TERRORISM IN AFRICA

NEW TRENDS AND FRONTIERS

INSTITUTE FOR AFRICAN STUDIES
OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

TERRORISM IN AFRICA

NEW TRENDS AND FRONTIERS

Moscow

IAfr RAS

2021

Editors

Dr. Glen Segell
Dr. Sergey Kostelyanets
Prof. Hussein Solomon

Reviewers

Dr. Svetlana Bokeriya
Dr. Leonid Issaev

Terrorism in Africa: New Trends and Frontiers. Moscow: Institute for African Studies; Haifa: University of Haifa, 2021. – 194 p.

This book illustrates how Africa has become an incubator for Islamic extremism, and how global and local actors and factors interweave to form a unique – 'glocalized' – form of terrorism on the continent. The contributions of authors reflect the spatial continuity of terrorism-affected areas in Africa and the creeping proliferation of terrorist groups across the region. Special attention is paid to Mozambique, which has become the southernmost hotbed of terrorism in the world in the wake of discovering large hydrocarbon reservoirs. A prime finding of the present volume is that terrorism has become increasingly one of the major obstacles to sustainable development in Africa. Further, the book critically evaluates counterterrorism responses by African and other states, and also examines contemporary terrorism tactics and strategies, including the widening use of social media for propaganda purposes and recruitment, the adoption of environmental agenda, and the development of new financing schemes amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The need to shift the focus away from the current military approach to countering terrorism in Africa is an issue that cuts across all chapters of the volume.

The present book is a result of a collaborative project between the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russia), the University of the Free State (Bloemfontein, South Africa), and the University of Haifa (Haifa, Israel).

CONTENTS

PREFACE

The Eleventh Plague of Africa

*Then Moses, at the behest of God,
set ten plagues, that is, great calamities,
in succession upon Egypt...*

God's Law for Family and School
Moscow, 1997

Africa strives for economic and social development, but on this path it faces the hardest trials: border and internal conflicts, interethnic and sectarian contradictions, foreign interventions, capital flight, plunder of natural resources, despotism, corruption, epidemics – from Ebola to COVID-19, droughts and floods. Let us recall the Bible and call them Africa's 'ten plagues.' Yet the 'eleventh plague' – terrorism – has emerged on the continent and is gaining momentum and taking over people and territory.

Most Africans are concerned about making a living and live on the brink of poverty and hunger, but grapes of wrath are filling and growing heavy among a minority. It is here that propagandists from extremist organizations pour into the hearts of the destitute and hopeless the hatred toward the 'corrupt rulers' who, instead of thinking about their people, 'crawl on their belly before the West, wicked, cruel, exploiting the Arab land, colluding with Israel.'[*]

Supporters of extremist organizations hate the society in which they live and envy those who have achieved material well-being, received a good education, or had the opportunity to travel. They draw support – both spiritual and material – in a narrow circle of like-minded people and friends, getting rid of the feeling of social inferiority. Their enemies include the West, Israel, and their sinful and corrupt rulers that are subservient to the West.

---

[*] A quote from al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya's leaflet.

5

Some of these groups have borrowed the structure and methods from extreme right-wing totalitarian parties: centralization under the strict leadership of a leader and the creation of a network of cells, with their leaders selected and appointed from above. In this form, they cannot become mass organizations, but they actively train their members. Upon receiving the support of the population, they become more open and create their own pseudo-state structures. On the other hand, if an organization is unable to lead a mass movement, its decentralization may give rise to rivalries among local leaders, and intelligence agents began to infiltrate its ranks.

In the 1980s, Afghanistan became a powerful catalyst for fundamentalist and extremist movements in the Muslim world. Thousands of volunteers from fifty Muslim countries joined the ranks of the Afghan opposition and took part in hostilities against Soviet and government troops.

The CIA along with some Muslim countries funded, armed, and trained Islamist fighters in Afghanistan, raising Frankenstein, who later turned his weapons against the USA and pro-Western regimes in Asia and Africa.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, thousands of 'Arab Afghans' began to return to Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia. With military experience and military training, imbued with a militant Islamist spirit, unable to do anything but fight, they became the backbone of extremist groups. Some of them have extended their terrorist activities to the USA and other Western countries.

The authorities in African and Arab countries used the iron fist of repressions against terrorists, but at the same time tried to create a favorable atmosphere for investment and economic activity. Somewhere it succeeded, somewhere it did not. The tragedy of the 'eleventh plague' of Africa is that the vicious cycle of violence, unemployment and poverty has become very difficult to break: the less security, the less investment, the higher the poverty, the better the breeding ground for extremism, including violence, and again, less security and less investment. But those who resorted to violence did not care. Their slogan was 'the worse, the better' – the weaker government structures will be, the easier it will be for them to win.

The very exercise of control by extremists over certain territories in Africa, be it Libya, Somalia, the Sahel zone, or Northern Mozambique, testifies to this. Moreover, we have witnessed the creation of quasi-states by such organizations as *Al Qaeda* and *Al Nusra* in Syria and Iraq, and also, more recently, a new phenomenon in Afghanistan, where a new government has grown out of Islamist organizations amid the overthrow and destruction of all structures of power and public life created during the twenty years of the occupation of the country by the USA and its allies. Can there be any

doubt that the *Taliban*'s[*] success in Afghanistan has inspired dozens and hundreds of extremist organizations to step up their efforts in the hope of ultimate success?

The words 'terrorist' and 'terror' have become commonplace in the lexicon of politicians and the media, as well as ordinary citizens. Bomb explosions in churches, mosques, synagogues and other public places are considered undeniable acts of terrorism. But by whom? Who are the judges? In whose eyes are the perpetrators of these acts disgusting criminals, murderers who deserve punishment and condemnation?

Let us recall that in those days when religious extremism had not yet become a breeding ground for terrorism, both in Europe and in Russia, many revolutionaries preached the same principles of terrorist actions and painted portraits of revolutionaries that, with a slight change of wording, would be quite suitable for a portrait of modern Islamist and other terrorists.

During the Cold War, Western propaganda blamed the Soviet Union for the rise of terrorism. 'Most of the terrorist groups operating in various countries of the world are Marxist', 'Moscow's hand can be found behind all registered terrorist acts in the world', 'it is the Soviet Union that is largely responsible for the fact that today international terrorism has expanded its scope of activity and got stronger' – these are examples of the statements of prominent American politicians of the time. In its turn, Soviet propaganda portrayed terrorists as faithful servants of the West and described how Western special services sponsored Islamist organizations of a fundamentalist and extremist nature, which fought against anti-Western nationalist regimes or left-wing pro-communist regimes. The pinnacle of this was the sponsorship of fundamentalists in Afghanistan.

Today, the manifestation of terrorism with religious motivation has become a feature of the international and domestic life in a number of countries, including in Africa after the end of the Cold War.

Indeed, no one knows what form the future society may acquire. The strength of fundamentalism lies in its ability to promise radical changes without specifying their features, without details, since Allah is considered the guarantor of the future, and he created *Sharia* law.

Identity crises, tantamount to a civilizational breakdown, have occurred more than once in history. But that were processes that stretched out over centuries. Now as all events accelerate many times over, combustion turns into an explosion. Today's media, cyberspace and information technologies create conditions for the faster mobilization of both extremists and their opponents.

---

[*] Here and hereafter: the *Taliban* is designated as a terrorist organization by the courts of the Russian Federation.

When you are guided by the providence of God, there are no moral constraints on the use of violence. This is explained not only by the total nature of the struggle, but also by those who are recruited into terrorist organizations. As a rule, these are young educated or, more precisely, semi-educated people or children of peasants who have recently moved to cities, urban slums, now cut off from their roots.

In accordance with the logic of the leaders and their followers, terrorist attacks represent a legitimate struggle against the aggressive, corrupting and arrogant West, against tyrants and against Muslims who have gone astray. They are waging an all-out war because they believe that the West and its servants – rotten regimes – are waging an all-out war against both the population and its convictions. Spiritual leaders of religious extremists form a sense of exclusivity and God's chosenness in the ranks of their organizations; they cultivate the spirit of fighting 'enemies' and the spirit of self-sacrifice. They praise the 'martyrs' in songs and poems.

Militancy by extremists can be directed against the corruption and injustice of the political system or against other religious communities. It can be focused on foreign influence, which acts as a cultural and economic threat to the existence of the traditional or neotraditional community, its religious and cultural values, norms, and structure.

The more examples of terrorist acts, violence by individuals, groups or states or government agencies we recall, the more we notice how the very concept of 'terrorism' escapes us. The question of what purpose – 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate' – is pursued by those who commit murder or violence becomes blurred. Suffice it to recall that both international organizations and individual countries recognize the *Taliban* as terrorists. Now they have created their own rather large state, and, naturally, they glorify former 'terrorists' as heroes.

A very important element in the development of terrorism is the absence of traditions of political, social and cultural dialogue. Any dialogue implies a desire to reach an agreement and, accordingly, some kind of compromise between the two sides. Without compromise there is no agreement, and when there is no agreement one or another side turns to violence. Violence breeds violence. Terrorism by no means is disappearing or diminishing in the world. The fact is that terrorism has been, is and will be. It is a serious illness that has afflicted both Africa and all of humanity. Only joint efforts, only the gradual uprooting of the moral, psychological, economic, social and other foundations of terrorism can lead, after years of efforts, to its reduction or eradication, although, of course, there will remain psychopaths inclined to solve any problems with the help of violence.

In Russia and in the world, there exists an extensive literature, both scientific and journalistic, devoted to terrorism in various countries. The list would be too long to be reproduced here. However, the present edited volume is the first to be published in Russia on the subject of terrorism specifically and exclusively in Africa. The book draws together works by South African, Russian and Israeli academics concerned about the expansion of terrorist threat on the African continent. The volume offers the readership a unique combination of insights and observations from international experts in the field of terrorism research and is extremely timely because of the rapid increase in the importance of Africa's resource, human and economic potential within the emerging model of global development.

A.M. Vasiliev
Full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Honorary President of the Institute for African Studies

INTRODUCTION

Africa as a battlefield for Islamic terrorist groups and the United States of America predates the *Al Qaeda*[*] 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the subsequent declaration by President George Bush on 11 October 2001 of a *Global War on Terrorism* (GWOT). Two American embassies in Africa were attacked on 7 August 1998 killing more than 200 people nearly simultaneously by truck bomb explosions in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and in Nairobi, Kenya. They brought Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and *Al Qaeda* to the attention of the American public for the first time. In response, President Bill Clinton on 20 August 1998 launched cruise missile strikes on Khartoum, Sudan, aimed at bin Laden and an alleged *Al Qaeda* factory. Despite the large amount of American funding since 1998, and the security assistance and deployment of forces from the US and other countries, there is an ongoing and devastating toll on civilians and military lives in Africa. We are witnessing the cancer of terrorism spread further across the continent. The present edited volume, which is aimed at investigating new trends and new frontiers of this phenomenon in Africa, looks forward, yet builds on sound historical evidence and empirical research.

As methods and goals of terrorists vary by culture, country and region and also depend on the situational context and their capabilities, it is difficult to provide a precise, universally applicable definition of terrorism. Indeed, a wide range of people and groups, acts and events may all have different connotations associated with the word 'terror'. Yet definitions are important, necessitating in most cases the use of those of them that are deductive from evidence and facts.

Terrorism has never been confined to Africa; it is a global feature whose objectives and characteristics have evolved dramatically over centuries. Arguably, terrorism was first popularized in the late 18th century in reference to the Reign of Terror launched by the French revolutionary state against its citizens. In the late 19th century, terrorism referred to the violent attacks by the leftist *Narodnaya Volya* organization against the Tsarist regime in the Russian Empire. In the 20th century, it came to denote the indiscriminate violence perpetrated predominantly by anti-colonial and nationalist movements all over the world (Romaniuk et al., 2017, pp. 76-77). Since the early 21st century and until today, the brand of terrorism that is perpetrated by Islamic extremists has occupied the center stage of global issues, including in Africa.

---

[*] Here and hereafter: *Al Qaeda* is designated as a terrorist organization by the courts of the Russian Federation.

From the African perspective, it must be said that when formulating definitions of terrorism deductively, African states and their citizens and residents also look both forward and back. They cannot forget or deny the history of violence that has been typically carried out by intra-state groups with the aim of overthrowing or weakening the incumbent government. The latter phenomenon goes back decades to colonial Africa and the decolonization process. Some prominent examples include the 1952-1959 Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya against Britain, and the struggles of FRELIMO against colonialist Portugal in Mozambique and of Namibia's SWAPO and the African National Congress against apartheid South Africa. Further, in the post-colonial period, it could be said that Africans also resorted to tactics that were terrorist in nature, suffice to mention the notorious Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda and various rebel groups in South Sudan, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Somalia and elsewhere on the continent. There have even appeared megalomaniac militant leaders with a 'vocation' for terror, such as Abubakar Shekau, Joseph Kony, Abdelmalek Droukdel, and others.

The aforementioned cases engender an assortment of definitions of terrorism, where all are valid in their own context, as it is not possible to formulate a predetermined set of reasons and motives for anyone to resort to certain tactics that may include forms of terror. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that a broad consensus exists that terrorism is a complex set of phenomena which encompasses a variety of threats and/or actions by extremist and violent groups with different origins and motives. Furthermore, terror could constitute a psychological projection of a threat based upon violence enacted in the past even in the absence of a new act of violence. Terrorism could be perpetrated by lone wolves/madmen, non-state groups with different motives, typically ideological and political, liberation movements, religious sects, criminal organizations, or serve as a proxy for non-governmental actors or even state entities that intend to intimidate and eliminate combatants and innocent civilians. For some of the perpetrators it could be an abrupt standalone act, while for others – a result of a long process of radicalization, during which groups of people prepare to engage in extreme and radical acts and violence.

Further complicating this is that some terrorists, but not all, may display a level of rationality in their decision-making, including in choosing between different terror tactics with due regard for relevant risks and opportunities. For them, violence could be the primary means to an end where an act of terror rarely occurs for the sake of terror. Other terrorists may be sole suicide bombers who take innocent lives without leaving a suicide note with demands and not living to see if their intention was met, if it was ever known

even to themselves. Thus, acts of terrorism and their victims, be they individuals or specific groups of the population, may be intentional or random.

Both historically and in contemporary times, developing a universal definition of terrorism has been complicated by state leaders who define terrorism in accordance with their own policies and interests, regardless of whether the designation corresponds to the essence of terrorism or, on the contrary, contradicts it. Accordingly, it may be that one event is described as a terrorist attack, while a similar attack, even more brutal, is not considered terrorist. Militants may fall under the categories of both domestic insurgent groups and elements of transnational terrorist networks, if only because they cannot operate without external support. It is the government that may choose to 'invent' terrorists in order to arouse the sympathy of the international community, obtain military and financial assistance, and so neutralize any political opposition. These governments interpret the definition of domestic terrorism so broadly that it can be used to refer to almost any anti-government action. Historically in Africa, those leading the liberation struggle against colonial and other oppressive rule were labeled terrorists. Such was the case with leaders of the anti-apartheid movement, including Nelson Mandela, the future president of South Africa and a Nobel Prize laureate. On the other hand, those whom governments label as terrorists rarely consider themselves as such and usually refer to themselves as separatists, freedom fighters, liberators, revolutionaries, rebels, patriots, etc. Sometimes both parties to a conflict categorize each other as terrorist.

In sum, it is clear that the definition of terrorism, and so too of terrorist organizations, in Africa is rather vague. When anti- and counterterrorism efforts are initiated, there are nevertheless attempts to find commonalities and define the term of terrorism, with a basic objective being to formulate and implement policies and plans. Indeed, one of the challenges in forming international coalitions against terrorism with African and foreign partners is choosing a definition of terrorism and acts thereof, but that constitutes a necessary prerequisite for preparing action plans, legislation, budget planning and provision of military and technical assistance to Africa. An attempt to produce a continentally accepted definition of terrorist act was made is the 2002 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) *Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*, to which many if not all African states subscribe and which reads (OAU, 2002):

'Terrorist act' means:

(a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any

number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or

(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or

(iii) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).

(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).

The above definition and the corresponding OAU initiative point to the fact that terrorism in Africa is a phenomenon characteristic of both rich and poor countries, authoritarian and democratic political systems, Christian and Muslim societies and others. Significantly, this definition on terrorism has been adopted by the African Union (AU) that succeeded the OAU and is supposed to inform all AU member states' national legislation on terrorism in Africa. This definition and, indeed, the future role of the AU could be critical for tackling terrorism, for it is a continent-wide phenomenon in Africa. As will be noted in the present volume, whilst there may be issues with defining terrorism on the international stage, all African states at least rhetorically agree to this one definition.

Another challenge in developing the theoretical framework of terrorism is that just like methods and goals, the preconditions for the emergence of individual terrorists and terrorism movements and their growth also vary substantially across cultures and regions. In the African context, as will be examined in the present volume, these preconditions include, but are not restricted to, weak economies and poor governance, economic and political marginalization of certain groups of the population on confessional, ethnic, cultural, geographic and other grounds, demographic imbalances, environmental crises, and excesses of modernization or the lack thereof. The absence of engaging political processes, such as democracy, and of changes in leadership and governance, often characterized by corruption, and the inability to enter into dialogue and negotiations to alleviate and ameliorate disagreements and disputes have been characteristic of countries in Africa

affected by terrorism. Other factors conducive to the emergence of terrorism include the development and accessibility of new types of weapons and explosive devices, increased terrorist financing resulting from human, narcotics and weapons smuggling, and technological advances associated with means of communication and transportation, all of which make it easier to carry out terrorist attacks. The aforementioned factors tend to accelerate the processes of radicalization and encourage the selection of terrorism as a preferred tactic, perhaps because others have not succeeded or have no chance of succeeding.

One of the rare commonalities that could apply in most definitions that are formulated deductively from cases in Africa is that terrorism prevails when normal political processes of dialogue and participation become less likely and extremist and violent means become more the norm than the exception. An example has been government repression against the opposition, as it happened in northern Nigeria in 2009, when the killing of *Boko Haram*'s founder Mohammed Yusuf and thousands of his alleged followers triggered the transformation of the group from a religious sect into a terrorist organization (Waldek & Jayasekara, 2011, p. 170).

What further complicates theory and practice of terrorism and counterterrorism in terms of developing theory and finding solutions is that sometimes terrorism in Africa is associated with attempts to restore traditional culture, especially traditional beliefs, practices and religion, in its purest form. Some of the individuals and groups that use terror as a tactic are proud of the cultural traditions of their peoples and cannot accept the status of 'second class citizens', while other possess martial traditions that give them a corresponding advantage on the battlefield. They may be driven by the fears of the destruction of their society, culture and way of life, search for those responsible for this destruction, and encourage feelings of outrage. This is not a totally a new phenomenon in Africa: for instance, the *jihad* movements in North and West Africa have centuries of history.

In the context of globalization, religion has become a kind of 'bargaining chip', which is arguably one of the paradoxes of modernity. In some cases this is evident in the Islamization of African societies through the imposition of Islamic norms in all spheres of life, which is a part of a global process aimed at the revival of the 'Islamic Golden Age.' The goal of such Islamic revivalists is to create an ideal Islamic society – a morally pure and just one. They see all tactics, including terror, as legitimate from a moral point of view, or a utopian view of own culture, often based on an imaginary 'glorious past' (Apenda & Tough, 2015).

The adepts of Islamic revival also see such society as an alternative to capitalism and other 'isms.' Such movements could be led by self-proclaimed

charismatic leaders – teachers, ideologists, and political activists. Islamic revival movements in Africa are established by schools, mosques, hospitals, women's organizations and industrial enterprises. Some movements adopt the form of political parties and lobby groups, while others take on a paramilitary character. Any opponents and enemies of such are portrayed as including not only foreigners (non-believers in Islam – infidels), but also local Muslims who follow more moderate forms of Islam.

A major cause for concern is that the motives, goals and methods of the recent global wave of Islamic fundamentalism have combined in Africa with local prerequisites and motives. There has been an awakening of the memories of historical African *jihad* that has linked to contemporary resentment and discontent, resulting in a phenomenon that has become commonly referred to as the 'glocalization of terrorism' (Okumu & Botha, 2007, p. 24). This definition applies the 'globalization and glocalization' phraseology previously developed by James Rosenau (1997), which is detailed in his examination of the trends of the domestic-foreign frontier. The present volume demonstrates that the greatest danger in terms of the number of casualties comes from countless 'glocalized' extremist and violent groups which employ Islamist ideology, methods and experience in attempt to overcome local grievances.

It is fair to say then, when considering this, that some homegrown terrorist groups in Africa tend to establish links with international networks, and then they may (or may not) become part of one of these networks. The development of these processes confirms the nature of modern terrorism as a 'glocal' phenomenon. Within the framework of 'glocalization,' individual terrorists may also internationalize (in the context of the broader Islamic revival), sharing their ideas and tactics with others and adopting others' experiences and practices. They may also volunteer to fight in other countries.

An observation that could be made from this is that terrorism that has internal roots is usually initially fueled and driven by local problems and interests. Among the factors that can induce domestic terrorists to turn into 'glocal' ones in the African context are the ability to exploit natural resources and generate income from the sale of locally mined metals and minerals in world markets and the benefit of joining international human, narcotics and weapons smuggling networks.

In light of the contemporary discourse on terrorism, the authors of the present volume were challenged with answering some questions, including: Why do some African opposition groups and movements choose terrorism as a means of achieving their political goals? Why do Africans join the ranks of terrorists? What are the local and external drivers of terrorism in Africa?

How have individual African countries responded to the threat posed? How have international actors reacted to the escalating terrorist threat in Africa? How do terrorism groups finance themselves and spread the malevolent message for recruitment purposes?

The contributors to the volume included scholars from the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russia) – Professor Leonid L. Fituni, Dr. Tatyana S. Denisova, Dr. Sergey V. Kostelyanets, Professor Vladimir G. Shubin and Dr. Natalia A. Zherlitsina; from the University of the Free State (Bloemfontein, South Africa) – Dr. Anneli Botha, Mr Willem Els, Dr. Alta Grobbelaar, Professor Theo Neethling, Dr. Glen Segell and Professor Hussein Solomon; from the Ezri Center at the University of Haifa (Haifa, Israel) – Dr. Glen Segell and Dr. Moshe Terdiman; and from the Institute of Security Studies (Pretoria, South Africa) – Mr Richard Chelin.

There are three parts in the volume, broken into twelve chapters. Part I *From Ocean to Ocean: Africa's Arch of Instability*, which consists of four chapters, points to the spatial continuity of terrorism-affected areas in Africa. Chapter 1 by Dr. Natalia A. Zherlitsina is devoted to *Counter-terrorism policies in North Africa: Morocco's approach*. The author notes that since 2001, the world has entered a new period of history – the war on international terrorism. This confrontation in the name of security has legitimately expanded the authority of state power in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. Morocco's own '9/11' took place on May 16, 2003: five attacks targeted places often visited by tourists and Moroccan Jews. The measures taken in the kingdom in response to these attacks were both regional and specific Moroccan in nature. Morocco has adopted many elements of counter-terrorism strategies of other states in the region, including anti-terrorism legislation, mass arrests of Islamists and opposition clergy, and rehabilitation programs for former terrorist prisoners. The uniqueness of the Moroccan strategy of combating terrorism lies in the approach to relations with the country's religious institutions. A year after the bombings in Casablanca, the country's leadership began a complete review of religious policy. Morocco's control over the religious sphere stems from the religious identity of the state and the monarch's unique position as a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed and leader of the Muslim religious community of the kingdom. In order to limit opposition from religious elites, the Moroccan authorities focused on the creation of a religious bureaucracy and institutional control. Existing religious institutions became state institutions and religious educational institutions were closely monitored. By placing the training of religious scholars under state control and then incorporating these scholars into national bureaucracy, the Moroccan authorities have largely succeeded in establishing control over a

class of persons who have historically been a source of opposition to the regime. As a result, a system has been developed that provides strong incentives for the participation of religious elites in the state project.

Professor Hussein Solomon in Chapter 2 focuses on *Terrorism, counter-terrorism and the need to problematize the state in the Sahel.* The author discusses how many mainstream accounts stress the external dimensions of Islamist militancy in the Sahel; the names of various regional jihadist organizations – such as *Al Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara[*] – refer to external terrorist organizations that seemingly intrude into the vast geographic space of the Sahel. It is further emphasized that at the root of the current militancy lay such factors as identity politics, environmental factors, worsening economic conditions, and governments across the Sahel displaying careless disregard for the plight of their people. It is these local considerations that are driving the insurgency, and unless they are addressed jihadist organizations will maintain their popular appeal. The policies of external actors, Washington and Paris, have exacerbated the situation, thereby fueling tensions across the region even further.

Chapter 3 by Dr. Tatyana S. Denisova is concerned with *Islamic radicalism in Cameroon: origins and prospects of further gains.* The author argues that the rise of Islamic radicalism in Cameroon is rapidly reshaping the country's religious landscape and contributing to the spread of religious intolerance. Unlike, for example, neighboring Nigeria or the Central African Republic, Cameroon has rarely encountered serious manifestations of sectarian tensions, but in the past 10-15 years traditional Sufi Islam has been increasingly supplanted by the ideology of Wahhabism. Wahhabism is rapidly spreading not only in the north of the country, but also in the south, which until recently was inhabited mainly by Christians and animists. The spread of Wahhabism is actively supported and funded by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Egypt. Sufism, followed mainly by Fulani living in the northern regions, is gradually losing its position. The growing influence of radical Islam in Cameroon is largely due to the expansion of the terrorist organization *Boko Haram* into the country; one of the consequences of this is that more and more Cameroonians, inspired by the calls to 'cleanse Islam' and introduce *Sharia* law, join the ranks of this armed Islamist group. As in other African countries, the radicalization of Islam is accompanied by the intensification of terrorist activities, leading to an exacerbation of the internal

---

[*] Here and hereafter: AQIM and the Islamic State (IS) are designated as terrorist organizations by the courts of the Russian Federation.

political situation, to an increase in the number of refugees, to a deterioration in the material situation of the population, etc. The inability of the government to contain terrorist activities in the north of the country may in the near future lead to an escalation of military-political conflict on religious grounds in the context of acute political instability, which Cameroon is currently experiencing, including due to the activities of the Anglophone separatist movements in the southwest of the country.

Dr. Anneli Botha in Chapter 4 writes on *Assessing the status and addressing violent extremism in East Africa.* The author's objective is to propose and employ a framework to assess the impact of initiatives to counter the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in Eastern Africa over the period between 2010 and 2020. This is done through determining the type and level of security challenges, as well as identifying the predominate type of counter-terrorism practices and the capacity and challenges that security officials are confronted with when addressing the threat in their respective countries. The nations of the region can broadly be divided into high-, medium- and low-risk countries in terms of terrorist threat. First, the threat of violent extremism is evaluated so as to shed light on its manifestations in this diverse region. It is also discussed whether the threat stayed the same or if it changed over time with reference to geographic location of incidents, the terrorists' *modus operandi* and target selection. Having recognized the diverse nature of the region when conducting vulnerability-, risk-, and threat assessments, the author proceeds to an analysis of the impact of countermeasures. Finally, the chapter identifies and proposes solutions to the situation on the 'ground', outlining the factors that countries in the region need to take into consideration to successfully counter the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in East Africa. While recognizing the existence of both strategic and immediate needs, the author places the primary focus of the chapter on the latter. Previous research has already identified the need for a holistic all-government approach with a particular emphasis on enhancing good governance, furthering security sector reform and stimulating broader economic development, but this chapter takes it one step further to also incorporate strategic planning on a tactical level to secure a positive impact of direct countermeasures.

Part II *The Cone Of Africa: Challenges Of Counterterrorism* includes four chapters, with the common thread of political violence and terrorism in the southern part of the continent. Professor Vladimir G. Shubin dedicates Chapter 5 to *National liberation movements in Southern Africa and terrorism.* The author considers the issue of the use of violence in the course of national liberation struggle on the example of Southern Africa, primarily South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), the oldest political

organization on the continent, during its first half century of operations was firmly committed to the principle of non-violence and guided by the desire to achieve the elimination of racist orders and the creation of a democratic state by peaceful, political means. However, in the early 1960s, the ANC leadership was forced to turn to the use of violence, albeit limited, and the chapter considers the reasons for this. At the same time, while choosing to resort to violent actions, the ANC firmly rejected terrorism from the very beginning and adhered to this policy for thirty years. This approach always found support in the USSR, which provided the ANC and other liberation movements with all-round assistance, including the training of their military personnel. The chapter also critically examines the positions on the issue of violence in Southern Africa taken in the late 1980s by Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze, the closest partners of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Chapter 6 by Professor Theo Neethling raises the question of *Extremism and insecurity in Northern Mozambique: why be concerned?* The author indicates that since March 2020 a rapidly escalating insurgency in the northern parts of Mozambique has caught the attention of conflict analysts and observers worldwide. Twenty-five years after the conclusion of the brutal Mozambican Civil War (1975-92), the insurgent movement *Ansar al-Sunna* started to cause havoc in the Cabo Delgado province, which is a stronghold of the ruling party, FRELIMO, but also an impoverished and predominantly Muslim province. This happened after a group of radicalized young men from the coastal areas of Cabo Delgado gathered in opposition to the local Sufi Islam and the Salafi National Islamic Council in the country. The question which chapter poses is: why should there be serious regional and international concern over the situation in Mozambique? At least four issues of relevance are cited and examined in this chapter. The first concerns *Ansar al-Sunna*'s links with the Islamic State (IS). The second pertains to the presence of multinational energy giants in Mozambique's promising offshore natural gas deposits and the potential developmental spinoffs of these projects for the country. The third concerns the limitations of the Mozambican security forces to deal with the challenges, as well as the assistance rendered by foreign private military companies to the Mozambican government. The last issue of concern is the manifestation of transnational criminal networks in the Cabo Delgado region and the funding of *Ansar al-Sunna*'s terror from illegal and illicit activities.

Mr Willem Els and Mr Richard Chelin in Chapter 7 present the topic of *Mozambique, Cabo Delgado insurgency: extraordinary mineral resources and liquid natural gas, a blessing that may be a curse or are we missing the point?* The authors inform that the terrorist insurgency in Cabo Delgado Province started in 2017 with small scale and low-key attacks, but has

escalated to almost daily attacks, leading to the displacement of more than 570,000 people. Despite the discovery and exploration of substantial reserves of natural gas, rubies, gold and graphite, the hope of a local economic resurgence quickly disappeared due to the corruption and greed perpetuated by politically connected officials in the province and in the country's capital – Maputo – and their international business partners. The chapter examines how the dissent and anger of the youth and the general population, which had been simmering for decades, eventually exploded and manifested itself in the attacks in October 2017, which eventually evolved into the Cabo Delgado insurgency. It is explained how grievances by the local population fuelled by the mismanagement and poor governance of natural resources in the province of Cabo Delgabo by the government resulted in the transformation of a 'resource blessing' into a 'resource curse.' The authors conclude with recommendations on how to mitigate the current conflict and offers practical post-conflict measures for policy makers to implement.

The concluding Part III *Terrorist Strategies and International Responses* contains five chapters. Professor Leonid L. Fituni in Chapter 8 writes on *Terrorist financing in Africa under the new normalcy of a post-pandemic world.* The author argues that at the moment, despite the twin-shock to their economies and political environment caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and a global economic downturn, African states are gradually moving away from the frustration of the first year of the crisis and are starting to build models and rules of existence in the 'new normalcy.' Despite the harsh restrictive measures of national governments and rampant border closures, international terrorism has on the whole survived the pandemic with relative ease in Africa. However, there have emerged some direct consequences for terrorist financing within the immediate area of activity of concrete terrorist groups. Changes in behavior as a result of the pandemic have presented terrorists with new opportunities to commit acts of terror and mobilize resources for financing their criminal and extremist activity. On the whole African countries have not yet identified a change in the terrorist financing risks as a result of the pandemic. It was rather the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), not national authorities, which indicated potential future vulnerabilities, primarily emphasizing the misuse of non-profit organizations and new opportunities in relation to the predicate threat environment. While the lockdowns and restrictions on public gatherings have reduced possibilities for terrorists to collect funds from restaurants, shop-owners etc, additional possibilities appeared for creating new charities and NGOs, instrumental for both gathering funds and transferring them under the legal guise. In some cases, like in *Boko Haram*-controlled areas in Nigeria, and certain territories with strong AQIM presence, the pandemic

helped to foster among local population a positive PR image of the terrorist groupings since these structures took over some social functions, which national authorities failed to deliver, but which were badly needed in the emergency.

Dr. Alta Grobbelaar in Chapter 9 discusses *Africa's online terror: the increased reliance of African terrorist organizations on social media.* The author asserts that continuous news coverage of terrorism across the globe has led terrorist organizations to increasingly rely on their own initiatives to attract international attention; terrorist organizations in Africa are no exception. Although Africa is by no means leading the race in the field of advanced technology and communications, terrorist organizations are increasingly being operated like trans- and international businesses – with individuals or departments dedicated to media and marketing. What used to be known as 'propaganda' or 'misinformation' can be published today under the flag of freedom of speech, -beliefs and -association. Social media's user-friendly policies keep making it difficult to deter terrorist organizations from making use of popular sites to reach impressionable audiences. The chapter analyses if and how the reliance of African terrorist organizations on social media sites has increased in Africa. This is done by not only examining social media sites themselves, but also the public – and by extension the audience's – preferences between news sites and social media sites. The author also briefly touches upon the topic of connectivity and access in Africa, which provides valuable insight into how the continent's terrorist organizations structure themselves and their communication- and marketing strategies. The goal of the chapter is to examine and consider ways in which African terrorist organizations' usage of social media sites can be anticipated, devalued and deconstructed and to contemplate ways in which public-, private- and possibly government structures can be adapted to lessen the impact of terrorist organizations' usage of social media.

Dr. Glen Segell in Chapter 10 writes on *Exporting religion from the Middle East – importing terror into Africa.* The author proposes a hypothesis of four phases that can be identified in the history of Islam in Africa: containment, mixing, reform and radicalization. The chapter puts the hypothesis to case examining a selection of historical examples over centuries of the first three phases of containment, mixing, and reform. It then shifts the focus to the fourth phase – that of radicalization, ideology and terror in Africa. While the phases are for the main part chronological over centuries, they are also iterative as elements of each coexist in the others. The first three phases might be ascribed as evolutionary, but the fourth phase is revolutionary; it is not a logical follow-on to the third phase. The emphasis is that radicalization does not necessarily follow reform. The data examined

alludes to the Islamic religion being pushed into Africa from the Middle East over centuries rather than accepted quickly or easily. Yet radicalization, and the means of terror, are more willingly and quickly used as they are imported by some local African leaders for their own purposes and goals. Like the Soviet Communist ideology and political system during the Cold War, some see Islamic radicalization as a means to an end. Islamic radicalization and terror are especially prevalent in African regions and areas of failed governance, ethnic and tribal strife, and poverty. The issue of how to address this phenomenon is complex and beyond the scope of the chapter. The goal of the chapter, however, is to examine the hypothesis and the data and so highlight the importance of identifying phases in the complexity and multi-dimensionality of belief and faith, political systems, ideology and the means to the end.

Dr. Sergey Kostelyanets devotes Chapter 11 to *Russia's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy in Africa.* The author argues that in recent years, counterterrorism cooperation has become an integral part of Russian military-technical collaboration with African countries. It typically involves training, intelligence sharing, conflict mediation, and at times even boots on the ground. Counterterrorism cooperation is also often accompanied with agreements to combat cross-border crime, cybercrime and maritime piracy, not to speak of countering extremism, which Moscow very much equates with terrorism. Despite Russia's inclination to offer multidimensional, comprehensive security deals, counterterrorism stands out as an important instrument of modern Russian security policy in many parts of Africa. It also ranked high on the agenda of the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi. The role of counterterrorism in Russia's Africa foreign policy has been buttressed by a number of factors. First, it is a highly sensitive issue domestically, which makes it a relatively solid justification for overseas involvement (and ensuing spending). Second, Russia maintains that in counterterrorism it is more effective and trustworthy than Africa's traditional Western partners; the ambiguous rhetoric in Washington and other Western capitals about shifting priorities away from fighting terrorism in Africa toward countering Chinese and Russian influences has in fact served to support Moscow's argument. Third, Russian focus on stability and sovereignty rather than democratization and governance, coupled with its broad definition of terrorism and extremism, seems quite attractive to many African governments, which face political dissent or even armed insurgency. These and other factors may seem to present Russia with opportunities to expand its foothold on the continent as a provider of security, yet there are certain inherent weaknesses in Russia's approach that greatly limit Moscow's successes in this regard. The chapter aims at exploring strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks of Russia's counterterrorism cooperation with Africa.

Dr. Moshe Terdiman in Chapter 12 offers a look at *The environment as a tool for terrorist organizations in Africa.* The author discusses how terrorist organizations in Africa use environmental issues and climate change in order to achieve their goals. For example, *Boko Haram* and the *Al Qaeda* organizations, which are active in the Sahel, Nigeria and Cameroon, use the fact that Lake Chad has been shrinking in size in order to recruit people and, in return, promise them and their families food, water and welfare. Terrorist organizations, such as *Al Shabab* in Somalia, use illegal ivory and charcoal trade in order to finance their activities while taking part in the deforestation of Somalia. At the same time, *Al Shabab* prohibited the uprooting of trees and the use of plastic bags, which corresponds to its economic interest but is presented as part of the green agenda.

The volume's twelve chapters examine different facets of the somewhat different picture of terrorism that is emerging in Africa and explore its historical antecedents, attempting to look at the phenomenon as a unique – 'glocalized' – product of local African factors and international influences and relying on political, sociological, anthropological and psychological approaches.

References

Apenda, I.T. & Tough, B.T. (2015). Terrorism and Boko Haram: A Reconsideration of Impacts on World Peace. *Terrorism*, 37. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/234670778.pdf

OAU. (2002). OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37289-treaty-0020_-_oau_convention_on_the_prevention_and_combating_of_terrorism_e.pdff

Okumu, W. & Botha, A. (2007). Domestic terrorism in Africa: Defining, addressing and understanding its impact on human security. Pretoria. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/TERRORISMREPORT.pdf

Romaniuk, S. N., Grice, F., Irrera, D., & Webb, S. (Eds.). (2017). The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy. Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Rosenau, James N. (1997). *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier.* Cambridge University Press.

Waldek, L. & Jayasekara, S. (2011). Boko Haram: the evolution of Islamist extremism in Nigeria. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 6(2), 168-178.

Part I

FROM OCEAN TO OCEAN: AFRICA'S ARCH OF INSTABILITY

Dr. Natalia A. Zherlitsina
Institute for African Studies, Moscow, Russia

Chapter 1. COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES IN NORTH AFRICA: MOROCCO'S APPROACH

Since 2001, the world has entered a new period of history – the war on international terrorism. Over the past twenty years, countries have developed both common and unique strategies to combat and prevent extremism. For the region of North Africa and the Sahel, this topic remains relevant in 2021; indeed, it is in Africa that the number of countries and regions where Islamist jihadist groups are gaining momentum is increasing and where the risk of new terrorist attacks is escalating. Despite the fact that the territorial caliphate of the Islamic State (IS) was destroyed in Iraq and Syria, the group continues to expand through branches in the Sahel, West and Central Africa, destabilizing the situation on the continent as a whole.

Before the bombings in Casablanca in 2003, which went down in history as the 'Moroccan September 11', Islamist jihadism was not perceived as a serious challenge to the kingdom's authorities and a challenge to their legitimacy. On Friday evening, May 16, before entering the facilities and blowing themselves up, suicide bombers cut the throats of the guards. Five bombings targeted places often visited by tourists and Moroccan Jews. In addition to the twelve attackers, at least thirty civilians were killed and nearly a hundred – wounded. The terrorist act was subsequently attributed to an *Al Qaeda* breakaway group operating in Morocco. This deadliest attack in the history of the country shook Morocco's long-held belief that the country was protected from violent extremism and questioned the kingdom's claim to be a model of moderate Islam. Subsequent terrorist attacks in 2007 and 2011 heightened fears about strengthening the position of radicals in the country.

In a speech in the summer of 2014, IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi singled out Morocco as a potential target for terrorist attacks, raising fear about the possibility of further attacks (Berrada, 2019, p. 25). The last high-profile terrorist attack occurred in Morocco in December 2018, when two Scandinavian tourists were beheaded in the Atlas Mountains. But in addition to the internal danger, Islamist radicalism puts Morocco's international reputation at risk. The participation of Moroccan citizens in the bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and the accession of young jihadists to IS in Syria, and then in Libya, raises new fears; the number of Moroccans who joined IS

in Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2017 is 1664; in Libya, as of January 2018, their number reached 300 ('Morocco: Extremism...,' 2021).

This ongoing war raises an important question about the policies of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa: how did the states of the region, and in particular Morocco, respond to the challenge? The two-decade-long confrontation in the name of security has legitimately expanded the powers of state power in both democratic and authoritarian states. The Moroccan approach to security is multidimensional, balanced and focused on soft power. Morocco relies far less on the use of force than other states in the region. Initially, after the 2003 Casablanca bombings, the kingdom used coercive strategies, including mass arrests of suspected Salafist sympathizers, but in 2004 changed its course, taking a number of measures and shifting to a more flexible approach. Fewer people were being arrested in Morocco and many of the detainees were released. If, in the course of anti-terrorism measures, well-known ministers of Islam were arrested, they were treated respectfully.

The Moroccan counter-terrorism program, of course, has many similarities with the strategies of other states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, including anti-terrorism legislation, anti-money-laundering measures, cooperation with foreign partners, and de-radicalization and rehabilitation campaigns. Morocco enacted its first anti-terrorism legislation in May 2003, ten days after the coordinated suicide bombings in Casablanca. This law was updated in 2014: amendments were made to provide for severe sentences of imprisonment from 5 to 15 years and fines of up to 500,000 Moroccan Dirhams (45,000 €) for any Moroccan who joins or tries to join any type of non-state armed organization, whether inside or outside Morocco. This provides a legal basis for the persecution of extremists. In addition, a new preventive security mechanism called *Hadar* (Vigilance) has been established to deploy armed elements of the Royal Armed Forces, the Royal Gendarmerie, the police and auxiliary forces to key strategic locations such as airports, railway stations, administrative buildings and some tourist areas.

In 2015, Morocco announced the formation of the Central Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCIJ) – a highly professional unit, often called the Moroccan FBI. The Bureau is designed to counter terrorism, arms smuggling and kidnapping. In the context of combating terrorism, Morocco also invested in strengthening its intelligence and special services. In the years following the terrorist attacks, the monarchy also reformed immigration policy and the Family Code, which granted more rights to women (Rybalkina, 2020, p. 103).

The de-radicalization programs in Morocco were designed to help prisoners reintegrate into Moroccan society after their release. They provided

educational opportunities in prisons and worked with Moroccan employers to find employment opportunities for prisoners after release. De-radicalization programs in prisons are implemented by the Ministry of Donations and Islamic Affairs under the supervision of members of local and regional *ulema* councils. In 2016, the General Directorate of Prisons of Morocco announced a prison modernization program involving the construction of 36 new prisons, and launched a program called *Musalaha* (Reconciliation), aimed at the de-radicalization and reintegration of jihadists. The program was designed for both returning jihadists and convicted terrorists who had never left the country. The Main Prison Administration, the Council of Ulema and the Moroccan Human Rights Council participated in its establishment.

The program is designed for four months and is a combination of lectures and seminars focused on psychological counseling, theological teachings and reintegration into society. Enrollment in the program is carried out on a voluntary basis and participants who successfully pass it are released from prison after a royal pardon. Mentors implementing the program receive special training: in the first year; there were 47 such people. In 2018, the number of voluntary participants amounted to approximately 300 convicts in prisons in four cities of Morocco: Casablanca, Tangier, Tiflet and Meknes. (Berrada, 2019, p. 28).

The uniqueness of the Moroccan approach to combating terrorism lay in the special relationship with the country's religious institutions. A year after the bombings in Casablanca, the authorities began a complete review of religious policy. Initiated in the 1990s and accelerated in 2004, religious reform is a key element of Morocco's approach to combating extremism and radicalization. The strategic position of the kingdom's authorities is aimed at preserving moderate Islam in Morocco, carried out through an updated interpretation of cultural and religious traditions. One of the most significant components of Moroccan Islam is the figure *Amir al-Muminin* (Lord of the Faithful) – a title belonging to the Moroccan king. It is believed that the *Alaouite* dynasty originates from the Prophet Muhammad. The figure of the Lord of the Faithful makes Morocco a unique country: no other modern head of the Muslim state has the right to such a high title. The new constitution of 2011, initiated by the Arab Spring protests, further strengthened the monarch's symbolic role and consolidated his dominant role in the religious sector.

King Mohammed VI is the highest religious leader of the country, not only in symbolic meaning, but also in structural terms. The national strategy implemented since 2004 under his leadership is aimed at further institutionalizing the broad commitment to the *Maliki* school in Islamic law within the framework of Sunni Islam; *Ash'arism* as a direction of Muslim

theology, which offers flexibility in reconciling religious practices with the modern world; and the traditions of Sufism, which are supported by religious associations and structures that help Moroccans deepen spirituality (Alaoui, 2017, p. 114).

It was Muhammad VI who launched political and religious reforms in 2004, aimed at improving governance and greater homogeneity of the religious sphere, giving a programmatic speech on the importance of rethinking the national religious strategy. The King insisted on the need to support those elements of the religious sphere that form the basis of Moroccan identity: 'The question of religion requires that we focus on our unique historical traditions, namely, the Sunni rite of *Maliki*, on which the unity of our nation is based, and the protection of which is the duty and mission of which we are the guardian' (Nejjar, 2018, p. 4).

These words are a clear response to what was perceived as an unnamed culprit in the 2003 terrorist attacks: the excessive growth of Saudi-style Wahhabi Salafism in the country as a phenomenon alien to Moroccan religious traditions. The reforms were initiated with the aim of 'protecting Morocco from extremism and terrorism trends and preserving its identity, which bears the seal of balance, moderation and tolerance' (Nejjar, 2018, p. 5).

'Spiritual security' – a term that came into use with the beginning of the reform of the Moroccan religious sphere – has become an imperative of national security and means comprehensive state control in this area. The extensive series of reforms initiated by the monarchy had a comprehensive impact on the state of the religious sphere in the kingdom. One of the most notable changes caused by these reforms was the increase in the formal presence of the state in the religious sphere and the 'bureaucratization' of *imam* and other religious officials as public servants.

Under the Ministry of Habus and Islamic Affairs, new departments of the religious bureaucracy were formed, the institutions of Islamic education and their programs were taken under control, the monopoly of the Council of Ulema on the publication of *fatwa* was established, the position of women preachers (*murshidat*) in public administration was legalized, and a large-scale educational program was launched for about 46 thousand *imam* in the country (Bruce, 2018, p. 47). The creation of a significant layer of religious bureaucracy was aimed at transferring the centre of spiritual power from one group – *ulema* – to another – bureaucrats dependent on and accountable to the state machine.

The reform included the modernization of religious institutions, such as the Council of Ulema and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as well as greater transparency in the financing of mosques and other religious institutions. The restructuring of the Moroccan religious sphere as a whole was largely based

on monarchical appointments. The Council of Ulema consists of scientists appointed either by the king himself or on the basis of royal criteria. In the Moroccan religious bureaucracy, all people are hierarchically positioned at the behest of the king himself and obey him, which makes him the highest religious leader of the country, not only in words, but also in organizational terms. It is therefore not surprising that more than half of Moroccan religious institutions are named after King Mohammed VI. Thus, the authorities sought to change the way Islam is taught and interpreted for Moroccan citizens. The government is also working to delegitimize fundamentalist interpretations of Islam through comics and games for children, as well as educational programs for adolescents. The authorities organized the training of female preachers for the subsequent preaching of a tolerant version of Islam.

The reform of state religious education has become a significant element in Morocco's national strategy. Islamic education is a compulsory subject in public schools and is taught in every class from kindergarten to high school. Although it is taught only a few hours a week, its presence in all curricula means that all Moroccan children receive knowledge of the subject in the interpretation of the state. The reform of Morocco's Islamic curricula has standardized the content of lesson plans. The King personally favored the integration of private religious education institutions into the state bureaucracy to ensure compliance with the standards. During the reform, the Moroccan Ministry of Education aimed at balancing four sets of values in the programs: 'Islamic values', 'modern values', 'national values' and 'human rights values' (Wainscott, 2015, p. 642).

The main change in religious education programs has been a strengthening of the emphasis on civic values and a decrease in the emphasis on Islam. Traditional practices, such as memorizing parts of the Koran and Hadith, have been almost completely removed from school programs. Discussion of Islamic practices, such as prayers, has been replaced by new topics, such as basic communication and health education. The partial removal of religious content has extended not only to Islamic education, but also to other subjects, such as Arabic and philosophy.

Taken together, the reforms of Islamic education, Arabic language and philosophy in secondary schools indicate that a concerted effort has been made to partially secularize the content of several school subjects. This approach reflects the controversial pressure exerted on the Ministry of Education both by the monarchy and by groups interested in preserving Islamic education. It also underlines that Moroccan religious policies are aimed at both deterrence and control.

As for higher Islamic education, which directly gives graduates access to positions in the country's religious bureaucracy, it received even more

attention from the authorities during the reform due to the fact that religious circles have often been the environment that fed the opposition throughout history. Thus control over the institutions that produce the religious elite was seen by the kingdom's authorities as a means of creating a loyal class of religious elites. In addition to loyalty, religious figures in Morocco should now be modern, highly educated, tolerant, and able to support any dialogue.

There are three types of higher Islamic educational institutions in Morocco. The first type is a Mosque – University, there are two of them: al-Qarawiyyn in the city of Fez and Yusufiya in Marrakesh. Al-Qarawiyyn underwent a reorganization in 2015 and came under the royal patronage of Mohammed VI, thereby having been integrated into the public education system. The second type of higher Islamic educational institution is the state religious college.

And, finally, the third is the department of Islamic Studies in state universities. All of these institutions offer various academic degrees related to Islamic sciences. State control over the curriculum in these universities allows the government to encourage the development of bureaucrats with the necessary modern approach to religion. By integrating existing religious institutions into state institutions and taking control of educational institutions in this field, the Moroccan state has co-opted religious elites and created incentives to ensure their loyalty and interested participation in the national project.

The reform of *imam* training under the leadership of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs has been a central step towards ensuring the manageability of this area. The Mohammed VI Imam Training Institute was opened in March 2015 and specializes in the training of religious preachers and *imam* of the Sunni rite. The curriculum has been substantially revised to include, in addition to traditional subjects, history, philosophy, comparative religious studies, and foreign languages, with the aim of fostering openness and moderation in future *imam*.

The number of students of the Institute increases every year. Students come not only from Morocco, but also from Tunisia, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Guinea, Nigeria and France. The expansion of the training of foreign religious preachers in Morocco was the result of both the growing demand from other countries for training that would allow the spread of 'moderate' Islam and Morocco's desire to use religious diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy. Currently, more than 1300 foreign students study at the institute (Eljechtimi, 2019). They receive a scholarship of 2 thousand Dirhams ($208) per month in addition to free accommodation, transport costs and health insurance. The curriculum includes, along with traditional Islamic disciplines, philosophy, the history of religions, sexual education and

psychology. Future *imam* may also receive training in electrical engineering, agriculture, shrimp farming and sewing in order to have a guaranteed source of income in the future.

In 2015, the establishment of the Mohammed VI Foundation for African Ulema was announced in Morocco; the goal of this organization is to 'unite and harmonize the efforts of *ulema* of Morocco and African countries to identify, disseminate and strengthen the tolerant values of Islam' (Hmimnat, 2018). The activities of the Foundation are aimed at several important goals: concentrating the efforts of the *ulema* of Africa on the problem of combating extremism and terrorism, exporting its own model of 'spiritual security' and promoting peace in the Sahara-Sahel region.

In strengthening the position of the *Maliki* school of Muslim law in North Africa and the Sahel, as opposed to the activities of Saudi and Pakistani missionaries, who over the past two decades have tried to radicalize North African Muslims, the Moroccan authorities see the way to ensure the security of the region. Back in 2013, Morocco signed a religious partnership agreement with Mali, implemented through the Ministries of Islamic Affairs of both countries, which obliged the signees to promote Maliki jurisprudence. *Imam* from Mali have been awarded almost 500 scholarships to study in Morocco (Charai, 2014). In addition, 100 women from Côte d'Ivoire are enrolled annually in the Rabat Institute run by the Moroccan Ministry of Religious Affairs. They are taught to preach moderate Islam to compatriots.

Given the fact that in the past decade Moroccans living in Europe very often have fallen victims of extremist recruitment, the reform of the Moroccan religious sphere could not circumvent this category of compatriots. It is Islam that is the factor that can strengthen the ties of the departed Moroccans with their homeland. The significant Moroccan diaspora is an important source of economic growth in Morocco: for example, in the first half of 2018, they sent about 31.9 billion Dirhams to relatives (Sawsene, 2018, p. 6).

Today, Moroccan migrants and their descendants can be found in all countries of Western Europe. They represent well-established demographic groups in France, the Netherlands and Belgium and have most recently become a major minority in Spain and Italy. It is not surprising that the Moroccan state has been thinking for a long time about developing a religious policy aimed at providing religious services to Moroccans abroad, from sending *imam* during the month of Ramadan to directly financing the construction of mosques and Islamic associations in foreign countries.

In 2008, Mohammed VI founded the European Council of Moroccan Ulema in Brussels and Rabat with the goal of improving the coordination of Moroccan Islamic associations throughout the continent. The Mohammed VI

Imam Training Institute accepts French students of Moroccan origin thanks to a 2015 agreement signed between French President F. Hollande and the Moroccan authorities. Franco-Moroccan students receive full scholarships and study specially designed programs to return to Europe and occupy positions of religious leaders. The number of French students ranges from 30 to 50 (Bruce, 2018, p. 49). Similarly, al-Qarawiyyn University in Fez signed an agreement with the University of Siena in Italy in 2017 to participate in the training of Italian *imam*.

Thus, Morocco exercises a pragmatic, long-term and active international policy on religion. Its goal is to proactively protect the kingdom's national security on the basis of a common Moroccan and African spiritual heritage. Morocco's strategy is to spread the policy of 'spiritual security' not only within the country, but also on a regional scale to deal remotely with potential threats.

'Spiritual security' in Morocco is not limited to the control of traditional religious institutions. The authorities also actively work with the media, forming public opinion. In 2005, a new radio station, Radio Muhammad VI of the Holy Koran, was formed, which by 2015 became one of the most popular in the country. The new Al-Sadisa television channel was also launched; (*Al-Sadisa* is literally translated as 'sixth', so the reference to King Mohammed VI is apparent). Al-Sadisa is a satellite channel available to viewers not only in Morocco, but throughout the region. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs initiated a partnership with the state media company SNRT to create religious radio and television programs in accordance with the religious policy of the state.

A distinctive feature of all media content of Morocco's religious broadcasting is positive thinking. Unlike competitors in the Gulf countries who portray Islam as attacked, Moroccans do not search for the enemy, but seek to educate compatriots about the personal responsibility of each Muslim to provide for himself and solve his own problems. The popularity of Moroccan religious broadcasting is also facilitated by such distinctive features as focusing on local problems, often inviting guests from the province and broadcasting in local dialects. In accordance with the objectives set in Morocco's religious policy, radio and television channels promote progressive Islamic values, including the emancipation of women, popularizing art and hosting a wide range of civil society representatives, not just religious figures. Although all these media outlets bear the name of the King, unlike Gulf countries they do not promote the cult of personality of the head of state and their owner, but demonstrate an institutional approach.

A study of the Moroccan experience in the fight against radicalism shows that by focusing on institutional control rather than force, the kingdom's

authorities have demonstrated the mechanisms by which the state can translate the discourse of the war on terrorism into a political agenda. By placing the training of religious elites under state control, and including them in the bureaucracy, the Moroccan state has largely succeeded in establishing control over the class of persons who have historically been a source of opposition to the regime. A new class of loyal bureaucrats with state-sanctioned powers contributes to Morocco's greater resilience in the face of extremist propaganda. However, the bureaucratization of religion as a counter-terrorism strategy does not solve political problems, and, ultimately, the future of the country depends on whether poverty, inequality and corruption, which form the fertile ground for radicalization, are overcome. Economic growth and new jobs for young people will become the best guarantee of national security.

References

Alaoui, A.B. (2017). Morocco's Security Strategy: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Extremism. European View, 16(1), 103-120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-017-0449-3

Berrada, K.K. (2019). Morocco's response to foreign terrorist fighters: Tighter security and deradicalization. In T. Renard (Ed.), Returnees in the Maghreb: Comparing policies on returning foreign terrorist fighters in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia (pp. 24-35). Brussels, Belgium, Egmont Institute.

Bruce, B. (2018, December). Morocco on the Road to European Islam. Oasis, (28), year XIV, 45-53.

Charai, A. (2014). Morocco, counter-terrorism, and the US-Africa summit. E-NOTES. Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/docs/charai_1.pdf

Eljechtimi, A. (2019, April 23). Morocco trains foreign students in its practice of moderate Islam. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-religion-idUSKCN1RZ1JP

Hmimnat, S. (2018, June 6). Morocco's Religious 'Soft Power' in Africa: As a Strategy Supporting Morocco's Stretching in Africa. Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis. https://mipa.institute/5642

Morocco: Extremism and Terrorism. (2021). Counter Extremism Project. https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/morocco

Nejjar, S. (2018). Morocco's Political Use of Islam and its Religious Diplomacy. EuroMesco Policy Brief, (86), 1-7.

Rybalkina, I.G. (2020). About the 2004 Family Code of the Kingdom of Morocco. Journal of the Institute for African studies, 4(53), 96-118. https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2020-53-4-96-118

Wainscott, A.M. (2015). Defending Islamic education: War on Terror discourse and religious education in twenty-first-century Morocco. The Journal of North African Studies, 20(4), 635-653. https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2015.1041108

Prof. Hussein Solomon

University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa

Chapter 2. TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE NEED TO PROBLEMATIZE THE STATE IN THE SAHEL

Introduction

On the 19th April 2021, Chad's president – Idriss Deby Itno – was killed whilst fighting rebels. His death was immediately lamented from within the region as well as from some Western capitals as a major set-back for counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel. Chad, after all, is an integral part of the 5,000 strong Sahel G-5 force closely allied with French Operation Barkhane troops aiming to robustly engage and defeat Islamists in the region (Rupesinghe, 2018; Business Day, 2018). The reaction to the Chadian President's death explains why counter-terrorism is failing across the Sahel despite the training and equipping of armed forces, the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars and the stationing of Western troops across the vast expanses of this desert region.

In spite of being lauded for his counter-terrorism stance against radical Islamism, the late Chadian president, by his actions, served to fuel the fire of extremism in his country. Here it is instructive to note that President Deby had just begun his sixth term as president of the country. He came to power via a coup against the brutal dictatorship of Hissene Habre, whom he served under as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Following his capture of power in December 1990, Deby promised democratic reforms and for a short period he was treated as a savior. Despite Deby and his Patriotic Salvation Front winning all six presidential and four parliamentary elections, all of these were marred by fraud. This fraud went beyond the political sphere.

Despite Chad having the tenth largest oil reserves in Africa, it is one of the world's poorest nations, ranking a measly 187 out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index. Much of the oil revenues were redirected towards Deby's own pockets, that of his family and the wider Zaghawa clan which constitutes only 4 percent of the population. Other funds were redirected towards the purchase of weaponry whilst his own citizens languished in abject poverty (Dickow, 2021). His exclusionary, corrupt and authoritarian rule encouraged rebellion as ordinary Chadians lost faith in the ballot box. Deby crushed rebellions to his rule in 2006, 2008 and 2019. In this chaos, various Islamist groups spread their pernicious influence among Chad's Muslims that constitute 55.3 percent of the total population (Pew-Templeton, 2016).

Whilst Islamist insurgency across the Sahel has many historic roots and proximate causes, this chapter will dwell on the nature of the state and how it has contributed to the Islamist insurgency wracking the region, resulting in a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. We begin our discussion with the nature of the African state.

The crisis of the post-colonial African state

The esteemed Russian historian Irina Filatova (2017) lays bare the weakness of the post-colonial African state based as it is on its artificial construction by colonial powers and its lack 'of an organic growth from the entrails of civil society'. The artificial nature of the state resulted in political fragmentation. Despite the modern trappings of statehood, lineage structures (clans and kinship networks) as well as ethnic and religious identity markers remained of paramount importance in most African societies (Bayart, 2009). The lack of the state's organic growth from civil society was also facilitated by colonial administrators who would identify a strong personality loyal to the colonial administration and did everything to increase that personality's power over and above the rest of that society (Filatova, 2017). Authoritarianism, then, became a legacy of colonial rule. This seems to be a pattern that has continued in the post-colonial era. Chad's President Deby was trained in France and then supported in his over three decades in power by the erstwhile colonial power. Whilst relations between N'Djamena and Paris grew ever closer, the relationship between Deby and his own citizens grew ever more distant (Dickow, 2021). These factors have contributed to African states featuring so prominently in the failed state literature.

Within the failed state literature, the decisive criterion of success rather than failure is based on the state's possession of positive sovereignty (Hill, 2005). This concept is most closely associated with Robert Jackson and is based in turn upon Max Weber's ideal state. According to Jackson (1993):

> Positive sovereignty... presupposes capabilities which enable Governments to be their own masters: it is a substantive rather than a formal condition. A positively sovereign government is one which not only enjoys rights of non-intervention and other international immunities but also possesses the wherewithal to provide political goods for its citizens. It is also a government that can collaborate with other governments in defence alliances and similar international arrangements and reciprocate in international commerce and finance.

A successful state, therefore, does not only enjoy international legal or *de jure* recognition of its statehood, but the government and organs of the state also possess the capabilities to project and protect their authority throughout

the entirety of its sovereign territory and consequently enter into collaborative arrangements with other states (Hill, 2005). It is exactly this ability of the government and organs of a state to exert their authority and enter into international relations with other states that result in them acquiring *de facto* statehood too, distinguishing them from negatively sovereign states. If positive sovereignty is defined as a substantive rather than a formal condition, then negative sovereignty can be said to represent its exact opposite. Jackson defines negative sovereignty as 'freedom from outside interference: a formal-legal condition' but nothing else (Jackson, 1993). Strong states are characterized by positive sovereignty and, conversely, weak states are characterized by negative sovereignty. In short, the sovereignty of successful states is both *de facto* and *de jure*, whereas the sovereignty of failing states is solely *de jure*.

States exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to citizens living within their designated territory. 'Political goods' may be defined as those intangible and hard to quantify claims that citizens made on sovereigns before the birth of the modern state characterized above, and now make on the state (Rotberg, 2003). They encompass expectations, conceivable obligations, inform the local political culture, and combined give content to the social contract between the ruler and the ruled. This lies at the core of regime/government and citizenry interactions (Pennock, 1996). Robert Rotberg (2003) argues that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states from failed or collapsed states according to their performance – to the levels of their effective delivery of most crucial political goods – based on their possession of positive sovereignty.

Underpinning each of the descriptions, therefore, are predetermined definitions of what constitutes a non-failed or successful state and what it is that failed states are failing to be. Thus, failed states have been described variously as those that 'can no longer perform the functions required for them to pass as states' (Zartman, 1995); those that 'cannot or will not safeguard minimal civil conditions for their populations: domestic peace, law and order, and good governance' (Hill, 2005); or those in which 'public authorities are either unable or unwilling to carry out their end of what Thomas Hobbes called the social contract' (Gros, 1996). Within these definitions one finds two common elements. The first is the identification of failed states as being either unable and/or unwilling to perform the functions that they should and the second encompasses what these functions are, namely the provision of welfare, law and order, and security (Hill, 2005).

A fundamental flaw with this approach is the assumption that all states are essentially alike and therefore function in similar ways. States considered

to be functioning are perceived as legitimate actors and worthy recipients of Western donor assistance, whereas those unable or unwilling to function according to the standard template tend to be regarded with some suspicion. This categorization of states as either functioning or failing by donors and policymakers is reductive, non-contextualized, and ahistorical. This in turn often results in aggregation of diverse states, cookie-cutter prescriptions for strengthening states, a strong emphasis on order over democratic discourse, and a Western value bias concerning the modern role of the state, according to Charles Call (2008). Accordingly, he warns of throwing a monolithic coat over disparate problems that ultimately require tailored solutions.

A more realistic approach – especially for Africa – is to focus on the capacity of the state to provide the most crucial political goods to its citizenry. And in the hierarchy of political goods, none is more critical and central to the success of the state than security, especially human security (Rotberg, 2003). The state's primary function, therefore, is to provide the citizenry with the political good of security: to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltration, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their disputes with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion.

In turn, the delivery of a range of other desirable political goods becomes possible when a reasonable measure of security has been sustained. These include everything from essential personal freedoms (such as civil liberties and human rights), health care and education to the promotion of commerce and the development of physical infrastructure. Considered together, the state's capacity to deliver a range of political goods starting with security establishes a set of criteria by which states may be judged as strong, weak or failed, according to Rotberg (2003).

States in the Sahel reflect negative sovereignty, not positive security, and political elites are unable or unwilling to provide their citizens with public goods. Moreover states are authoritarian in nature. As such, state (read regime) security is often purchased at the expense of human security of their citizens. Given the distance between ordinary citizens and their governments, insurgency, including terrorism, is often the culmination of citizens' frustrations. Moreover, regimes are unable to win over parts of the population by providing positive security given their own corruption and misgovernance. As such, they are compelled to rely on their negative sovereignty to be guaranteed by external powers who arm, equip and train their armed forces. This international support for decrepit, dictatorial and predatory rule of local incumbent elites serves to result in greater antipathy towards the foreign

power, which once again fuels Islamist narratives. These points are explored more in depth in the next section

The states in the Sahel and the origins of Islamist insurgency

Much of counter-terrorism responses privilege the state over the various non-state actors (Islamist and non-Islamist) operating in the region with no attempt to historicize the origins of the state or the various Islamist militants in the Sahel. Consequently, what one gets are often short-term militaristic responses with no attempt to engage with structural violence which contributes to terrorist violence. State violence, usually accompanied with extensive 'collateral damage,' often fuels the insurgency itself as the distance between state and society widens into an unbridgeable chasm.

Historical precedents to *Boko Haram* go all the way back to 1802-1804 when religious teacher and ethnic Fulani herder, Uthman dan Fodio declared his *jihad* to purify Islam (Griswold, 2010). In the process, he established the *Sokoto Caliphate*, which exists to this day. More recent precedents to *Boko Haram's* goals could be seen in the Maitatsine uprisings in Kano in 1982, in Kaduna and Bulumkutu and Yola in 1984, and 1985 in Bauchi. All of these uprisings represent an effort to impose a religious ideology on a secular Nigerian state in much the same way that *Boko Haram* is attempting to force Abuja to accept *Sharia* law across all 36 states of the Nigerian polity (Adesoji, 2011).

Between 1999 and 2008, 28 religious conflicts were reported – the most prominent being the recurrent violence between Muslims and Christians in Jos in 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2008 (Adesoji, 2011). Religions, however, do not exist in a historical vacuum. They are interconnected with issues like ethnicity, politics, economics, migration and violence. To understand the recurrent religious violence in northern Nigeria, we need to explore the context in which this Islamist fundamentalism thrives. As it has been correctly observed, 'Religious violence is embedded in moments of history and structures of culture' (Adogame, 2010).

In the case of Nigeria, religious identity is also reinforced by ethnic and regional identities that serve to shatter the nation-state project. Austine Ikelegbe (2005) is of the opinion that ethnic, communal, religious, regional and sectional identities are on the rise in Nigeria, since they provide a safe haven for increasing numbers of people fleeing an incompetent, insensitive and, at times, predatory state. The antipathy with which Nigerians view the state and the concomitant trust with which they view religious leaders has been demonstrated by the Pew Global Attitudes Project. Asked if religious leaders should play a role in politics, a staggering 91 percent in Nigeria agreed with the statement. This was the highest of all countries in the world (Mandaville, 2010).

Economics is also adding a layer of complexity in this toxic mix of identity politics. In the Nigerian context, this is a fatal omission of counter-terrorism officials. Consider the following: while 27 percent of the population in the largely Christian south live in poverty, the comparative figure in the overwhelmingly Muslim north is a staggering 72 percent. The north's precarious economic situation has been further undermined by desertification, frequent drought and a Rinderpest pandemic. The effects of economic globalization have also worsened the north-south economic divide. The little industry existing in the north is largely textile mills, and these have been unable to compete with cheaper Asian imports. Under the circumstances, the number of factories in the main northern city of Kano has fallen from 350 in 1987 to 103 today (Solomon, 2015). These economic grievances have been used by *Boko Haram* propagandists with great effect in their recruitment strategy.

In similar vein, to understand why a terrorist enclave developed in northern Mali and why the area remains the epicenter of terrorism in the Sahel, we need to understand both Tuareg nationalism and the nature of the Malian state. The call for a separate Tuareg homeland – *Azawad* – is not new and can be traced back to the latter part of the 19th century. On 28 December 1893, French troop entered Timbuktu and claimed this desert town as a French possession. The indigenous Tuareg did not accept their subjugation lightly and resistance to French rule continued until 1917, when Tuareg chiefs reluctantly surrendered following a series of bloody defeats (Benjaminsen, 2008). These Tuaregs were eventually incorporated into the state of Mali, which achieved its independence from France in 1960. The Malian Tuaregs resented the fact that they were separated from their Tuareg kin in countries like Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania (Keita, 1998). More importantly, the Tuareg saw themselves as different and superior from other Malians. They viewed themselves as Arab and not African, and saw their nomadic way of life as superior to the sedentary life of the townsfolk, crop farmers and settled villagers in the south (Seely, 2001). These negative stereotypes existed on both sides of north-south divide. Many Malians in the south view the Tuareg as 'a bunch of white, feudal, racist, pro-slavery, bellicose and lazy savage nomads' (Lecoq, 2002).

Tuaregs were also aggrieved by the policies of modernization and sedimentation pursued by successive governments in Bamako. The Tuareg sense of marginalization was based on a stark reality: pastoral nomadism hardly provides one with the necessary skill sets to partake in a modern economy. Thus, while the average poverty rate in Mali is 64 percent, it is much higher in the Tuareg-dominated north. Timbuktu has a poverty rate of 77 percent. For Gao, the figure is 78.7 percent and for Kidal, it is a staggering

92 percent. The unemployment rate among the youth in Gao was 80 percent (Farrell & Komich, 2004). Unsurprisingly, the Tuareg-dominated and Islamist *Ansar Dine* (Defenders of the Faith) mobilized popular support by calling for an end to poverty. Sanad Ould Bouamama, an *Ansar Dine* spokesman, demanded the right for every citizen in northern Mali to live with dignity, and that economic development was crucial to attaining that dignity (Oumar, 2012).

Similar dynamics is at play in Niger as well. During 2007-2009 in Niger, former president Tandja conducted a policy of genocide against ethnic Tuaregs. According to Jeremy Keenan, this negatively affected two million ethnic Tuaregs in varying ways and degrees (Oumar, 2012). Given the sense of marginalization groups like the Tuaregs feel across borders, bonds of solidarity are formed whilst the nation-state project has lost its appeal.

Niger's current president, Mahammadou Issoufou, is no democrat. He was re-elected president in February 2016 after his main opponent was imprisoned and then forced to flee the country for exile. Other opposition leaders boycotted the polls (The Economist, 2016). Ali Idrissa, a Nigerien journalist, notes that the president and his regime enjoy no legitimacy and that the people feel alienated from the political class. As a result, the government routinely uses repressive means to stay in power. Issoufou and his government sees cooperation with Western powers in the fight against terrorism as a means to extend their reign. Whilst providing the US with bases from which to launch drones against terrorists, Issoufou's regime receives financial assistance from Washington as well as training and arming of his already repressive security apparatus. This financial assistance hardly gets to the ordinary citizen. As Ali Idrissa bluntly states, 'We have a super-rich political class and a mass of people who have been abandoned' (The Economist, 2016). At the same time, political resentment breeds insurgency.

Given the fact that 94 percent of Nigeriens are Muslims, this insurgency takes on an Islamic flavor. The government then labels this 'terrorist' and gets Western countries to help suppress an often-legitimate opposition. The discourse of terrorism together with a repressive state security apparatus, armed and trained by Western governments, then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as moderate Sufi Islam is then replaced by a more radical Salafi Islam. The underlying point being made is a simple one – the origins of terrorism in the Sahel are intertwined with the origins of the post-colonial state itself and its predatory and repressive trajectory.

The problem with Western-led counter-terrorism responses in the Sahel

The predatory nature of the African state hardly occupies the minds of policy makers in London, Paris, or Washington. This is unforgivable given

the vast literature on the subject. Consider here, for instance, Jean Francois Bayart's (2009) seminal *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. In the process, Western states continued to treat their African counterparts as merely weaker versions of themselves. The emphasis was on capacity-building. The training of African military forces continued apace. Consider here the case of Mali's Captain Amadou Sanogo, who received extensive training in the US between 2004 and 2010. Upon returning to his country, he promptly staged a coup against the Malian government. Given the rapacious nature of African military forces, there is a real danger that military skills imparted by Western countries may well make a predatory African state even more predatory with new-found military skills and new military equipment compliments of a rather *naïve* West. In the process, disenchanted African citizens may turn to Islamists in droves to protect them from a rapacious state. This danger was recognized by former US Ambassador Princeton Lyman when he warned, 'The United States has to be especially careful that we do not become partners in a political process that drives people into the arms of Islamic extremists' (Solomon, 2015).

What accounts for this failure on the part of the world's unparalleled war machine to get it so wrong in the Sahel? The short answer seems to be ignorance – ignorance of local cultures, ignorance of the state in the African context, ignorance of history and ignorance of African military forces. Donovan Chau has cogently argued,

> 'Understanding unique foreign histories and cultures better enables formulation of sound US military policy. The defense approach lacks substantial depth and breadth of knowledge of foreign peoples and lands, especially Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) … The US military does not possess institutional knowledge of SSA. Institutional means sustained, in-depth and diverse knowledge as opposed to narrow, temporary and cursory. It also means possessing immediately available subject-matter expertise; this could be within the military or through the military's connections with academia and the private sector' (Chau, 2008).

Paris and Washington, through their ignorance, have fundamentally misdiagnosed the challenge of terrorism in the Sahel – viewing insurgents as part of Global Jihad, Inc – the local franchises of Islamist extremism. This narrative is appealing in its simplicity. The names of the various groups such as *Al Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) all suggest that these are local franchises of their global parent bodies. The Islamist rhetoric from both parent body and 'local franchise' is often similar with talk of perpetual conflict between the *Dar al Harb* (a place of war where non-

believers hold sway) and *Dar al Islam* (a place of peace where Muslims hold sway). Local jihadists have often benefited from the financial resources and technical know-how from global Islamist organizations.

Despite the appeal of this simplistic narrative, to speak of a global war on terrorism in the African context is factually wrong. 'The real challenges facing Africa today,' Stephen Emerson notes, 'is how to cope with the problem of domestically-based terrorism that springs from competing political, economic, and social demands upon fragile societies' (Emerson, 2009). In similar vein, Jakkie Cilliers has argued that it is imperative to distinguish between sub-state (domestic) terrorism and international terrorism and that a failure to distinguish between the two runs the risk of pushing sub-state terrorism into the waiting arms of international terrorism (Cilliers, 2003).

This is precisely what has been happening across the Sahel. To be fair, whilst Paris and Washington may be ignorant of local conditions, the same is not true of incumbent regimes across this blighted region. Government officials encouraged the myth of external jihadists intruding into the Sahel region as opposed to taking responsibility for the fact that these militant groups have proliferated as a result of their own governance failures, their own authoritarian policies and the rapacious corruption which has grown endemic across the vast expanses of the Sahel.

Concluding thoughts

Despite the billions of dollars spent on arming, equipping and training the region's military forces as well as US and French troops on the ground with drones hovering over the battlefield, the jihadists in the Sahel have continued to gain ground. This is graphically seen in the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region which has been labeled as a catastrophe by the United Nations. As a result of the ongoing militant violence, almost a million citizens of Burkina Faso were displaced – abandoning homes and livelihoods. In Mali, a quarter of a million people were forced to flee, whilst the figure for Niger was half a million. In Nigeria, meanwhile, the human costs of unimpeded terrorism are sharply brought to the fore by the 7.7 million Nigerians in dire need of emergency assistance (United Nations, 2020).

Whilst the military is an essential element of any counter-terrorism effort, it is imperative that it is recognized that brute force cannot replace the pressing need for better governance, greater economic development and political inclusion. Terrorism in the Sahel is the result of local conditions. Those who stress the international dimension over local conditions demonstrate ignorance of regional dynamics and factors as diverse as the

authoritarian legacy of the colonial state, environment, economics and the politics of identity. What is needed in the Sahel is greater democratic and responsive governance with more inclusive economic development. This suggests that more holistic solutions are needed for the Sahel's myriad challenges. These holistic solutions should stress better development and governance as opposed to military-centered responses. The Global Terrorism Index unequivocally noted that 'governance is the most important fact that determines the size, longevity and success of a terrorist group' (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020).

Far from supporting rapacious regimes across the Sahel militarily, the international community needs to use their leverage over governments to open up the democratic space. In all of his over thirty years in power, Deby was feted by the international community, which raised scarcely any concerns regarding his decades of misrule. The state of anarchy that Chad finds itself following his death is directly attributed to the support rendered by Western states to the 'Big Man' of Chad. Sovereignty of states must be seen in terms of government rendering public goods to their people and thereby fulfilling their social contracts.

Whilst there is broad consensus on this, it might not be easy to attain given the narrow national interests driving foreign players' involvement in the Sahel. Consider the case of French intervention in the region. 75 percent of France's electricity is produced by nuclear power plants. AREVA is a French parastatal which is 80 percent state-owned. AREVA's twin mining operations at Arlit and Agadez in Niger is AREVA's second largest source of uranium. The need to protect French energy interests was highlighted in a terrorist attack in May 2013 on the Arlit and Agadez's uranium mines (Harmon, 2015). French President Emmanuel Macron also made clear that the need to stabilize the region was essential if Europe intends to curb the influx of migrants (Xinhuanet, 2017). Sadly, given these dynamics, the humanitarian catastrophe across this troubled region will continue to take its toll on the people of the Sahel.

References

Adesoji, A. (2011). Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State. *Africa Today*, *57*(4), 99-119.

Adogame, A. (2010). How God Became a Nigerian: Religious Impulse and the Unfolding of a Nation. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *28*(4), 479-489.

Bayart, J. F. (2009). *The State of Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. 2nd edition. London. Polity.

Benjaminsen, T. A. (2008). Does Supply-Side Scarcity Drive Violent Conflicts in the African Sahel? The Case of the Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali. *Journal of Peace Research*, *45*(6), 819-836.

Business Day. (2018, January). Sahel countries set up fund for anti-terror campaign. Business Day. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-01-09-sahel-countries-set-up-fund-for-anti-terror-campaign/

Call, C. (2008). The fallacy of the 'failed state'. *The Third World Quarterly*, *29*(8), 1491-1507.

Chau, D. C. (2008). US Counter-Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures and Conflicts. Strategic Studies Institute. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA485702

Cilliers, J. (2003). Terrorism and Africa. *African Security Review*, 12 (4), 91-103.

Dickow, H. (2021, April 25). Chad's liberator was its curse. The Sunday Times. https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/2021-04-25-chads-liberator-was-its-curse/

Emerson, S. A. (2009). The Battle for Africa's Hearts and Minds. World Policy Journal, 25 (4), 53-62.

Farrell, W. B., & Komich, C. M. (2004). USAID Assessment: Northern Mali,' Prepared by Management Systems International for the United States Agency for International Development Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. Washington, 17 June 2004, p. 6.

Filatova, I. (2017). Democracy versus State: The African Dilemma. In Solomon, H. & Libenberg, I. (Ed.). Consolidation of Democracy in Africa: A view from the South. Ashgate.

Griswold, E. (2010). *The tenth parallel: Dispatches from the fault line between Christianity and Islam.* Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Gros, J. G. (1996). Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the new world: decay Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti. *Third World Quarterly,* 17 (13), 455-472.

Harmon, S. (2015). Securitization Initiatives in the Sahara-Sahel Region in the Twenty-First Century. African Security, 8 (2), 227-248.

Hill, J. (2005). Beyond the other? A postcolonial critique of the failed states thesis. *African Identities*, 3 (2), 139-154.

Ikelegbe, A. (2005). The construction of a Leviathan: State building, identity formation and political stability in Nigeria. *The crisis of the state and regionalism in West Africa*, 71-92.

Institute for Economics and Peace. (2020). Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the impact of terrorism. Sydney. https://start.umd.edu/global-terrorism-database-gtd-2020-update

Jackson, R. (1993). *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World.* Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

Keita, K. (1998). Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 9 (3), 102-128.

Lecocq, J. S. (2021). That Desert Is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996). Dissertation, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam, 2002. https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/3553370/21885_Thesis.pdf

Mandaville, P. (2010). *Global Political Islam.* London. Routledge.

Oumar, J. (2012, November 5). West Africa: Ansar Al-Din Begins Peace Talks. All Africa. https://allafrica.com/stories/201211061107.html

Pennock, J. (1966). Political development, political systems, and political goods. *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations*, 415-434.

Pew-Templeton. (2016). Global Religious Futures Project. Pew. http://global religiousfutures.org/

Rotberg, R. (2003). Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: Causes and indicators. In Rotberg, R. *State Failure and State Weakness in Time of Terror.* Washington D.C. Brookings Institution Press.

Rupesinghe, N. (2018). The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel: An Appropriate Response to Combat Terrorism? Conflict Trends, 2018 (2) www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-joint-force-of-the-g5-sahel

Seely, J. C. (2001). A Political Analysis of Decentralization: Coopting the Tuareg Threat in Mali. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39 (3), 499-524.

Solomon, H. (2015). *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram.* Springer.

The Economist. (2016, November 26). The eyes in Africa's skies: Taking on West Africa's terrorist. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/11/26/taking-on-west-africas-terrorists

United Nations. (2020, July 9). Situation in West Africa, Sahel Extremely Volatile as Terrorists Exploit Ethnic Animosities'- Special Representative Warns Security Council. United Nations. https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14245.doc.htm

Xinhuanet. (2017, December 18). Macron eyes new ties with Africa to better tackle terrorism. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/18/c_136832846.htm

Zartman, W. (1995). Introduction: Posing the problem of state collapse. In Zartman, W. (Ed.) *Collapsed States: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority.* Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Dr. Tatyana S. Denisova
Institute for African Studies, Moscow, Russia

Chapter 3. ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN CAMEROON: ORIGINS AND PROSPECTS OF FURTHER GAINS

Introduction

The rise of Islamic radicalism in Cameroon is rapidly reshaping the country's religious landscape and contributing to the spread of religious intolerance. In recent decades, traditional Sufi Islam has been increasingly supplanted by the ideology of Wahhabism. Interestingly, Wahhabism is quickly spreading in the south of Cameroon, which until recently was dominated by Christians and animists. Sufism, on the other hand, is widespread chiefly among the Fulani who live in the northern regions of the country, and is gradually retreating.

South Cameroon's Wahhabis are mostly young people. Many of them were educated in Sudan or in the Gulf countries, they communicate with each other in Arabic and oppose control of the Fulani over the Muslim community. It must be said that largely thanks to the southerners, the share of Muslims in the religious composition of the population has increased by almost 5 percent since the mid-2000s – that is, from 21 percent to 26 percent. Muslims constitute the majority in the north and in the western city of Foumban, but they are a growing part of population in the country's capital, Yaounde, and in its economic heart – Douala. Disagreements between the adherents of Sufism and Wahhabism have split Muslim communities and have already led to numerous clashes between Islamic groups.

A particularly dangerous situation has developed in the north of Cameroon, since in this region it is aggravated by the presence of the terrorist organization *Boko Haram*, or, more precisely, the two factions into which the movement has split – the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) and *Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad* (People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad), the latter being still referred to as '*Boko Haram*' for convenience.

The spread of Islam in Cameroon

Islam began to spread in Cameroon after 1715 with the expansion of the Kanem-Bornu Empire and the Sokoto Caliphate in the Chad Lake Basin. The Kanem-Bornu (Bornu) Empire existed until 1893, when it was conquered by the prominent Sudanese slave trader Rabih az-Zubayr, and included lands of

today's north-eastern Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon (Sanni, 2016, p. 13). The 19th century was an era of rapid socio-economic and political development of this region, and it was the 'brilliant past' that largely determined the desire for a 'brilliant present' and prompted the current leaders of Islamists to start forming a new Caliphate in the region (Denisova & Kostelyanets, 2021).

In the 18th century, the population of the Adamawa Plateau in northern Cameroon converted to Islam; in the 19th century, the emirate of Adamawa was founded, which became a theocratic state ruled by *Sharia* law. The emirate was divided into religious and administrative units called *lamidat*, headed by traditional and spiritual leaders – *lamido* (plural – *lamibe*) (Fombad, 2015). *Lamibe* established effective mechanisms of forced Islamization of the local population and of mobilization of citizens to take part in *jihad* directed against the followers of traditional beliefs; hence, Islamic radicalism took deep roots in the region. For centuries, different regions of the Lake Chad Basin underwent numerous invasions of the 'soldiers of Allah', motivated by religious zeal and the desire to subjugate local tribes and take control of the local economy. Since the 18th century, the evolution of Islam in North Cameroon was associated with religious violence, which in the 21st century took the form of terrorism.

By the time of the first German colonization in the late 1880s, most of the region – the periphery of the Sokoto Caliphate – was under Muslim influence, and even during the colonial period such *lamibe* cities as Garoua and Maroua retained their power. However, due to the activities of European missionaries, Christianity began to spread in the colony, mainly in the north among animists who continued to resist Islamization. By the beginning of the 20th century, the territory of the colony had actually been divided into two zones – the Christian south and the Muslim north, although the spread of both religions was not exclusive to these geographic areas.

At present, northerners are approximately equally divided into Muslims and Christians. Their coexistence, even before the appearance of *Boko Haram* in the North, was often characterized by armed clashes between communities. It should be noted that modern Islamists in their actions do not rely only on the Muslim population. This shows that the conflict, which has spread from Nigeria to neighboring countries, including Cameroon, being, on the one hand, a 'religious war', as the leaders of the terrorist group want it to seem, on the other hand, is largely determined by economic and political interests of the Islamists.

In turn, in the south of Cameroon, the Kingdom of Bamum, which actively traded with the Hausa people, converted to Islam at the end of the 19th century, and then the religion spread to the central regions of the

country. At that time it was Sufi Islam, and there were three main Sufi orders: Tijaniyya, Qadiriyya and Mahdiyya. Tijaniyya has remained the largest order. Its main centers are in the northern part of the country and in Foumban. *Lamibe* continue to be highly respected and advise locals on various issues of daily life. Historically, Tijaniyya *imam* were educated in Nigeria, mostly in Maiduguri, and therefore have maintained close ties with their Nigerian neighbors. Currently, many Islamic spiritual institutions have formed in Cameroon, and *imam* have begun to receive education locally. However, the administrative functions of *lamibe* have gradually been replaced by the powers of local authorities, and traditional Islam began to decline (Sanni, 2016, p. 4).

Ahmadou Ahidjo, the first president (1960-1982) of Cameroon, was a Fulani Muslim, who throughout his tenure maintained close ties with northern *imam* and provided them with economic and political support, although he was pragmatic and did not provide the northerners with real political powers ('Cameroon...,' 2010). However, Ahidjo obstructed the Christianization of the North, while also trying to contain Islamic radicalism by adopting decrees that limited the privileges of *imam*. For instance, by decree of 1974, he placed traditional Muslim rulers under the control of local government bodies (Fombad, 2015, p. 6).

The current (since 1982) head of state, Christian southerner Paul Biya, who in the early 1960s served first as an officer on special assignments in the presidential office and then as Director of the Cabinet of the Minister of National Education, owed Ahidjo his ascent up the political ladder. Nonetheless, Biya's harsh suppression of dissent after the 1984 *coup d'etat* attempt undertaken by northerners who were dissatisfied with his rule led to the loss of a significant part of the support of the northern Muslim elites (Issa, 2006). In part, the aggravation of relations between the central authorities and the political and religious elites of the North can be explained by the Biya administration's long ignorance of both the socio-economic and military-political problems of the region, including the terrorist activities of *Boko Haram*.

Spread of Wahhabism

Since the early 1960s, Wahhabi tendencies towards a return to 'genuine' Islam have begun to develop in Cameroon. This movement was initiated by alumni of Koranic educational institutions and former 'interns' of Arab Salafi centers operating in the countries of North Africa and the Persian Gulf. Young Islamic intellectuals set about transforming African Islam, depriving it of its local specificity – that is, customs and traditions inherent in African culture. The spread of Wahhabism initially started on university campuses,

where groups of 'mentors' carried out corresponding work among students and emphasized 'personal piety' and 'good behavior' in public and private life.

The growth of the influence of Muslim fundamentalism in Cameroon was catalyzed by the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, which pushed Africans, including Cameroonians, especially radical youth and local *imam*, to accept Wahhabism, which assumed strict adherence to the ethical and normative principles of the Koran. Although the stated mission of the Cameroonian Wahhabis was to spread 'pure' Salafi Islam, their rhetoric against the 'infidels' as well as against the Cameroonian Christian establishment, which was inspired by Iran's revolutionary Islamism, led to the destabilization of political situation.

The factors that contributed to the spread of Islamic radicalism in Cameroon also included the uprising organized in the early 1980s in the North Nigerian city of Kano by the *Maitatsine* ('the one who curses' in Hausa language) sect and the following retreat of its members – under the pressure of the Nigerian army – into the border areas of Cameroon (Flynn, 2017, p. 62). The sect was led by Al-hajj Mohammed Marwa, a Cameroonian who had arrived in Kano around 1970 and led a movement to purify Islam and oppose adherents of other religions. Marwa was killed during the 1980 riots; his associates moved to countries bordering the northeastern regions of Nigeria, where they established a number of extremist cells (Adesoji, 2011, p. 101).

The spread of Wahhabism has intensified since the mid-1980s. Currently, 10% of Cameroon's Muslims are Wahhabis (Kpughe, 2017, p. 4). The dissemination of Wahhabism is actively supported and funded by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Egypt. In Cameroon, Saudi Arabia builds Islamic institutions and mosques, supports development projects, disseminates the Koran in French, funds Arabic courses and libraries, which contain, in addition to Islamic literature, books on physics, chemistry, literature and other subjects, which attracts numerous students and schoolchildren; Saudi Arabia also sponsored the establishment of a university in Ngaoundéré, the administrative center of the Adamawa province, and the Tsinga Islamic Complex in Yaoundé.

After their training in Islamic law and secular subjects at the Islamic University of Medina and Egypt's Al Azhar University, young Cameroonians integrate into the local clergy and gradually take control of Islamic institutions, schools, associations and the media. Centers of Wahhabism have appeared in the Adamawa province, Douala, Yaoundé, Bafia and other major cities. Although the Wahhabis still represent a minority of Muslims, the movement is growing. The Saudi-led Tsinga Islamic complex in Yaoundé has become more popular than the central Briketeri mosque, which is

controlled by the Tijaniyya brotherhood. The rise of Wahhabism manifests itself, in particular, in the introduction of new standards in marriage ceremonies, funeral rituals, the imposition of the veil, the establishment of hospitals in which only female doctors can treat female patients, etc.

However, the role of Wahhabism is growing also due to the fact that Wahhabis are ready to respond to the needs of the population: they build medical centers, schools, mosques and wells, and finance other development projects. The rapid spread of Wahhabism in the South is explained by the fact that, unlike in the North, there is no *lamibe* there who would control the activities of mosques. Nevertheless, the spread of Wahhabism in Cameroon goes not without problems. Attempts by the Wahhabis to settle in Douala and Yaoundé in the 1990s provoked serious and violent conflicts between Muslim communities. Conflicts between Wahhabis and followers of Tijaniyya ended in bloodshed in 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2012 in the cities of Yaoundé, Koutaba, Bafia and others. The main reason for the discord was the imposition of radical Islam by the Wahhabis and the denial of a number of local cultural traditions.

The emergence of radical religious groups in the South, coupled with the presence of *Boko Haram* in the North, in the past two decades has markedly changed the situation of relative religious tolerance, which made Cameroon in the post-colonial period so different from, for example, neighboring Nigeria. The radicalization of Islam and the aggravation of interfaith relations in Cameroon were mainly blamed on young Muslim southerners, while Sufi Islam, which was represented mainly by northerners, gradually began to decline. The disagreements between traditional spiritual leaders and young Muslims were not only theological: the conflict was about economic and political influence in the Muslim *ummah*; it divided Muslim communities and resulted in local clashes between Islamic groups.

Meanwhile, in the North of Cameroon, Wahhabism has not yet become as widespread as in the South. Most of the Muslim northerners remain followers of the Tijaniyya order, characteristic of which in Cameroon is the sacralization of the *lamibe* and their family members.

However, in the northern regions, some *imam* are getting increasingly close to the Wahhabis. Wahhabi proselytism is promoted by free education in Wahhabi schools, in contrast to the traditional schools of the Koran, which require tuition payments.

Boko Haram and the radicalization of Islam in Cameroon's North

The emergence of *Boko Haram* in Cameroon dates back to 2004, when after the riots in the Nigerian city of Kanamma and the ensuing repressions, Nigerian Islamists began to seek refuge in Cameroon's Mandara mountains.

Soon, Islamists began to freely move around the Lake Chad Basin, and the terrorist threat took on a regional character. As a result, attacks on civilians and military targets increased in northern Cameroon, southern Niger and western Chad. Cameroon has become the second worst-hit area after Nigeria and experienced frequent outbreaks of violence in the 2010s, mainly along the border with Nigeria.

In 2006, one of Nigeria's Islamist leaders, Khaled al-Barnawi, who later, in 2012, became leader of the *Ansara Group* that broke away from *Boko Haram*, began actively recruiting Cameroonians into the ranks of the jihadists, and in 2007 created a network of cells in North Cameroon (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).

In 2009, after clashes between *Boko Haram* and government forces in Maiduguri, northeastern Nigeria, during which the group's founder Mohammed Yusuf was killed, new *Boko Haram* leader Abubakar Shekau and his associates again fled to the Mandara Mountains. It was then that the ideas of *Boko Haram* – such as the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in West Africa and beyond – began to spread in Cameroon and found their loyal adherents in the Wahhabi environment. The jihadists took advantage of the common history and geography of the region, managing to turn North Cameroon into a safe haven and finding here an opportunity to support their livelihoods, relying on available resources: the militants were engaged in extortion, participated in illegal trade and kidnappings for ransom, that is actively developed the 'economy of terrorism'. The Islamists have enlisted the support of Cameroon's criminal networks that control land and real estate transactions, as well as the main roads used for smuggling goods: Kuseri – N'Djamena (Chad), Marua – Maiduguri (Nigeria), Kolofata – Banki (Nigeria), etc. Among the types of activities that brought large profits to the militants was the stealing of livestock for the purpose of reselling it. In 2016 alone, the sale of three shipments of livestock in North Cameroon brought militants €12 million (FATF, 2016).

In 2009-2010, *Boko Haram* managed to recruit about 3 thousand followers in Cameroon, in 2016 – about 4 thousand (Vincent et al., 2017, p. 17). Most of them were Kanuri, because Abubakar Shekau belonged to this ethnic group and because it is the Kanuri that inhabit the border regions between Cameroon and Nigeria. The Kanuri language facilitates communication between local communities, farmers and traders. The knowledge of the language helps Islamists gain support of local residents, secure weapons supplies, train recruits and establish camps in the area. Thus, language, religion and territory have become channels of communication, indoctrination, infiltration and armed activity (Forest, 2012). The people of northeastern Nigeria and North Cameroon are separated by borders, but they

are united by language and religion and equally see themselves as victims of marginalization.

Although a significant number of Cameroonian militants were recruited by force and more than 300 empty villages, whose residents fled from *Boko Haram*, appeared along the border with Nigeria, many joined the Islamists for material reasons or did it voluntarily, inspired by calls for the cleansing of Islam, the introduction of *Sharia* law, etc. (Rackley, 2017). A large role in mobilizing Cameroonians into *Boko Haram* was played by nomadic preachers from Nigeria, other countries of the Lake Chad Basin and from Sudan, who were simultaneously engaged in the propagation of radical Islam and the recruitment of young people (Vincent et al., 2017, p. 17). The departments of Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari and the cities of Maroua and Kousséri have experienced the greatest radicalization and mobilization.

Until the mid-2010s, despite the growing violence in the north, Cameroon's authorities 'tolerated' the Islamists in accordance with a kind of a tacit non-aggression pact: Paul Biya viewed *Boko Haram* as a 'Nigerian problem' and the country's northern regions as a remote periphery. Only after an increase in the frequency of abductions of foreigners and high-ranking Cameroonian officials (for example, in 2014, several French and Chinese citizens were captured and an assault was committed on the residence of the Deputy Prime Minister of Cameroon) Biya declared 'war on *Boko Haram*', which was followed by Abubakar Shekau's oath of allegiance to IS (Tull, 2015, p. 1). Cameroon's territory then began to be considered by Islamists as a 'zone of *jihad*'. During military clashes on the border with Nigeria, both sides – *Boko Haram* and the Cameroonian army – suffered heavy casualties; consequently, Biya reinforced the Rapid Response Battalion (*Bataillon d'Intervention Rapide* – BIR), stationed in the North since 2001, with 2 thousand soldiers and officers (Tull, 2015, p. 2).

In 2014, the Cameroonian army destroyed the *Boko Haram* training camp at Girvidig in the Mayo-Damai department and arrested 84 Cameroonian youths aged 7 to 15, as well as 45 instructors. Local authorities argued that it was actually a Salafi Koranic school, and not a militant camp, but the boys were kept in prison for six months, in terrible conditions. Yet after the raid the recruitment to *Boko Haram* became even larger. Moreover, there increased not only the recruitment, but also the conversion to Islam of some local groups of Christians (Rackley, 2017, p. 3).

The president has consistently refused to negotiate with the Islamists; meanwhile, the benefits of militarizing the northern regions are highly questionable: BIR has already shown its inability to suppress the Islamists, while causing discontent among the local population with acts of violence against it, as well as looting and extortion.

A big problem for the Cameroonian government has been the growing number of refugees from northeastern Nigeria fleeing from the Nigerian army, which accuses them of 'complicity in terrorism'. The Cameroonian authorities, fearing the penetration of *Boko Haram* militants into the northern regions, try either deport refugees or prosecute them on their territory, thus encouraging them to join the Islamists, or place them in special camps, for example in Minawao, where they live in difficult conditions, overcrowded (the camp is designed for 39 thousand people, but there were 60 thousand residents in 2018), lacking food and basic necessities, experiencing constant violence, etc. In general, more than 325 thousand refugees currently live in North Cameroon (Ngassam, 2020, p. 9).

Tensions in the region have also developed between the central apparatus and local branches of the ruling party, the Democratic Union of the Cameroonian People (*Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais* – RDPC): metropolitan politicians accuse the northerners of supporting *Boko Haram* and seeking to destabilize the country (Tull, 2015, p. 3).

The main factors behind the growing influence of *Boko Haram* in the north of Cameroon are the limited presence of the state there, poor economic development, and high unemployment and impoverishment of the local population. Large-scale corruption amid poor governance and mismanagement also reduces the level of loyalty to the state.

As a result, the extreme northern regions of Cameroon have become fertile ground for the spread of any radical ideas, including Islamist ones, and for the engagement of locals in anti-government activities. The High North, with its 4 million inhabitants, is the most populous and poorest region in Cameroon; 74% of its population live below the poverty line, while the national average stands at about 40%. 75% of young people are employed part-time (Afu, 2019, p. 19-20).

After the emergence of *Boko Haram* in the region, the mechanisms for the survival of the population through legal trade and agricultural activities were completely destroyed. In turn, the interruption of trade with Nigeria due to the closure of border crossings in 2015 due to the fear of Islamist infiltration also had detrimental consequences for the legal economy: more than 60% of the region's income came from cross-border trade with Nigeria and Chad, and 80% of all consumer goods were imported from Nigeria (Tull, 2015, p. 2). As a result, illegal economic activities began to develop, primarily smuggling. 70% of farmers in the three most affected districts – Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, Logone-et-Chari – abandoned their farms. Prices for the main commodities – corn, sorghum and gasoline – rose by 20-80% in different regions (Afu, 2019, p. 19-20). The situation is aggravated by the practical lack of infrastructure in the region. Therefore, it was not difficult for *Boko*

Haram to take root there, making promises of the establishment of a new state – the Caliphate, in which justice, equality and economic prosperity would replace bad governance and mismanagement.

The marginalization of the Far North has also been manifested in the limited access of its inhabitants to basic services – health care and education. In the region which is home to 17.9% of Cameroonians (of the total of 28.5 million), the literacy rate is the lowest – about 40%, while the national average is 77% (Bdliya & Bloxom, 2006). The rate of school attendance for children aged 6 to 11 is 63%, compared to the national average of 85% (Ngassam, 2020, p. 11). In part, however, this is due to the fact that northerners are suspicious of Western schools and prefer to educate their children in Koranic educational institutions; as a result, even those attending school can read the Koran (in Hausa, Fulani, or Arabic) but do not speak either of the two official languages, English or French. In turn, the lack of professional education and, accordingly, decent work, prompts them to either join Islamists or engage in illegal activities. Conveniently, North Cameroon lies at the intersection of drug trafficking, arms and fuel contraband routes between Sudan, Chad, Central African Republic, Nigeria and other West African countries.

Criminal activity leads to an exacerbation of inter- and intra-community conflicts, which also contributes to the growth of religious radicalism; the spread of Wahhabism, which violates the established religious order, leads to the emergence of new fault lines within local communities. In each district, more and more new mosques are emerging, which compete with traditional prayer houses and attract young people. They not only preach radical Islamist ideas, but also voice direct calls for *jihad*. All this is taking place against the backdrop of a generational conflict in an environment where the making of policy decisions rests with the 'old guard' of politicians and traditional leaders, whose control over religious and political institutions has been threatened by youth oriented towards preachers from southeastern Nigeria. In addition, new religious leaders promoting *jihad* are establishing contacts with international terrorist networks and Islamic NGOs from Africa and the Middle East, which donate funds to *Boko Haram* under the guise of charity.

The combined impact of a difficult environment, outdated trading and production methods, and traditional lifestyles that are poorly adapted to modern realities make the region vulnerable to extremism, especially since in rural areas both ISWAP and *Boko Haram* often act as defenders of the local population against abuse by administrators, *gendarmerie*, customs officers, etc. and often offer young people who are willing to join significant entry bonuses in the amount of $300-2000, 'salaries' of $100-400 per month and

occasionally motorcycles (Ngassam, 2020, p. 14), thus driving a wedge between civilians and the government. However, young people from wealthy families – children of religious, political and traditional leaders, who are not motivated by economic benefits but rather see the creation of the Caliphate as the only real way to gain political power, – also often join the ranks of the Islamists.

One way or another, the inclusion of about 20 thousand young Cameroonians (Vincent et al., 2017, p. 20) into *Boko Haram* indicates that a huge number of children and adolescents come into contact with the militants. Children become easy targets for radicalization and manipulation; they are used to gather information, carry explosive devices, and, after appropriate indoctrination, are used as suicide bombers.

Many traditional rulers and local government officials also collaborate with *Boko Haram*, guided by economic interests and ethnic solidarity. The long-standing ties of local leaders with criminal structures have found new expression in the context created by *Boko Haram*. True, some leaders and officials collaborate with the Islamists out of fear for their lives, just as businessmen do to protect their businesses.

While carrying out acts of terror that repel potential supporters, *Boko Haram* at the same time, in a sense, replaces the state, providing the population with a certain set of services: healthcare, education, security, etc. (Mahmood & Ani, 2018a), although the simultaneous use of these tactics has turned out to be counterproductive: residents of North Cameroon were asked to stay in the region as citizens of the new Islamic caliphate, but Islamist brutality prompted many to flee.

It must be said that prisons – just like refugee camps – are becoming a convenient place for recruiting in *Boko Haram*. The indoctrination of potential jihadists is actively pursued, for example, in the prison of the city of Maroua, which in 2015 simultaneously held more than 1,200 arrested *Boko Haram* members (Faye, 2017). The 2014 arrests in Foumban of Wahhabi *imam* who allegedly supported *Boko Haram* and arbitrary arrests across North Cameroon of alleged 'terrorist accomplices' have proven counterproductive. On the contrary, the operations of the security forces angered local communities and encouraged them to join *Boko Haram*. In general, while Cameroonian Muslims condemn actions of the Islamists and many *imam* cooperate with the security forces, over the years of their presence in North Cameroon militants, many of whom had relatives here before, have now started their own families, and therefore can always find refuge and support.

Moreover, the transparent border, dense forests and the high mountains of Mandara facilitate guerrilla warfare and arms smuggling. Since the mid-

2000s, that is since the appearance in the region of *Boko Haram* militants and refugees fleeing from the Nigerian army, there has been a constant increase in cross-border crime – illegal trade, kidnapping of people and livestock, etc. *Boko Haram* actively recruits or cooperates with smugglers and uses their knowledge of the terrain and military and police tactics (Zenn, 2018, p. 68). Relying on smuggling networks, militants raid local communities and traders, prompting them to work with the group to stay safe.

The Islamists' success in gaining a foothold in the region sheds light on the weaknesses of government in the periphery: the far north of Cameroon has only recently become the focus of the authorities' attention, mainly due to the growth of terrorist activity and road banditry.

The distrustful attitude of northerners towards the official authorities, a low level of literacy, and the lack of prospects for young people have certainly contributed to the growth of influence of *Boko Haram* in the region, especially since the local economy is largely focused on trade with Nigeria, and local residents use the Nigerian currency – Naira. The locals are also accustomed to crossing the border freely in search of work and education; many have identity cards issued in different countries. The exchange rate of Naira determines the prices of local goods, so it is monitored even by the elderly and children. In cities, civil servants are forced to exchange their salary in CFA francs for Naira before spending it (Mahmood & Ani, 2018b, p. 12). It was in these areas beyond the control of the authorities that *Boko Haram* has taken root.

Religious education has been the main objective of the migration of young Cameroonians to the Nigerian state of Borno, primarily to its capital, Maiduguri. This trend has been particularly noticeable among border communities. Since the 1960s, Koranic schools have attracted more students than public schools, which were few in North Cameroon and often headed by Southern Christians. Often, young people received their education in higher Koranic schools, spending many years in Nigeria, which turned into a kind of initiation rite.

Cameroonians who came to Nigeria to study in Koranic schools in Borno state became disciples of *imam* close to *Boko Haram*, and returned home with audio cassettes with recordings of sermons of the first leader of the group, Mohammed Yusuf; correspondingly, Islamist ideas began to spread rapidly throughout the region.

One of the problems facing the people of North Cameroon is that they are constantly caught between two fires: the Islamists consider them 'agents of the government', and the authorities accuse them of collaborating with the militants. Since the military is not always able to protect the population, it prefers to do without the presence of the army, and cooperation with

terrorists becomes pragmatic and is a survival tactic that benefits Islamists and weakens government agencies. In addition, in areas where both Islamist groups operate, high unemployment and low literacy rates are combined with a growing environmental crisis due to the shrinking of Lake Chad, in the basin of which North Cameroon is located, and desertification, which leads to further deterioration in the material situation of the local population and makes it easier for Islamists to attract recruits.

Conclusion

In recent years, in both Western and African countries, it is the radicalization of Islam that has become the most frequently observed form of religious and other kinds of radicalization. In the 21st century, jihadist movements in the Sahara, the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa in general, have become a reflection of the radicalization of Islam. Young people are especially vulnerable to religious radicalism, as they suffer more than other groups of the population from socio-economic inequality and lack of life prospects.

The specific interpretation of Islam leads to the destabilization of religious and public political life, while the Koranic schools and refugee camps have become 'incubators of terrorists'.

In response to Islamic radicalization in the North of Cameroon, the government came up with initiatives to reduce poverty and eradicate illiteracy and allocated significant funds for the construction of schools, etc. However, the implementation of these projects, which are also poorly coordinated and ineffective, is accompanied by the arrests of *imam*, presumably Wahhabis, and the persecution of residents who have already suffered from the raids of *Boko Haram*, which only contributes to the radicalization of local Muslims.

Until recently, unlike neighboring Nigeria and the Central African Republic, Cameroon avoided serious sectarian conflicts. The religious climate was relatively calm thanks to the moderate Sufi Islam. However, the spread of Wahhabism, as well as the weakening of *lamibe*'s authority, in the foreseeable future may lead to a serious military-political conflict on religious grounds in the context of acute political instability, which Cameroon is currently experiencing, including due to the activities of Anglophone separatist movements in South Cameroon.

References

Adesoji, A. O. (2011). Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State. *Africa today*, *57*(4), 99-119. https://doi.org/10.2979/africatoday.57.4.99

Afu, I. K. (2019). Boko Haram Insurgency, Youth Mobility and Better Life in the Far North Region of Cameroon. *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos*, (37), 17-39.

Bdliya, H. H., & Bloxom, M. (2006). *Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis of the Lake Chad Basin*. LCBC–GEF Project on the Reversal of Land and Water Resources Degradation. https://iwlearn.net/resolveuid/9470ff35bbc5e0205dc364a8322a0f36

Cameroon: Fragile State? Africa Report N° 160. (2010, May 25). International Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-fragile-state

Denisova, T. S., & Kostelyanets, S. V. (2021). The Split in Boko Haram and Its Impact for the Lake Chad Basin Region. *Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law*, *14*(2), 214-230. https://doi.org/10.23932 / 2542-0240-2021-14-2-12

FATF. (2016). Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-West-Central-Africa.pdf

Faye, S.L. (2017). *Faces of Religious Radicalization in African Carceral Spaces*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14328.pdf

Flynn, D. (2017). *Understanding Boko Haram*. Chicago, DePaul University. https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=etd

Fombad, C. M. (2015). State, Religion, and Law in Cameroon: Regulatory Control, Tension, and Accommodation. *Journal of Church and State*, *57*(1), 18-43.

Forest, J. J. (2012). *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria*. Joint Special Operations University.

Issa, S. (2006). La prise d'otages aux confins du Cameroun, de la Centrafrique et du Tchad: une nouvelle modalité du banditisme transfrontalier. *Polis/Revue Camerounaise de Science Politique*, *13*(1-2), 119-146.

Kpughe, M. L. (2017). Christian Churches and the Boko Haram Insurgency in Cameroon: Dilemmas and Responses. *Religions*, *8*(8), 1-13.

Mahmood, O. S., & Ani, N. C. (2018a). *Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram*. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/research/books-and-other-publica-tions/factional-dynamics-within-boko-haram

Mahmood, O. S., & Ani, N. C. (2018b). *Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region: Policies, cooperation and livelihoods*. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf

Ngassam, R. N. (2020). *Historique et contexte de l'émergence de la secte islamiste Boko Haram au Cameroun*. Centre Thucydide. https://www.afri-ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Cahier-Thucydide-24-Boko-Haram-au-Cameroun.pdf

Pérouse de Montclos, M. A. (2014). *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria* (No. 2). African Studies Centre.

Rackley, E. B. (2017). *Cameroon's Far North: Responding to Boko Haram*. Oxford Research Group.

Sanni, A. (2016). *Jihadist and Salafi Discourses in Sudanic Africa: Boko Haram and the Emerging Terror Network in Muslim West Africa* (Vol. 17). King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS).

Tull, D. M. (2015). *Cameroon and Boko Haram: Time to Think Beyond Terrorism and Security*. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C42_tll.pdf

Vincent, P. N. E. J., Funteh, P. M. B., Henri, M. M., & Léa, M. N. N. J. (2017). *The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14200.pdf

Zenn, J. (Ed.). (2018, May) *Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency.* Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf

Dr. Anneli Botha
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa

Chapter 4. ASSESSING THE STATUS AND ADDRESSING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN EAST AFRICA

Countries within Eastern Africa previously experienced and are currently being confronted with very different manifestations of violent extremism. Being diverse in the manifestation and threat of violent extremism, countries can be divided into three categories based on attacks and the threat of attacks between 2015 and 2020: the high-risk countries include Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and Kenya; the medium risk countries include Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Rwanda and South Sudan in reference to sporadic attacks or increases in threat risk indicators. The low risk countries comprise Eritrea, the Comoros, and the Seychelles, which, due to their geographic location and domestic circumstances, are placed in a lower risk category. Despite this categorization, these countries still face risks and may be used as a transit point through which support could be channeled. Unfortunately, since the threat is not immediate, focus is limited. It is especially this limited focus that requires attention. Limited focus predominately stems from officials, referring to policy makers and/or practitioners. Limited attention may also come from intergovernmental organizations: the donor community, civil society, and non-governmental organizations. It is especially in this regard that lessons learned in what has worked are highlighted in this chapter.

UN Resolutions stress the need for a whole-of-government approach – with reference to *inter alia* enhancing good governance, furthering security sector reform, and stimulating broader economic development; this chapter will break these principles down to a more practical level. On a strategic and political level, through Regional Economic Communities (RECs), notably IGAD, the East Africa Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), regions as well as individual countries have developed Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Counter/Preventing Violent Extremism (C/PVE) strategies to implement international instruments and best practices while considering the manifestation of these threats in their respective areas of operation/jurisdiction. Taking these strategies and plans of action further, respective agencies and departments need to develop and implement initiatives and steps reflecting their specialties on a more tactical or practical level. Considering the critical role law enforcement and intelligence agencies are supposed to have in

providing the foundation of the entire criminal justice framework, this chapter will focus on law enforcement.

Placing the focus on law enforcement in context, it is important to note that violent extremist organizations through their overall strategy, area of operations (including structuring), *modus operandi* and target selection can be divided into 'purely' terrorist organizations and insurgent movements that resort to acts of terrorism as part of their broader arsenal. The latter may refer to *Al Shabab* in Somalia and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) – also referred to as *Madinat al Tawhid wal Muwahedeen*, or the City of Monotheism and Monotheists (MTM) – in the DRC, which serve as examples of violent extremist insurgencies and which require the attention of defense forces (national as well as through coalitions, such as the deployment of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia).

ADF is aligned to the Islamic State in forming the Islamic State – Democratic Republic of the Congo (IS-DRC), which together with *Ansar al-Sunna* in Mozambique, also referred to as the Islamic State – Mozambique, forms the Islamic State's Central Africa Province (IS-CAP).

On the other hand, terrorism-related activities are criminalized in national legislation and require an effective police force/service capable of investigating such crimes and building corresponding criminal cases for prosecuting authorities to present in court confidently. An effective judiciary and equal access to justice is the next vital component. Recognizing the role of the military in a counterinsurgency role, governments across the continent have throughout history focused predominately on the capabilities of the military. With many heads of state coming from a military background, while realizing that their own 'survival' depended on securing the support of the military, law enforcement agencies received very little attention and support. Instead of developing an effective law enforcement agency mandated to prevent and investigate criminal activities and playing a role in bringing perpetrators to justice based on the two central pillars – Rule of Law and Due Process – police focused on being a 'force' instead of a 'service' to local communities. This is evident in the lack of trust expressed by ordinary citizens and explained by the curricula of police colleges and the prestige associated with paramilitary training activities, instead of crime scene management, investigation techniques and community policing or working with ordinary citizens, families and victims based on Human Rights practices.

From the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that in 2004 in the aftermath of 9/11 initiated a process to give effect to the implementation of the OAU Convention on Preventing and Combating Terrorism (1999) and UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) on the

political level to the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) Counter-Terrorism Center of Excellence (CTCoE) on the practitioner level, a few key lessons are available in addressing the threat of violent extremism in Eastern Africa. Instead of trying to discuss all intergovernmental initiatives or creating the impression that the chapter intends to evaluate the success of these initiatives, core principles will be presented and briefly explained from the perspective of the author being involved in both.

Background to IGAD and EAPCCO Initiatives

The US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, served as an introduction to transnational terrorism following Osama bin Laden's *fatwa* issued on February 23, 1998, in which *Al Qaeda* through the 'World Islamic Front for *Jihad* Against Jews and Crusaders' declared war on the US and its allies. Although these attacks and the growing threat of violent extremism and terrorism, especially in North Africa (with Algeria and Egypt being the most targeted), led to the OAU Convention on Preventing and Combating Terrorism (1999), it was the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) and subsequent requirements within the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) issued under Chapter VII that hardened the African continent's resolve against terrorism.

Subsequently, following the 9/11 attacks, IGAD member states in January 2002 distinguished themselves in the forefront in the campaign against terrorism through developing strategies to implement UN Counter-Terrorism Conventions and the OAU/AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Despite this very important ground laying work, the organization realized that implementation and consistent re-assessment are essential elements in producing a successful strategy to effectively combat and prevent terrorism in all its manifestations in the short-, medium-, and long-term. IGAD consequently partnered with the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, South Africa to conduct regional and national threat assessments, as well as an assessment of national counter-terrorism initiatives. This report was presented to IGAD member states in Mombasa, Kenya in October 2004 supported by the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Gesellschaft (GTZ) and the Government of Spain through its Embassy in Addis Ababa.

A questionnaire was developed to assist governments in the sub-region to identify their own needs, strengths and weaknesses and allow IGAD to compare and co-ordinate the progress of member states in countering terrorism. Colonel Peter Marwa (IGAD) and Anneli Botha (ISS) visited member states to discuss and collect the questionnaire to compile a written assessment (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2004).

Following the initial threat assessment (to be briefly referred to below) and evaluation of existing capabilities, IGAD and the ISS formalized the relationship through a Memorandum of Understanding with the following core objectives in mind: to improve inter-departmental effectiveness in border control/security along the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan; to improve inter-state border control/security between these countries; and work towards the standardization and improvement of border control/security within the IGAD region. In addition to the border control focus, technical assessments, analysis, training, and other forms of capacity building were also included (Institute for Security Studies, 2006). These priorities became the initial building blocks in the creation of IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) in 2006. Furthering its independence from the ISS, ICPAT became the IGAD Security Sector Program (IGAD SSP) in October 2011 to enhance inter-state collaboration even further and beyond a counterterrorism lens (IGAD SSP, 2021).

Also driven out of necessity, law enforcement in Eastern Africa through the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO), representing Burundi, Comoros, the DRC, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, in October 2012 called for a structure within the organization to respond to the persisting acts of terrorism and threat of violent extremism. It is important to note that under the EAPCCO Secretariat, training on counter-terrorism was conducted for many years by cooperating institutions including the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), ISS, UNODC, European Union (EU), Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), to name a few, as well as through the direct assistance of individual governments, most notably Germany, the Netherlands, France, Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States.

During the annual general meeting (AGM) of EAPCCO in 2012, the Council of Police Chiefs recommended the establishment of the EAPCCO Counter Terrorism Centre of Excellence (EAPCCO CTCoE). According to the Resolution 14/8 of the Council of Police Chiefs, the CTCoE is tasked to facilitate the sharing of information; coordinate planning and initiating measures against terrorism and radicalization into violent extremist organizations; and facilitate the sharing of experiences and best practices between member states (Munyi, 2021).

In 2018, in response to above Resolution and the persisted threats of violent extremism and terrorism to EAPCCO member states, the Council of Police Chiefs of the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) adopted a resolution creating the EAPCCO Regional Counter-

Terrorism Centre of Excellence for Eastern Africa (CTCoE). In practical terms, the CTCoE is responsible to the EAPCCO Chiefs of Police and national counter-terrorism units to provide leadership and direction, as well as to determine and promote best practices in preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism. Central to this process is the development of a research capability within the CTCoE to conduct and facilitate research on radicalization into violent extremist organizations and all associated crimes being committed in the manifestation of violent extremism and terrorism.

This evidence-based approach towards understanding the threat is intended to lead to the development and implementation of the most appropriate and effective preventative and counter strategies. The realization that the development of strategies without implementation will not have any impact led to the final task of the CTCoE, namely, to coordinate and facilitate capacity building by criminal justice actors tasked with preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism. As mentioned earlier, through EAPCCO, as well as through bilateral assistance to EAPCCO member states, a substantial number of training programs have been – and still are being – presented on intelligence, crime scene management, investigation (including financial and cyber investigations), the financing of terrorism, border control (including airport security) and tactical intervention. While important, the CTCoE identified the need to determine the actual demand for the different training courses in member states and the levels of training being required against the threat – based on prior incidents, as well as the perceived threat based on international and regional developments – against existing capabilities (influenced by the number of cases, existing personnel and training already received).

It is, however, not just capacity building for the sake of presenting another training course, but it also needs to be steered towards where it is necessary and presented to officers tasked with that function. To move into the direction of initiating an approach where training courses are not presented to the same officers and often the wrong personnel who are not going to use the knowledge gained (as often is the case), the CTCoE called for a training needs assessment and threat assessment to channel and direct assistance where it can make a difference. To assist the CTCoE in operationalizing, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – Regional Office for Eastern Africa (UNODC-ROEA) with financial assistance from the Federal Government of Germany stepped in. Under the direction of Johan Kruger, the Head of Transnational Organised Crime, Illicit Trafficking and Terrorism programs, a mentoring process was initiated for researchers and the threat and training needs assessments was developed to direct future programming.

Understanding the threat of violent extremism and terrorism
## in Eastern Africa

Both initiatives called for a threat assessment to establish an indication of the existing challenges a country, or in this case a region, is being confronted with to identify corresponding needs; in other words, responding, but also acting in a pro-active manner. Historic information is particularly important to identify new trends. As a result, both assessments confirmed that the manifestation of violent extremism and terrorism is diverse, whether between regions (for example, Eastern or Southern Africa) or within a region (for example, between Somalia and neighboring Kenya or Djibouti), but it equally differs within a country (for example, the coastal region of Kenya in contrast to the western part of the country). It is therefore critical that when developing and implementing any strategy against violent extremis policy makers and practitioners are guided by a clear understanding of the manifestation of the threat in that country, the broader region, continent and beyond. These threat, vulnerability and risk assessments need to be periodically updated and linked to the strategy.

The initial threat assessment on Africa covering the period 1990 to 2002 indicated that 296 acts of terrorism resulted in 6,177 casualties (12-year period). In addition to international and transnational terrorism (for example, the US Embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the Paradise Hotel attack in Mombasa in 2002), the region experienced periods of domestic instability with devastating effects on human life and development. Considering that instability continued to plague countries like Algeria and Somalia since 1991, data on these incidents were limited, often not including attacks beyond where foreigners were targeted. To address this weakness, the author developed and used a database constructed from media articles (since 1990) to create a more representative picture on the continent. At that time Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan (especially today's South Sudan) witnessed the most attacks within the IGAD region (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya).

Since 2002, the threat of terrorism escalated substantially in the region. During the period from 2015 till the end of 2020 (five-year period), close to 10,000 acts of domestic and transnational terrorism were recorded in the region, leaving countless victims killed, injured, and displaced. In addition to physical scars, the psychological impact on victims, their families and broader communities cannot be estimated or measured. Living in constant fear, with intimidation being the primary objective of terrorists, it is the most vulnerable – children – who pay the long-term cost of growing up in either a family in which a parent or close relative were radicalized or experienced constant instability and violence, leading to a new cycle of violence and destitution.

There has been a 141.48% increase in the number of incidents between 2015 (1015) and 2020 (2451), with an overall increase of 10.96% between 2019 and 2020. Assessing the potential impact of COVID-19 on violent extremism extends well beyond not only the number or attacks, but also the manner groups such as *Al Shabab* attempted to use the virus to emphasize and exploit weaknesses on the part of the Somali government to provide basic services such as healthcare. For example, in June 2020, Sheikh Mohamed Bali thanked *Al Shabab's* Coronavirus Prevention and Treatment Committee for opening a COVID-19 centre in Jilib (380 km south of Mogadishu) (Aljazeera 2020). Comparing the manifestation of attacks between 2019 and 2020, one notices the increase in the number of attacks occurring in the first six months of 2020 whereafter figures stabilized to 2019 levels and even slightly decreasing during October till December 2020. It is however important to note that Figure 1 only presents an overall assessment and not changes within individual countries.

Figure 1. Execution of attacks in Eastern Africa during 2019 and 2020

Modus Operandi

In contrast to the preferred weapons and tactics in Europe and the Middle East, explosives and firearms in Africa were used in equal numbers for the period 1990-1999. The period from 2000 to August 2003 presented a different picture. During this period, the use of firearms increased by 26%.

One of the reasons was an increase in supply, as the availability and flow of illegal firearms due to the lack of control and inter- and intra-state warfare and instability made firearms the weapon of choice. Apart from the continent's own legacy of armed conflict, proxy wars during the Cold War and dumping of illegal firearms contributed to the availability of the latter. For example, since 1970 more that 30 wars have been fought in Africa. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 OAU countries were affected by armed conflicts. Stockpiles of weapons that were used during these and subsequent conflicts, corruption, and the fact that most African countries do not have the national resources or border control instruments to prevent the transnational trade in illegal weapons further contributed to an escalation.

This situation did not change, as according to the author's own database of incidents there has been a 169.28% difference between the frequency of the use of firearms (in the first place) and explosives in 2015-2020. The use of firearms increased by 159.36% between 2015 (652) and 2020 (1691), with an increase of 3.17% between 2019 and 2020. Attacks involving the use of explosives increased by 26.24% between 2019 and 2020, and an overall increase of 73.11% was observed between 2015 (264) and 2020 (457).

The most drastic difference between 2019 and 2020 occurred in the use of knives (with reference to beheading), with an increase of 110.81%, as well as kidnapping for ransom to finance violent extremism, especially in the DRC, with an increase of 34.52%. The mentioned increase in the number of kidnappings (often leading to beheading or ransoming) in the DRC and growing evidence of links with northern Mozambique (although not the focus of this chapter) is a reminder that allegiance to the Islamic State or *Al Qaeda* brought with it changes in *modus operandi*[*] although domestic grievances may be manipulated by external 'influencers', the root of violent extremist organizations are still driven by local vulnerabilities.

While the Allied Democratic Forces had its roots in the western parts of Uganda, it settled in the eastern DRC around 2013 following increased pressure from Ugandan security forces. In November 2018, the Congo Research Group (2018, p. 3) explained that ADF rebranded itself as *Madinat al Tawhid wal Muwahedeen* or the City of Monotheism and Monotheists (MTM). Followed by an attack on the village of Kamango (near the DRC border with Uganda) on April 18, 2019 in which the Islamic State claimed its first official attack in the DRC (Weiss, 2019). It was also during this period that IS-CAP was increasingly used in association with ADF, the Islamic State in Somalia and *Ansar al-Sunna* in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.

---

[*] While suicide attacks are traditionally associated with *Al Qaeda*, beheadings are the hallmark of the Islamic State.

Target selection

According to the author's own database of incidents, there has been an increase in attacks on civilians (9.15%), commercial[*] (26.49%), humanitarian (11.58%) and governmental (3.23%) targets, but also a slight decrease in attacks on security forces (4.16%) between 2019 and 2020. Providing an overall reflection on attacks on all targets, except for attacks on governmental targets that decreased by 3.76%, attacks on all other targets increased between 2015 and 2020. Attacks on civilians, the most targeted group, increased by 230% in five years, followed by attacks against humanitarian targets that increased by 141%. In addition to being a target of terrorist organizations, civilians also find themselves in the centre of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in both military and law enforcement-led operations. Examples in which security forces treat civilians as 'suspects' instead of victims gradually started to decrease in Somalia, where AMISOM soldiers regularly indiscriminately returned fire after being attacked by remote controlled detonated improvised explosive devices (RCIED), targeting bystanders, and in Kenya, which witnessed mass arrests, disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Not remotely at the point where capacity building in intelligence, enhanced investigation techniques, human rights and community policing can be classified as having a real impact in preventing and countering violent extremism, the negative impact of abuses is increasingly being recognized and commitments are voiced to change these negative practices.

Despite the decrease in attacks on security agencies between 2019 and 2020, attacks directed at security forces increased by 96.43% between 2015 and 2020, while attacks directed at commercial targets increased by 80.19% over the same period.

Attacks directed at humanitarian and commercial targets present their own set of concerns that need dedicated attention, starting with attacks on medical personnel and other forms of humanitarian assistance at the time communities are confronted with health crises. For example, when COVID-19 vaccinations are being rolled out in remote regions that cut into areas under control of violent extremist organizations, such humanitarian operations need to be carefully monitored and protected. Secondly, attacks on commercial targets, especially those directed at industries that may increase employment opportunities, introduce development, economic growth, etc., have a direct negative impact on initiatives to address socioeconomic conditions conducive to violent extremism.

---

[*] Despite the distinction between commercial and civilian targets, it is important to note that these institutions (hospitality – hotels and restaurants), as well as transportation, in most instances contribute to civilian casualties.

Radicalization

Lessons learned from earlier studies of where, why and how individuals were radicalized into violent extremism need to be taken into consideration when developing a proactive approach aimed at preventing radicalization. From these studies two main scenarios were identified: in the first, radicalization and recruitment occur between people in direct contact, especially within the confines of a family, between friends, or in other places and situations where social interaction occurs; in the second scenario, potential recruits are radicalized and recruited from a distance using the Internet and social media when the organization's area of operations is geographically remote. For both scenarios to occur, a cognitive opening need to exist making the individual susceptible to the message presented. Besides, the growing ability of violent extremist organizations to gain access to children from a very young age requires special attention, especially when the medium- to long-term consequences in preventing violent extremism are taken into consideration.

A growing concern when speaking to practitioners in the region is the medium- and long-term consequences to children growing up where parents or close relatives were radicalized into violent extremism or where children were sent away to radical teaching facilities under the false pretences of receiving an education. Even growing up in an environment where safety could not be guaranteed while being subjected to extremist messaging is a concern. Especially since the child soldier scenario continues to exist, for example, in the DRC and Somalia, where children are abducted and often 'choose' to join the organization rather than to be accused of being a government spy. Understandably, circumstances and the resilience of each individual will play a role, but growing attention is placed on the age of the person (those affected increasingly get younger).

Process developing a working relationship

Although specific steps proposed following the threat and training needs assessments cannot be presented (especially in reference to the CTCoE), the following section will briefly present valuable lessons learned to be considered in future programming, whether in working with inter-governmental organizations or individual countries. Unfortunately, due to limitations, this section will only touch on the five most critical lessons and observations.

Open to external assistance

The 'will' to ask or being open to external assistance is the first requirement. In other words, being open to external assistance when developing strategies and implementing action plans is critical to the success

of any initiative. This closely relates to 'political will' when individual countries are willing to act beyond lip service, that is developing strategies and initiatives on paper without any intention to implement or operationalize these commitments. IGAD took the first step due to the appearance of real physical threats and its threat perception. Similarly, the EAPCCO CTCoE was created following a resolution taken by the Chiefs of Police in response to the growing threat of violent extremism and terrorism in member states and to the need to coordinate regional efforts beyond capacity building.

Without urgency, talks may continue, but concrete steps in operationalizing strategies will be absent. This apathy also occurs within organizations that include countries with very different threat perceptions or when political leadership is convinced that they do not require assistance. Not recognizing the value of an international partnership or external assistance will bring any discussion or the provision of assistance to a standstill.

Recognizing the slowness of changing approaches, especially when it involves developing new capabilities – for example, establishing new specialized crime units that require training and equipment – countries and, in our case, law enforcement agencies throughout the region increasingly need to be proactive in their planning. Bureaucracy and budgetary constraints are possibly the most challenging factors on the government side. Considering that governments have a larger political agenda and other priorities, aligning policy makers with practitioners comes with its own challenges. It is especially here where intergovernmental organizations and the larger donor community play an essential and constructive role. Presenting the threat and risk of and vulnerability to violent extremism and terrorism in a larger regional context also enhance the success of these initiatives.

The reality remains that although domestic circumstances provide the underlying reasons for violent extremism and terrorism while at the same time stimulating additional recruitment, due to the interconnective nature of crime and terrorism (leading to transnational terrorism and organized crime) these threats cannot be addressed by individual countries. It has been proven over and over again that nothing stays 'domestic' and the only constructive way is to address these threats and challenges in a coordinated regional approach. Governments on the continent do not have the financial and technological means to address these challenges, requiring external assistance.

Assistance being provided is however not for the exclusive benefit of the region as it also has a positive role to play in international stability and security. Acts of terrorism being financed, planned and facilitated through providing safe haven in other parts of the world to be executed in the region or in donor countries, the threat of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), etc. are

only a few examples to highlight the interconnected international security architecture. In other words, an investment in the security of others is also an investment in one's own security.

Approach and subsequent relationship with the receiving party

The institution or agency providing assistance needs to be responsive to the needs of the receiving party. Honesty and trust are two critical components to any relationship that starts with listening followed by regular communication. The most rewarding approach is to be guided by 'evidence' instead of a perception-based approach. Determining priorities and continuously monitoring implementation will have a positive impact, especially when donor institutions and agencies adopt new directions and approaches where required. In other words, doing the same thing repeatedly without being responsive to the needs on the 'ground' will not only be ineffective, but may lead to wasting valuable resources.

Associated with this requirement is also the track record of the organization, country or institution providing assistance. Indeed, building trust and partnerships should be part of a long-term strategy. Establishing contact followed by periods of no interaction is counterproductive. Cooperation cannot be turned on and off to suit the interests of the donor country or institution providing assistance. It is especially in this regard where it is often difficult to justify the need for consistency to donors. Without maintaining contact, personnel changes within both parties may lead to a situation where building trust and establishing a partnership need to restart from scratch.

Partnerships with other institutions

No single institution or country can provide all the needs of an institution or country. Realizing own strengths (or specialization) and weaknesses (gaps in capacity or any other limitations) while partnering with other institutions will only contribute towards the success of an initiative, which in this case concerns addressing violent extremism and terrorism. Considering the size of the region, the array of specializations and institutional factors such as personnel, language etc., building a cooperative and coordinated approach to capacity building will enhance effectiveness.

Local ownership

The partnering institution should play a supporting role and not be the one directing or prescribing what and how needs to occur. Local ownership establishes a stake in the success of an initiative that eventually drives the operationalisation and functioning of the new organization. Starting with

local recruitment of personnel supported by own personnel and experts in the field will facilitate a mentoring process by enhancing institutional capabilities within the newly established institution.

It also means developing sustainability beyond the partner's involvement. Success at the end rests on the newly created organization's ability to continue with its work even if the organization or donor decides to withdraw from the project. Part of this process is for the new institution to determine its own priorities and in developing its own internal capabilities (and where necessary with the assistance of the partner institution).

Capacity building

While capacity building is a topic on its own, in this framework it refers to building internal capacity within the newly established organization. Having the institution and unlimited resources without the 'right' personnel will have a negative impact on the success and sustainability of the organization. Essential attributes of personnel recruited, or officers seconded by member states include factors associated with personality and temperament, but also personnel with the right background and experience. Considering the sensitive nature of the topic personnel also needs to be vetted and trained in the workings of the organization, as well as in the respective specialized areas.

When recruiting or nominating officers, the representative nature of personnel making up the organization also plays a role in establishing and/or reflecting local ownership. Sharing nationality will have a positive impact enhancing cooperation from the respective member states, as human beings naturally share more with other people they have something in common with. Being police officers, irrespective of nationality, creates a basic bond, but sharing a nationality, culture, language, etc. only strengthens cooperation. Another important factor is that if most of the staff component represents the host country and one or two other nationalities, presenting the organization as 'intergovernmental' and representing interests of the entire region may be a tough sell.

Conclusion

Since 2001, the threat of violent extremism has increased drastically. This trend needs to be partly explained through an international lens, with *Al Qaeda* and the Islamic State providing a new resolve to traditional domestic insurgent and terrorist organizations across the continent. However, domestic circumstances and capacity gaps of individual countries that prevent them from addressing this emergent trend were also placed under the microscope. Understandably, countering a transnational ideology and movement requires

a coordinated transnational response. While international organizations, in particular the United Nations and continental organizations such as the African Union, provide the overall framework and direction, real implementation occurs at regional and national levels. This occurs on both the political level – through RECs, for example, IGAD, – as well as on the practical level – in our case through a regional law enforcement body such as EAPCCO.

Although these two should not be separated, it is important to note that countries in East Africa may be members of more than one REC – IGAD, EAC, SADC or even of regional organizations beyond Africa such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference). This not only complicates coordination, but also refers to different areas of specialization, thereby limiting a truly holistic and coordinated approach. While EAPCCO concentrates on law enforcement as a critical component in the criminal justice approach to violent extremism and terrorism, there is often a disconnection with policy makers that may approach the threat from a military point of view.

Considering the growing threat of violent extremism and terrorism in the region and the different manifestations in a diverse area, regular domestic and regional threat, risk and vulnerability assessments need to be conducted to tailor countermeasures. Included should be analyses of the manifestation of incidents associated with violent extremism, which will provide additional guidance when determining priorities. A prominent concern in addressing violent extremism is still the predominant emphasis on the military approach to curbing this threat. While there is a place for both the military and law enforcement in a counterinsurgency framework, African countries still have not learned not to wait till violent extremism reaches the point of being classified as a full-fledged insurgency before acting, so when they respond it is through carrying out a military intervention. Growing signs of the spread of violent extremism are simply ignored due to the absence of sufficient intelligence capabilities to identify its emergence or – as in the case of Mozambique where government still does not want to admit that there is a problem – for political reasons. African governments, however, need to proactively address the problem through dealing with the underlying reasons of violent extremism gaining a foothold.

This chapter explained both political and practitioners' approaches to counterterrorism on the examples of IGAD, which merged combating terrorism into a broader security sector approach, and EAPPCO, which established the CTCoE to tailor the law enforcement's answer to the threat. Both were made possible through donor support and an openness to external expert guidance. Importantly, both examples illustrated the need for local

ownership. Creating organizations without capacitating and assisting in the operationalization of these initiatives will equally lead to medium- to long-term ineffectiveness and failure. The interconnective nature of international security implies that an investment in the security elsewhere in the world increase dividends in terms of the donor community's own security.

Although the temptation may well be to adopt a more hands-on approach, especially considering the last statement, i.e. without local ownership and irresponsive to local (national and regional) circumstances and needs, assistance will not be tailor-cut and consequently will be ineffective. The two examples stressed the importance of first understanding local challenges and existing capabilities before initiating additional programming.

In acknowledgement of the above need to show positive impact, a holistic approach to addressing violent extremism entails the involvement of other departments – including social welfare and education – to assist law enforcement. While security agencies need to be supported and trained in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), other government departments are currently excluded from the P/CVE discussion and need to be included in this framework.

References

Al Jazeera (2020, June 14). *Al Shabab* sets up coronavirus treatment centre in Somalia. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/14/al-Shabab-sets-up-coronavirus-treatment-centre-in-somalia

Congo Research Group. (2018). Inside the ADF Rebellion: A Glimpse into the Life and Operations of a Secretive Jihadi Armed Group. Center on International Cooperation New York University. https://insidetheadf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Inside-the-ADF-Rebellion-14Nov18.pdf

Institute for Security Studies. (2005, January 6). Press Release: ISS and IGAD Agreement. https://issafrica.org/about-us/press-releases/iss-and-igad-agreement

Intergovernmental Authority on Development. (2004, October 20). Report of the Second Conference on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in the IGAD Region. Whitesands Hotel, Mombasa, Kenya.

IGAD Security Sector Program. (2021, May 27). Background. https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HaqkswzSvjwJ:https://igadssp.org/index.php/about-us-main-menu/background+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=za

Munyi, S. Director's Message. EAPCCO Counter Terrorism Centre of Excellence. https://eapcco-ctcoe.org/directors-message/

Weiss, C. (2019, April 18). Islamic State claims attack in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *The Long War Journal*. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/04/islamic-state-claims-attack-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo.php

Part II

THE CONE OF AFRICA: CHALLENGES OF COUNTERTERRORISM

Prof. Vladimir G. Shubin
Institute for African Studies, Moscow, Russia

Chapter 5. NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND TERRORISM[*]

Unfortunately, in the world there still exists no universally accepted definition of terrorism. This often allows a misapplication of the term. For example, the popular (but notorious for its flaws) Wikipedia contains the following definition of the phenomenon: 'Terrorism is, in the broadest sense, the use of intentional violence to achieve political aims' ('Terrorism,' 2021). Indeed, this definition is too broad and unacceptable because it reduces actions to eradicate dictatorial regimes, armed struggle against foreign occupation, and other justified uses of violence to terrorism. Another problem is the reduction of terrorism to Islamic or far-left strains, as if there were no terrorists of other faiths or terrorists from the far-right. Finally, there are attempts to equate terrorists and guerrillas (Romaniecki, 1974).

In the present author's opinion, armed violence cannot be used in democratic societies where there are political ways of the struggle for one's goals and can never be applied against civilians.

In this chapter, the issue of the use of violence, especially in the form of terrorism, in the framework of national liberation struggle will be considered on the example of Southern Africa, primarily South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), the oldest political organization on the continent, for five decades adhered to the principle of non-violence and was guided by the desire to achieve the elimination of the racist order and the establishment of a democratic state through political means. However, in the early 1960s, the ANC leadership, acting in an alliance, although unofficial, with the South African Communist Party (SACP), was forced to abandon exclusively non-violent methods of struggle.

What preceded this and what were the reasons for such a radical change in the form of struggle? In April 1960, following the shooting of an African demonstration in Sharpeville, the ANC was banned, and all attempts to organize massive resistance to the apartheid regime, in particular by

holding a general strike on May 31, 1961, the day South Africa was proclaimed a republic, were suppressed by the government. Thus, the authorities imposed on the opposition forces the choice of a new form of struggle, the armed one.

This choice was facilitated by events in other countries, such as successful actions of rebels against a dictatorial regime in Cuba and especially in Algeria, where by the end of 1961 it had become clear that France would be forced to leave this African country. Other factors also influenced the choice of forms of struggle. In the late 1950s, armed uprisings broke out in several rural areas of South Africa, raising hopes of widespread support for violent action against the apartheid regime. In addition, in 1961, explosions occurred in several cities, organized by the so-called National Liberation Committee, which was soon renamed the African Resistance Movement, although, oddly enough, it consisted mainly of young white members of the South African Liberal Party. In addition, members of *Poqo*, an armed organization associated at least ideologically with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which split from the ANC in 1959, also used terrorist methods, which entailed the killing of white civilians. Thus, one of the reasons for the ANC's use of an organized armed form of struggle was to prevent the spread of uncontrolled violence and armed racial conflict in the country.

At the same time, while resorting to violence and creating an armed organization – *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation, abbreviated MK), the leaders of the ANC and SACP from the very beginning strongly rejected terrorism and adhered to this strategy for thirty years. Recently, especially after the death of Nelson Mandela, the first commander-in-chief of the MK, there have been many publications about his 'transformation' from a 'terrorist' into a 'man of peace'. It seems that the authors of such publications took the trouble to at least familiarize themselves with Mandela's speech (Mandela, 1978, p. 161) at the Rivonia trial[*], where he clearly expressed the position of the liberation movement, stressing that the violence that he and his comrades chose for themselves was not terrorism: 'Four forms of violence are possible. There is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is terrorism, and there is open revolution. We chose to adopt the first method and to test it fully before taking any other decision'. He emphasized that this choice was made to avoid loss of life and because it 'offered the best hope for future race relations'.

---

[*] The trial of Nelson Mandela and other leaders of the ANC and SACP became known as Rivonia trial by the name of the suburb of Johannesburg where most of them had been arrested on July 11, 1963 at the Liliesleaf farm.

A very cautious approach was also demonstrated by the leaders of the SACP when they raised the issue of employing an armed form of struggle at their consultations in Moscow. In November 1961, Moses Kotane, General Secretary of the SACP and a prominent leader of the ANC, and Dr. Yusuf Dadoo were guests of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. At their meetings in Moscow, in particular with Boris Ponomarev, the International Secretary of its Central Committee, they said that their party had already created a special subcommittee whose task was to develop practical measures to prepare for 'sabotage'.[*] However, the language of the document, entitled *Notes on Certain Aspects of the Political Situation in South Africa,* which was prepared by Kotane (1961, p. 12) for the Soviets, was very restrained: he wrote only about the use of 'some elements of violence, such as picketing and disruption of communications' during the strikes.

The following official opinion of the Soviet leadership was relayed to South Africans: 'Taking into account the situation in the country [i.e. in South Africa] we agree with the views expressed by Comrades Kotane and Dadoo. At the same time, the intention of the SACP to embark on the path of using armed forms of struggle imposes an enormous responsibility on the party. It is necessary not to counterpose one form of struggle to another, but to skillfully combine all of these forms. The armed struggle is the struggle of the broad masses of the people.' (CPSU, 1961). The leaders of the SACP also asked for assistance in training military instructors and were told that the USSR would be able to provide it. Thus, archival documents convincingly show that the decision to 'use violence' was made by the South Africans themselves, while Moscow treated it with understanding, but emphasized the priority of political work.

Later, faced with the intransigence of the racist regime, the leadership of the ANC and its military wing – *Umkhonto we Sizwe* – did make 'another decision' and began preparation for the guerrilla warfare; eventually the MK grew from a small armed group grew into the thousands-strong ANC's People's Army.

However, the rejection of terrorist methods was the strategic line that South African freedom fighters followed for three decades (albeit with a long intermission in 1965-1975) while performing armed actions in South Africa. In the history of the MK there have been no assassinations of political figures of the Pretoria regime, no hijackings of passenger planes, let alone attacks on schools or hospitals.

---

[*] Kotane did not mention in his conversation with Ponomarev that the first armed operations would be carried out just a month later; it may have been decided after his departure from South Africa.

Unfortunately, there were nevertheless cases when its actions led to the death of civilians, but this was never the policy of the ANC. Let us consider some of such cases and their causes, using a report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which was formed in South Africa in 1996[*].

According to the report, as a rule, ANC targets remained within the following boundaries:

– economic objects, communications and energy installations and infrastructure (electricity substations, oil refineries, telecommunications structures, etc.);

– government buildings and infrastructure and other symbols of apartheid (courts, post offices, government offices);

– security force targets (personnel and facilities of the police and military);

– individuals identified as 'collaborators' (councilors[**], state witnesses, suspected informers and defectors).

In addition, some targets were chosen within specific campaigns that were supported by the MK, such as labor actions and anti-election campaigns (TRC, n.d.).

However, innocent civilians occasionally became victims of MK operations as well, though these deplorable incidents were often provoked by the actions of the Pretoria regime. Let us consider some of such cases.

According to the huge body of evidence collected by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 'acts of violence' were quite different from each other, ranging from careful calculated intentional actions to unintentional, unplanned acts that occurred because things 'went wrong'.

Unfortunately, South African Defence Force (SADF) offices were as a rule located in the busy central areas of towns, often in buildings shared by other civilian offices; the most famous action organized by the MK was a bomb attack on May 29, 1983, which took place outside the administrative headquarters of the South African Air Force (SAAF) in Church Street in the heart of Pretoria. It was a part of a systematic bombing campaign, carried out by the ANC against security force personnel and military installations. However, of 20 people killed that day only 11 were SAAF personal, and of 219 injured – 84; the remaining casualties were civilian (TRC, 2000).

---

[*] The work of the TRC resulted in the disclosure of many facts related to the anti-apartheid struggle, however it was based on a legislation of the 'old' South Africa, and the ANC members had to apply for amnesty for joining the Umkhonto we Sizwe.

[**] Councilors were members of the local bodies created by the Pretoria regime in African townships who were regarded by the ANC as 'puppets'.

The head of ANC special operations unit, Aboobaker Ismail[*], applying for the amnesty at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, underlined that ANC had been making calculations regarding its way of war. This unit, subordinate directly to the ANC president O. R. Tambo, was headed initially by Joe Slovo and then by Aboobaker Ismail, known in the MK as Rashid Patel. It was set up in 1979 to undertake high-profile acts of sabotage on key economic installations, but later its activities shifted towards military personnel, who became justifiable targets, resulting in particular in the operation against the SAAF headquarters that had been approved by Tambo.

It should be underlined that this operation took place in the wake of the SADF cross-border raid into Maseru in December 1981 that killed forty-two ANC supporters and Lesotho civilians, as well as the assassination of Ruth First, a prominent intellectual (and Joe Slovo's wife) in Maputo by South African security forces.

Thus, although the intended targets were members of the security forces, the casualties were predominantly civilian passers-by. According to Aboobaker Ismail, who testified at the TRC on 4 May, 1998, 'If we were to accept that nobody would be killed at any stage, then we wouldn't have executed the armed struggle. You often found that the security forces themselves had based themselves in civilian areas and the choice then was always 'do you attack them or not''? (TRC, n.d.).

> In his testimony, Ismail further added that 'This was never a target, an attack against whites. We never fought a racist war. We fought to undo racism … We never set out deliberately to attack civilian targets. We followed the political objectives of the African National Congress in the course of a just struggle. However, in the course of a war, life is lost, and the injury to and the loss of life of innocent civilians sometimes become inevitable. The challenge before us was to avoid indiscriminate killing and to focus on enemy security force … Whilst Umkhonto we Sizwe had the means to attack civilians, and it would have been very easy to come to various houses and shoot people, Umkhonto never did that sort of a thing. It did not take the easy route. Instead it concentrated on military targets, on state infrastructure, often at the cost of the lives of its own cadres' (TRC, n.d.).

---

[*] The Pretoria security was hunting for him, but unsuccessfully; even in the notorious *Terrorism album* that contained hundreds of pictures of ANC and MK members, his name was put mistakenly under the picture of another leading MK operative, Barry Gilder. After the change of power in South Africa Aboobaker Ismail received the rank of Major-General in the South African National Defence Force.

Speaking about the SAAF headquarters bombing, Ismail told the Commission that

> 'There were large numbers of military personnel at the target at the time. We accepted that civilian casualties would result, but we felt that we had to strike at military personnel … It was not callous. It was not a school like the apartheid forces attacked when they were attacking school children. They were military people there … One regrets the loss of innocent lives of civilians, but … we did not think it was terrorism. In fact, the ANC in all its statements lauded that operation….' (TRC, 1998).

Acts such as this were quite clearly rational, intentional and thoroughly planned, although mistakes did occur; for example, the two ANC operatives in the SAAF headquarters bombing were themselves killed in the attack; the author was told by a MK commander that probably they underestimated the power of concentrated charges they used.

The ANC justified this bombing as having being aimed at a security force target and consistent with its policy of intensifying the struggle by attacking the enemy and avoiding civilian casualties whenever possible. ANC told the TRC that

> 'Had that bomb gone off at 16h30 [when office hours end – *V.Sh.*] … the overwhelming majority [of victims] would have been from [the Air Force]. But it went off prematurely … in war, in conflict, of course, one can't always be 100 per cent efficient, effective in an operation … But we are consistent here in terms of our principle and approach' (TRC, n.d.).

Indeed, the author heard from a former SADF officer, a member of its demolition squad, that the bomb was detonated by the loud noisy signal of a passing-by police vehicle.

The so-called Dolphin Unit was established in 1982 within the MK to carry out operations inside South Africa the country. At an amnesty hearing in May 1998, its head Mohammed ('Mo') Shaik described thirty-two carefully planned operations against police, embassies, magistrate's court and state department targets within South Africa. He emphasized that 'At all times I acted within the policy and guidelines laid down by the ANC; I was comprehensively briefed on the modus operandi of special operations in the MK. I accordingly attempted to avoid or minimize civilian casualties whenever I conducted operations. To this end, whenever circumstances permitted, I timed my operations after hours, when targeted buildings had been vacated by civilians. I accept that, in the end, there was always a possibility of civilian casualties.

Where there were civilian casualties these were never at any stage intended to be targets, but were rather caught in the crossfire. To the extent

that there were civilian casualties, I express my deep regret to those who experienced pain and suffering. The apartheid state left us no choice but to take up arms.' (TRC, n.d.).

A quite different type of action was the explosion at Sanlam Centre in the Amanzimtoti resort on December 23, 1985, when Andrew Sibusiso Zondo detonated an explosive placed in a rubbish bin. As a result, five people died in the blast and over forty were injured. This MK member was reacting in anger to the December 20, 1985, raid of the SADF into Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, where nine persons had been killed. He was aware that civilians would be killed and deliberately acted against MK policy. At the hearing at the TRC, the ANC representative conformed that Zondo's act was not in line with ANC policy, but regarded it as understandable as a response to the SADF raid into Lesotho. Zondo was convicted and executed for this act, but before the death sentence was passed, he apologized to the families of those who died. (TRC, n.d.).

On the other hand, some incidents were results of direct provocations by ANC adversaries. For example, in 1989 a bomb was detonated by the security police at the whites-only public toilets in the Strand, in the outskirts of Cape Town. It happened during the 'Open the Beaches' campaign, when supporters of the United Democratic Front demanded the end of racial segregation on the beaches. It is remarkable that members of the Cape Town security police in this operation were accompanied by senior officers. (TRC, n.d.).

The ANC Consultative Conference held in Kabwe, Zambia in June 1985 demonstrated a hardening in the ANC's attitude towards the MK's operations. One of the questions discussed at the conference concerned the so-called 'soft targets'. Joe Slovo, then Chief of Staff of the *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, explained later:

> 'One can say that up to a few years ago we were very anxious to avoid civilian casualties. We still are anxious. But there were moments in our military activity when we could have engaged the enemy effectively but opted out of that possibility because of the danger of civilian casualties. We are no longer completely guided by that consideration' (Slovo, 1986, p. 49.).

This discussion and a call by Oliver Tambo to shift the struggle out of the townships to the white areas were grossly distorted by the press in South Africa and some Western countries, which interpreted them as a decision to attack white civilians, though the main idea was to attack the SADF and police personnel. In reality not much was done in this respect, but the very discussion of the 'soft targets' allowed Pretoria's propaganda machine to convey a distorted picture of the ANC and MK to the population, especially whites.

Such decisions were, no doubt, influenced by the evolving situation. A month before the conference Vernon Nkadimeng, a son of the ANC leader John Nkadimeng[*], was killed by a bomb explosion in Gaborone. Then just two days before the event the South African security forces launched a cross-border raid in the capital of Botswana, killing twelve people. None of the casualties were MK operatives, and the ANC described them as 'very, very soft targets' (TRC, 1997).

The stated objective of the MK was never to engage in operations that deliberately targeted civilians or, indeed, white people (TRC, n.d.). Targets were not selected on the basis of race, and most attacks were aimed at the state, its organs and 'collaborators'. Attacks on 'collaborators' constituted a significant proportion of the MK's armed actions.

For several years an important part of the MK's actions in South Africa was landmine operations in the north-east border areas near Zimbabwe and Botswana and in the south-east near Swaziland. They began in late 1985, and it should be emphasized that in terms of ANC policy, only anti-tank landmines were approved for use; anti-personnel mines were specifically excluded to avoid undesirable losses of life. The targets were military personnel, both regular and combat units made up of farmers in the militarized border zones. However, the implementation of these goals created serious problems.

At the TRC amnesty hearing Dick Mkhonto, one of MK operatives involved in placing the landmines, gave an example. He spoke of careful reconnaissance:

> 'After the reconnaissance we found that place was only used by the military and the police and there were no inhabitants around that area. The road was used solely for the supply of the people at the border that served near the fence that separated Swaziland from South Africa. Then it was taken into consideration that there were no civilians who used those roads. We stayed there for three days, reconnoitring the area. However, despite this reconnaissance, a landmine was triggered by a vehicle driven by black civilians on March 28, 1987. Four of them were killed and the fifth was injured' (TRC, n.d.).

---

[*] John Nkadimeng was a very popular leader of the ANC, SACP and South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). In Kabwe, he and Chris Hani received the highest number of votes at the election of the ANC National Executive Committee; some years later Americans even regarded him as a possible successor of Nelson Mandela.

The former head of the ANC's military intelligence, Ronnie Kasrils[*], who applied for amnesty for the provision of maps of border areas and of the farm and security network, said: 'After farm laborers and civilians were killed and injured in some of these explosions, MK commanders, myself included, visited these areas with instructions to our operatives to exercise greater caution and be stricter with their reconnaissance. In the end these operations were called off' (TRC, n.d.).

Indeed, the campaign was halted by the ANC in late 1987 due to the high number of civilian casualties. According to police records, at least twenty-one landmines were detonated, causing twenty deaths. Only one of those killed was a member of the security forces. Nineteen security force members were injured during the campaign, as opposed to forty civilians, of whom twenty-nine were black and eleven were white (TRC, n.d.).

The attack against the SAAF headquarters was followed by a large number of attacks on police, military personnel and buildings, but the steps were taken not to repeat its negative consequences. A spectacular case was bombing of the SADF's Witwatersrand Command by Heinrich Johannes Grosskopf, a young Afrikaner. Based in central Johannesburg, the Command was responsible for the security of the region and for military operations in support of the police. Trying to avoid civilian casualties, the organizers decided to bring the car bomb into actual contact with the Wits Command building so that the effect of the explosion would be maximized. Accordingly, the bomb was planted in a car with an automatic gearbox that was set up to drive itself into the Command building without a driver before the bomb exploded, injuring 68 people.

The planning of the attack on the Witwatersrand Command described by Grosskopf, is a good example of the ANC's policy of avoiding indiscriminate killing. To reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, time of the operation was set at 9.45 AM 'when the morning rush hour would be over, children would be in school and recreational facilities like ... cinema and restaurants would either still be closed or have very few patrons'. No shrapnel was added and hollow charges were used 'to direct the force of the blast towards the front of the vehicle, thereby concentrating the blast effect onto the Wits Command building and reducing at the same time the blast effect in all other directions'. The organizers considered also the option of a night time attack that would reduce the possibility of civilian casualties in the street; however, it was rejected because it would increase the possibility of civilian casualties at the cinema complex, restaurants and hotels. Another objective was to

---

[*] Ronnie Karsils was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense in the Nelson Mandela cabinet in 1994.

minimize the time between putting the vehicle in position and detonating the bomb 'to reduce the possibility of the car bomb exploding next to or crushing into an oncoming car' (TRC, 2000). Besides, Grosskopf chose to launch the attack in Court Street, because it was the quietest of the four streets surrounding the Witwatersrand Command Headquarters.

However, as important as these precautions were, the main emphasis was on the education of all MK cadres about ANC policy with regard to legitimate targets. They were told that failure to comply with these orders would be considered violations of policy and action would be taken against offenders.

As mentioned above, the landmine campaign was called off in 1987 because the ANC leadership became gravely concerned about the number of collateral civilian casualties. Moreover, in 1988, the ANC National Executive Committee issued a special statement on the conduct of the armed struggle and expressed its concern that in violation of its policy attacks on civilians were taking place.

Such efforts of the ANC leadership facilitated the creation of the moral and political atmosphere in South Africa conducive to a political settlement.

Let us recall that this approach has always found support in our country, which provided the ANC and other national liberation movements in Southern Africa with all-round assistance, including in the training of their military personnel. Many hundreds of MK cadres were trained in the Soviet Union or by Soviet military instructors in the ANC camps in Angola. In the line of duty, the present author visited places where the *Umkhonto we Sizwe* militants studied and saw there, for example, a plan of an attack on a police station, which hung on the wall, but never one of attacks on peaceful civilian objects. It was the assistance of the USSR and its allies, especially the GDR and Cuba, that helped the ANC, as well as SWAPO in Namibia and other liberation movements in Southern Africa that enjoyed our support, to avoid resorting to terrorist methods. It would not be wrong to say that abandoning them became, so to say, a 'brand' of such movements.

While supporting the armed struggle of the ANC, Moscow welcomed its turn towards negotiations with the South African government at the time when conditions appeared ripe for them in the late 1980s, owing to the effects of this struggle.

However, it was during this period that among some of the top Soviet leadership negative sentiment arose (or had it emerged even earlier?) with regard to the methods of struggle used by the liberation movements, which meant a departure from the principled position regarding the legality of the use of violence.

Speaking on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the Great French Revolution on July 10, 1989, Alexander Yakovlev, then a member of the

Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said: 'The idea of violence as the midwife of history has exhausted itself...' (Yakovlev, 1989). Another member of the Politburo and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Eduard Shevardnadze, in his speech at the UN General Assembly in September of the same year, went even further, urging 'to act decisively against any violence, regardless of its motivation or justification' (Shevardnadze, 1989), which meant the condemnation of all decisive actions against the racist regime.

Such statements prompted the author to publish a paper then, in which it was noted that 'one can agree with' the first statement because '... just as in medicine midwives became inessential when there appeared not only highly qualified doctors but also effective drugs and tools to help with childbirth, so in socio-political life violence has become redundant in societies developing in an environment of participatory democracy and even consensus on the most important issues. However, is it always possible? And what if there are no tools and no doctors who know how to use them? Isn't it better to call an old midwife than wait for destructive gangrene to begin? Therefore, while it is extremely dangerous for revolutionaries to absolutize violence (however, neither the ANC nor the SACP can be blamed for this), it is unjustified to completely exclude the possibility of its use, especially in the case of violence by the state punitive machine' (Bushin, 1991).

It remains to add with bitter irony that Yakovlev was among those who welcomed the forcible dissolution of the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of Russia by Boris Yeltsin and the shelling of its building by tanks on the tragic days of October 1993, and Shevardnadze was placed in the chair of the ruler of Georgia by the people who had seized power by force and often had a criminal past, such as Jaba Ioseliani, who had previously been sentenced to 25 years in prison for robbery and murder.

References

Bushin, V. (1991). New political thinking and Southern Africa. *Asia and Africa today*, (2), 8-15.

CPSU. (1961, November 28). *Decisions taken by the instruction of the CPSU CC Secretaries without recording in the minutes.* The Russian State Archive of Modern History, (78).

Kotane, M. (1961, November 9). *Notes on some aspects of the political situation in the Republic of South Africa.*

Mandela, N. (1978). *The struggle is my life.* International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa.

Romaniecki, L. (1974). The Soviet Union and international terrorism. *Soviet Studies*, *26*(3), 417-440.

Shevardnadze, E.A. (1989, September 26). The Fate of the World is Inseparable from the Fate of Our Perestroika. Speech by the Soviet Foreign Minister at the 44th session of the UN Commission. *Izvestia*.

Slovo, J. (1986). 1976 to the present. *Dawn. Journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe*. Souvenir issue, (l), 49.

Terrorism. (2021). Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism

TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission). (1997, May 12). *Further submissions and responses by the African National Congress to questions raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.* https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/submit/anc2.htm

TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission). (1998, May 6). *Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Hearings.* http://www.justice.gov.za

TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission). (2000, January 16). *Application in terms of section 18 of the promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, no. 34 of 1995*, AC/2001/003. https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21003.htm

TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission). (2000, November 21). *On resumption on 21 November 2000 – Day 2.* https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/2000/201121pt.htm

TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission). (n.d.). *The Report of the Truth And Reconciliation Commission*; *TRC Final Report.* http://sabstrc.saha.org.za

Yakovlev, A.N. (1989, July 15). The Great French Revolution and Modernity. Report of a Member of the Politburo, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A.N. Yakovlev at a Solemn Meeting of Representatives of the Soviet public, held in Moscow on July 11. *Sovetskaya kultura*.

Prof. Theo Neethling
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa

Chapter 6. EXTREMISM AND INSECURITY
IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE: WHY BE CONCERNED?

Since March 2020, a growing insurgency in the northern parts of Mozambique has caught the attention of conflict analysts and observers worldwide. Twenty-five years after the conclusion of the brutal Mozambican Civil War (1975-1992), the insurgent movement *Ansar al-Sunna* started to cause havoc in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, which is a stronghold of the ruling party, FRELIMO, but also an impoverished and predominantly Muslim area. This happened after a group of radicalized young men from the areas of Cabo Delgado gathered in opposition to the local Sufi Islam and the Salafi National Islamic Council in the country (Israel, 2020).

Ansar al-Sunna, which is often locally referred to as the *Al Shabab* of Cabo Delgado, initially challenged local *imam* and defaced mosques, but eventually started to organize militarily by establishing military camps in the Quirimbas National Park (Israel, 2020). They burst on the scene in October 2017, when they launched an attack against three police stations in the port city of Mocímboa da Praia (Mackinnon, 2020). Since 2018, attacks have become less discriminate and more violent, including beheading, attacks on villages, and kidnapping of women and girls. An attack on a convoy transporting goods and workers for Anadarko, a now defunct United States (US) multinational oil and gas company which operated in Mozambique, has also occurred, resulting in a temporary suspension of construction work on the liquefied natural gas plant of the company in Cabo Delgado. After a period of calm, Mocímboa da Praia was once again attacked in April 2020, but this time the leader of the movement, Bwana Omar aka Cheia ('Flood'), announced that *Ansar al-Sunna* had come to remain and that they envisioned the establishment of a *Sharia*-based administration in the Cabo Delgado region (Casola & Iocchi, 2020).

These attacks played out in increasingly high levels of insecurity and displacement among the local communities, with a very negative impact on development within the region and a disruption of farming activities. This was followed by heavy-handed responses to the insurgents from the Mozambican security forces, which were very similar to security responses elsewhere in Africa, specifically Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel, and the Maghreb. In Mozambique, the escalating attacks and harsh security

responses have heightened distrust among local residents and led them to take to the streets in the city of Palma in Cabo Delgado. All of this occurred against the backdrop of growing foreign economic engagement in the region by gigantic multinational oil and gas companies relating to the discovery of natural gas reserves in the offshore waters of the province (Pirio et al., 2019).

The question is: Why should there be serious regional (and international) concern over the situation in Mozambique? At least four issues of relevance can be cited, and will be examined and discussed in this chapter. The first issue concerns the links *Ansar al-Sunna* has with the Islamic State. The second issue pertains to the presence of multinational energy giants in promising natural gas deposits off the Mozambican coast and the potential developmental spin-offs of these projects for the country. The third issue concerns the limitations of the Mozambican security forces to deal with the challenges and the assistance rendered by foreign private military companies to the Mozambican government. The last issue of concern is the manifestation of transnational criminal networks in the Cabo Delgado region and the funding of *Ansar al-Sunna*'s terror from illegal and illicit activities. These matters will be explored further in the sections below.

Militant Islam in Mozambique

The province of Cabo Delgado is located on the northernmost portion of the long Mozambican seaboard. Its history and communal life have been crafted by Indian Ocean trade networks developed by Arab traders over many centuries. This led to the spread of Islam along the East African coast, dating back to the eighth century (The New Humanitarian, 2007). To this end, Islam and conceptions of modernity, Arab nationalism and traditionalism all played a role in the shaping of communal ideas and views (Alden and Chichava, 2020). Today, Cabo Delgado with its population of more or less 2,5 million is a Muslim-majority province, and in total, Muslims comprise about 18% of the Mozambican population of more than 27 million people (The New Humanitarian, 2007; U.S. Embassy in Mozambique, 2018).

Cabo Delgado played a key role in the struggle for independence in Mozambique as the Makondo people formed the backbone of the FRELIMO guerrillas in the 1960s, but the country's independence in 1974 did not bring economic development to the province. In fact, the per capita income surge and investment boom were largely confined to the capital Maputo near the southern end of the country, as well as the southern parts of the country. *Ansar al-Sunna*'s emergence should be understood in the context of the above, but its origins are also linked to the assassination of radical Kenyan cleric, Aboud Rogo Mohammed, and his followers. Rogo was assassinated on 27 August 2012 in Kenya after accusations that he had arranged funding

for *Al Shabab* in East Africa, something that sparked days of rioting in Mombasa. The formation of *Ansar al-Sunna* in 2015 was in the form of a religious sect, but eventually the movement turned into a guerrilla movement – much like *Boko Haram* in Nigeria – and is said to have been influenced by Rogo (Alden & Chichava, 2020).

Initially, *Ansar al-Sunna's* goal was to impose *Sharia* law (Islamic law) in Cabo Delgado. The movement rejected the state's schooling, health system and laws, which resulted in much tension in the province. Some analysts argue that the movement is motivated by greed rather than by dogma or grievance, as it is making millions of dollars a week through criminal activities relating to mining, logging, poaching and contraband (Morier-Genoud, 2017; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020a). At the same time, many of its members or supporters are socio-economically marginalized young people without a proper education and formal employment (Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019). They have been joined by young immigrants from nearby countries in a similar marginalized position, and the movement's members managed to organize themselves in tens of small cells along the coast of northern Mozambique (Morier-Genoud, 2017).

A major concern is that violent extremism in Mozambique is the first of this kind in the southern parts of the African continent, namely the first emergence of a militant movement that is associated with the Islamic State (Aljazeera, 2020) and which accordingly is associated with the notion of a jihadist insurgency (Fabricius, 2020). This link between IS and *Ansar al-Sunna* was observed when the latter hoisted the IS flag in conquered towns and villages (Craig, 2020). What is of particular interest is that until recently, acts of terror conducted by Muslim extremists or jihadists in Southern Africa were confined to Tanzania and Zanzibar.

In a briefing in August 2020, Major General Dagvin RM Anderson, head of the US Special Operations Command Africa, observed that IS had leveraged local grievances to penetrate Mozambique. He stated:

> [W]e have seen them over the last 12 to 18 months develop in their capabilities, become more aggressive, and use techniques and procedures that are common in other parts of the world – in the Middle East – that are associated with the Islamic State (Mackinnon, 2020).

It is difficult to verify the death toll and displacements of Mozambican locals in Cabo Delgado, but reports indicate that about 1,500 locals died in insurgent attacks on locals towards the end of 2020 (Buchanan-Clark, 2020), while up to two million people had been uprooted or negatively affected by the crisis overall (Reliefweb, 2020).

In a broader international context, research clearly indicates that new terrorist threats have emerged worldwide and specifically that the global reach of IS has expanded across the following regions: Asia-Pacific, Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The number of IS attacks in individual countries shows an increase from two in 2013 to 27 in 2019. This includes Mozambique, where the Islamic State's Central Africa Province took over the port of Mocímboa da Praia for some time and declared a new outpost in their pursuit of establishing a caliphate after the (temporary) takeover of the town (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020).

Ansar al-Sunna's current operations in Mozambique can be viewed as a microcosm of IS operations in other parts of the African continent. It is characterized by mainly rural operations, extreme use of force and intimidation of the population, and thus uprooting and depopulating large parts of the countryside for training purposes. In the case of *Ansar al-Sunna*, the use of quite sophisticated systems is also prevalent and of concern, such as the use of large caliber weaponry and drones, as well as conducting small seaborne operations.

Finally, *Ansar al-Sunna* made it clear that they intend to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Cabo Delgado area (Hall, 2020). According to Janse van Vuuren (2020), *Ansar al-Sunna's* emergence should be viewed in the broader international context of IS pursuing the establishment of a caliphate. In Africa, IS is building momentum, and its elements are currently focusing on territorial expansion and recruiting – all with a view to 'getting the message out'. It also seems that lessons were learned from IS operations in Iraq and Syria, and in Mozambique, IS now operates through *Ansar al-Sunna* and is focusing on Cabo Delgado as a far-off territory, which is of less strategic interest to the big powers than countries in the Middle East (Janse van Vuuren, 2020).

Mozambique's liquefied natural gas projects at risk

In 2012, the US energy company, Anadarko, discovered major gas reserves off the coast of Cabo Delgado in the Rovuma Basin. Many role players hoped that this would bring much-needed development and prosperity to the region. Shortly after this discovery, the European multinational oil and gas company, Eni, also discovered a massive gas field in the area. Currently, Cabo Delgado is the province where considerable multinational energy giants are at work in Mozambique's promising offshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects. Eight LNG projects are in the process of development in Mozambique, containing a total liquefaction capacity of 44 million tons. In addition to similar projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, the region is set to become a substantial contributor to natural gas production and

export, accounting for more or less 8% of global capacity by the mid-2020s. Mozambique specifically is expected to become one of the top ten LNG producers globally by 2025 (Goodrich, 2020).

In a report of the African Development Bank Group, it is rightly stated that the LNG project presents an economic opportunity for Mozambique that could transform the country's economy, as Mozambique could become a global leading LNG-exporting country and the project has the potential to generate or bring significant long-term foreign direct investment (FDI) (African Development Bank Group, 2019).

The geographic location of the LNG project also positions the project well to meet Atlantic and Asia-Pacific market needs. It is further well positioned to tap into the growing energy demands of the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent (Total, 2020). Against this background, some of the world's biggest companies in the oil and gas industry are involved in offshore exploration, such as –

- Total (France);
- Eni (Spain);
- Exxon Mobil (USA);
- BP (Britain); and
- Shell (the Netherlands); and
- CNPC (China) (Qekeleshe, 2020).

Offshore exploration in the Cabo Delgado area is among Africa's three LNG largest projects (Craig, 2020), namely –

- the Mozambique LNG Project (involving Total and previously Anadarko) worth $20 billion;
- the Coral FLNG Project (involving Eni and Exxon Mobil) worth $4.7 billion; and
- the Rovuma LNG Project (involving Exxon Mobil, Eni and CNPC) worth $30 billion (Rawoot, 2020).

Obviously, these projects could be of major importance to poverty alleviation in indebted Mozambique, as investments of billions of dollars have been made in recent times. However, the escalation of violence since early 2020 has raised some questions over the future of these investments and even put them at high risk (Craig, 2020). In September 2020, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Total, Patrick Pouyanné, as the largest investor in Mozambique LNG projects, met with Mozambican president, Filipe Nyusi, to discuss the risks posed by the intensifying radical Islamic insurgency. Although exploration and operations are taking place offshore, support facilities are onshore and most vulnerable to attacks. Obviously, the foreign companies with their considerable investments feel threatened, especially at

the current stage where final investment decisions have to be taken (World Oil, 2020).

There could be no doubt that, from a development point of view, the success of the energy projects can be viewed as key to the economic future of Mozambique. As a country in 'debt distress', Mozambique will receive $14,9 billion in debt financing from Total. Together, the gas projects are estimated to be worth $60 billion, and this could revolutionize Mozambique's economy of $15 billion (Mackinnon, 2020).

However, many locals feel deeply aggrieved. Soon after the discovery of gas in Cabo Delgado, many locals were evicted and had to relocate to facilitate LNG infrastructure development, especially for onshore facilities to be used by Anadarko-Total and Eni. A report by Anadarko indicated that more than 550 families had to be relocated and close to a 1,000 people are estimated to lose access to their cultivated land. Furthermore, more than 3,000 individuals stand to lose their access to fishing grounds as a result of LNG operations. This resulted in many locals feeling marginalized and aggrieved. Many of them later complained about agreements regarding compensation, as well as the fact that they had been resettled inshore and away from the coastal fishing areas (Rawoot, 2020). Obviously, these factors complicate security in a very delicate social landscape even further (Pirio et al., 2019).

At the time of writing (March 2021), the major investments in the offshore natural gas projects, 40 km from the coast, are going ahead. The insurgency has not directly targeted the project sites, but attacks are coming dangerously closer. It has always been said that the town of Palma should be kept safe from attacks, as this is supposed to become the manufacturing hub where hundreds of skilled workers will be located. Unfortunately, the bloodshed by the Islamist insurgents extended to Palma on 25 March 2021 when dozens of people were killed during an armed attack and four-day assault on the town by hundreds of militants. This included the targeting of shops, banks, military barracks and the Amarula Hotel Palma (BBC News, 2021).

The biggest investor, Total, has not indicated publicly any pertinent negative response to the insurgency thus far, but Exxon Mobil has postponed the final investment decision on its projects – all of which are expected to deliver exports by 2024. A continuation of the insurgency could certainly hamper further investments, with a detrimental effect on the development of the northern parts of Mozambique (Louw-Vaudran, 2020).

Insecurity and foreign mercenary involvement

On 23 March 2020, *Ansar al-Sunna* attacked police and army installations for the first time. This was a change from the tactic of terrorizing civilians. In another deviation from past tactics, the movement started to distribute food to

local communities, which reportedly contributed to a more receptive attitude towards the extremist group in view of the growing resentment against the energy exploration in the region (Hall, 2020).

The Mozambican security forces – which mainly consisted of special police forces, specifically the Rapid Intervention Unit and the Special Operations Group (Beula, 2021) – proved themselves as too weak to counter the extremists, and they could not prevent the latter from briefly taking the strategic northern town of Mocímboa da Praia (Fabricius, 2020) or from the extremists invading a town near Quissanga. The government in Maputo essentially denied the extent of the problem, which was probably intended to divert the attention away from low morale and from unpreparedness amongst its soldiers. There were also problems in the armed forces in relation to defections of soldiers and even the selling of arms and intelligence to *Ansar al-Sunna* (Israel, 2020).

Observers of the conflict, such as Salvador Forquila, Director of the Institute of Economic and Social Studies in Maputo, argue that the Mozambican government underestimated the security threat since the start of the conflict – while in reality, the conflict posed a huge security threat with regional implications. Moreover, for a long time, the government in Maputo kept on referring to the dynamics in Cabo Delgado as a 'foreign conspiracy' without considering the domestic factors, which created the conditions for the insurgency. This was confirmed in a speech by President Filipe Nyusi in October 2020, when he said that the country 'is attacked by outside forces who are targeting the defenseless public and our social institutions' (Kajjo & Vilanculos, 2020). Instead, the insurgency and conflict in Cabo Delgado were rooted in endemic unemployment across the region, which had been worsened by the devastating effects of natural disasters of recent years (Alden & Chichava, 2020).

The inability of the Mozambican security forces to protect communities in Cabo Delgado also coincided with reports of serious human rights violations in Cabo Delgado communities committed by Mozambican armed forces (Schlein, 2020). In order to counter the growing insurgency, the Wagner group, a private Russian military company, was given the green light in Maputo to deploy in support of the Mozambican armed forces in September 2019. However, Wagner's involvement only sparked increased activities of external radical forces in the region. Reports even claimed that 11 Russian soldiers were killed by the insurgents, several of them beheaded (Fabricius, 2019), and consequently the Wagner group was withdrawn from operations in Cabo Delgado.

Other foreign private security groups or contractors also became involved in Cabo Delgado since 2019. Most notable among the foreign actors is the

South African security group, the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), which is owned by a retired Zimbabwean colonel, Lionel Dyck. DAG has been assisting the Mozambican government with training and air support until now. DAG deployed five helicopters, but thus far without any tangible success in stamping out the insurgents. In fact, the company has been facing a number of challenges in the operational area, which became evident when a DAG Gazelle helicopter was hit by small arms fire, and a Bat Hawk microlight came down. DAG was also publicly challenged after helicopter gunships were accused of civilian casualties, which coincided with accusations in the media that the gunships shot at everything that moved. According to reports, DAG also wrongly sank a boat of fishermen off the tourist island of Ibo, causing the deaths of 14 innocent men (defenceWeb, 2020a).

Neither military action by the Mozambican government, nor the use of mercenaries has stopped the attacks from *Ansar al-Sunna* (Institute for Security Studies, 2020). In fact, the situation has gone from bad to worse. In November 2020, dozens of people were reportedly beheaded by Islamist militants in northern Mozambique. This prompted the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR), Michelle Bachelet, to call for urgent measures to protect civilians in what is viewed as an increasingly dangerous and chaotic situation. In this regard, the HCHR accused the government of Mozambique of extrajudicial killings, ill-treatment, excessive use of force, arbitrary detentions – including of journalists – and unlawful restrictions on public freedom of movement (Schlein, 2020).

Lastly, it should also be noted that Total is having its own security arrangements and thereby adding to the foreign security presence in the Cabo Delgado region. This boils down to the hiring of security professionals – as it happens from around the world – and in this case, it is the hiring of French ex-military personnel, particularly from the Foreign Legion. In the case of the Afungi LNG facility in Mozambique, which is the single largest investment on the continent of Africa, Total's security will specifically be overseen by two former legionnaires, Frederic Marbot and Charles Stroeng. Marbot is employed directly by Total, while Stroeng is employed by the security sub-contractor, Risk&Co (Bowker, 2020). All in all, the above discussion substantiates the observation that, '[l]oss of control over the military powers of the State seems to be the path that Mozambique is taking with the use of private military companies' (Centro de Integridade Publica, 2020).

Organized crime networks

Another issue of concern, as far as the conflict dynamics in Cabo Delgado is concerned, relates to organized crime and criminal networks that have

become economically and politically entrenched in the Cabo Delgado region. This has been facilitated by high-ranking figures in the FRELIMO government. It could even be said that drug cartels have probably profited more from the insecurity and instability in the province than religious fundamentalists and petroleum multinationals (Centro para Democracie e Desenvolvimento, 2020). In this regard, it should be understood that heroin trafficking is flourishing in Cabo Delgado since the end of the Mozambican civil war. However, in the past 10 to 15 years, many other illicit activities in the region – including the smuggling of timber, ivory, rubies, other gemstones, drugs and human trafficking – have also been prevalent (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020a).

In brief, the Cabo Delgado region (including the nearby provinces) is a major conduit for smuggling drugs and other contraband. The volume of heroin produced by and shipped from Afghanistan along a network of routes via East and Southern Africa has increased considerably in recent years. The bulk of the heroin is destined for Western markets, but there is also a portion destined for consumption in Mozambique as well as South Africa, as the second largest economy on the continent. In this regard, Cabo Delgado is a key point in the trade routes and networks, and obviously, the insurgency and related dynamics in the province make it even more difficult to conduct law enforcement in the province (Haysom et al., 2018).

One of the problems is that the Mozambican armed forces have experienced 'decades of neglect and a dearth of investment' since independence, leaving the military without the required capacity and competency to conduct challenging operations against a threat such as *Ansar al-Sunna*. There are even reports that there is a persistent leakage of information from the armed forces by unmotivated soldiers on matters such as logistics and conditions on the ground (Alden & Chichava, 2020). A key issue from a coastal perspective is that the Mozambican Navy 'for lack of means, has been the branch of the armed forces with more men on the land than sea'. This made it possible for insurgents to enter Mozambique via the sea and plunder the districts along the coast of the province with the state in no position to stop them. Moreover, organized crime promotes instability, and there are countless allegations that state actors, including elements in the police, have been ensnared in illegal trafficking, which exacerbated the lack of public trust in the government (Pirio et al., 2019).

Cabo Delgado thus became an important drug corridor in East Africa since the 1990s, especially after Tanzania and Kenya repressed trafficking networks in their territories and, accordingly, pushed the networks into Mozambique. In fact, today there are dozens of entry points into Mozambique, and many access points serve as warehouses that link the

producers to consumers (Centro para Democracie e Desenvolvimento, 2020).

Some observers firmly believe that *Ansar al-Sunna's* funding is linked to illegal and illicit activities, especially timber and rubies (West, 2018). In a published analysis of the Jamestown Foundation, Sungata West (2018) writes:

> 'The group is likely also involved in the illicit trade in ivory and contraband goods, which would involve interaction with Tanzanians and other African, Chinese and Vietnamese nationals, with the revenues from these activities further boosting the militant group's finances.'

Bukarti and Munasinghe (2020) share these views by arguing that *Ansar al-Sunna* is financed from illicit activities, such as trade in ivory, wood, charcoal and rubber, involving partners in both Africa and Asia. In addition to the countries mentioned above, nationals from countries such as Cameroon, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, the DRC, Rwanda and Thailand also seem to be involved. Moreover, in April 2020, a high-level Brazilian drug trafficker, Gilberto Aparecido Dos Santos, was arrested in Mozambique. Dos Santos is a close ally of leading role players in *Primeiro Comando da Capital*, Brazil's largest and most powerful organized crime syndicate. His arrest was a clear indication of the growing links between crime groups in Southern and East African crime and smuggling networks in Brazil (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020b).

Research-based analyses conducted by the Maputo-based Instituto de Estudos Sociais o Economicos (IESE) confirm that *Ansar al-Sunna's* funding should be understood in a wide regional context, arguing that sponsors and members of *Al Shabab* are part of a large network of trans-border trade that connects a variety of countries, specifically Tanzania, Zanzibar and the Comoros in a regional context. These networks involve large- and small-scale business people in sailboats and motorboats, money transfers, gemstone trading and small-scale money lending (Casola & Iocchi, 2020). At the core of this are Mocímboa da Praia and Pemba in Cabo Delgado, where different types of goods are traded (Nelson, 2020).

Although there is currently no clear evidence that links *Ansar al-Sunna's* undoing to the highly lucrative and organized flows of heroin, other forms of drug trafficking seem to be sources of funding for the movement. In fact, Heather Merit, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics, made it clear that drug trafficking in Mozambique as a source of funding for 'terrorist networks' in Mozambique was the main reason that led Washington DC to strengthen support for Maputo through international partnerships (Frey, 2020).

Evaluation and conclusion

There are currently several issues of serious political and security concern in Mozambique, but in this chapter, four issues have specifically been highlighted. Firstly, *Ansar al-Sunna* is the first militant Islamic movement in the southern part of Africa that is associated with IS. In some respects, the movement resembles *Boko Haram* in the less governed, poverty-stricken north-eastern parts of Nigeria, where it started as an Islamic reform movement, but which was eventually framed by the Nigerian government of former president Goodluck Jonathan as a terrorist organization with ties to international jihadist networks. *Ansar al-Sunna*, like *Boko Haram*, is operating from an area where the lowest human development indicators in the country are the order of the day, while both movements are sustaining campaigns of intimidation and bloodshed (Brechenmacher, 2019).

A second concern relates to the fact that, after the discovery of major gas reserves off the coast of Cabo Delgado in the Rovuma Basin, many stakeholders had hoped that this would bring the much-needed development and prosperity to the region. However, hundreds of locals feel deeply aggrieved and marginalized, because soon after the discovery of gas in Cabo Delgado, many poor and rural Mozambicans were evicted and had to relocate to facilitate infrastructure development. Suspicions of corruption by top FRELIMO officials further fuelled local frustrations and discontent. The politics of exploration, promise, displacement and neglect provided fertile ground for the rise of militant Islam and the related crisis in Cabo Delgado.

A third concern is linked to the fact that the Mozambican armed forces are stretched beyond the point where they can protect the local communities in Cabo Delgado. This left local communities with a landscape where opportunities for serious human rights violations are prevailing. A weak naval presence also made it possible for insurgents and armed gangs to penetrate Mozambique via the sea, and plunder the districts along the coast. In order to counter the growing militancy and insecurity, the Mozambican government invited foreign non-state actors into the conflict. In 2019, the controversial Russian Wagner group was deployed in support of the Mozambican armed forces, followed by involvement of the South African-based DAG and other foreign contractors. Yet, despite the foreign assistance rendered thus far to the Mozambican forces, the extremists are still active and pose a substantial threat to the country's national security.

A final matter of serious concern in Cabo Delgado Province relates to the variety of organized crime and criminal networks that have become economically and politically entrenched in the region. Although *Ansar al-Sunna* cannot be linked to international and regional heroin networks, the

movement certainly benefits financially from other forms of illegal smuggling and drug trafficking. It can also be stated that, although *Ansar al-Sunna* does not control the illegal networks and trafficking of goods, they 'are plugging into these networks' (Hoskin, 2020). In addition to corrupt government officials who effectively facilitate organized crime and illicit networks, another key issue is that the Mozambican navy is simply not in a position to patrol the Indian Ocean along the Cabo Delgado region.

In conclusion, there is little doubt that *Ansar al-Sunna* has managed to increase the scale of its activities in Cabo Delgado and that the lack of governance and a proper security response is making this 'an attractive locality for IS revival' (Janse van Vuuren, 2020). The main gas installations and sites have thus far not been targeted or affected directly, but the security risks to these vast investments – and Mozambique's development potential – are on the increase. All of this is playing out in a landscape that is internationally and regionally attracting attention as a hot spot for extremist militancy and insecurity in Southern Africa, and thus a conflict area of serious international and regional concern.

References

African Development Bank Group. (2019, April). *Environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) Summary*. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Environmental-and-Social-Assessments/Mozambique_LNG_ESIA_Summary.pdf

Alden, C., & Chichava, S. (2020, October). Cabo Delgado and the rise of militant Islam: Another Niger Delta in the making? *SAAIA Policy Briefing*. https://saiia.org.za/research/cabo-delgado-and-the-rise-of-militant-islam-another-niger-delta-in-the-making

Aljazeera. (2020, April 4). Mozambique admits presence of ISIL-affiliated fighters. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/24/mozambique-admits-presence-of-isil-affiliated-fighters

Beula, E. (2021, January 10). Armed forces begin to gain visibility in the operational command in Cabo Delgado. *Centro Para Democracia E Desenvolvimento, Política Moçambicana*.

BBC News. (2021). 'South African Adrian Nel Killed in Mozambique Jihadist Attack'.29 March. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56563539

Brechenmacher, S. (2019, May 3). Stabilizing northeast Nigeria after Boko Haram. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Paper*. https://carnegie endowment.org/2019/05/03/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram-pub-79042

Bowker, T. (2020, September 4). Mozambique projects adjust to life in a war zone. *Petroleum Economist*. https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/upstream/exploration-production/2020/mozambique-projects-adjust-to-life-in-a-war-zone

Buchanan-Clark, S. (2020, October 29). Going deep into Mozambique's Cabo Delgado extremism. *GGA (Good Governance Africa)*. https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/jihadist-insurgency-crisis-could-spill-over-into-kzn-warn-analysts-48747883

Bukarti, A. B., & Munasinghe, S. (2020, June 19). The Mozambique conflict and deteriorating security situation. *Tony Blair Institute for Global Change*. https://institute.global/policy/mozambique-conflict-and-deteriorating-security-situation

Centro de Integridade Publica. (2020). *Resort to private military companies to fight the insurgency in Cabo Delgado: Without transparency and with disastrous results*. CIPMoz.

Casola, C., & Iocchi, A. (2020, August 3). The 'faceless evildoers' of Cabo Delgado: An Islamist insurgency in Mozambique? *ISPI Online*. https://www.is0pion line.it/en/pubblicazione/faceless-evildoers-cabo-delgado-islamist-insurgency-mozam-bique-27154

Centro para Democracie e Desenvolvimento. (2020, August 4). The hidden face of war in Cabo Delgado. *Maritime Security News*. https://maritimesecurity.news. blog/2020/08/05/the-hidden-face-of-the-war-in-cabo-delgado

Craig, N. (2020, May 31). Jihadist insurgency crisis could spill over into KZN, warn analysts. *IOL*. https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/jihadist-insurgency-crisis-could-spill-over-into-kzn-warn-analysts-48747883

defenceWeb. (2020a, April 15). Private military contractors appear to be active in Mozambique. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/private-military-contractors-ap-pear-to-be-active-in-mozambique

defenceWeb. (2020b, July 17). Private military contractor in Mozambique set for longer stay. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/national-security/private-military-contractor-in-mozambique-set-for-longer-stay/#:~:text=The%20private%20military%20company%20providing,element%20for%20Mozambique%20land%20forces

Fabricius, P. (2019, November 29). Wagner private military force licks wounds in northern Mozambique. *Daily Maverick*. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-29-wagner-private-military-force-licks-wounds-in-northern-mozambique

Fabricius, P. (2020, March 26). Islamist insurgents capture second town in northern Mozambique within 48 hours. *Daily Maverick*. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-26-islamist-insurgents-capture-second-town-in-northern-mozam-bique-within-48-hours/#gsc.tab=0

Frey, A. (2020, April 30). Mozambique: Violence in Cabo Delgado results from inequality, poverty – MDM. *Club of Mozambique*. https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-violence-in-cabo-delgado-results-from-inequality-poverty-mdm-159021

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2020a, May 8). Are Mozambique's insurgents closing in on illicit trafficking profits? *Daily Maverick*. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-05-08-are-mozambiques-insurgents-closing-in-on-illicit-trafficking-profits

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2020, June 8). Mozambique arrest of Brazilian drug kingpin points to southern African shift in global cocaine network. *Daily Maverick*. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-06-08-mozambique-arrest-of-brazilian-drug-kingpin-points-to-southern-african-shift-in-global-cocaine-network

Goodrich, G. (2020, October 1). Financing LNG in Mozambique. *Africa Oil & Power*. https://www.africaoilandpower.com/about/what-is-aop

Hall, J. (2020, June 2). Mozambique's energy sector caught in southern Africa's first terrorist insurgency. *In On Africa*. https://www.inonafrica.com/2020/06/02/mozambiques-energy-sector-caught-in-southern-africas-first-terrorist-insurgency

Haysom, S., Gastrow, P., & Shaw, M. (2018, June). The heroin coast. A political economy along the eastern African Seaboard. *ENACT Research Paper*, Issue 4. https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2018-06-27-research-paper-heroin-coast-pdf.pdf

Hoskin, G. (2020, August 17). Mozambique insurgency linked to regional organized crime syndicates. *TimesLive*. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2020-08-17-mozambique-insurgency-linked-to-regional-organised-crime-syndicates

Institute for Economics and Peace. (2020, November). *Global terrorism index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism.* Sydney.

Institute for Security Studies. (2020, August 13). Mozambique insurgency requires urgent response from SADC and the AU. *Press Release*. https://issafrica.org/about-us/press-releases/mozambique-insurgency-requires-urgent-response-from-sadc-and-the-au

Israel, P. (2020, May 4). Making sense of Mozambique's brutal insurgency. *The Mail & Guardian*. https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-05-04-making-sense-of-mozambiques-brutal-insurgency

Janse van Vuuren, I. (2020). The Islamic State and Mozambique: Cause for concern. *Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Research Brief*, 15.

Kajjo, S., & Vilanculos, A. (2020, October 7). 3 Years into insurgency, Mozambique's Cabo Delgado remains vulnerable. *VOA News*. https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/3-years-insurgency-mozambiques-cabo-delgado-remains-vulnerable#:~:text=3%20Years%20Into%20Insurgency%2C%20Mozambique's%20Cabo%20Delgado%20Remains%20Vulnerable,-By%20Sirwan%20Kajjo&text=The%20United%20Nations%20says%20the,the%20beginning%20of%20the%20conflict

Louw-Vaudran, L. (2020, October 14). What peace in Cabo Delgado means for Mozambique and its neighbours. *ISS Today*. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-peace-in-cabo-delgado-means-for-mozambique-and-its-neighbours.

Mackinnon, A. (2020, August 14). Mozambique's growing insurgency takes strategic port. *Foreign Policy*. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/14/mozambique-growing-insurgency-take-strategic-port-mocimboa-praia-islamic-state

Morier-Genoud, E. (2017, July 11). Mozambique's own version of Boko Haram is tightening its deadly grip. *The Conversation*. https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087

Nelson, A. (2020, June 15). A triangle of vulnerability: Changing patterns of illicit trafficking off the Swahili coast. *Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Research Report*.

Qekeleshe, S. (2020, March 20). Mozambique: The next great LNG player. *Africa Oil & Power*. https://www.africaoilandpower.com/2020/03/20/mozambique-the-next-great-lng-player

Pirio, G., Pittelli, R. and Adam, Y. (2019, May). The many drivers enabling violent extremism in northern Mozambique. *Africa Centre for Strategic Studies: Spotlight*,

https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-many-drivers-enabling-violent-extre-mism-in-northern-mozambique

Rawoot, I. (2020, February). Gas-rich Mozambique may be headed for a disaster. *Aljazeera*. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html

Reliefweb. (2020, April 8). Mozambique: Deteriorating humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado province. *Short Note*. https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-deteriorating-humanitarian-situation-cabo-delgado-province-short-note

Schlein, L. (November 13, 2020). Anarchy reigns in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado as conflict escalates. *VOA News*. https://www.voanews.com/africa/anarchy-reigns-mozambiques-cabo-delgado-conflict-escalates

Total. (2020). Mozambique LNG. https://www.mzlng.total.com/en/about-mozam-bique-liquefied-natural-gas-project

The New Humanitarian. (2007, September 3). Islamic leaders try to come to terms with AIDS. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/238247.

U.S Embassy in Mozambique. (2018). Mozambique – 2018 – International religious freedom report. https://mz.usembassy.gov/mozambique-2018-international-religious-freedom-report

West, S. (2018, June 14). Ansar al-Sunna: A new militant Islamist group emerges in Mozambique. *The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor: In-Depth Analysis of the War on Terror*, xvi(12). https://jamestown.org/program/ansar-al-sunna-a-new-militant-islamist-group-emerges-in-mozambique

World Oil. (2020, September, 2020). Total CEO meets Mozambique's president over growing security concerns. https://www.worldoil.com/news/2020/9/21/total-ceo-meets-mozambique-s-president-over-growing-security-concerns

Willem Els
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa
Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa

Richard Chelin
Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa

Chapter 7. MOZAMBIQUE, CABO DELGADO INSURGENCY: EXTRAORDINARY MINERAL RESOURCES AND LIQUID NATURAL GAS, A BLESSING THAT MAY BE A CURSE OR ARE WE MISSING THE POINT?

Introduction

Abundant natural resources, the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow for one of the poorest countries in the world? (Venusti, 2017, para. 1). When one of the richest deposits of rubies was discovered in the Montepeuz area in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique during 2009, hope appeared on the horizon of the desperately poor community. At the inaugural auction in 2014 of the rubies mined at Montepeuz, a total revenue of $33.5 million was gathered (Hsu, Lucas, & Pardieu, 2014, para. 3). The question is how much of that revenue was ploughed back into the development of the local community? In addition, one of the largest deposits of liquid natural gas was discovered in the province and off shore in the Mozambican Channel during 2010. Desperation turned into hope among the local communities as well as the rest of the country (Ratner, 2020, para. 5). Yet will the blessing of this abundance of natural recourses become a blessing to the desperately poor local people, or may it have already turned into a curse?

The region of Cabo Delgado in Northern Mozambique has been plagued by the scourge of terrorism since October 2017, and there is no sign in sight as to when the attacks will end. By the end of February 2021, over 800 attacks were committed, in which over 2 600 people perished (Cabo Ligado, 2021, para.1; Casola & Iocchi, 2020, para. 6). It is believed that the group responsible for most of the attacks came into existence in 2007, 10 years before its first major attacks in October 2017 (Morier-Genoud, 2020, p. 1). There is much debate about the nature of the insurgency, but it became clear that the initial attack on the town of Mocímboa da Praia was perpetrated by local people of which most grew up in the town and were recognized by the victims as local youths that had formed a local sect, known by the locals as 'Al Shabab' (Morier-Genoud, 2020, p. 3). While scholars and experts attribute the causes of terrorism to poor socio-economic conditions

and organized crime, particularly heroin trafficking, little focus has been given to the poor management of natural resource and the role it plays in terrorism in Cabo Delgado (Rehorst, 2020, p. 24).

This chapter thrusts the poor management of natural resources in the region in the spotlight and demonstrates how this has led to the socio-economic grievances experienced by the communities in Cabo Delgado providing impetus to the insurgency to develop. Furthermore, the key question the author aims to answer is whether Mozambique will succumb to the resource curse as other African countries have, or rather follow the example set by Chile, Malaysia or Botswana, which have leveraged their natural resources to become some of the fastest growing economies in the world. To this end, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first part introduces the reader to the context of Mozambique and, more specifically, Cabo Delgado Province. Then, the theoretical framework upon which this chapter is based, namely the resource curse, is expanded upon. Afterwards, the author provides a historical background of the discovery of natural resources in the area and demonstrates their mismanagement. The chapter then concludes with providing recommendations on what the Mozambican could embark next to address the socio-economic grievances of the local populace and on how it could also address some of the key factors of the insurgency.

Setting the scene

Mozambique, a nation in the south eastern part of Africa, is a vast country stretching along the east coast of the continent. It is slightly smaller than the State of California and about halve the size of South Africa. The distance by road from the City of Maputo to Mocímboa da Praia is 2600 km. To the north it shares international borders with Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia and towards the east with Zimbabwe, South Africa and Eswatini. Cabo Delgado Province is situated in the north eastern corner of Mozambique and it shares an international border with Tanzania. To the east is the Mozambican Chanel and Madagascar (Nation Master, n.d., para 2). Vast deposits of coal in the Tete and Niassa provinces, and a wide range of copper, tantalum, marble, graphite, iron ore, bauxite, gold, rubies, bentonite, kaolin, titanium, scapolite, tourmaline and apatite form the wide spectrum of commodities that are in high demand in the world (Privacy Field, n.d., para 1). The biggest concentration of these deposits is mined in the provinces of Tete, Manica, Namupla, Cabo Delgado and Niassa (Guilherme & Alfonso-Fialho, 2020, para 6).

Theoretical framework: resource curse thesis

The resource curse thesis stems out of various studies which have shown that countries rich in natural resources tend to develop poorly (Sachs and

Warner, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001). This runs contrary to what scholars like Adam Smith and David Ricardo argued, in particular that the discovery of natural resources such as oil and gas could allow countries to base their development on the income from these resources. However, since the 1980s, there has been an increase in the literature regarding the resource curse thesis, of which studies by Sachs and Warner have become the most seminal of all.

Another theory often recognized as the predecessor of the resource curse is the Dutch Disease model. Developed by Corden and Neary (1982), the Dutch disease refers to the economic phenomenon where the rapid development of natural resources hastens a decline in other sectors. The discovery on natural resources increases domestic income and demand for goods leading to a rise in inflation. Consequently, the relative prices of non-resource commodities increase, which leads to a decrease in the competitiveness of the non-resource commodities and the investment they attract. It is important to note that the Dutch disease model has since become one of the most prominent economic models to explain the natural resource curse.

In addition to the resource curse, scholars have argued that the resource curse can also be linked to the relationship between the discovery of natural resources and conflict. Collier and Laroche (2015, pp. 1-2) in their seminal work on natural resources and violent conflicts detected a strong correlation between the outbreak of armed conflict and a country's dependence on readily exploitable natural resources. The authors further argued that most of the sub-soil non-renewable sources of Africa are still to be discovered, leaving the door open for the so-called resource curse to raise its head. This proved none more prescient in the case of Cabo Delgado, a province endowed in mineral resources such as gas and rubies (Soutter, 2012, para 3-5).

Collier and Laroche (2015, p. 1) further identified two predominant factors providing the impetus for the resource curse, namely the political and economic facets of governance. On the economic front, the expectation of the local population is that the revenues be spent on better services for them, compared to corrupt officials that prefer to channel the federally administered funds to their own bank accounts, creating conflict. On the economic side, the manufacturing sector is neglected as focus is given to the export of non-renewable natural resources, creating an unsustainable economic growth, especially when resources run dry. In natural resource governance sector, as is often enshrined in the national policies governing natural resources, this is often referred to as the local benefaction of natural resources for the local community. In other words, this practice promotes the process whereby local mineral resources are used to provide a positive socio-economic impact in local communities. It is ideally meant to contribute to the development of key

infrastructure and a major source of employment for local people. However, this proved not to be the case in Cabo Delgado.

Natural resources in Mozambique:
liquid natural gas (LNG) and rubies

Since independence, successive Mozambican governments have not been able to effectively manage the country's natural resources, which has resulted in intermittent conflict and the collapse of the social contract between the government and the people (Green & Otto, 2014, p. 5; Ahmed, 2021, para. 9). This is nowhere more prevalent than in Cabo Delgado, which has the country's highest poverty and illiteracy levels and general absence of service delivery (Pswarayi-Riddihough, 2020). Drawing from the Collier and Laroche argument on the link between natural resources and conflict, this section examines the role that natural resources play in the ongoing violent extremism in Northern Mozambique. This section argues that natural resources are not the initial root cause of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, as the tension between the people and the state in Northern Mozambique pre-dates the discovery of the rubies and the liquid natural gas, which many scholars and analysts see as the primary reason for the attacks.

In terms of natural resource deposits, Mozambique is regarded as an extremely rich country. In 2010, considerable deposits of liquid natural gas reserves were discovered along the coast of Cabo Delgado, which may generate an estimated $9 billion per annum, or about 7% of the GDP, within the next 12 years, according to the World Bank (Armas & Sharma, 2014, para 1). Soon after that the prospect of boosting the Mozambican economy became a reality when major international players in the industry invested hundreds of millions of dollars in developing the infrastructure to explore the discovered natural resources, which if managed properly has the potential of boosting the economy of one of the poorest countries in the southern hemisphere and change the fortunes around for the population that lives close to the breadline (Oldenvik, 2019, p. 5). Indeed, it became a beacon of hope for the whole country. Veras (as cited in Oldenvik, 2019, p. 5) even refers to the LNG as the 'Golden Goose' that will save the country.

While achieving one of the highest growth rates on the continent, Mozambique is also ranked amongst the lowest in terms of the human development index. The World Bank (Armas & Sharma, 2014, para 5) insists that good governance and management should be applied in order to avoid becoming a victim of the resource curse. The challenge is that the local people have experienced or witnessed little or none of the promised improvement of their lives, but instead they have been bullied, deprived of their land and livelihood by a disengaged government that is 2600 km away –

the government that has shown little or no intent to deliver the goods in terms of the social contract with the voters of the poorest province in the country (Hanlon, 2020, p. 4). The government lost the trust of the local population due to the endemic lack of service delivery and inherent corruption of local government officials (Thorp, 2017, p. 9; Hanlon, 2020, p. 7). Little or none of the promises brought along by the promised Eldorado came true for the neglected people of the '*Cabo esquecido*', or 'Forgotten Cape' as the locals frequently refer to their province (Rawoot, 2020; Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019, p. 12). The blessing of rich natural resources became a curse to the local people as they are being excluded, bullied, forcefully removed and neglected by a government far away, which only features when it collects the rent. The province of Cabo Delgado is rated amongst the most corrupt provinces in Mozambique, where the local elite and officials have unchecked power, contributing even further to the disconnect with the people of the province (Hanlon, 2020, p. 7).

Symons (as cited in Oldenvik, 2019, p. 11) draws a parallel between various African countries, including Nigeria, where oil was discovered but the so-called Dutch Disease manifested itself once again, proving that it was difficult to translate the benefit of abundant natural resources to a wider population. In a similar vein, Barma (as cited in Oldenvik, 2019, p. 12) argued that Nigeria as one of the world's largest oil exporters remained one of the poorest countries in the world. Nigeria remains one of the least developed countries with high unemployment rates and poverty rates despite generating about $500 billion. Watts (as cited in Oldenvik, 2019, p. 12) states that: 'oil in Nigeria has been used to create an illusion and a hope for a completely changed life, a fairy tale of wealth through a lucky accident that is also a bit of a lie'. Oldenvik asked the question of whether it would be farfetched to believe the same would not be the case in Mozambique. It is further illustrated by the events in Tanzania where protests erupted around the allocation of a plant close to Dar es Salaam instead of near the Mozambique border where the gas fields are located. The promised regional development is never realized, excluding the local people that were supposed to benefit from the development (Oldenvik, 2019, p. 12).

The discovery of rubies in 2009 by a local woodcutter/farmer changed the social context of the many individuals in the local community of Montepeuz, as virtually every able person in the area became an artisanal miner. Today, Montepeuz accosts for 80% of the world's ruby production, with little to show in terms of infrastructure or other services in the area. The promise of a good life withered quickly when an artisanal miner from the town of Nthoro who built on top of the ruby riches was forcefully moved from his land. A senior member of the ruling FRELIMO party General Raimundo Pachinuapa

gained the concession to mine the area. He entered in a partnership with an international mining house, Gemfields, which now owns 75% of the concession along with his own company Mwiriti Limitada (Mail&Guardian, 2018, para. 2).

High-handed methods were used and local people were scared off their land by means of vigilante attacks backed by police. People were threatened and tortured and houses were burned down; some were even buried alive. Gemfields recognized the instances of violence, but denied liability. It, however, paid out an amount of 5.8 million British pounds to the victims (Buchanan-Clarke, 2020; Hsu et al., 2014, para 84). An area covering 36,000 hectares was fenced off and people were forcefully removed. The area was later expanded to cover 81,000 hectares. The local people were forbidden to mine, farm and to build houses in the area. They were move away from the area and placed in houses that were built by the Mining Company (Mail&Guardian, 2018, para 10). However, they were not given land to farm on to provide food or allowed to participate in artisanal mining of rubies. Indications are that many of these people joined the insurgency as a result. From the promise of riches came nothing, but the profits from rubies went to the mining company and the political elite with little or nothing to show in Montepeuz. To Suleimane Hassane, the poor illiterate farmer that discovered the rubies, nothing came from the promises made by the political elite and the dream brought about by the exceptional riches that are generated by exploring the minerals in his province; indeed, the blessing turned into a curse (Mail&Guardian, 2018, para 1; Hsu et al., 2014, para 11).

The fact that the dissent and disengagement of the local people that have been prevalent for many years – even before the discovery of the LNG and ruby deposits – indicates that the abundant resources initially did not play a major role, but have become a major contributing factor fuelling the insurgency in Cabo Delgado (Casola & Iocchi, 2020).

Conclusion and recommendations

Mozambique have fallen into the same trap as the majority of countries in Africa that are endowed with abundant natural resources. The lack of service delivery and non-existent governance coupled with endemic corruption and political nepotism have become the primary drivers for the dissent and marginalization of people in the post-war era, culminating in the militant insurgency in October 2017.

Applying the resource curse framework to the Mozambican case, it can be argued that the country fell into the resource curse category. To address the current situation, there are some recommendations which should be taken into consideration. A turnaround strategy based on good governance

principles which curbs the nepotism and corruption by the political officials both locally and in Maputo is crucial to address the current situation in Cabo Delgado. The ruling party that has been in power since 1974 is running out of time to address the challenge of corruption and has a lot of ground to gain in order to achieve this objective. Endemic corruption that is prevalent from the very top to the bottom should be decisively addressed as a matter of great urgency as it might fuel dissent amongst the working class in areas beyond Cabo Delgado Province. Grindle (as cited in De Vries, 2013, p. 2) is of the opinion that there are certain elements that should be on the agenda of what governments should do in order to promote good governance: they should 'put their political, administrative and financial houses in better order', and it is nowhere more applicable than in Mozambique, in particular in the province of Cabo Delgado.

Another recommendation is to address the current challenge of poor governance in the country and specifically the natural resources sector in Cabo Delgado. One way to achieve this is to invest in the manufacturing sector rather than the export sector, which will also ensure sustainable growth once the vast sub-soil resources run dry. In doing so the country will reap benefits of rich mineral resources way beyond the exploration of the blessing that was bestowed on them.

As previously stated, Cabo Delgado has been plagued by the scourge of terrorism and there is little sign of it abating anytime soon. While studies have emerged that attributed the causes of terrorism to poor socio-economic conditions and organized crime, little research has been done on the poor management of natural resource and the role it plays as a driver of terrorism in Cabo Delgado (Rehorst, 2020, p. 24).

The present chapter aimed to address the gaps by examining how poor management of natural resources over the past three decades has contributed to the degradation in the social contract between the government and the people of Cabo Delgado, resulting in a rise in socio-economic grievances. Subsequently, the chapter showed that the resource curse framework may hold true in some aspects of the current state of affairs in the area but does not capture the whole situation. The chapter then concluded with recommendations on how the government can address the challenges it faces in the region, most notably through the curbing of corruption in the public sector and promoting good governance in the natural resource sector.

References

Ahmed, K. (2021, March 6). 'So much trauma': Mozambique conflict sparks mental health crisis. *The Guardian*.

Armas, E. B., & Sharma, N., (2014, September 2). *Avoiding the Recourse Curse in Mozambique*. World Bank Blogs. https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/avoiding-resource-curse-mozambique

Buchanan-Clarke, S., (2020, October 29). *Going deep into Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Extremism*. Good Governance Africa. https://gga.org/going-deep-into-mozambiques-cabo-delgado-extremism

Casola, C., & Iocchi, A., (2020, August 3). *The 'Faceless Evildoers' of Cabo Delgado: an Islamist Insurgency in Mozambique?*. Italian Institute for International Studies. https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/faceless-evildoers-cabo-delgado-islamist-insurgency-mozambique-27154

Collier, P., & Leroche C. (2015, May 26). *Natural resources do not need to be a curse (Part 1 – Explaining the resource curse)*. International Growth Centre. https://www.theigc.org/blog/natural-resources-do-not-need-to-be-a-curse-part-1-explaining-the-resource-curse

Corden, W. M., & Neary, J. P. (1982). Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a Small Open Economy. *The Economic Journal*, 92(368), 825. doi:10.2307/2232670

De Vries, M.S. (2013). The Challenge of Good Governance. *The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 18*(1), article 2.

Green, C., & Otto, L. (2014 February 2014*)*. Resource Abundance in Mozambique: Avoiding Conflict, Ensuring Prosperity. *South African Institute for International Affairs, Occasional Paper No173*. https://saiia.org.za/research/resource-abundance-in-mozambique-avoiding-conflict-ensuring-prosperity

Guilherme, D., & Alfonso Fialho, J. (2020 April 14). *First-step analysis: Mining in Mozambique*. Lexology. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=111187 55-ae93-4416-91d9-e0b9ff7f9462

Hanlon, J. (2020, February 27). Notes on the evolution of the Cabo Delgado war: Although the global should not be forgotten, the local is most important. *Mozambique news reports and clippings 469.*

Hsu, T., Lucas, A., & Pardieu, V. (2014, December 3). *Mozambique: A Ruby Discovery for the 21st Century*. GIA. https://www.gia.edu-gia-news-research-mozambique-expedition-ruby-discovery-new-millennium

Matsinhe, D. M., & Valoi, E., (2019, October 2019). *The genesis of insurgency in northern Mozambique.* Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/research/southern-africa-report/the-genesis-of-insurgency-in-northern-mozambique

Morier-Genoud, E. (2020). The jihadi insurgency in Mozambique: origins, nature and beginning. *Journal of Eastern African Studies, 14*(3), 393-412. DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271

Mozambique Geography Stats. (n.d.). NationMaster. https://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/Mozambique/Geography

Mozambique- Mining and Mineral Recourses. (n.d.). Privacy Shield Framework. https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Mozambique-Mining

Oldenvik, S.C. (2019, January 31). *Selling hope in Mozambique: Corporate framing and future forecasting of the natural gas development project Mozambique LNG* [Bachelors thesis, Göteborgs Universiteit]. https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/ 2077/58821

Pswarayi-Riddihough, I. Z. (2020, October 6). *Why should we support Cabo Delgado?* The World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2020/10/06/why-should-we-support-cabo-delgado

Ratner, S. (2020). Natural Gas and War in Mozambique. *Columbia SIPA Journal of International Affairs: Politics of Protest, 73*(2), n.p. https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/natural-gas-and-war-mozambique

Rawood, I. (2020, February 24). *Gas-rich Mozambique may be headed for a disaster.* Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/2/24/gas-rich-mozambique-may-be-headed-for-a-disaster

Rehorst, B. (2020). *Dyami Conflict Analysis: Cabo Delgado, North Mozambique, An analysis of Cabo Delgado's insurgency and its effects on the region.* Unpublished manuscript.

Ruby rush brings hell not riches to Mozambique village. (2018, September 17). Mail&Guardian.

Sachs, J., Warner, A.M., (1995). *'Natural Resources Abundance and economic growth'.* National bureau for Economic Research (NBER). Working Paper 5398.

Sachs, J. D., and Warner, A. M. 1997. *Natural resource abundance and economic growth.* Center for International Development and Harvard Institute for International Development.

Sachs, J. D., and Warner, A. M. (1999). *The big push, natural resource booms and growth,* Journal of development economics, 59(1), 43-76.

Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review, 45(4-6), 827–838. doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00125-8

Sachs, J. D. (2007). How to handle the macroeconomics of oil wealth. Chapter 7 in Escaping the Resource Curse, edited by M. Humphreys, J. Sachs and J. Stiglitz (Columbia University Press: NY), 173-193.

Soutter, W. (2012 August 29). *Mozambique: Mining, Minerals and Fuel Resource.* AZO Mining. https://www.azomining.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=88

Thorp, M. (2017, March 13). *Public-Private Partnerships for Health: Opportunities in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique* [Doctoral dissertation, Harvard Medical School]. https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/40621406

Venusti, S. (2017, October 31). Some Factors to Consider When Asking Why Is Mozambique Poor? *Borgen Magazine.* https://www.borgenmagazine.com/why-is-mozambique-poor

Part III

TERRORIST STRATEGIES AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

Prof. Leonid L. Fituni
Institute for African Studies, Moscow, Russia

Chapter 8. TERRORIST FINANCING IN AFRICA UNDER THE NEW NORMALCY OF A POST-PANDEMIC WORLD[*]

At the moment, despite the twin-shock to their economies and political environment caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and a global economic downturn, African countries, very much like the rest of the world, are gradually moving away from the frustration of the first year of the crisis and are starting to build models and rules of existence in the 'new normalcy'.

Though not being a turning point, the current pandemic became the third fundamental milestone on the long and winding road of transformation of the global community and constituent societies. These milestones signposted drastic changes of the previously existing norms and persuasions about one's guaranteed rights, freedoms and permissible limitations thereof. The earlier two milestones were (a) the 9/11 terrorist attack with the ensuing adoption of the Patriot Act, and (b) the burst of the US mortgages bubble in 2007, which triggered a global financial crisis of unprecedented proportion that dragged on till 2010, but whose consequences persisted ever thereafter.

The events of the first crisis heralded that the world had reached the pinnacle of its unipolar construction, when one superpower commanded enough resources to direct the rest of the world without the need of support or approval of the latter. From then on all paths led downhill.

The second crisis marked the collapse of unipolarity and a bifurcation in potential scenarios of the world system development: one of the branching routes being towards a multipolar construction of the international system, and the other – towards a bipolar one. After the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2010 two things became evident and unavoidable, namely: the vain of EU's aspirations to become an independent centre of global power on par with US, and a steady and confident ascent of China towards the same goal the EU just failed to achieve.

All through the two sections of, what may be called, the trunk road of recent history, marked by the above-described milestones, international terrorism played an important role of both an existential threat and of handy

---

instrument-cum-pretext for global interference for quite a few state and many non-state actors on the world arena. It was elevated to the role of an existential threat of global magnitude and a worthy opponent in the war effort even for a superpower and its minions.

The evolving third cataclysm of the century, i.e. the pandemic-related crisis, has by far greater repercussions. It is the ultimate rule-changer. The crisis is unique in its unprecedented scale and profundity, its almost complete lack of lucidity about the looming prospects and its obscene command over the wills and deeds of national governments, which helplessly surrendered the control over the situation and voluntarily plunged their economies into the state of artificial coma.

Judging from the current developments, it seems that, unlike the two afore described preceding stages, the coming post-pandemic normalcy will be in many respects less responsive to the challenges of international terrorism. The surviving heavy-weights – China, the USA and Russia – appear to be more inclined to deal with the challenges posed by each other rather than to focus on what they now perceive to be a lesser than primary threat.

Still as any generalization this conclusion is fully valid only in a very broad context of superpower rivalry that became so graphic in the early days of the pandemic. It is also not equally applicable to all parts of the world and to all situations, the more so, if the notion of counterterrorism can be applied for the very purposes of the superpower competition or for undermining the positions of the geostrategic rival.

The African continent happens to be one of the few remaining parts of the world where combating the risks of terrorism may still fall in line with broader superpower strategies of the global domination in the post-COVID era. The key geostrategic zones of the continent – the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin plus water areas of the Gulf of Guinea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, threatened by pirates, all by coincidence concurrently happen to be hotbeds of international terrorism. And though China and Russia have yet to inscribe them into the official documents, the US had done that long ago.

Recent news reports indicate that terror groups are expanding operations and scaling up attacks in Africa, straining governments ill-prepared to battle extremism as the coronavirus pandemic drains much-needed resource. Rising violence has indeed made Sub-Saharan Africa home to seven of the 10 riskiest countries in the world, according to Verisk Maplecroft's *Terrorism Intensity Index* (Soto, 2020). Nations including Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Mozambique saw the biggest deterioration in the index, meaning the resource-rich region is falling behind the rest of the world and becoming more dangerous for investors. Even countries previously considered

relatively safe from jihadist violence, such as Ivory Coast and Senegal, saw their index scores drop as groups operating in the Sahel region infiltrate coastal West African nations. Mining and energy companies in the region will now have to spend more on protecting staff and operations, with companies that rely on transport routes to sites in Burkina Faso and Niger running the risk of being ambushed or becoming targets for militant roadblocks (Soto, 2020).

In February 2021, FATF added Burkina Faso, the Cayman Islands, Morocco and Senegal to its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring, where they joined 15 other countries. The identified deficiencies vary for each jurisdiction, but they include maintaining comprehensive beneficial ownership information and expanding the operations of countries' financial intelligence units, according to the Financial Action Task Force (on Money Laundering) ('Cayman Islands..,' 2021).

British intelligence and security agencies have estimated that Islamist terrorism emanating from North, East and West Africa continues to be the most prominent threat to Africa itself but also overseas. 'Terrorist groups based in these locations are often reliant on freedom of movement and local opportunities to generate and move funds. Sources of terrorist financing are likely to be combinations of funds raised through extortion, robbery, donations and opportunistic business interests' (HM Treasury, 2020).

We may add that as a result of the pandemic terrorists there have obtained new opportunities to engage in their activity and mobilize resources for financing their criminal and extremist exploits. As underscored by the international observers and analysts, and gathered from the available documents of the FATF-style regional bodies – *Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group* (ESAAMLG), *The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa* (GIABA), *Le Groupe d'Action contre le Blanchiment d'Argent en Afrique Centrale* (GABAC) and *Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force* (MENAFATF), – on the whole, judging by African FIUs' reports, African countries have not yet identified a change in the terrorist financing risks as a result of the pandemic.

Still some of the new vulnerabilities arising from the particular features of the current pandemic normalcy can be already acknowledged. One of the most obvious is the misuse of non-profit organizations and new opportunities in relation to the predicate threat environment. While the lockdowns and restrictions on public gatherings have reduced possibilities for terrorists to collect funds from restaurants, shop-owners etc, additional possibilities appeared for creating new charities and NGOs, instrumental for both gathering funds and transferring them under the legal guise. In some cases,

like in *Boko Haram* controlled areas in Nigeria, and certain territories with strong AQIM presence, the pandemic helped to foster among local population a positive PR image of the terrorist groupings, since those structures took over some social functions, which national authorities failed to deliver, but which were badly needed in the emergency.

Meanwhile, financial intelligence units both inside Africa and overseas agree that terrorist finance activity in Africa remains varied and typically low-level in scale. There is no one method of financial activity associated with terrorism. The raising and movement of funds are not considered to be the primary aim for terrorists. Instead, terrorist finance activity continues to be for the purposes of sending small amounts to associates located abroad or for funding low-cost attacks.

UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) suggested that the financial disruptions caused by the pandemic may make terrorist groups more reliant on criminal activities, including drug smuggling, trafficking in minerals and precious stones, fraud through electronic means, the sale of counterfeit medicines, and cybercrime. International travel restrictions could also give rise to new trafficking and cash smuggling routes.

International standards and new normalcy

Speaking about new phenomena and specific nuances of countering the financing of terrorism in African countries under the new normalcy, it should be borne in mind that the main condition for solving the problem is still strict adherence to international standards.

In October 2001, the FATF, a body dedicated to establishing international norms to stop money laundering, expanded its mandate to deal with the 'issue of the funding of terrorist acts and terrorist organizations,' creating eight (later nine) special recommendations on terrorist financing. These recommendations were first published in October 2001, and were revised in 2012 into the current 40 recommendations, encompassing terrorist financing within them. The FATF recommendations are meant to provide specific guidance to states on how to implement the requirement to criminalize terrorist financing, help them establish mechanisms to prevent and detect terrorist financing, and assist in the prosecution of those offences, addressing all aspects of prevention of terrorist financing. (Schmid, 2020, p. 471).

The FATF Recommendations set out a comprehensive and consistent framework of measures which countries should implement in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Countries have diverse legal, administrative and operational frameworks and different financial systems, and so cannot all take identical measures to counter these threats. The FATF

has issued Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. In October 2001, the FATF issued the original eight Special Recommendations on Terrorism Financing, following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Among the measures, Special Recommendation VIII (SR VIII) specifically targeted non-profit organizations. This was followed by the publication of the International Best Practices Paper on Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations in 2002, released one month before the U.S. Department of Treasury's Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, and the Interpretive Note for SR VIII in 2006. A ninth Special Recommendation was added later. In 2012, the FATF Recommendations received a new numbering order and Special Recommendations were merged with regular ones.

In the current (2012) edition three recommendations are unique to terrorist financing. They are set out in Section C of the FATF Recommendations. These are: Recommendation 5 ('Countries should criminalize terrorist financing'); Recommendation 6 ('Countries should implement targeted financial sanctions regimes to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions, freezing of funds and assets'); and Recommendation 8 ('measures to prevent the misuse of non-profit organizations') (FATF, 2020). They set an international standard, which countries should implement through measures adapted to their particular circumstances. However, many African countries failed to implement the recommendations concerning TF in full or comply only partially.

The following Table 1 provides a comprehensive picture of the level of compliance of selected African countries with the three FATF recommendations dedicated uniquely to TF based on FATF mutual evaluations data. The following indicators are used: 'C' means 'compliant'; 'LC' means 'largely compliant' (i.e. there are only minor shortcomings); 'PC' – 'partially compliant' (there are moderate shortcomings); 'NC' – 'non-compliant' (there are major shortcomings).

Table 1. TF country compliance

Jurisdiction	R.5	R.6	R.8
Botswana	C	LC	NC
Burkina Faso	PC	PC	PC
Cape Verde	LC	PC	PC
The Democratic Republic of Congo	NC	NC	NC
Ethiopia	LC	LC	LC
Ghana	LC	LC	NC
Madagascar	PC	NC	PC

Jurisdiction	R.5	R.6	R.8
Mali	PC	PC	NC
Mauritania	PC	PC	NC
Mauritius	C	C	NC
Morocco	LC	PC	LC
Senegal	PC	NC	PC
Seychelles	PC	PC	NC
Tunisia	LC	C	C
Uganda	C	C	NC
Zimbabwe	C	C	PC

Source: Compiled on the basis of *Consolidated assessment ratings* by FATF (FATF, 2021).

Indeed, less than a third of African countries underwent the mutual evaluation procedures. On the other hand, the majority of the above mentioned states have passed two or three rounds of evaluation. The results of the African nations reviewed are on average close to those of the developing countries with similar income levels from other regions of the world.

Out of the countries reviewed the least favorable situation with compliance may be found in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which failed to comply with all three TF recommendations. Not one African country is fully compliant with all three. Technically, the situation is best in Tunisia, which is compliant with two normative standards (R.6 & R.8) and largely compliant with Recommendation 5. Second best comes Zimbabwe (two 'C' and one 'PC'), though the country is still under Western sanctions.

From the substantive point of view, on the whole the situation is the best with the criminalization of terrorist financing, while a review of the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to non-profit organizations which may be vulnerable to terrorist financing abuse is still to be completed, and, in fact, in the majority of unreviewed countries is yet to start. Countries should apply focused and proportionate measures, in line with the risk-based approach, to such non-profit organizations to protect them from terrorist financing abuse, including (a) by terrorist organizations posing as legitimate entities, (b) by exploiting legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset-freezing measures, and (c) by concealing or obscuring the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organizations. (FATF, 40 Recommendations).

FATF categorized existing tools for disrupting terrorist financing into 5 groups on the basis of mixed criteria. They include Targeted financial

sanctions, Criminal Sanctions & Alternative Charges, Cross Border Cash Disruption, and Sanctions for Legal Entities and Alternative Methods. In relation to Africa, a geographically specific analysis of the effectiveness of the work or simply the operability and viability of these methods has not yet been systemically undertaken. We have tried to take the first steps to fill this gap with the following assessment of objective impediments and human miscalculations in this connection, with special emphasis on the influence of the pandemic on the issue.

The objective of the *Targeted financial sanctions tool* is to block terrorists from accessing their funds and assets and prevent them from using the financial system. This tool has been widely used against individual persons (mainly notorious leaders of terrorists), well-known terrorist organizations (*Al Shabab*, IS, *Al Qaeda* and their branches and affiliates in Africa), and countries (Libya). The effectiveness of this tool in the African context has proved to be ambiguous. On the one hand, the measures prevented significant funds from reaching the terrorist hands. On the other, the effect was in each case patently partial. In the COVID-19 conditions, the use of this tool may prove to be vulnerable to criticism since financial sanctions, no matter how targeted they are, inevitably adversely influence possibilities for vulnerable communities in Africa to mobilize domestic and international financial support.

In this respect, the *Criminal sanctions & alternative charges tool*, which is used to undermine activities of terrorists, their financiers and facilitator networks through criminal justice measures is less ambiguous, since whole communities in Africa are not directly hit by such measures. However, past experience of criminal persecution of certain African political leaders and alleged warlords by institutions of international criminal justice provoked accusations of selective justice and racism at various levels in Africa, including that of the African Union.

Limiting the ability of terrorist groups to transfer cash across national borders is the aim of *the Cross Border Cash Disruption tool*. The latter is one of the few that proved to benefit from the conditions imposed by the pandemic the world over, not in the least in Africa. Border closures, travel restrictions, dramatic fall in international trade caused by the anti-pandemic measures of national governments limited the ability of terrorist groups to transfer cash across national borders.

Contrastingly, *Sanctions for legal entities tool* meant to impede the capability of terrorists to use front and shell companies to raise, move and use funds has on the whole been of limited influence in the African context both before and after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Terrorist organizations in West and Central Africa rarely use large or significant

enterprises to generate financial flows to support terrorism on regular basis and on wide scale. An ad-hoc punitive legal measure against an occasional delinquent manager or director usually comes *post-factum* and in fact too belatedly. The propensity may be somewhat higher in Northern and Southern Africa, but basically the impact of this instrument of disrupting terrorist financing is not too high all over Africa.

Other means to disrupt terrorist financing, like non-public advisories and alerts, travel bans, etc., jointly called Alternative Methods, in our view, are arguably more efficient tools in the current situation of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Typologies old and new

As states strengthen their combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) legislation and measures, the pandemic is also fuelling a debate on the extent to which targeted financial sanctions might impact emergency humanitarian responses (CTED, 2020).

As to the new TF typologies that became prominent in Africa during the pandemic, we would like to point out pandemic-related adjustments in three known *modi operandi*.

1) **The use of the pandemic relief cover for accumulating and moving TF funds**. Particularly risky in this context are the fundraising campaigns run by non-profit organizations under the guise of anti-pandemic relief, when in fact the proceeds go fully or in part for purposes of terrorist financing. In our view, given the increased propensity of such endeavors, all fundraising initiatives attempting to raise money online should be subject to extra scrutiny for FIUs.

2) **The use of lockdown and increased dependence on Internet/mobile communication for mobilizing resources for TF through cybercrime**. The pandemic also opened way for increased activity in TF funds mobilization through cyber fraud cases involving methods of social engineering and phishing attacks. The innovation that represents both academic and practical interest is the localization of African operational centers of such activity. Available data analysis showed that only Nigeria was a country from which the perpetrators both technically initiated the web outreach the world over and at the same time on whose soil the terrorist recipients of those funds operated. In other cases the collectors worked from a 'third' African country (e.g. Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Senegal), employing also local nationals or those from European countries.

3) **The wobbling lifeline of diaspora funds**. Funds transfers from African diaspora abroad have for some time been a very important element of foreign currency inflows for quite a number of African countries. Due to

multiplicity and frequent intransparency of the channels of those financial flows, quite a significant part of the money in question ultimately ended in the coffers of organized crime, while another was used to finance extremist and terrorist groups or individuals. As a result of the pandemic and the ensuing border closures, the migratory movement of African population significantly receded in 2020. However, the established African diaspora in Europe and North America remain in place and numerically exceed dozens of millions of recent African migrants or their descendants, who still maintain links with their countries of origin and regularly send money to relatives or donate to charities and other benefactors, who would relay that monies to recipients on the continent. Such flows are particularly significant to Somalia, Ghana, the Sahel states, Nigeria and some other countries. On the technical side, the outstanding African leader nations in the sphere of mobile money and electronic transfers – Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco, Egypt and less obvious Somalia – are on the forefront in this respect. On the other hand, during the pandemic the money transfers, especially from outside Africa, became less regular and voluminous. This also affected the terrorist financing capabilities of some of the local groups.

The relative brevity of the elapsed period of the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa and the scarcity of available data does not allow yet to draw a distinct border line between confirmed and suspected sources and typologies of terrorist funding on the continent in 2020 and early 2021. In most instances, except for cases of abuse of health-related funds or direct misappropriation of medical supplies by terrorists, we will have to deal not so much with completely new ways of financing terrorist activity and moving funds, but rather with modification, which became possible due to new regimes and procedures imposed by the post-pandemic normalcy.

In view of the above mentioned considerations and undertaken analysis, the future work in order to minimize the risks of TF in Africa should concentrate on governance, scoping and national CTF coordination, including involvement of all relevant competent authorities and use of multi-stakeholder working groups and public-private collaboration to assess terrorist financing risks.

One of the major problems in African context is that of overcoming information-sharing challenge. That applies both to relations between African States concerned and to interagency and inter-stakeholder cooperation within one country.

Local FIUs should explore and be prepared to discover new terrorist financing risk methodologies that are relevant to post-pandemic normalcy. New threats and vulnerabilities should be analyzed and evaluated from this point of view.

Renewed attention should be given to assessing cross-border and sector-specific terrorist financing risks arising from the situation of the pandemic.

Finally, the importance of scrutinizing the accumulation and movement of funds by non-profit organizations and charities through identifying and assessing TF risks should be emphasized.

This work should not stop or be considered complete at any moment of time. Follow up and maintaining an up-to-date assessment of terrorist financing risks in Africa should be an ongoing process.

References

Cayman Islands, Morocco Placed on Terror-Financing Watch List. (2021, February 26). *Wall Street Journal*. https://www.wsj.com/articles/cayman-islands-morocco-placed-on-terror-financing-watch-list-11614301887

CTED. (2020, December). *The impact of theCOVID-19 pandemic on terrorism, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism.* https://www.un.org/security council/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2021/Jan/cted_paper_the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-counter-te.pdf

FATF. (2020). *Documents - FATF*. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/recommendations.htm

FATF. (2021). *Consolidated assessment ratings*. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/ media/ fatf/documents/4th-Round-Ratings.pdf

HM Treasury. (2020, December). *National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing 2020.* https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/945411/NRA_2020_v1.2_FOR_PUBLI CATION.pdf

Schmid, A.P. (Ed.). (2020). *Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness*. ICCT Press.

Soto, A. (2020, December 11). Terror Risks Escalate in Africa; Coronavirus Could Make it Worse.). *Bloomberg*. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-11/terror-risks-escalate-in-africa-coronavirus-could-make-it-worse

Dr. Alta Grobbelaar
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa

Chapter 9. AFRICA'S ONLINE TERROR:
THE INCREASED RELIANCE OF AFRICAN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS ON SOCIAL MEDIA

Introduction

It is not unusual for terrorist groups to use the media as a platform to induce fear in their 'enemies', communicate with one another in a public sphere, and – definitely – advertise. Ease of access is one of social media's best features, whether you are a member of a terrorist organization or a normal, impressionable teenager. The aim of social media platforms is to be user-friendly and widely available – this is to the utmost advantage of terrorist groups. A video of *Boko Haram* will be removed by a social platform's administrators, only to be replaced soon thereafter. Another terrorist group that is very active on social media is *Al Shabab* in Somalia. They prefer Twitter, and the same cycle is repeated; administrators will close their account and, not long after, a new account will be active.

The mainstream media decides on which conflicts are 'important' and which are not. Unfortunately, the media's survival depends on selling stories, and some stories just sell better than others. As a result, serious issues, especially in Africa, go unseen. An excellent example to use here is the issue of kidnapping in Nigeria. To the average reader, it will come as a shock that a terrorist organization could kidnap schoolgirls and simply get away with it – as *Boko Haram* did in April 2014 when they kidnapped 276 girls from Chibok in Borno State, Nigeria. Whereas for someone who has studied terrorism in Africa, this is not completely surprising. Terrorist groups have used kidnapping as a tactic for years; it is no new, shocking phenomenon. Scores of children have been kidnapped in the DRC, Uganda and all across Africa, yet the media has only recently decided to focus on it. Because of the recent coverage of *Boko Haram*'s actions, there has been an international outrage. Yet, there has been no outrage about the women and children dying of famine in other war-torn African countries. 'Why?' you might ask. Well, because it does not sell.

The power of the media to influence public opinion has not only been underestimated, it has also not been re-evaluated in the Information Age in which we currently find ourselves. Whether new media and media houses are entirely aware of exactly the power they possess is another issue that can be

left to thought. Because of the outrage caused by the media, there is immediately a large amount of pressure on the shoulders of the international community – to be informed of and react to various tragic events around the globe. Since modern technology is ever evolving, the international community's reaction to militant groups that use the media to advance their ideologies should be ever adapting. The research needs to match the threat. Clearly, merely blocking and removing information posted in digital media has not turned out to be a successful tactic.

The terrorist organizations discussed are based in Africa – *Boko Haram* originates from Nigeria and *Al Shabab* from Somalia. Both groups make use of a greater goal to justify their actions – in most cases, the goal is religious or political and ethnic. Yet, the actions of these groups cannot be interpreted as mere violence; it is rooted in fundamental beliefs and certain ways of living. Terrorism in Africa should not only be seen as a collection of different militant groups, affecting different democracies and civilians. It should be seen as an interactive network of activities, beliefs and customs, all intertwined and constantly changing to reach goals formed decades before the international community even became aware of terrorism and applied certain labels to what terrorism is and how it should be handled. This highlights the fact that a more focused approach is needed when investigating an issue as complex as terrorism in Africa, and the different facets thereof. There are numerous factors that influence terrorism on the continent, especially in Nigeria and Somalia, and this chapter merely looks at one of the myriads of contributing issues to the terrorism phenomenon on the continent.

Is Africa truly connected?

Africa is lagging far behind the rest of the world in terms of broadband connectivity, social media usage and overall media penetration (Rosabel, 2016). Yet, in spite of the low connectivity and penetration rates, militant and insurgent groups in Africa still use the media to their advantage. In the current, technological age, wars are fought on screens as much as they are on the battlefield. How the media reports on warfare and conflict not only influences, in some cases, the policies of nations, but also public opinion around the world. As technology evolves, the media is enabled to present more information, and at faster speeds and of a better quality (Shapiro, 2002).

Media outlets that fall behind in terms of up-to-date news coverage simply lose out in this intense field of competition. Here social media makes up the difference, especially in African states where media freedom and freedom of the press have become relative concepts. Yet, again, how much difference can social or new media make in this regard if it has far fewer users and far less reach than in the developed world?

It is not news that many African nations have had a growing terrorist presence and an explosion of information and communication technology, particularly Internet cafés and mobile phones (Baken & Mantzikos, 2012). Within the specific landscape of cyber-crimes, we should also consider the political and economic landscape in the wider region of northern Africa. African countries share some of the world's lowest standards of living. Artificial borders encapsulate different ethnicities, varying cultural backgrounds and uneven distribution of natural resources. Most African economies are based on the exploitation of natural resources and a skewed conception of the state – where financial and natural resources benefit only those in power. This contributes to the creation of an environment in which bypassing the law and using institutional privileges for personal advancement is not only justified but even accepted as a display of power.

More common features of many African economies include unemployment, low capital investment and unrestricted capital flow, as well as weak infrastructure. External financial assistance, payments from migrants and stronger informal sectors often counterweigh the structural weaknesses, but also create opportunity for various illegal and sometimes criminal business practices. Alongside the subsistence-oriented informal economies, unexpected opportunities for money launderers, computer hackers and cyber-criminals are created through the strength of parallel and shadow monopolies who govern large parts of the national markets (Baken & Mantzikos, 2012).

While this type of environment enables media usage for terrorist purposes, the research at hand should also elucidate the fast-developing availability of media and new media to those in the above-mentioned areas who are without the skills of a professional hacker or cyber-criminal. The terrorism/media threat in Africa has shifted from hackers who gain access to bank accounts and official records to youths posting on social media about the promise of a better life and future through *jihad*. The threat has most definitely shifted.

Not only have new technologies made it possible to produce materials intended as propaganda quite easily, they have also made it easier to broadcast and distribute these films and images. The relationship between terrorism and the media has been under scrutiny for some time now. Terrorists aim to inject fear in large groups of people; in this manner, they influence policymakers to advance their own goals. The modern form of terrorism, of which we are aware, developed in the mid- to late 19th century – coincidently at the same time that mass media and democracy gained international momentum. The media is vital in this regard, because without it, only a small number of people would know about an attack that has taken place. Democracy in turn proves its worth,

because without it, those in power would be under no obligation to react to terrorist violence.

Various scholars have written about the issue of terrorists' use of the media to achieve certain goals and objectives. Hoffman (2006) explains that 'without the media's coverage, the impact of terrorist acts is arguably wasted and remains narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of the attack, rather than reaching the wider 'target audience' at whom the terrorist violence is actually aimed'. Nacos (2000) agrees with Hoffman that without extensive news coverage, terrorist acts would resemble the proverbial tree falling in the forest: if no one learned of the incident, it would be as if it never occurred.

This also needs to be juxtaposed with the uses of social media that we are all too familiar with. If word does not spread of the success of a certain attack – e.g. live tweets from the Westgate attack in Kenya and videos and images of the Chibok girls kidnapped by *Boko Haram* – these groups will lose their ability to advertise their idea of a better, purer life to their followers, both current and future. At the same time, under-reporting of terrorist attacks in Africa needs to be considered as well. However, news in Africa may not disseminate that far because of local media's constraints of limited resources or government policies. In many African countries, the media lacks the resources to cover potential terrorist attacks in a fashion that could work to the full advantage of the terrorist organization at hand (Lutz & Lutz, 2013). The consequence: not all events get reported. Western media, by contrast, have the necessary resources to spread news in their own countries or, for example, events in foreign countries that involve their own citizens.

When the target audience of an attack is local, such attacks may even be completely overlooked, and not enter any type of terrorism database. This creates an impression that terrorism 'happens more' in the West and that attacks are more likely to happen in developed countries or involve citizens of developed states (Nacos, 2016).

Social media's appeal to terrorists lies in the features inherent to platforms such as Facebook and Twitter (Rudner, 2017). To be a successful social media user, no programming skills are needed. Any user can publish multimedia content that can reach a global audience within seconds. What adds to the appeal is that these features are completely free to the user. Security settings meant to protect basic safety needs of the average user play directly into the hands of terrorist groups, as these platforms are resistant to Denial of Services attacks. Basically, when a terrorist uses social media, they enjoy protection from hackers who regularly remove traditional HTML websites from the net. These protection mechanisms provided by social media sites are not only technical, but completely legal as well. Groups like

Al Qaeda regularly find their HTML sites being taken offline (Awan & Al-Lami, 2009); thus, the added protection granted by a social media giant like Facebook is welcomed (Seib & Janbek, 2011; Portland Communications, 2012; Mair, 2017).

Terrorism as business and worldwide communication

Since the years of momentous political shifts, like the fall of the Berlin Wall or the collapse of the Soviet Union, mass media communication has also changed in remarkable ways. This is in part because of the influence of cell phones and the Internet increasing global reach and connectivity. In the past two decades, people have increasingly connected and communicated through the Internet. New and old media transformed too; firstly, by gaining a foothold on the World Wide Web, and secondly, by increasing business-like mergers and acquisitions that lead to the development of media organizations with a more national, international and even global character (Alger, 1998; Bagdikian, 2000). Today, the 'shrinking' of the world through the development of larger public spaces by new and old media offers terrorist organizations much easier access to vastly larger audiences. The Internet has, by offering terrorist organizations this added element, become a means of inflicting damage on governments, businesses and citizens in ways that were not possible before. Cyber-terrorism is a real threat to the new generation of computer-dependent economies and polities. It has been argued that virtual attacks represent the new warfare of the 21st century; however, at the same time, information attacks are the new terrorism of our time (Nacos, 2002).

This is the case even in Africa, which has been described as 'the largest growing cell phone market in the world' (Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013). What makes Africa unique in this type of study is that cell phones in Africa are in many areas the only option for direct and interpersonal communication. When studying the relationship between terrorism and the mass media, the best approach for study and analysis is trying to understand how terrorists themselves see and address the problem of communication. It has been shown, many times over, that terrorism is not the most effective means of gaining political power. However, one has to concede that it has been successful in publicizing political and ideological causes and drawing the attention of much larger audiences (Wilkinson, 1997).

The idea that groups who present themselves as purely anti-Western should justify using the Western construct of media, and by default mass media, is not completely irrelevant. However, these groups will not have to speak to their usage of media, as they do not solely do so to attract the attention of Western audiences. The effective use of platforms like YouTube,

Twitter and Facebook would not necessarily be going against their ideology, but rather as a means to an end; achieving their global goal. As a relatively new phenomenon, terrorist organizations have been increasingly using the Internet, as it allows them to reach a vastly greater audience. *Al Qaeda* was one of the first terrorist organizations to use the Internet. However, IS has completely revolutionized modern terrorism with their usage of not only advertising and news media, but social media as well.

Recent history has continuously proven that terrorism and the media have a mutually beneficial relationship. Ever since the hostage-taking by Palestinian terrorists at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972, where seven Israeli Olympic team members were kidnapped and killed by the Palestinian group Black September; the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 by *Hezbollah* and Islamic Jihad terrorists in 1985, seeking the release of 700 Shi'ite Muslims from Israeli custody; and, of course, the terrorist attack on New York's twin towers in 2001, mediated mega-events have been routine in mass media. Terrorists deliberately wanted, and gained, the attention of international audiences. The media, on the other hand, reaped reasonable benefits from record sales and the attention gained by the same international audiences (Rohner & Frey, 2007). The more recent attacks in London, France, Belgium and Spain follow the same pattern. It is worthy to note that not all these attacks were Islamic, but that they followed the patterns and frames of terrorism that so often frequents mass media attention and sales.

It has become the norm for groups described as terrorists, both in the West and in Africa, to employ terrorism not only to propel their religious war, but also as a communication strategy. Targets and timing are carefully chosen to maximize media attention. Terror attacks with the most coverage most commonly take place in big cities with easy access to press agencies; this guarantees instant and widespread coverage. Should a certain attack take place in an area not ideal for instant and mass media coverage, terrorist groups employ measures to maximize exposure. *Al Shabab*'s live-tweeting of the 2015 Garissa University attack in Kenya serves as discernible proof that if the media does not give a certain attack enough attention, it will be swayed and its hand will be forced to maximize the mediated response. IS, for example, places such emphasis on media that they have an entire section of their forces dedicated to producing and posting videos and recruiting materials online.

'The media people are more important than the soldiers,' he said. 'Their monthly income is higher. They have better cars. They have the power to encourage those inside to fight and the power to bring more recruits to the Islamic State,' – Abu Abdullah al-Maghribi, ISIS defector. (Miller & Mekhennet, 2015).

The gates to news in Africa are open

As the media serves as the main source of information on events around the world for international audiences, journalists can in turn be viewed as gatekeepers of news. Basic Gatekeeping Theory states that many decisions are made between the event occurring and its news coverage. Each of these decisions can be referred to as 'gates', and those who make the decisions are the 'gatekeepers' (Shoemaker & Riccio, 2016). However, digital media and especially social media allow members of the public to also break, share and disseminate news. News and information no longer follow a unidirectional path from the event to the audience. Journalism and news outlets have less control over the dissemination of news, less control over the gates than ever before. As audiences grew larger and the world became smaller due to globalization and Internet connectivity, the number of the 'gates' of news as well as of the gatekeepers of news increased. Journalists can no longer have control over decision making in terms of what information to share and what not to share with the public. So too, terrorist organizations like *Boko Haram* and *Al Shabab* can take advantage of the open gates to disseminate and spread messages.

As all the factors pertaining to the relaying of messages and news information have increased, so too have the influences on these stories. These influences can shape journalists' decision-making process and, eventually, their gatekeeping decisions. Research by Shoemaker and Reese categorizes the influences on the gatekeeping process as societal, institutional, organizational, routine and individual practices (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).

The use of social media, even in Africa, has led to the increased use of social media in newsrooms as well. This exposes journalists to various forms of audience feedback and participation. As can be seen in both the Chibok kidnapping and the Westgate attack, ignoring these forms of audience participation is nearly impossible. Audience feedback and participation may be one of the influences on journalists' gatekeeping decisions. By examining terrorism in Africa and acknowledging the possible disruptive forms of social media on the hierarchy of influences, the influences can be identified as follows:

1) Individual level: This is where individual journalists are able to 'control potential messages from entering the organization and to reshape those messages' (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). Factors that may influence gatekeeping at this level may include personality, background, ethnicity, gender and religion (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). These influences are hard to measure without looking at individual journalists and writers. However, it can be assumed that, internationally, individual influences on reporting on these cases would include the journalists' own understanding of terrorism, Africa

and the combination of the two. This will mainly be determined by the frame of terrorism present for the journalist. These frames were put in place by past experiences, with the 9/11 terror attacks framing terrorism for the world and individual journalists alike. These frames will influence individual reporting and understanding. When covering terrorism in Africa, a few additional factors that could influence the journalist on an individual level should be considered, including access to the site, safety and connectivity.

2) Routine level: According to Shoemaker and Reese (1996) these routines that influence gatekeeping are 'repeated practices and forms that media workers use to do their jobs.' This will include the difference in locations of the attacks: reporting from a major city is much easier than from elsewhere. Terrorism in Africa is not a new phenomenon; thus these routines have been established in both local and international media outlets. Language and discourses used in the coverage of these events have been set before either of the attacks; the specific use of language and discourse would be set within a framework established by various routines. These routines were undoubtedly interfered with by the excessive use of social media by both terrorist organizations.

3) Organizational level: Factors that influence gatekeeping decisions – both locally and internationally – on the organizational level include a journalist's job role, organizational policy and the specific focus and structure of a news organization (for example, tabloids focusing on local news, or national and/or governmental news channels). This is particularly important when looking at local reporting on the Westgate attack. It would have been difficult for news organizations to filter information and news, since the public had a major participatory role in the coverage of the attack. The organizational level did, however, come into play with the Kenyan government's decision to implement a new media policy *after* the attack, promising more organizational influence on news stories in the future. With the prominence of social media in Africa, this level of influence may become severely contested. If an organization's editors, for example, publish a story with a different angle or conclusion than that of the audience (which they acquired through social media), the story, and the media outlet's credibility, will be publicly questioned.

4) Social Institutional level: This level is a combination of gatekeepers and relationships between organizations and sectors that can have a powerful influence on the news (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). This level will look at whether news is aligned with a certain market demand, such as advertiser needs, financial markets or benefits to the source of the story (e.g. governments, NGOs or media outlets themselves). It is within this level that influences of policymakers, political parties and media owners play a

significant role. This level of influence is applicable to both studies in the way that both the Nigerian and Kenyan governments responded to the events, and the information that they made available about the attacks. These reports would look significantly different from those published by entities without the social institutional influence. This level can also be directly linked to the relationship between the media and policymakers. In Africa, media freedom is not universally understood; the various influences on media freedom all connect to this level of gatekeeping.

5) Social System level: Media outlets and journalists operate within the social system of which they are part. Values and beliefs of society are taken into consideration in the gatekeeping process. Issues such as the social structure of the city or region influence gatekeeping on this level (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). This level of influence differed starkly between the Nigerian and Kenyan cases. Geographically, the Chibok kidnapping happened in a remote area, with rural communities being impacted the most by the event. This would mean that the way the story is framed would have to include the context of the village and its residents for audiences outside of that framework to understand the event better. In Kenya, the social context in which the attack took place was more familiar to international audiences. It took place in a large city, with a heavy international presence, within a mall – a familiar setting outside of the African context. The social system's influence on the Chibok kidnapping would inherently be larger than the influence found in stories about the Westgate attack.

It is clear that various norms, practices and routines used in news gathering are influenced by consumers, information suppliers and those in leadership roles. The state is struggling more and more to 'control' messages disseminated by local civilians via channels difficult or impossible to monitor through means of traditional gatekeeping. The disruption to gatekeeping caused by increasing prominence of fake news, misinformation and social media warrants definite avenues of future research – especially regarding Africa. All of these influences play a role in how a message is communicated to the audience and how the audience receives the message. This in turn leads to the audience eventually forming part of the very influences on the messages they receive. Although the hierarchy of influences and the gatekeeping process were not created specifically with Africa in mind, the increased access to all areas of the world through digital and social media has led to these influences becoming more globalised and general.

Conclusion

The combination of media and terrorism has been studied for many years. The 'oxygen' of publicity and the effects thereof on terrorism and crime have

been realized long ago. But just because that knowledge exists, and has existed for many years, does not mean that countering terrorism through the media is something that has been perfected.

Audiences around the world will agree that terrorism, the subsequent racism, and even xenophobia that follows are having a detrimental effect on society. Civilians in terrorism-torn countries accept acts of terror as reality, and audiences who hear about these attacks accept the reality thereof as well. It need not be the norm though, and affected communities, and society, do not have to feel defeated. As terrorist organizations evolve, research on terrorism evolves. This needs to lead to the evolution of counterterrorism efforts and ideas as well. More innovative social, political and legislative methods in dealing with terrorism are necessary. It is vital, in countries in Africa especially, to overcome the challenges of connectivity, remoteness and access to sites.

Ending the threat is not necessarily a viable possibility, but alleviating the threat is. It is possible to make it incredibly difficult for these organizations to disseminate their intended message. Or, when disseminating their message, to relay a sense of truth and feasibility of practical conclusions to be drawn from the message. This will create an informed, coherent audience, that even when a message is received, the audience will have the relevant frames in mind to be able to understand and analyze the message.

Profiling through social media has led many private firms to have access to detailed information about their users. Through increased public–private sector cooperation and data sharing – which is already happening in businesses around the world – new methods can be devised to identify potential terrorism and curb the spread of terrorism discourses. Various role-players in the field of counterterrorism employ many tools within the media, including behavioral surveys, case studies and improvised tracking methods; the main limitation of these tools is the lack of a standard measure of effectiveness. A possible starting point, as suggested by G. Osbourne (2017), would be to accept that people are more honest online – more outspoken and even controversial. This attracts more people, followers or 'likes'. A contributing factor is the lack of societal rules in online activities. It is a space where anything can be said or published.

Law enforcement agencies and various intelligence agencies have launched several attempts at controlling and monitoring the increased use of media, and even using activities on social media sites to find and convict foreign terrorists. Unfortunately, due to the ever-growing amount of media content, and the limited capacities of the above-mentioned agencies, it is not an easy task. In the context of counterterrorism, it can be assumed that changing the media narrative of terrorism will not necessarily influence those

who already form part of groups like *Boko Haram* and *Al Shabab*. The target audiences of counter-terrorism messaging should be those more susceptible to radicalization. Military forces are also unlikely to be the most credible messenger since many civilians already have an attitude of distrust towards foreign troops. This means local civil communities, local law enforcement, and local security agencies need to be utilized for counter-messaging purposes – especially when counter-messaging takes place on social media sites.

For many local populations in Africa, the media, especially social media, is the only link they have to politics. Many political opinions and decisions are created through information disseminated by media sources. On the other side of the spectrum, the media is also able to highlight societal issues and bring them to the attention of policymakers tasked to represent the public. The media is an undeniable link between civilians and the political process – locally and internationally.

References

Alger, D. (1998) *Megamedia: How Giant Corporations Dominate Mass Media, Distort Competition, and Endanger Democracy*. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Apard, É. (2015) 'Les mots de Boko Haram', *Afrique contemporaine*, 255(3), p. 43. doi: 10.3917/afco.255.0043.

Awan, A., & Al-Lami, M. (2009) 'Al-Qa'ida's Virtual Crisis', *The RUSI Journal*. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071840902818605 (Accessed: 9 February 2017).

Bacon, T. (2017) *This is why al-Shabab won't be going away anytime soon*, *The Washington Post*. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/06/this-is-why-al-Shabab-wont-be-going-away-any-time-soon/ (Accessed: 19 August 2019).

Bagdikian, B. (2000) *The Media Monopoly*. 6th edition. Boston: Beacon Press.

Baken, D., & Mantzikos, I. (2012) 'The cyber terrorism shadow networks in Africa: AQIM and Boko Haram', *African Renaissance*. Available at: https://journals.co.za/content/aa_afren/9/1/EJC120521 (Accessed: 8 February 2017).

BBC (2013) *Somalia's al-Shabab claims Nairobi Westgate Kenya attack*, *BBC News*. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24191606 (Accessed: 2 September 2019).

Bruns, A., & Highfield, T. (2015) 'From news blogs to news on Twitter: Gatewatching and collaborative news curation', in Coleman, S. and Freelon, D. (eds) *Handbook of Digital Politics*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Campbell, J. (2019) *Conflict in Nigeria Is More Complicated Than 'Christians vs. Muslims'*, *Council on Foreign Relations*. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/blog/conflict-nigeria-more-complicated-christians-vs-muslims (Accessed: 2 September 2019).

Campbell, J., & Harwood, A. (2018) *Boko Haram's Deadly Impact*, *Council on Foreign Relations*. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/article/boko-harams-deadly-impact (Accessed: 2 September 2019).

Freeman, C. (2019) *Boko Haram adopts 'hearts and minds' strategy in Nigeria – inspired by Isil*, *The Telegraph*. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/terror-and-security/boko-haram-adopts-hearts-minds-strategy-nigeria-inspired-isil/ (Accessed: 19 August 2019).

Gendron, A. (2017) 'The Call to Jihad: Charismatic Preachers and the Internet', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(1), pp. 44–61. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2016. 1157406.

Hoffman, B. (2006) *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Human Rights Watch (2018) *Somalia: Al-Shabab Demanding Children*, *Refworld*. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a60bb534.html (Accessed: 19 August 2019).

Jackson, R. (2011) 'In defence of 'terrorism': finding a way through a forest of misconceptions', *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*. Routledge , 3(2), pp. 116–130. doi: 10.1080/19434472.2010.512148.

Lowry, L. (2019) *'Leave or Be Killed'—Boko Haram Issues Warning to Christians in Niger*, *Open Doors USA*. Available at: https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/stories/leave-or-be-killed-boko-haram-issues-warning-to-christians-in-niger/ (Accessed: 2 September 2019).

Lutz, B. J., & Lutz, J. M. (2013) 'Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Missing Data', *Insight on Africa*, 5(2).

Mair, D. (2017) '#Westgate: A Case Study: How al-Shabab used Twitter during an Ongoing Attack', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(1), pp. 24–43. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157404.

Massaro, C. (2019) 'Nigeria plagued by ethnic and religious violence as attacks on Christians rise', *Fox News*. Fox News. Available at: https://www.foxnews.com/world/nigeria-ethnic-religious-violence-christians (Accessed: 2 September 2019).

Miller, G. & Mekhennet, S. (2015) *Inside the surreal world of the Islamic State's propaganda machine - The Washington Post*, *The Washington Post*. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-pro-paganda-machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html?utm_term=.88a0b6729028 (Accessed: 30 August 2017).

Nacos, B. (2016) *Mass-mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. Available at: https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=PGiDCwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=research+paper+media+and+terrorism&ots=Fu41GmrW74&sig=EU37_4XQ4jT-F76QXOGMCOzB9h8 (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

Nacos, B. (2000) 'Accomplice of witness? The media's role in terrorism', *Current History*, 99(626), pp. 174–175.

Nacos, B. (2002) *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Osborne, G. (2017) *Strategic Communications: Insights from the commercial sector.* Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.

Pierskalla, J. H., & Hollenbach, F. M. (2013) 'Technology and Collective Action: The effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa', *American Political Science Review*, 107(2), pp. 207–224.

Portland Communications (2012) *How Africa Tweets*, *Portland Communications*. Available at: http://www.portland-communications.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Twitter_in_Africa_PPT.pdf. (Accessed: 12 November 2016).

Reuters (2019) *Al-Shabab attacks Somali military base; casualties reported*, *Al Jazeera*. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/al-Shabab-strikes-so-mali-military-base-casualties-reported-190814121439284.html (Accessed: 7 May 2020).

Rohner, D. and Frey, B. (2007) 'Blood and ink! The common-interest-game between terrorists and the media', *Public Choice*. Available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-007-9182-9 (Accessed: 8 February 2017).

Rosabel, D. (2016) *Digital in 2016 - We Are Social Singapore*, *We are Social*. Available at: https://wearesocial.com/sg/special-reports/digital-2016 (Accessed: 6 January 2017).

Rudner, M. (2017) ''Electronic Jihad '': The Internet as Al Qaeda's Catalyst for Global Terror', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(1), pp. 10–23. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157403.

Seib, P. M., & Janbek, D. M. (2011) *Global terrorism and new media : the post-Al Qaeda generation*, *Media, war and security*. doi: 10.4324/9780203845370.

Shoemaker, P. J., & Reese, S. D. (1996) *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*. Second Edi. New York: Longman Publishers. Available at: http://www.chinhnghia.com/mediating-the-message.pdf (Accessed: 23 January 2018).

Shoemaker, P. J., & Reese, S. D. (2014) 'Mediating the Message in the 21st Century: A Media Sociology Perspective', p. 312. doi: 10.2307/461477.

Shoemaker, P. J., & Riccio, J. R. (2016) *Gatekeeping*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Shoemaker, P. J., & Vos, T. P. (2009) *Gatekeeping theory*. New York: Routledge.

Shpiro, S. (2002) 'Conflict media strategies and the politics of counter-terrorism', *Politics*. Available at: http://pol.sagepub.com/content/22/2/76.short (Accessed: 8 February 2017).

Sipus, M. (2010) *Support for al-Shabab through the diaspora*. Available at: https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/non-state/29.pdf.

Tandoc, E. C., & Vos, T. P. (2016) 'The journalist is marketing the news: Social media in the gatekeeping process', *Journalism Practice*, 10(8).

United Nations Development program (2017) *Journey to Extremism in Africa: drivers, incentives and the tipping point for recruitment*. New York. Available at: http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtre-mism-report-2017-english.pdf.

Wilkinson, P. (1997) 'The media and terrorism: A reassessment', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 9(2), pp. 51–64. doi: 10.1080/09546559708427402.

Dr. Glen Segell
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa
University of Haifa, Israel

Chapter 10. EXPORTING IDEOLOGY AND RELIGION FROM THE MIDDLE EAST – IMPORTING TERROR INTO AFRICA

Introduction

This chapter is a first step in a research agenda towards examining how Islam is exported from the Middle East and how ideology and terror are imported into Africa. While the presence of Islam in Africa could well date back over 1300 years, there is no evidence to indicate that the spread of the faith in regions that are now the modern states of Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Nigeria, and into Southern Africa was anything but a gradual process. Several models could explain this gradual spread of Africans adopting beliefs and practices based upon Islam. These different models emerge from different academic disciplines; for example, economics, theology, political science, sociology and anthropology are also applicable to explaining the spread of other faiths over the many centuries on the African continent.

Lapidus (2002) provides a summary of the main model accepted given that the majority of evidence tends in this direction. That is the model that emphasizes trade and commerce that is expanded on by Kemper (2012) in wider economic motivations. Lesser used models come from theology and are explained by Azumah and Sanneh (2013); they concern the draw of Islam's spiritual message. Harder to prove yet also acceptable is the model from political science noted by Easton (2014) as the prestige and influence of Arabic literacy in facilitating state building. Yet others from sociology and anthropology rely on the model that rests on individual level, where foreigners settled, integrated with local communities and married with locals. Salaam and Salaam (2011) provide anecdotal notions that the family and their descendants would have adopted the foreigners' ways, including religious beliefs and practices.

This chapter proposes a hypothesis that the common element in all these models are historical phases that can help describe how and why entire populations adopted Islam as a faith. There are four such phases that can be identified in the history of Islam in Africa: containment, mixing, reform and radicalization. The first three phases might be ascribed as evolutionary but the fourth phase is revolutionary; it is not a logical follow-on to the third

phase – radicalization doesn't necessarily follow reform. While the phases are for the main part chronological over centuries they are also iterative as elements of each coexist in the others.

This chapter will provide examples to put the hypothesis to case. It will continue by examining firstly how religion is exported from the Middle East in the first three phases of containment, mixing, and reform. Conrad (2009), for instance, provides primary source researched evidence on the historical development of the medieval empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhay. Isichei (1997) does the same for the 19th century *jihad* that led to the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in Hausaland and the Umarian state in Senegambia. In these are identifiable the first phase, where the African community leaders contained Muslim influence by segregating Muslim communities, the second phase where the population within the community blended Islam with local traditions as the population selectively appropriated practices from Islam, and the third phase, where African Muslims pressed for reforms in an effort to rid their societies of mixed practices and implement *Sharia*.

The chapter will then attend to the fourth phase, that of radicalization and importing ideology and terror into Africa. This chapter considers radicalization in Africa, that has as its roots Islam, as a fourth phase because it is spreading rapidly from the individual level to the community and even national due to recruitment by individuals and organizations that promote the religion for example in mosques, and schools. This fourth phase is the most recent phase, and has been the fastest, as until 2001 such radicalization was very localized and individualized in the same geographic and demographic areas of Africa that for centuries had gradual containment, mixing, and reform and that are still ongoing.

Containment

It is Lang (2018) that uses an economic model to describe the early presence of Islam and its spread in Africa linked to trans-Saharan trade. He explains that trade requires a type of merchant-scholar who is proficient in literacy and numeracy and has the tools of contract law, credit, and information networks. Ngom and Kurfi (2020) took this model and provide evidence on the growth of the Muslim merchant-scholar class in non-Muslim kingdoms as the explanation for the rise of Arab and North African Berber settlements in West Africa.

The economic model, although predominant, must be read together with Trimingham (1967), who undertook a political study on the spin-off of a rise in Muslim merchant-scholars as advisors and scribes, evident in the administration of kingdoms such as the Jakhanke, the Jula in Mali and the Ivory Coast, and the Hausa in Nigeria, Ghana, and Guinea-Bissau. Most of

these traders and merchant-scholars weren't missionaries. Indeed, one should also mention McKissack and McKissack (1995), whose sociological and anthropological study shows that in some cases, for example, Ghana's kings as a precaution didn't permit North African and Saharan merchants to stay overnight in their cities. Ghana's kings benefited from Muslim traders, but kept them outside their centers of power. This eventually gave rise to one of the major features of Ghana – the dual city.

Mixing

The evidence provided by Aderinto (2017) indicates that whatever the model, the historical evidence suggests that eventually over centuries African leaders began to allow Muslims to integrate and mix, exampled in Takrur – a Muslim state in the middle Senegal valley. Messier (2012) traces the historical evidence of mixing or assimilation and shows that then came two further processes of mixing, one imposed top-down and the second bottom-up, from the grassroots. The top-down mix imposed was the Almoravid reform movement that began in Western Sahara and expanded throughout modern Mauritania, North Africa and Southern Spain. It captured trade routes and posts, leading to the weakening of the Takruri state. It imposed a fundamentalist version of the practice of Islam with greater uniformity in an attempt to purify beliefs and practices from syncretistic or heretical beliefs.

The bottom-up, grassroots process of mixing examined by Page (2005) indicates that it was gradual as African rulers began to adopt Islam while ruling over populations with diverse faiths and cultures. Many of these rulers blended Islam with traditional and local practices. Over time, in some cases over many centuries, the population began to adopt Islam, often selectively appropriating aspects of the faith. Several Muslim polities developed, including the Kingdom of Kanem near Lake Chad, and the Hausa city-states in modern Northern Nigeria. Hausaland was comprised of a system of city-states – Gobir, Katsina, Kano, Zamfara, Kebbi and Zazzau.

Gomez (2019) provides an example in more depth, and that is the Kingdom of Gao. It patronized institutions preaching and practicing Islam and sponsored public buildings, mosques and libraries, including the Great Mosque of Jenne, which remains the largest earthen building in the world and was built in the 12th or 13th century. By the 16th century, there were several centers of trade and the teaching of Islam in the Niger Bend region, most notably the famed Timbuktu. The major trading partners of these were the Merenid dynasty in the Maghreb (north-west Africa) and the Mamluks in Egypt.

Another detailed example is provided by Conrad (2009), and that is the Mali Empire (1215-1450), which composed most of modern Mali, Senegal,

parts of Mauritania and Guinea. Muslims played a prominent role in the court as counselors and advisors. By 1300, Mali kings became Muslim, the most famous of them being Mansa Musa (1307-1332). He made Islam the state religion and in 1324 went on pilgrimage from Mali to Mecca. Emerging from the ruins of the Mali Empire, the Mande Songhay Empire (1430s to 1591) ruled over a diverse and multi-ethnic empire. Although Islam was the state religion, the majority of the population still practiced their traditional belief systems. The Songhay Empire ended when Morocco conquered the state in 1591, which marked the decline of big empires in Africa.

Reform

The third phase of reform is introduced by Hannoum (2016) as having started around the 12th and 13th century, when mystical Sufi brotherhood orders began to spread in Africa. Sufi orders played an integral role in the social order of African Muslim societies and the spread of Islam through the region well into the 20th century. Literate Muslims became increasingly aware of daily doctrine and practices based upon Islam and began to demand reforms during this period. Chesworth and Kogelmann (2013) show that that marked a shift in Muslim communities that practiced Islam mixed with 'pagan' rituals and practices to societies that completely adopted values and established *Sharia* Islam Law.

Robinson (2004) explains that this was also true of the 17th to 19th century *jihad* movements. The first known *jihad* in Africa was in Mauritania during the 17th century. At that time, Mauritanian society was divided along scholar and warrior lineages. The scholar Nasir al-Din led a failed *jihad* called *Sharr Bubba*. The 19th century *jihad* movements in Senegambia and Hausaland (in what is now northern Nigeria) successfully overthrew the established order and transformed the ruling and landowning class.

Hanson (1996) offers the case of Uthman Dan Fodio, a Fulani scholar, who in 1802 led a major *jihad* that overthrew the region's Hausa rulers and replaced them with Fulani emirs. The movement led to the centralization of power in the Muslim community, education reforms, and transformations of law. Following was the *jihad* of al Hajj Umar Tal, a Tukulor from the Senegambia region, who in the 1850s claimed to have received spiritual authority over the West African Tijani Sufi order; he conquered three Bambara kingdoms.

Motadel (2016) puts this in context as also being the period of European colonization in Africa for God (Christianity), Glory (Empire building) and Gold (Africa's raw materials). Although Africans, be they Muslims or Traditionals, lost political power, Muslim communities made rapid inroads in Africa during the early 20th century. Contrary to the efforts of European

colonial authorities, modern communication and transportation infrastructure facilitated increased exchange between Muslim communities. As a result, Islam began to spread rapidly in new urban centers and regions at rates far greater than in the previous centuries.

An example researched and written on by Ali (1985) is Senegal, where the rebel Samori Toure rose up against the French. Following his death, French forces defeated Toure's son in 1901. The French occupation of Senegal led to the forced final development of daily practice based upon Islam where leaders of Sufi orders became allies with colonial administrators and so a single faith state with Islam as the only religion emerged.

Another example researched and written on by Kanya-Forstner and Lovejoy (1994) is the Sokoto Caliphate, which ended in 1903 due to the British conquest. British colonial authorities attempting to maintain the established social order did so by rule through Northern Nigerian emirs whose position was strengthened and protected by British military forces.

Radicalization

The three phases of containment, mixing, and reform shed light on the centuries-long historical spread of Islam in Africa that could have started with the model of trans-Saharan trade. The phases might be ascribed as evolutionary, but not necessarily linear. Yet the fourth phase is revolutionary. It isn't a linear, evolutionary, logical follow-on to that of any of the other phases. Radicalization doesn't necessarily follow containment, mixing or reform individually or consecutively.

Joffe (2012) notes that radicalization is a phase in Africa that needs to be quantified, for it is a fairly recent phenomenon, as prior to 2001 experts indicated that terrorist and radical activity in Africa was largely localized and contained. He uses Securitization Theory to explore how Muslims have been constructed as a security issue in Africa after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. These attacks became the rationale for the US's Global War on Terror (GWOT). He explores, particularly, how western-centered security discourses around Muslims have permeated South African security discourse in the post-apartheid period. He also confirms that non-institutional voices have securitized the African Muslims by equating them with terrorism.

The takeaway is that individual radicalization based upon Islamic fundamentalism could happen in any community or country – not necessarily an Islamic one. It isn't an evolutionary process, but a radical introduction. Yet it is fair to believe that radicalization of a community or a state, compared to that of an individual, could occur and continue with greater probability when large segments of the population are already believing and practicing Islam.

In setting the scene for such a likelihood, the previous sections have provided examples to describe the prevalence of Islam as the majority belief and in faith in most of present-day Senegal, Gambia, Mali, northern Nigeria, Burkina Faso, as well as many neighboring communities. These Muslim communities have existed for over a millennium without the phase of radicalization. Given that there is no single driver of radicalization, the issue of how to address this phenomenon is complex.

Academic work on violent extremism does exist, but it is not always well known among policy-makers and practitioners and it is not well-integrated into programming. Besides these issues related to the nexus between academia and policy, there remain some significant gaps in research, advocacy and policy. One thing for certain is that context is helpful as a descriptor.

For example, Belaala (2010) provides the socio-political and historical context showing that while the realities of states vary significantly, it is possible to discern some similarities in context, as well as characteristics of drivers of radicalization in Africa with Islam was a root cause. For example the collapse of traditional organizations and increased funding for groups from outside sources is indicative of the resonance of international issues. In addition, the key ideological positions relevant to Islam in the region are Wahhabi Salafism and *Jihadism*, where the former is an approach that advocates the use of violence in the pursuit of goals, while the latter is an extreme fundamentalism that is influenced by Saudi Wahhabism that also gave rise to the *Al Qaeda* terrorism.

Socio-economic factors – while in themselves not key determinants of radicalization – add fuel to the context of wide-spread changes in a potent combination. The examples of such include poverty, political and cultural marginalization, low educational attainment, a lack of opportunities (particularly for young people), a history of authoritarianism, and any post-revolution or post-colonial political climate. Dynamics involve the intersection of ideology, individuals and institutions in different combinations and to varying degrees. Decades of conflict have left the area vulnerable to cross-border instability while the region's substantial mineral wealth contributes an additional dynamic. Porous borders and the activities of trans-national criminal network coupled with violent narratives and extremist propaganda in the age of social media add fuel to the fire.

There is no clear and obvious trajectory of radicalization of individuals, communities or states. Mere entry into a radical organization does not necessarily mean that the individual has been radicalized. Radical individuals and groups are not necessarily violent extremists/terrorists. However, certain individuals – and groups of individuals – serve as facilitators, catalysts and

active 'agents' of violent extremism; others may be victims or provide the social network around such individuals. Yet, the cause for concern is that Africa as a region is entering the phase of radicalization with Islam as a root characteristic. It is more and more the entire region that portrays conflict and violence. Extremist narratives are being propagated. At the same time, other regions of the world that do not have Islam as a significant religion, yet in a similar socio-economic situation, are not radicalized.

Another example may be found in Southern Africa, and that is Mozambique. Estelle and Darden (2020) describe the geographic and demographic antecedents of the country. Mozambique borders Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Malawi, Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to the west. Mozambique's eastern border features a 2500 km Indian Ocean coastline. Mozambique is a majority Christian country with a one-fifth Muslim minority. Most Mozambican Muslims live in the country's north. Cabo Delgado Province's population is 52.5 percent Muslim and 36 percent Catholic according to the 2017 census. Muslims constitute more than 75 percent of the population in six of the province's 17 districts.

The spread of Islam followed the first three phases. Pirio, Pittelli, and Adam (2018) give evidence of the fourth phase of radicalization being due to local circumstances and leadership struggles, but the radicalization was imported. They detail that Cabo Delgado's Salafi movement was initially peaceful but laid the groundwork for future militarization. It ran mosques in the Mocímboa da Praia area, whose students now participate in militias. Morier-Genoud (2020) analyses that it was been the ideological and generational schisms among Muslim leaders in northern Mozambique that set the conditions for today's Salafi-jihadi insurgency.

Bonate (2018) determines that one contributing factor was Wahhabi religious education, introduced in the early 1990s, including NGO-funded local programs and foreign travel to North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. This led to young men being sent to the DRC, Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania for military training; brought radical clerics to Mozambique; and paid former policemen and border guards for military training.

Hanlon (2020) completes the circle of the local leadership strife by noting that the issue of religious authority became fraught because the official Islamic Council of Mozambique was perceived as being too closely connected to the state at the expense of conservative Muslims, who were prevented from holding political office. Tanzanian sheikhs traditionally were accepted as religious authorities, further fragmenting religious authority in Cabo Delgado. A separatist Salafi movement formed in Cabo Delgado in response to these dynamics. Habibe, Forquilha, and Pereira (2019) add that followers of the extremist Kenyan cleric Aboud Rogo Mohammed, who was

killed in Mombasa, Kenya in 2012, moved southward into Tanzania before crossing into Cabo Delgado by 2015.

So what began as a narrow insurgency driven by local leadership strife, economic grievances and religious tensions in late 2017 is now a regional concern, primed to draw in several of East and Southern Africa's most powerful states. Islamic State Mozambique's (IS-M) foothold in Cabo Delgado provides a base for operations and potential attacks on neighboring countries. The involvement of private security actors and government-backed vigilante groups poses a clear risk to civilians and may contribute to persistent cycles of violence.

Data on radicalization

There are some amazing facts and figures about radicalization that need more than the brief glance than this chapter provides. Yet, this chapter aims to provide an insight, a pointer, to highlight some of the statistics that need further in-depth examination. Data is important because it shows trends and patterns over time. It is important to show that the radicalization and terror in Africa are alarmingly on the rise, and predominately by groups using Islam. The data also shows that the radicalization is not a centuries-long gradual social process but a very rapid change introduced by individuals locally in Africa.

This chapter uses three of many sources of data, which respectively are from a non-aligned international organization, a governmental organization and a private consortium. Despite the wide diversity of sources, consensus in data provides a modicum of validity to the correlation of the findings. These stress that it is local leaders who are drawing in the Middle East groups in a pull fashion rather than in a push fashion that was evident over the last hundreds of years. Thus, radicalization is being imported!

The data comes from the United Nations Development program (UNDP) (published in 2020), the US Congressional Research Service (published in 2018), and the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) in collaboration with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) led by the University of Maryland (published in 2020).

In November 2020, the IEP released the 'Global Terrorist Index 2020' (GTI-2020) that analyzes the impact of terrorism for 163 countries covering 99.7 percent of the world's population. Steve Killelea, Executive Chairman of IEP (2019), wrote that 'between 2002 and 2019, the largest number of deaths from terrorism globally was recorded in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), at more than 96,000 deaths'.

Further, the GTI-2020 Report Table 3.10 on Page 50 shows that of the ten countries globally that had the largest deterioration in deaths from terrorism,

seven were in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a 200 percent increase from a decade ago. These seven countries are Burkina Faso, Mozambique, the DRC, Mali, Niger, Cameron and Ethiopia. These countries are also facing various ecological threats, are among the countries with the highest population growth and suffer from low societal resilience.

The GTI-2020 Report explains this on page 23 that local leaders are using radicalization to strengthen their positions, while groups from the Middle East are willing to use and abuse the population whilst propping up these leaders as this furthers their own objective of a global caliphate. Their *modus operandi* is first to take the countryside and small towns and then move to larger urban areas. This type of guerrilla, insurgent, creeping conquest reminiscent of Vietnam makes it hard if not impossible for government forces or indeed international coalitions to engage in combat. Somalia may serve as an example. Since 2019, in response to increased counterterrorism operations, *Al Shabab* has shifted its focus to urban areas like Mogadishu, making it increasingly difficult for US and Somali forces to target the terror group given its close proximity to civilians. *Al Shabab* retains control over 20 percent of the country, including areas in the Jubbaland region and along the border with Kenya. The group has been able to move freely, extort local populations and forcibly recruit fighters, some of whom were children.

The GTI-2020 Report elaborates that Burkina Faso had the largest increase in deaths from terrorism, rising by almost 600 percent from 2018 to 593 in 2019. A large number of these attacks were the work of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Mozambique had the second largest increase in deaths from terrorism, and had the largest increase in terrorist activity in Sub-Saharan Africa outside of the Sahel. Much of this increase can be attributed to the Central African Province of the Islamic State.

Another source of data is the United Nations Development program (UNDP) that identified 18 focus countries in the African continent in its project 'Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach.' Figure 1 on Page 1 shows that the four epicenter countries – Libya, Somalia, Nigeria and Mali – have suffered 62 percent of the total attacks and 68 percent of the total fatalities from terrorism in Africa in the last five years. The report notes that internal displacement often feeds into and exacerbates pre-existing conflicts and dynamics of displacement among pastoralists. Here violent extremism inspired by certain interpretations of Islam is being manipulated and distorted to serve the ends of the vast majority of violent local extremist groups witnessed in Africa. The transnational nature of these groups has been underscored in Nigeria by *Boko Haram's* recent pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and in Somalia by *Al Shabab's* pledge to *Al Qaeda* several years ago.

Yet another source of data is the US Congressional Research Service, where a researcher Clayton Thomas on Page 9 of a Report titled '*Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy: Middle East and Africa*' informs that US and others anti-terrorist successes against the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) in the Middle East have led to ISIL's shift to Sub-Saharan Africa. ISIL's centre of gravity move to Sub-Saharan Africa saw total deaths by ISIL in the region increase by 67% by 2018. Twenty-seven countries experienced a terrorist attack caused by ISIL or one of its affiliates – and 41 percent of all ISIL-related attacks in 2019 occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa. The report also infers that the growth of violent extremism is not just a push from Middle East groups but also because the rule of law systems in the countries being radicalized are ill-equipped to deal with this rising phenomenon or have failed to effectively implement the laws that are in place. They lack the legal capacity to effectively prosecute those that have been engaged in criminal activities related to violent extremism. The emphasis is that it is local criminal elements that have brought in the radicalization and perpetuate it, rather than it being a faith mechanism.

The data from these three sources does not cover the COVID-19 era, however, provisional data for the 2021 Global Terrorism Index suggests that in settings where terrorism is occurring in the context of a broader conflict or due to ideological or religious exportation or exploitation COVID-19 seems to have had relatively little impact on the trajectory of violence. ISIL's centre of gravity move to Sub-Saharan Africa and the increase of terrorist activity there is an example.

Further, the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to present new and distinct counter-terrorism challenges. In particular, the increase of government deficits caused by increased public spending during the pandemic will likely have a negative impact on counterterrorism budgets. This may result in a reduction of international assistance for counter-terrorism operations in MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Another set of data provided by Segell (2021) looks at dependent and independent variables to correlate terrorism in Africa with religion, food shortages, ethnic strife, lack of services such as water supply and sanitation. There is no strong correlation of the cause of terrorism to any of these. Yet they could all add fuel to the fire as could overall poverty and the lack of education coupled with high levels of unemployment. More often than not in Africa there is a strong correlation between protests and riots and terrorism.

This could lead to the assumption that it is the lack of governance and resulting instability that lead to anarchy, which opens the door for power struggles. The lack of effective governance is very evident in areas where NGO's operate. Individuals, families, communities and tribes that are in strife

could become a 'franchise' of a terrorist organization that is imported and implemented by locals rather than through 'direct proxy control'. Similar to political systems such as communism and democracy adopted as 'franchises' during the Cold War, the locals need a sponsor to assist them in their disputes but they don't necessarily subscribe to the ideology. The issue of how to address this phenomenon is complex and beyond the scope of this chapter.

Conclusions

This chapter is a first step in a research agenda towards examining how Islam is exported from the Middle East and how ideology and terror are imported into Africa. The goal of this chapter was to highlight the importance of identifying phases in the complexity and multi-dimensionality of belief and faith. In doing so it seems reasonable to believe that the trajectory of Islam in Africa demonstrates that nothing is set in stone. This chapter proposed a hypothesis of four phases identified in the history of Islam in Africa: containment, mixing, reform and radicalization. It put the hypothesis to case with examples.

The phases of containment, mixing, and reform might be ascribed as evolutionary but the phase of radicalization is revolutionary. Data from three difference sources sustained that the radicalization is rapid and spreading. On the one hand, people and leaders change and with this there is nothing amiss to different interests, or at least a difference in the prioritization of interests. It is fair to believe then that in the framework of containment, mixing, and reform individuals, communities and their leaders contained or protected their current beliefs and faith from being influenced by others, mixed their faith with others, or enacted reforms. There is no evidence that in doing so an existential threat was posed to the entire Africa region. On the other hand, radicalization threatens the very essence of daily life.

Several models with examples were provided that could explain the gradual spread of beliefs and practices in African based upon Islam. These different models emerge from different academic disciplines, e.g. economics, theology, political science, sociology and anthropology, which are also applicable to explaining the spread of other faiths over the many centuries on the African continent.

On the other hand, radicalization based upon Islam as a phase that the entire Africa region might experience is irrational. On face value it doesn't appear in any manner to construct but could lead to destruction. It could lead to conflict, violence and wars – all of which would have a negative socio-economic impact. Data examined has shown that Sub-Saharan Africa has the most prevalent rise in such radicalization based upon Islam. Indeed, this would be contrary to the economic model that showed that Islam was a result

of successful trade. Radicalization and terrorism come with a heavy financial cost. To be sure, the UNDP (2020) report noted that the growth of violent extremism – and the devastating impact of groups espousing violent ideologies – is not only setting in motion a dramatic reversal of development gains already made, but threatening to stunt prospects of development for decades to come.

Given that there is no single driver of radicalization in Africa based upon Islam or a specific military solution, addressing it is beyond the scope of this chapter. But it is fair to note that one option is evident, as in less economically developed countries religious or ethnic ruptures and corruption are more strongly associated with high levels of terrorism. Similarly, high levels of group grievance, social disenfranchisement and exclusion play an important role in terrorism, just as weak rule of law correlates with terrorism across all countries.

As a concluding thought, policymakers need to be aware of novel approaches to counter-terrorism and need to do so informed by research and analysis on violent extremism. That could mean looking at the causes and reasons and not just the symptoms, as well as engaging in terror prevention rather than just counter-terrorism in response to terror, being proactive rather than just reactive. For example, looking to the landward when tackling piracy off the Horn of Africa and not just to the maritime aspect. Or, for example, looking at the level of the community, at formal and informal institutions and at the dynamics that play critical roles, as well as at the manner in which the responsibilities of the State are/are not executed, as these can be a significant driver of violent extremism, especially when combined with several other elements. And, indeed, one should consider the diverse factors that conflate at both the regional, transnational and global levels to foster the conditions that can ignite and sustain the growth of violent extremism in Africa.

Identifying the problem is the first step to a solution and novel approaches followed by building trust and confidence. Interventions focused on ideology may seek to engage in inter- and intra-faith activities as a way to expose doctrinal fallacies and areas where religion is being manipulated to serve political ends and to justify violence. With that this chapter will rest, having identified radicalization as a phase that is imported into Africa rather than just exported to it. The other three phases over centuries were more exported to Africa as an evolutionary process. All four phases could coexist in the context of the complexity and multi-dimensionality of belief and faith in Africa.

References

Aderinto, S. (2017). *African Kingdoms: An Encyclopedia of Empires and Civilizations*. ABC-CLIO.

Ali, S. A. (1985). *The Muslim World Today*. National Hijra Council.

Azumah, J., & Sanneh, L. (2013). *The African Christian and Islam*. Langham Monographs.

Belaala, S. (2010). *Cultural, social and political process of radicalization and violent radicalization*. European Commission: DG Justice-Liberty and Security.

Chesworth, J. A., & Kogelmann, F. (2013). *Sharīʻa in Africa Today: Reactions and Responses*. Brill Publishers.

Conrad, D. C. (2009). *Empires of Medieval West Africa: Ghana, Mali, and Songhay*. Chelsea House Publications.

Easton, P. (2014). *Sustaining Literacy in Africa. United Nations Educational.* Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Estelle, E., & Darden, J. (2020). *Combating the Islamic State's Spread in Africa*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Gomez, M. (2019). *African Dominion: A New History of Empire in Early and Medieval West Africa*. Princeton University Press.

Habibe, S., Forquilha, S, & Pereira, J. (2019, September). Islamic Radicalization in Northern Mozámbique: The Case of Mocímboa da Praia, *Cadernos Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos* 17.

Hanlon, J. (2020). Can Creating 'Pockets of Effectiveness' Reverse Mozambique's Decline? *Mozambique News Reports & Clippings* 504, October 9.

Hannoum, A. (Ed.). (2016). *Practicing Sufism Sufi Politics and Performance in Africa*. Routledge Press.

Hanson, J. H. (1996). *Migration, Jihad, and Muslim Authority in West Africa.* Indiana University Press.

http://dx.DOI.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.31552.46082

Institute for Economics & Peace. (2020, November). *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism.* Vision of Humanity. http://visionofhumanity.org/reports

Isichei, E. (1997). *A History of African Societies to 1870*. Cambridge University Press.

Joffe, G. (Ed.). (2012). *Islamist Radicalisation in North Africa: Politics and Process*. Routledge Press.

Kanya-Forstner, A. S., & Lovejoy, P. E. (1994). *The Sokoto Caliphate and the European Powers, 1890-1907*. Franz Steiner Publishers.

Kemper, S. A. (2012). *Labyrinth of Kingdoms: 10,000 Miles through Islamic Africa.* W. W. Norton & Company.

Killelea, S. (2020, December 21). *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Deaths from terrorism reach five-year low, but new risks emerge*. Vision of Humanity. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/global-terrorism-index-2020-deaths-from-terrorism-reach-five-year-low-but-new-risks-emerge

Lang, M. (2018). *Trans-Saharan Trade Routes Routes of Cross-Cultural Exchange*. Cavendish Square Publishers.

Lapidus, I. M. (2002). *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge University Press.

Lusa, L. (2020, June 22). Mozambique/Attacks: Armed Group Was Born 10 Years Before the First Attack–Researcher. *Club of Mozambique.* https://clubofmo-

zambique.com/news/mozambique-attacks-armed-group-was-born-10-years-before-the-first-attack-researcher-163672/.

McKissack, P., & McKissack, F. (1995). *The Royal Kingdoms of Ghana, Mali, and Songhay: Life in Medieval Africa*. Square Fish Publishers.

Messier, R.A. (2010). *The Almoravids and the Meanings of Jihad*. ABC-CLIO.

Morier-Genoud, E. (2020). The Jihadi Insurgency in Mozambique: Origins, Nature and Beginning. *Journal of Eastern African Studies,* 14(3) 396-412.

Motadel, D. (2016). *Islam and the European Empires*. Oxford University Press.

Ngom, F., & Kurfi, M. H. (Eds.). (2020. *The Palgrave Handbook of Islam in Africa*. Palgrave.

Page, W. F. (2005). *Encyclopedia of African History and Culture*. Facts On File.

Pirio, G., Pittelli, R., & Adam, Y. (2018). *The Emergence of Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique.* Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Robinson, D. (2004). *Muslim Societies in African History*. Cambridge University Press.

Salaam, M. A., & Salaam, M. (2011). *A Black Man's Journey in America: Glimpses of Islam, Conversations and Travels*. Xlibris USA.

Segell, G. (2021). 'Exporting religion from the Middle East: Importing ideology and terror into Africa' *Conference Presentation, New Frontiers of Terrorism in Africa*, 17 March 2021,

Thomas, S. (2018). *Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy: Middle East and Africa*. US Congressional Research Service.

Trimingham, J. S. (1967). *Islam in West Africa*. Clarendon Press.

United Nations Development program (UNDP). (2020, December). *Regional and Multi-Country Project Document, Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach.* United Nations Development program. https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/reports/preventing-and-responding-to-violent-extremism-in-africa--a-deve.html

Dr. Sergey V. Kostelyanets
Institute for African Studies, Moscow, Russia
HSE University, Moscow, Russia

Chapter 11. RUSSIA'S COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN AFRICA[*]

Introduction

In recent decades, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism (COIN-CT) cooperation has become a core element of strategic and security collaboration between African nations and key global actors. The September 11, 2001 attacks in the US, usually referred to as 9/11, triggered a particularly significant increase in the role of foreign actors as facilitators and implementers of COIN-CT in Africa. While it has been primarily Western countries that have played this specific role, the footprint of non-Western nations has also been expanding steadily. Such countries as China, India, Turkey, Israel and the United Arab Emirates have been actively expanding COIN-CT coordination with African states, filling the vacuum of security in parts of the continent alongside pursuing own political and economic interests.

Accordingly, it comes as little surprise that the Russian Federation, being a major non-Western power and a former superpower with a history of assertive involvement in Africa, in recent years has also joined the fray. Counterterrorism has already become the basis of the Russian agenda in the Middle East, particularly in the Syrian Arab Republic, and is now growing in importance for Russia's Africa policy, with COIN-CT cooperation becoming an integral part of Russian military-technical collaboration with most of the countries of the continent. Speaking at the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi, President Putin emphasized the importance of developing contacts between Russian and African law enforcement agencies and special services in the context of countering terrorists groups on the African continent, and especially in the Sahara-Sahel zone, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Horn of Africa; he also singled out terrorism and extremism, along with transnational crime and sea piracy, as the most serious impediments to the development of Africa (Russia-Africa Summit, 2019*). In February 2021, Foreign Minister Lavrov placed CT high on the agenda of the next Russia-Africa Summit, which is scheduled for 2022.

Russia's 2015 National Security Concept emphasizes 'the commonality of interests between Russia and other states ... with regard to many international security problems, particularly ... fighting international terrorism' (National Security Concept, 2016); Russia's 2021 National Security Strategy lists international cooperation in countering terrorism as one of the tasks of Russian foreign policy (National Security Strategy, 2021). According to the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept, Russia 'views combating international terrorism as an essential government task and a key priority for international security' and 'prioritizes international cooperation in countering terrorist organizations and groups, including through the use of military force' (Foreign Policy Concept, 2016). These and other official statements and documents demonstrate that Moscow, on the one hand, acknowledges terrorism as a critical national security threat and, on the other, perceives CT as a natural field of cooperation with foreign partners, in particular in the Middle East, but also with African countries, many of which have already been attacked by Islamist insurgents or face the real risk of such attacks in the future, and which often possess very limited resources or expertise to counter this threat effectively on their own.

Apparently, COIN-CT, but especially CT, has increasingly turned into the legitimator of the collaboration between Russia and Africa. Since 2015, Moscow has signed over twenty military cooperation agreements with African states, bringing the total of such agreements to over thirty, most of which also provide for CT cooperation and which may involve training, intelligence sharing, conflict mediation, and even boots on the ground, the latter frequently provided by private military contractors.

In Russian discourse for Africa, CT cooperation is also accompanied with agreements to combat cross-border crime, cybercrime and maritime piracy, not to speak of countering extremism, which Moscow very much equates with terrorism. Economic agreements are also often part of the deal, with Russia's state-owned corporations being the usual beneficiaries. Yet despite Russia's overall inclination to offer multidimensional, comprehensive security deals, COIN-CT stands out as an instrument of modern Russian security policy for Africa, also due to its relative novelty and exposure, which calls for a separate and thorough assessment.

Key parameters of Russia's COIN-CT cooperation with Africa

The keystone of Moscow's COIN-CT engagement with Africa has been the increasingly close military cooperation with Cairo. The bombing of a Russian passenger plane over Egypt's Sinai in October 2015 led the two countries to significantly expand their cooperation in the field of security. This has been reflected in joint tactical exercises of Russian airborne forces and Egyptian

armed forces paratroopers, and political and possibly military coordination with regard to Libya. In 2016, the first joint Russian-Egyptian CT exercise *Defenders of Friendship* was held in Egypt. In 2019, the fourth and, as of mid-2021, most recent *Defenders of Friendship* exercise took place in the Russian territory, with more than 150 Egyptian servicemen, mostly paratroopers, participating in the training (The Defenders of Friendship, 2019). In addition, in 2017 Russian Special Forces carried out training for Egyptian and Libyan militaries at Egypt's Sidi Barrani airbase 100 km from the Egypt-Libya border, which according to multiple reports involved practicing the use of drones to monitor Islamists' activities in the Libyan territory.

At the end of 2017, Moscow and Cairo signed an agreement on the reciprocal use of airbases and airspace. In this connection, in 2017 Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said that Russia did not plan to deploy any troops to Egypt on a permanent basis, but the agreement reflected the close CT partnership between the two countries. In late 2019, Russia and Egypt inked a further agreement to reinforce military and security cooperation, especially with regard to combating terrorism and extremist ideologies. In addition to joint exercises, primary areas of CT cooperation include intelligence sharing and transfers of technologies, e.g. for detecting explosives. In 2019, there also took place the first meeting of the special Russia-Egypt working group for counterterrorism issues, headed by deputy ministries of foreign affairs of both sides, whose focus was on sharing best CT practices.

Russia's CT cooperation with North African countries, clearly, has not been limited to Egypt. Since 2005, the Algerian-Russian Group for Bilateral Co-operation in the Fight Against Terrorism and Security Issues has served as the platform for CT-focused discussions between the two countries. Within the framework of this cooperation, since 2016 Moscow has been sharing high-resolution satellite imagery of terrorist groups moving across the Maghreb with Algiers. In particular, Russia offered satellite photos of key border crossings in the region, which helped Algeria as well as Tunisia to thwart several attempts to infiltrate their borders and smuggle weapons.

In 2016, in the course of the visit of King Mohammed VI of Morocco to Russia, the parties agreed to deepen cooperation in the field of CT. The same year, in the wake of the King's trip to Moscow, a delegation of Morocco's internal intelligence service went to Russia to seal bilateral collaboration in the fight against terrorism. More recently, in 2019, Slimane El Omrani, First Deputy Chairman of Morocco's Parliament, suggested that Morocco could host a joint parliamentary committee on countering terrorism that would include Russia and African countries.

While Russia's CT footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa is less prominent than in North Africa, it has also been expanding: Moscow concluded agreements

on counterterrorism with Chad, Niger and Nigeria in 2017, with Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Guinea and Madagascar in 2018, and the Republic of Congo and Mali in 2019 (Bugayova & Clark, 2020). Russia has attracted particular interest from the G5 Sahel states – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – which stand at the forefront of the war on terror in the Sahara-Sahel. On the sidelines of the 2019 Russia-Africa summit, the Permanent Secretary of the G5 Sahel, Maman Sambo Sidikou, argued that the region cannot cope with terrorism threats 'without a country like Russia' (UNHCR Open, 2019); Chad's leader Idriss Deby named Russia a key partner in countering terrorism and maintaining stability in the region; Burkinabe President Roch Marc Christian Kabore called on Russia to join the international Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S); and Ivorian ambassador to Moscow expressed his country's desire to develop military cooperation with Russia amid instability in the Sahara-Sahel.

Russia has already stepped up its support of the Malian Armed Forces, which are facing an Islamist insurgency in the north of the country. In the framework of the 2019 agreement, the parties have established a working group on CT and combating organized crime to exchange information and experience. In 2019, street protesters in Mali's capital Bamako even demanded that Russian troops be invited to the country to defeat Islamists. Meanwhile, Moscow has started to train over 100 Malian officers free of charge and sold Mi-35 helicopters, which are optimal for COIN-CT operations.

Indeed, besides intelligence data, Russia has been providing military hardware critical to anti-terrorist operations, such as helicopters, to many African countries, as well as offering corresponding technical and CT training. Similarly to Mali, Nigeria, when faced with *Boko Haram* threat, in 2014 turned to Russia for weapons and dispatched security personnel to Moscow for training on counterterrorism. The four Mi-35 helicopters, which were acquired from Russia along with other military equipment, have been instrumental in dealing major blows to Islamists in north-eastern Nigeria (Omotuyi, 2019).

In addition, Russia has significantly expanded its dossier on jihadists in the course of the war in Syria, and, accordingly, since 2017 has been promoting an international databank of terrorist organizations and individual terrorists, which was set up by the Russian Federal Security Service. As of February 2019, six African states – Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Morocco, Rwanda and South Africa – had access to the database, which contains information on over 44 thousand individuals implicated in terrorism (Malek, 2019).

Another avenue of Russia-Africa COIN-CT cooperation has been linked to the use of Russian private military companies (PMCs). It should be borne

in mind that PMCs reportedly paved the way for the Russian intervention in Syria. Russian PMCs have allegedly been active in Sudan, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mozambique (Sukhankin, 2019). Typically, PMCs deployed to Africa after high-level negotiations, often amid signing intergovernmental agreements on military and CT cooperation and arms contracts, which highlights their foremost role as promoters of Russian foreign policy and arms exports rather than commercial enterprises. PMCs are flexible, mobile, and usually work under the radar, drawing much less media attention than Russian regular forces, and the government formally does not hold responsibility for their actions or losses (see Kostelyanets & Okeke, 2018).

Russia's motives for pursuing COIN-CT agenda in Africa

The role of COIN-CT in Russia's Africa foreign policy has been buttressed by a number of motivating factors. Firstly, combating terrorism is a highly sensitive issue domestically, especially since the apartment bombings in the Russian cities of Buynaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk in September 1999, which killed more than 300 and injured more than 1,000. Moscow's recognition of international terrorism as a genuine national security threat has been reflected in the shift of CT focus from combating regional terrorism in North Caucasus to fighting 'glocalized' terrorism – that is, formed at the nexus of the global and the local (Adeyemi, 2013) – all over Russia, represented by home-grown cells affiliated with transnational networks of the Islamic State or *Al Qaeda*.

Indeed, the key message of the Russian government to the local and international audiences with regard to its 2015 intervention in Syria was that the main goal of the campaign was fighting terrorist organizations, such as IS or *Al Qaeda*, which had allegiant groups and cells in Russia's own North Caucasus region and elsewhere in the country, and which apparently aimed at destabilizing Russia proper. Furthermore, Russian officials have repeatedly reinforced the idea that the effort to eradicate terrorism at home could only succeed if coupled with fighting it abroad, mirroring America's War on Terror to an extent. In fact, the message that Russia should kill terrorists further from its borders has already become one of the main slogans of the Syrian campaign. With particular regard to Africa, it was the 2015 bombing of a Russian passenger plane over Egypt's Sinai by the Egyptian branch of IS, previously known as *Ansar Bait al-Maqdis*, that provided a major impetus for Moscow's COIN-CT engagement with African countries. Importantly, in terms of domestic public relations, combating terrorism has become a relatively robust justification for overseas military involvement and ensuing spending.

Secondly, in recent years, one of the key factors of Russia's foreign policy, including in the field of international COIN-CT cooperation, has been the continuing intensification of geopolitical competition on the global and regional levels, coupled with the inevitable increase in the importance of resource, human and economic potential of developing countries within the emerging model of global development. For various reasons, which are not within the scope of the present study, Russia has not been accepted as part of the West and NATO, despite its campaigning to become part of them in the 1990s. In addition, since the early 1990s, Russia's interests in the post-Soviet space and in other countries of the former Soviet bloc – in the so-called Near Abroad – have repeatedly been undermined by the West, which has been actively challenging Moscow's influence in the region. More recently, America's 2018 Africa policy openly prioritized counteracting Moscow, along with Beijing, leaving Russia with little choice but to adjust its own policy choices accordingly.

Under the circumstances, within the paradigm of the gradual revival of Cold War thinking and strategic reciprocity in world politics, Russia, willingly or unwillingly, has already entered into direct competition with the West in Africa. Consequently, Moscow explores the avenues for developing sustainable yet affordable (ideally – self-financing) mechanisms for protecting and advancing its interests, narratives and agendas on the continent, one of them being the promotion of models of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, occasionally even positioned as alternatives to the ones proposed by Western countries. In fact, in geopolitical terms, this strategy offers an opportunity to put into question one of the most important legitimators of Western military presence in Africa and elsewhere in the world – that is, the seemingly unique and irreplaceable role of the West in the global war on terror.

The third motive, which largely stems from the second one, is Moscow's determination to avoid isolation – political and diplomatic – that has been attempted by Western countries through the curbing of political interaction, imposition of various sanctions, reduction in diplomatic presence and visits, etc. (Besenyő, 2019), which has also adversely affected security dialogue between Moscow and the West. The key element of this strategy is making Russia an indispensable partner on the world stage, particularly in counterterrorism, which opens up channels of communication to discuss this and other issues with global and regional actors and helps bolster its global profile, or generally demonstrating that Moscow has shared concerns with Western capitals (Stepanova, 2019, p. 45). Closer security cooperation with African countries also brings dividends at the UN General Assembly, where Moscow's position on Crimea, Ukraine, Syria, etc., has been gaining

increasingly more diplomatic support and more favorable votes from developing countries, which has served the purpose of improving Russia's international standing.

An accompanying motive is advancing Russia's own CT narrative at the global and regional levels. In recent years, Russia has demonstrated a high profile in international CT efforts, for instance, by actively facilitating the development of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and related documents of other international organizations; besides, V. Voronkov, a Russian diplomat, has become Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism. In June 2019, Dan Coats, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, even publicly expressed his concern about Russia's attempts to assume the mantle of leadership in the CT sphere through efforts that include placing Russian nationals in senior counterterrorism positions in international organizations. Russia has also been said to be one of the few UN member states to exert control over the structure and activities of the UN counter-terrorism architecture (Hedenskog, 2020).

The establishment of the international databank of terrorist organizations and individual terrorists has helped raise Moscow's status as one of global CT leaders and simultaneously encouraged participating countries to accept Russia's definitions of terrorism and extremism, which regularly draw criticism in the West. Russia is also interested in transforming its databank into a global UN-approved database of terrorists with support of African countries, as well as gain new data on terrorists and extremists from partner states.

Last but not least, COIN-CT cooperation is an important driver of sales of arms and military services and a facilitator of greater economic collaboration in other spheres. Russia, which managed to become the biggest arms supplier to Africa in 2016-2020 and which aims at doubling its trade turnover with the continent to $40 billion over the next several years, faces stiff competition for the lucrative African markets (Korendyasov, 2020) and thus strives to strengthen its position as a key partner of African governments by becoming a provider of comprehensive security rather than just a seller of weapons. Russia is also interested in improving security of its tourists, who have frequently been targeted by terrorists in Africa (Grishina & Kostelyanets, 2020). These and other motives form a strong rationale for Russia to advance COIN-CT cooperation with Africa.

Guiding principles of Russia's COIN-CT approach in Africa

Russia's COIN-CT cooperation with African countries has been framed by a set of principles that simultaneously form the basis of Moscow's overall foreign policy and international security policy; it is also a matter of

geopolitical competition, where diverging national interests and ideological narratives collide. The war on terrorism has always been a battle of ideas, and Russia and the West, which, arguably, are currently the key players in the global COIN-CT arena, offer different counter narratives in this regard. There is a fundamental contradiction between the Russian emphasis on stability at the cost of democracy and the Western emphasis on democracy at the cost of stability; between the Russian emphasis on interethnic and interfaith dialogue between population groups and the Western emphasis on the development of civil society and individual freedoms.

Historically, Russia has viewed terrorism primarily as a threat to the state, its stability and sovereignty (Romaniuk et al., 2017, pp. 522-525); correspondingly, Moscow's focus has been on prioritizing national sovereignty and observance of international and domestic law. A result of this has been the tendency to employ similar military approaches to COIN and CT and to support counterterrorism collaboration first and foremost through military-technical assistance. Indeed, Russia has often been involved in those CT operations where the line between terrorists and insurgents was rather blurred (Boyle, 2010), which also provided for the use of 'divide and rule' tactics.

The terminological gap between terrorism and insurgency has largely been closed by the broad definition of extremism adopted in Russia: Russian laws interpret extremism as any activity aimed at violating the unity and territorial integrity or destabilizing political and social situation in a country. This definition may serve as a justification for labeling a very wide range of local actors as extremists and accordingly targeting them in COIN-CT operations. While the definitions of terrorism in Russia and the West are practically the same, extremism in Western countries is defined much more narrowly as the propaganda, use or support of any ideologically motivated violence. Undoubtedly, Russia's broad definition of extremism may seem quite attractive to many African governments, which face political dissent and armed insurgency.

Furthermore, despite the competition and ideological differences with the West, Moscow has regularly declared that it is open to unconditional and inclusive CT cooperation with any country. The message has been that terrorism can only be eliminated through coordinated efforts, while the division of terrorists into 'moderate' and 'radical' terrorists is counterproductive, just as the labeling of countries as pariah 'terrorist' states, which also constitutes double standards and is unacceptable. At the same time, Moscow has little trust in Western sincerity with regards to fighting jihadists, understandably at least due to the experience of the Soviet-Afghan War, but also due to a general perception that the War on Terror and other

western foreign interventions have not just failed to reduce or contain terrorism in Africa or in the world at large but actually generated additional terrorism and instability. This mistrust is also regularly transmitted to African partners and mass media. Along this line of thinking, Russia maintains that in COIN-CT it is more effective and trustworthy than Africa's traditional Western partners; the ambiguous rhetoric in Washington and other Western capitals about shifting priorities away from fighting terrorism in Africa toward countering Chinese and Russian influences has in fact served to support Moscow's argument.

Finally, in terms of prevention of terrorism and violent extremism, Moscow stresses the need to strengthen interethnic and inter-confessional dialogue and traditional spiritual and moral values and favors the focus on state-regulated education and the empowerment of ethno-religious groups through cooptation or consociation. The Russian approach accentuates the importance of countering foreign radical influences and the corresponding transnational currents and the risks of radicalization associated with mass uncontrolled and illegal migration, as well as the problems in the integration and social adaptation of former terrorists (Romaniuk et al., 2017, p. 98). This approach also stands in stark contrast with that of Western countries, particularly the US, which place an emphasis on facilitating a democratic response from the civil society, promoting decentralization and raising the profile of local authorities, police, and public organizations. Formally, Russia's policy on countering extremism also entails such grassroot level measures, but in practice Moscow predominantly operates through vertical hierarchical structures.

Weaknesses of Russia's COIN-CT model for Africa

Fundamentally, Moscow has become a prospective partner for African countries in the field of COIN-CT, owing to its counterterrorism successes in North Caucasus and Syria, the readiness and willingness to use military force (even if PMCs) to fight terrorism abroad, rising geostrategic profile and the ability to counterbalance the West and China, military-technical expertise, and respect for African states' sovereignty. There exist, however, significant gaps in Russia's policy that impede the practical implementation of COIN-CT cooperation activities in Africa.

First, it should be noted that Russia has failed to create a broad international CT coalition or join an existing one, and in Africa it continues to rely on bilateral defense and military-technical agreements, while a number of key international powers have developed multilateral – but typically exclusive – security mechanisms, even if only consultative. This goes hand in hand with Moscow's exceeding focus on personalized relations

with African leaders in place of the institutionalization of CT cooperation. The ad hoc arrangements may be effective in the short term, but do not create a basis for the long-term CT cooperation. Conversely, they make Russia's relations with African countries vulnerable to regime change and accusations of support of authoritarianism or even neo-colonialism. There is also very little CT cooperation between Russia and the African Union or Africa's Regional Economic Communities. However, the trans-border nature of both terrorism and insurgency in Africa makes bilateral agreements inherently inferior to regional or continental frameworks. These deficiencies in principle reflect the continuing absence of a comprehensive Russian strategy for Africa, which leads, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, to selective opportunism on part of Moscow.

At the same time, Russia's inclination to practically equate its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies, which works relatively well during high intensity stages of conflicts, in the long run, when non-military aspects of antiterrorism come to dominate the agenda, may hamper reconciliation and facilitate greater radicalization. The undervaluation of soft CT instruments and the over-securitization of anti-terrorism in the framework of Russia's COIN-CT approach limits the prospects for winning hearts and minds in Africa. Countering violent extremism (CVE) in Moscow's interpretation – with focus on education and the empowerment of traditionalist ethno-religious forces – mitigates some of such risks, but could only be efficient in African nations with closed or repressed civic space. Russia's capacity to offer developmental projects to weaken the socioeconomic causes of terrorism is also rather limited, so the scope of CT cooperation with Africa has remained narrow.

Third, the limited successes of Russia-supported operations, such as those in Libya, the Central African Republic (Denisova & Kostelyanets, 2019) and Mozambique, demonstrate the limits of ad hoc COIN-CT engagement. Russian successes in Chechnya and Syria first and foremost have been the product of firepower superiority and the involvement of special forces, while hybrid operations in Africa provide for more symmetric and thus less predictable warfare and do not necessarily bring a political solution closer. Russia, however, has long been critical of the deployment of foreign combat troops in Africa outside the framework of the UN operations, citing this as an example of neo-colonialism that undermines Africa's own agency, so it has effectively limited its own options on the continent.

Finally, the lack of transparency, publicity and non-state (Track 2) diplomacy when providing CT assistance to Africa, while justifiable under certain circumstances, delegitimizes Russia's involvement and in the longer run undermines collaboration. For instance, the success of the narratives

about Russian private military contractors who engage in CT operations in Africa and fail may be attributed not only to the dominance of Western mass media, but also to the underperforming public relations dimension of Russia's policy for Africa.

Concluding remarks

COIN-CT cooperation has already become an integral component of Russia's Africa policy and is likely to expand over the coming years, reflecting both the growing political and economic importance of Russia-Africa ties and Moscow's evident commitment to full participation in the new global geopolitical competition. In recent years, Russia has become a major power broker in the Middle East, and is now aspiring to repeat the feat in Africa. It is increasingly visible that COIN-CT as a tool to expand strategic influence in Africa and, simultaneously, to enhance own national security has gained traction in Moscow. In addition, the fact that Russia occupies a permanent seat at the UN Security Council makes it an important partner for all African countries, but especially those engaged in COIN-CT operations. Despite the aforementioned inherent weaknesses in Russia's COIN-CT approach, these and other factors may seem to present Moscow with opportunities to expand its foothold on the continent as a major provider of security. Intelligence sharing, including that of satellite imagery, joint COIN-CT exercises, military and technical education are the fields of cooperation in which Russia is particularly competent and for which there is a high demand in Africa. Besides, the involvement of extremists who fought in Syria in African conflicts makes cooperation with Russia, which has collected extensive dossiers on Syrian jihadists, an even greater priority for African governments.

A qualitative leap in Russia's COIN-CT cooperation with Africa would, however, require the development of a long-term comprehensive strategy for Africa, which would declare the establishment of security and peace on the continent as one of Moscow's global priorities and which would necessitate the establishment of corresponding international mechanisms and frameworks. For instance, the development of institutionalized multilateral CT and, ideally, CVE frameworks, which should involve not only a considerable number of African nations, but also other non-Western powers, in particular Asian ones, possibly even mirroring some of the mechanisms of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, could become an appropriate alternative to the current security bilateralism. The development of such a multilateral CT platform, preferably under the aegis of the AU, would be beneficial both for Russia and Africa as it would facilitate consultations, training, intelligence sharing, etc., as well as serve as an instrument to build trust among involved nations and to strengthen the global multi-polar order.

Despite the significant public demand in Africa for stability, Russia must take into account the general vector of modernizing African societies towards democratization, as well as the gradual shift of the emphasis of international security cooperation toward the area of extremism prevention. In general, Moscow should start paying more attention to non-military instruments of CT assistance to the continent and to public diplomacy. In terms of the latter, Russia should strive to improve its image in the eyes of Africa's Muslims, which constitute an increasingly large part of the continent's population. Russia has already been promoting the image of itself as a Christian-Muslim nation. The Group of Strategic Vision 'Russia – Islamic World', which was inaugurated in 2006 among other things to develop solutions to counter security threats based on traditional spiritual values of Islam and other religions, can serve as an example of a public diplomacy and CVE instrument, which, however, at the moment is underutilized, lacks visibility in Africa or a developmental angle.

All in all, modern terrorism in Africa should be confronted and countered as a 'glocal' phenomenon, the eradication of which requires addressing inequalities and injustices just as much as strengthening CT capacity, and the responsibility for which lies both with the host nation and major world powers. Security cooperation between Russia as one of such powers and Africa shall reinforce the agency of the African Union and its member-states at the time when they still lack own capacity to tackle the threats of terrorism and insurgency on the continent. Africa demonstrates many encouraging trends, such as deepening continent-wide integration, steady economic growth, and recurrent waves of democratization, which will eventually erode the support base of jihadism, and for Russia it would be a privilege to help bring this moment nearer.

References

Adeyemi, O. B. (2015). Glocalization of terrorism in West Africa. *RIMA Occasional Papers*, *1*(4), 1-7.

Besenyő, J. (2019). The Africa Policy of Russia. *Terrorism and political violence*, *31*(1), 132-153.

Boyle, M. J. (2010). Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together? *International Affairs*, *86*(2), 333-353.

Bugayova, N., & Clark, M. (2020). *Russian Security Cooperation Agreements Post-2014*. Institute for the Study of War.

Denisova, T. S., & Kostelyanets, S. V. (2019). The Central African Republic: Conflict Dynamics. *Asia and Africa Today*, (6), 24-31.

Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016). (2016). The Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248

Grishina, N. V., & Kostelyanets, S. V. (Eds.). (2020). *Tourism in Africa. Problems And Prospects.* Moscow: Institute for African Studies.

Hedenskog, J. (2020). *Russia and International Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism: From the Chechen Wars to the Syria Campaign*. Stockholm: Defence Analysis, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4916--SE

Korendyasov, E. (2020). 'Sochi Consensus'. *Asia and Africa Today*, (2), 4-11.

Kostelyanets, S. V., & Okeke, O. A. A. (2018). Russia and the global competition for Africa: the military dimension. *Vostok. Afro-aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost*, (6), 184-198.

Malek, M. (2019). Algerian-Russian Cooperation: True Strategic Partnership? *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations*, *19*(2), 284-292.

National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. (2016). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768

National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation. (2021). President of the Russian Federation. http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/QZw6hSk5z9gWq0plD1ZzmR5cER0g5tZC.pdf

Omotuyi, S. (2019). Russo/Nigerian Relations in the Context of Counterinsurgency Operation in Nigeria. *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, *2*(1), 48-68.

Romaniuk, S. N., Grice, F., Irrera, D., & Webb, S. (Eds.). (2017). *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Russia-Africa Summit. (2019). President of Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61893

Stepanova, E. (2019). Russia's response to terrorism in the twenty-first century. In Boyle, M. J. (Ed.) *Non-Western responses to terrorism*. Manchester University Press.

Sukhankin, S. (2019). *Russian PMCs in the Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond*. The Jamestown Foundation, 18. https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-in-the-syrian-civil-war-from-slavonic-corps-to-wagner-group-and-beyond

The Defenders of Friendship 2019 Russian-Egyptian-Belorussian counter-terrorism exercise active phase kicks off near Ryazan. (2019). Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. https://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12249287@egNews

UNHCR Open to Russia Sharing Security Expertise with Struggling Sahel Countries. (2019, November 11). *UrduPoint*. https://www.urdupoint.com/en/world/unhcr-open-to-russia-sharing-security-experti-759057.html

Dr. Moshe Terdiman
University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

Chapter 12. THE ENVIRONMENT AS A TOOL FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA

Introduction

In recent years, terrorist groups throughout Africa have been deploying climate change, control over natural resources and its access, animal and wood trafficking, and attacks against foreign and local water and energy infrastructures, among other means, in order to achieve their goals. According to Remmits and Torrosian (2021), the terrorist groups' 'purpose of using the environment – and water resources and infrastructure specifically – as a tactic can be described along several motives:

1. Psychological motives – to generate public fear and anxiety, and to weaken public confidence in state authorities;

2. Organizational methods – to strengthen local legitimacy and authority in the face of opponent's position (often national governments or other non-state armed groups);

3. Operational and instrumental motives – to use increased livelihood insecurity and scarcity in resources as a means of recruitment and employing the destruction and control of scarce environmental resources as a weapon of war.'

Indeed, the deployment and use of environmental issues and climate change impacts have served the terrorist groups throughout Africa as a major source of income and recruitment. Additionally, in African countries where the terrorist organizations have grown strong enough to compete with the central government over the supply of resources and basic needs to the general population, such as in the case of *Al Shabab* (AS) in Somalia, the terrorist groups have also developed green agendas. Last but not least, terrorist groups have been launching attacks against energy and water infrastructures in various parts of Africa as part of their war against the local regimes and the West.

The aim of this chapter is to shed light on this recent phenomenon and its importance for the terrorist groups as well for the governments, international organizations, security bodies, research centers, think tanks and counter-terrorism experts.

Factors allowing terrorist groups to deploy natural resources to achieve their goals

The ability of terrorist groups to deploy these resources to achieve their goals is based on a few factors. Geographically, terrorist groups are

concentrated mainly in North Africa, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa – regions which are characterized by an arid and semi-arid climate, a shortage of arable land, and water resources and high temperatures. As a result, these regions face five main environmental challenges: water security, food security, energy security, land degradation and desertification.

In recent years, terrorist groups affiliated with IS have appeared in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and northern Mozambique, which are characterized by a tropical climate, which means that these regions face other kinds of environmental challenges, including: poaching, deforestation, flooding, water pollution, soil erosion, environmental damage caused by mining.

All these environmental security challenges are combined with huge population growth. According to the UN World Population Prospects (2019), the world population reached 7.7 billion in mid-2019 and is expected to reach 8.5 billion in 2030, 9.7 billion in 2050 and 10.9 billion in 2100. Sub-Saharan Africa will account for most of the growth of the world's population until 2050, so that 1.05 billion people (52 percent of the global population) could be added in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The population of Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to continue growing through the end of the century. According to the same report, 32 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa experience and will continue to experience high population growth. Between 2019 and 2050, the population of 18 Sub-Saharan countries has a high probability of at least doubling in size, while in Niger, the population is projected to nearly triple by 2050. These countries are designated by the UN as least developed and some of them comprise the world's poorest countries. Additionally, in most African countries, the population between the ages of 25 to 64 is growing faster than in other age groups.

Thus, the huge population growth puts a lot of pressure on ever-dwindling basic natural resources, such as arable land and water. In case terrorist groups have succeeded in seizing control of these natural resources, especially in the case of *Al Shabab*, they use it as a means of punishment towards those who don't obey them and as a means of recruitment of people who depends on either arable or pasture land as a source of livelihood. Terrorist groups also use these basic natural resources as a weapon against the governments and their adversaries in the countries they operate in. Moreover, the huge population growth, especially between the ages of 25 to 64, gives the terrorist groups an endless pool of people who can serve as their foot soldiers in return for supplying them and their families with salaries and their basic needs.

There are few more factors that make it easier for terrorist groups to be active in Africa. They include: weak institutions, instability, corruption, mismanagement of natural resources, inability to deliver basic services and

porous borders which characterize many countries in the region and which make it easier for members of terrorist groups to move from one country to another.

Climate change impacts and the inability of African countries to deal with them exacerbate the situation even further. It is the fact that the people living in the continent that has contributed the least to global warming are to be among the hardest hit by climate change. According to the State of the Climate in Africa 2019 report, a multi-agency publication coordinated by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), climate change impacts, such as increasing temperatures and sea levels, changing precipitation patterns and extreme weather threaten human health and safety, food and water security and socio-economic development in Africa. According to the report, 'the latest decadal predictions, covering the five-year period from 2020 to 2024, show continued warming and decreasing rainfall especially over North and Southern Africa, and increased rainfall over the Sahel.'

WMO secretary-general, Petteri Taalas, said at the launch of the report on October 26, 2020 that 'climate change is having a growing impact on the African continent, hitting the most vulnerable hardest, and contributing to food insecurity, population displacement and stress on water resources. In recent months we have seen devastating floods, an invasion of desert locusts and now face the looming specter of drought because of a La Niña event. The human and economic toll has been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic' (WMO, 2019).

All of these factors make Africa a fertile ground for terrorist groups to make use of the environment and natural resources as a tool to achieve their goals along with taking advantage of political, economic, social and ethnic woes. This chapter will deal with *Al Shabab* in Somalia as a case study of an African terrorist group that existed for more than a decade and developed into a quasi-government that rules the only fertile and agricultural area in Somalia.

Al Shabab in Somalia: a case study of the multiuse of environmental resources and climate change impacts by an African terrorist group

Background

Al Shabab was established in the mid-2000s as the youth militia of the Islamic Courts Union, a body uniting hard-liner Islamists and Sufis, and which took control of Mogadishu in June 2006 and ruled most of Somalia until December 2006, when Ethiopia invaded Somalia and ousted it from Mogadishu. *Al Shabab* retreated to southern Somalia, led an insurgency against Ethiopia and in its heyday it controlled most of southern and central

Somalia. In 2012, its leadership declared its allegiance to *Al Qaeda*. However, in late 2011, it retreated from Mogadishu and it suffered more setbacks during the last decade and lost control over the sea ports of Kismayo and Barawe to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Nowadays, *Al Shabab* maintains control over part of southern and central Somalia. It also has some presence in Puntland, in north-eastern Somalia. From time to time, it has also competed with the central government over administering the territory and providing basic services to the population under its control (Felter et al., 2021).

Somalia's terrain consists mainly of plateaus, plains and highlands. Rainfall is subjected to the northeast and southwest Monsoon winds and it falls twice a year – between March and June and between September and December. Yet, the rainfall is sparse, and most of Somalia has a semiarid-to-arid environment suitable only for nomadic pastoralism or semi-nomadic herders of camels, sheep and goats. Only in the southwest of the country, where its two perennial rivers – the Jubba and the Shabeelle – are located, agriculture is practiced. Favorable rainfall and soil conditions make the entire riverine region a fertile agricultural area and the centre of Somalia's largest sedentary population, which is mostly if not wholly under *Al Shabab* rule. Thus, climate is the primary factor in much of Somali life. For the large nomadic population, the timing and amount of rainfall are crucial determinants of the adequacy of grazing and the prospects of relative prosperity (Terdman, 2008; Lewis, 1980).

Thus, according to the CIA Factbook, as of June 2021, the main environmental issues that Somalia deals with are: 'water scarcity, contaminated water contributes to human health problems, improper waste disposal, deforestation, land degradation, overgrazing, soil erosion, desertification and exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies. Due to floods, civil insecurity, desert locusts – about 1.6 million people were estimated to be in need of emergency assistance in the January-March 2021 period. Since late 2019, the food security situation has been affected by several negative factors, including the desert locust outbreak, widespread floods, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The negative impact of these shocks has been amplified by reduced household resilience due to insecurity and the lingering impact of previous droughts and floods. In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting the food security situation mainly through: movement restrictions within the country resulting in reduced market availability, increasing prices of food and reduced labor opportunities, especially in urban areas, reduced economic activity and containment measures in countries with large Somali diaspora populations causing a sharp decline in remittances, and reduced exports of

livestock to Saudi Arabia caused by the suspension of the *Hajj* pilgrimage (2021)'.

All these environmental issues have an impact on *Al Shabab* and on the areas under its control, especially given the fact that it is one of the only terrorist groups in Africa that rules a fertile and agricultural area and as such, the environment has served as one of the main sources of income for the group.

Climate Change Impacts and Demographical Trends as a Source of Recruitment

The above mentioned environmental issues together with the fact that most of the population is below the age of 30 and many of them are jobless produce a ready pool of recruits for *Al Shabab*.

The National Adaptation program of Action on Climate Change that was issued in April 2013 by the Ministry of National Resources of the Federal Republic of Somalia stresses these points. It says that 'Somalia has 73 percent of its population below the age of 30, the highest in the country's history. Many young people are trapped in an environment of violence, fear, unemployment and poverty. This both erodes their hopes for human development and makes them more likely to become part of conflict. Experiences from Somalia and elsewhere show that when large numbers of young people are jobless and have few opportunities for positive engagement, they become a ready pool of recruits for extremists. This is particularly concerning for Somalia where *Al Shabab* still poses a real threat to the stability of the country, particularly in the south. Climate change often leads to increased conflicts and would thus have a particularly severe impact on youth' (Ministry of National Resources of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013).

It also mentions some other impacts of climate change that may make the youth ripe for either recruitment for *Al Shabab* or be involved in conflicts. These include: 'children and youth suffer from malnutrition due to lack of calcium intake when livestock is lost to drought/flood and crops are destroyed due to drought/flood. Youth unemployment goes up due to the damage to the economy from droughts and floods; Unemployed youth are drawn into crime, drugs and other delinquent behavior… Marriages are often delayed during droughts and floods, affecting youth; During migration to urban areas, children often become beggars or street-children; Youth are often orphaned due to death of parents during drought/flood; Youth are forced to work in urban areas and drop-out of schools during droughts/floods' (Ministry of National Resources of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013).

Indeed, according to a report written in the framework of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in October 2019 titled 'Climate-related

Security Risks and Peacebuilding in Somalia' *Al Shabab* gains recruitment opportunities as a result of climate change and violence, and especially among the internally displaced people (IDPs). As of August 2019, there were approximately 2.6 million Somali IDPs, most of them migrated to urban centers where they live in improvised camps. *Al Shabab* recruits children as well as young and unemployed men in these IDP camps. It does that while taking advantage of the fact that these camps lack social cohesion and security since they are inhabited by thousands of strangers (Eklöw & Krampe, 2019).

Additionally, the same report stresses that scarcity of resources due to climate change impacts and natural disasters together with the loss of homes or family members due to conflict have been a source of constant grievances especially among marginalized groups and clans among the local population. *Al Shabab* takes advantage of these grievances in order to recruit the local population to its ranks and cause (Eklöw & Krampe, 2019).

The environment as a source of income

Al Shabab has various sources of funding, but the main one is the collection of taxes from the local population. *Al Shabab*, which is acting like a quasi-government, is the only entity in Somalia which collects taxes in rural areas. For that purpose, *Al Shabab* uses two departments: the Zakawaat Office is responsible for the collection of non-monetary taxes such as livestock and farm produce, while the Finance Office is responsible for the collection of all monetary taxes. Additionally, *Al Shabab* collects the arbitrary *Infaaq* tax that can amount from thousands to tens of thousands of dollars per clan when it feels that money is in short supply, including following natural disasters.

According to a report that Hiraal Institute issued in 2018 under the title 'The AS Finance System', the *Zakawaat* tax is collected by *Al Shabab* troops and clan elders during the month of Ramadan, which is traditionally the collection season. The report mentions that 'the starting rate is one camel out of every 25 camels owned and one goat out of every 40 goats. Collection is done uniformly across all the regions in south and central Somalia, including in the districts that AS does not control. Collectors issue receipts to pastoralists; those who lose their receipts are made to pay the taxes again in the next year. This ensures that pastoralists who were away from AS territory during the preceding year do not escape payment of *zakah*. Amounts collected vary by district… The livestock is auctioned to AS-linked businessmen that is generally just below the market rate, at $400-$600 per camel according to the animals' age and $30 per goat… This would translate, at a conservative estimate, to about $8mn annually from livestock *Zakawaat* throughout south and central Somalia' (Hiraal Institute, 2018).

Furthermore, according to another report titled 'A Losing Game: Countering *Al Shabab's* Financial System' which was issued by Hiraal Institute, '*Al Shabab* taxes everything in the territories it controls; it is so specialized that farmers are not allowed to use the river and its canals unless they pay special taxes for irrigation of farms'. In the course of the report's preparation, Hiraal Institute interviewed Somalis under *Al Shabab* rule and one of them 'complained that he was being forced to pay operations taxes for his tractor even when it is out of operation due to technical issues' (Hiraal Institute, 2020).

Another source of funding is extortion from humanitarian aid agencies and NGOs, who are forced to pay *Al Shabab* in order to pass in areas under its rule in which they work. *Al Shabab* employs a Humanitarian Coordination Officer, whose role is to vet and register agencies and assess how much they should pay, which is dependent on the type of work they conduct. The fees to operate and distribute aid in an area under *Al Shabab* control may amount to $10,000 (Action On Armed Violence, 2017).

Al Shabab also makes much profit from the charcoal trade, although the UN Security Council banned it in 2012 in an attempt to cut off funds for the terrorist group, and despite losing important trade centers, such as the control over the port city of Kismayo in the same year. The reason for it is a sort of business partnership existing between *Al Shabab* and the Kenya Defense Force and the Jubbaland administration which rules south-western Somalia. According to an unpublished annual report to the UN Security Council submitted by the UN sanctions monitors in October 2018, Somali charcoal export to the Gulf countries, and especially the UAE, where it is used for cooking and smoking *Shisha*, earn *Al Shabab* at least $7.5 million annually from checkpoint taxation (Nichols, 2018). Other estimates show that *Al Shabab* might earn as much as $15-$50 million annually (Action On Armed Violence, 2017).

In addition to serving as a means of funding terrorism and as a source of corruption and organized crime, the charcoal trade has also been the main cause for the deforestation of Somalia. The UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group estimated that between 2011 and 2017, a tree was cut down in Somalia on average every 30 seconds. Needless to say, this very rapid deforestation is exacerbating the severity of both drought and flooding. In this way, *Al Shabab* is responsible for environmental degradation and destruction in the areas under its control and, thus, for the plight of millions of Somalis.

Two other sources of funding that are marginal in the earning power of *Al Shabab*, but still worth mentioning, are mining and ivory poaching. A research conducted by the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa

found that *Al Shabab* joined mineral extraction and smuggling networks in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Gatimu, n.d.). Moreover, *Al Shabab* functioned as middlemen in the illicit ivory trade. Its monthly revenue from the ivory trade between the years 2010-2012 was estimated at $200,000 (Crosta & Sutherland, 2016).

Environmental policies

In order to keep its main sources of income, *Al Shabab* has had from time to time to form environmental policies in reaction to a real loss of its sources of income, whether it is livestock or agricultural yields and trees.

Such an example is *Al Shabab* banning single-use plastic bags. In a broadcast on the group's Radio Andalus, Jubaland regional leader, Mohammad Abu Abdullah, said at the end of June 2018 that *Al Shabab* bans single-used plastic bags since plastic bags present a serious threat to both humans and livestock and the waste they cause is bad for the environment. He also said that the group bans the logging of rare trees (McKernan, 2018).

The ban of plastic bags was necessary since it critically harmed one of the main sources of *Al Shabab*, which is the collection of taxes from businessmen and herders. Therefore, this move cannot be interpreted as being done out of a real concern to the environment but out of pure self-interest. A researcher at the Somali Institute for Peace and Human Rights said that 'the majority of the Somali people are livestock herders… Right behind droughts, plastic bags kill the second-greatest number of livestock in the country. By losing animals to plastic bags, *Al Shabab* felt that its only source of income was being threatened and decided to ban them. The ban was also meant to portray the group as one that cared for the economic and social well-being of the Somali people' (Bodetti, 2019).

Dealing with natural disasters

As part of administering the country, *Al Shabab* has also had to deal with a few natural disasters and environmental challenges while fighting against the Somali Transitional and later Federal Government.

Droughts

Between July 2011 and mid-2012, a severe drought affected East Africa and the Horn of Africa and caused a severe food crisis in the region that claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people in Somalia. The crisis hit Somalia the hardest, particularly the farmers in its southern part who have been under *Al Shabab* control. It developed after three successive years of failed rains which resulted in the soaring of food prices and the death of livestock (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2011). On July 20, 2011, the UN

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs officially declared that a famine exists in two regions in southern Somalia for the first time since the famine in Ethiopia in 1983-1985. It warned that the famine could spread to the rest of southern Somalia (UN News, 2011).

The famine and food crisis in southern Somalia were not caused only by failed rains but also by the lack of an effective aid operation resulting from four main factors. First, the inability of the UN to raise the funding it needed for the humanitarian assistance due to debt crises in Europe and the US at the time. Second, Western aid agencies did not reach many of the affected people because of security concerns. Third, US aid officials and other international aid organizations suspended most aid to southern Somalia by the end of 2009 since the US listed *Al Shabab* as a terrorist group in 2008 and the aid organization needed to make sure that none of the food benefited *Al Shabab*. Fourth, the Somali Transitional Federal Government, which then controlled Mogadishu, planned to first defeat *Al Shabab* and only then allow aid to flow into Southern Somalia, believing that the famine significantly weakened *Al Shabab*. Moreover, *Al Shabab* banned the World Food program from its territory in January 2010 after accusing it of being a US puppet (Perry, 2011).

Given the situation, *Al Shabab* announced on July 6, 2011, that it withdraws its restrictions on international humanitarian workers and that all aid organizations would be allowed in (UN News, 2011). However, on November 28, 2011, it banned 16 Western aid organizations, including several UN bodies, from operating in areas under its control, accusing them of 'financing, aiding and abetting subversive groups seeking to destroy the basic tenets of Islamic penal system'. It added that the agencies were 'persistently galvanizing the local population against the full establishment of Islamic *Sharia* system'. It further accused them of lacking 'political detachment and neutrality with regard to the conflicting parties in Somalia, thereby intensifying the instability and insecurity gripping the nation as a whole'. Additionally, *Al Shabab* accused these organizations of misappropriating funds and using corruption and bribery in their operations (The New Humanitarian, 2011). Nevertheless, *Al Shabab* allowed NGOs such as *Médecins San Frontières*, Somalia Red Crescent Society, Islamic charities and the International Committee of the Red Cross access to the areas under its control with certain restrictions (Seal & Bailey, 2013).

Preventing the famine was not a priority for *Al Shabab*, which was busier with its military campaign against the Somali Transitional Federal Government and its regional and Western allies. Thus, in addition to its decision to limit humanitarian access as part of its fight against the West, reports indicate that it placed restrictions on the movement of people

attempting to flee affected areas and that it extracted agricultural taxes which likely exacerbated food insecurity (Seal & Bailey, 2013).

As the conditions deteriorated, *Al Shabab* made demands on the local population. In Bu'aale district in Middle Shabelle, *Al Shabab* demanded a payment of $30 for every hectare of arable land along the Jubba River. In Afmadow in the Lower Jubba, some residents were required to feed *Al Shabab* members and were threatened with punishment if they refused to do so. In Afgoi, near Mogadishu, *Al Shabab* executed local herders who refused to turn animals to slaughter. Additionally, it diverted river water to commercial farmers who provide it with financial support (Zimmerman, 2011).

Indeed, the drought and famine that hit the areas under the control of *Al Shabab* the hardest and the consequent movement of people fleeing from these areas slowed its progress in Somalia and may have played an important role its withdrawal from Mogadishu on August 6, 2011. Hundreds of IDPs arrived daily in Mogadishu, more than 1,300 refugees arrived daily at the Dadaab camp in Kenya's Northeastern Province, and up to 2,000 refugees crossed the border into Ethiopia daily. These refugees were mostly farmers and herders, who were a major source of income for *Al Shabab* (Roble, 2011).

The local population in southern Somalia accused *Al Shabab* of catalyzing the crisis by locking out aid agencies. *Al Shabab* was under enormous pressure from clan leaders to act fast as the local population lost all of its livestock, crops and increasing number of lives while *Al Shabab* still used to take their income to pay for their arms, ammunition and salaries for their people. This situation brought about clashes between *Al Shabab* and locals who refused to pay taxes to it and threatened to divide the group into two sides: *Al Shabab*, on the one hand, and Shaykh Ahmed Abdi Godane, who forced his will against the opinion of his commanders from the most affected areas of southern Somalia, on the other. Also, *Al Shabab's* attempts to regain its popularity with the local population through meetings that its leaders conducted with clan elders mostly failed in this period (Roble, 2011).

On February 3, 2012, the UN declared an end to famine conditions in Somalia as a result of 'long-awaited rains, coupled with substantial agricultural inputs and the humanitarian response deployed in the last six months' (UN News, 2012). More than 260,000 people died in that famine.

Four years later, in 2016-2017, an even more severe drought affected Somalia to the effect that according to the UN, 6 million people in Somalia, which is half of the population, were in need of assistance due to consecutive poor rainy seasons, which brought about crop failure and high levels of livestock deaths and sickness (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2019). This time it seems that *Al Shabab* learned that it could use climate

change adverse impacts and position itself as service and relief providers during and following droughts, floods, locusts and COVID-19.

It launched a publicity campaign, which was shown and broadcasted in its media outlets in order to win hearts and minds among the local population. It established drought committees to coordinate relief operations in the areas under its control, constructed canals for farmers, and distributed food to the residents under its control. It also broadcast appeals to 'business communities and the wealthy to assist their brothers' by donating food (West, 2017). However, *Al Shabab* overshadowed its aid efforts by taxing the local population, seizing their food, animals and land and burning villages (Rono, 2017).

Locusts

In addition to the recurrent droughts, from January 2020 Somalia has experienced an outbreak of desert locusts which, according to On Dongyu, the director general of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 'presents an unprecedented threat to food security and livelihoods in the Horn of Africa' (Bariyo, 2020). This outbreak is the worst in 25 years and is mainly driven by climate change which has created ideal conditions for the locust numbers to surge (The World Bank, 2020).

Despite the dimensions of the disaster, *Al Shabab* has continued its non-collaboration policy either with the Somali Federal Government or with its allies. It has not let pest controllers into the areas under its control. When the locusts swarmed the land, *Al Shabab* fired anti-craft and machine guns at the swarms (Mohammed & Endeshaw, 2020).

COVID-19

As of the beginning of 2020, with the COVID-19 hitting Somalia and the rest of the world and its adverse effects on food security, *Al Shabab* has continued its policy of not allowing Western aid organizations and the Somali Federal Government into the areas under its rule; in March 2020, it issued a communiqué in which it blamed the spread of the disease on 'crusader forces who have invaded the country, and disbelieving countries that support AMISOM (the African Union Mission in Somalia)'. However, it has also continued to challenge the power of the Somali Federal Government and launched a campaign to win hearts and minds of the populace. In the same communiqué, AS urged Muslim society to 'take action against infectious diseases that are on increase such as Coronavirus and HIV'. It also promised to empower its sympathizers across the country to prosper economically and to 'safeguard the economy of Muslims and their resources, to inspire and encourage domestic produce such as farming, livestock rearing, and investment' (Garowe Online, 2020).

Al Shabab has also acted to prevent the spread of the pandemic. On May 13, 2020, Sheikh Ali Dheere, *Al Shabab's* spokesman, issued a communiqué in which he said that the group nominated a seven-member committee which would work efficiently to combat the pandemic. The committee members are doctors, religious scholars and intellectuals. The communiqué said that 'the committee comprises experts who we believe will help us tackle this monster which puts the population at big risk. They shall review immediate steps that should be undertaken to curb the spread of COVID-19'. It added that the coronavirus 'is a western weapon to punish homeless people around the world whose only crime is poverty. All residents must adhere to regulations that will be put by the experts'. It further said that *Al Shabab* 'is committed to keeping its members and population safe' (Garowe Online, 2020). In June 2020, *Al Shabab* said that its COVID-19 prevention and treatment committee opened a COVID-19 treatment centre in its capital, Jilib, which is located about 380 km south of Mogadishu. It asked all those who have symptoms to report to this centre, which is ready with vehicles to transport in suspected coronavirus patients (Al-Jazeera, 2020).

Moreover, in March 2021, it issued a communiqué in which it rejected the AstraZeneca vaccine because of its 'ineffective and adverse' side effects and said that it is 'deadly and unsafe'. Curiously enough, despite its rejection of the West, *Al Shabab* referred to some European countries, such as Germany, France and Italy, that rejected the vaccine because of its side effects in order to show the mismanagement of the Somali Federal Government. It said that 'these are countries with far better medical resources than the apostate Somali regime, which doesn't even have qualified medical personnel or laboratories to assess the efficiency, safety or performance of the vaccine'. It called on the Somalis to not 'allow your children and family members to be guinea pigs in the race to develop a potent vaccine for the coronavirus pandemic. Do not allow your family to be used as subjects in the experimentation of the safety of the AstraZeneca vaccine at a time when a countless number of people have died, and hundreds of others have developed severe adverse reactions, including the formation of blood clots, as a result of administering the vaccine' (Odour, 2021).

This was the first time in which *Al Shabab* talked on coronavirus vaccines. The timing of that statement was exactly when Somalia's Ministry of Health began the first phase of COVID-19 vaccinations.

The environment as a weapon

Al Shabab has also used its control over natural resources and the access to them as a weapon against the Somali Federal Government and the disloyal residents who support it. As a matter of fact, using water as a weapon has

become a central component of *Al Shabab* strategy against the Somali Federal Government after it captured most major cities and ports. In reaction, *Al Shabab* started to cut off cities retaken by the Somali Government from their water sources. It has used different methods. Firstly, it destroyed the cities' sources of water supply, such as in Garbaharey, a strategically crucial city in southern Somalia, where *Al Shabab* succeeded to bury the main borehole that supplied the city with water. Secondly, *Al Shabab* did not allow people from areas that were controlled by the Somali Federal Government to access the Juba River and fetch water from it (The World, 2014). Thirdly, *Al Shabab* used to poison wells in the areas from which it retreated in order to punish the local population for collaborating with AMISOM and Somali Federal Government forces (AMISOM, 2018; Jubbaland24, 2014). The success of this tactic was dependent on the extent that the inability of the Somali Federal Government and the AMISOM forces to provide water services eroded its authority and legitimacy.

Moreover, the Action On Armed Violence's report mentions that from time to time, *Al Shabab* imposes an economic blockade on certain areas, during which it continues to collect taxes from businesses. These blockades may last from several months to more than a year and result in economic and humanitarian effects. The report gives the example of the more than one year blockade of Hudur between 2014 and 2015 that resulted in malnutrition rates of 32% (Action On Armed Violence, 2017).

Summary

Al Shabab is a good example of an African terrorist group that operates like a quasi-government and, in the case of Somalia, has succeeded to create a very effective administration that equals if not surpasses that of the Somali Federal Government. In this framework, the environment and climate change impacts have a key role both as a main source of income and recruitment but also as a weapon against the Somali Federal Government, disloyal residents and sometimes even AMISOM. It has also been using the environment and climate change impacts as a tool of competition with the Somali Federal Government, which has been unable to address the impacts of climate, and turning the local population against the government and, in many cases, lured them to their cause.

Other terrorist groups throughout Africa have been using environmental issues, climate change effects, control of natural resources and the access to them similarly in order to achieve the same goals as those of *Al Shabab* in Somalia.

Climate change will continue to play a major role throughout Africa and increase instability among the agricultural and pastoralist societies, especially

in the Sahel and in Somalia. As a result, in the long run, military intervention and the address of core political, ethnic, religious, economic and social issues will not be enough in order to restore stability and curb terrorist groups in some African countries. What is really needed is an additional focus on the environmental security and the natural resource dimension.

References

A Drought So Severe It Has a Name. (2019, September 26). *International Committee of the Red Cross*. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/somalia-conflict-drought-so-severe-it-has-names

Action On Armed Violence. (2017, May 25). *Sources of Funding (Including Self-funding) for the Major Groupings that Perpetrate IED Incidents – Al Shabab*. https://aoav.org.uk/2017/sources-funding-including-self-funding-major-groupings-perpetrate-ied-incidents-al-Shabab/#_edn4

Aid Effort for Drought-hit Horn of Africa Must Include Long-term Measures – UN. (2011, July 13). *United Nations News*. https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/07/381492

Al-Shabab Fails to Stop Attacks in Somalia, Blames AU Forces for Coronavirus Pandemic. (2020, March 28). *Garowe Online*. https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-Shabab-fails-to-stop-attacks-in-somalia-blames-au-forces-for-coronavirus-pandemic

Al-Shabab Ban on Agencies Threatens Aid. (2011, November 28). *The New Humanitarian*. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/94321/somalia-al-Shabab-ban-agencies-threatens-aid

Al Shabab Blamed for Poisoning Wells in Jubbaland. (2014, November 24). *Jubbaland24*. http://www.jubbaland24.com/article/al-Shabab-blamed-for-poisoning-wells-in-jubbaland.aspx

Al-Shabab Sets Up Coronavirus Treatment Centre in Somalia. (2020, June 14). *Al-Jazeera*. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/14/al-Shabab-sets-up-coronavirus-treatment-centre-in-somalia

Al-Shabab's 'Water Terrorism' Is Yielding Results and Tragedy in Somalia's Civil War. (2014, August 12). *The World*. https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-08-08/how-al-Shabab-using-water-tool-terrorism

Bariyo, N. (2020, January 31). Africa's Worst Locust Plague in Decades Threatens Millions. *The Wall Street Journal*.

Bodetti, A. (2019, March 4). The Real Reason Al-Shabab Banned Plastic Bags. *LobeLog*.

Communities in Jowhar Benefit from Sixteen Shallow Wells with Hand-pumps, Implemented by AMISOM. (2018, October 16). *AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia*. https://amisom-au.org/2018/10/communities-in-jowhar-benefit-from-sixteen-shallow-wells-with-hand-pumps-implemented-by-amisom/

Crosta, A., & Sutherland, K. (2016, July). The White Gold of Jihad: Al-Shabab and the Illegal Ivory Trade. *Elephant Action League*. https://earthleagueinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Report-Ivory-al-Shabab-Oct2016.pdf

Eklöw, K., & Krampe, F. (2019, October). Climate-Related Security Risks and Peacebuilding in Somalia. *SIPRI Policy Paper 53*. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/sipripp53_2.pdf

Felter, C. et al. (2021). Al-Shabab. *Council on Foreign Relations*. https://cfr.org/backgrounder/al-Shabab

Famine Victims Soar. (2011, September 11). *The Sydney Morning Herald*. https://www.smh.com.au/world/famine-victims-soar-20110910-1k33e.html

Gatimu, S. (n.d.). Is the Illegal Trade in Congolese Minerals Financing Terror? *Institute for Security Studies*. https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/is-the-illegal-trade-in-congolese-minerals-financing-terror

Hiraal Institute. (2018, July). *The AS Finance System*. https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/AS-Finance-System.pdf

Hiraal Institute. (2020, October). *A Losing Game: Countering Al-Shabab's Financial System*. https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/A-Losing-Game.pdf

Lewis, I. M. (1980). *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. Longman Group Limited.

McKernan, B. (2018, July 3). *Al Shabab* Bans Single Use Plastic Bags Because of 'Threat to People and Livestock'. *Independent*.

Ministry of Natural Resources Federal Republic of Somalia. (2013, April). *National Adaptation program of Action on Climate Change (NAPA)*. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/som01.pdf

Mohammed, O., & Endeshaw, D. (2020, February 27). Running Out of Time: East Africa Faces New Locust Threat. *Reuters*.

Nichols, M. (2018, October 9). Iran is New Transit Point for Somali Charocal in Illicit Trade Taxed by Militants: U.N. Report. *Reuters*.

Odour, M. (2021, March 31). Al-Shabab Issues Warning against AstraZeneca Vaccine. *African News*

Perry, A. (2011, August 18). Somalia: A Very Man-Made Disaster. *Time*

Remmits, F., & Torossian B. (2021). The Widening Arsenal of Terrorist Organizations: Environmental Terrorism on the Rise in the Middle East and North Africa. *The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies*. https://hcss.nl/report/the-widening-arsenal-of-terrorist-organizations-environmental-terrorism-on-the-rise-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/

Roble, M. A. (2011, August 12). Somalia's Famine Contributes to Popular Revolt against al-Shabab Militants. *Terrorism Monitor 9 (32)*. https://jamestown.org/program/somalias-famine-contributes-to-popular-revolt-against-al-Shabab-militants/

Rono, M. (2017, March 22). Somalia Food Crisis: Has al-Shabab Adopted New Approach to Food Aid? *BBC News*.

Seal, A., & Bailey, R. (2013). The 2011 Famine: Lessons Learnt from a Failed Response? *Conflict and Health 7, 22*. https://doi.org/10.1186/1752-1505-7-22

Somalia: Al-Shabab Appoints COVID-19 Committee amid Calls for Ceasefire. (2020, May 14). *Garowe Online*. https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-al-Shabab-appoints-covid-19-committee-amid-calls-for-ceasefire

Terdman, M. (2008). *Somalia at War – Between Radical Islam and Tribal Politics*. The S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, Tel Aviv University.

The CIA World Factbook. (2021, June). *Somalia*. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/somalia/

The Locust Crisis: The World Bank's Response. (2020, July 1). *The World Bank*. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/04/27/the-locust-crisis-the-world-banks-response

UN Says Somali Famine Over, but Warns Action Needed to Forestall New Crisis. (2012, February 3). *United Nations News*. https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/02/402302-un-says-somali-famine-over-warns-action-needed-forestall-new-crisis

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2019). *World Population Prospects 2019: Highlights*. ST/ESA/SER.A/423. https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2019_Highlights.pdf

West, S. (2017, April 7). Al-Shabab Plays on Aid Distribution Role to Win Over Desperate Somalis. *Terrorism Monitor 15 (7)*. https://jamestown.org/program/al-Shabab-plays-aid-distribution-role-win-desperate-somalis/

When a Food Security Crisis Becomes a Famine. (2011, July 11). *United Nations News*. https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/07/382342-when-food-security-crisis-becomes-famine

World Meteorological Organization. (2020, October 26). *Multi-agency report highlights the current and future state of the climate in Africa*. https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/multi-agency-report-highlights-current-and-future-state-of-climate-africa

Zimmerman, K. (2011, September 8). *Al Shabab* and the Challenges of Providing Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia. *Critical Threats*.

CONCLUSION

Historical evidence is irrefutable that since the end of the Cold War in 1991, over the past thirty years, there has been a significant escalation of the terrorist threat and of actual acts of terror in Africa. While initial impetus could be attributed to the opening of state borders, reduction of proxy control by great foreign powers, and to a corresponding sense that Africa was not answerable to anyone but itself, more recently, especially after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001 (9/11), a trend has emerged that is not directly associated with the aftermath of the Cold War, but rather with the proliferation of Islamic fundamentalism. Its growing influence now includes even remote and inaccessible regions of the African continent, which have fallen under the influence of *Al Qaeda* and its metamorphism, the Islamic State. Yet in part, this is a franchise influence, with no external leadership pulling the strings from, for example, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan or Yemen. Overall, we have been witnessing a global geographic shift of epicenters of this specific brand of terrorist activity – the one connected to Islamic fundamentalism – towards the African continent, primarily but not exclusively to the regions of North Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and the Lake Chad Basin. Even Southern Africa, which had practically never experienced terrorism unrelated to decolonization struggle, is now affected by the Islamist scourge, as the case of Mozambique clearly demonstrates.

In examining this and other trends related to the terrorist threat in Africa, the present volume investigated some of the links between domestic and transnational terrorism, which are constantly evolving, just as are the relations between local extremist groups in different countries. There were chapters that explored how some African terrorist groups and networks integrate with international ones, how an 'economy of terrorism' may develop, and how states may respond with repression, sometimes labeling all insurgents as 'terrorists' and consequently forcing them to behave as terrorists even if their tactics were not originally so.

Other chapters of the volume examined how ideology also plays an important role in motivating individual terrorists and justifying violence, for different individuals join terrorist organizations for different reasons, and the spectrum is wider in Africa than in most other parts of the world. This is placed in context and also analyzed to substantiate or disprove the theory that the main motives for an individual participating in terrorist attacks are poverty and despair. Readers were requested to note that such a theory when applied to the Middle East, Europe, Latin America and some other regions of the world has

been refuted by facts. Indeed, a high standard of living does not necessarily prevent support for and participation in terrorist activities (Melo, 2020).

A prime finding of the present volume is that terrorism has become increasingly one of the major obstacles to sustainable development in Africa. A common thread that emerged is that many of the terror groups and organizations in Africa are often 'franchises' of radical Islamic groups elsewhere, but are not under their direct control. Another common assertion is that failed state and local governance is at the fore for local leaders of Islamic terror groups, who turn to 'religious and ideological franchising' as a means of gathering support. Some African terrorist organizations evolve from local groups that are not religious but have emerged as a result of dissatisfaction with government policies into groups inspired by Islamic reformist ideology.

Those terrorist organizations that have religion as a core element sometimes promote the esoteric theological aspirations of establishing the Islamic Caliphate and ascending to heaven, while others may merely offer basic sustenance paid by the local mosque as a means of recruitment. Details provided in the volume showed how some individuals are driven to join these groups. Their primary motivations include, according to present authors, getting out of poverty, improving their financial situation, and gaining economic opportunities that are promised to them by ideologists of *jihad,* sometimes over social media platforms and sometimes via preachers in the local mosque. The effectiveness of such recruitment is sometimes augmented by local traditions: it is not for nothing that *Boko Haram* is enlisting unemployed youth into its ranks, promising them money to afford the bride price that is traditional in African life and may be unaffordable to them due to poverty, drought and famine. Militant leaders, on the other hand, could be motivated by opportunity for self-enrichment.

Notwithstanding the reason for the creation and formation of a terror group, and for individuals to join it, it appears that a trend is for new groups to carry out selective attacks, but then escalate and resort to wider-spread indiscriminate violence, which becomes a routine for them. Moreover, in many cases militants' motives and goals change over time. For example, the demand for the introduction of *Sharia* law may get replaced by the goal of establishing the Caliphate, while the motive of basic survival and food with time is superseded by the motive of self-enrichment. In some cases, groups may begin to define their identity not only in religious terms, but also in traditional ethnic ones.

This makes answering the question of 'what is and what is not terrorism' even more challenging, and so too reaching a consensus on 'how and what to tackle', especially in and by international coalitions. These challenges are

substantiated by evidence in the present volume that the very nature of terrorism in Africa is constantly changing. Unlike the 20th century typified by the African decolonization struggle, where freedom fighters – often labeled terrorists – were revolutionaries or separatists, Islamist extremists in Africa in the 21st century appear to be guided by leadership who are seen both as true interpreters of the Holy Koran and as people who not only remove any ambiguity with regard to the use of violence, but also sanctify the killing of enemies. Killing and death thus become a way of life and a political norm in those parts of Africa where terrorism prevails, and this phenomenon is spreading.

Yet another point made evident in our observations in this volume is the ease with which Islamist ideologies that drive terrorism are transmitted to youth who perceive themselves as victims of government policies and of long-standing historical injustices. This is self-perpetuating as such 'victims of terror' become the 'wielders of terror,' using their own suffering as the excuse and justification for extremist and violent acts – terrorist attacks. This may not be the only or sole cause, as such youth also may resort to extremist and violent acts – to terror – to attain or regain their own dignity and that of their family or tribe, which they perceive as having been violated by others, including by their national leaders or by the relaxing of Islamic practices in society. Such sociological, anthropological and psychological explanations were also identified as causes of 9/11 (Segell, 2005).

It is fair to assume a common finding from the twelve chapters of the volume that clearly as individuals and even whole societies become more extremist and adapt cultural values that glorify martyrdom, revenge and hatred of other individuals and groups, their readiness to commit violence increases. And, once burdened with such motives, individual terrorists and groups cannot abandon their tactics of terrorism, or else they could lose their *raison d'être* ideologically, theologically, and forfeit their external funding. Add into the equation denying minorities the right to equal economic opportunities and the right and opportunity to express their cultural identity, or excluding them from political decision-making, and this may lead to resentment and encourage more radicalization and, eventually, terrorism. Terrorist attacks under such circumstances may seem to them as the most effective way of survival on a daily basis.

To be sure, in such eventualities there could be a vicious circle that is already the reality in some African states. For instance, in those without stable governance, or with rampant corruption, national and local authorities do not have the ability or will to exercise control over territory or wrest the monopoly on violence from terrorist groups. This creates a further power vacuum and consequently allows terrorists groups to improve recruitment, set

up more training camps, and spread further afield. This is happening in the Sahara, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin and elsewhere as far as Mozambique.

The presence of large uncontrolled territories in Africa predisposes to the spread of terrorism. Local or domestic terrorism has in some cases transformed into transnational, as it has happened, for example, with *Boko Haram*, which started as a local Nigerian organization and became an international one, expanding its activities in neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and a number of other countries in West and Central Africa.

The present volume also documented direct external influence besides the 'franchise' influence of international terrorist networks such as *Al Qaeda* and the Islamic State. Data is provided to substantiate the thesis of 'globalization and glocalization of terrorism,' demonstrating an increase in the overall number of terrorist attacks in Africa, especially since 2010. The complicit external actors include, for example, Iran, which globally promotes Shi'ite Islam accompanied with an Islamic revolutionary ideology, while Arab states of the Gulf and elsewhere cultivate Sunni Islam and Wahhabi Salafism. A means by all is to directly finance mosques, health and education (*madrasa)* facilities and even charities across Africa, using these to spread fundamentalist views and to serve as recruitment locations for terrorist movements. One of the direct motives for them is to recruit Africans to fight elsewhere, for example in Syria.

Last but not least, there is evidence in this volume that the US-initiated *Global War on Terrorism* (GWOT) after 9/11 has also shaped Africa's geopolitical landscape of terror and state response to terror. In part, GWOT has led to a renewed militarization of the continent. Evidently, whilst joining the GWOT campaign, not all international participants were solely engaged in counterterrorism, but some were selling weaponry and providing mercenaries to fuel local conflicts. Some of their activities may also be characterized as neo-colonial, as they exploited natural resources, local markets and Africa's human potential. Such foreign involvement doesn't always facilitate stable governance or promote sustainable development. It some cases, it is counterproductive, and especially so in the environments where many locals are disaffected and facing corrupted and ineffective governments. Some of these locals may be recruited to terrorist groups, which view foreign military and economic presence on their soil as a strong rallying point.

It should be noted that the fight against international terrorist organizations, on the one hand, is complicated by their sophistication and ubiquity, while on the other hand, is simpler, because these organizations are typically already designated as terrorist by the international community. At the same time,

'domestic terrorism' is a vague concept, with groups occasionally becoming mistakenly classified as terrorist. Accordingly, foreign powers in Africa tend to rather focus on those internationally designated terrorist groups and not necessarily on all domestic extremist organizations.

In their respective chapters, the authors focused on analysis rather than reiteration of the actions and activities of each terrorist group; they did not prejudge the issues but approached them eclectically, offering many different angles on terrorism within the volume. This diversity of viewpoints is in fact celebrated, as it presents an academically correct perspective given the complexity of the phenomenon and the unique characteristics of terrorism in Africa in terms of the specific geographical context it is located in. The diverseness of points is also facilitated by the authors' and editors' different vantage points, as they represent countries as different as Russia, Israel, and South Africa.

The presented case studies quite comprehensively covered the continent geographically from North Africa to Southern Africa and from West Africa across the Sahel to the East shores of Africa. The cases were also rather encompassing thematically, touching upon a range of issues that included ideology and practice of terrorism and extremism, their use of social media and environmental agenda, counterterrorism narratives and the role of external forces in the fight against terrorism in Africa.

A conclusion can be drawn from the above analysis that tackling the currently dominant brand of terrorism in Africa – that of Islamic fundamentalism or *jihadism* – will require specific and unique measures, for many of the various Islamic terrorist groups in Africa differ in many ways and are internationalized to a varying degree, ranging from those that originated as Middle Eastern 'franchises' to those that emerged as local, possibly ethnic, militias. A starting point may be to note that most active terrorist groups in Africa did not resort to terror in their early days. They adopted terrorism as a tactics under both external influence and internal pressure. The former was to a large degree applied within the framework of GWOT, while the latter has typically been exerted by repressive authorities, which are corrupt, ineffectual in governance and unable to overcome socio-economic challenges or develop inclusive polities.

References

Melo, H.B. (2020). Meta-Cultural Threats and Moral Disengagement–Cognitive Mechanisms Influenced By Islamic State Recruitment Advertising on the African Continent. *African Journal on Terrorism*, 9(1), 15-28.

Segell, Glen. (2005). 9/11: Wahhabism/Hegemony and Agenic Man/Heroic Masculinity, Strategic Insights: United States Navy, (IV)3, March 2005.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Natalia A. Zherlitsina, PhD (History) is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academic Secretary of the Russian Academy of Sciences Research Council for the Problems of Africa and Associate Professor at Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Her research interests include the study of the history of relations between Russia and the countries of North Africa in the 18th – 20th centuries. In addition to historical studies, Dr. Natalia A. Zherlitsina studies the modern problems of the Arab countries of the Maghreb, such as the threat of Islamist terrorism and the political consequences of the Arab Spring. Dr. Zherlitsina has published the book Russian-Tunisian relations from 1780 to 1991 and over 80 research papers in Russian academic journals and anthologies.

Professor Hussein Solomon is Academic Head of the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State, South Africa. He is also a Visiting Professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Japan and a Visiting Professor in the Department of History and Politics at Nelson Mandela University, South Africa. He is also a Senior Research Associate of the Jerusalem-based think tank Research on Islam and Muslims in Africa (RIMA) and a Research Fellow of the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) which is based at the South African Military Academy and Stellenbosch University. ORCID ID: 0000-0002-5980-9280

Dr. Tatyana S. Denisova, PhD (History) is Leading Research Fellow and Head of the Centre for Tropical Africa Studies at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Her research interests include the study of social and political problems in countries of Tropical Africa, political leadership, armed conflicts, primarily in West and Central Africa, terrorism and secessionism, relations between Russia and countries of Tropical Africa. Dr. Denisova has published three books, including Tropical Africa: the Evolution of Political Leadership, and about 100 research papers in Russian and in English. ORCID ID: 0000-0001-6321-3503

Dr. Anneli Botha (PhD) is senior lecturer at the Department Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State. She participates independently or led empirical research projects on radicalization, deradicalization, reintegration and terrorism throughout Africa, but particularly in Eastern Africa. During 2003–2016 she worked as a senior

researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria. Anneli has travelled extensively throughout Africa where she conducted research on terrorism and delivered specialized training on various aspects of the threat of terrorism, extremism, radicalization and counterterrorism to law enforcement and criminal justice officials. Prior to her position at the ISS, she served in the South African Police Service (SAPS) for 10 years. She was a founding member of the Religious Extremism and Terrorism Desk at Crime Intelligence Head Office and also served in the Rapid Reaction Unit and the Special Task Force on Urban Terror in the West Cape. At the end of her police career, she provided strategic support to the Head of South Africa's Crime Intelligence Unit. Anneli holds a Magister Artium degree from Rand Afrikaans University in Political Studies ('98) and Philosophiae Doctor from the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State ('14). ORCID ID: 0000-0002-1949-7833

Professor Vladimir G. Shubin, DSc. (History) is Principal Research Fellow at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Research Fellow at the Centre for Military Studies at Stellenbosch University (South Africa). He was also awarded the degree of PhD Honoris Causa by the University of the Western Cape. He lectured in 20 countries and authored over 250 publications, including seven books, three of them in English: The Hot 'Cold War'. Soviet Union and Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa, ANC: A View from Moscow and Social Democracy and Southern Africa. He is a member of the Editorial Boards/Councils of the Asia and Africa Today Journal (Moscow), Journal of Globalisation Studies (Volgograd), Journal of the Institute for African Studies (Moscow), Politikon (Tshwane), Scientia Militaria (Saldanha) and Brazilian Journal of African Studies (Porto Alegre). Before joining the academia, he was involved in the political and practical support for the liberation struggle in Africa. In addition to Orders of Friendship and Red Star and other Russian/Soviet state awards, he was bestowed with South Africa's Order of the Companions of O.R. Tambo (in silver) 'for excellent contribution to struggle against apartheid and colonialism in Southern Africa'.

Professor Theo Neethling obtained his MA degree in 1989 in South Africa from the Potchefstroom University (currently North-West University) and his DLitt et Phil in 1992 from the University of South Africa, both in the discipline of International Politics. He previously served in the Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy) of Stellenbosch University, where he started his academic career. In 2009 he moved to the University of the Free State where he has held the position of Professor in the Department of Political Studies and Governance. He also served as Head of Department

from April 2009 to June 2020 and was elected as a member of the Executive Committee of Senate of the University of the Free State in 2017. Prof. Neethling is the author (and co-author in a few instances) of more than 150 publicized outputs in scientific and popular scientific publications, including more than 60 articles in accredited (listed) academic journals and 20 chapters in scholarly book publications. These publications appeared in South Africa, Australia, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Kenya, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, he has presented 79 research papers at national and international level. In this regard, his projects have taken him to governmental and academic institutions in all five of Africa's regions, Asia, Australasia, Europe and North America. He also lectured in a visiting capacity at several foreign institutions. In recent years, he served on the editorial board of four academic journals and is rated as an 'established researcher' by the South African National Research Foundation (since 2009). His research interests mainly concern Africa's international relations; South Africa's foreign relations; security and politics in the African context; and African futures.

Mr Willem Els is Senior Training Coordinator at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS). Willem Els joined the ISS in 2013 as a senior training coordinator in the Complex Threats in Africa program in Pretoria. He is responsible for the ISS' Terrorism Prevention Training program that facilitates training interventions to specialized police units and the judiciary in West, East and Southern Africa. Before joining the ISS, he was commander of the Pretoria Explosives Unit of the South African Police Service (SAPS). Els joined the SAPS in 1984 and served in various specialized units. He developed and facilitated various bomb disposal and terrorist prevention courses for the Explosives Unit and other specialized units. While at the SAPS, Els completed various bomb disposal and investigation courses in South Africa and abroad. Els holds a BA Hons Degree in Policing Practice and is completing his Masters' degree in Governance and Political Transformation at the University of the Free State, investigating: Poor governance and the emergence of terrorist groups: The case of Cabo Delgado Province.

Mr Richard Chelin is Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies focusing on governance, corruption and organized crime and its impact on human security. Previously, he was a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation where he examined issues of transitional justice and terrorism. He holds a Masters (cum laude) in Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Professor Leonid L. Fituni is Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), DSc. (Econ.), Deputy Director of the RAS Institute for African Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic and Global Studies. He is one of the leading academic authorities in Russia on countering terrorist financing and money laundering (AML-CFT) and as such has been a long-serving consultant and adviser on AML-CFT issues to international organizations and bodies, including the Council of Europe, FATF, UNODC, the World Bank and Bank for International Settlements. He also led a number of international AML-CFT training projects. He has published more than 300 scientific articles in accredited journals and more than 30 handbooks and monographs. He has delivered more than 200 peer evaluated papers at academic and political symposia nationally and internationally. He serves as editor as well as on the editorial boards of several accredited scientific journals, both national and international. ORCID ID: 0000-0001-5416-6709

Dr. Alta Grobbelaar (PhD) is a lecturer in the department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State. She obtained her BA and MA degrees cum laude at the University of the Free State in South Africa and specializes in research on terrorism in Africa, the media and political discourse. She currently lectures undergraduate and post-graduate students at the University of the Free State in Political Theory and Ideology, African Politics and Governance. She has presented several papers on terrorism in Africa and the relationship between the media and terrorism in Africa at South African and international conferences. ORCID ID: 0000-0003-2246-4810

Dr. Glen Segell (DPhil, FRGS) is Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa, Research Fellow at the Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, Israel. He was born in South Africa and educated to a BA and MA at the Hebrew University Jerusalem and to a Doctor of Philosophy (DPhil) at the University of Oxford. He specializes in intelligence studies, civil-military relations, the nexus between air and sea power and strategic communications where he also consults as an expert for NATO. He has held teaching and research positions in the United Kingdom, Israel and South Africa. These include the Center for Defence Studies King's College London, The University of Reading, The Institute for National Security Studies Tel Aviv and the Ezri Center for Iran and Gulf States Research, University of Haifa. He holds the rank of Brigadier-General (Reserves). He was involved in active intelligence and offense operations in Iraq, Kuwait, Sudan and Libya. He has published a substantial number of peer reviewed articles and books. ORCID ID: 0000-0002-4186-2761

Dr. Sergey V. Kostelyanets, PhD (Political Science) is Leading Research Fellow and Head of the Centre for Sociological and Political Sciences Studies at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Research Fellow at the International Centre of Anthropology of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, and Associate Professor at Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. His research interests include the study of armed conflicts and conflict resolution in Africa, particularly in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, terrorism, secessionist movements, involvement of African troops outside the continent, and relations between Russia, Turkey, GCC countries and Africa, from the perspectives both of Political Science and Cultural Anthropology. Dr. Kostelyanets has published the book Darfur: A History of the Conflict (in Russian) and over 70 research papers in Russian and foreign academic journals and anthologies. Dr. Kostelyanets worked previously at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the sections for human rights and for combating human trafficking. ORCID ID: 0000-0002-9983-9994

Dr. Moshe Terdiman is an expert on Islam in Africa, terrorist organizations in Africa and environmental security. He is a research fellow at the Ezri Center for Gulf Countries Studies at the University of Haifa as well as in the Forum for Regional Thinking. He is the founder and director of the Research for Islam and Muslims in Africa as well as a co-founder and director of the Institute for Environmental Security and Well-being Studies.

TERRORISM IN AFRICA:
NEW TRENDS AND FRONTIERS

Approved for print by the Academic Council

of the Institute for African Studies

of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Chief of Publishing Department

Natalya Ksenofontova

Design and desktop publishing

Gulzhamal Abisheva

The present book illustrates how Africa has become an incubator for Islamic extremism, and how global and local actors and factors interweave to form a unique – 'glocalized' – form of terrorism on the continent. The contributions of authors reflect the spatial continuity of terrorism-affected areas in Africa and the creeping proliferation of terrorist groups across the region. Special attention is paid to Mozambique, which has become the southernmost hotbed of terrorism in the world in the wake of discovering large hydrocarbon reservoirs. A prime finding of the present volume is that terrorism has become increasingly one of the major obstacles to sustainable development in Africa. Further, the book critically evaluates counterterrorism responses by African and other states, and also examines contemporary terrorism tactics and strategies, including the widening use of social media for propaganda purposes and recruitment, the adoption of environmental agenda, and the development of new financing schemes amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The need to shift the focus away from the current military approach to countering terrorism in Africa is an issue that cuts across all chapters of the volume.