonov: Research and Materials,* Book 4, p. 156.

7 A. Platonov, *Notebooks. Biographical Materials,* p. 71.

8 Here was how the hammer and the sickle were united in the author's introduction to the collection of poetry *Golubaya glubina (Blue Depth):* "Between a burdock, beggar, songs in the fields and electricity, steam engine and siren which shakes the earth there is a certain connection, a sort of kinship, the same birthmark" (A. Platonov, *Works,* Moscow, 2004, vol. 1, Book 1, p. 480.)

9 A. Platonov, "Aphrodite," A. Platonov, *There Is No Death!,* p. 351.

10 A. Platonov, "Descendants of the Sun," A. Platonov, *Works,* vol. 1, Book 1, p. 224.

11 We should, however, say that there was an idea of a golden age as an illusion and unrealizable dream: "The picture showed a dream when earth was believed to be flat and the sky, very near" (A. Platonov, "Džan," A. Platonov, *Collected Works* in 3 vols., Moscow, 1985, vol. 2, p. 11).

12 A. Platonov, "Armor," A. Platonov, *There Is No Death!* p. 64.

13 A. Platonov, "The Seeking of the Lost," A. Platonov, *There Is No Death!,* p. 217.

14 A. Platonov, *Notebooks. Biographical Materials,* p. 181.

15 A. Platonov, "Love for Homeland, or the Journey of a Sparrow," A. Platonov, *Collected Works* in 3 vols., Moscow, 1985, vol. 3, p. 263.

16 A. Platonov, "Nikodim Maximov," A. Platonov, *There Is No Death!,* p. 194.

17 A. Platonov, "A Linen Shirt," A. Platonov, *There Is No Death!,* p. 412.

18 See N. Poltavtseva, "Platonov and Lukács (from the History of Soviet Art of the 1930s)," *Novoye literaturnoye obozreniye (NLO),* No. 107, 2011, pp. 253-270.

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19 A. Platonov, *Chevengur,* Moscow, 2004, p. 349.

20 A. Platonov, “Russia’s Unwieldy Carriage,” A. Platonov, *Works,* Moscow, 2004, vol. 1, Book 2, p. 191.

21 A. Platonov, “In Search of a Future (A Trip to the Kamenskaya Paper Mill,” A. Platonov, *The Foundation Pit. Text. Materials for History of Creation,* St. Petersburg, 2000, p. 369.

22 A. Platonov, *Notebooks, Biographical Materials,* pp. 103-104.

23 Ibid., p. 139.

24 A. Platonov, “Deliberations under the Moon,” A. Platonov, *Works,* vol. 1, Book 1, p. 118.

25 A. Platonov, “Letter to M.A. Platonova, 27 August 1931,” in *Archives of A.P. Platonov,* Book 1, p. 502.

26 A. Platonov, *Notebooks. Biographical Materials,* p. 272.

27 V. Polyakov, “Revolution and Christianity in Andrey Platonov’s *The Foundation Pit* and *The Innermost Man,*” *Creative Work of Andrey Platonov: Researches and Materials,* Book 4, p. 182.

28 A. Platonov, *Chevengur,* p. 54.

29 “Dynamic Transcription of the Manuscript Version of *The Foundation Pit*” in *The Foundation Pit. Text. Materials of History of Creation,* p. 197.

30 A. Varlamov, “The Third Son,” *“The Country of Philosophers” of Andrey Platonov: Problems of Creative Work,* Issue 4, p. 44.

A. Ryasov
Translated by Valentina Levina

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В. ФЕДОРОВ. Русский выбор. Введение в теорию электорального поведения россиян, М., Праксис, 2010, 364 с.

V. FYODOROV. *Russia's Choice. Introduction to the Theory of Electoral Behavior of Russians*, Moscow, Praxis, 2010, 364 pp.

In Russia, electoral behavior is a relatively recent sociopolitical phenomenon. In the strict sense of the word, it deals with political choice, that is, with an action which, although of an individual nature, every time is transformed into mass behavior which determines the country's future or, because of Russia's military-strategic importance, the future of the world.

This phenomenon is merely twenty years old: it goes back to 1989 when the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was elected. Are two decades (merely one generation in the history of society) enough to build up a theory and arrive at fundamental conclusions about the type and nature of the Russians' electoral behavior? It seems that the author asked himself the same question and answered it by describing his book as "an introduction to the theory." This modest self-restraint is one of the book's advantages. There are many ways of "introducing" to a theory or a certain subject field. The author can stress the methodological principles of his analysis expected to produce a synthetically integral theory of the object under study. In some cases an introduction is presented in the form of a detailed survey and analysis of relevant academic writings available.

The present author has opted for a different method: he starts with a detailed examination of certain "foundations" of a (future?) "theory of electoral behavior" and proceeds with an examination of the results of their application to the Russian electoral-political practice of the last twenty years. This means that while building up a certain "theory" he invites the reader to take part in a critical discussion of its conceptual-categorial structure and to a straightforward polemic with the author's interpretations, assessments and forecasts about the electoral-political process in Russia.

This strategy is totally justified because it widens, to a great extent, the circle of potential readers. While remaining a strictly scientific work, it will attract

The review first appeared in Russian in the *Politicheskiye issledovaniya (POLIS)* journal, No. 6, 2011.

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all those who have not been discouraged from trying to understand Russia which is "baffling to the mind."

The author asserts that "the changes in the electoral behavior of the Russian voters should be discussed not only in the context of the changing socioeconomic structure of society but also as related to the changing sociocultural paradigm" (p. 11). This serves as the starting point of his future theory of the Russians' electoral behavior. The author deliberately moves away from the methodology of rigid socioeconomic determinism (rooted in Marxism) to demonstrate that the cultural archetypes in their Jungian interpretations determine, to a much greater extent, human behavior.

This should not be taken to mean that the author refuses to admit that the socioeconomic structure affects the nation's electoral behavior; he even accepts it as an important factor which explains a lot. The "sociocultural paradigm" and its "incarnation" in the form of the specific Russian political culture, however, are treated as the determining factor.

Valery Fyodorov has specified his hypothesis by identifying two alternative sociocultural paradigms, or "models": the Soviet model archetypically rooted in the cultural model of the Russian Empire, and the model of the 1990s which he describes as "absolutely anarchic nihilism" (p. 14). The author describes the historical evolution of the last two decades as a cycle which includes a phase of moving away from the Soviet model toward Russian "lawlessness" and a return, at the beginning of the new millennium, to basically the same "Great Power state-oriented cultural model."

In the meantime, Russia's socioeconomic structure has changed a lot; new social groups have taken shape while the structure itself became "pear-shaped" with an overweight "bottom" formed by 51% of those who describe their incomes as below average, the poor and destitute. According to Valery Fyodorov, despite the fact that 42% place themselves in a group with average incomes, the socioeconomic shifts of the 1990s pushed the nation to the left.

One might expect that the Russians should have started voting for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and other left parties as a clear manifestation of their protest sentiments. In the last ten years, however, Russia has been demonstrating an incredibly high level of propower voting. An overwhelming majority invariably votes for Putin and the United Russia party as an alternative to liberal-antistate "lawlessness" and as an embodiment of the Great Power political culture.

The author defines the Russians' electoral behavior in the first and the second decades of the country's recent history as a "competitive model" imported from the Anglo-Saxon world (the 1990s) and the "contemporary model of plebiscitary democracy" of the "zero years" (p. 78).

The transition from one model to another is interpreted as a "relapse" of the Soviet model of electoral behavior. Today, very much as before (when the CPSU ruled unchallenged) the voters go to the polls not so much to "elect" in the true sense of the word as to confirm their loyalty to people in power. The patterns, however, are not absolutely identical: the Soviet behavioral model was oriented

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to the ruling Party and its ideology, while today it is "oriented to a politician as the national leader" (ibidem.).

This raises several questions: first, to what extent is this type of political culture and, therefore, the type of electoral behavior, uniquely Russian? Second, is a heightened, excessively rigid personification of power a temporary mutation or a constant of the purely Russian political culture?

The author has supplied a clear answer to the first question: "Typologically we were and remain a very special society, differing from the West, and going its own way" (p. 84). Should this be taken to mean that the plebiscitary-democratic model of electoral behavior is a unique Russian phenomenon?

We all know that Max Weber discovered and described the phenomenon of "plebiscitary leadership democracy" during the early Weimar Republic as its inevitable future. The question is: Is this similarity a consequence of isomorphism of the socioeconomic contexts of the Weimar Republic in Germany and post-Soviet Russia? A positive answer (given by many experts, the most consistent of them being Aleksandr Yanov) refutes the initial authorial postulate of the primacy of the cultural archetype over the socioeconomic determinant in formulating the theory which explains the Russians' electoral behavior. A negative answer fails to explain the similarity even at the terminological level.

The author is still more explicit when dealing with the second point: excessive "personalism" of the Russians' electoral behavior is not a cultural-archetypical constant. Therefore, he does not exclude a possibility that "a genuine ruling party as a form of organization of the ruling elite and transfer of power from one of its representatives to others in time might be revived in new forms" (p. 85). He proceeds from the assumption that "the present excessive personification of political power in Russia is, possibly, a transient phenomenon caused by the youth and weakness of the post-Soviet parties as compared with the experience and staunchness of political leaders" (ibidem.).

This statement, however, no matter how cautious will invite objections from the students of Russian political culture. Some of them believe, for example, that "personalism" should be treated as an "archetypical and eternal feature of Russian political culture" which "endows at least three very specific features to the Russian political practice. First, the desire to preserve political integrity through centralized power functions; second, idealization of the aims of political struggle; third, personification of political institutions."[1]

The book is highly polemical not only in a strictly academic respect. When formulating provisions of his future theory of the Russians' electoral behavior, the author relies on the current practice and at the same time uses his provisions to explain the most paradoxical and provocative subjects of electoral practice.

This method is clearly revealed in the author's approach to one of the acutest political problems—falsification of voting results. This is not a problem, writes the author, but a certain "black myth" of sorts turned into a social consensus which discredits the very idea of elections. Meanwhile, the author himself has written that in the conditions of domination of the plebiscitary model of electoral

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behavior there is "no need to falsify election results as an instrument of political manipulations" (p. 59).

His reasoning is simple. If the majority of the population follows the archetype of the Great Power political culture, then they automatically reveal their loyal attitude towards power in full conformity with the archetype. Putin and the United Russia party are a model of this conformity; there is no need to falsify the results of the elections which are predetermined anyway.

There is an indirect confirmation of this conclusion. Strange as it may seem, writes the author, political opposition persistently ignores preliminary and exit polls as two powerful instruments of control: "The opposition persists in its unwillingness to work with sociological data because it is fully aware that none of the polls will produce figures very different from the official election results" (p. 106).

This means that contrary to the generally accepted opinion we should agree with the author who says: "The myth of massive falsifications as an instrument of seizing and keeping power in the 2000s is irrelevant" (pp. 108-109). The myth invented and promoted mainly by opposition ideologists and politicians works against their cause, a tragic paradox indeed! It is due to this myth, precisely, the majority which has become disappointed in the election procedure is getting even more devoted to the plebiscitary model of electoral behavior.

The section dealing with the "foundations" of the theory of electoral behavior ends with a survey of foreign theoretical constructs. Valery Fyodorov deliberately limits himself to this format because, he argues, none of the foreign constructs are applicable in Russia. This is a logical conclusion for the author convinced of a very specific nature of Russia's political culture.

However, one of the foreign theories, namely Jean Blondel's theory of political leadership, is used by the author to create typological characteristics of Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev at different periods of their presidencies (p. 148). The author has drawn an interesting conclusion: no matter how different, the three started their presidential careers as "populist paternalists." The author is obviously devoted to his initial hypothesis and the logic of his studies. Indeed, if the Great Power etatist political culture dominates in Russia then the leader who meets the expectations of the majority should be a populist paternalist.

The second section in which the author describes "the practical uses of his theory" is no less interesting. He has outlined the sections of his future electoral theory to be treated as independent subjects of research. Here I will dwell on "Conclusion" dealing with the most acute and topical subject—the prospects of Medvedev's course of Russia's modernization. Here the author makes no attempt to withdraw into purely academic deliberations but plunges into the depths of the "frontline" of political analysis. In particular, he proceeds from the methodologically substantiated assessment of Putin's presidency before moving toward the scenarios of the future. He explains the interaction between the leader and the mass of voters in 2000-2008 as: "Putin was facing two options: either to go against what the majority, to whom he owed his power, wanted and launch a new stage of social and economic reforms or to rely on the majority to restore legiti-

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macy of power in the country, regulate the political system and, finally, probably accumulate enough potential for a modernization breakthrough (tomorrow, not today!) Putin opted for the second of the two roads to the cheers of the whole of Russian society" (pp. 342-343).

The author has discovered much more democracy under Putin than under Yeltsin, who after 1993 irreversibly lost popular support. Putin's democracy is of a special type—"direct, or plebiscitary leadership democracy"; "it could be called TV democracy in the full sense of the word" (p. 344). The author's assessments are diametrically opposite to what the inveterate critics of the Putin regime have to say, yet he is not an "apologist" but a researcher who relies on his methodological principles and premises.

This is especially obvious in the "Conclusion" which offers a long list of "vices" of the political and administrative system which took shape during Putin's presidency. There is a "paradox of governors"—the most loyal of them were the least efficient; the deficit of "feedback" in the administrative pyramid; the "tip of the pyramid" forced to make decisions on all issues and groaning under the burden which inevitably led to "stagnation"; "attenuation" of command signals from the top at the lower levels of the pyramid which makes "manual control" absolutely necessary and, finally, the paradoxical situation when the top level could control nobody but itself.

Valery Fyodorov has summed up the Putin model of democracy: "The desire to make Russia more manageable by applying administrative methods finally makes it less manageable" (p. 347). This is only natural: according to the author's logic, Putin did not create this system but merely realized what the vast majority wanted to see: the state paternalist construction. The country got what it wanted, or to quote Chernomyrdin: "Wanted the best, got the usual."

President Medvedev found himself at a crossroads: he had to choose from three strategies—"mobilizational" (or "authoritarian modernization of the country's socioeconomic system contrary to the mass requirement for stability, wait-and-see policy and doing nothing"); "inertial" (or "conservation of the present populist-paternalist political model") or "reformist" (or partial liberalization with reliance on the socially active minority "for the sake of modernization of the economy and the social sphere") (p. 348).

Having enumerated these "alternatives" as equally realizable the author admits that the reform strategy, or modernization proper, which should rely on the socially active minority is the hardest to realize. It is by no means easy to preserve political support of the paternalistically minded majority. Modernization of the economy is very expensive requiring huge investments, which means that the state will have to cut down its social obligations. Without choosing the "authoritarian modernization" road (i.e., without blocking the majority of voters' will by means of election manipulations), the paternalist Great Power attitudes of the electoral majority will be pushed to the fore.

The author writes about a "period of transition" of sorts (from 10 to 15 years) in the course of which the task, better described as "squaring the circle," can be resolved. However, he has written nothing about its possible solution as

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lying outside the scope of his book. He has diligently fulfilled his self-imposed task of a researcher: to identify the fundamental invariants of electoral behavior of the voting majority and to put in place some of the cornerstones of a future theory of the Russians' electoral behavior which will probably supply an answer to this "accursed question."

NOTES

1 V. Surkov, "Russian Political Culture as Seen from a Utopia," *Texts of 97-07,* Moscow, 2008, pp. 10-11 (in Russian).

L. Polyakov
Translated by Valentina Levina

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Л. СОКОЛОВА. А. Ухтомский и комплексная наука о человеке, СПб., Изд-во Санкт-Петербургского университета, 2010, 316 с.

L. SOKOLOVA. A. U*khtomsky and an Integral Science of Man*, St. Petersburg University Press, 2010, 316 pp.

The foundations of the physiological school of St. Petersburg University, the history of which contains many glorious pages of scientific breakthroughs, were laid by great physiologists Philipp Ovsyannikov, Ivan Sechenov and Nikolay Vvedensky whose scientific interests were concentrated on the mechanisms of nervous activity studied with the help of functional-systemic approach combined with physical-chemical methods.

Academician Aleksey Ukhtomsky (1875-1942) did a lot to develop the University's physiological school as a highly specific scientific phenomenon. A loyal pupil of his great teacher, Nikolay Vvedensky, and his pioneering approaches to the analysis of the nature of excitation and inhibition (the interaction on which determined, to a great extent, the functional state of an organ or tissue), Ukhtomsky followed his own path in science. He shifted his interest from the micro- to macrolevel to study the nature of integrative activity of the brain as an integral system and of the factors which underlie the organism's goal-oriented behavior in its environment. While accepting the dynamic nature of excitation/inhibition interaction in the organism's responses and an active role of coordinated inhibition in ensuring the vectoral directionality of human behavior, Ukhtomsky formulated the idea of the dominant constellation of nerve centers as a functionally mobile and dynamic "organ of behavior." This systemic approach to the organization of nervous activity became a cornerstone of the teaching of the dominant he formulated in 1923 as one of the key principles of brain activity which allows the organism to cooperate with the environment in an active goal-oriented way.

From the very beginning Ukhtomsky, an ardent supporter of an integrated approach in science, outlined a much wider sphere of application of his principle. The dominant was much more than a physiological law of activity of nerve centers, the law which determines the direction of the organism's responses at

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each given moment; it is a basic law of man's spiritual life responsible for the dominant motives of his activity and personal moral stand; this is a vertical of sorts which ties together the hierarchically organized system of man's relationships with the world, beginning with the cellular mechanisms of life activities and ending with the organizational principles of higher spiritual and social attitudes of the individual and society.

Under the totalitarian regime Aleksey Ukhtomsky could not publish much of what he wrote about the nature of man: many of his thoughts and ideas contradicted the scientific and ethical dogmas of the time. His thoughts and ideas, however, survived in his diaries, notebooks and letters now kept in state and private archives. For many years the precious evidence of greatness of Ukhtomsky the physiologist and an outstanding thinker of the 20th century, the author of an amazingly logical conception of man's integral biosocial nature, remained inaccessible to a wide circle of researchers. Those who edited the six-volume edition of his *Collected Works* (Leningrad, 1950-1962) concentrated on the "officially recognized" previously published in the Soviet press scientific works as absolutely safe ideologically.

Vasily Merkulov, Ukhtomsky's pupil, made the first attempt to put archival materials into circulation in his monograph *Aleksey Alekseyevich Ukhtomsky. Essays on Life and Activity* published in 1960. One has to admit, however, that its obvious advantages cannot conceal the ideological limitations imposed by that time and the author's "critical" attitude to his teacher's work.

The monograph under review, on the whole, fills in this gap in the history of science. It is the result of Lyudmila Sokolova's selfless efforts to restore the name of Ukhtomsky to its rightful place in science. The author's many years of persistent studies of archival materials were crowned with four excellent books which revealed a novel approach to the scientific and spiritual heritage of the great scientist.[1]

As distinct from Vasily Merkulov's book, which is a classical biography of the scientist describing the most important landmarks of his life path, the book under review offers a fundamentally different approach to an analysis of Ukhtomsky's scientific heritage. Lyudmila Sokolova abandoned the traditional chronological description in favor of the logic of Ukhtomsky's scientific thought related to the main determinants of human behavior and mind; she has accomplished a careful reconstruction of the scientist's main achievement—the teaching on the nature of man—in its integrity and versatility of the problems discussed. She leads the reader into the innermost world of the scientist's creative activity and gradually reveals the stages of this unique scientific project. The author introduces the reader to Aleksey Ukhtomsky the outstanding scientist, original philosopher and thinker who set the task of cognizing the nature of man, penetrating the extremely complicated determination of his behavior and psyche, and thus understanding the roads of mankind's spiritual development. His works go beyond the boundaries of purely physiological knowledge; they were one of the rare (yet signally important today) attempts to look at man as an integral whole in the context of his biological, social and spiritual life.

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Ukhtomsky's conception which pioneered a new, synthetic approach to human nature has been built at the junction of several sciences: biology, physiology, psychology, philosophy, sociology and ethics. This determined the main message of the book under review: Ukhtomsky's teaching as a triptych of sorts in which the biological, the psychological and the social in human activity are tied together by a meaningful vertical, viz., the idea of the dominant as the central principle of anthroposociogenesis. The author traces the road Ukhtomsky traversed to arrive at the idea of the dominant as the leading principle of brainwork. He elaborated an integral plan of studies of time-space factors (chronotope) of the functioning of the nervous system and substantiated the active role of inhibition in the integrative activity of the brain and in formation of a vector orientation of behavior. As a convinced supporter of the idea of integrated scientific knowledge, Ukhtomsky insisted on cooperation of scientific schools in an effort to explain the principal coordinating mechanisms of the complicated reflexive activity. He was the first to substantiate the deeply rooted dialectical interconnection between the dominant and the conditioned reflex as the reflection of an active and adaptive nature of an organism's behavior; he also revealed their role in shaping the organism's adequate adaptive response.

One of the book's sections deals with Ukhtomsky's preliminary plan of psychophysiological studies of a set of the dominant-related effects, first and foremost, the role of the dominant in the processes of attention and objective thinking. While insisting on the mainly imaginative nature of man's psychic activity, Ukhtomsky introduced into scientific practice the idea of an integral image as a product of the present dominant and an elementary unit of the process of cognition responsible for the determination of the goal-oriented behavior. Three temporal components—past, present and future—are embedded in an integral image of the environment that is being shaped against the background of the current dominant. Ukhtomsky pointed to the high deterministic potential of this psychophysiological entity: any integral image in the making is not a passive imprint of past experience but a dynamically developing entity, a certain "probabilistic project of foreseeable reality," time and again corrected by new time-space conditions of the environment, a project which ensures in this way high adequacy of the organism's behavior and progressive widening of its adaptive abilities.

Aleksey Ukhtomsky treated as one of the priorities the correlation between the conscious and the unconscious in the process of forming goal-oriented behavior and man's highest dominant attitudes; the nature of verbal-logical and intuitive types of thinking and their role in cognitive and creative activity of the personality. According to Ukhtomsky, the naturally sensory integral images and their objective and emotive content which, while remaining at the subconscious (prelogical) level, might affect the sphere of man's consciousness to a great extent and predetermine the course of his thoughts and actions. At the same time, the consciously realized creative idea launches, at the subconscious level, an important process of recombination of the traces of memory which leads to the emergence of a new image.

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The "Science and Morality, or 'Celestial Physiology'" section looks at Ukhtomsky's views about the sociocultural determinants of human behavior and psyche. Convinced that "our nature can be man-made" Ukhtomsky formulated the task of laying the foundations of a science of a "new nature of man" which would address the personality's spiritual creativity based, in the first place, on man's moral attitude to his environment. He believed that the environment included the cultural context shaped by the experience of the previous generations and people's real activities which strongly affected the world of nature and the inner world of man. In fact, Ukhtomsky treated the idea of the spiritual ecology of the environment as almost the central one in identifying the prospects of evolution of man and society. His cardinal idea was that morality should be raised to the category (rank) of the most important laws of man's existence (natural due to their genesis) which are responsible not only for genuine cultural progress but also for the human community's survival. This explains Ukhtomsky's move to the new positions from which he contemplated the nature of ideas and ideals of man as the most important stimuli of man's spiritual life and pointed to their deep psychophysiological underlying motive. In an effort to disclose the real mechanisms of human relationships he formulated two laws of interpersonal communication—the law of the double and the law of the worthy interlocutor—as two opposite moral orientations responsible, to a great extent, for the level of social development of an individual and society as a whole. The Double is oriented exclusively at strictly personal interests while the Worthy Interlocutor with a powerful dominant "at another person's face" is open to the world. Ukhtomsky treated this as an important factor of spiritual progress of mankind, not merely as a condition of the personality's creative behavior.

Summing up the author's discussion and analysis of the entire set of problems which Ukhtomsky formulated in his time, we can say that he built up an amazingly logical teaching whose importance at the contemporary stage of development of scientific knowledge can hardly be overestimated. The teaching laid the foundations for research methodologies in many fields of human knowledge, by formulating philosophical approaches to the leading principles of organization of human behavior and human psyche and the development of an appropriate system of social interactions. Erected at the junction of natural science and the humanities and being a clear example of a systemic approach to motivational determinants of human life activities, today Ukhtomsky's conception looks like one of the variants of a comprehensive science of man with a huge prognosticating potential. Lyudmila Sokolova has fully revealed this. One of the last sections entitled "How our Words Will Echo" deals with the impact of Ukhtomsky's ideas on scientific thinking of our days; the author has revealed and demonstrated the high efficiency of their applications to topical scientific problems, in particular, to the identification of the main factors of man's early socialization.

The author has not limited herself to a mere presentation and analysis of the great scientist's ideas, which can be described as another of the book's merits. She tells a life story of a man against the background of the cruel realities of Rus-

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sia's history as part of the tragedy of Russian intelligentsia and Russian culture of the 20th century. The section entitled "The Roads of Fate" is much more than a mere essay complete with facts of the bright and far from ordinary biography of Prince Ukhtomsky, academician and deputy of the Petrograd Soviet—it is an "inner psychological history of science" to quote the outstanding German physiologist Heinrich von Helmholtz. Indeed, the fate of science can be perceived through individual lives. The hero of the book under review is a devotee of science whose life was illuminated by the constant quest for Truth, Kindness and Beauty. Everything what he was doing was stamped with the originality of his personality invariably addressed to a living man, a "worthy interlocutor."

Misunderstood and unappreciated by his time, Ukhtomsky is coming back to us with the full scope of his scientific, philosophical and historic forecasts. He outstripped his time to the extent that today we have just started appreciating the true significance of his ideas and concepts. The practical value of his main scientific discoveries in different fields of knowledge is comprehensive: it is impossible to name a discipline in which his ideas never stirred up imagination to be transformed into forecasts of the vectors of further scientific trends and discoveries.

Lyudmila Sokolova's book will find many enthusiastic readers prepared to think of and ponder on many issues, who refuse to limit themselves to the narrow limits of specialized knowledge and who know that qualitatively new knowledge about the nature of man can appear only at the junction of natural science and the humanities to help us answer the questions: Who are we? What is our nature? and Where is mankind moving?

NOTES

[1] A. Ukhtomsky, *The Intuition of Conscience: Letters. Notebooks. Notes on the Margins,* St. Petersburg, 1996; idem, *A Worthy Interlocutor: Ethics. Religion. Science,* Rybinsk, 1997; idem., *The Dominant of Soul: from the Humanities Heritage,* Rybinsk, 2000; idem, *The Dominant,* St. Petersburg, 2002 (all in Russian).

A. Nozdrachev
Translated by Valentina Levina

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М. ГОРШКОВ, Ф. ШЕРЕГИ (ред.). Модернизация российского образования: проблемы и перспективы, М., ЦСПиМ, 2010, 352 с.

M. GORSHKOV, F. SHEREGI (Ed.). *Modernization of Education in Russia: Problems and Prospects*, Moscow, TsSPiM, 2010, 352 pp.

It is for several years now that Russian society has been discussing the idea of modernization, ample time for the political, business and academic elite to recognize the issue's absolute priority. There is no agreement, however, on the parameters and vectors of the planned transformations. High-tech retooling of at least part of the enterprises and setting up research centers of the Skolkovo type are obviously not enough. We should change our system of education, reorganize the structures of power and administration and the nature of their relationships with the institutions of civil society.

The priorities of these changes, their sequence and interconnection are still unclear. Indeed, should the orientation at sociopolitical stability, i.e., the so-called "conservative modernization" suggested by the Center for Socioconservative Policy, be maintained at all costs? Can we afford a certain degree of society's manageable destabilization since any deep-going transformations are always fraught temporary with a growth of tension in the socium, as the researchers of the Institute of Contemporary Development *(INSOR)* set up by President Medvedev argue? In what succession should the changes proceed: either in parallel, or primarily starting with the economy or politics, or sociocultural relations?

The book under review is an important contribution to the discussion about these problems; its authors rely on a vast amount of sociological data, economic, demographic and social statistics to prove that Russian society has matured enough to embrace postindustrial integral modernization. In fact, it is especially needed in the sphere of education which is no longer able to cope with the problems of Russia and the challenges it faces. The collective monograph convincingly outlines the tasks to be addressed in the immediate and more distant future.

The authors have demonstrated that even though the majority of the Russian citizens described their economic conditions in the crisis and postcrisis years

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(2008-2010) as "good" or "satisfactory" (pp. 12-13) the situation in Russia as a whole is characterized as negative. In the past two decades the index of dynamics of social satisfaction was at its lowest point in 1991 when 95% of those polled revealed a negative attitude to the situation in the country as a whole. We all know what happened at the time: the USSR collapsed. In 1998, Russia, in its turn, with 94% of dissatisfied came dangerously close to the brink of the precipice which had engulfed the Soviet Union. Having reached the lowest point the country gradually climbed up to 45% of negative assessments in 2006, the best result for the post-Soviet period. By 2010 the share of negative assessments rose to reach 82% (p. 11).

The majority of the Russian citizens expect that modernization will improve the situation in the state and society: 49% expect that it will put an end to corruption; 36% expect to see a more efficient system of governance; 35% pin their hopes on high technology; 28% want to see people better prepared to realize modernization, while 25% want the government leaders to pay more attention to what ordinary people think and say.

The authors are convinced that the ideas of modernization are widely supported in society and that "public consciousness is fairly fast changing to accept the idea of the country's readiness for a modernization breakthrough" (p. 41). According to public opinion polls, 83% of workers, 73% of peasants, 71% of the intelligentsia, 70% of businessmen, 70% of the youth, 62% of the middle class and 52% of the military are looking forward to modernization. Among the law-enforcers, on the other hand, only 32% are prepared to hail modernization; the share of bureaucrats is even lower (18%) (p. 39).

It seems that the transition to a qualitatively new state of society will require a lot of work. According to the authors of the reviewed monograph some of the branches (trade, the sphere of public and housing utilities and consumer services in the first place) have objectively no adequate modernization resources because the state has practically abandoned them to their fate (p. 28). The present system of social and labor relations does not encourage an upgrade of the professional skills of the workforce—rather, it leads to its degradation. 58% of the gainfully employed do not use any computer skills at their workplaces; 88% have no need to tap their knowledge of foreign languages (p. 32).

The question is: Can the system of education cope with the task of educating new generations of workers able to work in a new, modernized economy? On the whole, the authors have positively assessed the results of the already realized national project "Education." They refer to expert opinion polls to point out that much has been done in higher educational establishments to upgrade scientific research; the level and quality of the use of the latest scientific achievements in the educational sphere are much higher than before; active forms of education of students and postgraduate students are used on a much wider scale; the organizational structure of educational establishments was improved; they are more actively than before cooperating with industrial enterprises concerning the on-the-job training for their students (pp. 62-63).

Some problems remain pending: a meager 17.7% of professors and lecturers of the higher education centers are engaged in scientific research which is obvi-

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ously not enough (p. 89). There are several reasons for this: nominally the money allocated for scientific research at higher educational establishments and the cost of their equipment increased many times over, more than an order of magnitude, in the last 15 years. Adjusted for inflation coefficient, the figures are less impressive: by the time of the 2008 global crisis the level of funding was lower than in 1991, far from the best year in Russia's recent history (p. 93). The budgets of the leading Russian universities barely reach 3 to 5% of material funding of similar American establishments (p. 91). In Russia fundamental research is practically neglected: it accounts for 0.16% of GDP against 0.5-0.6% of GDP of the developed countries (p. 95). No wonder, machines and equipment used for R&D are mainly physically and morally obsolete. In one out of two research organizations machines and equipment are 15 years old and older, that is, inherited from Soviet times (p. 99).

The authors have pointed out that little or no progress in R&D is explained by the fact that the business community is not interested in innovations. Indeed, in Russia the business community pours 7 to 10 times smaller shares of its incomes into R&D than in the world's leaders—the USA, EU and Japan (p. 99). In Russia the state pays for 56% of R&D carried out in the private sector, the figure for OECD being 7%, for China, 5% (p. 100).

The situation in the sphere of scientific research is responsible for the degradation of the research staff: in post-Soviet Russia in which R&D had to survive on budget leftovers specialists were leaving universities and research institutes in great numbers. They moved into business or simply left the country. An analysis of the reasons why people switched to business activities carried out by the present authors revealed that people had been driven away by "low wages and lowered prestige of research activities; vague future; no prospects of professional growth; worse conditions for fundamental studies." Those who had emigrated pointed to "low wages; worsened conditions for fundamental research; concern for the future of their children; lower prestige of academic work; vague prospects in life; political instability in Russia" (p. 203).

The emigration figures were quantitatively not impressive and in the last few years have been going down. Between 1987 and 2005, about 30 thousand specialists (2.5%) employed in the Science and Science Services branch left Russia; but according to the experts quoted in the monograph about 40% of physicists engaged in theoretical physics, 70 to 80% of mathematicians working at the world level left the country forever (p. 201).

This left a gap which is not easy to fill: young people are not interested in science and teaching as no longer prestigious occupations. This result is obvious: those who remained in these professions are growing older. Professors are over 60 on average; assistant professors are moving closer to 50 (p. 196).

The authors write that social differentiation of Russian society obviously deepening has a telling effect upon the system of education too. It does not allow for training specialists able to cope with modernization. According to the data cited in the monograph, the present-day system of education in Russia does not give equal starting chances to young people. The children of the business and

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administrative elite families have wider access to good, quality education, but they display little interest in learning: their future status depends on the origin, social position and business connections of their parents rather than on their own abilities and knowledge. Children from poorer families have little or no chances to develop their talents; this is especially true of those who live in the countryside or in small towns: the barriers are too numerous and too high, one of them being the sociocultural capital of the family (the level of the parents' education and their social status.) The territorial factor (that is, the place where the family lives) and the family's material status are no less important.

The authors conclude that "this does not offer equal chances for all, while education does not help to go higher on the social ladder: legitimation of the inheritance of the social status reproduces social inequality. Failure is in store for those who actively seek better education of a higher level but are unable to overcome the existing barriers to get access to the possibilities theoretically or potentially granted to all members of society" (p. 190).

The authors are convinced that the present-day situation should be improved and that "the changes should go beyond the sphere of education; changes should be comprehensive, systematic, well organized and adequately funded" (p. 194). The authors, however, have failed to specify what should be done in the sphere of education even though some of their forecasts and suggestions are of undoubted practical interest.

What is written about the prospects of private education is highly topical: according to the authors, today there are about 2.5 thousand higher educational establishments in Russia, 1.4 thousand of them (together with branches) are private (p. 105). The authors disagree with a fairly widespread opinion that education provided by private (commercial) universities is inferior to what the state universities can offer, yet, at the same time, they write that many of the private structures "pretend to teach while their students pretend to study" (p. 126). On the whole, however, private higher educational establishments attract better lecturers with higher wages and rely on innovative educational services. Their graduates can count on better jobs adequate to their requirements even though this is partly explained by personal, that is, informal contacts of their parents rich enough to pay for their education and prestigious positions.

Despite the obvious successes of nonstate, private educational structures their future is shadowed by the inevitable drop in the number of students, the result of the distant demographic echo of World War II and the dramatic drop in the number of births in the 1990s.

In 2007, there were 1,300 thousand school-leavers; the forecast for 2012 is much lower—700 thousand (p. 123).

According to the authors' forecast, a couple of dozens of elite universities with about 6% of the entire student body will remain unaffected by growing competition (p. 123). All others, private universities above all, will have either to close down or look for other alternatives. The authors offer the following options.

- First, accept state support; abandon their independent status to become a branch of a state-run educational establishment (pp. 113, 127).

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- Second, offer additional education to adults, to teach them new competences. The corresponding market will be determined by the demands of the modernized economy and the development of individual interests and requirements (p. 135).
- Third, an export orientation of educational services in the first place to the CIS countries closely tied to Russia by their common past, culture and economies (p. 127). More than that: by offering higher education in Russia (which still has a fairly high international rating) to young people from potentially friendly countries these universities will add to Russia's international prestige (pp. 227-287).

The highly successful and topical monograph is not free from certain shortcomings: the authors' interest in foreign experience is justified, yet, for some reason, nothing is said about the Bologna process regarded as controversial by the academic community of Russia; likewise, Russia's efforts to integrate in the common European educational space remained outside the book's scope. Much is said about China's experience in teaching foreign and Russian citizens (Chapter 4, Part 2) yet it would have been much more logical to analyze and compare the educational models of the United States, the EU, Japan and China and point to the aspects which deserve greater attention.

It seems that the problems of the school, its cooperation with the institution of the family in the process of upbringing and socialization of youth have not received the attention they deserve.

This should not cast doubt on the value of this book as an important contribution to our understanding of the current state of education in Russia and of the landmarks of its modernization.

N. Zagladin, Kh. Zagladina
Translated by Valentina Levina

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ACADEMIC JOURNALS

Editorial note: We continue to inform you about the contents of the leading RAS journals published in Russian and confirm our readiness to help our readers order translations of any article mentioned below.

VESTNIK ROSSIYSKOY AKADEMII NAUK
(Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences)

No. 1, 2012

N. Popov. Is the Russian Population Dying Out?
A. Sarkisov. Phenomenon of How Public Consciousness Perceives the Danger Coming from Nuclear Power**.**
V. Pashin. Shipbuilding Is the Basis of Marine Activities.
A. Volkov, A. Sidorov. Deposits of Volcanic Belts of the North-East Asia As the Basis for New Mining Areas.
G. Matishov et al. Russian Fisheries and Aquaculture.
S. Avakyan, A. Namgaladze. Some Technospheric Manifestations of the Heliogeophysical Perturbations.
Yu. Leonov. School under the Bureaucratic Pressure.
V. Solodnikov. The Unified School Examination (USE) and the Reform of Russian Education.
O. Bogomolov. Sociohumanitarian Aspects of the Modernization of Russia.

No. 2, 2012

I. Varshavskaya et al. New Development Concept of the Hydrocarbon Resource Base.
V. Kuznetsov, N. Makhutov. Physics of Solar-Terrestrial Interaction and the Security Problems of the Energy Infrastructure of the State.
Monitoring of Space Weather Is the Task of National and Global Security. *Paper Discussion.*
V. Petrenko, O. Mitina. Perceptions of Russians of the Quality of Life under Different Governments.
V. Moskvichev, Yu. Shokin. Anthropogenic and Natural Risks in Siberian Territories.

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O. Mikhaylov. On Dissertation Councils and Awarding of Academic Degrees.
A. Karpov. Education in the Knowledge Society: a Research Model.
S. Nikolayev. Outstanding Researcher and Enlightener. *The 75th Birth Anniversary of Academician A. Panchenko.*
R. Nigmatulin. My Thirteen Bashkir Years.

No. 3, 2012

G. Matishov. Causes of Escalating Tensions and the Search for Ways of Stabilization in the North Caucasus.
A. Derevyanko, M. Shunkov. New Model of Formation of the Human of the Modern Physical Look.
Problem of Man's Origin: an Actual Approach. *Paper Discussion.*
A. Dyakov. Ways to Improve Reliability of Energy Supply of the Country.
Main Directions of Improvement of Power Industry. *Paper Discussion.*
V. Dymnikov et al. Modeling of Climate and Climate Change: Modern Problems.
O. Vasilyev. Development of Systems for Operational Forecasting of Floods and High Waters.
S. Shvartsev. Internal Evolution of the Geological System Water—Rock.
N. Grigoryan. An Inspired Worker of Science. *The 125th Birth Anniversary of Academician I. Orbeli.*
V. Mamay et al. Science School of E. Grigolyuk in the Area of Deformable Solid Mechanics.

VOPROSY ISTORII

(Problems of History)

No. 2, 2012

On the Threshold of the Complete Split. Contradictions and Conflicts in Russian Social Democracy, 1908-1912.
A. Vatlin. Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg and the Epoch of Mass Repressions in the USSR.
Ye. Kunts. Mikhail Nikitich Muravyev.
A. Darkovich. City Self-Government in West Byelorussia, 1926-1939.
R. Abinyakin. The Discharge of Former Officers from the Red Army in 1921-1934.
B. Kotov. Russian-German Trade Relations on the Eve of WWI As Presented in the Russian Press.

No. 3, 2012

On the Threshold of the Complete Split. Contradictions and Conflicts in Russian Social Democracy, 1908-1912.
P. Makarenko. "The German October," 1923, and Soviet Foreign Policy.

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L. Ivonina. Henri de Turenne.
V. Molotov's Letter to the CC of the CPSU, 1964.
Huraki Wada. Russo-Japanese Negotiations. Japan's Path to War against Russia.

No. 4, 2012

On the Threshold of the Complete Split. Contradictions and Conflicts in Russian Social Democracy, 1908-1912.
A. Mayorov. The First Rus—Rome Union.
M. Oskin. Nikolay Vladimirovich Ruzsky.
Yu. Tsentsiper. My Father and His Time.
V. Kozlov. Rehabilitation through Forgery.
L. Dolgilevich. Straight Connections of the USSR with West Berlin, 1962-1964.

NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA
(Modern and Contemporary History)

No. 1, 2012

The Commonwealth of Independent States Twenty Years Later: Realities and Prospects. A Roundtable Discussion.
V. Sogrin. Civilizational Factors and the Interdisciplinary Studying of the History of the USA.
M. Carley. (Canada). Only the USSR... Have "Clean Hands": the USSR, Collective Safety in Europe and the Destiny of Czechoslovakia (1934-1938).
A. Pilko. The NATO and the Berlin Crisis of 1958-1961.
V. Vinogradov. Ottoman Empire and Russia. The 15th—the End of the 19th Centuries.
V. Malkov. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Phenomenon.
M. Svoysky. (USA). From History of Bakhmeteff Archive in the USA.
N. Bukharin, I. Yazhborovskaya. Edward Gierek: from a Course on Social Justice to an Economic Crisis.
I. Orlik. The Bucharest Process over I. Antonescu. 1946.
P. Cherkasov. Behind the Screen of the Parisian Congress of 1856.

ROSSIYSKAYA ARKHEOLOGIYA
(Russian Archaeology)

No. 2, 2012

Kh. Amirkhanov. Picks in Oldowan and Early Acheulean Tool Assemblages.
V. Kotov. Paleolithic Sanctuary in Zapovednaya Cave in the South Urals.
N. Petrova. A Technological Study of the Pottery from the Hassuna Settlement of Yarim Tepe I.

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A. Trufanov. A 4th-Century AD Crypt from the Necropolis Near Kurskoye Village in the Crimea.
O. Zelentsova et al. Gilt Belt Set from Kryukovsko-Kuzhnovsky Cemetery of the Medieval Mordva.
T. Soldatova. A Planigraphic Study of the Bone Industry at Sungir Upper Paleolithic Site.
S. Medvedev. A Planigraphic Study of the Flint Inventory from the Upper Occupation Layer at Kamennaya Balka II.
O. Zagorodnyaya, K. Stepanova. The Use of Microtraceology in Analyzing Tools of Granular and Crystalline Rock.
O. Kurinskikh. Early Nomad Blade Weapons from the 6th—1st Centuries BC in the Cemeteries Near Pokrovka (Left Bank of the Ilek).
O. Voroshilova. Relief Ornaments on Wooden Sarcophagi from Phanagoreia.
V. Akimov, S. Olkhovsky. Conservation and Restoration of Underwater Finds from Phanagoreia.
A. Safronov. Historical Geography of the Ancient Maya: Traditional Approach and GIS Methods.
K. Vanyusheva. Letters As a Source in Researching the History of Archaeology in the Urals Region.
G. Afanasyev. Controversial Issues in the Methods of Interpreting the Damaged Skeletons from Saltovo-Mayatskoye Burials.
N. Krylasova et al. Burial 7 from Plotnikovsky Late Medieval Cemetery.

ETNOGRAFICHESKOYE OBOZRENIE
(Ethnographic Review)

No. 5, 2011

S . Arutyunov. From a Tranquil to a Fleeting Materiality: On the Issues in Ethnographic Study of Material Culture (Interview to N. Bogatyr).
F. Vannini. Material Culture Studies and the Sociology/Anthropology of Technology.
N. Bogatyr. Contemporary Technoculture through the Prism of Relations between Users and Technology.
D.J. Hess. Ethnography and the Development of Science and Technology Studies.
N. Bogatyr. Recovery Ritual in the Modern Sociotechnological Drama.
A. Novik. Self-Consciousness of Albanians in the Ukraine: Historical, Linguistic and Extralinguistic Contexts.
L. Ostapenko, I. Subbotina. The Russians of Moldova: Ethnodemographic Transformations.
O. Merenkova. The “British Bangladeshi” in Search of Identity.
T. Yemelyanenko. *Paranja* in the Traditional Dress of the Bukhara Jews.
V. Tishin. *Kazaklyk* As a Social Phenomenon.

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No. 6, 2011

D. Fais. Celebrating the "Day of the Dead" in Sicily.
Ye. Batyanova. National Holidays among the Teleut in the 20th—21st Centuries.
G. Makarova. Traditional Culture in Present-Day Ethnoidentificational Processes and Practices among the Tatar and Russians of Tatarstan.
M. Banayeva. The Buryat of Moscow: Migrations and the Experience of Sociocultural Adaptation.
Z. Szmyt. Nation and Ethnicity in Mongolia.
S. Dmitriyev. The Ethnographic Department of Tsarskoselsky Arsenal and Its Collections (Unknown Pages of Ethnographic Science in Russia).
S. Savoskul. Local Area Studies and Local Identity (the Case of Small Towns of Central Russia).
A. Zakurdayev. Children and Childhood in the Notions of the Chinese: the Past and Present.
L. Khakhovskaya. The Soviet Modernization of Deer Breeding in Remote Northern Regions (the Case of the Anadyr Region of Chukotka).
N. Tadina. Burkhanism and the Etiquette among the Altay People.
N. Baygabatova. The Felt Manufacture among the Kazakh of Mongolia.

No. 1, 2012

Ye. Breus. Identification Documents in China: History, Structure, National Idea.
D. Nikolayeva. The Connection between the Female Cult and the Stringed Musical Instrument *Morin Khuur* in the Traditional Culture of Mongolian Peoples.
D. Ivanov. The Nutrition System and Social Structure of the Chenchu of Southern India.
I. Vinokurova. Local Traditional Holidays of the Veps: Particularities of the Phenomenon in the 21st Century.
O. Ulyashev. St. Elias Day in the Voldino Village: Traditions in the Flow of Time.
A. Panyukov. Celebratory Territory Inspections in Local Traditions of the Komi.
D. Pantyukhin. The Komi-Permyak Celebration of *Prollaver* with the Bull Slaying Rite.
A. Abazov. A. Ladyzhensky, the Founder of the Legal Anthropology of the Caucasus (the 120th Birth Day Anniversary).
T. Shentalinskaya. Sofya Bogoraz—the Collector of Russian Folklore in Chukotka.
O. Bazaleyev. Problems of Social Capital Liquidity in Programs for the Development of Numerically Small Indigenous Peoples of the Sakhalin North.
N. Mamontova. Traditional Economy of the Sakhalin Nivkhs: Between Sustainability and Development.
O. Brusina. Marriage and Divorce in People's Courts of Turkestan: the Interaction of Adat and Sharia under the Russian Governance.

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No. 2, 2012

A. Golovnev. Ethnicity: Stability and Changeability (the Case of the North).
Ye. Martynova. Peoples of North-Western Siberia: Definitions and Political Science Discourse.
Z. Sokolova. Ethnicity: Both a Construction and a Reality.
N. Novikova. The "Roster" Identity and Real Life of Aborigines of the Russian North.
V. Shnirelman. Indigenous Peoples, Ethnicity and Politics.
V. Karlov. Stability, Changeability, and Ethnocultural Reproduction in the Modern and Postmodern Epochs.
Ye. Pivneva. "Real" and "New" Khanty/Mansi: On Factors of Ethnocultural Stability.
Ye. Fyodorova. The Present-Day Northern Mansi: A View from Within and from Outside.
A. Sirina. Some Remarks on Identity Formation among the Even and Evenki.
Ye. Perevalova. The Ivdel Mansi: Practice of Survival.
S. Sokolovsky. Contemporary Ethnogenesis or Identity Politics? On the Ideology of Naturalization in Social Sciences.
A. Golovnev. On Traditions and Innovations: Acknowledgments for the Discussion.
I. Shirobokov. Dermatoglyphic Data on the Problem of Origins of Modern Population of the North-East of European Part of Russia.
G. Aksyanova. An Anthropology of the Besermyan.
A. Khokhlov. Ritual Injuries on the Skulls of Representatives of the Khvalynsk Eneolithic Culture of the Volga Region.
Z. Tsallagova. Ethnopedagogical Potentialities of North Caucasian Proverbial Instructions.
A. Sokolova, A. Yudkina. Commemorative Signs at Road Accident Places.
V. Golovachev. Ethnic History of Taiwan in Works by Russian Travelers and Scholars (the Late 18th—First Third of the 20th Centuries).
Ye. Kochukova. Rethinking and Change of Terms in the Vocabulary of Contemporary Chinese Ethnology.
T. Shavlayeva. The Historical Metrology of the Chechen (Length, Distance, and Area Measures).

VOPROSY FILOSOFII

(Problems of Philosophy)

No. 1, 2012

M. Stepanyants. Culture As a Guarantor of Russian Safety.
V. Mironov. Philosophy and the Word, or Once Again on the Specificity of Philosophy.
V. Kuznetsov. Overcoming of Metaphysics As a Problem of Present-Day Philosophy.

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K. Momdzhyan. On the Typology of Social Groups.
I. Yablokov. Subject Domains of Philosophy of Religion (to the Discussion in Present-Day Russian Literature).
A. Chusov. Methodology of Science and Perspectives of Its Development: Modeling, Objectification, General Structure of the Method.
A. Krotov. Malebranche and Spinoza.
D. Bugay. Legal Thinking in Archaic Greece.
D. Lungina. The Bow and the Lyre. War and Peace in Vladimir Bogomolov's Novel *The Moment of Truth (In August 1944...).*
K. Isupov. Archeography of Philosophical Culture.
Yu. Kolesnichenko. Philosophy of Personality As the Overcome Phenomenology. V. Solovyov and M. Bakhtin.
I. Yevlampiyev. Religiousness of Russian Philosophy As a Problem.
D. Steila. Human Activity and Truth: Early Russian Marxists Facing Pragmatism.
A. Oliva. The Influence of Phenomenological Ideas on the "Discursive Interaction" Concept of Bakhtin's Dialogic Circle.
V. Makhlin. Reflecting Reflection (An Attempt to Comment).

No. 2, 2012

V. Rastorguyev. Political Planning and Forecasting: Ideological Frameworks and Civilizational Context.
V. Yakovlev. Metaphysics and Physics of Life.
V. Perminov. Reality of Mathematics.
A. Kozyrev. "Shaky Concept of the Individual": Personalistic Vocabulary of P. Cha-adayev.
Ju. Melikh. On Myths of the Silver Age and Heidelberg.
D. Maslov. Being the Principles of Cognition As Seen by the Parisian Franciscans of the 1320s.
Yu. Habermas. Concept of Human Dignity and Realistic Utopia of Human Rights.
M. Sekatskaya. Ethical Ideals, Logical Limits and the Problem of Freedom.
V. Porus. D. Hume and Philosophy of Culture.
A. Zapesotsky, A. Markov. Reflections in Connection with the Edition of the New Book of V. Mezhuyev.
Ye. Zhuravlyova. Epistemic Status of Digital Data in Modern Scientific Research.

No. 3, 2012

S. Katrechko. Is Metaphysics Possible? On the Way to Scientific (Transcendental) Metaphysics.
Ye. Kosilova. From Suggestion to Consciousness.
N. Khanova. The Topic of the Common Man's Spirituality in Spiritual Educational and Theological Works of Jean Gerson.

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Zh. Alfimova. Historical Essay of Dispute on Universals at the Lvov-Warsaw School.
G. Kiselyov. History and Its Similarity.
D. Trubitsyn. Industrialism As a Technological-Economic Determinism in the Theory of Modernization: a Critical Analysis.
T. Akhmedova. Political and Economical Aspects of Globalization.
V. Bychkov. Symbolization in Art As the Aesthetical Principle.
E. Spirova. Symbol As a Concept of Philosophical Anthropology.
D. Lakhuti. Mill, Peirce and Popper on Logic of Scientific Discovery.
R. Nugayev. Copernican Revolution: Intertheoretical Context.
G. Zhdanova. An Essay on the Theoretical Prerequisites and the Methodological Aspects of the Philosophy of Law in Russia.
O. Zhukova. National Culture and Liberalism in Russia (P. Struve and His Political Philosophy).
V. Kantor. The Dresden Reflections: the Russian Motives (the Appendix—Letters of F. Stepun and D. Obolensky).
An Quinyan. My Understanding of I. Frolov's Philosophy of Humanism.

No. 4, 2012

K. Serdobintsev. Differentiation of Power, Property and Management As a Necessary Condition for Modernization and Development of Civil Society in Russia.
T. Kuznetsova, Z. Orudzhev. The Historical Inherent in Human Nature.
R. Omelchuk. Fanaticism in the Light of the Ontological Approach to Belief.
A. Rubtsov. Architectonics of Postmodern. Space.
M. Blyumenkrants. Where Are You Flying, Trojan Horse, and Where Will Your Hoofs Touch Down?
S. Lebedev. Praxeology of Science.
M. Nenashev. Anthropic Principle and the Problem of the Observer.
A. Karpov. Epistemic Object (Thing) and Psychocultural Comprehension.
V. Petrenko. Basic Metaphors As the Genome (Germ) of the Future Theory (On Material of Psychological Science).
P. Grechko. Dispositions: Ontological Perspective and Communicative Application.
A. Yermichyov. *Casus* of Vladimir Ilyin, or How Difficult Is to Love Russia.
V. Belov. V. Sezeman—Systematizer of Russian Neo-Kantianism.
V. Sezeman. The Problem of Idealism in Philosophy (Translation by V. Belov).

CHELOVEK
(Human Being)

No. 1, 2012

V. Borzenkov. Epistemological Impediments on the Way of Scientific Cognition of Human Being.

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M. Konashev. Richard Dockins and Religion.
T. Porokhovskaya. Forgiveness.
P. Chumakov. Transcending the Possible: the "Human Genome" Project.
Ye. Makhiyanova. The "Human Genome" Project: Scientific and Administrative Aspects.
V. Vinogradsky. The End of "Live Disarray."
A. Karpov. Dispositive Origins of the Renaissance and the Reformation.
O. Donskaya. Nadezhda Lamanova: the First Russian Fashion Designer.
Ye. Krotkov. Multiplicity of Worldviews: Is It a Battlefield Territory?
V. Filatova. Semiotics of Folk Prayer.
M. Korogodina. "The Legend on Armenian Heresy": the Essay in Studying Myths on Nonorthodox Beliefs.
G. Smolyan. Reflexive Governance in Cyberspace Labyrinths.
Ya. Garipov, I. Mavlyautdinov. Fathers and Sons. A Case Study Based on Tatarstan Evidence.
Lev Ettinguen.
V. Sapov. Sociologist's Dream.
P. Sorokin. *The Forerunner. (Just Before the Twilight of the Life).* A Novel.
I. Salmanova. Which Tolstoy Is Not Rejected by Us?

PSYKHOLOGUICHESKY ZHURNAL

(Psychological Journal)

No. 2, 2012

L Dikaya. Social Psychology of Labor in the New Period of Development: Methodological and Theoretical Bases and Empirical Studies.
V. Bodrov. Modern Views on the Sense of Fatigue in Professional Activity.
A. Chernyshev. Sociopsychological Conditions for the Formation of Small Groups' Subjectness: Theoretical and Experimental Approach to the Study.
A. Sidorenkov, A. Mondrus. Empirical Substantiation of Group Cohesion Model.
O. Gulevich, Ye. Morozova. Organizational Culture As a Factor of Organizational Justice Perception.
T. Kornilova, I. Chigrinova. Stages of Individual Morals and Acceptance of Uncertainty in Regulation of Personal Choice.
B. Rebzuyev. Impulsive Consumers' Behavior under Limited Conditions of Cognitive Resources.
V. Koltsova, Ye. Kholondovich. Genius: Psychological and Historical Study.
V. Rozin. Commentaries to A. Zhuravlyov's and D. Ushakov's Article "Fundamental Psychology and Practice: Problems and Tendencies of Interaction."
A. Orlov. Psychological Practice As a Subject of Fundamental Psychology (Commentaries to A. Zhuravlyov's and D. Uhakov's Article "Fundamental Psychology and Practice: Problems and Tendencies of Interaction").

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A. Zhuravlyov, D. Ushakov. Theory and Practice: Views from Different Standpoints (Reply to Comments).

OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI I SOVREMENNOST (ONS)
(Social Sciences Today)

No. 1, 2012

V. Kasamara, A. Sorokina. The "Ideal" President As Seen by Russian and French Students.
N. Lebedeva, K. Tumanyants. Modernization Obstacles in Present-Day Russia.
A. Zhivitiashvili. Mass Sociomental Development—a Myth or Real Possibility?
T. Adamyants. Sociocultural Types in the Evolution of the Russian Village.
M. Mukhanova. Transformation of Socioprofessional Structure of the Russian Village (1994-2009).
V. Pastukhov. Russia in Search of "the Modern Times" (Cycles of the Russian Power).
A. Usachyov. "The Third Rome" or "the Third Kiev"? (Moscow Tsardom of the 16th Century in Perception of Contemporaries).
S. Lurye. In Search of the New Forms of Self-Identification of the Russian Urban Population: Methodology of *Grounded Theory* in a Practical Research.
V. Sheynis. The Bolshevist Power and the First Soviet Constitution.
L. Yevstigneyeva, R. Yevstigneyev. Formation of Economic Synergetics.
G. Musikhin. Ideology and History.
Vyach. Ivanov. Novella on Falcon in Jovanni Bokacho's *Decameron* and Vsevolod Ivanov's *Falcon.*
V. Novikov. The Novel of a Russian Writer with the Italian Language (an Academic Essay).
A. Markov. Dialogue of Cultures in the Conditions of Globalization. The 11th International Likhachev Readings in the St. Petersburg Humanitarian University of Trade Unions.

No. 2, 2012

L. Nikitin. Banking Space in Russia in 1988-2011: From the Monopoly of the Capital to the Competition between other Cities.
N. Latova, Yu. Latov. "The Capital City Centrism" As a Cause of Social Inequality in the Russian Higher Education.
N. Tikhonova. Peculiarities of Russian Modernists and the Prospects of Cultural Dynamics in Russia. Article I.
N. Lapin. On the Experience of Stage Analysis of Modernization.
M. Klupt. Regional Alternatives to the Global Demographic Development.
A. Vishnevsky. Are There Alternatives for the Nonalternative?
Is Klyuchevsky's History Outdated?

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Ya. Shemyakin, O. Shemyakina. "Faith-Isolate" As a Civilizational Alternative.
D. Kuznetsov. The "Vietnam Syndrome" in Public Opinion of the USA.
R. Abramov. Sociocultural Aspects of Post-Soviet Nostalgia in Former Yugoslavia (Reflections over M. Velikonja's and T. Petrovic's Works).
V. Voytov, E. Mirsky. Unexpected Social Problems of the Present Stage of Scientific and Technological Progress.

POLITICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (POLIS)

(Political Studies)

No. 2, 2012

A. Melville et al. Trajectories of Regime Transformations and Types of State Consistency.
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A. Neklessa. The Future and the Days to Come: Crisis of the Modern World.
S. Lurye, L. Kazaryan. World Politics and Its Prognostic Indicators.
D. Lane. Civil Society in the Countries of the European Union: Ideology, Institutions and Advance of Democracy.
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V. Kochetkov. Social Quest and Constitutionalism.
Ye. Mikhailova, A. Bardin. Online Civil Society Library.
G. Pushkaryova. Political Space: Problems of Theoretical Conceptualization.

GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO

(The State and Law)

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I. Klepitskiy. The Form and the Purpose in the Criminal Law.

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N. Krotkova. Interview with I. Bachilo, Doctor of Juridical Sciences, Professor, the Honored Jurist of the Russian Federation.
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V. Rusinova. Classification of Individuals in Noninternational Armed Conflicts: in Search of a Balanced Approach.
G. Tansykbayeva. Some Questions of Improvement of the Family Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

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S. Shishkin. The Ways of Improvement of Legal Support of State Regulation of the Economy.

VOPROSY EKONOMIKI
(Problems of Economics)

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Ye. Penukhina et al. Economic Effects of 2004-2009 Tax Reforms: Retrospective Analysis.
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B. Kheyfets. The Risks of Russia's Debt Policy against the Background of the Global Debt Crisis.
Ye. Lebedinskaya. Oil and Gas Funds' Role in Russia.
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Val. Lukov. Conceptualization of Youth in the 21st Century. New Ideas and Approaches.
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Ye. Frolova. Functional Specifics of Rural Settlements' Infrastructure in Chukchee Autonomous Region.

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S. Basov. Civil Society and Civic Relations: Search of Sense..
G. Gabdrakhmanova, R. Musina. Making and Development of Ethnosociology in the Republic of Tatarstan.
Ye. Tuzhba. Specifics of Ethnic Groups' Social Feeling in Abkhasia.
S. Zolotukhin. Specifics of Russians' Adaptation in Kazakhstan.
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O. Rybakovsky, S. Martynenko. Gender Aspect of Global Migrations.
Ye. Ivanova. Generation Problem and the Reproduction of the Population. Theoretical Approaches *vs*. Realities.
V. Volkov. Integrating Society in Latvia: Positions of Ethnic Minorities.
Ya. Garipov. Language Development of a Polyethnic Region.
G. Balakina, A. Kyldygay. Specifics of Ethnic Groups' Socioeconomic Adaptation in the Republic of Tyva.
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V. Bachinin. Sociological Nature of A. Sinyavsky's Literature.
O. Lysikova. Russian Tourists, Identity Types and Social Practices.

VOSTOK
(Oriens)

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B. Litvinsky. From the Unpublished. Introductory Article by V. Androsov.
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P. Lurye. Sogdian Beads on the "Roof of the World."
A. Balakhvantsev. The Dahaes of Central Asia of the Époque of Alexander the Great: According to the Narrative Tradition.
Ye. Smagina. Origin and Features of the Doctrine about Elements in Manichaeanism.
G. Kolganova. Bit Hilani: Current Historiography.
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E. Ali-Zade. The Russian Literature in the Arab Orient: the First Arabians Translations of Chekhov's Stories.
M. Kameneva. The Influence of Global Civilization Processes on the Cultural-Language Development in Iran (the 20th—Early 21st Centuries).
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K. Butba. Lineaments of Colonialism in USA Policy in Iraq. Contemporary USA Policy in Iraq in the Late 20th—Early 21st Centuries.

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D. Martynov (Kazan). On the Creation Time of Kang Youwei’s *Book of Great Unity.*
F. Yurlov. India in the Second World War.
N. Kazurova (St. Petersburg). The Role of Islam in Shaping of Ethnical and Aesthetical Identity in Iranian Cinema.
Ye. Denisov. Central Asia As a Region of the International Politics.
Discussion “World Economy: Time of Revaluations?”

VOPROSY LITERATURY
(Problems of Literature)

No. 1 (January-February), 2012

V. Bachinin. Alexander Schmemann and His “Research Laboratory” on the Theology of Literature.
M Abasheva. Literary Award As a Tool. *Notes of an Insider.*
O. Osmukhina. Literature As a Method. *Tatyana Tolstaya.*
Ye. Pogorelaya. *Marche funèbre* in the Remote Area of China. *Vladimir Sorokin.*
L. Khesed. History of One Generation. *Margarita Khemlin.*
A. Alyokhin. “The Poetry Is Love in the Broad Sense of the Word.” *The Talk Led by* ***Ye. Lutsenko****.*
Ye. Berkovich. Correction of Mistakes. *Marginal Notes on Thomas Mann Autobiography.*
In Memory of A. Karelsky.
V. Zusman. Ludwig Tieck’s *Puss in Boots:* from the Text to the Work.
T. Venediktova. “Railway Reading” As a Factor of Literary History.
A. Zherebin. Heinrich Heine’s “Oscar Wilde’s Paradox.”
V. Zuseva-Ozkan. Unfavorable Metareflexion. *Milan Kundera*.
D. Sobolev. Problem of Phenomenology of a Literary Work.
S. Kibalnik. Pseudounity of Russian Émigré Writers: Gaito Gazdanov and Vladimir Nabokov.
E. Akimov. *The Covetous Knight.*
M. Vishnevetskaya. “I am a Writer-Catharsist.” *The Talk Led by* ***G. Arosev****.*
N. Koroleva. My Friends on the Committee “April”—Writers in Support of *Perestroyka.*
V. Kantor. Difficult Rapprochement: Zaytsev and Stepun.

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A. Kabakov. Between Phantasmagoria and a Description of Everyday Life. *The Talk Led by* ***T. Solovyova.***
Ye. Ponomaryov. Mayakovsky's Travelogues. Beginning of the Genre.
N. Rumyantseva. Reflections on the Two Novels.
V. Ardov and M. Volpin's Oral Memories. *Introductory Article, Publication and Notes by N. Pankov.*
Ye. Shcheglova. Izrail Moiseyevich Metter. Reminiscences.
V. Zusman, V. Kirnoze. From the Text to the Literary Work.
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N. Morzhenkova. Tragedy on the Background of the "World" Landscape. *Gertrude Stein's Theater Landscapes.*
V. Shamina. Chuck Palahniuk's Novel *Fight Club. Between Romanticism and Postmodernism.*
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VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA
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I. Melchuk (Montreal). Dependencies-2011: Dependency in Language and Linguistics.
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M. Datsishina (Moscow). Language As an Instrument of Oppression: German on the Temporarily Occupied Soviet Territories, 1941-1944.
N. Bichurina (St. Petersburg). Minor Romance Languages: Metalinguistic Discourse and Language Policy in France (Occitan / Provençal and Arpitan / Savoyard).
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