

The King's Gambit: Kojong's Initiative to Set Up Chosŏn Legations in Japan, the United States, and Europe in 1887

DARIA GRISHINA National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow (HSE University)¹

Abstract

This paper examines the Chosŏn government's first attempt to establish legations abroad, carried out in July–November of 1887. Taking that time's geopolitical and internal situation into account, the author analyzes such events as the anti-Foulk campaign (early 1887) and the coup d'état rumors (summer of 1887) as factors that ensured the smooth dispatching of the Chosŏn (Korea) embassy to Japan in early August 1887. The geopolitical situation that surrounded the Korean Peninsula in late summer–autumn of 1887 will be analyzed as a factor, complicating the dispatch of Chosŏn diplomats to the United States and Europe later that year. In order to achieve these, and to reveal the deception and manipulation behind King Kojong's actions at the time, the author relies on the analysis of Russian, Korean, and English primary sources.

Keywords: Kojong, Chosŏn foreign policy, Yuán Shikǎi, Chosŏn foreign legation

Initiated in the early 1880s, a proactive line of diplomacy set up by King Kojong produced its intended outcome: by the mid-1880s, the Chosŏn government had concluded treaties with all major powers active in the region, with the American, British, German, and Russian diplomats residing on Korean soil to represent their countries' interests.² There were, however, no Chosŏn envoys sent to the above

mentioned nations to serve abroad. Evidently, before 1887, neither the King nor his government felt the necessity to carry out bilateral relations with foreign states. By mid-1887, that was to change.

On 6 July 1887, Kojong quite suddenly declared that the absence of a Chosŏn minister to Japan harmed friendly relations between the neighboring countries.³ The King's proclamation paved the way for a state initiative to set up Chosŏn's legations abroad—in Japan, the United States, and Europe. This action appears as a natural next step in the development of the Chosŏn state's foreign diplomacy. However, the timing of its launch offers grounds for speculation. As the matter of the British seizure of Chosŏn's Kōmundo islands had just been resolved,⁴ the country seemingly had no urgent need for an international, especially Western, representation.

Despite the existence of several prior studies focusing on Chosŏn's diplomatic relations in the late nineteenth century and the country's exchanges with its regional and Western partners, no detailed analysis of Kojong's attempt to establish the country's legations in Japan, the United States, and Europe in 1887 has been produced so far.⁵ Therefore, hoping to shed some light on the King's reasoning behind taking this politically tangled and economically burdensome action, this paper examines the complicated international and internal situations that affected Kojong's decision.

Part one: In the whirlpool of geopolitics

At the end of 1886, the balance of power around the Korean Peninsula had shifted. With Russia and China coming to terms on their relationship with Chosŏn,⁶ Japan, whose relations with the Qing were significantly wounded by the Nagasaki incident,⁷ began to suspect that, amidst a Chinese triumph,⁸ its influence in this region, limited by terms of the Tianjin convention,⁹ would weaken even further. The government in Tokyo assumed that the status-quo established between Russia and China over Chosŏn might cover not only these two countries' interests on the peninsula, but also the geopolitical agenda of a third party as well.¹⁰ Therefore, aiming to protect its geopolitical interests, by the spring of 1887, the Japanese government reportedly suggested renegotiation of the terms of its agreement with China.¹¹ The fact that the Qing and Meiji governments were once again about to rearrange their spheres of influence can indeed be considered a significant trigger for Kojong's responsive actions: amid rumored Sino-Japanese talks and with Russia and Great Britain being generally ousted, the geopolitical situation around the Korean Peninsula was in danger of degrading to the level of late 1884.

The only power, remaining uninvolved in the recent political struggles, which Kojong, with a certain degree of remorse, could still call an ally was the United States. Its representative in Seoul, George Clayton Foulk,¹² enjoyed the King's trust and affection. Therefore, it was only natural that from late 1884, and amid Foulk's steadily increasing political influence, the activities of the US legation in Chosŏn's capital challenged the Chinese strategies on many occasions. In addition, Foulk's relationship of trust with Kojong and the latter's reliance on the former's expertise and opinions regarding issues of Chosŏn's domestic and foreign policies highlighted the authority that this American, and the government he represented, enjoyed in Korea. Their personal relations, in turn, elevated the already generally positive perception of the United States even further. A sustained level of reliance, which Kojong maintained on the United States (expressed, for example, in its continuous requests for US military advisors),¹³ frequently posed a threat to Chinese authority over Chosŏn. Yuán Shikǎi,¹⁴ the Qing's minister-resident in Seoul, understood this all too well. Therefore, exploiting the abovementioned changes in the geopolitical situation, in late 1886, under the pretext of ousting Foulk, the Chinese diplomat sought to launch a campaign to damage Chosŏn's relations with the United States, which by extension would enforce and ensure the country's international isolation. Parts of Foulk's secret report to his government about the events of the Kapsin Coup (1884), published by a foreign newspaper in Shanghai in late 1886, set this campaign in motion.

In late December 1886, right after Foulk's resignation from his official duties at the legation due to health problems, the Foreign Minister of Chosŏn, Kim Yun-sik,¹⁵ unexpectedly called on the United States minister, William Rockhill,¹⁶ and informed him that Foulk had published not one but three articles laying out his opinions—false, as Kim emphasized—about a coup d'état that occurred in Seoul in December 1884.¹⁷ Aiming to attract the American official's utmost attention, Kim pointed out that by spreading untruths, Foulk was weakening the friendly relations between the two countries.¹⁸ At that time, Foulk was still present in Seoul,¹⁹ and he was able to personally answer these accusations: he stated that he never published anything whatsoever in any form relating to Chosŏn and that he was ignorant about how the newspaper's reporters had obtained the published materials.²⁰ This first-hand clarification evidently was satisfactory, because in late March 1887, the Foreign Minister of Chosŏn informed the US legation that he was now aware that Foulk had absolutely nothing to do with the publication of these articles.²¹ The case was seemingly resolved, but not exactly.

While Rockhill and other members of the US legation were making efforts to pacify Kim Yun-sik, seeing the resolution to be Foulk's prompt departure from Chosŏn, Kojong, evidently, made all necessary efforts to ensure the former US

official's further involvement in Korea's state affairs, at least in a semi-official capacity.²² Therefore, in early March 1887, rumors of the King's intention to employ Foulk in the Chosŏn government began to spread.²³ By May 1887, the rumors were fueled by yet further speculation that a house, built at Kojong's expense, was being prepared for Foulk to occupy.²⁴ This became rich fodder for fresh Sino-American tensions.

After almost one month of secrecy and silence, which assured the new US minister, Hugh A. Dinsmore,²⁵ of the complete settlement of the matter regarding Foulk's alleged publications,²⁶ on 31 April, Kim Yun-sik paid an unexpected visit to the American legation once more. He brought up the matter again, and, stating that Foulk had been instrumental in the publication of three newspaper articles prejudicial to Chosŏn and its high officials, demanded that he never again set foot in the country.²⁷ Dinsmore asked Kim for the source of this new information, and the Chosŏn Foreign Minister revealed that the publications in question came into his possession through the Chinese.²⁸ The next day, an official dispatch from the Chosŏn Foreign Office to the United States legation in Seoul confirmed Kim's demands. The correspondence stated that, in light of Foulk's actions, the ministers of state and people of Chosŏn had lost their trust in him, and, therefore, he should leave the country immediately.²⁹ This dispatch turned the issue into a diplomatic row.

At this point, it was obvious that the Chinese representative in Seoul stood behind the campaign against the former American diplomat. Evidently, Yuán Shikǎi became aware of the King's intention to secure Foulk's presence in the country and attempted to object to it by announcing that he would not feel safe in Seoul unless it was free of Foulk's presence.³⁰ In early May 1887, several foreign representatives in Seoul reported that, aiming to set an example, Yuán was about to leave and sail for China.³¹ It was expected, however, that, despite the threat, the Chinese official would not leave the country. Nonetheless, his vocal support of the Chosŏn Foreign Office's actions added to the general understanding that the attempt to expel Foulk was inspired by the Chinese.³²

Through May 1887, Kim and Yuán's claim found no satisfaction as United States officials continuously stressed their inability to influence a civilian, which Foulk was, in his choice of residency. Finally, this countering pushed Kim Yun-sik to voice an open threat: the Foreign Minister stated that further noncompliance would involve the US legation in "trouble."³³ Yuán naturally supported Kim's rhetoric, expressing his hope that the American officials would lose no time taking proper action to satisfy a request from a country that was of deep interest to China and submit to the demand for Foulk's deportation.³⁴

It is noticeable that all this time, in parallel to Kim and Yuán's vocal protests, Dinsmore continued to receive semi-official dispatches from the palace, which repeatedly assured him of Kojong's desire for Foulk to remain in the country.³⁵ Siding with the King, Dinsmore continued to oppose the Foreign Office's demands which were obviously directed by the Chinese representative in Seoul.

By mid-June, after witnessing the ineffectiveness of Kim Yun-sik and Yuán Shikái's efforts in Chosŏn, Qing higher officials came up with a new approach to settle the Foulk issue. The Chinese representative in Washington informed the United States government of intelligence that Foulk, still present in Chosŏn, was aided by some "evil" Koreans to plan a rebellion against China.³⁶ The claim represented a threat to Sino-American relations and produced results favorable for the Qing. On 15 June, the Secretary of the Navy annulled Foulk's furlough and ordered him to immediately report for duty on one of the United States steamers in the Asian region, literally extracting the former diplomat from Chosŏn.³⁷

It is easy to assume that even before Foulk left the country, witnessing Kim Yun-sik openly allying with the Chinese, Kojong suspected his efforts would have an unfavorable outcome. Discord between the King and the Foreign Office highlighted the strengthening of pro-Chinese political forces in the country, posing a threat to Kojong's line of active and diversified diplomacy.³⁸ However, the so-called anti-Foulk campaign had a geopolitical consequence as well. The open character of the Qing's calls to the United States, which the government in Washington satisfied, demonstrated how far China was willing to go in pursuing its interests in Chosŏn. Meanwhile, the United States government's ultimate decision on Foulk's relocation showcased the almost unchallenged nature of the Chinese claim over the Korean Peninsula. Taken as a whole, the outcome of Foulk's case highlighted that Chosŏn was widely perceived as a subject state of China.³⁹

Pressed by the need to protect and secure the country's sovereign international status, Kojong found the solution in a scheme for Chosŏn's legations to be sent abroad. It was however obvious that China would not only criticize such a move but, under current circumstances, most possibly succeed in negating the King's intentions. Therefore, Kojong needed a diversion, something to bring the international community of states to his side, at least temporarily, to ensure the Qing government was blind to his actions. An idea of yet another coup d'état being cooked up somewhere in Seoul with a pinch of Chinese assistance—a strategy that Kojong was familiar with, perhaps, too well—satisfied this need most perfectly.⁴⁰

This is how Min Yŏng-ik,⁴¹ Kojong's trustworthy ally, who at the same time enjoyed the confidence of the Qing court, became a part of the King's "tricky" scheme.⁴²

Part two: The king's tricky scheme

In the summer of 1887, residents of the Chosŏn capital were once again agitated by spicy rumors circulating on the streets about yet another risky plan cooked up by the Taewŏn'gun to overthrow his son, Kojong.⁴³ The sole source of this speculation was a Chosŏn high state official, Min Yŏng-ik, who throughout June–July 1887 spared no efforts to increase public awareness of the crisis looming over his country. It is, however, noticeable that Min's venture did not begin in Seoul.

Accounts of the Russian Foreign Ministry disclose that in mid-May 1887, Min Yŏng-ik had unexpectedly called on a Russian agent in Shanghai. Min revealed that, aided by pro-Chinese state officials, the Taewŏn'gun was preparing a coup to overthrow Kojong. Min passionately and selflessly expressed his will to prevent the coup from happening, and, for this purpose, requested two Russian warships to deliver him to Chosŏn,⁴⁴ and, should his attempt fail, to ensure his retreat and protection.⁴⁵

Min's request alarmed Russian high officials. The Russian minister in Seoul, Carl Waeber (also known as Weber or Вебер),⁴⁶ was promptly contacted about the state of affairs on the peninsula. His seemingly ambiguous reply was that, although there was no evidence to prove Min Yŏng-ik's claim, given the current situation in the country,⁴⁷ an attempted coup was quite possible.⁴⁸ The government in Saint Petersburg soon reached a decision to not become involved, at least officially. Therefore, although issuing an order preventing Min Yŏng-ik from reaching Chosŏn onboard a Russian vessel,⁴⁹ the Russian government, now possessing a tool to reinstate its influence on the Korean Peninsula,⁵⁰ that is Min Yŏng-ik's intelligence, ultimately resorted to semi-official diplomatic means.

Details of Min's report were promptly transmitted to the Russian Minister in Japan for him to disclose it to the government in Tokyo.⁵¹ Suspecting that the plan for a coup d'état was created by the government in Beijing, the Russians also semi-privately and quite strategically enlightened the German consul in China.⁵² Finally, the Russian consul in Tianjin was ordered to call on Li Hóngzhāng.⁵³ Maintaining the sources' strict anonymity, he inquired about the matter.⁵⁴ In sum, by late May–early June 1887, Russian diplomats had made all the necessary semi-official efforts to spread international awareness of the possibility of a coup in Chosŏn.

This, however, did not satisfy Min Yŏng-ik. On 10 June, he informed the Russian consul in Yāntái that his actions were sanctioned by the King of Chosŏn,⁵⁵ and once again attempted to induce the Russian government to open action. Only after this attempt, too, met with Russian refusal, did Min finally give up and depart from Yāntái for Chosŏn on a regular steamer, reaching Chemulp'o on 14 June,⁵⁶ after

a yearlong absence from the country. The second act of his play was to unfold in Seoul.

In mid- to late June, Min visited the United States legation in the Chosŏn capital at least twice and shared his abovementioned knowledge with Dinsmore. He also informed the American diplomat of a plan that was formed between the Chinese representative in Seoul, the Taewŏn'gun, and a few pro-Qing Chosŏn state officials to depose the King and place his younger brother on the throne.⁵⁷ Min Yŏng-ik added that the Chinese aimed to explore the upcoming coup d'état as an opportunity to seize the country and establish an outer province of China on the Korean Peninsula.⁵⁸ Min ended by hinting at the prospect of danger to foreigners residing in the country. For this, he pointed out that if the Taewŏn'gun, infamous for his long and deep dislike of foreigners, rose to power yet again, it would pose a direct threat not only to the personal well-being of foreigners in Chosŏn but to the country's diplomatic and economic relations with its Western partners.⁵⁹

Around 16 June, Min Yŏng-ik called on Carl Waeber and essentially repeated his speech to the United States minister. It is noticeable, however, that his narrative became more detailed: Min additionally revealed that the coup d'état plotters planned to set the palace on fire and kill the King and the Queen.⁶⁰ Finally, Min Yŏng-ik acquainted a foreign advisor to the Chosŏn government, Owen Nickerson Denny,⁶¹ the third and most elaborate version of the upcoming events. It contained the additional information that, after gaining control over the Chosŏn garrison at Kangwha island, Yuán Shikāi was to commit an arson attack on the Taewŏn'gun's house while rioters attacked the royal palace. In short, Yuán was to then lead Chosŏn troops to save the day, just as he did back in 1884. As a result, Min warned, Yuán would then declare the son of the King's elder brother heir-apparent, with the Taewŏn'gun serving as regent, thereby enabling the Chinese to thoroughly seize control over the government and country.⁶² Min Yŏng-ik's relentless efforts began to bear fruit, and by late June 1887, rumors of an upcoming attempt to overthrow Kojong spread widely around Seoul and penetrated the Chosŏn government.⁶³

The rumored coup, however, never materialized. Despite the agitation that occurred in Seoul in late June–early July 1887, neither the Taewŏn'gun nor the Chinese representative took any real action. Additionally, Lǐ Hóngzhāng affirmed that he was completely unaware of the rumor,⁶⁴ and asserted that any disturbance in Chosŏn would cause only problems and was therefore unwanted by the Chinese government.⁶⁵ By mid-July, the situation in Seoul returned to a more or less normal state.

The general audience, puzzled by Min Yŏng-ik's secret escape from the country in late July 1887,⁶⁶ interpreted his midsummer venture as the spontaneous action of a "half-wit."⁶⁷ No one suspected any connection between the rumors of a coup

d'état and Kojong's intention to set up Chosŏn legations abroad. Furthermore, following Dinsmore's report, Min Yŏng-ik informed the American representative of the King's plan to establish various foreign legations around mid-June 1887—about one month before the 6 July declaration.⁶⁸ The Russian minister too learned of Kojong's intention to appoint an envoy to Russia and other countries—news that would raise the temperature in Seoul's political circles only one month later—from Min, who was leaving Chosŏn aboard a Russian vessel.⁶⁹ However, none of these two officials connected Min's activities and the King's plans at that time. Therefore, Min Yŏng-ik's contribution to the events that followed remained unnoticed by his contemporaries.

Yet, in light of all this, it is safe to assume that assigning the role of whistleblower to Min Yŏng-ik, who was to alarm Chosŏn's treaty partners about a possible crisis looming on the Korean Peninsula, Kojong intended to secure their (at least) moral support, which would restrain China from interrupting the King's further actions. In the beginning, this plan worked well. Right after the 6 July declaration, Kojong immediately appointed several officials to represent Chosŏn's state interests in Tokyo and, therefore, develop a rapprochement between the two countries. Following diplomatic protocol, four days later, on 10 July, the Japanese legation in Seoul was informed of the King's decision.⁷⁰ On 1 August, the Japanese government was officially notified of the coming of a Chosŏn minister, and two days later, on 3 August, a party of Chosŏn diplomats, led by Min Yŏng-ik's relative, Min Yŏng-chun,⁷¹ left for Japan. All of these drew no reaction whatsoever from the Qing.

As members of the Chosŏn legation to Japan were dispatched smoothly, further actions aiming at strengthening the country's relations with its Western treaty partners were promptly taken. On 18 August, Kojong appointed Park Chŏng-yang as the Chosŏn minister to the United States,⁷² and Sim Sang-hak as the Chosŏn representative to five European treaty countries,⁷³ England, Germany, Russia, Italy, and France.⁷⁴ It was expected that the newly appointed officials would leave for their posts in mid-September.⁷⁵

This time, however, Kojong's actions drew Qing attention. The King, apparently, underestimated Chosŏn's strategic importance to China: consenting to share its authority with Japan, both being bound by the Tianjin Convention, the Qing were opposed to the idea of Chosŏn's representation in the West. Therefore, an August appointment of Chosŏn envoys to Europe and the United States was an action that China could not overlook under any circumstances. Still, restricted by the recent rumors of a coup d'état, it acted quietly during the late summer of 1887. But, as the agitation about the potential coup died out by autumn, China finally felt free to tame its tributary neighbor. That, however, does not mean that Kojong gave up on his idea easily, so the Sino-Chosŏn tension escalated.

Part three: The battle begins

As mentioned above, Park Chŏng-yang and Sim Sang-hak's appointment to the United States and Europe invoked strong opposition from Yuán Shikǎi. On 20 August, the Chinese representative sent a telegraph message to Lǐ Hóngzhāng informing the Viceroy of the King of Chosŏn's intentions⁷⁶ and then, reportedly, left the capital along with his secretary and a large train of retainers, intending to leave the Korean Peninsula for China.⁷⁷

Although the United States minister explained Yuán's alleged departure as a result of his failure to press through the Taewŏn'gun's appointment to State office,⁷⁸ the Russian sources claimed that the Chinese minister's public demarche was an attempt to prevent the Chosŏn ministers to Europe and the United States from leaving the country.⁷⁹ Given the history of Yuán's previous eccentric behavior, politically motivated every time,⁸⁰ and the unfolding tensions around the Chosŏn envoys, it is indeed easy to follow the Russian account and deduce that the Chinese minister's actions were nothing more than a muscle-flexing exercise, aimed at taming the rebellious King. It is further known that Yuán ultimately never left Seoul; he was persuaded to stay by the King himself.⁸¹ The latter perhaps aimed to avoid alienating the Chinese diplomat, but ultimately miscalculated the greater significance of this action.

Lǐ Hóngzhāng's reply to Yuán Shikǎi's report came in early September 1887. The viceroy questioned the need to send ministers abroad to countries where Chosŏn had no merchants or trade.⁸² Evidently, rather than forbidding the dispatching of diplomats, the Chinese high official intended to persuade Kojong not to carry out the plan. Three days later, however, yet another letter from Lǐ Hóngzhāng was delivered to the Court of Chosŏn. In his second message, the viceroy, in much less restrained language, stated that as a dependent state, Chosŏn must seek the Chinese government's permission before appointing diplomatic representatives abroad.⁸³ Given the difference in tone between these two dispatches, it can be deduced that the first message, composed on 6 September, was not a direct reply to Yuán Shikǎi's telegram. It can be further assumed that when composing this dispatch, Lǐ was not yet aware that the Chosŏn minister to the United States was about to leave the country to take up his duties in Washington. Rather, his cautious inquiry was a follow-up to Min Yŏng-chun's party leaving for Tokyo. A narrative change in Lǐ's second message, composed on 11 September, clearly shows his awareness and concerns regarding the upcoming further dispatch of Chosŏn envoys.

It took about ten days for Kojong to produce and transfer his reply to Lǐ's inquiries. In his correspondence, dated 22 September, the King explained that Chosŏn's intention to establish legations in the capitals of treaty powers had

previously been discussed with the viceroy on several occasions. Kojong also highlighted that, as the treaty with the United States had been concluded with the assistance of the Chinese government, the latter was well aware of and should be prepared to comply with clauses of the document that ensured Chosŏn's ability to appoint and dispatch official representatives. He added that the same clauses were included in Chosŏn's treaties with other countries and clarified that the current decision to establish legations was taken in response to requests from the treaty powers. Finally, the King stated that in light of the above circumstances, he deemed that China was duly informed of Chosŏn's intentions and approved of them.⁸⁴ Overall, Kojong's reply reflected his firmness in preventing the Chinese from affecting or getting involved in his diplomatic activities.

He proceeded accordingly, implementing no changes in minister Park Chŏng-yang and his party's schedule. The delegation of Chosŏn diplomats was to leave Seoul for Chemulp'o on 24 September. That day, Yuán Shikǎi once again attempted to importune the King to change his purpose by presenting yet another dispatch from Lǐ Hóngzhāng, received by Yuán on 23 September.⁸⁵ This letter, in a much less cautious tone than Lǐ's previous correspondence, once again delivered the Chinese government's clarification that Chosŏn must first ask for Qing approval, and only after obtaining it could Kojong appoint and send ministers to foreign countries.⁸⁶ Further hinting at Chosŏn's role as a dependent state, the telegram specifically stressed that such a procedure would be a proper way for the King to act.⁸⁷

However, this too did not influence Kojong to comply. The issue culminated with Yuán's order to prevent the Chosŏn minister to the United States and his party from leaving the country, allegedly by force.⁸⁸ According to an account of the American representative in Seoul, minister Park and other diplomats were met by Chinese officers as emissaries of the Chinese minister near the city gates, and either by force or intimidation were induced to delay their departure.⁸⁹ Waiting for further instructions, Park stayed outside the city gates for two or three days, when he was summoned back by the King.⁹⁰ Although it was officially announced that the delegation had to postpone its departure due to Park unexpectedly falling sick,⁹¹ evidently, Yuán Shikǎi finally succeeded in pressing Kojong into submission by threatening to declare war if the party of Chosŏn diplomats left for the United States.⁹²

It is evident that the early, rather relaxed, responses to Yuán's threats can be explained as having been fueled by the King's conviction, with international opinion on his side, that none of the written dispatches covering the issue of the Chosŏn diplomats that were delivered to the Korean Court by the Chinese representative in Seoul were written or sanctioned by Lǐ Hóngzhāng. Up until

late September 1887, both Kojong and the majority of Chosŏn state officials were, wrongly as it turned out, assured that this correspondence was forged and issued not by the viceroy but by Yuán Shikǎi himself.⁹³ The events of 24 September, however, poured cold water on the matter. That day, Kojong most probably realized that the Chinese were not above utilizing military force to bend Chosŏn to their will. Experiences of 1882 (the Imo incident) and 1884 (the Kapsin coup), which most dramatically showcased Qing resolution, were evidently recalled in late September 1887, and ultimately forced Kojong to change his approach.

Part four: The bitter end

After late September 1887, feeling that momentum was lost and extremely anxious to have his ministers go,⁹⁴ Kojong had to mitigate his previous adamant attitude. A memorial in the name of the Emperor was prepared to pacify the Qing. In this document, Kojong reaffirmed his country's tributary relationship to China and yet emphasized that the king of Chosŏn was a full sovereign in all matters of international administration and foreign relations.⁹⁵ Aiming to please the Chinese even further, Kojong added that as a dependent state Chosŏn was reverently maintaining and observing the proper rules of courtesy and respect. However, it regarded itself as equal and reciprocal with foreign nations. Hence, ministers, clothed with power, were now needed for Chosŏn to attend to international questions then arising.⁹⁶ Therefore, as a matter of formality, Kojong was appealing for the Chinese Emperor's post-factum approval of the appointment of Chosŏn ministers, which would settle the question regarding envoys in conformity with the stipulations of the country's treaties with Western powers.⁹⁷

Along with that, attempting to combat the Qing pressure with the support of Chosŏn's Western treaty powers, on 30 September, Kojong requested Horace N. Allen⁹⁸ to confer with the Americans and Russians and see whether they would back the King in sending off his envoys.⁹⁹ Allen complied, and a day later met with Waeber and Dinsmore. The latter, offended by Yuán Shikǎi's attitude,¹⁰⁰ suggested sending the delegation of Chosŏn diplomats at once, regardless of the hazards and despite the Qing objections, but Waeber advised they wait until orders of conduct regarding the issue were received from the Russian and American governments. He rationalized that, whether good or bad, the mere fact of the receipt of such a dispatch would be sufficient to intimidate the Chinese, and, possibly, make them back off.¹⁰¹ Ultimately, all parties sided with the Russian minister's suggestion, and related requests were sent to both Washington and Saint Petersburg.

Additionally, on the same day, 30 September 1887, Denny was sent to Shanghai to negotiate the issue with Lǐ Hóngzhāng directly.¹⁰² Apparently, the King expected

to challenge the authority of the Chinese minister in Seoul, and thereby mediate Qing dissatisfaction. For this purpose, Kojong furnished Denny with copies of Yuan's written threats, perhaps hoping to find that they were unauthorized by the viceroy.¹⁰³ Denny's attempt, however, was unfruitful. Lǐ Hóngzhāng confirmed the authority of Yuán's recent actions and, once again, repeated the narrative that Chosŏn had to take China's permission before sending diplomats abroad. The Chinese high official also voiced a new condition that the appointed ministers must not be of a higher grade than minister resident.¹⁰⁴ It is evident that by putting Chosŏn diplomats a grade lower than their Chinese counterparts, Lǐ intended to boldly showcase Chosŏn's dependent status internationally.

The King's attempt to win the support of Russia and the United States also ended in disappointment. When the requested instructions came back, it became clear that none of Chosŏn's so-called partners were willing to mediate. The government in Washington merely expressed surprise and regret regarding the Chinese obstruction to sending a Chosŏn envoy to the United States,¹⁰⁵ Waeber was, apparently, specifically forbidden to take any official or semi-official part in the ongoing crisis.

In this situation, in mid-October, an official letter from China came. The Qing government approved the dispatch of Chosŏn ministers to the West. It, however, demanded, supporting Lǐ Hóngzhāng's claim, that to highlight the difference between China and Chosŏn, the Chosŏn diplomats must be appointed as Minister Resident.¹⁰⁶ This correspondence was soon followed by the rules of conduct, composed by the viceroy for the Chosŏn officials performing their duties abroad, which were delivered to the Chosŏn Court on 9 November. These new regulations dictated that the Chosŏn envoys to the West present themselves for duties through the Chinese ministers, to take a place lower than that of Chinese officials during receptions and other official gatherings, and to always consult with the Chinese ministers before taking any diplomatic actions.¹⁰⁷

Kojong did not comply. Instead, he exploited the momentum and on 16 November, bid farewell to Park Chŏng-yang's party as it left for Washington.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly, the King neither adjusted Park's credentials and official papers nor issued additional instructions for the Chosŏn minister to the United States.¹⁰⁹

Kojong's deliberate negligence did not go unnoticed by the Chinese. Cho Sin-hŭi's party,¹¹⁰ which departed for Europe soon after Park's delegation, faced the consequences of the King's noncompliance. Reaching Hong Kong by the end of 1887, the group was prevented from proceeding further to Europe. In early January 1888, Kojong once again attempted to mediate Qing dissatisfaction by publicly submitting to the three rules of conduct and transferring them to Park Chŏng-yang in Washington.¹¹¹ However, even after that, members of Cho Sin-hŭi's

party, apprehensive of the Chinese, never left (or were never permitted to leave) for their posts in Europe.¹¹²

In lieu of a conclusion

Although not without significant losses, by deception and manipulation in the summer–autumn of 1887, Kojong succeeded at least partly in his intentions. The idea of setting up Chosŏn's legations abroad was a responsive measure: the Qing's political intrusion and diplomatic intervention since late 1886 forced his hand. The idea of staging a coup d'état, prepared by the Chinese and their supporters among local officials, was indeed a creative approach.

However, even these measures did not ensure the success of the whole operation. Kojong's actions led to an escalation of tensions with the Chinese, prompting the Qing to initiate harsh countermeasures. Noticeably, despite their expressed dissatisfaction, Chosŏn's Western treaty partners refrained from becoming involved. Therefore, the campaign of punishment that China carried out after late 1887 affected not only the disposition of political forces on the Korean Peninsula, gradually allocating more and more authority to the pro-Chinese factions at the Court, but a general perception of Chosŏn position as an actor in geopolitics and international diplomatic interactions. With the Qing guiding almost every move of the Chosŏn diplomats abroad, their duties quite soon become purely ceremonial. The ministers in Tokyo and Washington had no power or voice to represent Chosŏn and, more importantly, defend the interests of their state. From that perspective, all the efforts and sacrifices that Kojong made in the summer and autumn of 1887 were in vain.

Notes

1. PhD in Korean History, assistant professor of Korean history. Email: degrishina@hse.ru.
2. Chosŏn's treaty with Japan was concluded in 1876. It was followed by treaties with the United States (1882), Great Britain (1883), Germany (1883), Italy (1884), Russia (1884), and France (1886).
3. *Kojong sillok*, 24 kwŏn, Kojong 24.5.16 imsin, article #2. http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_12405016_002.
4. From mid-1885 to early 1887, Great Britain, in violation of Chosŏn territorial integrity, placed its navy squadron at the Kŏmundo islands. The British navy's venture produced vocal protests from the Chosŏn government and an attempt to approach its Western partners for support. Under the Qing's pressure, this decision was canceled. Nonetheless, the Kŏmundo islands issue, which triggered a massive international scandal, was resolved with threats of invasion from the Russian Empire and the Qing taking a role of a mediator.

- For details, see Sangpil Jin, *Surviving Imperial Intrigues: Korea's Struggle for Neutrality Amid Empires, 1882–1907* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2021), pp. 63–64.
5. General monographs honoring the theme of Chosŏn foreign relations (e.g., *Han'guk ūi taeye kwan'gye wa oegyosa kŭndae p'yŏn* [Seoul: Tongbuna yŏksa chaedan, 2018]; George Alexander Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899* [Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1982]); specialized research focusing on Chosŏn's relations with the United States (e.g., Kim Won-mo, *Han-Mi sugyosa* [Seoul: Chŏlhak kwa hyŏnsilsa, 1999]) or Japan (e.g., *Tong Asia sok ūi Han-Il kwan'gyesa, sang* [Seoul: Chei aen ssi, 2010]); and monographs about historical figures taking part in these events (e.g., Han Ch'ŏl-ho, "Ch'odae Chu-Mi Chŏngwŏnsa Pak Chŏng-yang ūi hwaldong kwa kŭ ūiŭi," *Han'guksa hakpo [needs han'gul]* 77 [2019]: 29–67) contain no detailed outlook on Kojong's intention to establish Chosŏn legations in Japan, the United States, and Europe. At best case scenario, some briefly mention it without going into detail about the crisis that this initiative created in the autumn of 1887.
 6. The British seizure of Chosŏn's Kŏmundo became the main trigger for Sino-Russian talks. Ultimately, by mid-November 1886, both parties concluded a verbal agreement whereby both Russia and China guaranteed Chosŏn's status quo, i.e., its sovereign and territorial integrity. This agreement temporarily pacified hostile Sino-Russian relations, as the government in Saint Petersburg de-facto acknowledged China's rights in Chosŏn. For details, see Korph, Memorandum osobogo sobraniya, 26 January 1887; Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii, Fond №143 «Kitayskiy stol», 491, 5, 1887; Vsepoddaneyshiy doklady, 168, List 10—10 oborot, 17 oborot—18.
 7. A riot caused by Chinese sailors in the Japanese port of Nagasaki in mid-August 1886. The event resulted in numerous casualties on both sides and embittered already complicated Sino-Japanese relations. By mid-February 1887, difficulties between China and Japan were settled. For detail, see "Mr. Denby to Mr. Bayard," 15 February 1887, #306. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1887/d149>.
 8. General public opinion was that the Kŏmundo issue was solved due to China's interference. This significantly elevated the Qing's authority and influence over Chosŏn. For details, see "Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Bayard," 22 January 1887, #50, *Index to the Executive Documents of the House of Representatives for the Second Session of the Fiftieth Congress, 1888–'90, Vol. 1, Part 1* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1888–1889), p. 255.
 9. The Convention of Tientsin, concluded between China and Japan on 18 April 1885, ordered Chinese and Japanese troops to leave the peninsula, and forbade both countries from providing military instructors to Chosŏn. Amid an uneasy internal and external situation—the aftermath of the Kapsin Coup—it completely deprived Chosŏn of any external military protection. For details, see "Convention of Tientsin, 1885 (Tiānjīn Convention)" in National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), "Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations," Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (IASA), University of Tōkyō. <https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/pw/18850418.T1E.html>.
 10. "Kempermann to Bismark, A," 2271, Söul, den 27. Dezember 1886, PAAA_RZ201-018908_12 ff., *Togil oegyo munsŏ Han'guk p'yŏn 1874~1910, 2* (독일외교문서 한국편 1874~1910, 2). Koryŏ taehakkyo *Togil ōgwŏn munhwa yŏn'guso*, 2020, p. 616.
 11. "Kumani to Girs," 10 May 1887, 150, Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii, Fond №150 «Yaponskiy stol», Doneseniya poverennogo v delakh i general'nogo konsula v Seula i raznaya perepiska o polozhenii del v Koreye, ob otnosheniyakh onoy k Kitayu i o snosheniyakh Koreyey Rossii i drugikh derzhav, list 283.
 12. George Clayton Foulk (1856–1893) was a United States Navy officer. From 1883 to 1886, he served as Naval Attaché to Chosŏn, and from 1886 to 1887, he served as the US minister in Chosŏn. Foulk maintained close relations with several influential politicians and enjoyed Kojong's confidence.

13. The issue was finally solved to Chosŏn's satisfaction in mid-1888, when three American officers "arrived to drill Korean troops." For details, see Horace Newton Allen, *Korea: The Fact and Fancy* (Seoul: Hanbinmun'go, 1983), p. 177.
14. Yuán Shikāi (袁世凱, 1859–1916) was a Qing military official and diplomat. Yuán first arrived at Chosŏn in 1882 as a military commander; in 1885 he was appointed the Imperial Resident in Seoul and held this post until 1895.
15. Kim Yun-sik (김윤식 / 金允植, 1835–1922) was an influential politician and diplomat. In 1884, he served as the Foreign Minister of Chosŏn and signed a treaty with the Russian Empire. Despite that, Kim Yun-sik was known as a pro-Chinese politician.
16. William Woodville Rockhill (1854–1914) was a US diplomat. From December 1886 to April 1887, he served as the US representative in Chosŏn.
17. "Kim Yun Sik to W.W. Rockhill," 30 December 1886, in Spencer J. Palmer, ed., *Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, Volume II: The Period of Growing Influence, 1887–1895* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 56–57.
18. "Kim Yun Sik to W.W. Rockhill," 30 December 1886.
19. Foulk was about to leave the country for Japan, where he expected to treat his worsening illness.
20. "George C. Foulk to W.W. Rockhill," 2 January 1887, p. 59.
21. "Kim Yun Sik to W.W. Rockhill," 28 March 1887, p. 64.
22. "W.W. Rockhill to Secretary of State," 24 January 1887, #52, p. 62.
23. While to this day, it remains unclear whether Kojong really planned to employ the former United States official, written evidence from the time reveals that Foulk expressed his "preferences" for the "arrangement" of the house, which were taken into account by the King's agents. For detail, see "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 3 May 1887, #14, p. 67.
24. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 3 May 1887, #14, p. 67.
25. Hugh Anderson Dinsmore (1850–1930) was an American politician and diplomat. From early 1887 to 1890, he served as the US minister in Chosŏn.
26. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 3 May 1887, #14, p. 67.
27. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 3 May 1887, #14, pp. 67–68.
28. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 3 May 1887, #14, pp. 67–68. While this statement generally hinted at the Chinese party's hand in the issue, Kim refused to name his source.
29. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 3 May 1887, #14, pp. 67–68.
30. "Waeber to Girs," 29 April 1887, delo 493, 1, K1, 1885–1887, Doneseniya poverennogo v delakh i general'nogo konsula v Seula i raznaya perezpiska o polozhenii del v Koreye, ob otnosheniyakh onoy k Kitayu i o snosheniyakh Koreyey Rossii i drugikh derzhav, list 288.
31. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 3 May 1887, #14, p. 69.
32. "Waeber to Girs," 29 April 1887, list 288.
33. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 9 May 1887, #16, *Korean-American Relations*, p. 71.
34. "Yuan Siu Kwai to Hugh A. Dinsmore," 28 May 1887, pp. 77–78.
35. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 9 May 1887, #16, p. 72; "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 27 May 1887, #20, p. 13.
36. "T.F. Bayard to Hugh A. Dinsmore," 17 June 1887, p. 78.
37. "T.F. Bayard to Hugh A. Dinsmore," 17 June 1887, p. 78.
38. This diplomatic approach was proclaimed after the Imo incident of 1882, and focused on the diversification of Chosŏn diplomacy, aiming to strengthen the country's presence

- in global geopolitics and its gradual reformation. For details, see *Kojong sillok*, 19 kwŏn, Kojong 19.8.5 mu-o, article 5. http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_11908005_005.
39. In the early summer of 1887, amid China's "tightening her grasp upon this government and its King," the British minister in Seoul became "quite outspoken in his declaration that [Chosŏn] ... is a vassal state and altogether incapable of self-government," while from "the tone of the public press in Japan it would seem that even that [the Japanese] government has almost decided to allow the absorption of [Chosŏn] ... by the Chinese without opposition from her." For details, see "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 27 May 1887, #20, p. 11.
 40. In his report to the foreign minister in Saint Petersburg, Waeber assumed that rumors about a coup d'état, spread by Min Yeong-ik, were "a trial ball, released to reveal a common opinion" aiming to induce Chosŏn to use its treaty powers to protest against Chinese policies on the Korean Peninsula. For details, see Waeber to Girs, 4 June 1887, list 315.
 41. Min Yŏng-ik (민영익 / 閔泳翊, 1860–1914) was an influential diplomat and politician of late nineteenth century. Since 1882, he maintained close relations with the King and was a principal actor in the events of the summer of 1886.
 42. Owen N. Denny's report reveals that the conspiracy of May–July 1887 (spreading rumors of a coup d'état) was carried out by Min Yeong-ik "with the knowledge of the King" and that Min "faithfully reported its different phases from time to time to His majesty." For details, see "China and Korea" in Owen Nickerson Denny, *An American Adviser in Late Yi Korea: The Letters of Owen Nickerson Denny*, ed. Robert R. Swartout, Jr. (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 156. Lǐ Hóngzhāng's disappointment in Min Yŏng-ik was apparently so great that he intended to question Min personally, right after the Chosŏn official returned to China in early August. That, however, did not happen, as Min fled from Lǐ's agents and spent the next few months in hiding. By October 1887, the viceroy was convinced that it was Min Yeong-ik who "laid the plot [for a coup d'état] and induced Yuan to go into it." For details, see "Copy from the dispatch of the envoy in Beijing," 28 August 1887, list 332; Denny, *An American Adviser in Late Yi Korea*, p. 156.
 43. Taewŏn'gun (홍선대원군 / 興宣大院君, 1821–1898), also known as Hŭngsŏn Taewŏn'gun, was born as Yi Ha-ŭng (이하응 / 李昞應). The Taewŏn'gun was Kojong's biological father. He ruled Chosŏn as regent from 1864 to 1873, and after his retirement was accused of several attempts to dethrone his own son. One of these, carried out in 1882 during the Imo incident, was almost successful.
 44. "Kumani to Girs," 19 May 1887, list 300.
 45. "Kumani to Girs," 28 May 1887, list 311.
 46. Carl Waeber (Карл Иванович Вебер, 1841–1910) was a Russian Imperial diplomat and a close acquaintance of Kojong. From 1885 to 1897, he served as the Russian representative in Chosŏn. In this capacity, Waeber largely contributed to strengthening the Russian Empire's influence on the Korean Peninsula.
 47. Apparently, Waeber was referring to the campaign that was launched against Foulk by Yuán Shíkǎi in late 1886.
 48. "Kumani to Girs," 28 May 1887, list 311.
 49. "Girs to Beijing," 26 May 1887, #41, list 310.
 50. After the so-called letter incident of 1886, the Russian Empire's political presence on the Korean Peninsula had temporarily weakened. For details, see Daria Grishina "A Pawn in the Great Game: Chosŏn's Rapprochement with the Russian Empire Amidst the British Seizure of Kōmundo, 1884–1886," *European Journal of Korean Studies*, 21.1 (2021): 189–212.
 51. "Girs to Beijing," 26 May 1887, #41, list 310.
 52. It can be assumed that this move was strategically planned. Since 1886, the Germans were making efforts to expand business activities in China. By 1887, Germany became China's third largest trade partner. Its influences on the Qing's policies grew accordantly.

- The Russians expected to utilize the German influence in China to counterbalance the British political and diplomatic ventures in the region. For details, see A. L. Narochnitskiy, *Kolonial'naya politika kapitalisticheskikh derzhav na Dal'nem Vostoke 1860–1895* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademiiya nauk SSSR, 1956), p. 452.
53. Lǐ Hóngzhāng (李鴻章, 1823–1901) was an influential politician and diplomat in Qing China. Since the mid-1870s, he oversaw China's policies regarding Chosŏn. Under Li's supervision, Chosŏn signed a treaty with the United States in 1882.
 54. "Kumani to Girs," 28 May 1887, list 311.
 55. Kumani's secret telegram, 2 June 1887, list 314.
 56. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 21 June 1887, #30, *Korean–American Relations*, p. 13.
 57. Kojong had several siblings, however, at the time of events only his older brother survived. Therefore, it is possible to assume that the conspiracy aimed to replace Kojong not with his younger brother but with his nephew. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 21 June 1887, #30, p. 14.
 58. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 21 June 1887, #30, p. 14.
 59. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 21 June 1887, #30, p. 14.
 60. "Waeber to Girs," 4 June 1887, list 315.
 61. Owen Nickerson Denny (1838–1900) was a US diplomat. From 1877, he served in China, first as the US consul in Tianjin, then, from 1880, as consul-general in Shanghai. From 1886 to 1890, Denny was stationed in Chosŏn as a foreign advisor to King Kojong.
 62. Denny, *An American Adviser in Late Yi Korea*, p. 155.
 63. "Kumani to Girs," 22 June 1887, #91, list 323.
 64. It is important to note that in October 1887, Lǐ Hóngzhāng provided Denny with a different account of the events: "On the occasion of my second visit in October of last year, to discuss Korea's right to send public ministers abroad and to open ports in the interest of trade, as well as to protest against Yuan's latest conspiracy against the King, if it became necessary, in one interview, finding that the Viceroy turned a deaf ear to everything reflecting in any way upon that official, I was about to dispose of him once [and] for all, as I supposed, by presenting the indisputable evidence of his recent treasonable conduct, when, to my amazement, the Viceroy coolly informed me that he knew all about the dethronement scheme; that while Yuan was in it, yet it was all the fault of Min Young Ik, who laid the plot and induced Yuan to go into it, and that for his stupidity in letting himself get drawn into such a thing he had been severely reprimanded." For details, see Denny, *An American Adviser in Late Yi Korea*, p. 156.
 65. Kumani's secret telegram, 29 June 1887, list 325.
 66. Both Dinsmore and Yun Chi-ho's accounts of events reveals that Min Yeong-ik left the country in late July, before 1 August. For details, see "Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 21 August 1887, #49, *Korean–American Relations*, p. 100; Yun Chi-ho, 21 August 1887, *Yun Chi-ho ilgi*, vol. 1, trans. Song Pyŏng-gi and Park Chŏng-sin (Seoul: Yonsei taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2001), p. 450.
 67. Kumani's secret telegram, 10 August 1887, list 331.
 68. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 21 August 1887, #49, p. 100.
 69. "The dispatch of the Russian Representative in Beijing," Aleksey Kumani, 28 August 1887, list 332.
 70. *Han'guk ūi taeye kwan'gye wa oegyosa kundaep'yŏn*, p. 350.
 71. Min Yŏng-chun (민영준 / 閔榮駿, also known as Min Yŏng-hwi, 민영휘 / 閔泳徽, 1852–1935) was a politician and diplomat in Chosŏn and the Korean Empire. After 1905, he became actively involved in the independence struggle on the Korean Peninsula. He was personally acquainted with many independence activists such as An Jŏng-gŭn.

72. Park Chŏng-yang (박정양 / 朴定陽, 1841–1904) was a politician and diplomat in Chosŏn and the Korean Empire. In 1887, he was siding with the pro-Chinese lobby at the Chosŏn government. In the later years, however, his political standing changed: Park supported the pro-Japanese reforms of 1895 and participated in activities of the Independence club and People's joint association.
73. Sim Sang-hak (심상학 / 沈相學, 1830/1845–1890) was a politician and diplomat of Chosŏn.
74. *Kojong sillok*, 24 kwŏn, *Kojong* 24.6.29, ūl-myo, article 1. http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_12406029_001.
75. Robert R. Swartout, Jr., *Mandarins, Gunboats and Power Politics: Owen Nickerson Denny and the International Rivalries in Korea* (Honolulu, HI: University Press of Hawai'i, 1980), p. 90.
76. *Han'guk ūi taeye kwan'gye wa oegyosa kŭndae p'yŏn*, p. 352.
77. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 23 August 1887, #51, *Korean–American Relations*, p. 48.
78. For details, see "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 23 August 1887, #51, p. 48.
79. "The dispatch of the Russian Representative in Beijing," Aleksey Kumani, 28 August 1887, list 332; Payson J. Treat, "China and Korea, 1885–1894," *Political Science Quarterly*, 49.4 (1934): 536.
80. Such as, for example, Yuán Shikǎi's attempt to protest the rumored employment of Foulk as an advisor to the King.
81. For details, see "The Dispatch of the Russian Representative in Beijing," Aleksey Kumani, 28 August 1887, list 332.
82. "Mr. Yuan Sii Kwai to the Corean Government, Inclosure #1 in Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard," 30 September 1887, in #53, *Index to the Executive Documents*, p. 434; 6 September 1887, Ofitsial'noye soobshcheniye Yuanya, Kitayskogo Upolnomochennogo v Koreye dlya glavnogo zavedyvaniya trgovymy snosheniyami, Sanovnika tret'yey stepeni, vozvedennogo v zvaniye Rukovoditelya, list 340.
83. Doneseniya poverennogo v delakh i general'nogo konsula v Seula i raznaya perezpiska o polozhenii del v Koreye, ob otnosheniyakh onoy k Kitayu i o snosheniyakh Koreyey Rossii i drugikh derzhav, list 341.
84. Kyŏng-min Chŏng, "Chosŏn ūi ch'odae chu-Mi Chosŏn kongsa p'agyŏn kwa ch'inch'ŏng nosŏn anghwa," *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 96 (2015): 267–268. It seems important to note that in his reply Kojong did not address the Chinese party's lack of disapproval of the appointment of a Chosŏn minister to Japan.
85. "Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard", 30 September 1887, #53, p. 433.
86. "Mr. Yuan Sii Kwai to the Corean Government," 23 September, Inclosure #2 in "Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard," 30 September 1887, #53, p.434.
87. "Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard," 30 September 1887, #53, p. 434.
88. "Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard," 30 September 1887, #53, p. 433. Horace N. Allen, however, claims that the party was recalled under pressure from Yuán, who forged a telegram from Lǐ Hóngzhāng. For details, see Horace Newton Allen, 23 September 1887, *Allen ūi ilgi*, trans. Kim Wŏn-mo (Seoul: Tan'guk taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu 1994), p. 516.
89. "Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard," 30 September 1887, #53, p. 434.
90. "Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard," 30 September 1887, #53, p. 434.
91. "Waeber to Girs," 21 September 1887, #100, list 338.
92. Allen, 23 September 1887, *Allen ūi ilgi*, p. 516; "Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard," 30 September 1887, #53, p. 434.
93. "Waeber to Girs," 21 September 1887, #100, list 338.
94. "Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard," 30 September 1887, #53, p. 434.

95. "Draft of Memorial presented to His Majesty, the Emperor of China by the King of Corea in the matter of sending Envoy's abroad, Enclosure in Charles Denby to Secretary of State," 9 December 1887, #521, *Korean-American Relations*, pp. 110–112.
96. "Draft of Memorial presented to His Majesty, the Emperor of China by the King of Corea in the matter of sending Envoy's abroad," Enclosure in Charles Denby to Secretary of State, 9 December 1887, #521.
97. "Draft of Memorial presented to His Majesty, the Emperor of China by the King of Corea in the matter of sending Envoy's abroad," Enclosure in Charles Denby to Secretary of State, 9 December 1887, #521.
98. Horace Newton Allen (1858–1932), was a physician, diplomat and Christian missionary. He arrived at Chosŏn in early 1884 as a physician. His relations with Min Yeong-ik (Allen attended Min's injuries after the attempted assassination on 4 December 1884) became a starting point for Allen's strengthening political standing and authority in Seoul. By the late 1880s he enjoyed Kojong's confidence. In 1890, he was appointed as a secretary of the US legation in Seoul, and since 1897 served as the US general consul in the Korean Empire. Allen left the country in 1905.
99. Allen, 30 September 1887, *Allen ūi ilgi*, p. 517.
100. On 27 September, the American minister attempted to ask his Chinese counterpart why the latter was discriminating against the Chosŏn envoy assigned for duty in Washington, while having no objections regarding Min Yeong-jun's party leaving for Japan. Yuán simply stated that he was not aware about the appointment of the Chosŏn minister to Japan, or of the party of Chosŏn diplomats leaving for Tokyo. This did not convince Dinsmore as he knew Yuán had reportedly attended "entertainments given in honor of the envoy to Japan" and had been present at Min Yeong-jun's "final leave ... with demonstrative congratulations." For details, see "Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard," 15 October 1887, #63, p. 437.
101. Allen, 30 September 1887, *Allen ūi ilgi*, p. 517.
102. Denny, *An American Adviser in Late Yi Korea*, p.156.
103. Allen, 1 October 1887, *Allen ūi ilgi*, p. 517.
104. "Hugh A. Dinsmore to Secretary of State," 11 November 1887, #71, p. 107.
105. "Mr. Bayard to Mr. Dinsmore," 7 October 1887, #38, p. 436.
106. "Mr. Yuan Sii Kwai to the Corean Foreign office," 21 October 1887, Inclosure in Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard, 11 November 1887, #71, *Ibid.*, p. 441.
107. "Telegram from his excellency Li Hung Chang to Mr. Yuan Sii Kwai, Chinese Commissioner at Seoul," Inclosure in Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard, 17 November 1887, #73, *Ibid.*, pp. 441–442.
108. "Telegram from his excellency Li Hung Chang to Mr. Yuan Sii Kwai, Chinese Commissioner at Seoul," pp. 441–442.
109. Evidently, during the audience with the President of the United States on 17 January 1888, Park delivered Kojong's letter dated 23 September 1887. For details, see "Letter of the Korean King to the President of the United States," *Korean-American Relations*, pp. 113–114.
110. Cho Sin-hŭi (조신희 / 趙臣熙, 1851–?) was a politician and diplomat of the Late Chosŏn period. In mid-November he replaced Sim Sang-hak as the Chosŏn minister to Europe. For details, see *Kojong sillok*, 24 kwŏn, Kojong 24.9.28 im-o, article 1. http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_12409028_001.
111. "Letter from King of Corea to Viceroy Li Hung Chang," published in Shin-pao 13 January 1888, Inclosure in Mr. Denby to Mr. Bayard, 21 January 1888, #551, *Index to the Executive Documents*, pp. 249–250. According to Ch'ŏl-ho Han, Park was informed of the so-called three rules of conduct sometime shortly after the party's arrival to Washington. For detail, see Ch'ŏl-ho Han, "Ch'odae Chu-Mi Chŏngwŏnsa Pak Chŏng-yang ūi hwaldong kwa kŭ ūiui,"

35. However, pressured by Allen, Park did not follow these rules in his official capacity. For details, see Allen, 13 January 1888, *Allen ūi ilgi*, p. 533.
112. Cho Sin-hŭi, who explained his inability to follow the King's order and take up the post in Europe because of the “*sense of sickness*,” returned to Chosŏn only in mid-February of 1890, spending almost two years in self-imposed exile in Hong Kong. He was punished by the King for his disobedience and exiled, but that was soon lifted. For details, see *Kojong sillok*, 27 kwŏn, Kojong 27.1.12 kye-chuk, article 3; http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_12701012_003; *Kojong sillok*, 27 kwŏn, Kojong 27.1.16 chŏng-sa, article 1; http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_12701016_001; *Kojong sillok*, 27 kwŏn, Kojong 27.8.2 ki-hae, article 2; http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_12708002_002.

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