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THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDIES

This handbook examines the study of international relations (IR) in Russia, giving a comprehensive analysis of historical, theoretic-conceptual, geographical, and institutional aspects. It identifies the place and role of Russia in global IR and discusses the factors that facilitate or impede the development of Russian IR studies. The contributors represent diverse Russian regions and IR schools and offer an overview of different intellectual traditions and key IR paradigms in the post-Soviet era. Filling the vacuum in international understanding of the Russian perspective on pivotal international issues, they demonstrate the continuity and change in Russia's international policy course over the past three decades and explain how different foreign policy schools and concepts have affected Russian foreign policy making and the decision-making process. Providing a unique contribution to the discussion on non-Western IR theory, this handbook will appeal to scholars and students of international relations, Russian studies, world politics, and international studies.

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Edited by Maria Lagutina, Alexander Sergunin and Natalia Tsvetkova

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Designed cover image: TBC

First published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

Taylor & Francis
Not for distribution

ISBN: 978-1-032-18995-6 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-18996-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-25726-4 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003257264

Typeset in Bembo
by Apex CoVantage, LLC

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INTRODUCTION

Maria Lagutina, Alexander Sergunin and Natalia Tsvetkova

The past decade has seen a rise of interest in international studies in Russia and a broader academic public in non-Western theories of international relations (IR). Against the changing international landscape and appearance of emerging or re-emerging great and middle powers in the world arena, the West-centric theoretical framework that has traditionally dominated political and academic IR discourse and has been applied to explaining IR fell short in explaining some new trends in IR and the behavior of emerging powers or the developing world. A number of rising powers or developing regions, including but not limited to China, India, Russia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, have started to articulate their specific visions and approaches to IR more pronouncedly.

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Moreover, a number of leading scholars (among the pioneers were A. Acharya and B. Buzan) initiated a discussion on the issue of whether there are non-Western theories of IR and, if so, what characteristics they have. It has led to a surge in publication on the issue. Scholars from different parts of the world started to conceptualize their national IR thinking and understanding of IR theory. The most vocal has been the global South scholarship on IR while comparatively less attention has been paid to the development of Russian IR theory.

This handbook aims to provide a contribution to the discussion of non-Western IR theory by offering an overview of various intellectual traditions in Russia's international studies and key IR paradigms in the post-Soviet era. There is a widespread, inaccurate belief that Russian IR theory is non-existent. Such a belief can be traced to the Soviet period experience, when, in the Soviet Union, international studies were highly politicized and mainly centered on political and ideological issues rather than theoretical ones. Moreover, at that time, they were dominated by the only paradigm – Marxist-Leninist – that did not allow other IR schools to exist and challenge its dominance. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened new horizons and created the conditions for Russian IR to develop, although at a slow pace.

International Studies: Russia's Case

According to many scholars,[1] the Russian international studies case is rather controversial. Indeed, Russia has quite a problematic experience of Russian international studies in historical retrospective: during the Soviet period, international studies were highly politicized and mainly centred on political and ideological issues rather than theoretical ones. Moreover,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003257264-1

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they were dominated by the only paradigm – Marxist-Leninist – that did not allow other schools to exist and challenge its dominance. At the same time, the theories of international relations being developed in Western science were practically unknown in the USSR. The exceptions were the works carried out at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR under the leadership of V. I. Gantman and the problem laboratory of MGIMO Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the USSR, as well as individual studies on certain countries where foreign theoretical studies were analyzed. Works of Western scholars on theory of international relations, as a rule, were in the funds of special storage of the central Soviet libraries and were available to a limited circle of Soviet social scholars. At best, these works were viewed from the critical point of view. As a result, during the Soviet period, studies on international relations in the country were isolated from theoretical work carried out abroad, so the early period of the Russian post-Soviet theory of international relations was characterized, firstly, by the study of foreign theoretical material (and here the pioneer was Pavel A. Tsygankov) and secondly, by the predominance of imitative tendencies, when Russian scientists simply tried to transfer Western theories of geopolitics, realism/neorealism, liberalism/neoliberalism, etc. to the Russian ground.

Perhaps the only attempt to create something of their own was neo-Eurasianism. Moreover, the range of ideas and authors writing in this area was quite wide: from fairly odious works to moderate ones. To the latter, we can attribute, for example, the research of V. Tsymbursky. However, the attempt to build theoretical models on the basis of neo-Eurasianism was not successful, and the school itself had practically ceased to exist by the mid-1990s. By the turn of the 1990s–2000s, the Russian theory of international relations, as well as the global one, were in crisis.

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In the early post-Soviet period (the first half of the 1990s), Russian international studies mostly aimed to acquaint itself with Western theories and concepts and try to accommodate them to the Russian needs. Under these circumstances, Russian international studies, on the one hand, developed in line with the Western IR paradigms. For a while in the early 1990s, the so-called Atlanticist school prevailed in Russian foreign policy thinking. On the other hand, there was a trend among the Russian policy thinkers towards developing IR theories of their own based on national ideas and traditions. This trend was exemplified, for instance, by the school of neo-Eurasianism that was theoretically based on the idea of Russian exceptionalism, including the need for a "special path" for Russia in terms of socio-economic and political models as well as international course.

Since then, Russian international studies have gradually moved from the Atlanticist-Eurasianist dichotomy to a less polarized and more academic-type discourse. On the one hand, Russian international studies scholarship feels itself an integral part of the world international studies community, rather than an isolated school, as was the case in the Cold War era. However, on the other hand, Russia's international studies thinkers understand that the country's new role in the present-day world should be better explained by the home-born theories, and its foreign policy should be supported by Russia's own concepts and doctrines.

Moreover, in addition to the rise of Russia's authentic theoretical approaches, international studies' geographical landscape became much more diverse. Along with the traditional centers of IR theory production, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, new regional centers have emerged: Kaliningrad, Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Volgograd, Yekaterinburg, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Vladivostok, etc. This made Russian international studies even more diverse and interesting.

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Current Debates on International Studies in Russia

Until recently, Russian IR theory had not attracted much attention from either Russian academic society or international audience. The very existence of Russian IR theory as a national indigenous set of paradigms and concepts on IR, distinct from the Western ones, was disputable. However, there were multiple calls coming from leading Russian academics and scholars for developing a Russian IR theory.

The process of the development of a Russian IR theory commenced with the translation of foreign literature on the main paradigms of Western IR theory and its re-interpretation by Russian scholars. Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov – two well-known Russian IR theorists – labeled this initial period in Russian IRT development as the time of mastering the world's intellectual experience by Russian international scientists. These two scholars have undertaken one of the first efforts to explore Russian IRT and identify different domestic and foreign theoretical and methodological traditions of Russian IR theory. They managed to trace the two main trends in Russian international studies of the 1990s: Westernization and isolationism. Another renowned Russian IR theorist, A. D. Bogaturov, outlined two foundations that laid the basis for Russian IR theory development: the politico-sociological (world-political) one, which was represented by philosophers and sociologists, and the historic-international one, which was mainly used by scientists and historians. One more IR scholar – M. M. Lebedeva – analyzed the origins of the development of Russian IR theories and the directions of theoretical research in Russia. She also came to the conclusion that Russian IR theories are organically part of the global IRT (although with their own specifics), and other national IRTs cannot act as an alternative to global ones. In the works of Alexander Sergunin, the development of Russian IR theory is also linked to the paradigms and schools of IR theory that have developed in the West. A different point of view is expressed in the works of Pavel A. Tsygankov, Andrei P. Tsygankov, A. D. Voskresenski, and a number of other scholars who believe that, having passed the imitative/replication stage, Russian IR theory has been gradually developing its own theories and concepts. It should be noted that despite some quite rare manifestations of nationalistic/isolationist/exceptionalist ideas in Russia's foreign policy discourse, the present-day Russian international studies mainstream is generally non-xenophobic, rather tolerant, and open to a dialogue with foreign IR schools.

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The purpose of this handbook is to examine the current state of affairs of Russian international studies. Particularly, the handbook will produce a comprehensive analysis of various aspects of the Russian international studies: historical, theoretical-conceptual, geographical, institutional, etc. It is also important to identify the place and role of Russia in the global IR (A. Acharya and B. Buzan).[2] It is no less important to understand what factors facilitate and impede Russian IR studies' development. Equally, it is vital for the future of Russian international studies to figure out whether it is unique, original, or just a copy of what has already been done by foreign international studies. More generally, is Russian international studies able to contribute to the global IR, or is it doomed to remain a marginal school that has no impact on world scholarship?

The handbook also aims to fill the vacuum in the international understanding of the Russian perspective on pivotal international issues. In the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, many international players found themselves puzzled by the sources and reasons of Russia's foreign policy behavior, both in East Europe and on the world stage. Numerous inaccurate stereotypes and theories of Moscow's contemporary foreign policies are being circulated in world international studies scholarship. The authors of this handbook want to demonstrate the continuity

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and change in Russia's international policy course over the past three decades. What foreign analysts sometimes perceived as Moscow's unpredictable, improvised, and chaotic foreign policy moves in reality turned out to be a logical end product of a rather lengthy process influenced by both domestic and international dynamics. The authors also aim to explain how different foreign policy schools and concepts affected Russian foreign policy making and to what extent they were influential in the decision-making process.

The Structure of the Handbook

The handbook consists of five parts, each covering: 1) the historical and ideological foundations of Russian international studies; 2) Russia's main IR paradigms, including the philosophy of IR, geopolitics, the international political economy, etc.; 3) area studies; and 4) the current research agenda in Russia's IR and its reflection in Russia's foreign policy.

In this handbook project, we have invited leading scholars and experts on Russia's IR to create a comprehensive picture of contemporary Russia's IR theory and practice. As we approached individual contributors, we asked them 1) to assess the current state of research in their field/topic/issue in Russia by identifying its most important representatives and research centers; 2) to identify the specifics and traditions of Russian studies in their field and the level of their development and constrains in that field; 3) to examine whether there is some influence of the research results on their field/topic/issue in Russia's foreign policy; and 4) to provide concluding remarks: future developments, new research avenues, and policy consequences.

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Part One of the handbook analyzes the historical and intellectual foundations of Russian international studies and the evolution of Soviet/Russian IR theory from Soviet ideology to the first steps of creating the Russian theoretical approaches to international studies. The study of historical background is an important prerequisite to understanding the political culture of contemporary Russia with all its specific features. Professor Valery Mikhaylenko and Professor Elena Khakhalkina argue in their chapter that the history of international studies in Russia was highly influenced by the political situation in the country and international context. At the current stage, international studies in Russia has lost its Marxist-Leninism ideological basis but still preserves a specific research agenda determined by Russia's national interests and practical preferences. Professor Andrei P. Tsygankov and Professor Pavel A. Tsygankov agree that the Russian theory of IR is nationally specific and discuss three main intellectual traditions – Westernism, statism, and civilizationism – as a basis of contemporary Russian international studies. Professor Alexander Sergunin pays attention to IR intellectual debates in modern Russia and identifies Russia's major producers of international studies in institutional terms.

Part Two shows the reflection of Russia's IR studies in Western IR theories and concepts and key difficulties of its adaptation to Russian intellectual traditions in Russia's international studies. Special attention is paid to the topics that are developed mainly within the framework of the Russian school: philosophy of international relations and world politics, linguistic dimension of IR, Russian geopolitics, etc. According to Professor N. Vasilyeva, such new fields of research as philosophy of IR and world politics allow the worldview to rise above the pragmatism of classical IR theories and find a functional approach to harmonization of the relations between different civilizations and the relations between technosphere and biosphere, as well as the relations within the global society, etc. In her chapter, Professor Irina Zeleneva analyzes the genesis of geopolitical ideas in Russia and notes that it is inextricably linked with the process of the formation and development of Russian statehood itself. The origins of Russian geopolitics are rooted in a historical dispute about the origin and character of the Russian nation. Professor

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N. Eremina points out that the Russian civilization's approach allows explaining the continuity of different periods in the history of Russia, calling them manifestations of the Russian civilization, and is able to advance understanding of Russia's positions on key issues of international relations. Professor Valery Konyshev and Professor Alexander Sergunin provide a comprehensive analysis of three classical Russian IR paradigms – neorealism, neoliberalism, and globalism – and conclude that they complement rather than contradicting or excluding each other, making the Russian IR landscape more diverse and richer. Professor Ekaterina B. Mikhaylenko and Professor Maria Lagutina discuss in their chapter the Russian IR school's contribution to regional studies and try to identify the main trends and niches in the development of regional studies in Russia.

Part Three presents a spectrum of most popular area studies in Russia − European studies, American studies, Asia Pacific studies, Middle Eastern studies, Latin American studies, etc. − and underlines their specific characteristics. This part of the handbook highlights issues and aspects that are prioritized in the respective Russian area studies, demonstrates accomplishments made by Russian scholars in the respective area studies, traces the evolution of area studies in Russia, and identifies major Russian think tanks and leading experts and their input into the fields. Of specific interest for the foreign audience might be chapters on Russia's Arctic studies and Eurasian studies as scholarly fields in which Russia has unique, quiet expertise.

Part Four examines Russia's international studies research agenda, including Russia's vision of the current world order, new trends and traditions of Russian diplomacy, Russia's approach to "soft power," and different issues of modern world politics. The first chapter of this part analyzes the evolution of Russia's views of world order since the beginning of the 1990s, on both the official and expert levels. The chapter by Professor Stanislav L. Tkachenko deals with the process of the establishment in the Russian Federation of a discipline, International Political Economy, as a segment of the emerging Russian school of the theory of IR. Following the topic of Russia's approaches to the world order, Professor Yana Leksyutina, in her chapter, seeks to conceptualize Russia's so-called "Turn to the East," to trace and reveal driving forces behind Moscow's elevated focus on the Asia-Pacific region, and to identify major accomplishments of and challenges to Russia's engagement with this region. Dr. Denis S. Golubev addresses conceptual, methodological, and institutional aspects of how conflict studies have evolved in Russia since early 1990s, as well as its reflection on how Russia positions itself in today's both globalized and fragmented world. Professor Tatiana Zonova presents the historical overview of the general development of Russia's diplomacy and tries to identify its traditions and new trends. The chapter by Professor Natalia Tsvetkova and Grigory Yarygin is devoted to the concept of "soft power" and its interpretation in Russia. The authors discuss different theoretical approaches to the concept of "soft power" developed by Russian experts in the field of the international studies. N. Tsvetkova believes that the Russian community of scholars draws on multiple interpretations of the concept, based on both Western and non-Western approaches. While Dr. N. Bogolubova and Dr. Yulia Nikolaeva explore the specific features of Russia's sports diplomacy and define it as an integral part of the wider "soft power" paradigm utilized by countries to promote their own appeal. Dr. Elena A. Maslova discusses a climate agenda in IR studies, and Professor Tatiana Zonova shows how the role of the Orthodox Church has changed since Soviet times and how it influences current Russian policy. Dr. Elena V. Stetsko pays attention to the role and activity of non-state actors in modern Russia, indicating the main problems and limits of influence in the foreign policy sphere of each group of interest. Finally, Z. Bakhturidze represents Russia's policy towards the unrecognized/partially recognized states, taking into consideration the case of post-Soviet states.

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Notes

1 See Andrey Makarychev and Viatcheslav Morozov, "Is 'Non-Western Theory' Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR," *International Studies Review* 15, no. 3 (September 2013): 328–350.
2 A. Acharya and B. Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

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3
MAPPING RUSSIAN IR SCHOOLS
The Post-Soviet Era

Alexander Sergunin

Introduction

It took a while for the Russian post-Soviet IR to move from a paradigmatic uniformity, Marxist-Leninist concepts, and self-isolation to ideological pluralism and joining the world IR discourse. Several factors have impeded this process.

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First, after the collapse of Marxism, which had served as an official theoretical basis for the social sciences, a sort of theoretical vacuum emerged. For some time, Russian academics simply did not dare to touch on theoretical problems because they were too sensitive for them. They were unable or did not want to fill this vacuum with some new theories of their own or theories borrowed from abroad. Because of a long-term isolation from world social sciences, many Russian IR specialists were simply unfamiliar with Western theories or treated them as a hostile/unacceptable political philosophy.

Second, there was a sort of institutional inertia in the post-Soviet academia because most of the professors who taught IR or related disciplines were trained in the Soviet period and in a pro-Marxist spirit. This generation of Russian scholars was simply unable or did not want to grasp new theoretical approaches, research methods, and problematique. At the same time, these professors were assigned the task of establishing IR and political science departments in the Russian universities in the early 1990s. In many universities (especially on the periphery, departments of international relations and political science were mainly formed on the basis of the former departments of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, scientific communism, and the Communist Party history.

Third, one more institutional aspect of the problem was that before the collapse of the USSR, IR was taught only in the two elite Soviet universities that trained future diplomats – Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and the Institute of International Relations (Kiev State University, Ukraine). IR itself was seen as an empirical/historical rather than theoretical discipline. University curricula were full of empirical/applied disciplines such as IR history, area studies, diplomatic and consular services, diplomatic protocol, foreign languages, etc., which were seen as integral components of diplomats' professional training. That's why, when a new federal educational standard for the IR training program was approved by the Russian Ministry of Education in 1994 (similar to the Western universities, it was designed in a way to train not only diplomats but also specialists in IR in a broader sense), and several

DOI: 10.4324/9781003257264-5

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Russian universities (St. Petersburg State University, Nizhny Novgorod State University, Kazan State University, Urals State University, Tomsk State University, Far Eastern University, etc.) decided to introduce this program, they faced a problem of qualified teachers' staff. The faculty had to develop both courses and curricula almost from the scratch, and this, of course, affected the quality of training in a negative way. The institutional/curriculum change lasted until the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Fourth, in the 1990s, Russian scholars had to respond to the real challenges posed by the post–Cold War international environment and meet the immediate needs that confronted the newly born Russian diplomacy. This environment was more favorable to applied studies than to theoretical ones.

Fifth, the development of the Russian post-communist IR theory in the 1990s was hindered not only by the prevalence of applied research but also by the inclination of the world politics discourse towards ideological rather than academic/theoretical approaches. Various political parties and groupings pressed Russian foreign policy experts to produce policy-oriented rather than objective/independent research. For this reason, both Russian academia and the expert community were highly politicized and deeply involved in power struggle of the 1990s.

Sixth, with the rise of numerous "think tanks" and a more or less independent mass media, the demand for foreign policy experts in these spheres has dramatically increased. Many gifted scholars have moved from the academia over to analytical centers, newspapers/journals, and TV channels or tried to combine these new jobs with their old ones. This has made international studies more popular, but their quality and standards of expertise have become worse.[1] Again, theoretical issues remained ignored.

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Finally, the chronic economic crisis and changes in public attitudes towards science have had a negative impact on the state of the field in Russia. The state and society as a whole have lost interest in science and higher education (at least for a while), and the prestige of these fields has declined accordingly. Salaries have fallen dramatically, and the social security system has almost been destroyed. Scholars have migrated from academia either abroad or to other sectors (private business, politics, think tanks, mass media). According to then–Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Bulgak, from 1991 to 1997, 15,200 Russian scientists took up foreign citizenship and another 5,000 worked in foreign countries on a contractual basis. (These figures include specialists in natural sciences.)[2] The situation started to slowly change in a positive direction about ten years ago when universities managed to attract more students on a commercial basis, and the government decided to channel a part of Russia's income from oil and gas exports to the higher education system. Still, the Russian higher education system is less attractive than other sectors (private business, public service, mass media, etc.) in terms of salary, opportunities for professional career, and prestige. It continues to experience a lack of finance, skilled personnel, and the government's attention and care.

Theoretical pluralism in post-communist Russian scholarship has been accompanied by the quantitative growth of research and training centers dealing with IR. Four main categories of centers can be identified: university departments and centers, the Russian Academy of Sciences, ministerial institutes and research centers, and independent think tanks.

Universities

Compared to other sectors of the IR community, the Russian higher education system found itself in a better situation. Despite the lack of finance and governmental support, Russia's leading universities, such as, for example, the MGIMO, Moscow State University, St. Petersburg

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University, etc., not only survived but also broadened their scope of research and improved curricula and training programs. There can be at least three explanations of this phenomenon.

First, professors and researchers became free to choose theoretical approaches and teaching methods. This created a fruitful atmosphere for developing IR in terms of both research and teaching.

Second, universities quickly learned how to fund raise and earn money. University administrators succeeded in searching Russian and foreign grants, establishing good contacts with wealthy sponsors and attracting promising candidates for undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate programs who are ready to pay for training. As mentioned, some prominent Western foundations and donors have initiated sponsorship programs to assist Russian international studies. Many of them established offices in Moscow and some regional centers.

Third, in the 1990s, Moscow allowed peripheral universities to establish IR training programs of their own. This, in turn, has resulted in mushrooming training centers around Russia. More than 50 universities have now IR and area studies training programs. The whole Russian higher education system (including international studies) has been radically changed. Several "generations" of the IR federal educational standard have been developed by the Ministry of Education over the last 25 years. In contrast with the Soviet-era curricula, new training programs include more theoretical disciplines. Along with historical, diplomatic, and linguistic components, new curricula now have political science, economic, legal, and cultural studies disciplines and are closer to international standards.

Since 2003, when Russia pledged to join the Bologna process, a new round of reforms started in the higher education system (including the IR programs). This reform aimed at harmonizing the European and Russian university systems by introducing in Russia a two-level system (bachelor and master's degrees), the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS), more variable curricula, a less centralized quality-assurance system, diploma supplement in English, and so on.

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As mentioned, the geography of the Russian IR has become more diverse over the last 25 years. However, most of the university centers of international studies are still based in Moscow. For example, in the post-Soviet period, the MGIMO focused its research on the following topics: IR theory;[3] national, regional and global security;[4] globalization/regionalization dichotomy;[5] conflict resolution;[6] foreign services of different countries;[7] diplomatic history;[8] international law;[9] international economy, eco-diplomacy, and techno-diplomacy;[10] and international information.[11]

Along with departments (diplomacy, international relations and foreign policy, political science, European and American history, Oriental studies, global economics, international economic relations and foreign economic operations, international information and journalism, international law, constitutional law, and so on) the Center for International Studies (established in 1974) conducts interdisciplinary studies of world politics with special emphasis on international relations systems, regional stability and security, conflict resolution, and Russian policy towards specific regions.[12]

Moscow State University aims at examining international relations history (the Department of Modern and Current History), IR theory (Department of Sociology of International Relations, Department of Comparative Politics), international law and constitutional law of foreign countries (Faculty of Law), global economy (Economic Faculty), and international information and mass media (Faculty of Journalism).[13] Some other Moscow-based universities also run research projects on IR history and theory, international law, world economy and integration, and area studies (including Europe): Russian University of Peoples' Friendship,[14] Moscow State

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Pedagogic University, Russian State University of Humanities,[15] the Russian Academy of Public Service,[16] the Higher School of Economics, Moscow State University of Commerce, and the Russian Academy of Economics.

Among the non-Moscow-based universities, St. Petersburg State University should be mentioned first and foremost. The Department of Modern and Current History is traditionally involved in studies of diplomatic history. The International Relations Faculty (established in 1994) targets examining not only IR history but also IR theory, political thought history, international security, public diplomacy, area studies, and Russian foreign policies.[17] A number of units of the Political Science Faculty (Departments of Political Theory and International Politics)[18] and the Faculty of Economics (e.g., the Department of World Economics)[19] study international relations system and international organization.

A number of other St. Petersburg–based universities, such as St. Petersburg Pedagogical University, European University, St. Petersburg University of Economics and Finance, St. Petersburg University of Technology, North-West Public Service Academy, etc., deal with international relations and world economy.

Many other peripheral universities are also quite active in international studies. Diplomatic history studies are strong in universities such as Ivanovo State University, Nizhny Novgorod State University,[20] and Urals State University. IR theory is represented by centers such as Nizhny Novgorod State University,[21] Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University,[22] Ural Federal University,[23] and Irkutsk State University.[24]

Security studies and conflict resolution are well established in Nizhny Novgorod State University, Nizhny Novgorod State Linguistic University, and Voronezh State University. The globalization/regionalization processes are thoroughly discussed at Nizhny Novgorod State Linguistic University, Ural Federal University, and Volgograd State University.

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Area studies (especially European, Arctic, American, Middle Eastern and Asia-Pacific) are developed by many peripheral universities, including the Baltic Federal University, the Far Eastern Federal University, Ivanovo State University, the Northern (Arctic) Federal University, Mari State University, Nizhny Novgorod State University, Nizhny Novgorod State Linguistic University, Voronezh State University, Ural Federal University, and so on.

It should be noted that rapid growth of peripheral centers not only brought to an end Moscow's monopoly on international studies but also provided Russian IR scholarship with regional perspectives and added theoretical polyphony. Moreover, this process has contributed to training personnel for the local diplomatic and international business structures, which were developed rather dynamically in the regions in the 1990s and 2000s. Inter alia, it provided regional political, security, and economic elites with expertise in world politics and made them more independent (from the federal center) in the foreign policy sphere. Therefore, peripheral IR has implicitly facilitated the process of democratization and decentralization of Russia's foreign and security policies in the post-communist era.

The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)

Compared to universities, the RAS was less successful in adapting its research, financial, and administrative structures to the post-Soviet realities. There are several factors that impeded IR development in the RAS system.

First, the Academy is more dependent on the government in terms of finances. It has fewer opportunities for launching commercial projects. Low salaries and a lack of resources and opportunities for professional careers provoked a real "exodus" of foreign policy experts from the RAS in the 1990s.

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Second, foreign foundations and private sponsors are less generous to academic institutions; they prefer to deal with higher education institutes, independent think tanks, and NGOs because they are less conservative, more dynamic, and more influential in terms of affecting society and foreign policy making.

Third, similar to academia in general, the RAS has experienced competition from other segments of the expert community – universities, consulting firms, NGOs, mass media, and especially public service. The RAS lost many talented scholars even before the economic decline caused by the market reforms of the early 1990s. Under late Gorbachev and early Yeltsin, many leading researchers left the RAS for high-ranking positions in the government, politics, higher education system, and mass media.

Nonetheless, the RAS managed to keep some skilled personnel to develop international studies. The RAS institutes – the Institute of Europe, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the Institute for USA and Canada Studies (ISKRAN), the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, the Institute of Oriental Studies, and the Institute for Slavic Studies – are particularly good in area studies because many of them are organized in accordance with geographic principle. The Institute of General History and the Institute of Russian History are traditionally good in diplomatic history studies. IMEMO, the Institute of Sociology, the Institute of Government and Law, and the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology develop conflict prevention and resolution studies.

Unfortunately, the RAS pays little attention to IR theory as such. A few RAS scholars from ISKRAN[25] and IMEMO[26] published some theoretical works. However, universities still retain their priority in this particular field.

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Ministerial and Presidential Centers and Institutes

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Since the Soviet time, many Russian foreign policy, economic, security, and defense ministries/agencies have got think tanks and training institutions of their own. For example, MGIMO has "dual loyalty," being subordinate to both the Ministry of Higher Education and the Foreign Ministry. In addition to MGIMO, which trains students for the Russian foreign service, there is a Diplomatic Academy that trains or retrains mid-career diplomats. Along with departments (for instance, the Department of Foreign Policy Studies), there are several purely research units, such as the Center for Methodology of International Studies and the Center for Global Problems, that are involved in international studies as well.

The Foreign Ministry itself has a Department of Historical and Archival Studies, which is in charge of handling the ministry's archives and publication of documents. Similar to the Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry (MoD), Federal Security Service (FSS), and Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) have both educational and research institutes, such as the General Staff Academy, the Military University, and FSS and FIS Academies. These institutions mainly focus on studying national and international security policies. They are also rather active in examining the role of the military and intelligence agencies in shaping and implementing world politics. In addition, they take part in debates on Russian national security doctrine and organization. Prior to its merger with the General Staff Academy, the Institute of Military History focused on studying and publishing archival documents.

The Presidential Administration and the Cabinet of Ministers run a number of specialized higher education institutions that basically train personnel for the federal and regional public services. Some of them, such as the Russian Academy of Public Service (merged with the National Economy Academy) and its regional branches and the Academy of Finance conduct research projects on international relations, world economy, and international law.

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The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) is the most authoritative organization among the state-run research institutes dealing with international studies. In accordance with the 1992 presidential decree, the RISS is a state research organization that provides governmental bodies with analytical information and recommendations related to national security. The RISS was established by Yevgeny M. Kozhokin, a former member of the Supreme Soviet and chairman of the sub-committee on defense and security. Initially, the Institute operated under the FIS auspices, but in 2009, it was subordinated to the Presidential Administration. The Institute maintains close relationships not only with the Presidential Administration but also with the Foreign and Defense Ministries, security services, and the Parliament (State Duma and Council of Federation).

The priority areas of research for the RISS include national security and Russia's strategic interests in different regions of the world, developments in the CIS countries, the European security system, Russia-NATO and Russia-EU relations, disarmament and global stability, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and peacekeeping operations.[27] The RISS produces an academic journal (*Problems of National Strategy*), books, reports, analytical reviews, expert evaluations, analytical memoranda, and papers. The Institute periodically holds international conferences on national and global security, arms control, and disarmament.

Because of their official status and proximity to governmental agencies, these institutes have a unique opportunity to influence Russian foreign policy decision making. Some of them (e.g., the Diplomatic Academy, the General Staff Academy and the RISS) are really influential. This, however, makes them more policy oriented and less academic. Obviously, to contribute to the Russian IR debate in a positive way, these institutions need more coordination and cooperation with the university and RAS centers.

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Independent Research Centers

The rise of public policy centers is an important characteristic of the Russian political and intellectual life in the post-communist era. Most of them were created for purely political purposes, such as monitoring, providing expertise and prognoses, servicing election campaigns, human rights protection, and so on. For this reason, few of them have been oriented to fundamental research. Some of these centers aim to affect foreign policy making.

The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP), which was established by Sergei Karaganov (then deputy director of the Institute of Europe), is one of the most influential among such centers. The Council was established in February 1992 as an independent non-governmental organization. The Council is directed by an assembly of some 50 prominent figures in government, business, academia, and the mass media. For example, retired top-ranking governmental officials, businessmen, and journalists, such as former Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Security Council Igor S. Ivanov, First Deputy Defence Minister N. V. Mikhailov, Secretary of the Security Council Yuri Baturin, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Valery L. Manilov, Deputy Director of the FIS G.A. Rapota, Deputy Director of the FSS A. E. Safonov, President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Arkady I. Volsky, President of the Russian Bank Association S.E. Yegorov, Director of RISS Kozhokin, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee Alexei Arbatov, former Chairman of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Vladimir Lukin, editor in chief of the newspaper *Nezavisimaya gazeta* Vitaly T. Tretyakov', president of the NTV Company Igor E. Malashenko, etc., were among them. The Council has a small permanent staff of some ten and a number of part-time staff for specific projects. The CFDP is led now by famous Russian journalist Fyodor Lukyanov.

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The Council's activities include publication of occasional reports and policy papers; regular meetings and informal discussions among policy analysts and decision makers; conferences, seminars, and discussion groups; research projects; educational campaigns in mass media; and consulting and training for technical and social assistance programs.[28] According to the Council's charter, the CFDP does not conduct projects at the request of the government structures but chooses topics of research on its own initiative and based on the decisions of the assembly and the board. Although the Council claims that it is not an analytical think tank, it unites the leading Russian specialists in foreign and defense policies and aims to provide decision makers with recommendations on the following topics: Russian national interests, threat assessment, developing and evaluating new strategic concepts, regional and global security, ethnic and religious conflicts, arms control, conversion, and so on.

The CFDP assisted in establishing the Valdai International Discussion Club in 2004. According to the club's website, its goal is to promote dialogue between the Russian and international intellectual elite and to make an independent, unbiased scientific analysis of political, economic, and social events in Russia and the rest of the world. Over 900 representatives of the international scholarly community from 62 countries have taken part in the club's work. The club runs several research projects on international politics and regularly publishes policy papers and reports. The Valdai's research programs include security and war studies, the contemporary state, changing institutions and leadership, globalization and regionalization, the general state of the world economy and global governance, global alternatives to the liberal model of social and political development, and Eurasia.[29]

The Russian Foreign Policy Foundation (RFPF) is another influential non-governmental actor in the decision-making process. The Foundation was established in 1992 on the initiative of the Foreign Ministry by the Diplomatic Academy, *International Affairs* magazine, and several powerful Russian banks (Incombank, Avtovazbank, Menatep) and companies (KAMAZ, LUKoil, and others). From the very beginning, the RFPF was designed to bring together the Russian foreign policy and business communities as well as harmonizing their interests.[30] For this reason, it paid more attention to practical than research activities. However, its research program is also quite impressive. The Foundation holds several conferences a year and publishes their proceedings. The RFPF was very active in establishing contacts with Russian regions, such as Kaliningrad, Karelia, Krasnodar, Novosibirsk, the Russian Far East, and other members of the Russian Federation that conduct intensive foreign policies. The RFPF even established regional offices in Krasnodar and Novosibirsk.

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Among other policy-oriented independent centers, the foundation Political Studies, the foundation Politics, the Russian Public Policy Center, the Russian-American University (RAU) Corporation, the Center for Ethno-political and Regional Studies, the Center for National Security and International Relations, the Institute for Defense Studies, and others should be mentioned.

The second group of think tanks tries to combine both applied and fundamental research. Over the last 25 years, it has included various organizations that ranged from representative offices of foreign think tanks (the Moscow Carnegie Center, the East-West Institute), expert institutions (the Moscow Public Research Foundation, which incorporated the Center for Strategic Assessments; the Center for Russian Political Research (PIR-Center); the Center for International Research and Programs, the Baltic Research Center (both from St. Petersburg); the Nizhny Novgorod Center for Socio-Economic Expertise; etc.) to public policy centers (the Gorbachev Foundation, the Strategy Foundation [St. Petersburg], etc.).

It should be noted that, in contrast with well-established democracies, in Russia, think tanks and public policy centers are relatively few in number, centrally located (mostly in Moscow and

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St. Petersburg), and less influential (in terms of decision making). It is still a weaker element of the foreign policy–making community.

Concluding Remarks

To sum up, over the past 25 to 30 years, Russia has managed to develop a full-fledged academic community engaged in international studies. In contrast with the Soviet period, when most research on international politics was concentrated in Moscow and few other large cities, in the post-Soviet period, the geography of international studies has expanded due to the emergence of new regional educational and research centers. There are new actors involved in the study of international relations (for example, independent think tanks and public policy centers). The degree of integration of Russian international studies into the world academic community has increased, although in light of recent international events that have led to an aggravation of relations between Russia and the West, Russian scientists have to search for new partners in other regions of the world.

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RUSSIAN "CLASSIC" IR THEORIES

Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin

Introduction

In the early 1990s, the Russian theoretical vision of world politics was heavily affected by the Soviet legacy in terms of concepts, theories, and methodological approaches. The core of this legacy was formed by the Marxism-Leninism teaching, which included the next key elements: international economic relations considered as prevailing over political; a global rather than state-centric vision of international policy emphasized the role of classes, social groups, and elites in creating the mechanisms of domination; all international conflicts originate from the capitalist nature of the Western states striving to international exploitation of poor states; the historical mission of the Soviet Union was to facilitate the global revolutionary process toward socialism; Western IR theories were hardly criticized and interpreted as ideological support of imperialism rather than science.[1]

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At the same time, it should be mentioned that since the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the Soviet IR theory has undergone a rather unusual change. The Soviet IR has tacitly incorporated a number of postulates of structural realism (neo-realism), paying more attention to such categories as state, national interests, balance of power, and "spheres of influence." Similar to the Western neorealists, Soviet scholars made great strides in developing a system approach to world politics.[2] However, in the Gorbachev era, for several years, there was a shift of the Soviet IR thinking from the pro-realist approach to a combination of liberalism and globalism with a prevalence of the latter. This mixture of Marxism and Western concepts named New Political Thinking stressed ideas of "all-humankind" values and interests over national, claimed the end of confrontation with the West, and focused on mechanisms of cooperation and peaceful coexistence instead.[3]

During the 1990s, Russian political thought was affected by the end of the Cold War; the breakdown of the USSR; the re-emergence of Russia as a separate, independent entity; and the challenges of the globalizing world. Additionally, after the collapse of Marxism, which had served as an official theoretical basis for the social sciences, a sort of theoretical vacuum had emerged. In these hard conditions, political and academic elites had to redefine Russia's national interests and the conceptual basis of its international strategy, and make adjustments in foreign policy.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003257264-10

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Initially, the Russian post-Soviet IR discourse was manifested by the so-called "Atlanticism"-"Eurasianism" debate. While "Atlanticism" was considered a pro-Western type of thinking, which aimed to integrate Russia to the Western economic, political, and security institutions,[4] "Eurasianism" was oriented to the uniqueness of the Russian civilization and its great destiny as a bridge between the East and West.[5] The process of consolidation of some Russian domestically oriented elites produced a new group – Derzhavniki, who were guided by the principles of strong state power and self-sufficiency, as well as the protection of Russian identity, national interests, and values as the opposite of the pro-Western way of modernization.[6] These approaches became the basis for the further development of Russian IR theories, which are discussed later in this chapter.

It should be noted that, with time, the Russian IR discourse took more or less the same shape as the global one. Now all three "classic" IR theory paradigms (neorealism, neoliberalism, and globalism), which oppose the "non-traditional" postpositivist approach, can be identified in present-day Russia. This study aims to examine how these three "classic" paradigms interpret Russia's national interests, the most important problems of international relations, trends of world policy, and their vision of the optimal trajectory of Russia's foreign policy.

Neorealism

The "Eurasianists" and Derzhavniki, with their advocacy of Russian national identity and national (rather than "all-humankind"/global) interests, paved the way towards the rehabilitation of the realist/neorealist school of thought in Russia. Currently, neorealism is a dominant IR paradigm in Russia. There are several theoretical schools within this strand of Russian international studies. Some of them were developed from the Soviet theoretical legacy; others drew on the principles of the Western version of neorealism. For example, the system-structural approach, which has both Western and Soviet origins, focuses on the study of the role of various systemic factors of nature – domestic, geopolitical, geoeconomic, geostrategic – on foreign policy making and the distribution of power in the international relations system. These studies are aimed not only at identifying the factors that make international politics holistic but also at explaining how and why the heterogeneous components of the world process and different paradigms of social and political development coexist. In this regard, the question being discussed is, "What is Russia's place in this complex configuration of international interactions and interlinks?"

The historic-systemic school, to a larger extent, is based on the late Soviet legacy. This school pays significant attention to long-term historical developments of specific states and the international relations system at large. The philosophy of history serves to a greater extent as a theoretical basis for this school.

The sociological approach has much in common with the historic-systemic school but emphasizes the study of the role of social and political institutions, groups, and individual actors, in both foreign policy making and world politics.

The so-called neoclassical realism is gradually gaining momentum in Russian neorealism. This school tends to concentrate its research on issues such as the role of domestic factors, specific historical circumstances, and the peculiarities of the decision-making system in shaping a state's foreign policy.

The hegemonic stability theory is rather popular among the Russian neorealists as well. According to the proponents of this theory, because of the competitive and potentially conflictual nature of the international system, it takes a dominant power with preponderant power resources – a hegemon – to set the norms and rules of the international order and ensure at least

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some level of compliance by other states. Currently, there is a lack of such hegemony, and, for this reason, the international relations system is unstable and turbulent.

As for the specific problems of Russia's foreign policy and the international relations system, neorealists prefer to focus on categories traditional to this paradigm, such as national interests, national security, the conflictual nature of world politics, power distribution, and struggle.

With the rise of Russian neorealists in the mid-1990s, the balance of power, rather than the balance of interests, was again in fashion. National, not international, security became the matter of primary concern. According to the neorealists, Russia's national security strategy should depart from the real power of the state; provide for the rational use of resources; and combine and interact with internal, foreign policy, socio-economic, scientific, technological, and informational, as well as all other aspects of life and work among the state's people.

In fact, in the 1990s, the neorealists represented one of the first schools of thought in Russia to propose extending the concept of national security to include both "hard" and "soft" security issues. As the neorealists underlined, the state security strategy should contain a comprehensive analysis and classification of the existing and potential threats to Russia's security, as well as internal and external mechanisms for the prevention and elimination of these threats. It also should ensure a coordinated effort on the part of both the state and the people as a whole to provide security at the national, regional, and global levels, as well as the organization of internal and international interaction in solving urgent and long-term security problems[7].

The neorealists distinguish between four main categories in terms of Russia's national interests. First, there are functional interests – economic, political, social, military, humanitarian, and environmental. Second, the groups of interests depending on the longevity – short-term, mid-term, and standing interests. Third, interests need to be categorized depending on their importance – vital, important, or marginal. Finally, domestic and foreign policy interests should he clearly defined. The neorealists stress that in an interrelated and interdependent world, the national interests of different countries may overlap, cross, or even clash in various political forms, ranging from "soft" to "hard."

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The neorealists suggested that after the Cold War, the internal threats to Russia's security were underestimated and need more attention: disintegration because of inter-ethnic and center-region contradictions, degradation of socio-economic conditions resulting from economic decline and deep social differentiation, organized crime and corruption, cultural and spiritual degradation, the degradation of the environment, and the lack of information security.

To cope with external and internal threats, Russia should first accomplish its domestic reforms. The neorealists believed that the cohesion of all levels of security – intra-regional, national, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), European, Asia-Pacific, global – should be reached. This should be aided by the rational and effective use of all forces and means currently at the disposal of the Russian state. Moreover, the neorealists preferred political, diplomatic, economic, and other peaceful methods to meet security challenges. However, they did not rule out the use of military force if differences between states' vital interests could not be reconciled.[8]

Since the 1990s, the regional priorities of the neorealists include three main circles of Russian interests: 1) "near abroad"/CIS; 2) East Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East; and 3) the West (the United States and Western Europe). The remainder of the world meanwhile was of peripheral importance to Russia. In line with other schools of thought, the neorealists have stressed the Eurasian geopolitical location of Russia. However, Russian foreign policy on the continent should be defined by real interests rather than messianic ideas (a critical comment on the "Eurasianist" philosophy).

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According to the neorealists, the "near abroad" was (and is) the first regional priority in Russia's international strategy. The main goals of Moscow's foreign policy in the "near abroad" were to prevent the rise of unfriendly regimes and the emergence of ethnic and religious conflicts, to establish stable relations with its neighbors, to protect Russian citizens' human rights, to shape a common security space on CIS territory, and to resolve territorial disputes with the New Independent States (NIS).[9]

The second circle of Russia's national interests includes Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. The neorealists were critical of Boris Yeltsin's policies towards Central and East European countries because Moscow has been unable to prevent their drift towards the West both in economic and security terms. According to the neorealists, Eastern Europe must be shown, through clever initiatives in various fields, that it will be safer and more prosperous, not in the role of a *cordon sanitaire* thrown around Russia, but functioning as a connecting link between Eurasia and Western Europe.[10]

Russian policy towards the Middle East should be determined by its interests in the "near abroad" – the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia. Potentially, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan could be Russia's opponents. According to Lukin,[11] Russia has to vigorously resist Islamic fundamentalism, the spread of which threatens to destabilize the situation both near and inside the CIS. It was essential, however, to seek various avenues of agreement and develop mutually beneficial interstate relations with the biggest Islamic countries (including Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the Arab states). At the same time, Russia must rebuff all attempts by Islamic extremists to encroach on Russian economic, political, and military interests.[12]

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As for the Far East, the neorealists have noted Russia's weakness and declining role in the region. Rogov[13] admitted that some of the ex-Soviet republics could be drawn into the spheres of interest of such regional centers of power as China or Japan. Arbatov[14] even suggested that China may represent the greatest external security threat to Russia in the long run. He and other neorealists did not approve of too quick a military rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and warned of the possibility of Russia's one-sided dependence on Beijing.[15] For that reason, Arbatov[16] observed that the interests of Russia in the region may best be served by the maintenance of the United States' political role and limited military presence. If the United States were to withdraw, the Japanese reaction could be none other than re-militarization in view of the rapid growth of economic and military power in China. A clash between these two giants could draw Russia into the conflict as well. In addition to keeping the United States' military presence, Russia's national interests would be best served by a new multilateral security system in the region.

According to Rogov, the third circle of Russian interests included Moscow's relations with the West, in particular with the United States and Western Europe. As for the United States, the neorealists saw a number of areas in which the two states had common interests: 1) accomplishing Russian economic and political reforms; 2) developing a bilateral arms control regime (in particular, further reductions in strategic armaments and a nuclear test ban); 3) preventing the rise of resurgent regional powers, which could violate the existing power balance; 4) nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons non-proliferation; and 5) peacekeeping.[17]

At the same time, the neorealists have singled out some sources of tension between Russia and the United States – Russia's inability to move fast with its domestic reforms; the lack of a common enemy, which is indispensable for any military-political alliance; the model of mutual nuclear deterrence inherited from the Cold War; the United States' refusal to admit Russia into the Western community; the preservation of the system of military-political alliances set up by

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the United States during the Cold War; NATO and EU enlargement through admitting the Soviet Union's former "clients" but not Russia itself; NATO's aggressive policies in the Balkans; and Russia's arms and dual-use technology transfers to Third World countries.[18]

Concerning European security problems, since the mid-1990s, the neorealists have focused first of all on NATO and EU enlargement. They did not oppose the latter and regarded the former as detrimental to the regional security system. The neorealists did not favor NATO's dissolution. On the contrary, they acknowledged the Alliance's positive role in the maintenance of European security both in the Cold War era and beyond.[19] But they also believed that NATO should not be extended and strengthened at the expense of Russian security. According to the neorealists, to prevent a new clash between the East and the West, the OSCE should become the main collective security organization on the continent.[20] The neorealists have also focused on the search for a compromise with the West. They have proposed both a delay in NATO's expansion by a number of years and that its eventual enlargement be limited to the Visegrad countries only and not be extended to the Baltic States. They have also proposed a special Russia-NATO charter to ensure Moscow's security (no further expansion to the CIS countries, no military bases and nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, the continuation of arms control dialogue, and so on).[21] The Russian-NATO Paris Agreement (May 1997) was concluded, in fact, on the basis of these principles.

As far as the post–9/11 world order was concerned, the neorealists believed that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have demonstrated the return of the world to the 19th-century-like anarchical model based on power politics, selfish national interests, and hard competition between major players. They emphasized the inability of international organizations and international law to prevent new wars and the rise of hegemonic powers. Instead, they suggested several possible models for the "neo-anarchical" world. Some of the Russian neorealists believed that the era of US unilateralism was looming ahead[22] and advised the Russian leadership to choose sides – either join the US-led pole as a junior partner[23] or try to counterbalance the American superpower with the help of other power poles – the EU (or certain European countries, such as France and/or Germany), China, CIS, and so on.[24]

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Another group of neorealists see the world as a chaotic combination of ad hoc and shifting coalitions in which different states pursue their national interests. The neorealists warned the Russian leaders that since these coalitions will be of a temporary (short-term) rather than permanent (long-term) nature, Russia should not invest too much in them and should change allies and alliances when they stop to serve Russia's national interests.[25] They pointed to US-Russia cooperation on Afghanistan (2001) and the Russia-France-Germany strategic triangle in the case of Iraq (2003) as examples of such ad hoc coalitions.

Finally, some neorealists believed that a multipolar model of the world was still possible, and Russia could become one of the power poles, especially in the post-Soviet geostrategic space.[26] More specifically, this model of the "manageable anarchy" could result in the creation of a "concert of powers" international security system in which Russia could play a significant role. The G-8 was seen as an embryo of such a less informal but more flexible and reliable security regime.[27] President Putin's speech at the Munich conference on international security (February 2007) went along the same lines.[28] Some neorealists suggested including China and India in the G-8 and transforming it into a G-10 to make this institution more authoritative and representative.[29] The UN Security Council should not be neglected either. It could be useful when there is a consensus between five permanent members, or it could be used by Russia (and its allies) to block (or make illegitimate) undesirable initiatives and strategies.[30]

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The "Arab awakening," a series of "color" revolutions in the post-Soviet space, and, more recently, the Ukrainian and Syrian crises forced the two latter neorealist groupings to merge and shift to a more pessimistic view of world politics. For the Russian present-day neorealists, it is absolutely clear that the so-called "collective West" (particularly, the US and the EU) should be blamed for the Ukrainian crisis.[31] This hard-line school believes that by helping the nationalist forces in Ukraine to oust the pro-Russian regime of Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, the West wanted to withdraw this country from Moscow's sphere of influence and sideline Russia in the post-Soviet space. They fully approve Vladimir Putin's policies on Crimea's integration into Russia and supporting the breakaway Donetsk and Lughansk people's republics (DPR and LPR). The radical version of this school even suggested not limiting the concept of "Novorossiya" (New Russia) to Donbass only, but including other Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine in it (from Kharkov to Odessa) and helping the local pro-Russian forces "liberate" these territories from the Kiev-based "junta."[32]

As far as the future of the Ukrainian question is concerned, initially, the Russian neorealists believed that the "frozen conflict" scenario was the most probable one because the warring parties have no more resources to continue the conflict in its open form.[33] This option could not bring peace and stability to the region but could stop military activities and killing civilians and create the necessary conditions for rebuilding the region's economy and social institutions. This scenario was possible in an environment where neither of the parties was interested in serious concessions or compromises, but at the same time, they were not in a position to implement their maximalist program. Ukraine had limited resources for defeating the separatists if it did not want to risk escalating tensions with Russia. If Russia were to increase support to the self-proclaimed republics of Donbass, it would risk entering a new Cold War.

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However, the relative status quo (including the frozen conflict status) was maintained for only eight years. The Kremlin, irritated by Western reluctance to guarantee Ukraine's neutral status and stop weaponizing the country, which made Kiev's new invasion of Donbass inevitable, initiated a special military operation in both Donbass and Ukraine itself in February 2022. The most radical scenario suggested by the neorealists in 2014, which aimed to include the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine to Russia and destroy Ukrainian military potential, became a dramatic reality.

The neorealist legacy has had a fairly mixed record. On the one hand, neorealism has contributed positively to the Russian foreign policy debate. The neorealists have helped overcome the crisis in Russian foreign policy thinking, which was generated by the struggle of two extremes represented by such schools of thought as Atlanticism and Eurasianism. The neorealists succeeded in articulating Russia's real security interests and priorities to both domestic and foreign audiences. Moreover, the spread of their ideas made Russian security thinking more predictable and understandable for the West. The Russian national security strategies, in fact, drew heavily on the realist ideas. On the other hand, the coming of neorealism with its emphasis on national interests, national security, and national sovereignty implied an obvious return to the old paradigms belonging to the age of classical modernity, which was based on power policy and the preferable use of coercive instruments in international politics. They failed to develop any concepts suggesting a more cooperative model of the international relations system.

As for the future development of the realist tradition in Russian IR, it is inspired by both its own experience and Western neorealism. One can, for example, observe the rising interest of Russian scholars[34] in neoclassic realism, which is a combination of structuralism and system vision of international policy on the one hand and focus on state attributes and internal factors to explain its foreign policy on the other.

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Neoliberalism

Despite the dominance of the neorealist paradigm, the neoliberal perspective on international relations is also represented in Russia, although it is rather weak in the present-day Russia. The declining role of neoliberalism is explained by its seemingly pro-Western image. In a situation when the West put pressure on Moscow through various means because of the Ukrainian crisis, IR theoretical approaches based on ideas of cooperation and partnership with international players who are perceived as anti-Russian actors are unpopular for obvious reasons. However, several schools can be identified within the neoliberal paradigm: neofunctionalism, which aims to explain the phenomena of international integration and globalization; interdependency theory, which believes that despite numerous conflicts and diverging interests, many countries of the world still depend on each other in many ways; liberal intergovernmentalism, which aims to explain which factors encourage different countries to cooperate with each other; international regime theory, which favors the creation of formal and informal international regimes to secure international cooperation and prevent conflicts; and the Russian version of the soft power concept, which, however, is different from the Joseph Nye one.

As mentioned earlier, most neoliberal ideas were borrowed from Western political thought represented by neoliberal theories, including interdependence, interaction of economic and political factors in international politics, and a normative approach to understanding international policy. Neoliberalism emphasizes globalization trends in the world economy, which strengthen the trend toward global management of economic and political developments and generally increase the relevance of international legal frameworks, thus reducing global anarchy. Neoliberals believe that the development of multilateral institutions and regimes could guarantee stability of the international system. Although the trend toward a multipolar world is not neglected in the neoliberal perspective, it argues that the future development of the international system is no longer predominantly determined by the shape and outcome of rivalries among the major centers of economic and military power but, increasingly, by the dynamics of their common development and interdependency.[35] The neoliberals argue that the geopolitical drive for control over territories does not matter anymore and suggest that it should be replaced by geo-economic thinking.[36]

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The debate between neorealists and neoliberals in Russia on the more practical aspects of diplomacy has mainly concentrated on two issues: integration of the post-Soviet space and European security. For instance, Zagorski[37] argued that the real dilemma of Russian politics in the CIS was not further disintegration versus integration, but rather reintegration versus eventual "natural" new integration on the basis of democratic and market reforms yet to be completed. Zagorski also argued that to pursue the latter option one needed to recognize that the major building blocks of the experience of the EU did not apply to the CIS, and another NAFTA-type of soft integration should be the goal.

In the 2000s, the neoliberals pushed forward the idea of a "multi-track" integration that included several models ranged from the Russian-Belorussian Union State (confederation), Customs Union, Eurasian Economic Community, and, finally, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to some loose cooperative arrangements under CIS auspices. Priority was given to further development of the EAEU, which was seen as a "brain child" of Russian neoliberalism. A treaty aiming for the establishment of the EAEU was signed on May 29, 2014 (i.e., after the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis) by the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia and came into force on January 1, 2015. Two more CIS countries – Armenia and Kyrgyzstan – joined the Union in 2015. Along with basic neoliberal principles, the EAEU introduced the free

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movement of goods, capital, services, and people and provided for common transport, agriculture, and energy policies, with provisions for a single currency and greater integration in the future. The EAEU's creation was a result of a difficult compromise between Vladimir Putin and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who suggested the idea of the Eurasian economic integration in the mid-1990s. Where Putin had wished for common political institutes like parliament, a common passport, and common currency within the EEU, Nazarbayev remained steadfast in confining the organization to a purely economic union.[38]

Despite some ups and downs in the development of EAEU cooperation, which were generated mostly by external factors such as Western sanctions against Belarus and Russia and the coronavirus pandemic, the whole project proved its effectiveness and continues in a quite dynamic way.

As for European security, in the 1990s, the major controversial issue was NATO enlargement. The neoliberals have argued for a cooperative solution, explaining that the predominant interest of Russia in Europe should be the strengthening of multilateralism as a guarantee that there will be no return to balance of power politics in Europe.[39] Pro-Western neoliberals viewed no serious threat stemming from NATO enlargement. They believed that NATO extension was a natural reaction of the former Soviet satellites to Russia's unpredictable behavior. The neoliberals also were discontent with Yeltsin's inability to make full use of the opportunities that were opened to Russia in the framework of different security arrangements ranging from Partnership for Peace (PfP) to OSCE programs.[40]

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the neoliberals considered NATO the main guarantor of stability in Europe.[41] They believed that Russia was interested in NATO's responsibility for the stability of borders in Central and Eastern Europe, a region with a number of potential hotbeds of instability that could endanger Russia and the CIS member-states. The neoliberals thought that once NATO accepted the Central and Eastern European countries, which are currently anti-Russian, it will no longer have an incentive to be hostile to Moscow and that they would become more benevolent neighbors to Russia. In this view, partnership between NATO and Russia could become an instrument of conflict resolution in Russia's relations with its neighbors.[42] Moscow should have good relations with NATO to allow free hands in coping with the "arch of instability" extending from the Black Sea and North Caucasus through Central Asia farther on to China.[43]

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The neoliberals pointed out that NATO is not an aggressive organization but an alliance of democracies.[44] It is a defensive rather than offensive security organization. The neoliberals maintained that Russia has to focus on its domestic problems, which they consider much more dangerous than NATO enlargement. They proposed that Russian diplomacy should be focused on dialogue with NATO on disarmament and confidence building.[45] More generally, NATO has been regarded as a mechanism that helped modernize societies, overcome nationalistic aberrations, and condition the thinking and behavior of new political elites.[46] Some neoliberal analysts even believed that the "national humiliation" experienced by Russia in the case of NATO enlargement was useful for the future democratic transformation of this country. According to some accounts, NATO's extension forced Yeltsin 1) to progress with economic reforms; 2) to pay more attention to Russia's neighbors such as Belarus, China, Iran, and Japan; and 3) to start real military reform.[47] According to the liberals, NATO overreacted to Milosevic's Kosovo politics by bombing Serbia but should remain Russia's main partner in ensuring European security[48].

As for the nature of the post–Cold War European security model, neoliberals were quite pessimistic regarding the possibility of creating an effective pan-European structure in which Russia could have a major say. According to Zagorski,[49] the main objective of Russia's foreign policy

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should not be joining Western European organizations but using cooperation with them to facilitate its own integration into the world economy and the community of democratic states. For example, the neoliberals were satisfied with projects and initiatives such as the EU's Northern Dimension that aimed at integrating Russia's northwestern regions into the single European economic, social, and cultural space or a Russia-NATO 20 (19 + 1) cooperative format.[50]

In the 2000s, however, the neoliberal school's views on the European security architecture and its institutions have changed significantly. The neoliberals put OSCE in the center of the European security order. For example, the draft of a European security treaty (EST) proposed by then-President Dmitry Medvedev (November 2009) was obviously inspired by the neoliberal/globalist idea of a "Greater Europe," lasting "from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals." The EST draft outlined the contours of a new European security architecture and proposed the idea of a special security treaty of a binding nature.[51]

Presently, the neoliberal school's attitude towards the OSCE is rather contradictory. On the one hand, the neoliberals are quite critical about the role of this organization in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, including the Georgian (2008) and Ukrainian (from 2014 to the present) ones. The Russian neoliberal analysts believe that the OSCE was often too slow and indecisive, its capacities and mandates were too limited, and its implementation process was inefficient. As for the conflict in the Ukrainian southeast, the neoliberals often accused the OSCE special monitoring mission to Ukraine of being biased in favor of Kiev.

But neoliberals still hope to use the OSCE for solving existing problems, including the conflict in and around Ukraine. For that purpose, some neoliberal experts suggested a number of improvements:

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- To transform OSCE into a full-fledged treaty-based regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter
- To approve a Convention on the International Legal Personality, Legal Capacity, and Privileges and Immunities of the OSCE that was finalized in 2007 but has not been signed to date
- To expand the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center's powers regarding conflict monitoring and early conflict prevention
- To resume the pan-European dialogue on conventional arms control within the framework of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation
- To revive discussions within the OSCE on the modernization of the Vienna Document on confidence and security-building measures

However, in the current situation of high tensions between Russia and the Western OSCE member-states, this initiative can hardly be implemented. As far as the global security regime is concerned, the Russian neoliberals are anxious about the decreasing role of international organizations and international law and the rise of unilateralism in the aftermath of 9/11.[52] At the same time, they still believe that a broad consensus in the international community over concepts of justice is necessary to solve most global problems, like the negative consequences of climate change or fighting the pandemic.[53]

There was a split among the neoliberals on the nature of the emerging world order. Some liberals insisted that Russia should aim to restore the crucial role of international organizations and law in world affairs. Another group of neoliberals is close to the realist camp, suggesting a switch from traditional international organizations to more flexible and informal institutions (such as the G-7/8) and the "concert of powers" model.[54] They hope this could help prevent the complete collapse of the world order and keep the chaos of international politics in a

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manageable phase. In efforts to create regional balances, neoliberals see additional instruments to achieve a more stable world system For example, balance in Europe is possible in the case of resolving the Ukrainian crisis. Prior to 2022, the neoliberals believed that recognition of Crimea as a part of Russia by the West and the reintegration of Donbass to Ukraine on the basis of Minsk agreements were possible.[55]

To sum up, although neoliberals are unable to dominate or even influence Russian IR discourse significantly, they play a useful role by challenging neorealism and providing these schools with an intellectual alternative.

Globalism

In terms of a theoretical vision of the present-day world, the Russian globalist paradigm emphasizes the study of the universal historical laws that govern humankind's development. The globalists believe that globalization is an inevitable and objective process, although sometimes it takes uneven and discriminatory forms. Its primary objective is the creation of a homogenous global society that will create safe and comfortable conditions for the whole of humankind. To guarantee that globalization develops in a proper way, global governance should be established and further developed.

The Russian globalist IR paradigm consists of several schools. First of all, there are two main versions of Marxist-inspired political thought in Russia. The first is a more traditional one and is exemplified by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), led by Gennady Zyuganov. The second one is close to social democracy and has been developed by certain organizations and authors such as the Gorbachev Fund, Alexander Yakovlev, and Dmitri Furman. The former group can be called traditionalists, while the latter can be termed Social Democrats.

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Traditionalists. The Communists have been unable to reconcile themselves to the demise of the Soviet Union and to the country's loss of great power status. They believe that Gorbachev and Yeltsin led the USSR to defeat in the Cold War and finally to its collapse. These two leaders are, in fact, regarded as national traitors.[56] As some pro-Communist experts have suggested, in the search for a national security doctrine, Russia should choose between two alternatives: the domination of national-state interests over cosmopolitan ones and Russia's independent position in the international relations system or an orientation towards "Western values and the joining to a 'community of civilized countries.'"[57] The CPRF opts for the first alternative. The Communists explained their position by the general nature of relations between Russia and the West. According to their assessments, the aim of the United States is to undermine Russia's economic, scientific-technical, and military capabilities and also to isolate Moscow from promising trade partners and markets (in particular, in areas such as advanced technologies and arms trade). The West's motive for doing so, it has been argued, is to hopefully prevent Russia's transformation into a potential rival[58].

Similarly to the neorealists, the Communists emphasize the invariable nature of the country's national interests, which do not depend on a concrete regime or dominant ideology. They believe that the main Russian national interest inherited from its history consists of preserving the country's territorial and spiritual integrity. The idea of a powerful state based on multi-ethnicity is the equivalent of the Russian national idea. Thus, the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the weakening of the Russian state have undermined Russian security and worsened its geostrategic position. The Communists believe that Russia is not part of the West or of the East. It should define its own, independent way. But they understand the term *independent way* differently from the more radical *special path*, seeing both Russian and world history as the result

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of objective processes rather than messianic ideas. However, they acknowledge the need for a national ideal or doctrine that could consolidate Russian society.[59]

According to traditionalists, some global developments could challenge Russian national security:

- Resurgent powers that aim at changing their regional and global status (Germany, Japan, China, India, Brazil, South Africa)
- The rise of regionalism in the world (such as the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN), which could potentially increase Russia's isolation
- The aggravation of global social, economic, and environmental problems
- A decrease in the significance of nuclear deterrent force and the rise of unstable regional alliances with high conflict potential[60]

Some measures on global and regional levels could contribute to a more favor strategic environment for Russia. The UN is considered the leading organization in peacekeeping and solving international conflicts; that should be strengthened. At the same time, Communists opposed the idea of the expansion of UN Security Council membership. They criticized attempts to replace the OSCE with NATO as the principal security organization in Europe and called for improving security regimes on the principles of equality and reciprocity.

Speaking on regional security priorities – again, similarly to the neorealists – traditionalists regard the CIS and "near abroad" as the first priority for Moscow's foreign policy. As they believe that the Soviet Union has been dissolved illegally, the Communists have tried to foster the reunification of the former Soviet republics. Even so, they have ruled out the use of force to restore the USSR.[61] The Communists put pressure on the Yeltsin government to protect Russian minorities abroad.

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As for Europe, the CPRF has pointed out that NATO's eastward expansion violates the balance in a number of ways. The enlargement inevitably destroys the existing "security buffer" between Russia and NATO. It also brings NATO's military presence to Russia's borders, including military bases and probably nuclear weaponry. They predicted that NATO extension may provoke a Russian military build-up on its western and northwestern borders and accelerate the creation of a military alliance within the CIS while resuming the confrontation between the East and the West on a military bloc basis.[62]

The Communists actively pressed the Kremlin through their faction in the parliament, opposing any contact with NATO after bombing Serbia in 1999 and the Kosovo intervention. They did not stop criticizing the Kremlin for its "appeasement policies" with regard to NATO. For example, they heavily criticized the Putin administration for "swallowing" the 2004 round of NATO's eastward expansion that included three post-Soviet republics.[63]

As for other regions, the Communists have proposed restoring Russia's links with its traditional friends and allies such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba.[64] This could prevent America's unchallenged worldwide leadership and provide Russia with profitable orders for its troubled arms industry. They have accepted *detente* in Sino-Russian relations as well as an active arms export policy in the region because it strengthens Russia's international authority and supports the defense industry. Many leaders of the CPRF are fascinated with the Chinese model of socialism and believe that Gorbachev should have used the PRC's experience to reform the Soviet Union. At the same time, the CPRF is concerned with the future security orientation of China and the correlation of forces in the Asia-Pacific area, which is turning out to be quite unfavorable for Russia.[65]

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The CPRF has strongly supported President Putin's 2014 decision to reintegrate Crimea into Russia and support the Donbass rebels. They also supported the Kremlin in its military intervention in the Syrian conflict.[66] The Communists, however, noted that these moves should be made in a more decisive way, regardless of the Western opinion. For this reason, they fully supported Putin's special military operation in Ukraine in 2022.

It should be noted that, unlike in the domestic sphere, the CPRF has failed to produce any coherent and clearly pronounced foreign policy doctrine. Instead, it has operated with an amalgam of the party leadership's statements and remarks, which have made it difficult to reconstruct the CPRF's foreign policy platform. Despite its significant domestic influence, the CPRF has, in fact, been unable to influence the Russian discourse on IR theory.

Social Democrats. After his resignation in December 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev and his allies Aleksandr Yakovlev and Georgi Shakhnazarov committed themselves to the creation of a social-democratic movement in Russia to confront the Communist coalition. The Gorbachev Fund and the journal *Svobodnaya Mysl* [*Free Thought*] became the most important pillars of the emerging social democracy in Russia. Although the Social Democrats failed to form any influential political coalition, they produced some foreign policy concepts that affected the Russian IR discourse. For example, the Social Democrats have contributed to the Russian discussion of national interests. Contrary to the Gorbachev doctrine of the 1980s, which was grounded in the unconditional priority of "all-human" interests over national interests, the Social Democrats have admitted that national interests are the subject of primary concern for any country. They define national interests as a manifestation of the nation's basic needs (survival, security, progressive development).[67] National interests may be subjective in terms of their form or way of expression, but they are definitely objective in terms of their nature.

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The Social Democrats, however, do not limit themselves to the acknowledgement of the significance of national interests. They believe that, in an interdependent world, international actors cannot afford to solely pursue their own interests. Since the international environment has become multidimensional, the actors should take into account both the national interests of other players and universal (all-human) interests. According to the Social Democrats, narrow-minded nationalism is absolutely outdated and detrimental not only to the world community but, in the end, also to a nation conducting a nationalist policy.[68]

The Social Democrats regard the creation of a global civil society as the only way of replacing national interests with "all-human" values. In their view, a world civil society could be based on a system of horizontal links between both intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations dealing with economic, political, environmental, and cultural issues. Some experts have proposed the creation of a world government to resolve global problems and to save humankind from imminent catastrophe.[69] Thus, the Kantian project of "perpetual peace" – the methodological basis of the Gorbachevian New Political Thinking (NPT) – could be put into practice.

Along with other IR schools, the Social Democrats perceive the world as moving from a unipolar (the United States as the only superpower) towards a multipolar structure. None of the countries or ideologies will be able to impose their model on the others. The Social Democrats disagree with Fukuyama's (1992) thesis on the worldwide domination of the liberal-democratic model. Various civilizational models will compete in the foreseeable future. A future world will be born out of the interaction of two contradictory processes – integration and regionalization. The future poles of power will emerge on the basis of economic, religious, and cultural differentiation.[70]

In discussions about Russian identity, the Social Democrats stress that Russia is part of Europe, and Russians are part of the European nation.[71] For that reason, Russia should aim at entering pan-European economic, political, and security structures. "Europe" is also defined in

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a civilizational rather than geographical sense: the Gorbachevian project of a Common European House or "Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok" is still popular among the Russian Social Democrats.[72]

The Social Democrats have proposed a model of "multidimensional partnership" that is directed at cooperation with the major players of the world, regardless of their geographical location. According to this model, Russia's policy should not be based on geopolitical choice but rather should be oriented towards establishing long-term and stable bilateral relations as well as promoting multilateralism.[73] However, it remains unclear which methods should be used to create such relations and how to convince other powers to accept this model.

To sum up, the social-democratic foreign policy doctrine has taken over many concepts and principles of Gorbachev's NPT, but the latter was complemented with some advocacy of Russia's national interests and balanced policies towards the East and the West.

The environmentalists. The environmentalist version of Russian globalism was one of the first that redefined the concept of security in the post-Soviet period.[74] Adepts in this school suggested that, contrary to military or geopolitical threats, which are mainly hypothetical, ecology directly affects the nation's economy, health, and climate. Under the pressure of environmentalism, nearly all leading schools of foreign policy thought included an ecological dimension in their concepts of security. A special section on ecological security was put into the National Security Concepts of the Russian Federation of 1997.[75] Environmentalists believe that Russia, along with other states, should develop new thinking based on a common interest in survival in the face of global problems.[76]

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Environmentalists are quite radical in their recommendations regarding solutions to global problems. They recommend the dissolution of political boundaries and a de-ideologizing of international relations (of course, except for environmentalism itself). In order to cope with ecological problems, they say that humankind should be able to forecast both the near and distant future. Since only scientists are able to make good forecasts, this stratum should be elevated to the very top of society and charged with political management as well. National and international economies should be based on new technologies targeted at the rational exploitation of natural resources. Rather than public and private properties, cooperative property will be the best form of ownership to deal with environmental issues. Furthermore, transnational rather than national bodies should be in charge of global problems as nation-states are unable to cope with them any longer[77].

According to the environmentalists, managing ecological problems is merely the first step in humankind's progressive development. The main objective looming ahead is to move from a program of survival to one of sustainable development. The latter can be described as a social order based on harmonious relations with nature and the prevention of major internal and external threats to stability and social well-being.[78]

It goes without saying that these ideas are by no means original. Russian environmentalists have borrowed many of them from their foreign "colleagues." The Rome Club papers, the Brundtland Commission report, and the ideas of Bertrand Russell are among the most authoritative theoretical sources for the Russian ecologists.[79] However, the environmentalists have been less successful in their attempts to influence Russian discourse on future security challenges. Russian foreign policymakers and analysts regard this part of environmentalists' problematique an exotic intellectual exercise, hardly relevant to present-day Russia. They are concerned with Russia's compelling needs (including some ecological issues) rather than with challenges in the distant future. However, this situation may change if Russia is able to resolve its most acute social and economic problems and, hence, is more able to pay attention to ecology.

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Peace research school (PRS). Methodologically, PRS is based on Johan Galtung's[80] theory of structural violence. This school tries to explain that violence is deeply embedded in both the society and the international relations system. For PRS adepts, the structural violence is a socio-political phenomenon rooted in the capitalist society and economy. They believe that the forms of contemporary exploitation are not essentially different from those depicted by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir Lenin.

Along with the structural violence, its cultural variation is becoming a popular theme in Russian peace research. They note that the so-called "color" revolutions in the post-Soviet space and Arab countries were often facilitated by the West, with the help of public diplomacy based on the cultivation of liberal/democratic values among the local youth and political opposition. For this school, cultural violence can be even more dangerous than other forms of violence because it not only reinforces other "angles" of the "conflict triangle,"[81] but it can also have long-term negative and unexpected effects.[82]

The PRS notes that, in general usage, "peace" conveys the notion of "the absence of war" and not a particular ideal condition of society. According to Galtung, peace seen merely as the absence of war is considered to be "negative peace," and the concept of "positive peace" should be used to describe a situation in which there is neither physical violence nor legalized repression. Under conditions of positive peace, war is unanticipated. A state of positive peace involves large elements of reciprocity, equality, and joint problem-solving capabilities. There have been many different proposals for the positive definitions – integration, justice, harmony, etc. – all of which call for further conceptualization. Analytically, peace is conceptualized by the Russian scholars in a series of discrete categories ranging from various degrees and states of conflict to various states of cooperation and integration.[83] The dominant trend in Russian PRS research is to interpret peace as synonymous with the category of sustainable development.[84] Some scholars believe that "positive" peace can be seen as a sort of a social order in which not only are major security threats absent, but the favorable conditions for human creativity are also provided.[85]

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The PRS's positions on conflict resolution and mediation (CRM) offer a broader understanding of conflict than the other IR paradigms. The PRS approach is based on the assumption that conflicts are a natural product of various contradictory processes in society. The PRS does not reduce the causes of conflict to the legal ones (as the neoliberals do) but additionally identify the economic, social, identity, political, military, environmental, cultural, ideological, religious, and other factors.[86]

The PRS does not limit CRM methods and techniques to legal instruments and procedures. This school believes that to resolve a conflict and preclude its re-emergence, its causes should be first eliminated. Consequently, the CRM arsenal is broader, including the "legalists" (negotiations; cease-fire, truce, and peace agreements; peacekeeping and peace enforcement mechanisms; etc.) and post-conflict peace building and development that envisage a radical transformation of the society and its institutions with the aim of eradicating the causes of the conflict.[87]

To prevent new conflicts, the PRS suggests creating an early warning/monitoring mechanism. The latter should be based on a system of indicators that monitor dangerous developments and identify conflict-prone areas. The PRS believes that conflicts can be resolved and lasting peace is possible if not only governments but also societies talk to each other and develop horizontal contacts. That's why peace researchers welcome the active participation of non-state actors in CRM activities: people-to-people, NGO-to-NGO, company-to-company contacts, the so-called "people's" or "civil diplomacy."[88]

Despite its marginal positions in the Russian IR community, the PRS continues to provide Russian scholarship with innovative insights into basic IR issues such as causes of war and conflict, nature, sources and manifestations of violence, essences and ways of achieving both

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"negative" and "positive" peace, transformation of the international relations system in the post–Cold War era, and so on.[89] This type of research continues to challenge Russia's predominant IR paradigms, thus forcing them to develop their concepts, argumentation, and research techniques.

Conclusion

It should be noted that despite significant theoretical differences between the three Russian "classic" IR paradigms, all of them maintain an intensive and rather fruitful dialogue with each other. Moreover, from a holistic point of view, they often complement, rather than contradicting or excluding each other, making the Russian IR landscape more diverse and richer.

The current state of affairs in Russian IR can be described as follows:

- Neorealism has become a dominant IR paradigm in Russia over the last 25 to 30 years.
- Most of the Russian IR schools give a priority to the protection of Russian national interests; the secondary role is awarded to "all-human" or global values.
- Again, many Russian foreign policy schools agree that Russia should remain a great power with a major voice in the international community.
- Other goals should not be given priority in Russia's foreign policy over the country's domestic needs. Foreign policy should serve these needs rather than being a goal in itself (as it often was in Soviet times).
- Russia's main national interest consists of ensuring the country's security and territorial integrity.
- Today, world security includes not only military and geopolitical but also societal, environmental, cultural, and other dimensions vital to the individual and society.
- Russia should not be biased in favor of either the West or the East. Instead, its policy should he even handed and oriented to cooperation with all countries.
- Among Moscow's regional priorities, the "near abroad" is the most important one. Russia has special geopolitical, strategic, economic, and humanitarian interests in the post-Soviet geopolitical space and should be recognized as an unchallenged leader in this area.
- Russia should resist the rise of US unilateralism but, at the same time, if possible, maintain a cooperative US-Russia agenda on issues such as fighting international terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, and disarmament.
- Russia should be more assertive in voicing its specific interests in relations with the West. It should not hesitate to differ with Western views if Russia's vital interests are at stake.
- Moscow should be more realistic in assessing the West's attitudes towards Russia – in particular, its position on Russia's admission to Western economic, political, and military institutions.

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This intellectual consensus has made it possible to produce a number of governmental concepts and doctrines such as the foreign policy concepts, military doctrines, and national security concepts/strategies.

It should be noted, however, that a consensus has been reached on those issues mainly dealing with Russia's immediate security needs. While many schools are able to identify threats to the country's security, they are still not ready to go beyond negativism and construct a positive security concept for the future.

Russian IR schools continue to differ on many important theoretical and practical issues: the meaning of Russia's national interests and security; the correlation between "hard" and "soft"

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security; the future of national sovereignty; the role of international organizations in ensuring national and international security; civilizational orientations; the use of military force in international relations; functional and regional priorities; particular ethnic, religious, and territorial conflicts; and so on.

The Russian IR discourse still aims at responding to the fundamental question: What is Russia about? This discourse is a way towards nation building rather than defining the country's future foreign policy and security agenda. This is hardly surprising, given Russia's newly born polity, culture, and even boundaries, as well as its unfinished reforms. It is understandable why fairly old-fashioned approaches such as Eurasianism, realism, and geopolitics could come to dominate Russian security debates. As these concepts refer to national interest, national security, national sovereignty, and territory, they seem a reliable theoretical basis for searching for a national identity.

Russian and other countries' experience shows that these concepts may provide both society and the political elites with some intellectual support for building a foreign policy consensus. However, as the country departs modernity and faces the challenges of postmodernity, many quasi-reliable paradigms (including realism/geopolitics) do not work.

What can easily be predicted, however, is that Russian IR debates will not stop with the reaching of a consensus on a neorealist basis. That is the starting point rather than the end of these debates. With the achievement of a certain level of socio-economic and political stability, as well as a more favorable international environment, new concepts with an emphasis on human and societal security will likely challenge collectivist and state- or nation-oriented theories. The entire landscape of the Russian IR discourse will be even more diverse in the years to come. Plurality rather than unification and consensus building will probably become the main characteristic of this discourse. A completely different set of priorities could be the focus of future IR debates: ensuring domestic stability and territorial integrity and preventing the rise of hostile powers and alliances may be replaced by concerns such as the environment, mass disease, international terrorism and narco-business, migration, the increasing vulnerability of economic and information networks, and so on.

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14 ARCTIC STUDIES IN RUSSIA[1]

Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin

Introduction

The Arctic became a subject of study in Russian IR relatively recently – in the late 2000s. Before that, the Arctic was the subject of attention mainly from the natural sciences, which studied such problems as climate change and its consequences for Arctic ecosystems, the dynamics of polar ice, the state of the permafrost, prospects for the development of natural resources in the region, conservation of biodiversity, etc. Soviet and Russian social sciences and humanities did not show much interest in the international aspects of the development of the Russian Arctic and mainly focused on the problems of its socio-economic development and the indigenous peoples of the North.

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The situation changed radically at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, when Moscow announced its return to the Arctic, and not only to its sector but also to the region as a whole. Moscow has stepped up its policy within the framework of international institutions dealing with the Arctic, including the Arctic Council and Barents-Euro-Arctic Council. Russia has made efforts to modernize its armed forces stationed in the region and severely degraded in the 1990s, and it has also increased its military presence in the Arctic, including the resumption of regular military exercises, as well as air and sea patrols.

In this regard, it was necessary to develop an international component of the Russian strategy in the Far North, including its foreign economic, diplomatic, scientific, educational, environmental, cultural, and military aspects. The Russian academic and expert communities have tried to meet this need by initiating discussions about Russian national interests in the Arctic, existing and potential threats and opportunities for international cooperation in this region, and the main directions of foreign policy and military strategy in the Far North. The Arctic problematique has firmly established itself in the research agendas of many Russian universities, academic institutes, think tanks, and public policy centers.

The research objectives of this chapter are to examine how Arctic studies are structured in Russia, which schools exist, and what the main problematique of Arctic research is. Let's start by examining how Arctic research is organized institutionally.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003257264-18

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Mapping Arctic Studies

The history of Arctic research in Russia stretches back more than a hundred years. However, as already noted, these were mostly natural science studies. The network of academic institutions engaged in Arctic international studies only began to take shape in the late 2000s. Currently, four types of organizations are engaged in international Arctic studies: 1) universities, 2) institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), 3) research institutes belonging to governmental agencies, and 4) independent think tanks and public policy centers.

Universities. Among Russian universities, St. Petersburg State University (SPSU) occupies a leading position in the field of international Arctic studies. In the works of its scholars, there is a thorough analysis of the full range of international problems of the Arctic: strategies of Arctic and non-Arctic states in the Far North; international transport corridors, including Arctic shipping; hard and soft security; international cooperation in such areas as climate change, ecology, science, education, culture, indigenous peoples, and so on.

Since 2012, SPSU has been a member of the network-type University of the Arctic (UArctic), which unites more than 200 universities and research centers in Europe, Russia, the USA, Canada, and non-Arctic states. In 2016, the 1st World Congress of the University of the Arctic was held on the basis of SPSU. In 2019, the Center for Arctic Research was established at the university, which coordinates both scholarly activities and international contacts. In 2021, the Arctic Project Office was created at SPSU to coordinate its project activities.[2]

The Northern Arctic Federal University (NArFU) (Arkhangelsk), which was established by merging several local universities in 2010–11, is another leader in IR-related Arctic studies. NArFU scholars pay special attention to problems such as the priorities of Russia's Arctic strategy, the Northern Sea Route's (NSR) development as an international transport route, international educational and scientific cooperation, etc. The UArctic Research Office was opened at NArFU in September 2011, during the second Arctic international forum The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue. Together with UArctic administrative offices located in North America and Europe, the research office at NArFU is aimed at networking and developing international cooperation.

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The following activities of the research office were identified as priorities:

- To support cooperation between Russian, European, and North American members of the UArctic
- To spread information about UArctic activities, including projects and events organized by the Russian members of the consortium
- To participate in the preparation and submission of research applications for funding from private and public funds
- To promote the integration and exchange of knowledge obtained by Russian and international researchers in the global context of the Arctic science development[3]

Since 2012, an innovative research and educational project – the Arctic Floating University (AFU) – has been implemented by the NArFU with the support of the Russian Geographical Society and the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring. The expedition/AFU takes place every summer (except 2020 because of the coronavirus pandemic). Although the AFU is mainly devoted to the natural science problematique, a number of international issues, including soft and hard security problems, are also studied within the summer university framework.[4]

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In 2013, the Arctic Center for Strategic Studies was established at NArFU, which is responsible for the coordination of Arctic research projects, the organization of the AFU on the annual basis, and publishing a bilingual professional journal, *The Arctic and the North*.[5]

The other universities and academic institutes located in Murmansk, St. Petersburg, Petrozavodsk, Ekaterinburg, Yakutsk, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, etc. conduct research on political, social, and economic problems and international cooperation and develop corresponding educational programs focused on Arctic. Most of them cooperate with the of University of the Arctic, which promotes international collaboration.

Think tanks and government institutions. The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) is a non-profit academic and diplomatic think tank that was established as a link between the state, expert community, business, and civil society. It publishes on social, economic, diplomatic, and security issues. The Valdai Discussion Club provides an international forum for more than 1,000 experts from about 71 states. Valdai's mission is to tell the world about Russian policy in Arctic along with the other topics.

The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) pays significant attention to Arctic studies. Experts from this institution are oriented on the neorealist (state-centric) vision of international politics, which stresses national interests as a first priority. The RISS was established by the president to serve as independent analytical center to provide information support to the Administration of the President, the Federation Council, the State Duma, and the Security Council as well as to government offices, ministries, and departments. The Carnegie Moscow Center, being affiliated with the Carnegie Foundation (USA), is an example of neoliberal expertise in Russia that emphasizes international cooperation in the Arctic.

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The Institute of Military History of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation publishes widely on the history of Arctic exploration during two last centuries, as well as on the modern problems of Arctic policy including defense, international shipping, building shore infrastructure, technology implementation, and sustainable development. The institute engages both military and academic experts, providing balanced and complex analysis while expertise is clearly neorealist oriented.

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Public organizations and forums. The Project Office for the Development of the Arctic has the goal of raising the knowledge of the Russian public on the Arctic, providing grant research programs, conferences, and foreign investment, as well as supporting best practices to improve living standards in the Arctic. The Russian Association of Indigenous People (RAIPON) concentrates on legal issues in the interests of indigenous peoples. RAIPON actively interacts with the Russian Parliament and ministers to prepare bills that do not infringe on the rights of aboriginal nations to improve regional policy and local self-governance instruments. RAIPON monitors the important events in AZRF and distributes expertise in media and professional journals. One important dimension of RAIPON's activity is international cooperation with different institutions, including the Arctic Council, the Saami Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Arctic Atabaskian Council, and Gwich'in Council International.

Russia's Unofficial Discourse

Based on different theoretical approaches, it is possible to identify two main paradigms in the post-Soviet Russian discourse on the Arctic: rationalist/scientific and eclectic/intuitivist. While the first paradigm is based on various scientific approaches to the discussion of Arctic issues, the second is not often bothered by any rational argumentation and prefers to simply postulate its vision of the Arctic problems. However, since both paradigms affect Russia's Arctic discourse

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and – subsequently – Moscow's decision making on regional policies, they both should be paid due attention.

The rationalist paradigm. This paradigm includes three schools with clear identities – neorealism, neoliberalism, and globalism – and numerous ones of a "hybrid" nature. Three former schools are based on classical international relations (IR) theories; the latter try to combine various research approaches in a rather pragmatic way. The "hybrid" schools, however – being sometimes rather eclectic – retain their rationalist/scientific character.

Neorealism. The neorealist Arctic doctrine is based on the assumption that the world is state centric, and, for this reason, states are key actors in international politics. In forging their Arctic strategies, the Russian neorealists prefer Kenneth Waltz's interpretation of sovereignty, which is based on the assumption that a state is sovereign when "it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments to them."[6] This approach assumes that states should be the only legitimate force of national power within their own borders.

Russian neorealism's vision of Moscow's policies in the Arctic is based on the following principles:

- "National interests" are a key category. Among them, economic and strategic interests are most important ones.
- Russia needs to ascertain her sovereignty over the Arctic territories, natural resources, and maritime routes.
- International law is mostly seen as an instrument to resist any foreign "encroachments" on Russian sovereign rights in the region and keep control over Arctic spaces, resources, and transport communications.
- A regional governance regime is only possible as a temporary compromise between the major (coastal) Arctic powers (A5) – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States.[7]

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According to the neorealist perspective, Russia's principal interest is to turn the Arctic into its main "strategic resource base," and other policy considerations should be subordinated to this overarching goal. Both Russian domestic policies in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) and Moscow's international strategy should be oriented towards the protection of its national interests in the region (Alexandrov 2009; Oreshenkov 2010; Voronkov 2012; Konyshev and Sergunin 2012). Against this background, it is especially important to secure Russia's economic interests in the Arctic.

The neorealists tend to see every Arctic problem from the national security point of view – be it ecological problems and fisheries or territorial disputes and control over sea routes. For example, the 2013 Russian Arctic strategy is partially designed in such an alarmist/securitized way by focusing on hard and soft security threats and challenges to the AZRF.[8] Even the very title of the document – "The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2020" – reflects such a securitized approach.[9]

A variety of instruments, ranging from diplomacy and international arbitration to a modest military build-up and creation of capabilities to effectively prevent poaching and smuggling, are suggested. In contrast with the neoliberals, the neorealists are quite pragmatic as regards international institutions such as the UN, the Arctic Council (AC), and the Barents-Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC). They do not believe that these international fora are the components of a global or regional governance system, whose existence is sharply denied by them. They suggest

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using these bodies first and foremost to protect Russia's national interests in the region (like other member-states do) rather than to promote some abstract universal/cosmopolitan values.

The radical version of the neorealist school views the Arctic as a manifestation of the perennial geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West. The neorealists believe that, in contrast with the past, the West prefers economic rather than military instruments for putting pressure on Russia. However, the aim of the Western policies remains expansionist and boils down to securing Russia's status as the West's "younger partner" and a source of cheap natural resources and a labor force. Contrary to what has been stated in the Russian official security doctrines about Moscow's Western partners' international behavior, the perception of the US and NATO as the main threats to Russia's security is still alive in large parts of the Russian political, military, and expert establishment. Military and diplomatic activities by the US and NATO in the High North are routinely perceived as being of an "offensive character."

Neoliberalism. The neoliberal school represents a rather radical departure from the Soviet-time Marxist-Leninist foreign policy doctrine. According to present-day Russian neoliberals, territorial sovereignty as the ordering principle for world politics has been redefined and, in some ways, transcended by networks of interaction that involve actors of many different kinds and at many different levels. The state is often a player in these networks, but it does not necessarily control them and is increasingly intertwined with them.[10]

According to the neoliberals, sovereignty is still a very important mode of power within the global polity, but it is not the only one. There is also another mode of power: namely, governmentality that orders world politics in a different way. Governmentality does not challenge or undermine sovereignty but rather steps in to give it a new form. The main challenge to international players is how to combine these two modes of power to make the world both governable and secure.

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According to this approach, the Arctic (particularly its natural resources and sea routes) is a common humankind heritage that should be exploited with other countries and in a very careful way.[11] International law and institutions should be the focus of Arctic politics and the basis of an emerging regional governance regime. The neoliberals believe that sub-regional institutions such as the AC and BEAC are parts of the global and regional governance systems and should be designed and function accordingly. For them, the AC and BEAC should avoid discussion of security issues; rather, environmental issues and the "human dimension" (indigenous people and other residents of the Arctic regions) should be their main priorities.

The proponents of the neoliberal approach point out that the military significance of the Russian North has dramatically decreased in the post–Cold War period. The region is, in their view, unable to play the role of Russian military outpost. The neoliberals hope that the Arctic will be further opened up for international cooperation to become a Russian "gateway" region that could help Russia gradually integrate into the European and world multilateral institutions. They believe that, due to its unique geo-economic location, the AZRF has a chance to be a "pilot" Russian region to be included in the regional and sub-regional cooperation. Priority should be given to the issues that unite rather than divide regional players – trade, cross-border cooperation, transport, environment, health care, Arctic research, indigenous people, people-to-people contacts, and so on. In this respect, they view the Northern Dimension partnerships as well as AC's, BEAC's, and Nordic institutions' programs as a helpful framework for such cooperation.[12]

The Northern Dimension was initially launched as an EU program for Brussels's cooperation with neighboring non-EU countries, including Russia.[13] In 2007, it was redesigned into a system of partnerships between the EU and Iceland, Norway, and Russia. In contrast with their opponents from the neorealist "camp," the proponents of the neoliberal approach believe that

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most of the Arctic problems can be solved through negotiation and compromise. The work on this technical level has a consolatory effect on the conflicting parties and creates an interdependency mechanism that contributes to the problem-solving process.

The Russian neoliberals insist on the need to develop a sound arms control regime in the High North that covers not only land but also the Arctic seas. They also suggest introducing some confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to ameliorate the regional environment and increase trust between the regional players. They stress that it is very important to guarantee that the Arctic players interact with each other on the basis of the following principles:

- Preserving peace, predictability, and stability in the Arctic region
- Ensuring sustainable management and development of natural resources
- International cooperation to meet common challenges in the Arctic
- Developing national and international legal mechanisms to promote Arctic governance

Globalism. The Russian globalists go further than neoliberals in terms of Russia's possible participation in international cooperation in the High North. They believe that globalization and regionalization are worldwide processes, and Russia cannot avoid them. According to this school, the Arctic is a place where these two tendencies are intertwined.[14] On the one hand, the Arctic is the subject of a dialogue between different regional and global players. On the other hand, there is a clear tendency to create a new international or even global region in the Arctic where Russia could find a mission of its own. The globalists think that Moscow should promote cooperative concepts and ideas of global scale and significance.

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The globalists support most of the neoliberal ideas, such as the vision of the Arctic as a humankind "asset" or "treasury," development of a governance mechanism in the region, conflict prevention and resolution on the basis of the international law, protection of indigenous peoples, climate change mitigation, sustainable development strategies, establishment of regional arms control regime and CSBMs, etc.

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Most radical globalist versions believe that an international legal regime similar to the Antarctic Treaty should be established, and a comprehensive agreement should be concluded on the Arctic to make it a "region of peace and cooperation."[15] Similar to the Antarctic legal system, a proposed new Arctic regime should prohibit any economic and military activities in the region. Only the subsistence economies of indigenous peoples of the North and research activities should be allowed in the High North. Some globalists suggest establishing a UN-based governance regime in the Arctic to replace the existing national sovereignty–oriented model.[16]

This globalist sub-school tends to ignore the fact that, for many Arctic countries (especially Russia), this region is of growing economic importance and a home for many industrial centers that produce up to 20 percent of the entire Russian GDP – even if only about 1.6 percent of the country's population lives there.[17]

"Hybrid" theories. Along with the two extremes – neorealism and neoliberalism/globalism – there are numerous "hybrid"/moderate schools in the Russian academic community. Differing in their specific theoretical postulates, these schools, however, share some common principles with regard to the existing and emerging Arctic legal system.[18]

The moderates believe that Russia should be a responsible international actor that behaves in the international arena in line with international law principles and commitments. According to this school, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); the Ilulissat Declaration (2008); AC-sponsored agreements, particularly on search and rescue (SAR) operations (2011), oil spill response (2013), and Arctic science cooperation (2017), and directions and recommendations; the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Polar Code, etc. should be the

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legal basis for Russia's Arctic strategy. On the other hand, Russia should be firm in defending its legitimate rights and national interests in the region, including the definition and expansion of the outer limits of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean, control over the maritime routes, fighting poaching and smuggling in the AZRF, modernization of the armed forces deployed in the High North, etc.

The moderates do not share the neoliberal/globalist view of the Arctic as humankind's "common treasury," and they do not believe that it is realistic to establish an Antarctic Treaty–type legal regime in the High North (even in the distant future). The moderates point out that statements that mention the Arctic's deep seabed (or Area), continental shelves, and high seas in the same breath as the common heritage of mankind carry the risk of confusion. Deliberately or not, failing to distinguish thoroughly between the different maritime zones may create the impression that the whole (marine) Arctic is considered a common heritage of mankind. However, the moderates favor creating a flexible regional governance system in the Arctic based on the pragmatic combination of hard and soft law. The moderates do not even oppose establishing some elements of supranational governance in the region, like, for example, in the case of the Central Arctic Ocean (Area), which is currently beyond the national sovereignty jurisdiction and where any economic activity – be it extraction of hydrocarbons or fishery – is presently impossible while the local environment is extremely fragile and vulnerable. For instance, under the moderates' pressure, the Russian government agreed to sign first a declaration on a fishing ban around the North Pole in 2015 and, later, a binding agreement on this issue in 2017.

Similar to the neoliberals and globalists, the moderates suggest making full use of the existing international institutions engaged in Arctic affairs – the UN (and its specialized bodies, such as the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf [CLCS], IMO, UN Environmental Program [UNEP)], etc.), AC, and BEAC. However, they do not believe that these institutions will be able to exercise real supranational governance in the region in the foreseeable future. The moderates, however, think that some institutional reforms are possible. For example, they suggest empowering the AC with more rights, including the right to conclude binding agreements (similar to the SAR's oil spills response and science cooperation documents) and further institutionalization of the council with the aim of transforming it from a discussion forum to a full-fledged international intergovernmental organization.[19]

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According to the moderates, there should be harmony between the economic, ecological, humanitarian, and military-strategic aspects of Russia's Arctic policies, which is only possible if Moscow builds its strategy on the basis of international law principles and norms.

To sum up the Russian theoretical/rationalist debate on the Arctic, it should be noted that, regardless of its strong polarization (neoliberal-neorealist/globalist dichotomy), compromise/moderate schools have emerged that formed a mainstream of the Russian foreign policy thought. This mainstream has managed to avoid xenophobic/extremist views on the Arctic international relations system and develop more or less moderate and well-balanced concepts.

Irrational/intuitivist paradigm. Along with the rationalist paradigm, there are various Russian schools that never had the ambition of adhering to the principles of rigorous science. Their views of the Arctic and Russia's role in the region quite often represent an eclectic mixture of different philosophic, historical, cultural, and even religious approaches rather than theories in the classical sense. No surprise that many of these ideological doctrines simply degenerate to wishful thinking and do not correspond to the realities of the modern world.

Hyperboreans. In ancient Greek mythology, the Hyperboreans were mythical people who lived "beyond the North Wind." The Greeks thought that Boreas, the god of the North Wind, lived in Thrace, and therefore, Hyperborea indicates a region that lies far to the north of Thrace. Later, Roman and Byzantine sources continued to change the location of Hyperborea, pointing

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to Britain, the Alps, Central Asia, the Urals, Siberia, etc. However, all these sources agreed these were all in the far north of Greece or southern Europe.

In the 19th and 20th centuries, there were numerous pseudo-academic and esoteric schools that claimed the Hyperborean origin of the Indo-European culture or believed that Hyperborea was the Golden Age polar center of civilization and spirituality. For example, the Dutch-German interwar philosopher and historian Herman Wirth placed the origins of European civilization on the mythological island of Atlantis, which he thought had been located in the North Atlantic, connecting North America and Europe. Its inhabitants supposedly were pure Aryans, influencing the cultures not just of Europeans but also of the natives of North America and the wider "Old World" beyond Europe.[20]

The Hyperborean school emerged in Russia in the early 1990s, led by Alexander Dugin, a well-known conservative philosopher and geopolitician. Following Wirth, Dugin believes that there was a continent called Atlantis or Hyperborea that gave birth to the Arians, the real heir of which is the Russian nation, not the Germans, as Wirth believed.[21] This romantic-nationalistic school believes that the Russians are modern Hyperboreans who differ from Western people with their materialistic/consumerist/individualist culture in spirituality, high moral standards, and patriotism.[22] According to this thinker, "Russia is a country of polar archetypes, the place where the ancestors came from – the founders of ancient South-Eurasian civilizations."[23]

Dugin underlines that in modern Eurasia, a new political and spiritual continent (space) Arctogeya emerges, led by Russia: "Russia traditionally fulfills the geopolitical mission of the Hyperborean, unifying force."[24] He believes that Siberia and the Far North are a modern "paradisiacal empire," fulfilling a special role:

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> [A] special role falls to the lands of Siberia. Indeed, if the centre of Tradition is located somewhere in the East, and initially it was at the North Pole, then it is Siberia that is the connecting space between these two sacral regions. This feature of the Siberian lands, perhaps, determines the specific mystery that surrounds everything connected with the history of this part of the continent.[25]

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For the "Hyperboreans," the Far North is a means of spiritual revival for Russia, a way of realizing the "cosmic destiny" of Russia, after which the growth of its influence in the world – geopolitical and spiritual – will inevitably follow.

In its perception of the Arctic problems, this school quite easily combines the spiritual-mystical interpretation of the Far North with modern geopolitical theories. Dugin himself and his followers believe that currently, the "geopolitics of territories" has been replaced by the "geopolitics of resources." Now, the "maritime" or "Atlantic" powers seek control not over the territory of the Heartland (Halford Mackinder) or Rimland (Nicholas Spykman), which includes the Arctic, but over the hydrocarbons located there.[26]

However, international competition for natural resources does not exclude the possibility of armed conflict and even war because the stakes are so high. In the struggle for these resources, Russia will inevitably confront the other coastal Arctic states. In the worst-case scenario, Russia can lose not only the Arctic shelf but also the Northern Sea Route to the "internationalization" for which the Americans are already calling.[27] Dugin believes that Russia should lead the coalition of countries that hold energy resources and should confront the expansionist plans of the "Atlanticists" by their own "Eurasian energy project," based on the principles of asymmetry.

> Russia (Eurasia) can act as an energy dispatcher in the new model of the Eurasian energy complex, offering an alternative to the Atlanticist algorithm, Dugin maintains.

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> For this, Russia has every reason – its own mineral deposits and central spatial location, which is a key for the organization of transport networks, special relations with the CIS countries, and even with some countries that are considered "rogue states" (Iran, Iraq, Libya), as well as certain skills in energy production and a serious intellectual and logistical potential. What is fatally missing is finance.[28]

The "Hyperboreans" reacted positively to the fact that, in the last decade, Russia began to pay more attention to the Arctic by implementing programs of socio-economic development, strengthening the military infrastructure in the AZRF, and actively advocating its international legal positions in the region. Dugin believes that these can be considered constructive steps toward the multipolar model of the world.[29]

Russian Orthodox neo-communists. It is interesting to note that some neo-communist thinkers were unable to avoid the temptation to develop an esoteric-mystical and messianic interpretation of Russia's mission in the Far North. For instance, the famous Russian pro-communist writer Alexander Prokhanov tends to agree with his conservative "antipode" Dugin on the existence of Russia's special historical and spiritual mission, specifically in the Arctic and – more generally – in the world.

According to the writer,

> [T]he Russians are a messianic people. The Lord created them to fulfil their universal mission. . . . The Russians got a mandate to explore and cultivate the virgin, untrodden and unsuitable for the habitation lands: permafrost, impassable swamps and thickets, the Arctic Ocean rim. For centuries, the Russians have created a unique northern civilization: paved roads, built cities, discovered mineral deposits. And today . . . [Russia] supplies half the planet with hydrocarbons and ensures the prosperity of the world machine civilization"[30]

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For Prokhanov, the Arctic is both a natural habitat for the Russian people and a space on which Russia has a chance to take historic revenge for the defeat and lost territories after the Cold War. In one of his numerous interviews, Prokhanov said:

> [T]he Russians are being pushed to the north. It's terrible, but it's not fatal because the Russians are the Nordic people, they are the people of the polar lights and the Polar Star. And we explored this Arctic from the very beginning.[31]

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Prokhanov believes that Russia's return to the Arctic can serve as a new national idea. Commenting on the expedition of Arthur Chilingarov to the North Pole in August 2007, during which one of the Russian bathyscaphes placed the Russian titanium flag on the ocean floor, the writer prophesies: "The Arctic is once again becoming a source of Russian power. . . . The long-awaited 'idea of Development,' the technocratic leap, the 'philosophy of the future' breathe in this Arctic raid."[32] Therefore, the Arctic is seen by the "Orthodox Communists" as the last defensive line, "which should not be ceded to the Western rivals. Given the Western expansion in the region."[33] In unison with the Hyperboreans, Prokhanov predicts a new war for the Arctic's re-division: "The ships are being built, military ships of the Arctic projects are being built, icebreakers are being built, new nuclear submarines are going there. . . . This is a fight for the Arctic. The war for the Arctic began."[34]

AuQ22

For the neo-communist version of imperial thinking, the Arctic Ocean is the "inner sea of Russia," in which it must reign supreme. To prevent Russia's "northern march" from drowning,

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the country should mobilize its forces and intellect and make the development of the Far North and ensuring its security top priorities of its domestic and foreign policies. "Our imperial move to the Pole will not be an easy walk," Prokhanov writes. "We are followed by America's satellites. The enemy submarines are darting in the icy waters. The diplomatic war began when the sea polynya had not yet closed in the place where the bathyscaphes submerged." However, the writer is optimistic:

> Russia is ready to rebuff – intellectually, diplomatically and militarily. . . . The Russian spirit has not dried up, the victorious nation has not forgotten its great victories. A new generation of passionaries, handymen and visionaries has come to replace the polar explorers of the past.[35]

The Russian post-positivism. Along with the imperial-messianic strands, the irrational-intuitivist paradigm includes a number of post-positivist schools, primarily social constructivism and post-colonialism.

Social constructivists consider the Arctic problems mainly through the prism of identity and how the Far North is perceived by individuals, social groups, and states. For example, the constructivists note that in the post-Soviet period, the old discourses, such as "conquering the North," "struggling with the forces of nature," and "glorification of polar explorers" are being gradually replaced by pragmatic and/or environmentally-oriented discourses: the Arctic as Russia's "strategic resource base," the need for the AZRF's sustainable development, the Arctic as a "region of peace and cooperation," etc.[36]

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According to the constructivists, these new discourses better serve the current needs of Russia's Arctic policy. The region is no longer perceived as a hostile object that should be "conquered" or the place that is unsuitable for comfortable living and where it is possible to work only on a rotational basis. The modern Russian mentality is increasingly oriented towards a careful attitude about the Arctic: the need to exploit its resources in a sustainable way, taking into account the possible negative consequences for the fragile northern ecology and the indigenous peoples' traditional way of life. Now, priority is given to the creation of comfortable and attractive conditions for working and living in the AZRF. The aim is to eliminate the psychology of a "seasonal worker," and attract and consolidate human resources in the Russian Arctic.[37] At the same time, the constructivists are interested in explaining why the imperial, nationalistic, and alarmist discourses are persistent and periodically reproduced in post-Soviet Russia during the last quarter of a century.[38] Supporters of this school consider the sustainability of confrontational stereotypes in the mentality of Russian politicians and the broad public as a serious obstacle to Russia's constructive policy in the Arctic and transformation of this area into a "region of peace and cooperation" (a concept officially declared in Moscow's Arctic doctrinal documents).

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One of the explanations for this "imperial syndrome" suggested by the constructivists is the so-called "status theory." This theory focuses on the emotional and subconscious rather than the rationalist aspects of the Russian Arctic discourse. According to this theory, the main motive of Russia's Arctic strategy is to ascertain its great power status that should be respected by other regional and global players. Russia's reluctant withdrawal from the Arctic and the overall decline in the country's international prestige in the 1990s have resulted in serious psychological trauma for both the Russian elites and society. Recovering from this trauma is painful and accompanied by the imperialist and nationalist aberrations in the public consciousness as well as by distortions and zigzags in the foreign policy course.[39] It takes some time and requires a favorable international environment for the Russian public discourse to get rid of the imperialist, revanchist, and messianic concepts and replace them with more creative and cooperative ideas.

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As for the "post-colonialists," this school is only making the first steps in Arctic studies. The theory was borrowed from the Western post-positivists. It is rather popular among indigenous peoples' organizations of Greenland, Alaska, Canada, and Northern Europe, as well as among researchers who sympathize with these ethnic groups. Following their Western "colleagues," Russian "post-colonialists" argue that the Russian Arctic is undergoing transformation from an "internal colony" to a "normal" territory.[40] According to this school, since the time of the Russian Empire, the attitude towards the Far North has been purely consumerist; the entire policy of both tsarist and Soviet Russia was aimed at the exploitation of the Arctic natural resources. The Russian/Soviet industrialists relentlessly pumped out national resources without thinking about the long-term environmental consequences. The indigenous peoples were not given due attention, and this led to their dying out, assimilation, and the loss of ethnic identity and original culture.

Only in the post-Soviet period – specifically, under the Putin administration -– have the federal center's policies begun to change. Moscow's socio-economic and ecological strategies in the AZRF are now based on the sustainable development concept, albeit largely on a declarative basis. The environmental and social consequences of the AZRF natural resources exploitation are now taken into account. The federal programs were adopted to protect the indigenous peoples' interests. However, as the "post-colonialists" emphasize, Russia still has a long way to go to get rid of the "imperial" or "colonialist syndrome" and develop an adequate policy in the Arctic region.[41]

Conclusion: Tendencies and Perspectives in Developing Arctic Studies

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The unofficial Arctic discourse is dominated by two main paradigms – rationalist and emotional/intuitivist. The rationalist discourse is inspired by ideas coming from neorealism, neoliberalism, and globalism, with their focus on thinking about the Arctic in terms of power, cooperation, and global challenges. There are numerous "hybrid" schools that try to pragmatically combine these theories in order to develop Russia's sound Arctic strategy.

The second strand of unofficial Russian thinking on the Arctic is dominated by "Hyperboreans" (led by conservative utopian thinker Alexander Dugin), "Russian Orthodox neo-communists" (Alexander Prokhanov), and post-positivists. Differences in their philosophical and ideological underpinnings notwithstanding, these three schools share a common view on the North's unique place in the Russian mentality and Moscow's "special mission" in this region.

It should be noted that there are not only differences between various Russian IR schools but also some consensus between them. For instance, they tend to agree on the growing significance of the Arctic, both for Russia and for the world at large. They also agree that Russia has to have a coherent and sound Arctic strategy that should clearly describe its national interests and policy priorities in the region, including both opportunities for and the limits of international cooperation. The Russian theorists would like to have a flexible Arctic strategy that makes a distinction between Russia's long-, mid-, and short-term goals in the region and is able to quickly adapt to change.

As a whole, the Russian discourse on the Arctic cannot be reduced to the neorealist paradigm, although it is still dominant in Russian foreign policy thinking. This discourse has gradually grown diverse and creative. Now, in terms of expertise, the Russian political leadership faces diversity rather than uniformity and has the option of choosing among different views and options. For example, Putin's decision to emphasize the soft power instruments in his Arctic policy demonstrates that not only the neorealist but also the liberal/globalist argumentation has been heard by the Kremlin.

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The emerging Russian Arctic policy consensus is based on the assumption that the Arctic cooperative agenda could include the following areas: climate change mitigation, environmental protection, emergency situations, air and maritime safety (including Polar Code implementation, charting safe maritime routes, and cartography), search and rescue operations, Arctic research, indigenous peoples, cross- and transborder cooperative projects, culture, etc.

In order to prevent potential conflicts, avoid misunderstandings, and facilitate regional cooperation, Russian decision makers and the expert community suggest that the Arctic states should be clear about their military policies and doctrines and should include arms control initiatives and confidence- and security-building measures in their bilateral or multilateral relations in the Arctic. To materialize this ambitious agenda, solid institutional support is needed. For this reason, the regional (the AC, BEAC, Nordic political and economic organizations) and global (IMO, UNEP, UN Development Program, etc.) governance institutions, which slowed down their activities in the Arctic because of the recent tensions between Russia and the West, should be revived.

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IN LIEU OF CONCLUSION

Towards a Global IR Research Agenda?

Maria Lagutina, Alexander Sergunin and Natalia Tsvetkova

Several immediate conclusions emerge from this analysis.

First, over the last 30 years, there has been a dramatic expansion of Russian international studies – both qualitatively and quantitatively. In qualitative terms, Russian IR became much more mature in the sense that it managed to shift from the Marxist-Leninist uniformity of the Soviet era to a theoretical pluralism that is favorable for a flourishing and creative intellectual atmosphere. The Russian IR was able to overcome the Cold War–era isolation and start a fruitful dialogue with the world IR community. Moreover, the quality of Russian international studies was significantly improved also due to the fact that in the post-Soviet era, Russian scholars can travel abroad to collect empirical data and discuss with their foreign partners issues of common interest. They also can invite their foreign colleagues to teach IR in Russian universities, or perform joint research, or arrange joint conferences. Opening up Russian IR to a dynamic dialogue with international academic community was really enriching and inspiring for both those researchers who make empirical studies and theory building. Needless to say, in the Cold War era, most Soviet IR specialists had never been abroad or in the countries that were the subjects of their studies. They were also deprived of communication with their foreign colleagues and had no opportunity to discuss anything in person or even via correspondence.

Russian international studies expanded in quantitative terms as well. As demonstrated in one of the chapters, in contrast to the Soviet time, when IR research was done mostly in Moscow and a very limited number of large cities, now international studies prosper in numerous Russian regional centers, trying to effectively compete with the Moscow-based academic institutions. The volume of IR scholarly production (articles, books) has increased several times over that of the Soviet time. Moreover, Russian IR specialists now are being published extensively by prestigious international journals and publishing houses, which was simply impossible in the recent past.

There have also been significant changes in Russian international studies' institutional/organizational structure. Now, Russian universities play a leading role in IR research, although the Russian Academy of Sciences still retains strong positions in some fields: for instance, area studies. The so-called ministerial and other government-directed research centers became more active in international studies, although they prefer to focus on empirical/applied research. Finally, new actors such as independent think tanks and public policy centers emerged in the post-Soviet era. Some of them (e.g., Valdai Club) even managed to influence the governmental decision-making process.

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DOI: 10.4324/9781003257264-34

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One of the most fundamental questions this handbook has tried to address, which is a serious challenge for the present-day Russia's IR community, is whether or not a specific Russian IR school exists. More specifically, the question is whether it is necessary to create a Russian theory of IR at all, or we can limit ourselves to borrowing Western and non-Western theories?

On the one hand, there is a group of scholars (for example, Andrei Makarychev, Vyacheslav Morozov,[1] Maria Omelicheva, and Lidiya Zubytska) who have some doubts about the existence of a Russian school of IR: "[T]here is still not a Russian national school of IR with a distinct set of concepts and theories, research methods, and meta-theoretical standards for assessing legitimate contribution to the IR knowledge."[2] They believe that Russian international studies have not gone beyond Western paradigms. Besides that, this group of scholars points out that "it retains a highly ideological and relativist character that limits its global appeal," and "Russia's theoretical perspective have been shaped, by and large, by political rather than academic considerations."[3] All this creates serious obstacles to the formation of a Russian school of IR and limits possible contribution of Russian international studies to global IR.

In our opinion, such a skeptical attitude towards Russian international studies is due to a number of specific circumstances in the development of IR in modern Russia. One of them is the problem of so-called "Moscow-centrism," which is mainly a legacy of the Soviet past, when Moscow institutes were the de facto only center of Soviet/Russian IR: first of all, Russia's oldest IR institutes – IMEMO and MGIMO. Despite the emergence of both new Moscow and regional centers for the study of IR in the post-Soviet period, Moscow, in many respects, continues to maintain a certain expert monopoly in the field of IR (including financial). This largely explains the strong influence of the official position of the Russian leadership on the development of Russia's international studies. Nevertheless, regional centers of international studies (in St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Yekaterinburg, Vladivostok, etc.) have formed in Russia, whose representatives adhere to a more academic approach in their research. However, the limited institutional and often financial capabilities of the regions lead to the fact that the results of research by representatives of "regional schools" are not in wide demand, either in Russia or abroad.

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On the other hand, there is a group of Russian researchers who believe that it is possible to say that the Russian school of IR has been formed (among them Andrei P. Tsygankov, Pavel A. Tsygankov, Marina Lebedeva, Alexander Sergunin, etc.). They suppose that, for 30 years, Russian IR scholars not only accommodated Western theories to the needs of Russian academic and political circles but have also proposed and developed a number of original approaches and concepts in understanding Russia's foreign policy and world politics (see, Part Two and Part Three of this volume). They point out that Russia has a rich historical heritage of theoretical knowledge (Russian political thought and philosophy),[4] which can form the basis for the modern Russian school of IR. The current stage of Russian IR studies development could be described as a synthesis of the so-called "paradigmatic pluralism" and attempts to outline the specifics of Russian IR theory. The current research agenda of Russia's international studies is pretty wide and includes different aspects of global development, as presented in Part Four.

Probably a compromise between these two extreme approaches can be reached by not focusing on the "either/or" principle (either special/original Russian IR school or copying foreign IR theories); instead, the emphasis can be placed on the integration of Russian international studies into the global intellectual process.

Today, we are witnessing a new great theoretical debate in international studies: a debate between supporters of Western centrism in the theory of IR and its critics, who advocate overcoming Western dominance in modern international studies. We are talking about the idea of global international relations (global IR), the purpose of which is to overcome "the divide

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between the West and the Rest."[5] The idea was proposed by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan.[6] This approach proposes rethinking the world experience from the standpoint of world history and regional and civilizational diversity. Acharya points out six main dimensions of global IR:

> [C]ommitment to pluralistic universalism, grounding in world history, redefining existing IR theories and methods and building new ones from societies hitherto ignored as sources of IR knowledge, integrating the study of regions and regionalisms into the central concerns of IR, avoiding ethnocentrism and exceptionalism irrespective of source and form, and recognizing a broader conception of agency with material and ideational elements that includes resistance, normative action, and local constructions of global order.[7]

In other words, the idea is that a modern theory of IR should take into account the experience of the development of both the Western and non-Western worlds and consider the approaches of representatives of different national schools of international studies. The idea of global IR caused serious discussions in the international scientific community and put on the agenda a number of important conceptual and theoretical issues,[8] but a more important consequence is the intensification of the efforts of representatives of different countries and regions to create their own "national schools" of international studies. In this context, the discussions about the Russian school of international studies have been updated.

At this stage, there are no active discussions in the Russian academic community about global IR itself; Russian experts rarely use this term in academic publications in Russian. "Global IR theory" as a term is used in the English-language scientific discourse published by Russian scholars.[9] However, today in Russia, there is a high degree of interest in non-Western IR theory,[10] including in the context of discussions about the "identity" of the Russian IR school itself (Western or non-Western). It is obvious that the Russian school of IR can develop fruitfully only in the process of active dialogue with Western and non-Western colleagues. Russia, as a country at the crossroads of West and East, global North and global South, still has special opportunities for an academic dialogue. Russia is able to speak on behalf of both the center and peripheral parts of the world, thereby becoming an important voice in the global discussion.

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The Routledge Handbook of Russian International Relations Studies tried to provide a contribution to the discussion of non-Western IR theory and global IR by offering an overview of various intellectual traditions in Russia's international studies and key IR paradigms in the post-Soviet era. Besides a comprehensive analysis of various aspects of Russian international studies, the contributors to this handbook try to identify the place and role of Russian international studies in global IR.

Notes

1 Andrey Makarychev and Viatcheslav Morozov, "Is 'Non-Western Theory' Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR," *International Studies Review* 15, no. 3 (September 2013): 328–350.
2 Maria Y. Omelicheva and Lidiya Zubitska, "An Unending Quest for Russia's Place in the World: The Discursive Co-evolution of the Study and Practice of International Relations in Russia," *New Perspectives* 24, no. 1 (2016): 41.
3 Ibid., 20–21.
4 Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov, "Russian IR Theory: The Crisis of a Globally Pluralist Discipline," *ERIS* 1, no. 2 (2014): 9–17.

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5 Amitav Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): 647, https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12171.

6 See, e.g., ibid., 647–659; A. Acharya, "Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (2016): 4–15, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv016; A. Acharya and B. Buzan, "Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years On," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 17, no. 3 (2017): 341–370, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcx006; A. Acharya and B. Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations. Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108647670.

7 Amitav Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): 647, https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12171.

8 Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov, "The Global and the Nationally Distinctive in IR Theory," *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations* 22, no. 1 (2022): 9.

9 В основном это работы Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov: Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov, "Russian IR Theory: The Crisis of a Globally-Pluralist Discipline," *ERIS* 1, no. 2 (2014): 9–17; Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov, "The Global and the Nationally Distinctive in IR Theory," *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations* 22, no. 1 (2022): 7–16.

10 A. D. Voskressenski, *Non-Western Theories of International Relations: Conceptualizing World Regional Studies* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); T. A. Alekseeva, " 'The West' and 'Non-West' in the Space of International Relations Theory," *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations* 17, no. 2 (2017): 217–232; M. M. Lebedeva, "Non-Western Theories of International Relations: Myth or Reality?" *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations* 17, no. 2 (2017): 246–256; D. A. Degterev, "Non-Western Theories of Development in the Global Capitalism Era," *Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya* 65, no. 4 (2021): 113–122; M. M. Lebedeva, "Non-Western Theories of International Relations: Myth or Reality?" *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations* 17, no. 2 (2017): 246–256.

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