

Orthodoxy and the Soviet Regime: From Conflict to Adaptation

Alexei V. Makarkin

QUERY SHEET

This page lists questions we have about your paper. The numbers displayed at left are hyperlinked to the location of the query in your paper.

The title and author names are listed on this sheet as they will be published, both on your paper and on the Table of Contents. Please review and ensure the information is correct and advise us if any changes need to be made. In addition, please review your paper as a whole for typographical and essential corrections.

Your PDF proof has been enabled so that you can comment on the proof directly using Adobe Acrobat. For further information on marking corrections using Acrobat, please visit <http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/production/acrobat.asp>; <https://authorservices.taylorandfrancis.com/how-to-correct-proofs-with-adobe/>

The CrossRef database (www.crossref.org/) has been used to validate the references. Changes resulting from mismatches are tracked in red font.

AUTHOR QUERIES

Q1 Editor, please check: could receive, or could not receive?



Orthodoxy and the Soviet Regime: From Conflict to Adaptation

Alexei V. Makarkin

ABSTRACT

The Soviet authorities applied the most rigid model of state–confessional relations—segregation—to the Russian Orthodox Church. They emphasized the complete exclusion of the church from public life and its subsequent liquidation. By 1919 the Church was already publicly avoiding conflict with the Soviet authorities; its attempts at adaptation, however, were unsuccessful. By 1939, the church organization in the Soviet Union was practically eliminated, though the majority of the population still believed in God. This fact, as well as foreign-policy interests and the loyalty to the state exhibited by the majority of believers during the war, led to a softening of the segregation model and to the church’s adaptation to operating within the Soviet state.

KEYWORDS

Russian Orthodox Church;
Soviet Union; Lenin; Stalin;
socialism

We can examine the relationship between church and state in Russia/the Soviet Union using a framework of four models of state–confessional relations: identification (a “state church”), cooperation (freedom of religion with special relations between the state and one or more confessions), separation (freedom of religion with a separation of church and state), and segregation (separation of church and state with religious discrimination).¹

Before the Bolshevik victory

Until 1917, the Orthodox Church in Russia was officially “dominant and preeminent,” according to the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire. However, after Nicholas II signed a decree on religious tolerance in

English translation © 2022 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, from the Russian text, “Pravoslavie i sovetskaya vlast’: ot konflikta k adaptatsii.”

Alexei V. Makarkin is affiliated with the National Research University Higher School of Economics. E-mail: a_makarkin@mail.ru

Notes have been renumbered for this edition.—Trans.

Translated by Brad Damaré. Published with the author’s permission.

© 2022 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

April 1905 and the manifesto of October 17 proclaiming freedom of conscience, the identification model began to evolve into a cooperation model. The Church officially remained dominant and preeminent, but the first component of this formula began to erode. 30

The overthrow of the autocracy meant there were no longer barriers to transitioning to a cooperation model. The provisional government adopted the law “On the Abolition of Religious and National Restrictions” and a resolution “On the Freedom of Conscience” and transferred parochial schools to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Education. The state stripped the Church of its “dominant” status (the question of “preeminent” remained arguable), but it also granted the Church self-governance, withdrawing the strict control that had existed since Peter’s time. 35 40

That said, there was no transition to a separation model. The Provisional Government continued allocating funds for the operation of the Church, including its Local Council meetings. However, it is unlikely that the socialist majority of the Constituent Assembly would have continued this course, and the transition to the separation model seemed almost inevitable. The Church, for its part, viewed any infringement of its usual prerogatives negatively and managed to indicate its harsh disagreements with the Provisional Government about the fate of its parochial schools. However, no one in the Church could have expected that a single party would come to power in the country and reject any arrangements with it at all. 45 50

Vladimir Lenin, who dominated the party as both its leader and its theorist, was ruthless about any attempts to synthesize socialism and religion when it came to party ideology. On a personal level, he demonstrated an undisguised hatred of religion and God. He wrote to Maxim Gorky, “Any religious idea, any idea of any dear little god, any flirtation even with some dear little god, is the most inexpressible abomination.” Even more remarkable is Lenin’s argument from the same letter about the special danger posed by “a priest without a cassock, a priest without a crude religion, a priest of ideas and democracy.”² Thus, Lenin demonstrated that he perceived attempts at reform in the religious sphere not only as hostile to the cause of communism but as even less acceptable than the traditional church, which he considered subject to numerous vices and therefore easier to discredit. 55 60

Putting together a segregation model

Once they came to power, the Bolsheviks implemented the segregation model: The church was excluded from all spheres of public life, up to the possibility of its elimination. This model underwent a complex evolution over time, but it was always discriminatory. 65

In their first months in power, the Bolsheviks tried to avoid a “head-on” conflict with the church while they addressed more pressing problems. 70

However, the decree on land adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets nationalized church lands, among others. The shelling of the Kremlin with “red” artillery was a shock for the participants of the Local Council that was taking place simultaneously with the Bolshevik revolution.

The pressure on the church gradually increased between December 1917 and January 1918, while a “framework” document that would enshrine the segregation model was under development. The turning point came on January 19, 1918, when the Red Guards began the process of seizing the property of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, Petrograd’s main monastery, and killed the Archpriest Petr Skipetrov, who was protesting against their lawlessness. That same day, the newly elected Patriarch Tikhon (Bellavin) delivered the harshest message of the entire patriarchate, making the severe persecution of the church known and calling on the faithful to stand up for her, even if it meant “to suffer for the cause of Christ.”³ The key point is that he anathematized the church’s persecutors, clearly with the Bolshevik leaders in mind, albeit without mentioning them by their names.

A few days later, on January 23, the Council of People’s Commissars adopted the fundamental document on church–state relations, the decree “On the Separation of Church from State and of School from Church,” which defined the foundations of their segregation model. Its rhetoric was markedly “separational” by nature (for example, it proclaimed the abolition of all restrictions on choice of belief and even forbade the issuing of “any local laws or regulations that would hamper or restrict freedom of conscience”), but a number of its provisions created the basis for segregation.

First, “ecclesiastical and religious societies” could not own any property (it was all declared public property, that is, *de facto* nationalized) and they had no right of legal-entity status. The ban on religious education in schools left only one opportunity for that kind of education—“citizens may teach and study religion in private”—effectively marginalizing it.

Second, only “free performance of religious rites” was allowed, and even then, with the proviso that free performance was allowed only insofar as it did not violate the public order and was not accompanied by infringement on the rights of citizens. It provided for no freedom to preach or publish religious literature and periodicals, though these were not prohibited either, leaving the state room to maneuver in its relations with the church.

However, protests in support of the church and protection of its property were relatively few and scattered; this demonstrated the church’s weakness, which allowed the Bolsheviks to toughen their policies against it. For the most part, both clerics and parishioners tried to avoid direct conflict with the new government. Their sympathies were of course on the side of the anti-Bolshevik forces (the hierarchs and clergy on territory under White control actively supported them), but they usually did not dare demonstrate their disloyalty directly. In 1918, Patriarch Tikhon lamented that he had more

than one hundred million baptized in his flock, but barely any of them could even be considered catechumens (that is, preparing for baptism).⁴ Much later, after the end of the Civil War, Count Valerian Murav'ev spoke through his heroine Sofiia about the church's vulnerability, about its inability to defend its shrines in the face of the anti-religious Komsomol demonstration of 1923, when "nobody came out" in response. "Everyone was afraid or everyone was indifferent."⁵ More precisely, the fears of the minority were complemented by the indifference of the majority. 115

Furthermore, the state pursued a more complex policy toward the church than simple suppression. On the one hand, it not only pursued a policy of completely ousting the church from the sphere of education, but it also relied on direct terror against its representatives as part of the "Red Terror" against all real and potential opponents of Soviet power. This terror was aimed both at intimidating the church by stripping it of its ability to resist and at eliminating or neutralizing its representatives who were most socially active and most bitterly disinclined toward the Soviet authorities. This approach achieved its desired result: The January 1919 message would be the patriarch's harshest. 125

On the other hand, Article 13 of the 1918 Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic provided for freedom of both religious and anti-religious propaganda. The possibility of revitalizing church life remained, along with the emergence of new institutions that were difficult for the authorities to control: "Moscow was covered with a network of brotherhoods, circles, and unions" whose activities were sanctioned by the patriarch.⁶ The church was reduced in size in terms of the "nominal" Orthodox, but it was not possible to exclude it completely from public life. 130

Under these conditions, the church began to evolve by the end of 1918 from its difficult conflict with the Soviet authorities to a desire to build relations on the basis of a separation model. By mid 1919, the church leadership actually recognized the Soviet legal framework.⁷ While the outcome of the Civil War was not yet a foregone conclusion, and the White Army under General Anton Denikin was advancing on Moscow, the patriarch's message of October 8, 1919, publicly established their political loyalty to the Soviets. Patriarch Tikhon forbade the clergy to welcome the Whites or "to interfere in the political life of the country, to belong to any parties, and even more so, to make liturgical rites and sacred rites an instrument of political demonstrations."⁸ Thus, the church had switched to an adaptation strategy as early as 1919, effectively offering the Bolsheviks a compromise that was not, however, accepted. 140

From segregation to liquidation

The segregation model persisted for the nearly seven decades that followed, though it too evolved over that time. 145

The focus until 1939 was on liquidation of the church, albeit by various methods. After the Civil War ended, the New Economic Policy was introduced, which meant controlled liberalization in the economic sphere and an easing of policy in the public sphere. The church was an exception, however, since it remained the only pre-revolutionary institution of a national scale; it might have emerged from the Civil War with considerable losses, but it retained its organizational structure and influence over parishioners. It also remained completely ideologically unacceptable to the Bolsheviks.

The attack on the church that Lenin initiated in 1922 was of a complex nature and included both an intensification of direct repression (including the execution of a leading hierarch, Metropolitan Veniamin (Kazanskii), and the arrest of Patriarch Tikhon), the seizure of its movable property (church valuables), and a schism initiated by the authorities (initiated in this case by Lev Trotsky, who tried to remain in the background) and carried out by the leadership of the sixth department (the “church” branch) of the secret State Political Directorate (GPU), under whose auspices a renewal movement appeared and declared church reformism. The pro-Soviet rhetoric of this movement was, with few exceptions, driven by conformism. Its representatives were counting on the normalization of relations with the state; their emotions were vividly expressed by the priest Vladimir Gradusov (later the Yaroslavl archbishop of the Russian Orthodox Church), who wrote in 1922, “we, the churchmen, are tired—exhausted, and we have no strength to continue living like this.” In return for their complete loyalty, he wrote, “let the Soviet Authorities see us as honest citizens and well-meaning toward them.”⁹

However, back in 1919–1920, the proposals from within the Cheka to create a “Soviet church” controlled by the special services was rejected, leading the leader of the Cheka, Felix Dzerzhinsky, to explain to his subordinate Martyn Latsis that “the church is falling apart. We need to help it along, not to revive it in a renovated form.”¹⁰ This was not merely a rejection of the church as an institution: The Soviet authorities saw people of the church as opponents who must be made loyal.

Renovationism received the support of a significant number of the “tired and exhausted” clergy but was rejected by the overwhelming majority of parishioners, those who remained in the church and those in particular who participated in post-revolutionary religious activity. They were able to “vote with their feet,” refusing to visit churches that came under the control of the Renovationists, nor could they be subject to sanction for this. In other cases, the more active parishioners prevented Renovationist priests from entering the church, though this came with a risk, albeit less of a risk than direct opposition to the Soviet authorities.

Furthermore, the European politicians with whom the newly created Soviet Union sought to build relations considered destruction of the

canonical church and replacement with a “red” version to be unacceptable; this was reflected in an ultimatum delivered by the British foreign minister Lord Curzon on May 8, 1923, which included the cessation of religious persecution. 200

After the failure of the Renovatianist movement, the Soviet authorities changed their tactics: They preserved the movement itself but released Patriarch Tikhon from prison on June 26, 1923, a month and a half after Lord Curzon’s note. Tikhon was allowed to return to the church leadership provided he publish an appeal acknowledging his guilt before the Soviet government. In this appeal, the primate of the church disavowed his own statements (“harsh attacks”) for the first time in Russian history, but he also sought to preserve his own identity, dissociating himself from identification with the atheist authorities. “Of course I do not pretend to be the kind of admirer of the Soviet authorities that the church Renovatianists are . . . but on the other hand, I am by no means the kind of enemy they make me out to be.”¹¹ 205 210

However, neutrality was not what the authorities needed; rather, it was complete subordination. The authenticity of Patriarch Tikhon’s testament and its further concessions to the state (including a call to “submit to Soviet power not in fear, but in good conscience,” and a threat of trial against the hierarchs of the church abroad who refused to reconcile with the Bolsheviks and provided aid to monarchist-sympathizing émigrés), made public after his death in 1925, is disputed by a number of scholars.¹² Forced to recognize the authenticity of the “testament,” Tikhon’s successor as head of the church, the patriarchal locum tenens (they were permitted to elect a new patriarch only in 1943), Metropolitan Petr (Polianskii), never referred to it afterward and pursued a policy of preserving the identity of the church, which led to his arrest in late 1925 and many years of imprisonment, culminating in his execution in 1937. The Chekists then stepped up their pressure on the church in order to crush it as much as possible, encouraging any activity that might contribute to new schisms, fragment the church, and consequently delegitimize it. 215 220 225

After some hesitation, Petr’s successor, the deputy patriarchal locum tenens, Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodskii), accepted the conditions of Soviet power, issuing a 1927 declaration in which he, unlike Tikhon, submitted completely to the state, declaring, “We want to be Orthodox and at the same time to recognize the Soviet Union as our civic Motherland, whose joys and successes are our own joys and successes, and whose failings are our own failings.”¹³ Thus, the political loyalty to which Patriarch Tikhon agreed was replaced by a complete solidarity with the Soviet authorities. At the same time, the Declaration of Sergius contained a mention that critics of the Soviet regime could still participate in church activities, “leaving their political sympathies at home.” For the totalitarian regime that had taken shape by 230 235

that time, this kind of doublethink based on inner disloyalty was already unacceptable. 240

Sergius's declaration meant that the authorities no longer encouraged new schisms, since the process of subordination was complete, and it was easier to control a centralized organization. Furthermore, the relevance of the Renovationists dramatically decreased, and they too became subject to persecution (closure of churches, arrests, curtailing of educational activities). At the same time, repressions against the church continued, sometimes intensifying (during the collectivization period), sometimes temporarily abating, affecting both the supporters of Metropolitan Sergius's declaration and the opponents who refused to submit to its authority. In 1929, pursuant to Politburo resolution "On Measures to Strengthen Anti-Religious Work," the provision allowing religious propaganda was removed from the Constitution; thus, the church became isolated within its own temples (a similar approach was enshrined in the Soviet Constitutions of 1936 and 1977). 245 250 255

New informal rules provided for the elimination of public petitions to the Soviet authorities. Back in 1924, the Renovationist Metropolitan Evdokim (Meshcherskii) could publicly, albeit futilely, petition that the Council of People's Commissars abolish segregation, that is, provide representatives of the clergy, their families, and their parishioners with all their civil rights; allow churches charities, the unimpeded operation of schools, and free issue of periodical press; and introduce a fair tax system for the clergy.¹⁴ However, with time, even much more modest wishes that did not challenge the segregation model could only be stated in confidence. In 1930, Metropolitan Sergius sent a memorandum to Petr Smidovich, chairman of the Standing Commission under the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, in which he outlined much more modest petitions to the Soviet regime, from easing the harsh taxation and discrimination against their families to permission to open a single institution for religious education and publish a single journal.¹⁵ Some of these petitions were satisfied, but the discrimination persisted, and permission to open an educational institution was denied. 260 265 270

Petitions with complaints about financial difficulties related to the use and maintenance of churches, and about the opening of closed churches and continued operation of existing churches, became the main means by which believers trying to defend their rights would communicate with the authorities; to succeed, they had to demonstrate their loyalty and perseverance. The active protest so widespread in the early 1920s had declined, with women's protests¹⁶ becoming the main form, while men tried to avoid them, rationally concluding that the Soviet regime would be more lenient toward women as "ignorant" and "illiterate" while also being able to make concessions to relieve tensions. Furthermore, these riots usually did not lead to serious consequences for the 275 280

regime but had more of a demonstrative effect. Despite the believers' strong emotions about the closure of churches during the collectivization period, the Joint State Political Directorate recorded only thirty-eight cases of "religious-motivated kulak terror" in 1938; "terror" meant a wide range of violent actions against government officials, up to and including light beatings.¹⁷ 285

The segregation model reached its climax during the Great Terror. In the second half of the 1930s, having suppressed any attempts at active resistance but continuing to assume the internal disloyalty of the clergy and active parishioners, the Soviet regime proceeded to the complete dismantling of church institutions and the physical destruction of their core leadership. The number of church leaders who died is uncertain. Nikolai Somin assumes that 109,756 active Orthodox believers were repressed during the period of persecution under Lenin and Stalin (including 13,499 monastics, 40,938 priests, 8,451 deacons and psalmists, 12,951 elders and members of parish councils, and 33,914 other lay people; the absolute majority of which took place during the Great Terror).¹⁸ This figure is significantly lower than the inflated numbers estimated by Nikolai Emelianov (about 600,000 people),¹⁹ not to mention the even more significant figures found in editorial writing. It was nevertheless a catastrophic blow for the church, given that it focused mainly on active, highly motivated, sincerely faithful individuals who formed the basis of the churchgoing people. 290 295 300

Only a quartet of active canonical bishops remained in the country by 1939 (and there is documentary evidence that two were linked to state security agencies)²⁰ and only five renovationist bishops. At the same time, the 1937 census found that 56.7 percent of Soviet citizens over the age of sixteen would express their attitude to religion by calling themselves believers (moreover, 64 percent of the believers were women, and though the number did not exceed 25–30 percent among young men, believers made up some 40–49 percent among even literate young women).²¹ This testified to the utopianism of ideas about the "end of religion" but also inflamed the desire to destroy the church as an institution. 305 310

The task of liquidating the church was practically complete by early 1939, but Stalin left a few practically inactive church leaders at liberty, apparently to use not so much for domestic purposes as for foreign policy, given an approaching war with a then-unclear system of alliances (religious freedom was an important factor for parliamentary states, as Stalin might have recalled from the experience with Lord Curzon's note). This is the point where foreign policy begins to "outweigh" domestic policy in the religious sphere. 315 320

The alleviation and decline of segregation

The foreign policy impulse was what made it possible to revive the church organization, albeit in reduced form. The annexation of new territories in

1939–1940 meant the need to adapt local Orthodox dioceses to the needs of the Soviet regime, which was accomplished by those canonical hierarchs who also served as agents of the state security agencies (the Renovationists were uncompetitive here due to their nonrecognition in the rest of the Orthodox world). At the same time, the number of bishops and clerics dramatically increased at the expense of those located in the new territories. For the first time, the state had need of the church as a loyal political tool for addressing state problems, and the theme of liquidation began to wane.

This need increased even more during the Great Patriotic War, when it was necessary to convince the conservative and religiously minded portion of the American public to support assistance to the Soviet Union. It is no surprise that Stalin, who had delayed restoring the patriarchate and legalization of religious education, did so only in September 1943, just before the Tehran conference deciding on the “second front.” The elimination of Renovationism, whose core had already merged into the patriarchal church, was linked both to its unpopularity among believers and to its lack of demand in foreign policy. After the war, the church was used to promote the interests of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, Western Europe, and the United States; it was called upon to play a leading role in world Orthodoxy at the 1948 Pan-Orthodox Conference. After the failure of this project due to resistance from the Patriarch of Constantinople, Stalin’s interest in the church declined, and the opening of new churches ceased. However, the church remained involved in Soviet foreign-policy (“peacekeeping”) projects much longer, until the late 1980s.

The second impetus for revival of the church organization was the war, not so much the predictably patriotic position of the controlled hierarchs, but the patriotism of the majority of believers who remained loyal citizens despite religious persecution. The existing “doublethink” did not prevent them from taking part in the defense of their country. The war stimulated the opening of some of the churches (the process was curtailed already in 1948), and it became somewhat easier for believers to defend their interests through the usual petitions to the authorities, since these petitions were now being submitted not by ordinary citizens but by war veterans or relatives of front-line soldiers. Even some of the opponents of Metropolitan Sergius’s Declaration joined the officially recognized church, while the ones who remained underground became marginalized as a result of continued repressions and never amounted to a serious force.²²

The result was that the segregation model was preserved, but in a softened form. No one seriously raised the question of liquidating the church, even with the deterioration of church–state relations under Nikita Khrushchev, the closure of a few seminaries and monasteries, and the encouragement of crude atheist propaganda. However, even under these conditions, two bishops were arrested and sentenced to prison on charges of economic

crimes (they were later released and given new cathedra appointments). Circumstances became calmer and more predictable under Leonid Brezhnev, though the church was still not an organic part of the Soviet system: Its usefulness (outside of foreign policy) was rejected by communist ideologists, and the hierarchs themselves were not full-fledged members of the elite, since they could receive deputy status, which indicated full belonging to the stratum of the Soviet elite (the first were elected deputies only in 1989).

The bishops depended on the benevolence of regional commissioners on religious affairs, who could both aid their careers and bring them to a halt. The alleviation of the segregation model was also linked to an increase in the internal loyalty among believers: Unlike their predecessors, generations who grew up under the Soviet Union and came to the church did not consider the Soviet regime an anomaly. Among the women who came to the church were many former Komsomol members who had lost their husbands at the front. The younger priests were also more loyal than the predecessors who had survived persecution. Along with its official “peacekeeping” activities, the appeal to the church’s contributions to pre-revolutionary history and to patriotism during the Great Patriotic War became a means of legitimizing the church.²³ During the “stagnation” of the Brezhnev years, Soviet people who did not belong to the party or the Komsomol, who did non-ideological work (schoolteachers, human-science instructors, and so forth), and who were not making careers for themselves could visit churches without serious issues.

By the time of perestroika, the segregation model had exhausted all its possibilities simultaneously with the decline of the communist ideology on which it was based, so the state began to reconsider it. The segregation provision of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, which was “silent” on the possibility of religious propaganda, began to be interpreted in the context of the then-popular expression “what is not forbidden is permitted.” The constitutional provisions thus acquired the character of a “separation” model, and this was later enshrined in the 1993 Russian Constitution. However, in practice, the new model of both Soviet and Russian state–confessional relations turned out to be much closer to the cooperative model, with the solemn celebration of the Millennium of the Baptism of Russia in 1988 and the blessing of the newly elected Russian president Boris Yeltsin by Patriarch Aleksei II (Ridiger) in 1991.

Notes

1. On the state-confessional relations models, see S. Ferrari, “Evropeiskaia model’ tserkovno-gosudarstvennykh otnoshenii. Chast’ I. Evropeiskaia model’ otnoshenii mezhdru gosudarstvom i religiiami,” *Nauchnyiulleten’*

- “*Sravnitel’noe pravo*,” 2005 (February 25); A.Iu. Grigorenko, “Osnovnye tipy i modeli godustarstvenno-tserkovnykh otnoshenii v sovremennom mire (XX–XXI veka),” *Vestnik Russkoi krhistsianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii*, 2015, 410
vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 140–144.
2. V.I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 48 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), pp. 226–227. (For “little god,” Lenin uses the common diminutive “*bozhen’ka*,” meant to express a kind of endearing if not childlike quality—ironically here, of course. Similarly, he uses a colloquial word for priest, “*pop*,” with a disdainful tone.—Trans.) 415
 3. *Akty Sviateishego Tikhona, Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseia Rossii, pozdneishie dokumenty i perepiska o kanonicheskom preemstve vysshei tserkovnoi vlasti, 1917–1943*, ed. M.E. Gubonin (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo PSTBI, 1994), p. 83.
 4. *Bog sudil mne byt’ ispovednikom. Zhitie sviashchennoispovednika Romana Medvedia* (Moscow: Regional’nyi obshchestvennyi fond “Pamiat’ muchenikov i spovednikov Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi,” 2020), p. 266. 420
 5. V.N. Murav’ev, *Sochineniia* (Moscow: IMLI RAN, 2011), vol. 1, p. 192.
 6. I.M. Kontsevich, *Optina pustyn’ i ee vremia* (Moscow: Sviato-Troitskaia lavra, 1995), p. 534. 425
 7. A.N. Kashervarov, “Patriarkh Tikhon i grazhdanskaia voina 1918–1920 godov,” *Khristsianskoe chtenie*, 2019, no. 2, p. 191.
 8. *Akty Sviateishego Tikhona, Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseia Rossii*, p. 164.
 9. V. Gradusov, “Tomlenie Tserkvi,” *Zhivaia Tserkov’*, 1922, nos. 6–7, p. 5.
 10. M.Iu. Krapivin, “Diskussiia o sozdanii ‘sovetskoii’ Pravoslavnoi tserkvi v rukovodiashchikh krugakh bol’shevistskoi partii i sovetskogo gosudarstva (1919–1921 gg.), *Noveishaia istoriia Rossii*, 2016, no. 2(16), p. 290. 430
 11. *Akty Sviateishego Tikhona, Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseia Rossii*, pp. 283–285.
 12. D.V. Safonov, “K voprosu o podlinnosti ‘Zaveshchatel’nogo poslaniia’ sv. patriarkha Tikona,” *Bogoslovskii vestnik*, 2004, no. 4 (Sergiev Posad, 2004), pp. 265–311; A.A. Kostriukov, *Zarubezhnaia Tserkov’ v 1925–1938 gg. Iurisdiksionnye konflikty i otnosheniia s moskovskoi tserkovnoi vlast’iu* (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo PSTGU, 2012), p. 20. 435
 13. *Akty Sviateishego Tikhona, Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseia Rossii*, pp. 510–512.
 14. A. Levitin-Krasnov and V. Shavrov, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi tserkovnoi smuty* (Moscow: Krutitskoe patriarshee podvor’e, 1996), pp. 428–431. 440
 15. *Akty Sviateishego Tikhona, Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseia Rossii*, pp. 689–691.
 16. The author references the somewhat condescending term for the peasant women’s protests against collectivization, the “*bab’i bunty*.” “*Baba*” is a dismissive term for women, implying their ignorance, hysteria, etc.—Trans. 445
 17. V.S. Batchenko, *Vlast’ i vera: antireligioznaia politika i ee vospriiatie naseleniem Zapadnoi oblasti, 1929–1934 gg.* (St. Petersburg: Petroglif, 2019), pp. 187–239.
 18. N.V. Somin, “Ispol’zovanie reprezentativnoi vyborki otsenki chisla postradavshikh za veru v Rossii v XX v.,” *Vestnik PSTGU. Series II: Istoriiia. Istoriiia Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi*, 2019, vol. 87, p. 98. 450
 19. N. Emel’ianov, “K voprosu o chisle novomuchenikov i ispovednikov Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v XX veke,” *Materialy XV Ezhegodnoi Bogoslovskoi konferentsii PSTGU* (Moscow, 2005), vol. 1, pp. 265–271.
 20. I.A. Kurliandskii, *Vlast’ i religioznye organizatsii v SSSR (1939–1953 gg.). Istoricheskie ocherki* (St. Petersburg: Petroglif, 2019), pp. 117–122. 455

21. V.B. Zhiromskaia, I.N. Kiselev, and Iu.A. Poliakov, *Povleka pod grifom “sekretno”*: *Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 1937 goda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1996), pp. 100–102.
22. A.L. Beglov, *V poiskakh “bezgreshnykh katakomb”*. *Tserkovnoe podpol’e v SSSR* 460 (Moscow: Politicheskaiia entsiklopediia, 2018), pp. 236–255.
23. *Pomestnyi sobor Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi. Troitse-Sergieva Lavra, 6–9 iiunia 1988 goda. Materialy* (Moscow: Izdanie Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, 1990), pp. 86–91, 116–117.