



## Revolutionary Russia

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: [www.tandfonline.com/journals/frvr20](http://www.tandfonline.com/journals/frvr20)

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To cite this article: Mikhail N. Loukianov (2023) Toward a Constitutional Monarchy or a Dictatorship? The Progressive Nationalists, the Far Right, and the Monarchy, July 1914–February 1917, *Revolutionary Russia*, 36:2, 254-275, DOI: [10.1080/09546545.2024.2302219](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2024.2302219)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2024.2302219>



Published online: 18 Jan 2024.



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## TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY OR A DICTATORSHIP? THE PROGRESSIVE NATIONALISTS, THE FAR RIGHT, AND THE MONARCHY, JULY 1914–FEBRUARY 1917

*The advocates of opposing versions of Russian conservatism during the First World War, Progressive Nationalism and the Far Right, saw the tsar's figure as a symbolic expression of state power, and not its real carrier. Instead, state power was seen as being in the hands of the government, which could be either supported or opposed, depending upon its policies. The conservatives' participation in public politics influenced their political creed. They embraced the idea of a limitation of the monarch's influence in making political decisions, transferring the major role in this process to public officials, which were considered autonomous political figures in spite of their appointment by the tsar.*

The swift disappearance of the Russian monarchy made a strong impression on contemporaries. Vasilii Rozanov reacted to the fall of the tsar by the famous phrase, 'Rus' faded away in two days. At the most three'.<sup>1</sup> And N.N. Sukhanov stressed, 'The tsarist regime remained without any support and hope before the formal liquidation of the Romanovs'.<sup>2</sup>

Soviet and Western academics' explanations of this phenomenon complemented each other. While Soviet historians connected the downfall of the monarchy with the activities of the working class movement, their western colleagues stressed the role of Liberal politicians.<sup>3</sup> In the post-Soviet era, Russia's historians have concentrated on the conflicts between Liberals and the government, so the interpretations of the causes of the Revolution in Russian and Western historiography have come closer.<sup>4</sup> Then, both Russian and Western academics turned to the evolution of mass consciousness as a source of political troubles. The attempts to gain mass support with the help of propaganda led to unexpected results. Eric Lohr and William Fuller demonstrated how anti-German hysteria, inflamed by patriotic mobilization, discredited a Romanov dynasty with kinship ties to German rulers.<sup>5</sup> B. I. Kolonitskii showed that intense monarchic propaganda paradoxically led to the loss of face for the tsar – the mistakes in representations of the royal family compromised the monarchy in the eyes of the common people.<sup>6</sup>

Historians have paid much less attention to conservatives, who occupied the political space between Progressive Nationalists and the Far Right. Their evident unwillingness to fight for the monarchy was explained by moderate conservatives becoming Liberals, or (in the case of the Far Right) by unfortunate circumstances and subjective failures.<sup>6</sup> But an important point is that during the war the conservative's attitude toward the monarchy changed significantly. The war strengthened their criticism of Russian realities, which had appeared long before the war started.<sup>7</sup> As a result, the old order lost the support of those who had backed it. Matthew Rendle correctly states that 'the comprehensive collapse of tsarism by early March cannot be solely attributed to popular unrest. A crucial factor in determining the quick success of the revolution was the rejection of autocracy by elites'.<sup>8</sup>

It is worth noting that the Progressive Nationalists, the most moderate conservatives who were also willing to compromise with conservative Liberals as well as the Far Right, refused to defend Nicholas II. The Progressive Nationalists, members of the Progressive bloc were in favour of the 'Ministry of Trust' (the government based on the support of public opinion), represented one more step toward a constitutional monarchy. The Far Right, the Progressive Nationalists' irreconcilable opponents, did not attempt to defend the emperor either. As Iu. I. Kir'anov wrote,

There was not even a single mass action by the Right to save the autocracy. The parties of the Right became an amorphous union who gave up their positions that they had been fighting for the last ten to twelve years.<sup>9</sup>

This article analyses changes in the rhetoric of these two opposing versions of Russian conservatism- – Progressive Nationalism and the Far Right – during the war to define how conservatives' attitude to the monarchy and the monarch evolved.

## **The Russian conservatives and the monarchy on the eve of the war**

Before the war, Russia's conservatives of all kinds stated that the all-powerful monarchy was the cornerstone of the Russian political structure. The maintenance of the monarchy became the main claim of conservative political organizations that came into being during the 1905 Revolution. During the Revolution of 1905 future conservative opponents shared the same political niche heading provincial antirevolutionary political unions. The future Chair of the Progressive Nationalist Faction V.A. Bobrinskii, became the leader of the Tula Union for the Tsar and the Order, while his main opponent in the Duma during the First World War, N.E. Markov, headed the Kursk Popular Party of Order.<sup>10</sup> During and after the Revolution of 1905, conservatives looked at a strong monarchy as at the most essential element of the Russian political system. This opinion was shared both by those who accepted the possibility of political democratization, and those who rejected the changes provided by the Fundamental Laws of the April 23, 1906, and dreamt of returning to 'pure' autocratic rule.

The columnist of *Novoe vremia*, one of the leaders of the All-Russia Nationalist Union M.O. Men'shikov, declared the monarchy to be the basis of state order in Russia. Insisting on the necessity of representative institutions, he stated that the monarchy cemented the Russian state. 'Strengthening the S[tate] Duma and S[tate] Council

and before strengthening them it is necessary to strengthen by all possible means the monarchy as the main root of the statehood.<sup>11</sup>

M. M. Perovskii-Petrovo-Solovovo, suggested organizing The Independent Conservative Party (*Partiia Nezavisimyykh Konservatorov*), as the Russian counterpart of the British Conservative party, which would be moderate and able to adapt to changes. At the same time he thought that the monarchy was absolutely necessary for Russia. Admitting the growing rights of the State Duma and even women's suffrage, Perovskii-Petrovo-Solovovo characterized the projected political formation as 'strikingly monarchical' (*iarko-monarchicheskaia*).<sup>12</sup> The ideologist of the national-democratic Imperial People's Party, I.I. von Zek, came out in favour of 'democratic tsardom' (*demokraticeskoe tsarstvo*).<sup>13</sup> According to the main conservative authority in state law, Novorossiisk University professor P.I. Kazanskii, the new version of the Fundamental Laws, like the previous one, attached the key importance in state order to the crown. From his point of view, the autocracy continued to exist even after the adoption of the new Fundamental Laws. 'One cannot find any differences between the descriptions of the Emperor's prerogative in the old and new Fundamental Laws. Both the latter and the former state, that the Emperor owns absolute power'.<sup>14</sup>

The well-known conservative ideologist and editor of *Moskovskie vedomosti* L.A. Tikhomirov, found it possible to return the old description of the tsar's power to the Fundamental Laws, 'The Emperor of all Russia is the autocratic and unrestricted monarch. Obedience to this power, not only out of fear but for the sake of conscience is ordained by God himself' (*ne za strakh, a za sovest' sam Bog povelevaet*).<sup>15</sup> Tikhomirov suggested introducing two paths to make laws: the ordinary (through the State Duma and State Council), and the extraordinary (by the tsar himself). The Fundamental Laws were to be supplemented with the formula that 'no one new law might be adopted and or abolished by any other way, except by the highest command of the emperor'.<sup>16</sup>

The members of the Duma Right Faction supported the idea of the fundamental importance of the monarchy for Russian politics. Entering the Duma on the basis of the popular vote, they declared themselves servants of the tsar, and not of the voters. As G.A. Shechkov remarked, 'We recognize over us not the mutinous (*mnogomiatezhnuiu*) will of the people, but only the will of the Orthodox tsar, established by God, representing not the historical popular will but something more important – the historical conscience of the people'.<sup>17</sup> K.N. Paskhalov, the influential ideologist of the extra-parliamentary Right, went even further.<sup>18</sup> From his point of view, the Russian political system included irreconcilable institutions – the autocracy and the legislative representative chambers. The way out was to return the absolute power to the autocrat, absolving him from any limitations. 'The autocracy is, in its essence, the representation of the Supreme will of the monarch limited by nothing, to choose the decisions, which he finds the most completely adequate to the benefits of the state', Paskhalov wrote in his conceptual article in *Moskovskie vedomosti* at the beginning of July 1914.<sup>19</sup>

At the same time, many advocates for strengthening the tsar's authority in the management of the state and legislature had serious doubts whether Nicholas II could use his power properly. The positive view of the autocracy often was combined with a derogatory opinion about the autocrat. For self-evident reasons people restricted these views to either personal diaries or private correspondence destined for no one else's eyes. B.V. Nikol'skii stated in his talk with the emperor on 3 April 1905, 'Whether Russia would exist or not and whether the Autocracy would exist or not,

this is one and the same [question]'.<sup>20</sup> Soon after, he remarked, 'I believe that the tsar is organically unteachable. He is worse than lacking talents. He is – God forgive me – a complete nobody'.<sup>21</sup> Another conservative, A.A. Kireev, who was a neoslavophile writer and a courtier intimately familiar with Nicholas II, expressed in a personal letter to the tsar on the day of the coup d'état of 3 June the hope that the tsar would return the country to 'its authentic autocratic-consultative order (*samoderzhavno-soveshchatel'nomu stroiu*)'.<sup>22</sup> A year and a half later he stressed the inability of the monarch to act properly. 'The sovereign, who still (*en dernier resort*) is the supreme ruler of affairs is so unstable, that he cannot be relied upon'.<sup>23</sup> Tikhomirov, who in his diary often compared Nicolas II with Alexander III, directly contrasted the former with the latter.

It is impossible to invent anything more contradictory! At the beginning of the new reign the throne was occupied by 'the Russian intellectual', not of the revolutionary type, of course, but of the 'liberal', weak, loose, 'beautiful-hearted' type, who did not understand the natural laws of life.<sup>24</sup>

M. M. Andronikov, who was well-informed about the mood of the conservative milieu, pointed to the paradoxical connection between the positive attitude to the autocracy and the negative one to the autocrat.

While the revolutionaries from 'the left' cry, 'down with the autocracy', without touching the monarch in person, the revolutionaries from 'the right' try to save and strengthen the autocracy according to their model even if it would lead to sacrificing the real sovereign personally.<sup>25</sup>

## The monarch as the personification of 'Sacred Unity'

Regardless of what the champions of the monarchy thought about the tsar before the war, the start of the war brought the tsar to the centre of patriotic mobilization. Alluding to him became the equivalent of a general patriotic manifestation.<sup>26</sup> The Nationalist *Novoe vremia* stated, 'the Russian land is waiting for terrible trials, but they do not scare us while the unity between the tsar's spirit and the people is alive. It pulled the Russian state out of the long chain of disasters. It will pull us out of it now'.<sup>27</sup> *Kolokol*, which expressed the views of conservatives and was close to the Orthodox Church, urged, 'All power and life are for the tsar. (*vse sily i zhizn' – za tsaria*)'.<sup>28</sup> The Far Right *Russkoe znamia* stressed the unity of the tsar and the people, 'the tsar and his people have embraced each other and remain in this embrace before the great motherland'.<sup>29</sup>

Once the war started, private utterances concerning Nicholas II became more loyal and sympathetic. Several days before the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia expired, Nikol'skii was afraid that the tsar would try to avoid joining the fight. 'A war is brewing. I am only afraid of our adored colonel. He is the main danger' (*Vidimo, voina nazrevaet. Ia boius' tol'ko nashego obozhaemogo polkovinka. V nem – glavnaia opasnost'*).<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless these fears soon dissipated. Nikol'skii called the tsar's Manifesto declaring war and his speech to the members of the State Duma and the State Council

'decent'.<sup>31</sup> In Tikhomirov's diary the first negative words about Nicholas appeared only on 31 August 1914.<sup>32</sup> It might be added that between August 1914 and January 1915, the censors detected no negative comments about the monarch in the perflustrated correspondence of conservatives.<sup>33</sup>

During the first year of the war, the conservatives on the whole tended to safeguard the Russian 'Sacred Unity' aimed at securing social and political unity for the sake of victory over the enemy in the war. From the start, there were certain disagreements about how to construct this unity. More moderate elements leaned toward building political compromise between conservatives and Liberals, and consensus between society and the state. 'The government could not to wage this war without the support of the country and of the people', the member of the Nationalist Duma faction A.I. Savenko wrote in the beginning of February 1915.<sup>34</sup>

*Russkoe znamia* interpreted the role of the monarchy differently. In a lead article published shortly before the opening of the three-day session of the State Duma and the State Council in January 1915, it recommended that the tsar follow a hard line, rather than a policy of concession and agreement. 'Compromises with the opposition only weaken authority'.<sup>35</sup> The tsar's government should carry out his will and control the country with a firm hand. The forces of society are a valuable aid, but only if they are in the hands of an experienced high official.<sup>36</sup> Without leadership from the state, previous national conflicts could re-emerge and disrupt the union between the monarch and his subjects.

The emerging trend in society ought not to be looked at as something self-sufficient. It is to be infused into state-wide activities. ... Otherwise, the old paths of confusion and disorder open back up and the durable and broad unity of the tsar and people via the Sovereign's government will disappear.<sup>37</sup>

The members of the Duma Right actively supported this approach. As early as June 1914, the semi-official organ of the Duma Right *Zemshchina* suggested that the government avoid summoning the legislative chambers and take necessary steps, including the introduction of new taxes, on its own initiative.<sup>38</sup> The State Duma was seen as an important, but supplementary communication channel between authority and the population. On the eve of the session of the legislative chambers in January 1915, N.E. Markov said the Duma must help the government in every way.<sup>39</sup> The common opinion about the necessity of reconstruction of the entire inner politics, making the will from above its main instrument formed the basis of the convergence of the Duma and Extra-Duma Right. In Autumn 1914 *Russkoe znamia* called Markov and his colleagues 'margarine' (*margarinovye*, i.e. false) monarchists, but by 1915 such characterizations disappeared from the newspaper's pages.

While recommending strict centralized control over all orders, the adherents of the hard line still doubted the abilities of Nicholas II to adhere to it. When the initial wave of sympathy to the monarchy subsided, the critical mood returned to Nikol'skii's and Tikhomirov's diaries. 'What a disaster with this Tsar!', Nikol'skii lamented on 25 August 1914.<sup>40</sup> A week later Tikhomirov remarked how the tsar being far from the frontline was a grave political mistake.<sup>41</sup> At the end of 1914, Tikhomirov came to a broader conclusion, 'and the tsar in the German war leads me directly to dark thoughts. What an incomprehensible reign. Not a single bright spot and all that

begins, fails'.<sup>42</sup> This mood grew even darker in summer 1915. Tikhomirov stressed that even people sympathetic to the tsar did not look at him as a saviour of the Fatherland. 'The Tsar is loved and sympathised. This is fact. . . . But the idea of him someone able to help Russia seems to have almost disappeared. His weakness has been shown to be even greater'.<sup>43</sup> Some days later, the author returned to that subject. 'One feels pain and pity for him. He is like a martyr. Of course, people sympathise with him and love him. But is this necessary during such a trial for the country?'<sup>44</sup> Other conservatives shared Tikhomirov's scepticism of the tsar's personal role in the war efforts. The conservative writer and politician D.A. Khomiakov stated ironically,

In addition to our misfortunes there is one more unpleasant piece of information about the arrival of the Sovereign to the army. He always brings evil with his trips; what's the use of riding this time. It would be better if he sat at home until the end of the war and then celebrated its results.<sup>45</sup>

The most important reason for the dissatisfaction with the monarch was the reconstruction of the government in June and beginning of July 1915. Though three new ministers belonged to the Right (A.D. Samarin, A.A. Khvostov, and A.A. Polivanov) and one to the Right Centre (N.B. Shcherbatov) of the State Council, the appointments drew disfavour from the right.<sup>46</sup> The dismissal of the N.A. Maklakov, the Minister of Interior, who openly patronized rightist politicians caused special discontent. 'The removal of Maklakov makes a murderous and nasty impression (*ubiistnenno-gadkoe vpechatlenie*)', Nikol'skii wrote in his diary.<sup>47</sup> The follower of Dubrovin, Academician A.I. Sobolevskii, found what was happening was akin to the beginning of the P.D. Svyatopolk-Mirskii's, 'Spring', i.e. the liberal policy of the government on the eve of the Revolution of 1905.<sup>48</sup>

The State Council's Right connected the revolving door of ministers with the tsar's desire to placate the Liberals in the Duma and Council. 'Now it is rather unlikely that the behaviour of the legislative chambers will be worrisome, because of their common satisfaction in beating (*izbievaniem*) of the high official'.<sup>49</sup> Sometime later he expressed his concern, that 'now the next step is [...] the introduction of parliamentarianism with the ministers responsible to it'.<sup>50</sup> According to Nikol'skii, the tsar and not the Liberal bureaucrats who opposed Maklakov was the main cause of all that happened. 'The whole trouble is not with those Molchalins, but with the beloved colonel [i.e. Nicholas II]'.<sup>51</sup>

At the beginning of the new session of the State Duma and State Council the latent conflict between those conservatives who relied on compromise and political dialogue and their opponents who trusted the strength of the order, came to the surface. V.A. Bobrinskii, one of the leaders of the Nationalists (and later chair of the faction of Progressive Nationalists) addressed the State Duma on 19 June 1915. He stated that it was not the Duma's duty to back the government unconditionally. The ministers had to deserve its support. He pledged to back the government only if 'we would be sure that the government really would be confident, and willing and able to move forward for the Russian society and Russian people as a whole'.<sup>52</sup> On the same day, the head of the Right Group of the State Council P.N. Durnovo declared the opposite: the key to the problems lied not in the search for political consensus, but in the rigorous implementation of commands from above.

It is still possible and indeed necessary to give orders in Russia, and the Russian Sovereign can order everything that his supreme judgement deems helpful and necessary for his people, and no one, either illiterate or literate, dare not disobey him. Everyone will obey not only the tsar, but everyone authorized by him as well.<sup>53</sup>

At the end of the first year of the war, two opposing strategies of patriotic mobilization among the conservatives emerged. One of them stressed political consensus and the dialogue between state and society, and the other the force of command from above and readiness to obey from below. In the first case, the tsar above served as a *symbol* of unity of all social and national groups of the Empire, but in practice, was to be managed by the government. In the second case, the tsar became the highest political leader who was responsible for all important political decisions. The development of these approaches escalated the conflict between them, split the conservatives and formed contradictory visions of the necessary changes in the political system.

### **The Progressive Nationalists: from the dualist to the constitutional monarchy**

The adherents of the political consensus dominated among the conservatives at the beginning of the new session of the legislative chambers. Even the Right supported the formula of procedure moved by Bobrinskii with the famous phrase ‘only the tight union between the country and the government enjoying the complete trust of the former could lead to a quick victory’.<sup>54</sup> But, in the beginning of August the situation changed. The Nationalist Faction split, and its left flank formed a coalition with Liberals.<sup>55</sup> The result of these manoeuvres was the emergence of the Progressive bloc with its demand of the Ministry of Trust. Thus, the Nationalists, who joined the bloc, spoke in favour of transforming of the dualist monarchy into a constitutional one.<sup>56</sup>

The leaders of the new faction rejected accusations from the right that they betrayed their ideals and stated that despite the coalition with Liberals they remained conservatives. V.V. Shul’gin, the editor of *Kievlianin* which became the semi-official organ of the Progressive Nationalists, interpreted the new political configuration in such words, ‘Now we are facing the union of the Liberal part of society with its conservative part’.<sup>57</sup> He argued that ‘people who were not less conservative, and probably much more conservative than the government itself’ took part in the drafting of the bloc’s programme.<sup>58</sup> Savenko explained the necessity of a coalition with Liberals to avoid the ‘catastrophic left turn’ after the war.<sup>59</sup> The Progressive Nationalists consistently emphasized their commitment to the monarchy up to February 1917. Describing the tsar’s visit to the State Duma on 9 February 1916, the lead article in *Kievlianin* placed the monarch higher than the representative institution and expressed confidence that ‘the tsar’s visit will come down like the Lord’s blessing on the labours of the representatives of the people’.<sup>60</sup> Even in late Autumn 1916, Progressive Nationalists continued to portray themselves as authentic monarchists. The editor of *Kievlianin* reminded readers about the members of the opposition’s service to the tsar during the Revolution of 1905 and maintained that they remained loyal to him during the Great War. As evidence he referred to



speeches full of deep patriotism and loyalty from the first word to the last, pronounced by Rodzianko, Shul'gin, and other deputies devoted to the throne . . . , who in those memorable years of 1905-06 along with Russian citizens who shared the same feelings safeguarded the century-old pillars of Russia.<sup>61</sup>

Describing their attitude towards the government, the Progressive Nationalists stressed their conservative identity and commitment to a strong executive power. Interpreting the position of the newly formed Progressive bloc as the position of the whole Duma, *Kievlianin* argued that it did not pretend to control the government. 'It [The Duma] knows that the government must rule the country, so it desires that the helm of the state be managed by the government, strong willed, active, and powerful with public confidence'.<sup>62</sup> The aim was to provide the government with public support, 'so that a unified government extend a hand to a unified country'.<sup>63</sup> The leaders of the Progressive Nationalists saw in the cooperation between the government and the representative institutions the evidence of its strength. In February 1916, Savenko declared that a government lacking parliamentary support could not be considered strong.<sup>64</sup> *Kievlianin* complained about 'the disconnect between state and society, which stemmed from the state's misplaced fear of society as something harmful and dangerous'.<sup>65</sup> So the Ministry of Trust was seen not as a government controlled by representative institutions, but as a government connected with society through the mediation of parliamentarians.

Even this very limited interpretation of the central claim of the Progressive bloc did not find an understanding in the government circles. The Progressive Nationalists responded by demanding the Stürmer ministry's removal. At the beginning of the new Duma session, Shul'gin asserted the duty of the Duma majority to call for the resignation of the government.<sup>66</sup> It is revealing, however that even the participation in the 'Assault on Power' was coupled with monarchic rhetoric. On 19 January 1916, Bobrinskii declared in a long speech that his loyalty to the sovereign made him fight with ministers appointed by the tsar. According to Bobrinskii, his attacks on the government stemmed from his devotion to the throne. The speaker stated that in spite of the accusations of the Right he and his colleagues always sought collaboration with the ministers. Bobrinskii insisted that the monarch wanted concerted action of the government and the representative bodies, too.

The sovereign prescribed or ordered the government to work in concert with the forces of society, which would try their best to defend the country. You know that the chair of the Council of Ministers remained deaf to this command of his sovereign.[...]. He did not want to see in us, representatives of the people, loyal subjects of the tsar and motherland, and he wanted us to become serfs of the servile government. We refused.

And though the Duma tried to find common ground with Goremykin's, and then with Stürmer's government, it could not succeed. When Nicholas II became convinced that collaboration of the Ministers with Duma was impossible, he took the latter's side. 'The tsar heard the voice of the country and Stürmer is not on this . . . bench'.<sup>67</sup> He followed: 'The Sovereign needs loyal subjects, and not serfs, the monarchists must remember that'.<sup>68</sup> Thus, the conservatives, who entered the Progressive bloc, tried to look more committed to the monarchy than the opponents from the Right.

Up to the dissolution of the Duma in February 1917, the Progressive Nationalists stressed the intent of the Duma majority to come to terms with the ministry. In December 1916, Savenko wrote in a private letter that ‘the government finds itself to be terribly lonely (*pravitel'stvo okazyvaetsia uzhasaiushche odinoko*)’.<sup>69</sup> And several days before the beginning of the February Revolution, Shul'gin expressed fear that the desire of the Minister of Agriculture A.A. Rittikh to earn the confidence of the population might lead to his dismissal.<sup>70</sup>

The formation of the Progressive bloc heightened conflicts among the Duma Right, which became clear during the first year of the war. Parallel to the rapprochement of Markov and Dubrovin, another pillar of the Duma Right V.M. Purishkevich drifted leftward. He ceased anti-Liberal rhetoric and personal attacks on P.N. Miliukov and became more positive toward the Liberals and their leader.<sup>71</sup> Soon after the bloc's emergence, Purishkevich seconded the claim to the cooperation of the state and public organizations.<sup>72</sup> In a speech before the Duma in February 1916 he argued that political compromise would be the crucial factor for political stability in the country after the war.<sup>73</sup> Purishkevich made his famous speech of 19 November 1916 immediately before Bobrinskii's speech quoted above. In fact, the rightist formulated some points which were then developed by the leader of the Progressive Nationalists. Stressing his loyalty to the throne, the speaker refused to equate loyalty to the monarch with support of the government and insisted on the necessity of mutual understanding and cooperation between the authorities and society.<sup>74</sup> His long held associate Markov was highly critical of Purishkevich's evolution and labelled him a ‘newly-born progressive’ (*novoiavlennym progressistom*),<sup>75</sup> but the majority of the Duma Right supported Purishkevich. As a result, the major part of the faction left it and organized a new political group – The Faction of the Independent Right, which joined the bloc on the eve of the February events.<sup>76</sup>

During the First World War, the rhetoric of moderate groups of Russian conservatives changed. They suggested basing the government on an agreement between the tsar and the majority in the parliament. The demand for the Ministry of Trust limited the monarch in his choice of ministers and suggested negotiating a programme of the government with the parliamentary majority. Though the construction of the Ministry of Trust did not mean the creation of a constitutional monarchy, its emergence would limit the emperor's executive power and become an important step in this direction.

### **The far right: from the dualist monarchy to the dictatorship**

The main opponents of the Progressive Nationalists, the Far Right, changed their views on the monarchy, too. They were driven not so much by the need to adapt to new circumstances, as by their growing disappointment with the monarch himself. While opposing the attack on the tsar's prerogative, many of them still doubted whether he could exercise it properly. Before the negative reaction to the reconstruction of the government on the eve of the summer session of the State Duma and State Council could calm down, a new wave of criticism against the tsar emerged.

First, the tsar was blamed for being unable to distinguish between reliable individuals and hidden enemies of the autocracy. At the end of June this was the key argument for Nikol'skii and the former minister Maklakov, who after his resignation became a

notable person in the Right Group in the State Council.<sup>77</sup> Then, the tsar was directly accused of being unwilling to support the Right. In the beginning of August 1915, the noble leader A.K. Varzhenevskii wrote about ‘the leftist bias of the central person himself [the tsar]’, who ‘now ... did not need the Right’.<sup>78</sup> The doubts helped to explain the negative reaction to the tsar’s decision to become the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Such a step, which expanded the powers of the sovereign, should have received support from the champions of autocracy. Nevertheless, neither Nikol’skii, nor Tikhomirov approved the decision on the grounds that it would not make a positive impression on the army.<sup>79</sup> According to Sobolevskii, the tsar’s promotion made the situation worse. ‘Relieving command of the Great Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich brought a deadly panic from society, which will certainly lead to negative consequences’.<sup>80</sup>

The monarchists looked at the tsar as the target of political pressure and wanted to counterbalance pressure from the left by applying it from the right. In the end of August 1915, the Right organized a large assembly in Saratov, which became the prelude for two Right conventions held at the end of November in Petrograd and Nizhnii Novgorod.<sup>81</sup> ‘All or several monarchist organizations must approach the TSAR with objections to the reassurances of the leftists that the “country” demands the Ministers responsible to the St.[ate] Duma – i. e. a coup d’etat’, Paskhalov wrote soon after the assembly in Saratov.<sup>82</sup> Opposing the Progressive bloc, the Far Right presented itself as the defenders of the status quo and blamed their opponents for planning to revise the Fundamental Laws by limiting the emperor’s powers.

The resolution of the Petrograd Convention declared, ‘The demand of the Progressive parliamentary bloc [about the construction of the Ministry of Trust – M.L.] ... definitely violates the Fundamental Laws of the Russian State and aims to assault the rights of the Supreme Autocratic Authority’.<sup>83</sup> Fighting against the claims to power which belonged to the emperor, was declared a duty of the authentic monarchists. Paskhalov, elected the chair of the Nizhnii Novgorod Convention, saw the fundamental distinction between his soulmates and the bloc in that the former fought for the power of the emperor without trying to capture it. ‘The fundamental difference between us is that all other organizations fight for power, undermining the monarchic rule of governance, and we are fighting for safeguarding monarchism’.<sup>84</sup> Markov seconded him, ‘They [members of the bloc – M.L.] under the guise of a claim for a responsible ministry, modest at first glance, want to limit the power of the sovereign emperor and to assume power themselves’.<sup>85</sup>

At the same time, the participants of the conventions did not hesitate to impose their agenda and recommendations for solving domestic political problems on the tsar and government. ‘We are elaborating a political programme for those in power’, confessed one of the participants of the Petrograd convention.<sup>86</sup> The uncoined desire to influence the tsar disturbed A. A. Bobrinskii, who after the death of Durnovo headed the Right in the State Council. In his letter to the chair of the Petrograd convention I. G. Shcheglovitov he stressed the impropriety of ‘instructing the sovereign or criticizing his activity’ and warned of the probability of the opposite result.<sup>87</sup> Apparently his concern proved to be right. The conventions united the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary Right on the platform of a confrontation with the Progressive bloc, but organizers of the conventions lacked enough evidence that the

tsar agreed with them. The monitored letters of Paskhalov clearly demonstrate his doubts in the tsar's benevolence to the Right.

The Chairman of the Nizhnii Novgorod convention Paskhalov was especially offended by Nicholas' refusal to give an audience to the deputation of its participants with the icon of Our Lady of Vladimir, specially commissioned for the occasion.<sup>88</sup> He informed Maklakov about his objection to transporting it via the Minister of the Court V.B. Frederiks. To his mind, the suggestion to use Frederiks (a Lutheran) to transfer the gift deprived the gesture of 'reason and meaning'.<sup>89</sup> Another hint that the tsar was discontent was his silence after receiving the Convention's welcoming telegramme. 'The tsar, whose rights we are standing for, apparently is angry with us. This is clear from his refusal to accept the deputation with the icon and the absence of a response to our faithful (*vernopoddannuiu*) telegramme. For what?' Paskhslov asked A.A. Shirinskii-Shikhmatov pathetically.<sup>90</sup> 'We protect the sacred state ideal, which we accept as the only way of saving Russia, and in spite of the support it deserved – nothing ...', he wrote with irritation in another letter.<sup>91</sup> Paskhalov's dissatisfaction with the tsar's behaviour was so great that he did not relax after the information about the long-expected answer to the Convention's address or the passing of the unfortunate icon to Nicholas II.<sup>92</sup> The slow reaction of the addressee was interpreted by the adherents of the autocracy as disapproval. 'We unlucky rightists cling to any support, which, alas, we so seldom gain in the highest spheres'.<sup>93</sup> 'We are crushed by enemies and those whose rights we defend', Paskhalov remarked to the Odessa Right activist I.I. Dudnichenko.<sup>94</sup> In another letter he stressed that reverence to the autocracy and the autocrat is not one and the same. 'You defend not the person, but the idea, the great state idea'.<sup>95</sup>

Paskhalov's correspondents felt disappointed by the tsar, too. 'I think that you judge the tsar's actions in the abstract a bit, but he is well-known for constant cunning', wrote D.A. Khomiakov. He interpreted Goremykin's replacement by Stürmer as the Chair of the Council of Ministers as a trick, and connected it with the tsar's desire to please the Duma leadership.<sup>96</sup> Dubrovin complained that the tsar was not prepared to defend his power and remarked in this regard, 'One cannot be more royalist, than the king'.<sup>97</sup> Varzhenevskii saw the monarch's visit to the Duma in February 1916 as an unreasonable attempt of 'appeasement (*umilostivleniia*) of the stubborn leftists, looking somewhat similar to [the road to] Canossa ...' hinting at the penitential visit of the Emperor Henry IV to Pope Gregory VII in 1077.<sup>98</sup>

Though the emperor's political sympathies raised doubts, the Far Right continued attempts to influence him and his decisions. 'The Supreme Power will not self destruct. Indeed, it needs to be encouraged and persuaded that the opponents make a lot of noise but lack real strength', the Chair of the Astrakhan' People's Monarchist Party N. N. Tikhanovich-Savitskii insisted. And if the tsar did not give proper orders, the monarchists had to do this for him. 'We gave nothing and recommended nothing, only playing the role of guardians (*razygryvaia lish' rol' okhranitelei*), while leaving everything else to the government; now we must change all that and provide concrete recommendations'.<sup>99</sup> Dudnichenko informed Sobolevsky about his plans to approach Nicholas II directly to achieve his goal. Shortly before the beginning of the final session of the State Duma and State Council he wrote that he worked out 'the huge report to Headquarters', though he did not have much hope for it.<sup>100</sup>

The session of the representative chambers that opened on 1 November 1916 confirmed the concerns of the critics of the tsar from the outset. Shechkov saw Stürmer's

removal as Chair of the Council of Ministers as yet another example of the tsar's weakness and inability to rule. 'Whoever [Stürmer] is, to remove him because of Adzhemov's, Miliukov's, and Shidlovskii's screaming means capitulating to the scoundrels and sacrifice the advocates of order to its enemies (*vydavat' storonnokov storonnikov poriadka golovoi*)'.<sup>101</sup> In December 1916 a group of senior officials, well-known for conservative views, was appointed to high positions, which gave some grounds for optimism.<sup>102</sup> 'Thank God, power takes the reins in its own hands, making it stronger', Rodzevich wrote.<sup>103</sup> But a week later he doubted this success and separated the tsar from monarchists. 'In the end the unfortunate step might ruin the just cause in the eyes of the tsar and the population *finally* [*italics added*]'.<sup>104</sup>

A part of the Right hoped to influence the tsar through Aleksandra Fedorovna. On 13 December 1916, Dubrovin recommended sending her letters filled with demonstrations of loyalty.<sup>105</sup> Rodzevich named her 'the main bulwark of the autocracy'.<sup>106</sup> Tikhonovich-Savitskii asked the empress in person 'to support the sovereign and help our presentations [of the Far Right M.L.] be considered when possible.' He suggested 'surrounding the SOVEREIGN in Tsarskoe Selo and in the headquarters with only those of the Right'.<sup>107</sup> By controlling the tsar's inner circle, he planned to counteract attempts of establishing the constitutional monarchy and to preserve the existing political system.

As an alternative, the Far Right suggested a radical institutional reform – the real 'revolution from the right'. One of its ideas was the restoration of the autocracy *de jure* with the transformation of legislative institutions into consultative bodies. In May 1916, Tikhonovich-Savitskii sent a detailed project for constitutional reform to right-wing politicians.<sup>108</sup> A similar project worked out in the circle of A.A. Rimskii-Korsakov at the turn of 1916-17 was sent to Nicholas II. Its authors assumed 'that the monarch in the process of approval of bills passed by the chambers, keeps unlimited authority and the law in this regard does not put any obligations on him'. This vision of the monarch's power allowed him to react to the State Duma and its decisions as he liked.<sup>109</sup> *Zemshchina's* editor wrote that according to the existing laws the tsar could both dissolve the representative chambers and extend their mandates, if needed. 'If the Sovereign orders to extend the mandate, it would be extended. If he orders to dissolve the Duma, it would be dissolved'.<sup>110</sup>

Some leaders of the Right in discussions about strengthening the authority focused not the emperor's prerogative, but on the reconstruction of the bureaucratic apparatus and increasing control over lower levels of governance. A series of projects of this kind appeared in *Russkoe znamia* in the second half of 1916 and in the beginning of 1917. Its authors suggested forming new bureaucratic structures (including a Public higher guardianship, Board of chiefs, and a Governmental corps) to ensure better strategic decisions on the one hand and to provide the rigorous control over their implementation on the other. The number of projects envisioning a political reconstruction, based either on the idea of the elimination of the legislative representation or on the idea of radical reform of the system of government, demonstrated the lack of unity on how this reconstruction might be realized.<sup>111</sup> But an even more serious obstacle for the realization of the projects was the tsar's unwillingness to support them.

All these circumstances explain why the 'common denominator' for the Far Right became the idea of a dictatorship. The rationale for it was present in the conservative

press as early as Summer 1915. *Moskovskie vedomosti*'s editorial supported Durnovo's speech of 19 July 1915, and insisted on the 'authority from above and subordination from below'. According to the newspaper, who would give orders was not of great importance. 'We don't need responsibility of the ministers, but a dictatorship of power, whether it be the government as a whole, or an individual dictator responsible to the sovereign emperor and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. All the bodies, whether already in existence or newly established, are to help, not to control him'.<sup>112</sup> Returning to the theme at the beginning of September the newspaper stressed the role of order from above as the sole possible source of changes. The phrase '*Let the people (narod) wait for the satisfaction of his true demands, needs, and hopes from the authority and from no one else*' was italicized.<sup>113</sup>

The message about the need of a dictatorship was a constant feature of the Far Right's public rhetoric up to the downfall of the monarchy. A dictatorship was looked at as the most effective instrument in solving Russia's problems. In July 1916, *Zemchshina*'s editor explained that 'the quickness [of decision making, M.L.] is a characteristic of personal power', and suggested 'vesting somebody with the rights of a dictator or supreme boss (*verkhovnogo nachal'nika*), who would have the ability to issue commands independently'.<sup>114</sup> *Moskovskie vedomosti* in October 1916 mentioned the need of an 'iron dictatorship of the rear (*zheleznoi diktatury tyła*)'.<sup>115</sup> Tikhomirov expressed similar thoughts in his diary on the eve of the opening of the last Duma session, making an important caveat about the dictator's personality. 'As is heard, the Duma after the convocation wants to demand the responsibility of the ministers. Total nonsense! A great personality would be needed here, with character and good common sense'.<sup>116</sup> Markov in his Duma speech in November 1916 appealed to the experience of Ancient Rome, which handed complete authority during the war to 'a strong-handed dictator (*kulaku-dictatoru*)'.<sup>117</sup>

The straightforwardness and toughness of the dictatorship were seen as the most important assets of this type of political rule, which should impress the public.

Now we need neither benevolence, nor lusciously sugary Liberalism from above, promising programmes and good manners. We need an authority that inspires not only respect but also fear. Then, confidence in authority will appear. It would be strong by being conscious of the totality of its strength and responsibility. We need dictatorship.<sup>118</sup>

Just a week before the February events, the chair of the Right faction S. V. Levashov insisted from the Duma a platform establishing the position of a dictator.<sup>119</sup>

The popularity of the idea of a dictatorship might be explained by two circumstances. First, the idea of a dictatorship during war removed the question about the need for constitutional reform. It gave to the opponents of the Progressive bloc the possibility to avoid discussions about the exact content of constitutional changes, to get rid of accusations of organizing a revolution from the right, and present themselves as the champions of the existing order. Second, the individual with dictatorial powers would be a specially designated official, and not the tsar. That solved the problem of the 'unreliability' of the monarch without acknowledging this extremely embarrassing dilemma for monarchists.

## Conclusion

During the First World War, the tsar began to be perceived not so much as the real carrier of power, but as its symbolic expression, while real governance of the country was being carried out by others. On 21 July 1915, Tikhomirov wrote in his diary,

The tsar is not discussed at all, either in the Duma, or in Russia. The words sovereign and emperor are pronounced as symbols. But authority is looked for and attempted to be found not in him, but in other people – the Grand Duke, the ministers, and in the Duma.<sup>120</sup>

This approach was shared by the Far Right and the members of the conservative wing of the Progressive bloc. Both the advocates of a strong dictatorship and political compromise stopped seeing the monarch as the carrier of real power. No wonder that the former did not lift a finger to defend the emperor and his family, while the latter took part in transferring authority from the tsar to the Provisional Government.

It is worth noting that the advocates of opposing versions of Russian conservatism thought that the real power in the country was concentrated in the hands of the government. In their interactions with it, they admitted to not only supporting the government, but opposing it as well. The Progressive Nationalists spoke out in favour of the new approach first. They joined the oppositional Progressive bloc and supported the idea of the Ministry of Trust, while confronting the existing government. At last, even the Far Right accepted in principle the possibility of opposition to the government appointed by the tsar. In February 1917 *Zemshchina* wrote, ‘If the right-wing tendency in the government prevails, we naturally will share its views, if the left-wing tendency prevails in the Government ... we will disagree sharply’.<sup>121</sup>

Progressive Nationalists, as well as their opponents, believed that the government ought to act as a single unit, accepting the principle of ministerial solidarity. The government was supposed to behave as ‘a close-knit team’ (*druzhnaia artel'*), Bobrinskii insisted in his speech on 19 November 1916.<sup>122</sup> Three days later, Shul'gin used the same construction in *Kievlianin*: ‘The Council of Ministers must be a close-knit team, and not cooperating in the style of “a swan, a crayfish, and a pike”’.<sup>123</sup> The Chair of the Right Faction S.V. Levashov made the same point at the opening of the last Duma session. He blamed the ministry for ‘the incoherence and inconsistency in action, and absence of a unified, resolute and strong authority’.<sup>124</sup>

The most important source for such an evolution of the political views of Russian conservatives was their participation in the work of representative institutions, or, more broadly, in public politics which came into being during the Revolution of 1905. Conservatives saw the necessity to avoid, or at least substantially limit, the monarch's influence over specific political decisions. These decisions were to be taken by the ministers or other officials. In this way, they stopped being the ‘sovereign's servants’ and became autonomous political figures, acting in accordance with a definite political programme. A structured system of government with a clear organization of the interaction of its key elements might be especially helpful in case of inadequacy of any particular person in power, including the sovereign.

These changes were evident signs of the modernization of Russian conservatism. New developments disavowed Karamzin's famous maxim, 'the autocracy is the palladium of Russia', which had remained Conservatives' slogan for more than a century. The First World War clearly demonstrated that this archaic vision of the monarch's power was completely inadequate to meet the political realities and personal characteristics of the sovereign. And the main victim of these changes in conservatives' attitude to monarchy was Nicholas II. Those who saved the tsar in 1905 refused to save him in 1917.

## Notes

1. Rassypannoe tsarstvo, in Rozanov, *Apokalipsis nashego vremeni*, 6.
2. Sukhanov, *Zapiski o revolutsii*, 8.
3. See Diakin, *Russkaia burzhuaziia i tsarizm*; Katkov, *Russia 1917*; Hamm "Liberal Politics in War-time Russia"; Chermenskii, *IV Gosudarstvennaia дума i sverzhenie tsarizma*; Pearson, *The Russian Moderates and the Crisis of Tsarism*; Hasegawa, *The February Revolution*; Avrekh, *Raspad tret'eiiun'skoi sistemy*; Avrekh, *Tsarizm nakanune sverzheniia*.
4. See, for example Airapetov, *Generaly, liberaly i predprinimateli*; Gaida, *Liberal'naia opozitsiia na putiakh k vlasti*; Kulikov, *Biurokraticheskaia elita Rossiiskoi Imperii*.
5. See Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire*; Fuller, *The Foe Within*; Kolonitskii, "Tragicheskaia erotica".
6. See, for example Kir'ianov, *Pravye partii v Rossii*; Ivanov, *Vladimir Purishkevich*; Ivanov, *Pravye v russkom parlamente*.
7. See for details Loukianov, "Conservatives and 'Renewed Russia'"; Gilbert, *The Radical Right in Late Imperial Russia*, 155–88.
8. Rendle, *Defenders of the Motherland*, 33.
9. Kir'ianov, *Pravye partii v Rossii*, 388.
10. On monarchists during the Revolution of 1905 see Rawson, *Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905*.
11. M. O. Men'shikov, "Gosudarstvennyi scandal." *Pis'ma k blizhnim*, 1909, no. 3, 214.
12. Perovsky-Petrovo-Solovovo, "Partiia Nezavisimykh Konservatorov", 7.
13. Vechevoi [I. I. von Zek] "Natsional'nyi ideal i ego protivniki", in *Novaia Rossiia*, 75. On Russian national democracy see Chemakin, *Istoki russkoi national-demokratii*; Chemakin, *Russkie national-demokraty v epokhu potriasienii*.
14. Kazanskii, *Vlast' Vserossiiskogo Imperatora*, 50.
15. "Ob ispravlenii kodifikatsii 1906 goda", in Tikhomirov, *K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii*, 258.
16. This phrase was suggested as the substitution of the acting formula in the Article 86 of the Fundamental Laws, 'No new law can be enacted without the approval of the State Council and the State Duma, and it shall not be legally binding without the approval of the Sovereign Emperor'. *Ibid.*, 261.
17. G. A. Shechkov, "Nesostoiatel'nost' Gosugarstvennoi Dumy nyne deistvuishchego zakona", *Mirnyi trud*, 1913, no. 3, 39.
18. A. Ia. Avrekh compared his influence among the right with that of P.A. Kropotkin among the anarchists. See Avrekh, *Tsarizm i IV Duma*, 231.
19. K. N. Paskhalov, "Gosudarstvennaia shatkost'", *Moskovskie vedomosti*, 1 July 1914, 1.
20. Diary of B. V. Nikol'skii, entry for 3 April 1905, in Nikol'skii, *Dnevnik*, 48.



21. Diary of B. V. Nikol'skii, entry for 15 April 1905, in *Ibid.*, 55.
22. A. A. Kireev to Nicholas II, 3 June 1907, Otdel Rukopisei Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennoi Biblioteki (OR RGB), fond (f.) 126, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 21/22, list (l.) 90b.
23. Diary of A. A. Kireev, entry for December 1908, in Kireev, *Dnevnik*, 301.
24. Diary of L. A. Tikhomirov, entry for 19 July 1909, in *Krasnyi arkhiv*, 1935, vol. 73 (6), 175.
25. M. M. Andronikov to A. A. Orlov, September 12, 1907, Rossiiski Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA), f. 1617, op. 1, d. 75, ll. 2–3.
26. See for details Kolonitskii, "Tragicheskaiia erotica", 73–98.
27. "Tsar' i narod", *Novoe vremia*, 21 July 1914, 3.
28. "Vse sily i zhizn' – za Tsar'ia", *Kolokol*, 22 July 1914, 2.
29. N. V. "Tsar' i narod", *Russkoe znamia*, 22 July 1914, 2.
30. Diary of B. V. Nikol'skii, entry for 14 July 1914, in Nikol'skii, *Dnevnik*, 195.
31. Diary of B. V. Nikol'skii, entry for 27 July 1914, in *Ibid.*, 197.
32. See Diary of L. A. Tikhomirov, entry for 31 July 1914, Gusudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 634, op. 1, d. 22, l. 2010b.
33. See GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 990–1009.
34. A. Savenko, "Mysli i vpechatleniia. V Tavricheskom dvortse", *Kievlianin*, 1 February 1915, 2.
35. *Russkoe znamia*, 25 January 1915, 1.
36. *Russkoe znamia*, 8 February 1915, 1.
37. *Russkoe znamia*, 30 May 1915, 1.
38. S. Glinka, "Ne opasno li?", *Zemshchina*, 25 August 1914, 2.
39. Chermenskii, *IV Gosudarstvennaia дума i sverzhenie tsarizma*, 75.
40. Diary of B. V. Nikol'skii, entry for 25 August 1914, in B. V. Nikol'skii, *Dnevnik*, 202.
41. Diary of L. A. Tikhomirov, entry for August 1914, GARF, f. 634, op. 1, d. 22, l. 2010b.
42. Diary of L. A. Tikhomirov, entry for 22 December 1914, GARF, f. 634, op. 1, d. 23, l. 222.
43. Diary of L. A. Tikhomirov, entry for 3 June 1915, in Tikhomirov, *Dnevnik L. A. Tikhomirova*, 72.
44. Diary of L. A. Tikhomirov, entry for 13 June 1915, in *Ibid.*, 76.
45. D. A. Khomiakov to A. D. Sverbeev, 13 June 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1013, l. 100.
46. According to S. V. Kulikov, the changes in the government were initiated by the 'shadow prime minister' A. V. Krivoshein, who planned to replace Goremykin's ministry with the government consisting not of professional bureaucrats only, but of civic leaders, as well. The preparations for the reconstruction of the government began earlier than Summer 1915, and the main reason for it was the eagerness of a part of the highest bureaucracy to introduce the principles of parliamentarianism into Russia's governance. See Kulikov, *Biurokraticheskaiia elita Rossiiskoi Imperii*, 45–55.
47. Diary of B. V. Nikol'skii, entry for 8 June 1915, in Nikol'skii, *Dnevnik*, 218.
48. A. I. Sobolevskii to Iu. A. Kulakovskii, 16 June 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1023, l. 148.
49. S. D. Sheremetev to A. G. Bulygin, 22 June 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1024, l. 219.

50. S. D. Sheremetev to A. G. Bulygin, 14 July 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1025, l. 345.
51. Nikol'skii is referencing Aleksei Molchalin, one of the characters in the 1833 play 'Woe from Wit' by Aleksandr Griboedov, who readily agreed with his superiors. Nikol'skii underlines here that the Ministers were not independent figures, but simply followed the tsar's will, and it was not good. Diary of B. V. Nikol'skii, entry for 18 June 1915, in Nikol'skii, *Dnevnik*, 219.
52. *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozvyv chetvertyi, sessiia III* (Petrograd, 1915), stb. 69–70.
53. *Gosudarstvennyi Sovet: Stenograficheskie otchety, sessiia XI* (Petrograd, 1915), stb. 35.
54. *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozvyv chetvertyi, sessiia IV* (Petrograd, 1915), stb. 72. Later Markov declared this decision wrong. See *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozvyv chetvertyi, sessiia IV* (Petrograd, 1916), stb. 2475. Стб. 2475.
55. Savenko wrote that he was totally against 'being in one company with Durnovo and Markov'. See A. I. Savenko to N. K. Savenko, 10 August 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1031, l. 632.
56. In order to differentiate them from the members, who stayed in the Nationalist faction, they were called Progressive Nationalists, or less frequently National Progressives.
57. *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozvyv chetvertyi, sessiia IV* (Petrograd, 1916), stb. 1162–3.
58. V. Shul'gin, *Kievlianin*, 1 September 1915, 1.
59. A. Savenko, "Mysli i vpechatleniia. Eshche o dumskom bloke", *Kievlianin*, 3 September 1915, 2.
60. *Kievlianin*, 10 February 1916, 1.
61. "Pravitel'stvo i Gosudarstvennaia Duma", *Kievlianin*, 6 November 1916, 2.
62. N. Pogodin, "Doverie k narodu i doverie naroda", *Kievlianin*, 29 August 1915, 1.
63. V. Shul'gin, *Kievlianin*, 1 September 1915, 1.
64. *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozvyv chetvertyi, sessiia IV* (Petrograd, 1916), stb. 2420–1.
65. *Kievlianin*, 14 February 1916, 2.
66. *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozvyv chetvertyi, sessiia V* (Petrograd, 1916), stb. 68.
67. *Ibid.*, stb. 290.
68. *Ibid.*, stb. 296.
69. A. I. Savenko to N. K. Savenko, 10 December 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1066, l. 1603.
70. *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozvyv chetvertyi, sessiia V* (Petrograd, 1917), stb. 1496.
71. On the conciliation between Purishkevich and Miliukov and the impression, which it produced, see Ivanov, *Vladimir Purishkevich*, 193–5.
72. See "Itogi pervogo boevogo goda: v tylakh i na fronte. Doklad V. M. Purishkevicha v Russkom Sobranii 4 sentiabria 1915 goda", in Repnikov, ed., *Pervaia mirovaia voina*, 176–7.
73. *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozvyv chetvertyi, sessiia IV* (Petrograd, 1916), stb. 1499–505. See also Purishkevich, *Chego khochet Vil'gel'm II*.
74. See *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozvyv chetvertyi, sessiia V* (Petrograd, 1916), stb. 261–8.

75. See *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv chetvertyi, sessiia V* (Petrograd, 1916), stb. 358.
76. Nikolaev and Gavroeva, "M. V. Rodzianko i raskol fraktsii pravyykh"; Nikolaev, "Protokol zasedanii soveshchaniia Gosudarstvennoi dumy".
77. Diary of B. V. Nikol'skii, entry for 26 July 1915 in Nikol'skii, *Dnevnik*, 226; N. A. Maklakov to K. N. Paskhalov, 30 July 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1026, ll. 500-500ob.
78. A. K. Varzhenevskii to S. D. Sheremetev, 3 August 1915, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (RGADA), f. 1287, op. 1, d. 5128, l. 122ob.
79. Diary of L. A. Tikhomirov, entry for 20 August 1915, in Tikhomirov, *Dnevnik L. A. Tikhomirova*, 102-3; Diary of B. V. Nikol'skii, entry for 27 August 1915, in Nikol'skii, *Dnevnik*, 232. Tikhomirov continued to assess the tsar negatively as a Supreme Commander-in-Chief later on. See, for example Diary of L. A. Tikhomirov, entry for 6 May 1916, in Tikhomirov, *Dnevnik L. A. Tikhomirova*, 277; Diary of L. A. Tikhomirov, entry for 17 November 1916, *Ibid.*, 306.
80. A. I. Sobolevskii to I. S. Pal'mov, 26 August 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1029, l. 1230.
81. On the conventions and their resolutions see Kir'ianov, *Pravye partii v Rossii*, 238-55.
82. K. N. Paskhalov to N.N. Rodzevich, 8 September 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1014, l. 707.
83. Kir'ianov, *Pravye partii*, 487-8. The Nizhnii Novgorod convention, which began its work some days later, fully supported the resolution. See *Ibid.*, 513.
84. *Ibid.*, 497.
85. *Ibid.*, 498.
86. Indecipherable signature to Bishop Vasilii (Chernigov), 22 November 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1038, l. 2037. It is interesting that the author did not hesitate to mention in the same context the notorious tsar's favourite, 'We decided to tell the Tsar the whole truth right up to Gr.[igorii] Rasp.[utin] by a special deputation under Shcheglovitov'. *Ibid.*
87. Kir'ianov, *Pravye partii*, 494-5.
88. K. N. Paskhalov to N. N. Rodzevich, 8 September 1915, GARF, 102, op. 265, d. 1014, l. 707.
89. K. N. Paskhalov to N. A. Maklakov, 31 October 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1036, l. 1857ob.
90. K. N. Paskhalov to A. A. Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, 15 December 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1040, l. 2238.
91. K. N. Paskhalov to N. A. Maklakov, 19 December 1915, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d.1040, l. 2280-2280 ob.
92. This can be concluded from Paskhalov's letters in January 1916. See K. N. Paskhalov to N. N. Rodzevich, 5 January 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1048, l. 27; K. N. Paskhalov to A. A. Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, 12 January 12 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1048, l. 88.
93. *Ibidem.*
94. K. N. Paskhalov to I. I. Dudnichenko, 22 January 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1049, l. 159.
95. K. N. Paskhalov to A. I. Dubrovin, 12 February 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d.1051, l. 391.

96. D. A. Khomiakov to K. N. Paskhalov, 20 January 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1049, l. 135.
97. A. I. Dubrovin to I. I. Dudnichenko, 29 January 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1050, l. 227.
98. A. K. Varzhenevskii to S. D. Sheremetev, February 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1052, l. 401.
99. N. N. Tikhanovich-Savitskii to A. I. Sobolevskii, 18 May 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d.1055, l. 141.
100. 'Maybe they will respond' ('*Avos' tam otzovutsia*'), he wrote. Dudnichenko to L. I. Samarskii-Lipitskii, 10 October 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d.1058, l. 874.
101. G. A. Shechkov to V. A. Obraztsov, 5 November 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d.1059, l. 934.
102. The advocates of the turn to the Right were especially pleased by the promotions of two well-known members of the State Council's Right – I. G. Shcheglovitov (who became the Chair of the State Council) and N. D. Golitsyn (who became the Chair of the Council of Ministers) and by the appointment of N. K. Kul'chitskii, the Minister of Education. Since 1903, the latter was a member of the Council of the of the Russian Assembly's Khar'kov branch, and in 1906 joined the local Council of the Union of the Russian People.
103. N. N. Rodzevich to A. P. Rodzevich, 29 December 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1067, l. 1813.
104. N. N. Rodzevich to I. G. Shcheglovitov, 5 January 1917, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1068, l. 40.
105. A. I. Dubrovin to the Chair of the Odessa branch of the All-Russian Dubrovinist Union of the Russian People, 13 December 1916, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1066, l. 1654.
106. N. N. Rodzevich to P. M. Latugina, 14 January 1917, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1068, l. 100.
107. N. N. Tikhanovich-Savitskii to N. A. Maklakov, 31 January 1917, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 1070, ll. 10-10ob.
108. See, Kir'ianov, *Pravye partii*, 553–8.
109. *Ibid.*, 592.
110. S. Glinka, "Nashi zakonniki", *Zemshchina*, 29 January 1917, 2.
111. See for details Stogov, *Pravomonarkhicheskie salony Peterburga – Petrograda*, 189–271; Loukianov, "Support for the Regime and Right Wing Reform Plans".
112. "Otvetsvennoe ministerstvo ili diktatura?", *Moskovskie vedomosti*, 23 July 1915, 1.
113. "Edinstvennyi vykhod", *Moskovskie vedomosti*, 2 September 1915, 1.
114. S. Glinka, "Priblizhaemsia k tseli", *Zemshchina*, 2 July 1916, 2.
115. "Otvetsvennost' vlasti", *Moskovskie vedomosti*, 15 October 1916, 1.
116. Diary of L. A. Tikhomirov, entry for 26 October 1916, in Tikhomirov, *Dnevnik L. A. Tikhomirova*, 298.
117. *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv chetvertyi, sessiia V* (Petrograd, 1916), stb. 201.
118. "Doverie k vlasti", *Moskovskie vedomosti*, 27 November 1916, 2.
119. See *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv chetvertyi, sessiia V* (Petrograd, 1917), stb. 1381.
120. Diary of L. A. Tikhomirov, entry for 21 July 1915, Tikhomirov, *Dnevnik L. A. Tikhomirova*, 87.

121. S. Glinka, "Printsipy i taktika", *Zemshchina*, 2 February 1917, 2.
122. *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozryv chetvertyi, sessiia V* (Petrograd, 1916), stb. 291.
123. V. Shul'gin, "Perelom", *Kievlianin*, 22 November 1916, 1.
124. See *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozryv chetvertyi, sessiia V* (Petrograd, 1917), stb. 1381.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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