

The International Institute for Central Asian Studies was established on July 5, 1995, the outcome of a large-scale UNESCO Silk Road project. The idea for Institute's creation emerged during an international scientific expedition on the Central Asian steppe route; organized within the framework of the "Integral Studies of the Silk Roads: Roads of Dialogue" program, a major project of the World Decade for Cultural Development (1987-1997). Member states of IICAS are Azerbaijan, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan.

IICAS's mission is to draw attention to a wide audience concerning the scientific and cultural challenges of Central Asia and to strengthen cooperation between local scholars and their international counterparts in the interdisciplinary study of the region, including tangible and intangible cultural heritage, environment, archaeology, art history, history of religions, history of science, ethnology, historical geography, written and oral literature, and social sciences among others. The objectives and functions of IICAS are reflected in the research and applied projects carried out by the Institute. The Bulletin of IICAS is intended not only to reflect research outcomes but also to be a publication that promotes an expanding communicative space for interaction between experts from different countries.

All articles submitted to the editorial board are peer-reviewed, and publications are reflected in the RSCI bibliographic database. We hope to improve research standards by publishing scholarly articles and making all the materials freely available to those interested. The editorial board also considers it a priority to provide the academic community with opportunities to initiate scientific discussions and share opinions.

Within each section of the journal, materials are grouped not by subject, but by the authors' names in alphabetical order. This neutral principle applies not only to thematic blocks, where the autonomy of each article is inappropriate; but also, more importantly is the logical linkages between the texts presented. The journal focuses on publishing specific studies' outcomes in the disciplines mentioned above, as well as polemics, criticism, and a bibliography with the most recent sources. This allows users to track and evaluate all the essential matters regularly emerging in the study of the Central Asian history and contemporary culture.

Regulations and instructions for contributors and the entire archive of the journal is freely accessible at www.unesco-iicas.org.

BULLETIN OF IICAS 37

BULLETIN

OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES



37

ISSN 2181-8592

BULLETIN

OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR CENTRAL ASIAN
STUDIES

37

PUBLISHED TWICE A YEAR

Founded in 2005

SAMARKAND

2024



International Institute
for Central Asian Studies (IICAS)
by the UNESCO Silk Road Programme

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

Chairman **Evren Rutbil**, Director of the IICAS; **Bakhtiyar Babajanov**, Dr. Sci. (Hist.), The Abu Rayhan Biruni Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan; **Jian Ma**, professor of the School of Cultural Heritage at Northwest University, Xi'an, China; **Julio Bendezu-Sarmiento**, PhD in prehistory, ethnology and anthropology, University of Paris 1 Sorbonne Pantheon, French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS-ENS); **Michael Frachetti**, professor, Department of Anthropology Washington University in St. Louis, USA; **Yegor Kitov**, PhD Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Archeology of the Ministry of Science and Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan; **Bulat Khusainov**, Dr. Sci. (Economics), Associate Professor, Kazakh-German University, Almaty; **Roland Lin Chih-Hung**, PhD in Art History and Archaeology, Professor, Paris-Sorbonne University; **Pavel Lurje**, PhD in philology, Oriental Department of the State Hermitage Museum, St.Petersburg; **Simone Mantellini**, Ph.D. in archaeology, University of Bologna; **Shahin Mustafayev**, Dr. Sci. (Hist.), Academician, President of the International Turkic Academy (TWESCO); **Claude Rapin**, Dr (HDR), National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS-ENS), Paris; **Ayrat Sitdikov**, Dr. Sci. (Hist.), Institute of Archeology named after A.Khalikov, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan; **Michael Shenkar**, Associate Professor of Pre-Islamic Iranian Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; **Rafael Valeev**, Dr. Sci. (Hist.), Professor of Kazan Federal University, Vice-President of National Committee ICOMOS Russia; **Ona Vileikis**, PhD in engineering science, the UCL Institute of Archaeology; **Dmitry Voyakin**, PhD in archaeology, Member of the National Commission for UNESCO and ISESCO of the Republic of Kazakhstan; **Kazuya Yamauchi**, Professor of Archaeology, Teikyo University, Tokyo.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-Chief **Ruslan G. Muradov**, Professor of the International Academy of Architecture, Moscow branch (IAAM); **Bakyt Amanbaeva**, PhD in archaeology, Professor, Institute of History and Cultural Heritage of the National Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Republic; **Farda Asadov**, Dr. Sci. (Philology), Professor, Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Azerbaijan; **Enkhbat Avirmed**, the School of Business Administration and Humanities, Mongolian University of Science and Technology; **Naranbaatar Baasansuren**, PhD student, School of Business Administration and Humanity, MUST, Mongolia; **Bauyrzhan Baitanayev**, Dr. Sci. (Hist.), Academician, Institute of Archaeology of the Ministry of Science and Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan; **Larisa Dodhudoeva**, Dr.Sci. (Hist.), Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan; **Steven Gilbert**, PhD in historical and ethnographic and theological studies, the Lanier Center for Archaeology at Lipscomb University, USA; **Svetlana Gorshenina**, Dr (HDR), University of Geneva - National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS-ENS), Paris; **Elmira Gül**, Dr. Sci. (Art), Professor, Institute of Art History of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan; **Hanife Güz**, Prof. Dr., Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi, Türkiye; **Alexander Djumaev**, PhD in art studies, Leading researcher of the Institute for Cultural Research and Intangible Cultural Heritage of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent; **Saeid Khatibzadeh**, Professor, Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran; **Hee Soo Lee**, Professor of the Department of Cultural Anthropology, Hanyang University, Seoul; **Philipp Meuser**, Prof. h.c. Dr.-Ing., architect, publisher, Visiting Professor for Public Humanities, Brown University (Providence/Rhode Island, USA), "Meuser architekten GMBH", Germany; **Tigran Mkrtchyev**, Dr. Sci. (Art studies), Director of the State Museum of Arts named after I. V. Savitsky, Nukus; **Shakirjan Pidaev**, PhD in archaeology, Fine Arts Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan; **Ghani-ur Rahman**, Assistant Professor, Taxila Institute of Asian Civilizations Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; **Khalil Shirgholami**, Deputy General Director for research in the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), Iran; **Dmitry Tayursky**, Dr. Sci. (Physical and Mathematical Sciences), Vice-Rector for Scientific Activities of Kazan Federal University, federal expert in the scientific and technical field, Russia; **Tim Williams**, Professor of Silk Roads Archaeology, the UCL Institute of Archaeology, Great Britain.

Editorial Office: **Zarina Muminova**

The authors are responsible for the choice and the presentation of the facts contained in this edition and for the opinions expressed therein, which are not necessarily those of IICAS and do not oblige the organization in way, nor do they represent the expression of any opinions as the part of IICAS concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontier or boundaries.

CONTENTS

CULTURAL STUDIES

- R. Kh. Sulejmanov, Kh. A. Toichiev, U. K. Abdumazarov,
F. Sh. Shamukaramova, A. G. Mukhamadiev,
D. R. Normurodov, G. A. Mukhtorov, A. A. Abduganiev,
O. O. Elmuratov, O. T. Ergashev, B. A. Elmuratov*
Archaeological research at the Arkutsay Geological Section and in its Environs7
- Julio Bendezu-Sarmiento, Olivier Lecomte (†),
Mukhammed Mamedov, Akhmed Khalmuradov*
Ulug depe in the system of the First Civilizations15
- Bakhtiyar Babajanov, Yelizaveta Nekrasova*
Phenomena of Cultural Integration: Turkmens in medieval Bukhara32
- Bauyrzhan Baitanaev, Yuri Yolgin*
Late medieval Iconic Architecture of Turkestan region
(Fergana influence in the architectural heritage)49
- Alexander Djumaev*
From the History of Musical Culture of the Turkestan region
and Soviet Uzbekistan (Early 20th century –late 1950s)58
- Natalya Anurova-Shabunts, Valentina Khairova*
Book Graphics of Turkmenistan in Editions for Children of the 1920s–1930s93
- Boris Chukhovich*
From “Mother” to “Madonna”: the Social History of a Photograph by Max Penson107

HISTORIOGRAPHY ISSUES

- Daniil Melentev*
What was Hujum?131
- Jakhongir Ostonov*
Some Aspects of Central Asian Studies in France146

CHRONICLE

Snezhanna Atanova

Ethnographer In The Museum.

The exhibition "Dust and Silk" at the Ethnography Museum in Heidelberg155

Talgat Mamirov

Celebrating the 70th birthday

of the academician Zhaken Taymagambetov158

Jamshid Adilov, Oksana Pugovkina

Valery Germanov (1950–2023)163

Books published by and with the support of the IICAS168

The Distribution of Grant Funding of IICAS in 2024-2025172

Evren Rutbil, New Director of the IICAS173

Addresses of Authors174

Abbreviations175

DANIIL MELENTEV

WHAT WAS HUJUM?

Abstract. *It is still believed that the campaign for the «practical emancipation» of Muslim women in Central Asia, or Hujum, proved successful and forever changed the social and cultural history of the region. Muslim women finally gained civil and political rights, and they joined the ranks of various Soviet educational institutions and state-owned enterprises in large numbers. The researchers agree in the representations of Hujum as an uncompromising struggle of the European Communists against the veil, which was for them a symbol of «household remnants» and an artifact of the «backwardness» of the indigenous population. In addition, historians emphasize that Hujum was carried out by cruel methods and was a «compulsion to freedom». The present study is devoted to the revision of such representations of Hujum in historiography. The article is based on a wide range of Russian-language sources created mainly by European women employees of women's departments. Some sources are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. The article critically examines the role of Muslim communists, court and police officers during the Muslim women emancipation in the 1920s, which in Soviet historiography were positioned as the major defenders of women during Hujum. Paid special attention to women's departments, which, unlike the Bolshevik party or the «Jadids», have not yet become an object of study in historiography and have not been positioned as one of the main actors in the emancipation of Muslim women. The women's departments methods of work are highlighted in detail and thus is questioned the conclusion that they tried to «force Muslim women to freedom». In addition, the article examines the period after Hujum, which was ignored by the scholars. In the sources, in particular in document management, journalism and memoirs of women's departments employees, it was called «Retreat». During the study, it was found that Hujum turned out to be an unsuccessful campaign, which was immediately recognized by women's departments employees and high-ranking Central Asian officials. Hujum destroyed the women's departments and the entire infrastructure of emancipation. The Soviet government failed to eliminate gender inequality, as well as the religious worldview that legitimized the patriarchal social and everyday life of the indigenous population in Central Asia.*

Key words: *gender history, cultural history, emancipation, Hujum, Central Asia, Uzbekistan.*

Citation: Melentev, D. (2024). What was Hujum? in: *Bulletin of the IICAS* 37, 130-144.

Article link: <https://doi.org/10.34920/2181-8592-2024.37en.008>

THE BOLSHEVIKS, who came to power in 1917, considered women to be the most oppressed part of the population of the former Russian Empire, especially in the “East”. Women were squeezed into the narrow framework of various taboos, deprived of the legal rights and freedoms that men had. To the Bolsheviks, this situation seemed to be an unjust world order, which should be immediately abandoned in the name of the public good and progress. A set of measures to change gender roles in Soviet society in the 1920s designated by the term “emancipation”. It was understood as the liberation of women from any infringement of rights and freedoms, any restrictions. Emancipation implied service not to the “home,” but to the proletarian society and the state. Emancipation implied not only the recog-

inition of socio-political and economic freedoms for women, but was aimed at changing the worldview, everyday life and family structure of peoples who, according to the Bolsheviks, were at different stages of historical development. The most famous episode in the history of Muslim women emancipation in the USSR was *Hujum*.

The interest in solving the “women’s issue” arose in the USSR in the second half of the 1950s. Probably the first researcher, who took up the history of this issue, was Vera Bilshai. In her second research work, she touched on the topic of Hujum, recognizing “serious problems in the emancipation of women of the “Soviet East””, for example, “universal illiteracy”, the coexistence of Soviet courts as well as those based on *Adat* and *Sharia* laws in Turkmen and Uzbek SSR,

the murders of activists (*Bilshai* 1956: 145, 148, 165). Bibi Palvanova's work on the emancipation of Turkmen women was published a year later and, unlike the work of Bilshai, it did not say anything about the difficulties of resolving the "women's issue" in Central Asia and did not mention Hujum (*Palvanova* 1957: 15). In the 1960–1970s, a period of "thaw" began in the USSR, when the unspoken ban on the study of pressing social topics, which included the "women's issue", was lifted in science (*Pushkareva* 2010: 51–64). This time period in the West was marked by the growing popularity of works dedicated to communities that had long been subject to discrimination, including women. At the same time, myriads of works on the emancipation of Muslim women appeared in the USSR (*Shukurova* 1961, 1970, *Palvanova* 1961, 1967, *Aminova* 1975; *Tatybekova* 1963, 1975).

In Soviet historiography, Hujum overshadowed all other manifestations of gender politics. Its characteristics are stereotypical and non-specific: it was believed that Hujum was a success, and the main achievement of the struggle for freedom of the "woman of the Soviet East" was the elimination of the *burqa*. However, opinions may differ regarding Hujum's original goals. Zh.S. Tatybekova wrote about the following: "The slogan "On the offensive" meant a transition from predominantly explanatory work to the mandatory implementation of Soviet laws and party directives for the emancipation of women in Central Asia" (*Tatybekova* 1975: 32). Later, a document was discovered in which the unveiling was not indicated as the goal of Hujum. Its first point stated that it was launched to "popularize the legislation of the Soviet government on the emancipation of women," the second point was about "promoting economic emancipation," while the third one dwelled on "the struggle for literacy" (*Palvanova* 1982: 166).

Soviet researchers artificially expanded the chronological framework of Hujum. Rahima Aminova divided it into two stages: "preparatory" – 1926–1927, and "consolidation of the results" – 1927–1932. (*Aminova* 1975: 5). Bibi Palvanova believed that Hujum began in 1923 during the planning of the national-territorial delimitation of Central Asia (*Palvanova* 1982: 164). Soviet historians noted the "decisive struggle" of the court, police and Komsomol during the Hujum, but did not say anything about the role of departments dealing with political work among women (*Zhenotdels*), which since 1920 have been engaged in the emancipation of women in the USSR (*Shukurova* 1961: 101; *Aminova* 1975: 79–82; *Palvanova* 1982: 164). "The enemies of emancipation" were called "agents of the capitalist powers in Central Asia" – the *Basmachs*, the *Bays* and the "Muslim clergy" (the *Ulems*).

In the Soviet historiography there are features

that formed a narrative full of gaps regarding the emancipation of women in Central Asia, which did not change until the late 1980s. Firstly, for a long time historians did not call the indigenous women of the region as Muslims, speaking only of "female workers". Secondly, "European women" (Russians, Jews, Tatars, etc.) were reluctantly mentioned being an important category for the pre-revolutionary, Soviet and post-Soviet history of the region. Thirdly, the influence of the emancipation of Muslim women on economic indicators was investigated, which can be explained by the application of Marxist-Leninist theory, which placed production relations at the forefront, and considered the political and cultural needs of classes to be secondary. Fourthly, the authors ignored the key figure for Central Asia in the 1920s – Isaac Zelensky, who served as executive secretary of the Central Asian Bureau (*Sredazburo*) of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks (VKP(b)) and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Uzbekistan SSR (KP(b)Uz). In the sixth place, the topic of the "women's issue" in Central Asia was dealt with, with rare exceptions, by representatives of the indigenous peoples of the region. Thus, at the all-Union scientific conference "National aspect of solving the women's issue in the USSR", which was held in Tashkent on December 18–19, 1975, reports on Central Asia were made by scientists from these republics, while the reports on the R.S.F.S.R. were introduced by Russian researchers (*Akhunova* 1976: 56–57). Obviously, the unspoken demarcation of the scientific field was dictated by the national policy of the USSR, when the history of the republics was written by representatives of their titular nation.

It was only during the period of "glasnost" that some historians began to doubt Hujum's achievements. Dilorom Alimova argued that, regardless of the popular opinion on a positive solution to the "women's issue" in Central Asia, this was far from the case: "Unfortunately, at present in the republic, the research of the women's issue is not among the most important scientific developments leading to a practical solution. It is absolutely insufficiently covered in the press. The appearance of articles on women's issues in the republican press is spontaneous. The year 1987, which brought a noticeable shift in the volume and quality of published materials in connection with the 60th anniversary of "Hujum," was followed by a noticeable decline in interest paid to this problem, although it is noticeably far from being resolved. In a republic where the women's issue has always been and remains burning, it would be necessary to have a constantly open platform on the pages of one or another newspaper or magazine" (*Alimova* 1989: 51–56). At the same time, a book dedicated to the cam-

campaign for the “actual emancipation” of women in the “Soviet East”¹ was published. However, this campaign was presented in a canonical form – as a successful struggle for the freedom of Muslim women from “everyday prejudices” and the burqa.

Before the very end of the USSR, there was published the work of Alimova, in which she denounced the Soviet historiography, admitting that in the 1930s, “the developing process of women’s emancipation was inhibited. This had the most severe consequences in the republics of Central Asia, where, in fact, women were not yet involved in production; such phenomena as seclusion, burqa, bride price, marriage of minors, polygamy, and bride kidnapping were common. This is what we see as the origins of the declarative attitude towards the women’s issue in these years” (Alimova 1991: 4). Among other things, the statistical data cited in Soviet historiography about Muslim women who threw off the burqa are unpalatable (Alimova 1991: 6).

In independent Uzbekistan, the researcher revised her representations. Alimova believed that Hujum was necessary not so much for Muslim women as for men who were morally not ready to say goodbye to their dominant position in the family and society, as well as to see women on the street without a burqa (Alimova 1998: 147-155). At the same time, Hujum was not a “clash of classes,” as Soviet historiography claimed, but a struggle for the dominance of radically different mentalities – European and Muslim (Alimova 1998: 147-155). A few years later Alimova considered the involvement of Uzbek women in labor as “enslavement,” and the Soviet way of achieving equality as “violent” (Alimova 2008: 253-254). Alimova began to reproduce gender stereotypes, for example, that the “natural function” and “destiny of a woman” is the birth of children, and not work for the benefit of society and the state (Alimova 2008: 262).

The earliest study on Muslim women in Central Asia, written outside the USSR and the post-Soviet space, belongs to Gregory J. Massell. The author argued that the emancipation of Muslim women was a violent policy initiated by the Bolsheviks, based on utilitarian considerations – increasing the labor reserve and implementing economic reforms (Massell 1974). According to the author, Muslim women were a “surrogate proletariat” because the proletarian class did not exist in pre-revolutionary and early Soviet Central Asia. The researcher concluded that the indigenous people of the region, including the communists, did not understand the essence of Hujum, so they perceived it as an uncompromising struggle against the burqa (Massell 1974: 235). At the begin-

ning of the 21st century, the work “Empire under the Burqa” was published, which largely supported Massell’s ideas about the emancipation of Muslim women in Central Asia (Northrop 2004). The author of the study, Douglas Northrop, considers emancipation to be the violent colonial policy of the Bolsheviks, which was no different from Western and Russian imperialism. According to the researcher, for the Bolsheviks, Central Asia represented a “laboratory of identities” in which the Russians conducted experiments on the consciousness of Muslims and settlers (Northrop 2011: 235-272). The author views Hujum as a socio-cultural experiment that was launched by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (*Sredazburo*) together with the Caucasian Bureau in order to destroy the religious identity of the indigenous people (Northrop 2004: 82).

The New Woman of Uzbekistan by Marianne Kamp, published several times later, was carried out within the framework of oral history and is in many ways unique, since the researcher in 1992–1993 conducted a series of interviews with Uzbek women and those of other nationalities who witnessed Hujum (Kamp 2006). The researcher proves that emancipation in the Muslim republics of the USSR should not be considered a continuation of Russian colonial policy. On the other hand, Hujum was the work of middle- and lower-level Muslim communists who tried to prove their loyalty to the Soviet system with their zeal (Kamp 2014: 205-228). Adrienne Edgar comes to a somewhat opposite conclusion, saying that “Soviet policy towards women in Central Asia in the 1920s–1930s was not imperial in intention, but turned out to be imperial in essence” (Edgar 2006: 252-272). Edgar agrees with Massell and Northrop that the goal of the emancipation of Muslim women in Central Asia was economic modernization (Edgar 2006: 252-272). Marianne Kamp agrees with the opinion of S. Keller, who argues that Muslim women during the Hujum were left between a rock and a hard place – the Soviet government, which demanded to “become modern” and a society that wanted to maintain restrictions on women’s rights and freedoms, including wearing the burqa (Kamp 2006: 12).

This investigation is at the borderline of several methodological optics – institutional, social, cultural and that of gender history. In this case, the emancipation of Muslim women in Central Asia in the 1920s is analyzed through the prism of the perception of *Zhenotdels* employees, who were the projectors and implementers of gender transformations. They inevitably made mistakes and could not understand the society and culture of the indigenous people in a sketchy way. Therefore, the research is based on the cultural experience and socio-political thought of employees of Central Asian *Zhenotdels*. The article is based on a

¹ *Hudzhum – znachit nastuplenie (Hujum – Means Offensive)*. Tashkent: Uzbekistan Publ., 1987 (In Russian).

wide range of sources. Their main body is the document flow between the Tashkent Central Office dealing with political work among women (Tashkent CO) and the Moscow CO. The corpus of records of Central Asian *Zhenotdels* accessible to researchers in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History was fully investigated². Not all documents were included in the Moscow archives, but they also contain rich information on the history of the “women’s issue” in Central Asia. These documents are capable of changing the perspective of the study of emancipation, which is inherent in Soviet and modern works. On the one hand, the documents from Moscow archives make it possible to abandon the admiration for emancipation, and on the other hand, from its unconditional condemnation. Moscow archives help to formulate a general picture of the emancipation of Muslim women in Central Asia in the 1920s, while at the same time having sources that can illustrate unique cases.

By way of investigation of emancipation in Soviet Central Asia, the publicism was involved, for example, numerous propaganda brochures and other works by the head of the Tashkent Central Office S.T. Lyubimova, articles from the *Kommunistka* magazine, memoirs of employees of Central Asian *Zhenotdels*, as well as little-known regional periodicals, primarily the newspaper *Pravda Vostoka*. Employees of Central Asian *Zhenotdels* viewed their publications as a tool of agitation among Russian-speaking citizens as well as a platform from which they could highlight the problems of gender equality in Muslim society. *Zhenotdel* employees paid close attention to Muslim women; they rarely wrote about the problems of European women. The publication activity of employees of Central Asian *Zhenotdels* should be viewed as a desire to maintain the interest of Soviet citizens and influential party officials in the topic of gender equality in the region. The purpose of this study is to find out what consequences Hujum led to the authorities and society of the indigenous people of Central Asia. The problem of this article is to determine the reasons for the gap in the representations of Hujum in historiography and sources.

Emancipation of Muslim women before 1927

The emancipation of Muslim women in the R.S.F.S.R. began in 1920 under the leadership of Anna Kollontai. The first project on the emancipation of Muslim women, published in the magazine *Kommunistka*, was compiled by the Moscow Central Office and focused on the Volga-Ural, Orenburg and Astrakhan regions; there was no talk of Central Asia

and the Caucasus³. They were taken care of in 1921. Then the Eastern Bureau was created in Moscow, which was engaged in the emancipation of Muslim women in the “Soviet East”⁴. In 1921, the Tashkent Central Office independently developed a project to emancipate Muslim women in Central Asia⁵. Agitation was proclaimed to be the core of emancipation among them, and the goal was to get rid of “the religious and everyday remnants”: bride price, polygamy, marriage of minors, levirate, disproportionate division of household responsibilities between spouses. The draft says nothing about eliminating the burqa. The work that began among urban Muslim women in Central Asia was ceased until 1923 due to the escalation of the Civil War – one of the *Basmachi*’s demands was an end to emancipation⁶.

With the arrival of Serafima Lyubimova from Moscow in 1923, the work of the Tashkent Central Office began to revive. Methods of emancipation characteristic of the R.S.F.S.R. began to be practiced. The first method was participation in the delegate movement. Delegates were the activists who were supposed to know Soviet laws well and protect women from the arbitrariness of power and men (*Stites* 2004: 456). Political emancipation was an unpopular method in Central Asia. There were no models of interaction between women and authorities in the region, so Muslim women were afraid of any contact with *Zhenotdel* employees who asked to share personal information with them⁷. Party functionaries pointed out that women are busy with the issues of survival, so they have no energy to engage in politics⁸. One of the employees of the Moscow Central Office argued that the delegate movement in Central Asia was a characteristic feature of urban life, and in rural areas, nomads’ camps and mountains it was unavailable (*Zavaryan* 1926: 66-70). Later, an inspection of the Moscow Central Office revealed that the Central Asian *Zhenotdels* had not held re-elections of delegates since 1925, and then canceled them altogether⁹.

The second method was labor. There was no developed industry in Central Asia – it was an agricultural region¹⁰. Initially, *Zhenotdels* tried to create various artels, but they did not become popular among

² RGASPI [Russian State Archive of Socio-Political –History]. Fund 17. List 10; Fund 61. List 1–3; Fund 62. P. 1–4 and etc.

³ O rabote sredi musulmanok (On the work among Muslim women), in: *Kommunistka*, 1920, No 5. P. 42 (in Russian).

⁴ RGASPI. Fund 17. List 10. File 39, p. 20–22.

⁵ National Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Fund 34. List 1. File 266, p. 1–27.

⁶ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 446, p. 17–21.

⁷ RGASPI. Fund 17. List 10. File 222, p. 1–4.

⁸ RGASPI. Fund 17. List 10. File 222, p. 1–4.

⁹ Ot nastupleniya k sistematicheskoi rabote (From the “offensive” to systematic work), in: *Kommunistka*, 1928, No 1. P. 57–63 (in Russian).

¹⁰ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 775, p. 1–31.

Muslim women¹¹. They admitted that “they don’t need work outside their home,” since such women “were looked at as people who went against religion” (Lyubimova 1925a: 25). In 1926, the Urtak tobacco factory was opened in Tashkent. At its opening, the chairman of the local department of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) Udarov spoke, who said: “The new tobacco factory marks the beginning of the development of industry in Central Asia. The factory machine not only produces goods, it educates new fighters and builders of socialism, especially from the indigenous population and especially women” (Oktyabrev 1926: 5). However, a “survey” of the factory conducted in 1926 by the Tashkent Central Office found that European and Muslim women experienced mutual hostility¹². The director of the factory, A.G. Zelenskaya, did not have a high opinion of the productivity of Muslim women. The director claimed that they were “unable to work, extremely slow and skip a lot¹³”

At the same time, the Turkmen SSR was given a textile factory in Reutov (Moscow region) for free use, where Turkmen were sent for training (Drobot 1926: 4). The Turkmen were trained at the Krasnaya Talka textile mill in Ivano-Voznesensk¹⁴. The Turkmen were the members of the Bolshevik Party, illiterate, who came to the RSFSR together with their wives and children. Turkmen women were not allowed to work on machines for a long time, since they could not master Russian literacy. The second Land and Water reform (1925–1926) turned out to be relatively successful for the residents of the Uzbek SSR. During this time period the state helped *female dehkans* [peasant women] create artels and their own farms, which convinced male farmers that women’s labor was financially beneficial for the individual family and the *kishlak* (Lyubimova 1926a: 56–59). The second Land and Water reform contributed to the elimination of some of the prejudices among men regarding the ability of women to independently manage the household¹⁵.

The third and most important method for the Tashkent Central Office was education. It was closely associated with the idea of re-education, as well as agitation. Women’s departments had connections with a wide network of educational institutions. Starting from 1920, Soviet schools began to appear in large cities in the region, as well as literacy schools for girls¹⁶. However, both of them were in low demand by

indigenous people, since the teaching staff was male (Bendrikov 1960: 457–458). In addition to this, the joint education for boys and girls was introduced in 1923¹⁷, as well as tuition and library fees (Rachinskaya 1925: 66–74). Suddenly, Muslim old-method *maktabs* for girls began to develop and gained popularity, and they outnumbered those intended for men, especially in Bukhara¹⁸.

Another educational institution was women’s clubs, which began to appear in the mid-1920s. For example, the activities of the Tashkent demonstrative women’s club named after Nadezhda Krupskaya was aimed at the comprehensive development of Muslim women. Creative and sports clubs, societies for the study of national cultures collaborated with the Tashkent women’s club¹⁹, and Muslim women were also provided with financial (provision of employment), humanitarian and legal assistance²⁰. An important area of emancipation through education was sanitary and hygienic agitation. Employees of *Zhenotdels* ensured that Muslim women sought qualified help in Soviet hospitals and ambulance clinics, gave birth in sterile conditions, and raised children in accordance with “modern” health care standards (Lyubimova 1926b: 29). However, all the efforts of the *Zhenotdels* led to the opposite effect. The indigenous women increasingly trusted their lives to the *Tabibs*. They were even brought with them as experts to hospitals and ambulance clinics to confirm or refute the diagnosis made by the Soviet doctor. The conclusion of the *tabib* determined whether the patient would accept the treatment prescribed by the Soviet doctor (Khublarov 1926: 5).

A separate area of *Zhenotdels* activity was the protection of the civil rights of Muslim women. *Zhenotdels* wanted to improve relationships in Muslim families, which meant freeing up time for women to get an education and master a profession (Lyubimova 1926c: 11). The famine that struck the region from 1918 to 1923 affected Muslim gender relations. Men in Bukhara and Khorezm began to reduce women to the level of cattle bought at the market, saying: “Camels have become cheaper, women have become more expensive” (Lyubimova 1925b: 4). In Fergana, cases of “purchasing women in bulk” were noted. The “price” of kalym fell greatly and parents, wanting to save their girls from death, “sold” them for “any price, even for a pound of quinoa” (Lyubimova 1924: 40–41). In 1923, the decrees banning bride price, polygamy and marriage of minors (girls under 16) were re-approved, and a law according to which all marriages had to be

¹¹ RGASPI. Fund 61. List 1. File 61, p. 1–44.

¹² RGASPI. Fund 61. List 1. File 61, p. 1–44.

¹³ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 794, p. 69–74.

¹⁴ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 428, p. 9–10.

¹⁵ Kampania za raskreposhenie zhenschiny v Uzbekistane (Campaign for the emancipation of women in Uzbekistan), in: Pravda. March 20, 1927 No. 64, p.6 (in Russian).

¹⁶ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1700, p. 60–80.

¹⁷ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 428, p. 75.

¹⁸ Shura-maktabe, in: *Pravda Vostoka*. July 25, 1927, p. 2 (in Russian).

¹⁹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 432, p. 25–26.

²⁰ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 442, p. 203–208.

registered only through the registry office with the permission of the *Zhenotdels* came into force²¹.

The consequence of this was, firstly, that the parents of girls expected the most advantageous offer, and secondly, marriage in the registry office began to be combined with the norms of Adat and Sharia, i.e. the union of the newlyweds was additionally recorded by an *akhun* or *mullah* at home *nikah* ceremonies²². In 1925, in the Uzbek SSR, thousands of marriages with the participation of an *akhun* or *mullah* were already registered through registry offices²³. To obtain a permission for a second marriage, Muslims sometimes mutilated their wives. For example, a 70-year-old man came to the Zerafshan *Zhenotdel* and asked for a permission to marry a second wife, citing the fact that the first one was incapable of sexual activity. His wife was 32 years old. The *Zhenotdel* sent her to a doctor, who issued a certificate that the woman was completely normal. The old man was not allowed to marry, and he left. A month later he showed up with a new certificate, which stated that his wife was indeed incapable of sexual activity. He received permission to marry. Wanting to find out what happened to the woman, they called her to the *Zhenotdel*. It turns out that her husband cut her perineum between the anus and anterior passage with a knife, healed the wound with native remedies and then took her to the doctor” (*Michurina* 1926a: 3). Central Asian *Zhenotdels* have had some successes in protecting the rights and freedoms of Muslim women, albeit within the framework of Sharia law. The Bolsheviks limited its criminal legal part, but the *kazis* were allowed to engage in divorce proceedings, make decisions on the right of ownership and inheritance, and the purchase and sale of movable and immovable property (*Abidova* 1973: 39-41). There are known cases when in 1924 the Uzbek woman Akhmerova from Bukhara became a *kazi*. She worked in the *vilayat* among peasant women, examining women’s complaints together with male *kazis*²⁴. It is also known that in 1925 the possibility of cooperation between *Zhenotdels* and *kishlak*’s women-*ishans* was discussed in order to influence *dehkan* women through them²⁵. The extent to which this approach has justified itself is unknown.

Muslim women often filed for divorce through the Sharia court, but, according to the assurances of the head of the Tashkent Central Office, he never took their side (*Lyubimova* 1925c: 4). Therefore, in 1926, the Tashkent Central Office initiated an inspection of the courts and police for compliance with women’s rights. Inspector T. Michurina identified many vio-

lations of the rights of Muslim women. Thus, judges in the Kyrgyz Autonomous Region (KAO) deliberately delayed decisions on the cases of Kyrgyz women, while the cases of European women went through all the procedural mechanisms on time²⁶. The district people’s courts of the KAO performed even worse. In the Kitmen-Tyube region, the courts refused to grant divorce based on the complaints of Muslim women, explaining it this way: “if the husband does not want it, it is impossible”²⁷. It was known that there was no point in going to the Belovodsk or Tokmak people’s court for a Muslim woman, since their statements were completely ignored there²⁸. Courts in “old” Tashkent suffered from red tapery in handling cases brought by Muslim women: 91% of them were applications for divorce due to beatings²⁹. In the Turkmen SSR it turned out that in 1925–1926, 30 criminal cases were opened under the article of murder, but not a single one was investigated. In all cases, the victims were Turkmen women, and the reasons for the reprisals were the women’s desire to take advantage of Soviet legislation to claim rights to property or children (*Michurina* 1926b: 80-83). In private conversations with the inspector, the Turkmen women admitted: “If they kill the donkey, the court will force you to pay a fine. If they kill a woman, nothing will follow” (*Michurina* 1926b: 80-83). In the Zeravshan region of Tajikistan, an inspector found that local judicial workers were completely unaware of the Soviet laws and judged exclusively according to Sharia (*Michurina* 1926a: 3).

An alternative to going to court was filing a complaint with the police. But this was often a waste of nerves, time and effort, since “law enforcement agencies ignored the requests of Muslim women and, without trial, made a decision in favor of the men” (*Lyubimova* 1925a: 18). The police often ignored legal discrimination against Muslim women, and often law enforcement officials themselves were guilty of this. An employee of the Tashkent Central Office, Ms. Nikolaeva, wrote to *Pravda Vostoka* about police officers harassing delegates with “vile proposals” in the “old” Tashkent in the Sheikhtaur region (*Nikolaeva* 1925: 4). One investigator at the KAO told T. Michurina that cases of bride price are closed due to the lack of corpus delicti, even when “the payment is fixed, neither the father nor the buyer denies it, but since the woman does not report violence, there is no corpus delicti”³⁰. The qualifications of Uzbek police officers were also low. The Uzbek police did “not provide any assistance to women and there is not even a register

²¹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 446, p. 17-21.

²² RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 439, p. 36-63.

²³ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 443, p. 148-152.

²⁴ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 95, p. 175-177.

²⁵ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 419, p. 70-72.

²⁶ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 770, p. 8-21.

²⁷ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 770, p. 8-21.

²⁸ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 770, p. 8-21.

²⁹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 770, p. 8-21.

³⁰ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 770, p. 8-21.

where statements from women are recorded. The police believe that their functions do not include providing assistance to women, and that such assistance should be provided exclusively by *Zhenotdels*, where they send them with their statements³¹.

Investigators from the departments of “old” Tashkent recorded women who filed a complaint with the police as mentally ill, sending them to undergo a psychological examination³². To deprive the police of the opportunity to dismiss claims under the pretext of “mental instability” of women, the Tashkent Central Office ensured that Muslim women could submit applications directly to the prosecutor. After which, the number of “mentally unhealthy Muslim women decreased sharply”³³. The vices of Central Asian law enforcement officials were most fully described by the poetess Anna Almatinskaya in a letter to Isaac Zelensky: “You are talking about raising the authority of Soviet bodies. But the *Zhenotdels* cannot do this, because the representatives of these bodies themselves in most cases do everything to lower this authority. Where the chief of police kills a village resident in order to take possession of his wife and property, where the police rape delegates as prostitutes only because they have thrown off the *chachvan* and talk to men, where the chairman of the executive committee arrests a woman who left her husband, where judges take bribes and delay cases of wives seeking alimony from their husbands or even their own property for 2 years, there is no talk of authority there”³⁴.

Hujum

Employees of the Central Asian *Zhenotdels*, starting in 1924, when they began to be allowed to attend meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Uzbekistan³⁵, continually complained that party members and Komsomol members ignored legislation on gender equality and resisted emancipation in every possible way³⁶ (*Sudakov* 1927: 22-27). On March 8, 1926, an article by Isaac Zelensky was published in *Pravda Vostoka*, in which he once again threatened to remove from their posts party members who resisted emancipation³⁷ (*Zelensky* 1926: 1). Apparently, none of the party members took seriously the threat of the chairman of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Then, on September 22, 1926, he made

a report at the III regional meeting of *Zhenotdels*, at which he put forward the slogan “on the offensive” against the outdated way of life for women³⁸. Serafima Lyubimova wrote that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (*Sredazburo*) considered the Hujum as a test of Uzbek party members for loyalty to the Soviet system, the fight against opportunism and distortion of legislation on gender equality (*Lyubimova* 1928: 16). In one of the subsequent articles, Isaac Zelensky gave a clear definition of what Hujum should be:

“The Soviet apparatus in a number of places either formally relates to the implementation of laws, or sabotages and distorts them. The Party is unable to monitor and ensure the genuine implementation of our Soviet legislation. What should be done? In cultural and everyday work, we must put forward a number of tasks, including the fight for a girls’ school. We emphasize – for a girls’ school. The indigenous population considers it wild for boys and girls to study together. Therefore, we must wage a serious struggle to take over the girls’ school. We must begin to work for the development of medical care, the introduction of sanitation, hygiene, everything that makes human life easier.

In the matter of organizing party work among women, there is a lot of conventionality, formality, a lot of hypocrisy and falsehood. In some cases, we show completely unnecessary condescension and kindness towards those party members who, while formally recognizing the need to fight for the emancipation of women, in fact – in practice – every time violate party requirements and our Soviet laws. Until we make more stringent demands on every responsible communist, until we say to our communists, responsible workers who, by virtue of their communist rank, aspire to leadership positions in the party and the Soviet apparatus: “if you aspire to leadership as communist, then please kindly follow the communist ideology; and, if you cannot follow it, have not yet sufficiently freed yourself from bourgeois ideology, and if the bais, mullahs and ishans strongly hold you in their clutches, then please do not pretend to be either the leader of the party or the leadership of the Soviet apparatus,” – until this happens, we will not see real results in the struggle for emancipation” (*Zelensky* 1926b: 2).

Thus, Hujum was supposed to make a break with Islamic values in the minds of officials. During Hujum, Muslim communists and Komsomol members

³¹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 770, p. 8–21.

³² RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 770, p. 8–21.

³³ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 770, p. 8–21.

³⁴ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 419, p. 143–146.

³⁵ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 419, p. 84–95.

³⁶ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 445, p. 64–73.

³⁷ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 419, p. 31–36.

³⁸ Sredneaziatskoe soveschaniye rabotnikov sredi zhenschin (Central Asian meeting of women workers. Report by Comrade Zelensky), in: *Pravda Vostoka*. September 22, 1926 No. 218. P. 3 (in Russian).

had to be at the forefront of the struggle for emancipation and, through personal example, prove their devotion to Soviet power and its ideology. In 1926, she described precisely such landmarks in her letter addressed to Stalin, head of the Tashkent Central Office S.T. Lyubimova and her deputy S. N. Shimko³⁹. This letter said nothing about eliminating the burqa. In November 1926, at the IV regional meeting of the heads of *Zhenotdels*, Z. A. Prishchepchik warned officials from the *Sredazburo* of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that during the Hujum it would not be possible to avoid “women’s tragedies”⁴⁰. On the other hand, Hujum was started as a legal and sociocultural experiment. If it was successful, they wanted to carry out a similar campaign in the North Caucasus, where the emancipation of Muslim women had not really begun at that time⁴¹. In December 1926, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee decided that Hujum would begin on March 8, 1927⁴².

This decision was made despite information from secret reports from the Eastern Department of the Plenipotentiary Representative Office of the United State Political Directorate (VO PP OGPU) in Central Asia, from which it was known that 95% of the population of the Uzbek USSR was against emancipation⁴³. A striking example of this is an excerpt from a letter illustrated by the VO PP OGPU from the Samarkand communist Sultanzade Sharafutdinov. The letter was sent to someone named Usmanov in Tashkent on January 11, 1927. S. Sharafutdinov, reflecting on women’s freedoms, wrote: “You and your movement are out of the path, there is culture, education, new beliefs, but they are wrong. Let’s take the French people. Their women and girls behave extremely indecently, and there are a lot of nasty things in their lives - this is a consequence of the fact that women walk around uncovered, while the entire people are obsessed with venereal diseases. Let’s take Russian women, they live with Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Armenians, Jews, Lezgins, Tajiks and as a result there is not a single honest woman and that it because they achieved “culture” 1000 years ago. Let’s take the example of the deputy chairman of the Central Executive Committee, Sultan Khoja Kasym Khojaev, he studied a lot, fought for the revolution, lived with unskilled workers, was under arrest for workers and peasants, has a higher education, but still does not reveal his wife. Another example is Faizulla Khojaev, who is an impeccable revolutionary,

but also has not yet revealed his wife. The same goes for Akhunbabaev”⁴⁴. S. Sharafutdinov reproduced the Occidentalist discourse, ridiculing the achievements of the European Enlightenment. The official considered human rights and gender equality detrimental to Uzbeks. He also believed that women’s personal freedom, especially their Westernized appearance, would lead to prostitution and venereal disease. The official recognized literate and cosmopolitan European women as a danger to the national identity of the Uzbeks. At the same time, S. Sharafutdinov cannot be called anti-Soviet, since he spoke respectfully about the Uzbek communists.

In other words, Hujum was prepared without reliable social support. In addition to the lack of communist loyalty, the percentage of literate Muslim women in the cities of the Uzbek SSR ranged from 0.2% to 0.7%⁴⁵. *Zhenotdels* lacked female employees from the indigenous population. There was a serious budget deficit. By 1927, most Muslim women remained poorly integrated into the Soviet economy⁴⁶. On the eve of Hujum, it became clear that Muslim communists, Komsomol members and other government officials did not perceive it as a comprehensive campaign, but were only concerned about preserving the burqa, making this issue central⁴⁷. The day before the start of Hujum, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Uzbek SSR Yuldash Akhunbabaev signed the resolutions “On providing special benefits to women to protect them through judicial institutions from violence and insults regarding the removal of the burqa” and “On the protection of exposed women” (*Masharipova* 1990: 49). They guaranteed the provision of monetary compensation or pensions to the relatives and families of Muslim women who suffered at the hands of bandits. At the same time, the courts and police were given orders that, as a matter of priority, cases of insults and murders of Muslim women should be dealt with in open sessions and with the involvement of journalists (*Aminova* 1975: 90).

So, on March 8, 1927, the elite of the *Zhenotdels* gathered at the Tashkent solemn meeting: K. Zetkin, A. V. Artyukhina, A. I. Nukhrat, S. T. Lyubimova, Ye.A. Ross et al. The meeting took place in the “old” part of the city, stretching from Sheikhtaur to Khadra⁴⁸. Serafima Lyubimova gave a speech at the rally in which she ridiculed the patriarchal roles of men and women characteristic of the Middle Ages: “The “Offensive” campaign,” she said, is the greatest in

³⁹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 778, p. 13–14.

⁴⁰ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1196, p. 1–31.

⁴¹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1211, p. 1–47.

⁴² RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1211, p. 1–47.

⁴³ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1214, p. 1–5.

⁴⁴ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1214, p. 30.

⁴⁵ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 445, p. 96–98.

⁴⁶ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1711, p. 2–50.

⁴⁷ Fergana on March 8, in: *Pravda Vostoka*, February 28, 1927, No 48, p. 3 (in Russian).

⁴⁸ V starom gorode (In the old city), in: *Pravda Vostoka*, March 10, 1927, No 58, p. 3.

importance that has ever taken place in all the years of the party's work among the women of the Middle Ages Asia. All further work on the emancipation of women not only in Central Asia, but also in all republics and regions of the Soviet East depends on how this campaign is carried out. Long gone are the days when a male warrior had to win and defend the right to exist for his family and clan, and a woman performed less important functions and could become the prey of the winner in every raid and clash. The "Offensive" campaign is a declaration of war primarily against the mullahs and bays. The party in Central Asia faces the question of the "Offensive" not in terms of "whether it is possible", but with an insistent demand – "it must be done at all costs"! The "offensive" in the party environment is a struggle for the creation of truly Bolshevik, Leninist work force⁴⁹. It must be emphasized that employees of Central Asian *Zhenotdels* and Russian-speaking officials were not talking about Hujum, but about the "Offensive". Militarist rhetoric accompanied many campaigns in Central Asia in the 1920s. For example, before this, the "offensive" was associated with the implementation of the second Land and Water reform (*Aulny* 1925: 4). Militarist rhetoric was necessary to ensure that Russian-speaking citizens, a small but consolidated support of the Bolsheviks in the region, were constantly mobilized and ready to carry out the party line.

Quite quickly, the Tashkent Central Office realized that the "Offensive" campaign was running out of steam. The first murders of Muslim women appeared a few days after March 8⁵⁰. On April 15, 1927, a meeting of the local and Moscow Central Offices was held in Tashkent with the participation of members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. At the meeting, a report was made by an employee of the Moscow Central Office, F. E. Nyurina, who visited the KAO, the Uzbek and Turkmen SSR⁵¹. On the one hand, she admitted that she knew nothing about the region, on the other, she enthusiastically described Hujum. After the report, the debate began. The first to speak was S. T. Lyubimova, who criticized F. E. Nyurina for misunderstanding the essence of emancipation in Central Asia – only as attracting Muslim women to work and eliminating the burqa. Lyubimova said that emancipation in this area requires a complex and comprehensive work. Akmal Ikramov expressed a similar thought: "We do not raise the issue of emancipation in such a way as to remove only the burqa. Here the issue is related to the involvement in all public work, in the party, *Koshchi*

unions, trade unions, production, etc"⁵². In addition, all the attendees of the meeting did not note the serious achievements of Hujum.

"Retreat"

The achievements on the "fronts" of the "Offensive" period turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. In the middle of the summer of 1927, something happened that in the documents and memoirs of *Zhenotdel* employees received the metaphorical name "Retreat". The main "enemies" of Hujum happened to be not mullahs and ulemas, but Muslim communists, Komsomol members, judges, and police officers. In 1927, Muslim communists tried to use the intelligentsia opposed to the Soviet regime to discredit Hujum. The VO PP OGPU [Military District of Plenipotentiary Representation of Joint State Political Directorate] reported that three Tashkent communists (their names are not indicated in the document) came to the home of Munavvar-kary Abdurashidkhanov⁵³, who was known for his anti-Soviet position, which, however, did not prevent him from working in the waqf department of the People's Commissariat of Education (NKP) and the Main Waqf Administration (GVU) (*Khalid* 2022: 172, 288–289, 352). The communists asked M. Abdurashidkhanov to write an article in one of the newspapers on behalf of Muslim women who are against Hujum. Abdurashidkhanov refused to write an article⁵⁴, because at that moment he was negotiating with the VO PP OGPU about reconciliation with the Soviet regime (*Khalid* 2022: 489-490).

In the Jan-Jal village (Kasansay district of the Andijan region), a certain party member Kambar Ali Umar Aliyev, being in a teahouse among 20 people, anticipated "changes for the better": "The authorities are forcibly opening up women, but there is no need to be afraid of them. If anyone calls women to meetings, these individuals will be caught and killed, because now we can expect the emergence of Basmachi. God willing, they will appear in a week"⁵⁵. In Fergana, party member Mirzabai Baibacha Karabashev, while in a teahouse, shared his sexist views with the friends: "Now it is necessary to marry exclusively religious women who will never open up and said that an Uzbek woman will never make a useful public worker because of her underdevelopment"⁵⁶. A student of the cotton committee school and Komsomol member Kuzy Giyasov, in the presence of friends, insulted his classmate Nabiev, saying: "Your mother threw off

⁴⁹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1206, p. 10–12.

⁵⁰ "Vot tebe osvobodzhenie" ("Here is liberation for you"), in: *Pravda Vostoka*, March 18, 1927, No 64, p. 3.

⁵¹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1211, p. 1–47.

⁵² RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1211, p. 1–47.

⁵³ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1214, p. 1–5.

⁵⁴ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1214, p. 1–5.

⁵⁵ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 777, p. 78–79.

⁵⁶ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 777, p. 78–79.

her burqa, and now she will turn into a prostitute”⁵⁷. The chief of police of the village of Jalalabad, Fergana region, Batyrov publicly stated that he would “rather leave the service than reveal his wife”⁵⁸.

Hujum provoked the emergence of socio-psychological terror against Muslim women. It was especially acute in the Uzbek SSR in the cities of Andijan, Namangan and Kokand⁵⁹. Social and psychological terror was expressed not only in direct physical violence, but also in driving women to suicide. The decision to commit suicide was led to by social bullying and public humiliation of dignity, spreading rumors discrediting the honor and dignity of girls⁵⁹. There were cases of forced soldering for gang rape of liberated Muslim women (*Lyubimova* 1928a: 19)⁶⁰. Cases of gang rape and then murder, dismemberment and burning of girls’ corpses were revealed⁶¹. This deviant behavior was the desire of men to demonstrate power, rise and assert themselves. Sexual violence against Muslim women turned them into outcasts who were not accepted by either society or their parents. The victims had no opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. Men took revenge on women because they dared to claim a revision of power relations within patriarchal society, thereby modifying moral principles. Sexual violence against Muslim women is an act of abortion.

In the summer of 1927, the *Zhenotdels* initiated a review of the “successes” that had been achieved. The inspectors were shocked when they faced the reality, and not the statistics that officials presented in their reports. *Zhenotdel* employees in their memoirs and researchers provide data on approximately 90-100 thousand Muslim women who shed the burqa from March to May 1927 (*Aminova* 1977: 4-8). In October 1927 in Tashkent, at the All-Uzbek Conference of Women Workers, activist T. P. Arinkina admitted that the Tashkent Central Office did not verify the figures: “More serious calculations convinced us that our successes were exaggerated”⁶². It turned out that even the successes in unveiling were declarative. One of the leaders of the *Turkestan mukhtoriyati*, Mustafa Chokaev, denounced the Muslim communists in his memoirs:

“The responsible “leaders of revolutionary socialist” Uzbekistan came to rallies with their “unveiled” wives, who immediately veiled again upon returning home. Sometimes “revolutionary leaders” acquired two categories of wives: “open Soviet” ones,

with whom they “walked revolutionary” through the streets, and closed “Muslim” ones, whom they hid at home more strictly than before, so as not to somehow compromise their “revolutionary spirit.” Party and Komsomol members, who were supposed to set an example, shouted a lot and loudly in words about the opening of women, but in reality they were against the opening. Among the senior officials who supported the opponents of women unveiling is the Moscow favorite and permanent chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of Uzbekistan, and he is also one of the defendants-chairmen of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Fayzulla Khoja” (*Chokai* 1993: 49-50).

In November 1927, at the V Central Asian regional meeting of women workers, Isaac Zelensky admitted that “the campaign for the “actual emancipation” of Muslim women failed, and the *Zhenotdels* received false indicators, which created the illusion of success”⁶³. The failure of Hujum was also recognized by the head of the Moscow Central Office: “You haven’t done much here that has already been done by working and peasant women in the R.S.F.S.R. or Ukraine. The work of actually emancipating women is far from being complete. This work has come to a standstill in recent months; there is not an *offensive*, but a *retreat*”⁶⁴. The activist of the Tashkent Central Office Ms. Muratova focused on the fact that “despite the clear instructions given at the III regional meeting, the issue of actual emancipation was considered as a matter of unveiling. The Turkmens and Kyrgyz viewed the “offensive” something like this: there are no external signs of seclusion, women do not wear burqas, therefore the whole issue comes down to the fight against bride price, polygamy, etc. They did not take into account that both Turkmen and Kyrgyz women were no less enslaved than Uzbek ones - they had no right to speak in the presence of their elders or strangers, had no right to go to the market to sell their products – carpets, silk, etc”⁶⁵.

Why did Hujum fail? In the investigation of 1928 made by the Moscow Central Office, the conclusion was made that “the Central Asian *Zhenotdels* lost their threads of control over the “Offensive,” so at the lower level of the party hierarchy there was chaos and misunderstanding of how to conduct the work”⁶⁶.

⁵⁷ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 777, p. 78–79.

⁵⁸ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1211, p. 229–230.

⁵⁹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 777, p. 78–79.

⁶⁰ RGASPI. Fund 151. List 2. File 5, p. 2–4.

⁶¹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 777, p. 76–77.

⁶² RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1206, p. 87–88.

⁶³ Puti namecheny – osnova za rabotu (The paths are outlined - the basis for the work). At the All-Uzbek Conference of Women Workers, in: *Pravda Vostoka*. October 11, 1927 No. 233. P. 3 (in Russian).

⁶⁴ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1196, p. 39–56.

⁶⁵ Report by Comrade Artyukhina at the Central Asian regional meeting of women workers, in: *Pravda Vostoka*. November 29, 1927 No. 272. P. 3 (in Russian).

⁶⁶ Report by Comrade Artyukhina at the Central Asian regional

There was no mutual understanding between the *Zhenotdels* and the people's commissariats, so they worked asynchronously, not knowing who was doing what. Serafima Lyubimova explained the failure of Hujum by the negligence of the Uzbek communists, who perceived the campaign as a temporary measure (Lyubimova 1928a: 18). A. I. Nukhrat believed that the blame was with Soviet officials who were unable to ensure security and who abandoned the "recluse" of Muslim women. They were abandoned to the mercy of fate, demoralized, so they could not be integrated into the political system, labor activity, or educational institutions (Nukhrat 1932: 27). *Pravda Vostoka* cited the reason for the failure as the inaction of the courts and police, who did not want to protect Muslim women⁶⁷. Another newspaper article directly stated that "the courts and police, who received clear instructions on the eve of the "Offensive" to protect victims of violence with all their might, did not obey the orders of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (*Sredazburo*)"⁶⁸.

In our opinion, the results of the emancipation of Muslim women in Central Asia and Hujum depended on the involvement of the *Zhenotdel* employees in the cultural life of the region, primarily in their knowledge of the languages of the indigenous inhabitants. Isaac Zelensky criticized the *Zhenotdels* for their reluctance to learn them⁶⁹. Hujum proved to be a failed campaign because there was no understanding at a basic level between the various levels of political power. The leadership of the republics, with rare exceptions, were Europeans who did not know local languages, while the middle and lower level officials did not speak Russian, in which most orders were given. This problem is mentioned in the project on the indigenization of the state apparatus in Central Asia⁷⁰. The head of the Andijan *Zhenotdel*, Ms. T. Shadieva, spoke about the problem of communication between European women and employees from among the indigenous population⁷¹. In addition, the paperwork of the Central Asian *Zhenotdels* until 1930 never switched to the languages of the indigenous inhabitants. The middle and lower-level officials could not understand the true goals of gender equality projects, simply because they did not know Russian-language political terminology and its semantic structure. On the other

hand, the negative attitude of the population towards the idea of gender equality, which was based on the sacralization of the subordination of Muslim women to traditions and family authority, made it difficult to introduce new ideas about the role of women in politics, economics, society and culture.

Why did Soviet historians, and after them the Western ones, reproduce the narrative that Hujum was successful, and its main symbol was unveiling? For example, according to the memoirs of Anna Almatinskaya, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) tried to present Hujum as a request from the "working masses from below." In the fall of 1926, the Tashkent Central Office allegedly received letters from Muslim women from Poltoratsk, Bukhara, Kokand and other cities about their desire to honor the memory of Lenin, publicly destroying his burqa in a fire on the October holidays. The Socialist Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to coincide this event with a more symbolic date – International Women's Day (Almatinskaya 1971: 3-4). It seems that it was important for the Soviet authorities to consolidate in the cultural memory of Central Asian society the idea that a return to patriarchal relations is impossible. The best way to prove this was to create a narrative of an uncompromising struggle for modernization in which the communists were victorious. Modern authors, despite the fact that they use the latest methods of analysis, continue to uncritically reproduce Soviet templates in which the history of the 20th century is represented as the path from victory to victory of communism. However, it seems to us that the emancipation of Muslim women in Soviet Central Asia must be represented as a simulacrum.

In 1928, the number of Muslim women in Uzbek silk spinning factories decreased from 82% to 55%. The leadership of the Office of Sericulture Affairs of Turkestan (*Turksholk*) spoke out against the use of female labor, proposing to reduce the share of female workers to 25% (Shukurova 1961: 116-117). In 1928, women's clubs and schools were closed in the Uzbek SSR, agitation among Muslim women ceased, and the Tashkent Central Office stopped receiving reports from local departments on the state of emancipation (Lyubimova 1928a: 18). An inspection of the Moscow Central Office found that the emancipation facilities, which were listed as functioning, in fact did not exist⁷². Hujum destroyed the Central Asian *Zhenotdels*, negated the modest achievements of the previous years, and also emphasized that emancipation was not carried out outside large cities. Hujum did not break the chain of continuity of time and generations. "Thanks to" the courts, the police, Muslim commu-

meeting of women workers, in: *Pravda Vostoka*. November 29, 1927 No. 272. P. 3 (in Russian).

⁶⁷ From "offensive" to systematic work. To a survey of work in Central Asia, in: *Kommunistka*. 1928. No. 1. P. 57-63 (in Russian).

⁶⁸ V bor'be za raskreposchenie (In the struggle for emancipation), in: *Pravda Vostoka*. July 9, 1928 No. 154. P. 1.

⁶⁹ Raskreposchenie zhenshin – vazhnyi uchastok klassovoi bor'by (The emancipation is an important part of the class struggle), in: *Pravda Vostoka*. November 11, 1928 No. 259. P. 2.

⁷⁰ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 419, p. 31-36.

⁷¹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 95, p. 213.

⁷² RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 445, p. 14-23.

nists and Komsomol members, the battle for the minds of young people was lost, and the indigenous people began to value religious traditions even more.

In 1928, the issue of combating the burqa was raised again, but this time the initiative came from Azerbaijan. Teachers advocated a legislative ban on wearing the veil (*Smirnov* 1929: 67). The initiative was supported by S.T. Lyubimova, who proposed issuing a special decree that would officially prohibit the wearing of the burqa. She believed that this was “a ‘good reason’ for Muslims, to which no one would object” (*Lyubimova* 1928b: 73-78). The initiative was supported by her colleagues from Turkmenistan (*Bogacheva* 1928: 66), as well as Nadezhda Krupskaya, who called the idea “worthy of being supported by the agitation and local party members” (*Krupskaya* 1928: 5-12). She proposed to encourage the unveiling with material benefits: “If I’m not mistaken,” she wrote in *Kommunistka*, that in Uzbekistan women are provided with land. But what kind of women, those who have taken off the burqa or those who have not? If land is given to the one who has not taken off her burqa, this land goes to the disposal of her husband and it is beneficial for him to have more wives who have not unveiled. And if a woman receives land only with her face open, this already changes the matter. A woman acquires rights” (*Krupskaya* 1928: 5-12). The orientalist Prof. Nikolai Smirnov spoke up in support of the decree: “Muslim women must be prepared for this law as the last act of complete and unconditional emancipation” (*Smirnov* 1929: 69).

In December 1928, at the VI Central Asian meeting of *Zhenotdels*, Isaac Zelensky opposed the decree banning the burqa⁷³. Zelensky proved to be consistent, because back in 1925 he also spoke out against the forced unveiling: “What is more useful for us: to involve the masses in the work or to have 5-6 people who took off the burqa? I think there may not be 5-6 people who took off the burqa, but if we manage to organize forces to eliminate illiteracy, we manage to organize forces to fight unhygienic conditions, to improve life, for all kinds of mutual assistance – it will be ten times better, a hundred times better than removing 5–10–100 burqas⁷⁴. The *Zhenotdel* employees supported Isaac Zelensky as well. Migunova asked: “Is removing the burqa the most obligatory thing? After all, those, who unveil, are considered prostitutes! We must first re-educate the masses; now there is no point in forcing the burqa off; anyone, who wants to, can take it off themselves. This cannot be made a mandatory condition; this will only scare us away⁷⁵.”

⁷³ Ot “nastupleniya” k sistematicheskoi rabote (From “offensive” to systematic work). To a survey of work in Central Asia, in: *Kommunistka*. 1928. No. 1. P. 57–63.

⁷⁴ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1717, p 77.

⁷⁵ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 419, p. 31–36.

In 1928 Yemelian Yaroslavsky, at the All-Union Conference on Work among Eastern Women and National Minorities, which took place in Moscow, supported the adoption of the decree⁷⁶. Central Asian officials found themselves confused, not knowing which line to support. A member of the Samarkand district committee, Zhdanov, agreed with Zelensky: “The work now and for the coming period should consist of the deployment of broad propaganda, explanatory and educational work among the working masses of the village and city, while paying special attention to consolidating the results of emancipation. After this work has been successfully completed, perhaps a decree can and should be issued⁷⁷.”

In February 1929, the head of the organizational department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Nikolai Gikalo called for organizing an agitation campaign in support of the legislative ban on wearing the burqa on the eve of March 8: “In view of the demands of the masses that have emerged in some places for the issuance of a decree banning the wearing of the burqa, March 8 should be used to prepare broad layers of workers to take legislative measures against the burqa. Anyone who interferes with the cause of emancipation, who does not give a decisive revolutionary rebuff to hostile forces, who does not fight the slavish position of women in their everyday life, goes against socialism, is actually doing something anti-Soviet, and cannot be in the Soviet apparatus. From this point of view, the work of the judiciary and the prosecutor’s office should be checked before the female working masses” (*Gikalo* 1929: 2). As a result, the position of Zelensky prevailed and the decree intended to ban the burqa was not adopted.

At the same time, in 1928, at a joint meeting of the Tashkent Central Office with party functionaries, an agreement was reached that “women themselves should take on the main role in the struggle for equality: activating the female masses, raising their initiative is the key to success. Don’t wait for liberation, but liberate yourself⁷⁸”. Thus, there was a return to the idea that was expressed in 1925 by party members and intellectuals, for example, the writer Sergey Girinis and diplomat Cristian Rakovsky that Muslim women should independently realize that they are oppressed, and *Zhenotdels* should facilitate the integration of indigenous women into Soviet society⁷⁹ (*Rakovsky* 1925: 6). At the meeting in 1928, it was decided to make agitation the main method of emancipation. However, it did not bear fruit (*Smirnova* 1929: 27). Therefore, in 1929, the Bolsheviks abandoned *Zhenotdels* and state

⁷⁶ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 445, p. 64–73.

⁷⁷ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1717, p. 77.

⁷⁸ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1717, p. 77.

⁷⁹ RGASPI. Fund 62. List 2. File 1711, p. 2–50.

policy to enforce gender equality. Officially, the *Zhenotdels* were closed in January 1930. All this confirms the hypothesis of Shirin Akiner, according to which in the late 1920s a “tacit agreement” was concluded between the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Muslim communists in Central Asia. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks stopped the emancipation of Muslim women, preserving the patriarchal family and everyday life of the indigenous inhabitants, and Muslim communists guaranteed loyalty to the Soviet government (Engel 2023: 299). At the same time, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks turned a blind eye to the fact that Hujum contributed to the merging of the national and religious consciousness of Central Asia peoples (Engel 2023: 300).

Conclusion

Summarizing the above, it is worth noting that the emancipation of Muslim women in Central Asia in the 1920s did not achieve its intended goals. It would be more correct to say that the *Zhenotdels* laid the foundation for the sociocultural changes that occurred in subsequent decades. Therefore, positive assessments of the emancipation of Muslim women in Central Asia in the 1920s, which can be found in historiography, should be considered dubious. A careful study of archival documents, memoirs, journalism and periodicals shows that emancipation was met with strong opposition from men in power. State pol-

icies to emancipate Muslim women in Central Asia were ineffective because the Bolsheviks failed to reach consensus with Muslim communists who wanted to preserve the dominant gender order. Therefore, no transformations planned by the *Zhenotdels* and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks could be implemented. The attitude of Muslim communists towards emancipation and *Zhenotdels* was hostile.

Serious resistance to emancipation was shown by the indigenous people, who conditionally recognized Soviet power, even collaborated with it, but considered the pre-Soviet gender order to be fair. Liberation, designed to destroy old norms, under the influence of agitation and Hujum only strengthened them. Muslim communists, Komsomol members, judges, and police officers did not allow emancipation to take place. Hujum was not a campaign of European communists and *Zhenotdel* employees against the burqa. The official goals of the campaign were misinterpreted by Muslim communists due to a lack of smooth coordination with Russian-speaking officials who did not speak the local languages. Isaac Zelensky and Serafima Lyubimova saw Hujum as a campaign that was supposed to force indigenous people to comply with Soviet legislation on gender equality and increase the number of working Muslim women studying in literacy schools. Various sources indicate that Muslim party members were being disingenuous when they claimed to support emancipation. History witnessed their true attitude towards gender equality under Hujum.

REFERENCES

- Abidova, N. (1973). K istorii sozdaniya edinoj sovetsoj sudebnoj sistemy v respublikah Srednej Azii (On the History of the Creation of a Unified Soviet Judicial System in the Central Asian Republics), in: *ONU*. No 3. P. 39–41 (in Russian).
- Ahunova, M. A. (1976). Vsesoyuznaya nauchnaya konferenciya «Nacionalnyj aspekt resheniya zhenskogo voprosa v SSSR» (All-Union Scientific Conference «The National Aspect of Solving the Women’s Issue in the USSR»), in: *ONU*. No 3. P. 56–57 (in Russian).
- Alimova, D. A. (1989). Zhenskij vopros v sovetsoj istoriografii Srednej Azii 20-h godov (The Women’s Issue in the Soviet Historiography of Central Asia in the 20s), in: *ONU*. No 11. P. 51–56 (in Russian).
- Alimova, D. A. (1991). *Zhenskij vopros v Srednej Azii. Istoriya izucheniya i sovremennye problemy (The Women’s Issue in Central Asia. The History of the Study and Current Problems)*. Tashkent: Fan Publ.
- Alimova, D. A. (1998). A Historian’s Vision of «Khujum», in: *Central Asian Survey*. No. 17:1. P. 147–155.
- Alimova, D. A. (2008). *Istoriya kak istoriya, istoriya kak nauka (History as History, History as Science)*. Vol. 1. Ed. by E.V. Rtveldzde. Tashkent: Uzbekistan Publ. (In Russian).
- Aminova, R. H. (1975). *Oktyabr i reshenie zhenskogo voprosa v Uzbekistane (October and the Solution of the Women’s Issue in Uzbekistan)*. Tashkent: Fan Publ. (In Russian).
- Aminova, R. H. (1977). Slavnaya vеха v istorii borby za ravnopravie zhenshin Uzbekistana: k 50-letiyu «Hudzhuma» (A Glorious Milestone in the History of the Struggle for Women’s Equality in Uzbekistan (on the 50th Anniversary of Khujum), in: *ONU*. No 3. P. 4–8 (in Russian).
- Aulny (1925). Nastuplenie nachalos’ - nuzhno podkreplenie (The offensive has begun - we need reinforcements), in: *Pravda Vostoka*. January 4, 1925 No. 2. P. 4 (in Russian).

- Bendrikov, K. E. (1960). *Ocherki po istorii narodno-go obrazovaniya v Turkestanе (1865–1924) (Essays on the History of Public Education in Turkestan)*. Moscow: Academia pedagogicheskikh nauk RSFSR Publ. (In Russian).
- Bilshaj, V. (1956). *Reshenie zhenskogo voprosa v SSSR (The Solution of the Women's Issue in the USSR)*. Moscow: Gospolitizdat Publ. (In Russian).
- Bogacheva (1928). O chadre, in: *Komunistka*, No 11. P. 66 (in Russian).
- Chokay, M. (1993). *Turkestan pod vlast'yu sovetskogo vremeni. Turkestan pod vlast'yu Sovetov (Turkestan under Soviet rule)*. Articles, memories. Alma-Ata: Aykap Publ. (In Russian).
- Drobot, B. (1926). Reutovka, in: *Pravda Vostoka*, 25.10.1926, No 246. P. 4 (in Russian).
- Edgar, A. (2006). Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet «Emancipation» of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective, in: *Slavic Review*. Vol. 65. No. 2. P. 252-272.
- Engel, B. (2023). *Zhenshiny v Rossii, 1700–2000 (Women in Russia)*. Trans. from English. St. Petersburg: Academic Studies Press (In Russian).
- Gikalo (1929). On the celebration of March 8 by party organizations in Central Asia, in: *Pravda Vostoka*. February 11. No. 33. P. 2 (in Russian).
- Kamp, M. (2006). *The New Woman in Uzbekistan. Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism*. Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Kamp, M. (2014). Women-initiated Unveiling: State-led Campaigns in Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, in: *Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World. Gender, Modernism and the Politics of Dress*. London: Routledge. P. 205-228.
- Khalid, A. (2022). *Sozdanie Uzbekistana. Naciya, imperiya i revolyuciya v rannesovetskij period (Making Uzbekistan. Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR)* Trans. from English into Russian. St. Petersburg: Academic Studies Press.
- Khublarov, A. (1926). Tabibs of old Tashkent, in: *Pravda Vostoka*. April 2. No. 77. P. 5 (in Russian).
- Krupskaya, N. K. (1928). Ways of emancipation for women of the East, in: *Communistka*. No. 12. P. 5–12 (in Russian).
- Lyubimova, S. T. (1924). Letters from Turkestan, in: *Communistka*. No. 1-2. P. 40–41 (in Russian).
- Lyubimova, S. T. (1925a). Theory and practice of the party's work among women. A manual for courses on training workers among women in Central Asia. Tashkent: Turkprint Publ. (In Russian).
- Lyubimova, S. T. (1925b). *Shifts*. Tashkent: Uzgosizdat Publ. (In Russian).
- Lyubimova S. T. (1925c). Work among peasant women, in: *Pravda Vostoka*. February 2, No. 25. P. 4 (In Russian).
- Lyubimova, S. T. (1926a). *For a new way of life*. Tashkent: Sredazkniga Publ. (In Russian).
- Lyubimova, S. T. (1926b). *How women of Central Asia live and work*. Moscow: Gosizdat Publ. (In Russian).
- Lyubimova, S. T. (1926c). Across Central Asia, in: *Communistka*. No. 4. P. 56–59 (in Russian).
- Lyubimova, S. T. (1928a). The work of the party among the working women of the East. Moscow: Gosizdat Publ. (In Russian).
- Lyubimova, S. T. (1928b). Decree on the veil and the society “Down with bride price and polygamy”, in: *Communistka*. No. 8. P. 73–78 (in Russian).
- Masharipova, Sh. M. (1990). *Raskreposhenie zhenshin Horezma i vovlechenie ih v socialisticheskoe stroitelstvo (Emancipation of the Women of Khorezm and Their Involvement in Socialist Construction)*. Tashkent: Fan Publ. (In Russian).
- Massell, G. J. (1974). *The Surrogate Proletariat. Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Michurina, T. (1926a). Legal protection of women in Zeravshan (based on materials from a survey of the women's department of the Sredazburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the work of judicial authorities in relation to women's affairs), in: *Pravda Vostoka*. May 9, No. 103. P. 3 (in Russian).
- Michurina, T. (1926b). Legal status of women in Turkmenistan, in: *Communistka*. No. 10-11. P. 80–83 (in Russian).
- Nikolaeva (1925). Not yet lived. A few words about the attitude towards women in the old city, in: *Pravda Vostoka*. November 17, No. 260. P. 4 (in Russian).
- Northrop, D. (2004). *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Northrop, D. (2011). Nacionalizaciya otstalosti: Pol, imperiya i uzbekskaya identichnost (Nationalization of Backwardness: Gender, Empire and Uzbek Identity), in: *Gosudarstvo nacij: Imperiya i nacionalnoe stroitelstvo v epohu Lenina i Stalina (State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Building in the Era of Lenin and Stalin)*. Trans. from English. Moscow: ROSSPEN Publ. P. 235–272 (In Russian).
- Nukhrat, A. I. (1932). *October and the woman of the East*. M.: Partizdat Publ. (In Russian).
- Oktyabrev, K. (1926). Opening of the Urtak factory, in: *Pravda Vostoka*. February 1. No. 27. P. 5 (in Russian).
- Palvanova, B. (1957) *Pobeda Velikoj Oktyabrskoj socialisticheskoy revolyucii i raskreposhenie zhenshin-turkmenok (The Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Emancipation*

- of Turkmen women). Ashgabat: Academia nauk Turkmenskoj SSR Publ. (In Russian).
- Palvanova, B. (1961). *Docheri sovetskogo Vostoka (Daughters of the Soviet Orient)*. Moscow: Gospolitizdat Publ. (In Russian).
- Palvanova, B. (1967). *Oktyabr i zhenshina Turkmenistana (October and the Woman of Turkmenistan)*. Ashgabat: Turkmenistan |Publ. (In Russian).
- Palvanova, B. (1982). *Emansipaciya musulmanki. Opyt raskreposheniya zhenshin sovetskogo Vostoka (The Muslim woman Emancipation. The Experience of Women Emancipation in the Soviet Orient)*. Moscow: Nauka Publ. (In Russian).
- Pushkareva, N. L. (2010). Zhenskaya i gendernaya istoriya: itogi i perspektivy razvitiya v Rossii (Women's and gender history: results and prospects for development in Russia), in: *Istoricheskaya psihologiya i sotsiologiya istorii (Historical psychology and sociology of history)*. No 2. P. 51-64 (in Russian).
- Rachinskaya (1925). Zhenskoe obrazovanie v Turkestanе (Women's education in Turkestan), in: *Za pyat'let (In five years)*. Collection on the work of the Communist Party among women in Central Asia. Moscow. P. 66-74 (in Russian).
- Rakovskiy, H. G. (1925). Woman of the East – your liberation should be the work of your hands, in: *Pravda*. March 8. No. 56. P. 6 (in Russian).
- Shukurova, H. S. (1961). *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Uzbekistana v borbe za raskreposhenie zhenshin (1924–1929) (The Communist Party of Uzbekistan in the Struggle for the Emancipation of Women)*. Tashkent: Gosizdat UzSSR Publ. (In Russian).
- Shukurova, H. S. (1970). *Socializm i zhenshina Uzbekistana. (Istoricheskij opyt KPSS v raskreposhenii zhenshin sovetskogo Vostoka na primere Uzbekistana 1917–1937 gg.) (Socialism and the Woman of Uzbekistan. (The Historical Experience of the CPSU in the Emancipation of Women of the Soviet Orient on the Example of Uzbekistan)*. Tashkent: Uzbekistan Publ. (In Russian).
- Smirnov, N. A. (1929). *Chadra. Proishozhdenie pokryvala musul'manskoy zhenshiny i bor'ba s nim (Chadra. The origin of the Muslim woman's veil and the fight against it)*. Moscow: Bezbozhnik Publ. (In Russian).
- Smirnova, A. (1929). Pochin po bor'be s religiey na Vostoke (Initiative to combat religion in the East), in: *Communistka*. No. 8. P. 27 (in Russian).
- Stajts, R. (2004). *Zhenskoe osvoboditelnoe dvizhenie v Rossii: Feminizm, nigilizm i bolshevizm (1860–1930) (Women's Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism and Bolshevism)*. Trans. from English. Moscow: ROSSPEN Publ. (In Russian).
- Sudakov, V. (1927). Devushka Vostoka i komsomol (Girl of the East and the Komsomol), in: *Communist*. No. 8. P. 22–27 (in Russian).
- Tatybekova, Zh. (1963). *Raskreposhenie zhenshiny Kirgizii Velikoj Oktyabrskoj socialisticheskoy revolyuciej (1917–1936 gg.) (Emancipation of the Kyrgyz Woman by the Great October Socialist Revolution)*. Frunze: Academia nauk Kirgizskoj SSR Publ. (In Russian).
- Tatybekova, Zh. (1975). *Velikij oktyabr i zhenshiny Kirgizstana (Great October and the Women of Kyrgyzstan)*. Frunze: Kyrgyzstan Publ. (In Russian).
- Zavarian, N. (1926). Nekotorye momenty iz raboty sredi zhenshin (Some moments from work among women in Central Asia), in: *Communistka*. No. 6. P. 66–70 (in Russian).
- Zelensky, I. A. (1926a). The struggle for the emancipation of women is the work of the entire party, in: *Pravda Vostoka*. March 8. No. 57. P. 1 (in Russian).
- Zelensky, I. A. (1926b). For emancipation! We must give a slogan in our work: go on the offensive! in: *Pravda Vostoka*. October 22. No. 244. P. 2 (in Russian).