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O. Molyarenko: "Since the early 2010s, the state in Russia has been gradually appropriating economic and social functions, starting with the most important and problematic ones that had been previously transferred to the municipal level. At the same time, to increase the controllability of municipalities, signs of their subordination are becoming more explicit, and territorial changes are fostering the consolidation of municipalities and the creation of a single-tiered system of local self-government."

G. Zborovsky, P. Ambarova: "Our sociological interpretation of student educational failure purports to provide a comprehensive analysis that includes three levels: communal, organizational and institutional. We believe that this method of sociological analysis may contribute to a practical solution of the problem. This approach reveals that educational failure of Russian students is not an exclusively pedagogical problem and is not reflected only in individual personal practices. It has broader social implications and therefore must be recognized as a fundamental problem of present-day society."

A. Medushevsky: "The claims about the end of globalization in general and global constitutionalism in particular appear to be premature and unfounded. It is true that from a legal viewpoint, integration processes have reached a point when their forms, content, and instruments of advancement need to be adjusted. In that respect, the pandemic crisis and the economic recession were a wake-up call that exposed the shortcomings of global governance (manifested above all in a deficit of trust, information, and global coordination), which can be eliminated through the joint efforts of international institutions, states, and civil society."

I. Levakin: "Practically every new Russian Constitution (be it Soviet or bourgeois) reflected substantial changes in the forms of property, modes of production, distribution, exchange and consumption of material goods, and in the social class structure of society. The 2020 reform of separate articles, without a fundamental change of the 1993 Constitution of the RF, reflects this pattern and seeks to elaborate the constitutional-legal principles of the economic system... In other words, the goal is a progressive social transformation, which should be assessed according to its results."

V. Martyanov, L. Fishman: "The neoliberal idiom of the mainstream describes and legitimizes the moribund ontology of the Western society. Thus, it makes no sense for Russian society to be on the periphery of expiring classifications of political regimes and hierarchies of descriptions whose ideological dimension precludes a positive legitimization of any Russian political order. There is no point for Russian social scientists to strain to find quasi explanations of various deviations of Russian society from the ideal model of the liberal-democratic political ontology of Western capitalism. For not only Russia but the rest of the world, including the West, deviates from this model."

A. Seregin: "This paper makes a case against metaphysical retributivism, i.e., the belief that the existence of physical evil (suffering) can be causally explained and normatively justified by being interpreted as a just punishment for the moral evil committed by those who suffer... [T]he author introduces a disjunctive distinction between the humanistic and non-humanistic normative theories of moral good and evil... [M]etaphysical retributivism is logically inconceivable and morally unacceptable both according to humanistic … and non-humanistic … normative standards, in other words, in any case."

O. Aronson: "During pandemics, wars, and revolutions we sense … a sharing or connectedness of people who are remote from each other socially and psychologically. This is not mutual attraction (friendship understood psychologically) but the movement of sharing itself. We can talk about collective fear, a sense of justice or desire of freedom as causes and purposes, but much around us makes us wonder whether such schemes are justified. It may well be that community itself has to be conceived in the forgotten logic of the elements, which comes back to us together with mass society, the processes of depersonalization and dehumanization taking place in it along with the crisis of institutions and ecological catastrophes."

V. Alpatov: "In the history of the science of language, one example of a dramatic change of paradigm was the crisis of the research program of positivism, which had held sway in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, and various proposals concerning the way out of the crisis… The ideas of the … critics of positivism in linguistics (Schuchardt, Vossler, Cassirer, Marr), for all their differences, had something in common. They were all unhappy about neglect of theory, narrowness of approach and in many ways the themes of the positivists, and their critique was largely convincing. They sought a broader view, often characteristic of earlier thinkers … but they were unable to work out a method of tackling these problems, sometimes for lack of material and sometimes for the dif-

ficulties of its systematization… [T]he paradigm finally formulated by Ferdinand de Saussure turned out to be the most valid scientifically… And yet, alternative programs have been proposed even after the structural paradigm was established. In Russia, one of them was set forth in Valentin Voloshinov's book *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (Mikhail Bakhtin probably took part in developing the concept). The book is fiercely polemical toward 'abstract objectivism.' "

M. Chesnokova: "The problem of correlation between philosophy, scientific theory, and practice is one of the most complicated and debated issues in psychology. The psychotherapeutic approaches of Bugental and Vasilyuk demonstrate different solutions. Bugental's approach is a synthesis of philosophy and 'art' of psychological practice; he tries to avoid an attempt to construct an objectively orientated general psychological theory, even if this theory is present in his approach. Vasilyuk's coexperiencing psychotherapy is a carefully elaborated psychotechnical practice that consistently develops from the basic provisions of cultural activity theory of consciousness as its concretization in the field of the empirical… While Bugental's approach is traditionally defined as existential-humanitarian, Vasilyuk's approach can be called existential-active, with a synergetic development trend."

Russia's Pivot to the East: Achievements, Problems, and Prospects

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Dmitry STRELTSOV
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Abstract. The time that has elapsed since Russia officially proclaimed its "pivot to the East" warrants some tentative conclusions about its nature, achievements, problems, and prospects. Today, the qualitative differences between this current course and earlier stages of Russia's eastern policy have come into bolder relief. In particular, it is important to note the structurally more complex character of the "pivot to the East," as several components at the junction of domestic and foreign policy, as well as the regional and global dimensions of the Russian foreign policy strategy, have come into sharper focus. The first component lies in the realm of international political and economic relations, marked by the search for additional sources of economic growth, technologies and (since 2014) alternative energy markets and political and economic alternatives as a whole in the face of tightening US and EU sanctions. A contributing factor has been the fact that Russia's key partners in Asia (China, India, the Republic of Korea, Southeast Asian states) refused to join anti-Russian sanctions, while Japan only paid them lip service. The second component has to do with internal political and institutional development and involves an attempt to revise the developmental paradigm and models of Siberia and the Russian Far East amid a dramatic transformation of the external situation and growing economic and demographic asymmetry between the European and Asian parts of Russia. The third component involves the development of a conceptual framework for Greater Eurasia that would enable Russia to retain and ideally enhance its

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integration potential as one of the leading states in the international system through institutionalization of political and economic partnerships, chiefly with Asian states. While transformations within the framework of the first component are already evident and ready for the qualitative and quantitative appraisal presented in this paper, the contours of the second and third are still in the making.

The Russian Federation has unique regional parameters which enable it to play an important role in Asia's economy and politics. These include its geographical proximity to the economically dynamic Asia-Pacific Region (APR), its huge transit potential and the wealth of its natural resources. It commands well-deserved authority in the region, where it enjoys the status of one of the most influential powers. Evincing an interest in the development of regional multilateral formats of interaction, Russia is a member of tmost regional organizations and forums, both political and economic, and is active in political processes in the APR.

Russia's pivot to the East was conceived to a large extent on the basis of geostrategic and geo-economic considerations. The world balance of forces today obviously depends in many ways on the situation in Asia, so Russia needs to rely on the region in which global economic and political processes manifest themselves in a concentrated form. Because East Asia is emerging as the main driver of global economic growth, Russia's status as a world power will depend heavily on the strength of its positions in the region. Geostrategically, the military-political dynamics in the Middle East and relations with India, the key partner in the South Asian region, are no less important. In other words, to preserve and increase its influence on the global level, Russia needs a quantum leap in its relations with the non-Western world in the broader sense.

The pivot-to-the-East policy declared by Russia in the second half of the 2000s was prompted by considerable economic, technological, administrative and political-strategic challenges. It has to be admitted that Russia's positions in the APR are still not strong enough. The Regions of Siberia and the Far East (RS&FE) are among the less developed, if not depressed, parts of the Russian Federation compared to the European part: their economies suffer from depopulation, one-sided orientation toward the Chinese market, dependence on commodity production and lack of sources for innovation. All these circumstances until recently combined to determine their potential role in the economic processes in the APR as a fuel and raw materials appendage of the more developed economies in the region.

Meanwhile the geographical proximity of these territories to the burgeoning East Asian economies favors the development of trade and investment links be-

tween them. In other words, Russia's eastern territories may be "points of entry" for capital, technologies, services and manpower from the dynamically developing East [1, p. 10] if the internal and structural tasks of their economic development are addressed.

The pivot-to-the-East policy also faces psychological problems. These include the orientation toward Europe characteristic of several generations of the Russian political elite and the business community, who at the turn of the millennium did not see the Asian countries as a serious and—most importantly, necessary—locus of foreign policy and economic efforts. Although three-quarters of Russia's territory is east of the Urals, it is the home of less than 30% of the population ,and for many Russians the problems of the country's Asian regions remain "remote" and are not perceived as "their own." The majority of the country's people still think that Russia is closer to Europe than to Asia (55% versus 18%) [22]. Until recently, structural problems were compounded by the lack of consensus on develpmental models for Siberia and the Far East and the instruments of implementing them.

Against this background, the main goals of such a pivot are to eliminate the imbalance in development between Russia's eastern regions and its European part, and to build those regions into the structure of economic relations of the APR with due account of current political and economic trends.

Russia's policy in the region should be three-pronged:

(1) speeding the development of the Russian Far East by fully implementing announced government investment programs;

(2) building up efforts to promote economic integration of the RS&FE into the APR;

(3) deepening strategic bilateral and multilateral political interaction with partners in the region—and, ideally, implementing the Greater Eurasia idea together in a tangible way—while taking into account the specificities of competing and interacting macro-regional projects.

We are talking about maximum diversification of economic and geostrategic partners in Asia to include its major economies: China, Japan, South Korea, India, ASEAN and others. While the first task is internal, the second and third ones, being profoundly interconnected, are external. Because of the constraints imposed by the scale of this paper, the authors deliberately put aside Russia's relations with the Muslim world countries, although their active development in recent years is certainly a significant part of the Russian pivot-to-the-East policy.

Historical Background to the Pivot-to-the-East Policy

Historically, Eastern policy has occupied a special place in the domain of the Russian identity. The intellectual elite in Russia have argued for decades about the extent to which Russia's destiny is connected with the East and its future depends on the state of affairs in Asia.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, Russia pursued its policy in Asia with the senso of being "a European in Asia," to use Fyodor Dostoevsky's expression. He

wrote: "Russia is not only in Europe, but also in Asia; because the Russian is not only a European but also an Asian. Moreover: there are probably more hopes for us in Asia than in Europe" [2, p. 504]. Russia was advancing to the East based on a messianic idea whereby the Russian Empire was performing a great civilizing mission in Asia.

In the late 19th century, many Russian thinkers believed that Russia's future was connected with the East, which included the Muslim world and especially Central Asia. Later, in the 1920s and 30s, the idea was reflected in the activities of the founding fathers of Eurasianism: Pyotr Savitsky, Nikolay Trubetskoy, Georgy Vernadsky and others. After the formation of the USSR, the Leninist ideology was based, among other things, on solidarity with the colonial and enslaved peoples of Asia. Propagating the ideas of "national liberation," Russia was to set an example to the peoples of Asia in the quest of paths toward socialism.

In the post-Soviet period, Russia sought to remain a key regional player in addressing Asian issues while remaining a global power. Russia's search for common ground with many Asian countries was largely based on taking advantage of their discontent with the West-centric institutional architecture of world governance formed in the era when the West had unlimited dominion over the global economy.

The Eastern vector of Russia's foreign policy was articulated in the late 1990s at the tail end of the Yeltsin era. It is strongly associated with the name of Yevgeny Primakov, Russia's foreign minister in 1996-1998 and prime minister in 1998-1999. Primakov challenged the dominant role of the USA in world affairs and advocated a multilateral world order. He came out for a balanced foreign policy aimed at maintaining a friendly atmosphere in the relations with the West while simultaneously developing cooperation with the Asian countries, especially China and India. Primakov put forward the idea of a Moscow-Delhi-Beijing strategic triangle. In his speeches he argued that Russia should give priority to the development of friendly relations with East Asian and Middle East countries by embracing a multi-vector strategy and rejecting unipolarity [5, pp. 145-205].

With the start of Vladimir Putin's presidency in 2000, Russia stepped up its Asian diplomacy, stressing the need for closer economic ties with the Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea as well as ASEAN states. In the early 2000s, Moscow put forward the idea of a common space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, whereby Russia would play a geostrategic role as a transcontinental link between the Atlantic and Pacific "wings" of Eurasia. In 2001, in response to the proposal to create a common economic space made by European Commission President Romano Prodi, the Russian leaders at the Russia-EU summits stressed their wish to accelerate the bulding of a Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok [3, p. 87].

The pivot-to-the-East policy gained added relevance in the late 2000s when, in light of the lessons of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, trade and economic relations with the Greater East Asia countries became key [11, pp. 16-17]. The Kremlin realized the need to maintain mutually beneficial partnership relations with both the West and the East.

A milestone in implementing the pivot to the East was the APEC summit in

Vladivostok in September 2012, where Russia, as the host country, positioned itself as a full-fledged member of the Asia-Pacific community capable of setting a regional agenda at such a representative forum [8, p. 8]. On the eve of the summit, *The Wall Street Journal* published Putin's article in which the Russian president thus outlined Russia's position in the APR: "Our country is an inalienable part of the APR historically and geographically. We see a full-scale entry into the Asia-Pacific space as a key guarantee of a successful future for Russia and the development of our Siberian and Far Eastern regions" [19]. In his traditional address to the Federal Assembly in December 2013, Putin declared the development of Siberia and the Far East to be "our national priority for the whole 21st century" [20].

However, the crisis in the relations with the West over the repossession of Crimea in 2014 forced the Kremlin to make substantial adjustments to its Eastern policy. While previously the pivot to the East was prompted more by Moscow's forecast that Asia would be the main driver of economic growth and therefore mutually beneficial relations with it should be sought, now one of Russia's main motives was the wish to diminish its economic dependence on the West as a whole (especially Europe) and diversify the destinations of Russian energy supplies [7, p. 111]. Part of the reason for this reappraisal was that Russia's main Asian partners (China, India, the Republic of Korea and Southeast Asian countries) refused to join the anti-Russian sanctions, while Japan went through the motions of joining, causing little damage to the Russian economy.

Simultaneously with the revision of the inner content of foreign policy priorities in the wake of 2014, the Russian pivot to the East acquired yet another dimension because Moscow had launched its own integration project in Eurasia called the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). By 2015, the EAEU had united Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the key partners in Asia were invited to work out formats of mutually beneficial cooperation [9].

In the post-Crimea period, Russia made an effort to attract investments from Asian countries, above all from China, in the development of new oil and gas resources in Siberia and the Far East. In his public speeches the Russian president stressed the role of the Asian vector in Russia's foreign policy priorities. For example, in the foreign policy part of his presidential address in February 2019, Putin mentioned the Asian countries ahead of Europe and the USA [21].

Russia's pivot to the East was manifest not only in the economic but also in the financial sphere. In 2018, The Bank of Russia slashed the share of its assets in the USA from 29.9% to 9.7%, simultaneously increasing its assets in China (from 2.6% to 14.1%) and Japan (from 1.5% to 7.5%). The share of the Bank of Russia reserves denominated in dollars dropped from 45.8% to 22.7%, while its yuan-denominated Chinese assets jumped from 2.8% to 14.2% [13, p. 95].

The priorities of the pivot to the East that had to do with the development of Siberia and the Far East were also gradually adjusted. The pivot to the East was originally seen in terms of attracting Asian investors to major infrastructure and energy projects, which would help the resurgence of the region. Now it became clear that such projects have a limited impact on the regional economy, above all because they made little difference to the interests of the majority of the region's

population [4, p. 162]. The problem with these projects was that many of them were politicized from the start and that the foreign partners' interest in them had been overestimated. This was true especially of infrastructure development projects (for example, the building of a trans-Korean railway or a trans-Korean gas pipeline, or a pipeline and railway bridge between Sakhalin and Hokkaido).

Such projects had some commercial prospects but failed to take into account all the political risks, and thus failed to attract due attention from would-be partners. Where such projects materialized (for example, the Eastern Siberia-Pacific oil pipeline or the Power of Siberia gas pipeline), the economic benefits flowed mainly to Moscow, while the benefits to the region were limited, failing to kick-start an economic resurgence. Now the emphasis was on attracting foreign investors into high-tech areas with a high added value, using tax, visa and administrative inducements. To accelerate economic development and improve local living standards the Russian government in 2015 began creating Advanced Special Economic Zones (ASEZs) in Siberia and the Far East.

Russia's Pivot to the East: The Far Eastern Vector

The most noticeable part of the pivot to the East was the increased role and significance of China in the Kremlin's Eastern policy. The period since 2000, when Putin came to office, has seen qualitative improvements in Russia's relations with China. In 2001, the two countries signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. The tensions inherited from the period of Sino-Soviet confrontation were gone, and all border issues were settled by 2004, making the world's longest land border with China (4,200 km) a zone of good-neighborliness and cooperation. A major achievement of Russia-China relations in that period was the formation of a common security space on the perimeter of the Sino-Russian border [10], sealed on a multilateral level in the 2001 by the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Cooperation between Russia and China got a boost after the 2008 crisis revealed the inadequacy of largely Western-regulated global governance. During his 2011 election campaign, Putin called for catching "Chinese winds" in the "sails" of the Russian economy. The course for priority development of Russia-China partnership got a fresh impetus after Putin's return to office in May 2012. In his speeches, the Russian leader stressed that economic and strategic partnership between Russia and China was based on their shared approach to the transformation of the world order and international institutions.

The partnership soon began to bear fruit: Russia received substantial funding from China for the construction of a new oil pipeline in the eastern direction. In early 2014, Russia made an exception for China by allowing it to be the first foreign investor in the extraction of oil and other resources. In the same year, amid the deepening political and economic crisis in the relations with the West, Russia signed a $400 billion 30-year agreement on annual supply to China of 38 billion cubic meters of gas from fields in Eastern Siberia. The Sila Sibiri (Power of Sibe-

ria) pipeline built to implement the agreement was launched in December 2019, and is expected to hit design capacity by 2024 [24]. Russia has become the main supplier of crude oil to China, ahead of Saudi Arabia.

As early as 2011, China overtook Germany to become Russia's biggest trading partner. In 2018, China-Russia trade reached $100 billion. The two countries' leaders promised to double that figure by 2024. Qualitative changes in the structure of foreign economic relations have to be noted. In addition to the traditional Russian exports to China—arms, minerals, timber, machines and equipment—Russia has increased its agricultural supplies to the Celestial Empire, gaining a foothold as a key supplier of soybeans to the Chinese market [24].

At present Chinese partners and Chinese capital are engaged in some 30 investment projects worth $22 billion. A large chunk of Chinese investments—$3.5 billion—is in projects in the Russian Far East [18].

Another track in Russia-China cooperation is the pursuit of agreements to coordinate efforts within the framework of two macro-regional projects they have initiated, the EAEU and the One Belt One Road Initiative, whose launch was announced by PRC Chairman Xi Jinping in 2013. The result of this pursuit was the 2015 agreement on the conjunction of the two projects. The "conjunction" terminology is a compromise formula, which implies that Russia is an object or part of the One Belt One Road Initiative, but will have a say in implementing it.

The good personal chemistry between President Putin and PRC Chairman Xi Jinping is an important factor in promoting cooperation projects, especially in such politically significant sectors as energy and national defense. The latter has been the most dynamically growing area of bilateral relations in recent years. For example, in 2016-2017, the two countries held a number of joint anti-missile defense exercises, and in July 2019 joint air patrolling of the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea [17]. In October 2019, Putin announced that Russia would help China to develop an early rocket launch warning system.

At present, an objective factor that prompts Russia and China to seek common approaches to military security is their shared awareness of the need to preserve strategic stability now that the USA has, to all intents and purposes, unilaterally withdrawn from all the key treaties of the system: the ABM Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), and the Open Skies Treaty.

Symbols of Russia-China cooperation were the inauguration in March 2019 of the first railway bridge over the Amur River, which linked the cities of Tongjiang in the Chinese province of Heilongjiang and Nizhneleninsky in the Jewish Autonomous Area in Russia. In November 2019, construction was completed of an automobile bridge between the city of Heihe in northeastern China and Blagoveshchensk. The opening of the two bridges was symbolic because they were the first permanent bridges across the Amur, which had been a natural border between the two countries for centuries.

Following PRC Chairman Xi Jinping's visit to Russia in June 2019, a joint statement on the development of a comprehensive strategic partnership for collaboration in the new era was signed. It set new ambitious targets and laid long-term guidelines for cooperation [16]. From the Russian perspective, these rela-

tions accord with the long-term goal of putting an end to US dominance and the Western-oriented world order Putin spoke about at the Munich Security Conference in early 2007 [23, p. 4]. Relations between Moscow and Beijing are at an all-time high. Although these relations do not depend on external circumstances, their intensive growth in recent years owes much to the tensions in US-Russia and US-China relations, which have increased since 2018.

At the same time, looking at these relations from Russia's point of view, one can see trends that give cause for reflection. For example, the structure of trade and economic links falls short of their inherent potential. Because energy accounts for about 70% of Russia's exports to China (2018 data) [14], Russia is increasingly worried about the prospect of becoming overly dependent on the Chinese market and becoming a raw materials appendage of China. This makes Russia extremely vulnerable to fluctuations of demand on the part of Chinese enterprises and affects the volume of Russian exports, in which China is already dominant. Calculations show that the target of increasing trade set by the two leaders is only realistic if its structure remains unchanged, i.e., if Russia's commodity exports to China and China's exports of equipment to Russia increase simultaneously. However, for the reasons mentioned above, China does not relish this prospect, which is why Moscow is pressing for a qualitative upgrading of the innovation component of cooperation, speeding of integration in the framework of production models, and intra-firm cooperation. The links of the production process scattered on both sides of the border presuppose the creation of substantial added value on each side.

Russia has also to be mindful of the fact that the structural features of its economy prevent it from playing the key role in the region as a whole, especially in the context of the ongoing economic and technological development of Asia. Considering the global scramble for Chinese investments, Russia cannot expect "easy money" from China. Thus, the search for promising projects that would attract Chinese investors remains one of the key tasks.

A further issue is respect for each other's national interests, which do not always coincide on pressing issues of the international political agenda. Moscow is fully aware that China will not necessarily side with Russia on all the issues in its conflict with the West. Taking China's economic and military-political rise as a given, Russia has its own views on the emerging world order, and does not want to be China's "junior partner" as a result of the widening gap in the economic might of the two countries.

With China involved in a number of border conflicts with its neighbors, Moscow would hate to face the need to take sides in such conflicts because of its special relationship with Beijing. One thinks, for example, of India and Vietnam, which are Russia's time-tested partners and major buyers of Russian arms; as well as Japan, with which Russia is trying to forge mutually beneficial relations woth regard to investment in the Far East. Russia is pursuing its relations with these countries on the basis of mutual respect for each other's positions on key regional issues, and does not want to see their territorial disputes with China affect its relations with these states.

In order to avoid falling into the trap of bilateral relations in which China may

happen to be the dominant power, Russia should develop durable partnerships with all the Asian countries, offering them equal access to its big internal markets and natural resources. Equal opportunities and competition between rapidly developing Asia-Pacific countries for such access is objectively good for Russia, which may feel more confident in the region's markets and have more room for diplomatic maneuver in Asia.

In this context, Russia should continue to seek support from India, which is already included in many multilateral formats involving Russia and China (SCO, RIC, BRICS). Economically, Russia's key partners in East Asia are Japan and the Republic of Korea, although their bilateral trade with Russia ($21 billion with Japan and $25 billion with the ROK in 2018) is well below that of China.

Although geopolitically Japan is Russia's adversary under its security treaty with the USA, that is no obstacle to mutually beneficial economic and political relations. Russia sees Japan as an important Asian partner, with which stable relations are key in the context of the pivot to the East. These relations have been on the rise since Putin was elected president for another term in 2012.

Russia is interested in attracting Japan to the projects of social and economic development of Siberia and the Far East as a potential source of technologies and investments. Stable partnership relations with Japan, from which Russia has repeatedly benefited in the past, strengthen Russia's position in the world and in the region, helping it to avoid a "China tilt" in its Asia policy.

Strong personal relations between leaders are important factors in bilateral relations. Putin and Shinzo Abe have met 27 times. On Japan's initiative, an eight-point plan of economic cooperation between the two countries was launched in May 2016. About a hundred investment projects are currently under way.

For Russia, partnership with Japan has chiefly economic significance. Russia is making inroads in Japan's energy market, especially in light of Japan's need to fill its energy gap in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011. In 2019, Japan acquired a 10% stake (over $2 billion) in the Arctic LNG 2 project, and an agreement has been reached on the participation of Japanese companies in the building of an LNG facility in the Russian Far East with a capacity of 6.2 million tons a year. According to investment plans, the project will meet about 10% of Japan's need for natural gas.

An obstacle in the way of stable relations with Japan is still the unresolved issue of the peace treaty, which reflects the fundamental differences in the two sides' approach to the results of World War II. No wonder the Russian president described this situation as "not normal." Even so, the two sides continue to engage in constructive dialog on the issue, and the absence of concrete accords is no obstacle to the development of bilateral relations in other areas.

Economic and political ties with the Republic of Korea form an important part of the pivot-to-the-East policy. It is particularly important that the New Northern Policy proclaimed by the Moon Jae-in administration, which is part and parcel of Seoul's vision of cooperation with Russia, opens up vistas for "conjunction" with the pivot-to-the-East policy [6, p. 166]. In addition to economic benefits, trade and economic relations between the two countries contribute to the lessening of ten-

sions on the Korean Peninsula and to regional stability in Northeast Asia. Another promising area, which combines the potentials for the development of bilateral as well as multilateral relations, is Russia's interaction with ASEAN, which was elevated to a new level of strategic partnership in 2018. ASEAN as a collective partner enables Russia to participate on an equal basis in all the key multilateral formats centered around it. These include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on security, the East Asian Summit and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting with the main dialog partners (ADMM Plus). Since 2016, Vietnam and Singapore have been economic partners of the EAEU in the free trade area, and negotiations have started with Thailand. Russia and ASEAN also have shared views on the Indo-Pacific region (IPR) idea. Both sides see the opportunities for its implementation from a politically and economically inclusive angle, not a military-strategic one [15; 12].

Conclusions

The pivot-to-the-East policy that Russia has been pursuing since the 2010s has turned out to be a more enduring and content-rich phenomenon than Russia's Eastern policy in previous historical periods. In the longer term, this policy is based on the priority of its economic interests over political ones and the link between diplomacy and internal needs. What makes it different from earlier stages is that it is being implemented against an increasingly hostile foreign policy background. Confrontation is prevailing over cooperation; the security situation is becoming more complex in the Euro-Atlantic region and in the APR, which is influenced by the main driver of world economic growth; and confrontation between Russia and the West is sharpening on key issues of the world order.

The pivot-to-the-East policy is inevitably influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, which poses a major challenge to the entire global governance system. The pandemic has convincingly demonstrated to the world the danger of non-military threats, especially those fraught with the risk of fresh flare-ups of infectious diseases, climate change, natural disasters and other unforeseen natural emergencies.

The pandemic has highlighted the weakness and inefficiency of the global and regional institutions called upon to counter these threats, and has sharpened the sense of the common destiny of the human race. It has reasserted the principles of indivisible security, an area in which there can be no winners or losers, and hhas dermonstrated that the strategy of blocs cannot be relied upon in international politics. The pandemic, which ignores national borders, even if they are closed, calls for concerted efforts from the whole world community, a competent and inclusive system of managing global ties.

And yet, even before the pandemic broke out, there were signs of a growing geopolitical confrontation between the world's two biggest economies, the USA and China, which prompted talk about "a new bipolarity." The report United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China, released by the Trump Administration, signals a qualitative and irreversible shift from containing China to

rejecting it. The chances are that the post-COVID era will see further exacerbation of the ideological and military-political confrontation between the US-led West and China, which the US is trying to blame for withholding information about the pandemic at its initial stage. Russia should not allow itself to be dragged into this confrontation. Russia's strategy should seek to promote its vision of the world order based on the accumulated positive experience of international interaction and to preserve its position as an independent pole in the international system. Such a strategy will increase trust in Russia among those Asian countries, which do not wish to take sides in this confrontation.

The objective reality is, however, that Russia's biggest success in its pivot-to-the-East policy has been achieved in promoting economic cooperation with China, which in 2010 became the world's second biggest economy after the USA. For Russia, the priority of its China policy is the key element of the foreign policy part of its national security strategy, aimed at neutralizing the West's efforts to isolate Russia internationally and mitigating the consequences of economic sanctions. At the same time, one-sided orientation of economic flows toward China is fraught with the risk of increased dependence on the Chinese market and strategic vulnerability of the Russian economy. Such dependence may (if desired) be used for political purposes, which threatens Russia's national security. Thus, Russia faces the need to diversify its economic partners and join multilateral projects of mutually beneficial cooperation in the APR.

Its resources in the Asia-Pacific region being limited, Russia is interested in a stable political and economic environment and stable rules of international behavior. This makes Russia here a largely status quo power that opposes any attempts to revise the established rules. Russia's "anti-revisionism" performs a balancing function in the system of regional relations, enabling it to play a much bigger role in the APR's security and diplomacy. To preserve its balancing role, Russia needs to make a sober assessment of the main trend of the regional dynamics in recent years, and that is the shift of focus from the Asia-Pacific toward the Indo-Pacific region. Distancing itself from the military-geopolitical aspects of this construct, it makes sense to seek a more productive dialog with those regional forces that are really at the center of the region and want it to be inclusive, above all ASEAN, India and Japan. Addressing the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2016, President Putin articulated the concept of Greater Eurasia partnership as a way to develop Eurasian integration and extend Russia's influence to Asian countries. The partnership is called upon to consolidate Russia's status as a key player on the continent, not just on the territory geographically linking Asia and Europe. The aim of the Russian initiative is to provide a platform for effective cooperation among all the countries and regions on the Eurasian continent, including Russia, the countries of Eastern, Southeastern and South Asia, and the center of Eurasia, as well as the countries of the European subcontinent and their organizations to the extent that they are committed to constructive cooperation. By taking into account the key role of India in the IPR and China in the Asia-Pacific, and recognizing ASEAN's central role in the institutional organization of this vast emerging political-economic space, Russia would be able to win support for its macro-regional projects. With respect

to Russia-China relations, the Greater Eurasia concept enables the partners to avoid competition and develop cooperation in a strategically important direction by harmonizing the Chinese and Russian projects, the One Belt One Road Initiative and the EAEU. The above initiative is still at the conceptual stage, suggesting a direction in which interaction among Eurasian states can develop. However, in seeking to turn Eurasia into a center of world economy and politics, it holds great attraction for the less developed and smaller countries in the region, enabling them to accelerate their development while remaining in the non-confrontational paradigm.

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Local Self-Government in Contemporary Russia

Olga MOLYARENKO

Abstract. This article focuses on the evolution of local self-government in Russia over the past three decades. Built on the ideas of James Scott regarding the good intentions of the state, it provides not only a general description of the changes, but also reconstructs the logic of legislators. The central government in post-Soviet Russia has distanced itself from local self-government as much as possible by turning municipalities into a firewall of sorts against citizens seeking social guarantees. That explains why in the 1990s through the early 2000s, local self-government was fairly independent and diverse. The history of the transformation of local self-government in Russia in the last 20 years can be described as attempts by the central government to bring order and social justice (as interpreted by the rent-oriented part of the country's population) to municipalities. It acted under the pressure of mainly negative information about the state of local self-government from people and regional authorities and the gradual transformation of the structure of settlements. This has resulted in the unification and *de facto* nationalization of local self-government (in the near future, *formal* nationalization is also expected). Centralization of local self-government (i.e., its integration into the unitary system of state power) separated local authorities from the local population and made local socioeconomic processes less transparent for municipal administrators.

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Introduction

As a subject of scholarly study and discussion, local self-government (LSG) contains many subfields and trends: the economic foundations of LSG, municipal finances, municipal law, local economics, the territorial organization of municipalities, interaction between the state and the population, spatial development of municipalities, etc. These and many other aspects of local self-government are studied by experts in management and administration, jurists, urban planners, geographers, economists, and sociologists. The author has touched upon certain related spheres, such as federalism, public procurement, and official statistics. This explains why the literature review has been deliberately limited to publications dealing with similar subjects: the general logic of the unfolding processes with an emphasis on the attitude of central government to local self-government in which we have conventionally identified three basic trends: romantic, tactical, and skeptical.

The *romantic* trend of local self-government reform of the first post-Soviet decade includes certain components of democratic construction that elevated the institutions of civil society and self-organization of the local population *exclusively* to liberalize power and create a "normal" state similar to the best European models [10; 3; 5]. In this context, everything that government has been doing after the year 2000 can be described as the emasculation or even "obliteration" of local self-government and the related low-level democracy realized within the process of building up the vertical of power [10; 3; 12]. The authors either pass over in silence the questions: "Why is this vertical being built at all?", "Are there certain objective prerequisites of centralization?" or, at best, refer to the mentality and archetypes of public consciousness [10; 15]. This ontology was, on the whole, popular among researchers and experts directly involved in drafting the local self-government reforms of the 1990s.

According to the *tactical* approach, the *contemporary* central authorities are working hard to *create from above* comprehensive and autonomous self-government but invariably fail for certain reasons [2; 19]. As a rule, the blame is shifted onto regional governments that prevent the consolidation on their territories of power closest to the people. (This is not exclusive to the tactical approach; negative assessments of the role of regional authorities can also be found among "romantics" and "skeptics") [24; 10]. This interpretation is, on the whole, typical of experts who are either federal bureaucrats or heads of all-Russia associations of local self-government.

The *skeptical* approach is typical of those who doubt that local self-government was deliberately set up as far as possible from the state *exclusively* for the purposes of liberalization and democracy [12; 13]. In this context, everything that the current authorities are doing is assessed as an infringement on the autonomous status of local self-government caused, among other things, by *objective reasons* (the redistribution of financial resources among municipalities and maintenance of municipal social services at the minimal level) rather than by a legislator's ill intentions [24; 13; 16].

The above positions do not intersect in their pure form; this is confirmed by

the intersection of authors' names in the references. Simon Kordonsky and Yury Plyusnin, for example, identified the main reasons for the separation of municipalities from the state as a shift in responsibility and obligations without accompanying resources. In their assessment of the situation of the early 2010s, they tend to condemn the federation that is infringing on local self-government, yet they do not analyze the reasons for these actions [12]. Interpretations may vary over time. Initially skeptical researchers [24; 13] later assessed what the state was doing as destructive and emasculating, intended to consolidate the centralization of power [23; 25; 14].

Here we have reconstructed, to a great extent, the logic of the development of local self-government in the spirit of James Scott [21]: In our discussion of the history of past decisions and their repercussions, we proceeded from the state's benevolent intention to improve socioeconomic realities and, in particular, the situation in the provinces (i.e., local self-government). The desire of the Russian authorities to improve local self-government and the negative assessments by certain experts, municipal officials, and part of the local population inevitably stemming from standardization and centralization look very much like the similarly painful responses of Scott's Prussian forest to scientific forestry and public rejection of ideally planned urban spaces.

The picture of what was happening before Federal Law No. 131-FZ was enacted was recreated from written scientific-research sources, oral descriptions of leading experts on local self-administration, and the recollections of our respondents in municipalities. Everything that follows generalizes the results of field expeditions (mainly observations and interviews) in which the present author participated in 2010 to late 2019, combined with efforts to trace and analyze the changes to legislation. As a rank-and-file, assistant, or lead researcher, the author took part in approximately 50 research exhibitions funded either by the Higher School of Economics or the Khamovniki Foundation. The geography was fairly vast: from Kaliningrad Region in the west to Khabarovsk Territory in the east, and from Arkhangelsk Region in the north to North Ossetia and Primorie Territory in the south (about 35 subjects of the Russian Federation: Some expeditions visited new municipal structures (MS) in previously visited regions). These figures are not exact: During this time, the author visited a least 350 municipalities and interviewed in each of them at least the heads of local MS or the head of a MS administration. Locals belonging to various social groups and officials of territorial departments of federal organs of executive power and representatives of regional authorities in many regions were also interviewed.

Local Self-Government in the 1990s

The system of local self-government that had been taking shape in the 1990s was strongly affected by the initial political-economic context in which its normative principles were developed and implemented. The *problem of large-scale obligations that remained in place despite a budget deficit* [12] was the first important

factor. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, the authorities had accumulated a large number of social obligations requiring considerable financial resources: free health care and education, free housing, and cheap communal and transportation services. But starting in the mid-1980s, it became much harder to fill the state coffers. As the Soviet Union's successor, Russia inherited these problems. It became clear that the obligations of the state must be immediately reduced as a matter of urgency. On the other hand, the commercialization of services earlier paid for from the budget (amid rising prices and other socioeconomic shocks) threatened to elicit extremely negative responses from the people in the form of mass protests and strikes. In these conditions, a quasi-state level, officially strictly separate from the state (a wall of sorts intended to protect the state from its population), was needed to assume—without adequate funding, which was impossible at that time—the most expensive obligations.

The *threat of the country's disintegration* was the second existential problem.[1] From the viewpoint of the socioeconomic sustainability of its territorial units, Russia hypothetically could have broken up into regions but not *municipalities, which were too small* to survive without outside economic assistance. The transfer of significant obligations, powers, and responsibilities to municipal entities would have raised the loyalty of local authorities to the federal center and ensured centripetal rather than centrifugal regional trends. In addition, fairly autonomous municipalities would have regularly confronted the authorities of the federal subjects with urgent tasks, thus diverting their attention from thoughts of independence. This means that fully-fledged local self-government with large sources of revenue and powers would have made it easier to consolidate the country and prevent its disintegration.[2]

And, finally, the third, declarative rather than significant, factor was *the desire to switch to Western socioeconomic and governance models*. As mentioned above, "romantic" ideas about local self-government being independent from the state treated this as an important step toward a democratic society: greater involvement in making decisions and greater control over their implementation. It was expected that people would independently define the necessary level of social benefits, development priorities, etc., which would make it easier to take into account socioeconomic, cultural, geographic, and other differences among Russia's territories. The fact that the municipality institution was implanted in a form that made it possible for the state to *pretend that it was a "normal"* (in the normative meaning of the ideality of Western models) *developed state* (for more information about this mimicry, see [4; 18]) and to adjust itself to Western discourse in the international arena.

Events unfolded according to this logic: The Decree of the President of the RF No. 1760[3] of 1993 was more of a temporal adaption of the Soviet law on local self-government[4] than a systemic decision. It nevertheless revealed the future framework of federal regulation (there were no set lists of possible types of municipalities and local self-government, the basic concepts remained unexplained). In December 1993, the new Constitution of the Russian Federation confirmed the separation of local self-government from state power (Art. 12).

Federal Law No. 154-FZ adopted in 1995 offered systemic confirmation of the above principles.[5] This law and corresponding laws on finances[6] confirmed the high degree of autonomy of local self-government in terms of the scope of its powers, sources of income and possible actions of its authorities. It should be said that by that time, the threat of territorial disintegration had been already averted, which made it possible to transfer many organizational issues to the federal subjects, such as the enumeration of the types of municipal structures and the order of territorial changes of municipalities.

Ratification of the European Charter of Local Self-government in 1998 was the last stage in the process of expanding the autonomy of local self-government.[7] Russia was the only signatory of the Charter to accept it in its totality: Its provisions could not be properly implemented due to their institutional complexity. The Russian federal authorities were probably guided by imitation and mimicry: not to copy the developed world but to outdo it in democracy. On the whole, the provisions of the Charter reflected in laws were and are fulfilled only if possible.

This meant that the 1991-2002 period can be described as one of maximal autonomy of local self-government in contemporary Russia; the period when the independence of local self-government from state power reached its highest point. Its closest historical analogies can be found in the first two decades after the Zemstvo Reform of Alexander II of 1864 and, taking into account the specifics of the time, local Soviets of the early to mid-1920s. This autonomy, including its financial component, was realized in highly varied forms across the extremely varied territory of the Russian Federation:

Financial and economic differentiation of municipalities. The quasi-market nature of the distribution among the territories of numerous sources of revenue plunged poor municipalities into greater poverty and made richer municipalities even richer. In other words, the minimal redistribution of financial resources among municipalities divided them into groups with very different budgets. It turned out, therefore, that local revenue completely depended on the state of municipal economies, and administrations of depressive municipalities had no money to stimulate local economics. The share of "rich" municipalities was small; certain experts [16] associated the sad state of local finances with regional politics and the gradual accumulation of funds at the regional level by federal subjects. It should be said, however, that the level of local self-government (as described earlier) was established to assume the responsibility for meeting large-scale social obligations in the absence of adequate funds. In other words, at that stage, regional powers were only partly responsible for unbalanced local budgets: The federation planned it that way from the very beginning.

High differentiation in the level of social services. This factor is mainly determined by what was mentioned above: Different municipalities required different funds to meet their obligations (even if we disregard geographic, transportation, and other differences). Many municipalities could not supply services in education, health protection, and housing and public utilities even at minimal levels. This discrimination by place of residence is increasingly obvious.

Deviant behavior of local elites. The public was largely indifferent to local

self-government (in the 1990s, people were mainly struggling to survive); therefore, autonomy and the lack of rigid rules and oversight by higher administrative bodies was frequently replaced with arbitrariness, or at least made the quality of municipal administration dependent on the personal qualities of the head of a municipality or local administration. In the late 1990s, heads of municipalities and their relatives moved into flats intended for certain social categories who had waited for them for many years. Budget funds were embezzled; local officials distanced themselves from citizens by all possible means and made decisions in their own interests or in the interests of those who paid for them.

The system of settlement and the territorial organization of the economy contracted while the old administrative-territorial structure of government continued functioning on inertia. When the Soviet Union ceased to exist and economic principles changed, migration across the country gradually increased: People followed the geographical redistribution of jobs. Small industrial towns in which industrial enterprises went bankrupt were the first victims. Collective and soviet farms (many of them reorganized) survived more or less successfully until the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the rural population started moving to district centers and regional capitals. That process, which began in the 1990s and has not yet ended,[8] was succinctly characterized by Vyacheslav Glazychev: "The model of population distribution cut according to the patterns of planned economics hung on Russia like a jacket on an emaciated man" [22].

Gradual consolidation of regional power. Having avoided the threat of territorial disintegration, the federal center transferred a wide range of organizational powers in the sphere of local self-government to the regions. Some federal subjects tried to capitalize on their new powers by integrating the municipal level into the system of regional power: They infringed on the rights of the local population to realize local self-government by de facto appointing, for example, heads of municipalities from above and shifting nonfunded mandates (powers without financial support) to municipalities.

It should be noted that despite the largely negative context, there were positive practices and examples of the successful organization of independent and full-scale local self-government. This refers to municipalities in which official institutions were successfully transformed into the initially intended models: The public wanted self-government and there was enough money to realize all powers; locally elected heads were addressing the problems of their territories and people's needs in a professional manner. But on the whole, positive practices were few and far between. Even more significant is the fact that information of this sort practically never reached the federal center via the feedback system. Even if bits and pieces became known, they left a much weaker impression than information about problems. Most managers and administrators were more concerned about failures and dysfunctionalities in the system than about promoting successful practices.

Reform of 2003

Everything that the state has been doing in the first two decades of the 21st

century in local self-government amid the gradually improving socioeconomic situation in the country (which expanded the realm of possibilities of the federal center) can be interpreted as a response to the current state of affairs, numerous complaints from all parts of the country, and the desire to bring more order.

Increased involvement of the central authorities in any process is usually accompanied by the standardization (unification) of that process. In other words, to influence any phenomenon, the state must first understand and classify it to make it more transparent and manageable. For example, starting in the early 19th century, the state sought to regulate land tenure and simplify the process of land inheritance, and actively opposed strip holdings of land, a system that peasant communities found highly useful but that remained vague and incomprehensible to outside observers [21]. These relationships should have been clearly organized, and the country needed a single unified system of measurement. Until the early 18th century, Russia relied on local measures of weight that were understandable to the local population but unacceptable to the central authorities.

By the early 21st century, the state had inherited from the previous period scores of different types of municipalities, local power structures, specific local taxes, and varying scopes of local power. This was a logical result of the *carte blanche* organization of local self-government previously sanctioned by the state. Seen from the center, the municipal level looked opaque and chaotic. The state saw the need to create and consolidate on a legislative basis identical organizational foundations—in particular, a set list of all possible forms of municipalities—and to unify the scope of rights and powers as its top priority. A large number of complaints and requests made the restoration of financial "fairness"—the leveling out of municipal budgets—the second most important priority. The state had to reorganize the processes of redistributing resources among donor and recipient territories.

Thus, Federal Law No. 131-FZ acquired a firm foundation in the form of the indispensable unification[9] of local self-government (unified organizational foundations across the country) and the leveling out of the financial statuses of municipalities to achieve at least a minimal (at best unified) level of social services. The powers of local self-government were clearly defined, while their scope remained practically the same as in the previous period.[10] Even more important, at this stage, the authorities did not abandon the idea of addressing as many socioeconomic issues as possible at the level closest to people. A two-tiered model of local self-government (districts and constituent settlements) was created for non-urban territories.

Federal laws were passed to establish acceptable models to limit the impact of federal subjects on local self-governments. The Budget[11] and Tax[12] codes contained detailed descriptions of sources of local budget revenue; tax and nontax revenues were reduced compared to the previous period. The fiscal system was, on the whole, centralized to level out, as mentioned above, the budgets of lower structures by higher structures. The problem of nonfunded mandates at the municipal level received due attention; according to proposed laws, delegated powers must be accompanied by money in the form of subventions.

The new law on local self-government was implemented in stages and not nationwide. Some of the provisions of Federal Law No. 131-FZ entered into force in October 2002 and were enacted in 46 subjects of the RF on 1 January, 2006; in the other subjects (with the exception of Chechnya and Ingushetia, where administrative borders remained vague), this happened on January 1, 2010 [16; 28].

Its practical implementation somewhat distorted the basic principles. From the very beginning, the "nested doll of paternalism" proved to be a destructive factor: Each level of government doubted the ability of lower level authorities to handle self-government, which explains why the formal norms of transferring the full scope of possibilities and money were frequently neglected. Many municipal districts, for example, tried to prevent any consolidation of settlements. They accumulated money at their level and unofficially pushed settlements to transfer their rights to the district level. Interviewed district-level officials of local self-government attributed the situation to the inability of settlement officials to dispatch all their duties due to the lack of trained personnel, financial, organizational, and other resources. It should be said in all fairness that many settlements had no chance even to test their abilities.

For objective reasons—the continued outflow of people due to internal migration that reduced the population size and even the number of settlements in rural localities (with the exception of territories in southern fertile zones)—some regions tried to simplify the system of municipal self-government on their territories. In this context, due to the proportional number of specialists (the number of municipal officials per 1,000 people), rural municipalities might seem overstaffed and in need of optimization. On the other hand, socially vulnerable groups (poor families, disabled people, and pensioners) who remained in depressive municipalities needed a wide range of social services and were not mobile enough to go to other settlements to get them. Self-government bodies were among the few local employers; this means that their liquidation reduced the number of jobs in the local labor market and launched the multiplicative process of the depopulation of rural localities.

Financial centralization supplied federal subjects with even more tools of informal pressure on municipalities. Some of them sought to hoard as much money as possible at their level without disbursing it to municipalities, thus discouraging them from building up their own revenue basis. For example, a new investor increased a municipality's tax revenues during the first financial period, but in the second financial period, the region reduced the volume of equalizing transfers by approximately the same amount. From the perspective of municipalities, this practice looked unfair and killed any motivation to develop the economy on their territories.[13]

To sum up, the reform formally unified local self-government but burdened municipalities with the responsibility for a wide range of local issues while considerably limiting their financial resources. Their volume depended not so much on their efforts as on the frequently subjective decisions of the regional authorities.

Indirect Regulation

The status of local self-government changed not only due to the reform described above, but also because of the stricter regulation of adjacent spheres and the extreme consolidation of the organizing foundations of public governance in general.

Public procurement. In the mid-2000s, the state started paying closer attention to the procurement of goods, labor, and services for government and public organizations[14] in order to bring more order to state and municipal procurement, make the process transparent and controllable, and end nepotism and corruption. New organizational principles reached the municipal level as well. This approach became the dominant one in the early-mid 2000s, when the central authorities imposed on all government entities uniform mechanisms and principles of work that gradually deprived local self-government bodies of real autonomy. Under Federal Law No. 131-FZ, they retained their powers, but their real possibilities, the measures they could implement and the instruments they could use were gradually limited by other normative legal acts, including by-laws issued by federal executive power agencies. Under Federal Law No. 94-FZ, municipalities were de facto deprived of the right to choose suppliers of goods, labor, and services on their own.

It should be said that in municipal practice, nepotism is not invariably a destructive phenomenon: Local authorities preferred to cooperate with those whom they knew well in order to guarantee quality and reliability. Informal contacts made it possible to influence the contractor, facilitate better quality and even ensure the prompt fulfillment of contractual obligations. Local municipal procurement stimulates local economies. Public procurement encouraged a shift from the (possible) subjectivity of the customer to the deviant behavior of the supplier. Those who won bids flourished; bogus companies arrived from other regions to win tenders by submitting low-ball bids. They never intended to fulfill the order. At best, they took a slapdash approach by supplying the cheapest goods with a corresponding level of quality. Here is an example. Before Federal Law No. 94-FZ was adopted, a small bakery in a municipality of Pskov Region sold half of its products through retail outlets and the other half to a local hospital and schools. The bakery employees were fully cognizant of their social and moral responsibility. They carefully checked the quality of their ingredients and products, since their children and the children of their friends and relatives who live in the same municipality ate their bread. When Federal Law No. 94-FZ went into force, several firms from St. Petersburg offered the lowest prices and won the contract to supply bread to the local schools and the hospital. First, the quality of food at local schools and the hospital diminished; people complained of a "synthetic" taste. Second, the bakery lost half of its revenue: It still sold its products through retail outlets, but lost revenue from sales to state and municipal enterprises made it impossible to survive. The bakery went bankrupt and its workers lost their jobs. This hurt the local economy. At the local level, this law undermined many local economies, pushed small local road builders, foodstuff producers, construction companies, etc. out of local markets.

Municipalities lost their economic tools and could no longer stimulate the local economy through public procurement.

Activities of oversight and supervisory agencies. It was approximately at the same time, in the mid-latter half of the 2000s, that the country's leaders firmly demanded that small businesses no longer be harassed [20]. But the organizational principles of oversight and supervisory agencies and the assessment of their activities remained unchanged. The demand to reduce the number of inspections of private enterprises and private entrepreneurs contradicted the requirements to uncover a certain number of violations every year. In an effort to find an optimal solution, the numerous oversight agencies—the public prosecutor's office, health and sanitation agencies, fire departments, environmental protection agencies, environmental watchdogs, engineering supervisors, etc.—turned their attention to local self-governments and agencies within their jurisdiction as the least administratively and politically protected level of public power. It turned out that it was much easier or even more comfortable to meet oversight and supervision quotas by targeting these entities: They were less mobile than businesses and were less able to retreat into the shadows, reorganize themselves or move to other places. Local self-administration found itself in a quandary: Laws in Russia are broad, contradictory[15] and very often vague enough to allow all sorts of interpretations. This means that no matter what they were doing, municipal powers were breaking laws. This created a strong destructive effect; positively minded local officials who came to municipalities driven by ideological considerations were unpleasantly surprised.

A good example is the frequent flooding caused by the infrequent dredging of local rivers. According to the Water Code of the Russian Federation,[16] all rivers are federal property, which means that dredging carried out by municipalities of local rivers without permission from above is regarded by oversight and supervisory bodies as damage to the property of the Russian Federation and unlawful use of municipal budget funds punishable by sanctions. In simpler terms, the local authorities have no right to dredge. On the other hand, floods and the resulting emergency situations bring heads of municipalities to court on accusations of negligence. During our field studies, we met municipal officials who, fully aware of the negative repercussions of spending budget money on properties of other levels of government (illustrated by the negative experience of neighbors or their predecessors), opted for inaction. Others tried to solve the problem on their own and were placed under investigation; some entered into unofficial agreements with local public prosecutors and other oversight agencies that promised to overlook the violations caused by objectively necessary measures to prevent emergency situations.

In this sense, *strict oversight and the gap between formal norms and local realities make the human factor* (*the possibility of reaching a* "*consensus*") *very important*; *strange as it may seem, it plays the same role in unregulated contexts*. We should bear in mind, however, that *this makes it impossible to spread best practices* across the country. More than once, municipal officials told us that the actions of municipal powers strictly punished by the public prosecutor's office in some regions are ignored in others.

Official statistics. During the same period, the state decided that it was time to improve the quality of the information basis of decision-making and increase the transparency of the system for collecting and analyzing statistical data. The federal law on official statistics[17] was passed in 2007; a year earlier, in 2006, two normative legal acts were enacted to bring more order to the use of information technologies.[18] This made local self-governments objects, rather than subjects of official statistics—they lost their statistical services even if the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) could not meet their informational needs; municipalities could no longer request generalized data and information about physical and juridical persons from territorial divisions of federal organs of executive power (inspections of the Federal Tax Service, local branches of Rosstat and the Ministry of the Interior, etc.).

Similar changes were taking place in other spheres: New unified rules for registering state and municipal property ("skidding" cadastral registration) and unified rules for dealing with people's requests were established; municipalities were connected to a single system of interdepartmental digital interaction. Each of those measures reduced the autonomy and range of opportunities of local self-government—in short, everything they had done at their own discretion to do their job. By the early 2010s, local self-government became responsible for a wide range of issues of local importance (and even issues within the purview of higher levels of government, judging by the above cases) but had limited budgets and means due, in particular, to the close oversight of watchdog agencies, which made it hard to achieve many benchmarks.[19]

This trend is still very much alive. The organization of municipal school education is regulated much more strictly than before thanks to constantly updated federal standards. In 2016, the state realized that it should get involved in funeral services and cemetery maintenance, previously a municipal matter [17].

Direct Impact

Due to budget deficits and limited means, many local government bodies could not handle the greater responsibility, prompting a flood of complaints from people and regional powers. Municipalities were accused of failing to provide social services at an adequate level and perform their functions in general. By that time, the financial status and the socioeconomic situation allowed the federation to centralize power and reform the social sphere (by introducing quasi-market mechanisms), starting with the most important issues, in the state's view.

It all started in 2011, when the *health protection system was moved from the municipal to the regional level*.[20] Centralized resources and a smaller number of management subjects were expected to unify the level of medical services, bring more money to the health protection system and attract skilled medical workers. Having acquired wider powers, most federal subjects began to "optimize" the health care system on their territories: Hospitals were enlarged while rural medical stations in small settlements and villages were shut down. Those that decided

to do so ignored the fact that public transportation services, especially in the depressive territories, had been reduced. In the past, transportation companies made several trips a day from small villages to administrative centers where central district hospitals were located. Now, transport routes between the central parts of settlements and district centers is limited to two or three trips a week. This means that the process of concentrating resources in certain areas occurred at the same time that people were losing transportation resources. Today, the population is highly differentiated according to the accessibility of medical assistance. Those who live close to hospitals and other medical institutions have found themselves, on the whole, in a better situation, while those who live on the periphery are deprived of all types of medical assistance.

In 2014, another important change occurred:[21] Realizing that rural settlements had not acquired real status, federal authorities transferred many of their *existential powers to the municipal level* (urban settlements retained their status). The Explanatory Note to the document commented that "in view of a considerable deficit of material, financial, and human resources, rural settlements have become overburdened with powers… Municipal regions expected to exercise their inter-settlement powers on corresponding territories are helping rural settlements deal with many local problems or even acting in their stead."[22] The deficit of material, financial, and human resources at the settlement level is largely a result of the concentration of these resources at the district level. These amendments were not welcomed in some settlements, in part because, having acquired resources and formal authority, municipal powers pushed the periphery aside to concentrate on developing district centers. Later, the number of officials in rural settlements was reduced, which caused more opposition: Local administrations in rural non-fertile areas were the main employers together with schools, houses of culture, and medical stations.

Federal Law No. 136-FZ also introduced two new types of municipalities to create *a two-tiered system of local self-government in urban okrugs*. This did not align with the general trend of changes at the discussed stage. At first, in order to preserve the unity of urban economies, Federal Law No. 131-FZ did not envisage municipalities in the form of inner-urban districts in urban okrugs. This was done as an experiment: While the two-tier model of local self-government had failed in rural areas, perhaps it would prove more effective in urban okrugs with their potentially more active population (from the standpoint of involvement in the formal mechanisms of self-organization). This model, likewise, shrank to Chelyabinsk, Samara and Makhachkala—three urban okrugs with inner-urban districts.

In 2014, it was legislated[23] that the powers to *deal with solid communal waste should be transferred from the municipal to the regional level*. A lack of the required organizational foundation, material basis, and infrastructure caused implementation of the law to be postponed until January 1, 2019. It was expected that the centralized collection and removal of solid communal waste would make it possible to organize the processing and reuse of waste, thus minimizing the volume of dumped waste. Today, various regions are demonstrating various results. A few subjects worked hard to improve the new system, which proved effective

in 2019. In other subjects, regional operators remain passive even after having signed subcontracts with former waste disposal contractors; and in some regions, regional operators have not even started operating even after winning contracts (at least as of the fall of 2019). Municipalities had no choice but to spend non-earmarked funds to deal with waste on their own.

In 2015, a new mechanism for appointing municipal heads[24] made it absolutely clear that *local self-government would be formally included in the vertical of power*. In the past, municipal heads were elected either by direct vote or from among the members of the elected representative structure. Now, the selection of candidates is entrusted to selection commissions that nominate candidates to representative structures with a recommendation to elect a certain candidate as head of their municipality. Half of the members of these commissions are appointed by local representative structures and the other half by the governor of the region. In the case of municipal districts, urban okrugs, urban okrugs with inner-urban districts, and municipal okrugs, half of the members of selection commissions are appointed by corresponding representative structures and the other half by heads of municipal districts or urban okrugs with inner-urban districts. According to the authors of the amendments, conflicts between heads of municipalities and governors often negatively affected the quality of governance and life in related municipalities. The amendments were expected to guarantee smooth and constructive relationships between heads of various levels. Each federal subject is free to choose the desirable model; most opted for controlled municipalities.

In May 2019, the *single-tier model of local self-government on rural territories was simplified by a newly established type of municipal unit*, *the municipal okrug*.[25] By that time, the process of municipal reform had stirred up conceptual chaos of sorts. Indeed, the desire to reduce the number of municipal officials and municipalities resulted in the establishment of urban okrugs on mainly rural territories. During our expeditions, we met mainly the following forms of optimization.

Amalgamation of rural settlements and unification of rural and urban settlements. In 2009-2014, this was the main optimization variant caused by the shortage of skilled personnel (it was next to impossible to find the necessary number of deputies and employ enough officials for administrations in rural areas). There were other causes: conflicts between heads of districts and settlements; economic considerations (the desire to cut the cost of municipal elections and the wages of municipal officials); and the desire to even out the statistical indices of a territory by uniting the "strong" with the "weak."

Between 2015 and mid-2019, *transformation of municipal districts into urban okrugs was the most popular form of optimization*. In many cases, this was done because the (as a rule, newly elected) governor wanted to change the municipal elites to ensure their loyalty and manageability; in other cases, regional powers wanted to liquidate the settlement level to simplify administration. They claimed that this would save money, accumulate financial resources, and ease life for the local population.

Some urban okrugs of this type replaced rural municipal districts. To achieve

the uniformity of the territories within municipalities, Federal Law No. 131-FZ required that no less than two-thirds of the total population of an urban okrug be living in urban conditions. In all other cases, a municipal okrug should be created. In 2019, municipal districts were actively transformed into municipal okrugs in Kemerovo Region (and to a lesser extent in Tver Region and Perm Territory); in 2020, Perm and Primorie Territories and Kirov Region joined the process.

As a rule, a considerable portion of enlarged budgets is redistributed in favor of the administrative center of the municipality. Under the pressure of these changes and the redistribution of funds, the inner periphery is widening, and the territories of former noncentral rural settlements are losing residents. Territorial departments that replaced village councils (if this was done at all) survive at least six months before being liquidated. Statistics aggregated from a large territorial unit look more balanced, but in fact, living standards are differentiating.[26] It should be said that informal and socially important functions of municipal officials (e.g., supporting elderly people who have no one to look after them, maintaining communal facilities with budget funds, and monitoring dysfunctional families)[27] are ignored when the system of local self-government is simplified.

Our survey has described the main stages of changes. It is absolutely clear, however, that since the early 2010s, the state has been gradually appropriating economic and social functions, starting with the most important and problematic ones that had been previously transferred to the municipal level. At the same time, to increase the controllability of municipalities, signs of their subordination are becoming more explicit, and territorial changes are fostering the consolidation of municipalities and the creation of a single-tiered system of local self-government.

Conclusion

On the basis of our studies, we are convinced that the "local self-government" concept is quite broad in substance. We can even say that, simplified or merely outlined, the ontology of local self-government in Russia consists of at least three "levels of reality":
   (1) *state* (federal and regional) governance of municipal units
   (2) *municipal governance* (mainly paternalist in relation to the population and in the means and methods used by local self-government to deal with local problems; formalized mechanisms of self-government)
   (3) *local self-government* (mainly informal self-organization of the local population to deal with local problems and, in certain cases, with local officials performing coordinating functions).

While in the 1990s, the second and third levels were de facto detached from the core of the state, starting in the early 2000s, the second level is gradually being raised to the first. The president of the Russian Federation has already outlined the logical conclusion of this process [26]; a unified system of public power will soon be established.[28] When local authorities are integrated into the single state

structure, they will be detached from their population, and the independent socioeconomic processes taking place in society (at the third level) will become less transparent for municipal officials and preserve (frequently illusory) transparency for the state.

On the whole, corrections are made to the system of local self-government on the basis of complaints and not on positive practices implemented at various stages. The social state provoked parasitic sentiments and did not motivate people and other entities to take independent action or seek self-sufficiency. The state and municipalities have grown accustomed to paternalism and do not expect feedback from the people. Faced with the threat of plummeting living standards, citizens can organize themselves partly by involving population segments that are normally indifferent to government and social policy. It is expected that integrating municipalities into the centralized system (resulting in the simplification of the current forms of municipal administration and their alienation from the local context) will multiply the number of similar manifestations of negatively tinged spontaneous self-organization.

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Notes

1   This threat as a factor responsible for the autonomous status of local self-government was assessed as such by Olga Motyakova (in 2002-2005—deputy head of the department of the Committee of the Federation Council on local government; in 2005-1011, head of the department of the Committee of the Federation Council on federal affairs, regional policies, local self-government and northern territories).

2   This was one of the factors responsible for centripetal trends.

3   Decree of the President of the RF No. 1760 of October 26, 1993, "On Municipal Reform in the Russian Federation."

4   Law of the RSFSR No. 1550-1 of July 6, 1991, "On Local Self-Government in the RSFSR."

5   Federal Law No. 154-FZ of August 28, 1995, "On General Principles of Organization of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation."

6   Federal Law No. 126-FZ of September 25, 1997, "On Financial Foundations of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation."

7   Federal Law No. 55-FZ of April 11, 1998, "On Ratification of the European Charter of Local Self-government."

8   With the exception of southern fertile territories and certain other zones.

9   As could be expected, this unification was later criticized by the expert community; its members argued that, given the great geographic, economic, social, cultural, etc. differences in Russia, strictly unified principles would prove inefficient in certain places where they could not be adapted to local requirements.

10 Formulation of questions of local importance is by no means a simple issue. The legislative body deliberately made them more or less generalized to allow local authorities to adjust them to local conditions. Municipalities, however, first did not understand what they should do if the law says that they should "promote," "create conditions for," or "take part in." Second, as we will demonstrate below, the broadness of the interpretations of unspecified provisions by oversight and supervisory agencies allowed them to impose sanctions on local self-governments.

11 Federal Law No. 143-FZ of July 31, 1998, "Budget Code of the Russian Federation."

12 Federal law No. 146-FZ of July 31, 1998, "Tax Code of the Russian Federation. Part One" and Federal Law No. 117- FZ of August 5, 2000, "Tax Code of the Russian Federation. Part Two."

13 The trap of the welfare state: redistribution discouraged both the recipients and the donors.

14 Federal Law No. 94-FZ of 21 July 2005, "On State and Municipal Procurement of Goods, Works and Services"; replaced by the Federal Law No. 44-FZ of April 5, 2013, "On the Contract System in State and Municipal Procurement of Goods, Works and Services."

15 According to Law No. 131-FZ municipalities had to realize any of its powers, while according to another relevant law, in particular, No. 44-FZ on the contract system or the Civil Code, they had no such rights.

16 Federal Law No. 74-FZ of June 3, 2006, "Water Code of the Russian Federation," Article 8.

17 Federal Law No. 282-FZ of November 29, 2007, "On Official Statistical Records and System of State Statistics in the Russian Federation."

18 Federal Law No. 149-FZ of July 27, 2006, "On Information, Informational Technologies and Protection of Information," Federal Law No. 152-FZ of July 27, 2006, "On Personal Data."

19 From an interview with one high-level municipal official: "*R*. If they fail to find the culprit he will be appointed. *N*. From among municipal officials. *R*. Yes, there is no other option. This is the same problem—one of the deadliest. Basically: they give you a space, tie your hands behind your back and say 'start diggings.' "

20 Federal Law No. 323-FZ of November 21, 2011, "On Basics of Health Protection of the Citizens in the Russian Federation."

21 Federal Law No. 136-FZ of May 27, 2014, "On Amendments of Article 26.3 of the Fed-

eral Law "On the General principles of the organization of legislative (representative) and executive bodies of State power of the subjects of the Russian Federation" and the Federal Law "On General principles of organization of local self-government of the Russian Federation."

[22] From the Explanatory Note to the draft law No. 469827-6 (see at http://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/469827-6).

[23] Federal Law No. 458-FZ of December 29, 2014, (variant of April 3, 2018) "On amendments to the Federal Law 'On production and consumption waste' " and individual legislative acts of the Russian Federation and recognition of certain legislative acts (provisions of legislative acts) of the Russian Federation as invalid.

[24] Federal Law No. 8-FZ of February 3, 2015, "On Amendments of Articles 32 and 33 of the Federal Law 'The basic guarantees of electoral rights and the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to participate in a referendum' and in Federal Law 'On the general principles of the organization of local self-government in the Russian Federation.' "

[25] Federal Law No. 87-FZ of May 1, 2019, "On Amendments to Federal Law "On general principles of organization of local self-government in the Russian Federation."

[26] This also happens when regions are enlarged: the "weak" and the "strong" areas are united to yield better statistics, yet the real disproportions do not disappear but become even more apparent (see [1]).

[27] Much of the above belongs to federal and regional responsibilities (social services, district police officers). They, too, were optimized; today they are not always present in rural localities.

[28] Formally, a unified system of public power is not nationalization or even a change. Earlier, both the state (federal and regional) and the municipal levels of power were component parts of a single system of public power. The discourse of central power and responses in the administrative structure suggest that in this sense, public power per se will be nationalized and the municipal level absorbed.

Translated by Valentina Levina

Educational Failure of Russian Students: A Sociological Interpretation of the Problem

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Abstract. This article contains a sociological analysis of the problem of educational failure of Russian undergraduate, specialist and master's degree students. On the basis of research materials and with due account of the real educational practices of higher education, it shows that the problem under consideration is indeed very relevant for Russian society. The authors argue that the pedagogical dimension of students' educational failure is not enough to understand its causes and essence, and that a sociological interpretation is necessary. The latter is carried out in the article at three levels—community, organizational, and institutional, yielding a profile of educationally unsuccessful students. At the organizational level, educational failure is influenced by the system of intra-university interaction of academic, pedagogical and managerial personnel. In a broader sense, it is due to institutional gaps and contradictions that exist in the relationship between higher education and society's institutions. This article identifies the social factors that contribute to the educational failure of students.

Keywords: educational failure, higher education, students, universities.

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Introduction

Educational failure is one of the key problems of Russian higher education. The problem has been noted both by scholars [1; 8; 18] and public figures [20; 21; 19]. Today it has repercussions beyond the academic milieu, acquiring social resonance and calling for a sociological interpretation.

Let us mention the limitations of traditional research, which have prompted us to develop our own approach to the problem and predetermined its novelty. Traditionally, academic failure and dropout of students have been viewed as a strictly educational and pedagogical problem [11]. However, pedagogical tools and innovations have proved unable to eliminate the problem of educational failure. Obviously, the problem has to do with not only the educational, but also the social context of higher education, which reflects the contradictions between society and higher education.

Another limitation of research is that it is confined to the university level [16; 15] and restricts the social space and the number of actors involved in its orbit. Typically, these include students, teachers, university administration, and sometimes parents and family. Proceeding from earlier studies [6; 10; 5], we propose to broaden the "organizational" framework of the problem to the institutional level and include the impact of government policy in the field of higher education, pre-university education, employers and the labor market. This shift of focus makes it possible to show how student educational failure originates at the pre-university level, is inherited and reinforced at the university level, and translates into social and professional failure of graduates.

Today, the traditional interpretation of educational failure as exclusively academic failure has exhausted its heuristic potential. Although academic underachievement is the most salient sign of student failure [2; 3] it is necessary to expand the interpretation of the phenomenon by including such categories as educational motivation, professional self-determination, research activity, behavioral strategies and social emotions. This would help to reveal the mechanisms of student educational, research and social activities that can be instrumental in eliminating educational failure [12; 7].

The aim of this article—a sociological interpretation of the problem of educational failure of Russian students—implies the solution of the following tasks: (1) description of failing students as part of the educational community of students; (2) consideration of failing students as part of the system of organizational relations and practices at Russian universities; (3) analysis of educational failure through the prism of institutional contradictions and gaps affecting the link between higher education and other institutions of Russian society; (4) identification of the social factors contributing to educational failure of students, along with the study of this phenomenon and its impact on social processes and relations.

In this article we aggregate the data of sociological studies of higher education in the Ural Federal District (UFD) that we conducted in 2011-2020. These include: (1) semi-formal interviews with administrators and teaching staff of universities in the UFD (N = 80 in 2016; N = 30 in 2019-2020); (2) eight focus

groups with students at Yekaterinburg universities, of which three were held in the pre-COVID-19 period (November-December 2019) and five in June-October 2020; (3) online survey of university students in the Sverdlovsk Region (summer 2020, N = 410 respondents), quota sample by age, error margin 3.5%; (4) survey of teachers on student motivation and their readiness to study at university (2011-2017). We have aggregated data for 200 academic groups.

Educational Failures in the Body of Russian Students

Educational failure of students is a complex qualitative characteristic of their activities in the process of learning and interaction with the research and pedagogical staff and the education institution. There is a discrepancy between the students' personal academic achievements and educational level, on the one hand, and society's expectations, on the other. The most vivid manifestation of this discrepancy is the inability to meet educational standards and attain proficiency in educational programs.

The aggregated body of interview materials has revealed the following main characteristics of student educational failure: poor disciplinary and meta-disciplinary competences (unpreparedness for higher education programs); lack of positive educational motivation; difficulty in choosing a major; lack of interest in accumulating human capital and in social achievement; lack of research activity; propensity for academic cheating; negative social emotions related to education (low self-esteem, dissatisfaction, resentment, lack of self-confidence).

University students remain one of the largest social communities in the country, in spite of the 40% drop in the size of the student body during the 2010s. The number of baccalaureate, specialist and master's degree students dropped from 7,050,000 in 2010-11 to a little over 4,161,000 in 2018-19 [4, p. 181]. Official statistics and earlier research do not give an idea of the proportion of educational failures in the Russian student body. Let us therefore turn to the results of our study conducted in 2011-2017 at universities in the Ural Federal District.

The survey revealed that 55% of students in provincial universities had positive educational motivation. Only 15% fulfilled their aspiration, while 40% of students in this group wanted to but were unable to study successfully. They were short of knowledge and skills due to poor school background. Of the 45% that had no wish to study, 30% were qualified for further study and 15% were "unteachable." Thus, about 85% of the students at provincial universities belonged to the risk group of those unable or unwilling to learn [17, p. 106]. The data obtained enabled us to structure the educational community by the place and role of its individual groups in the life of the university and the student body, and to single out the "nucleus," "semi-periphery" and "periphery."

The "nucleus" are groups of students who achieve significant academic results in research, discoveries, inventions, culture, arts, and sports and are socially active. They are the vanguard of the student body who set the pace of its development. Students in the "semi-periphery" make some progress in the aforemen-

tioned fields, primarily in education. It is thanks to this (the largest) part that the Russian student community reproduces itself as an educational community. The "periphery" of the student body includes the groups that do not have and do not seek to have any significant results in any of the above spheres, notably in the priority education sphere.

On the strength of the study, we estimate the ratios of the "nucleus," "semi-periphery" and "periphery" to be 15%, 55% and 30% respectively. Academically unsuccessful students form the entire "periphery" and about half of the "semi-periphery." Note that these are above all students of non-elite educational establishments of Russian regions which, in turn, are on the "semi-periphery" and "periphery" of Russian higher education. For years the quality of admission to these universities has been consistently poor, unlike the universities in the capitals and megalopolises that take in "high achievers" and Olympiad winners.[1]

The relations between failures and high achievers are a special aspect of the sociological interpretation of the problem. There is often no love lost between them if a large part of the student group shows characteristics of academic failure: "A good student is someone who works in a team, takes the side of the other guys, can listen to them and does not press his point of view… Nerds are interesting only to each other but not to us" (focus group excerpt). In such groups, motivated students try to keep a low profile, not to parade their knowledge and their interest in studies and science.

On the contrary, in a high-achieving group educational failure is seen as pathology; low-achieving students are "taken in hand" or condemned for their attitude to studies, truancy and academic cheating: "The whole group knows that he used cheat notes. He is treated accordingly. Guys tease him over the way he tries to curry favor with them and with the teachers. He may do stuff like bring a girl a coffee, but still he is not treated very well" (focus group excerpt).

Our 2019-2020 interviews have revealed the more significant social factor that aggravate academic failure in the context of the economic crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Some of these are traditional (the quality of pre-university training and level of socio-economic inequality in society) and some are relatively new (massive digitization of higher education and non-recognition of academic failure as a problem of state education policy).

The introduction of online technologies and distance learning have sharpened the division of the student body into achievers and failures. The secondary school students set on going to university and equipped for independent study have quickly adapted themselves to the new format. They have maintained their academic standards, developed digital competences, habits of self-organized study and activated additional education practices: "Online education helps us to discover new opportunities and find new ways of communicating during classes. It's interesting when we can work together through Google. It's much easier to contact teachers, and they answer our messages more readily now" (focus group excerpt).

Another portion of students (both members of the "periphery" and "semi-periphery") have found themselves in a situation of social and academic deprivation.

These students have lost their connection with the university, the faculty, or their group, run up long lists of missed assignments, have been cheating more often and are facing expulsion. Note that we are talking about the shortcomings of online education, which aggravated academic failure under the COVID-19 regime: "We are all very well aware of the difference between offline and online. Not only information, but also non-verbal contact with the teacher, classmates, and team spirit are also important. Even when you don't say a word during a lecture, you still communicate with other people (if only through eye contact). Information sinks in less well in isolation. There is no sense of life, the seriousness of what is happening" (focus group excerpt).

Our study has revealed the discrepancy between the ways academic success during the pandemic is assessed by the students and by the university. Focus group participants note that online learning makes it easier to pass exams and get credits, but more difficult to acquire quality knowledge. "Total online" gives many a sense of fatigue and disenchantment. A survey of students in the Sverdlovsk Region (2020) has shown that the pandemic-induced transition from traditional forms of study to online and distance forms has dramatically downgraded many educational performance indicators (see table).

Meanwhile, university officials believe that quick transition to distance learning has stimulated students to do more independent work. One university reports a significant improvement of overall academic performance and its quality indicators (from 66.5% to 70.8% and from 49.0% to 54.7% respectively), the share of students awarded personal scholarships and Straight A Student titles, relieved of paying fees, etc. [22]. Granted, the official reports do not say what proportion of students accounts for these positive trends and what happens to the other, the low-achieving portion.

Table

How do you assess the impact of the switch from traditional to online forms of education during the pandemic?
(% of respondents)

Indicator of educational activity	Improved	Worsened	No change	Hard to say
Quality of information technologies	32.7	27.7	22.3	17.3
Quality of education	15.1	61.9	12.1	10.9
Academic performance	29.7	36.4	21.1	12.8
Motivation	15.0	55.6	18.0	11.4
Ability to study independently	28.5	36.4	23.3	11.8

What are we to make of the contradiction indicated above? In the opinion of students, the switch to online technologies has not improved the real quality of education, and continuation of this trend after the pandemic is over will aggravate their educational failure. University administrators argue that the pandemic has shown that online learning may improve academic performance, and that the future of higher education definitely belongs to it. This already very real scenario does not take into account the increased risk of students' educational failure.

Looking at the prospects for educationally failing students, we have to bear in mind the worsening social and economic conditions of students and their families due to the pandemic [24]. Along with cuts in budgetary funding of higher education, family investments in it are likely to diminish too. In recent years, of course, these have been one of the main sources of support of higher education. This poses the risk that even school students who are doing quite well academically but come from low-resource families may choose a professional track (vocational school) instead of an academic one (university), so that higher education will have a smaller reserve for reproducing the successful section of the student body. Shrinking family incomes and parents' unemployment are prompting a change of behavioral strategies of students who have to choose between going to work and getting a good education. The logical result of this process will be deteriorating quality of education and growing number of academic low achievers.

The increase of academic failures poses serious risks for society and for the professional and social environment of university graduates. Such alarmist predictions are based on the notion that graduates "inherit" many value, motivational and behavioral characteristics of educational failures.

Educational Failure of Students as an Organizational and Institutional Problem of Higher Education

A sociological interpretation of student educational failure dictates the need to consider it within the system of university organizational relations. This may clarify many of the contradictions and conflicts that prevent the university community from addressing the strategic tasks of higher education development in a constructive way.

University teachers and managers obviously take different positions on educationally failing students. The differences have to do not only with the substance of the problem, but also with the readiness (or lack of it) to discuss the problem. For university management the main criterion of the quality of admitted students is Unified State Examination (USE) scoring. This approach is dictated by the macro-regulator, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education—which proceeds from data of the TIMSS (Trends in Mathematics and Science Study),[2] and the Federal Service for Supervision in Education and Science on the USE results and monitoring of admissions quality to give an optimistic forecast of the development of the student body. Hence the upbeat rhetoric of the universities, which see a growing number of "excellent" and "good" students among the applicants.

The opinions of teachers are less optimistic: "Just imagine, they passed the USE in mathematics and they can't round off or calculate percentages. They passed the Russian language test and wrote the composition, and they don't have the rudiments of academic writing. They don't know how to write a library research paper (not a compilation), an essay or to speak coherently on a topic in an expository manner for ten minutes" (No. 7, associate professor). Teachers point out that future academic performance depends not only on high USE scores but

also on the student's creativity, analytical abilities, critical thinking, motivation and industry. Thus, the teaching and research staff and the university administrators use different criteria for assessing the students' human capital. For the administrators, students are a factor that determines the quantitative indicators of the university's performance. For the teachers, front and center is the ability of students to sustain the quality of education and science and, upon graduation, the level of their professional socialization and overall professional culture.

University management adheres to the policy of "student retention" aimed at preserving the student body at all costs. Behind this practice is the system of per capita funding and the need to preserve the university budget and teaching positions. Another attitude frequently expressed by teachers is as follows: "Flunkers and slackers attempt to complete their exams or credits three, four or even five to six times. Of course, when the administrators see 20 applications landing on their desks from students who have flunked 10 or more exams, they begin to wonder how to preserve the student body. Their reaction is simple: give them another chance, otherwise we'll have our staff chart slashed and you'll be without a job. But students' knowledge does not increase with the number of times they try to pass their tests" (No. 11, professor).

The position of the teaching community can be summed up as follows: something can be done about failing students, but for that there need to be organizational conditions and resources, i.e., time and no sanctions for there being failures in academic groups. Also, work with such students should be included in the instructor's teaching load and effective employment contract.

Another reason for the aforementioned contradiction is that university management devises simulation strategies to handle this problem: it is not mentioned in the public space, speeches highlight only success stories, reports refer only to positive trends in student educational and research activities. Members of research and teaching staff, driven by their pedagogical duty, on the contrary, do what they can to highlight this problem as being key to the development of universities and higher education. However, with teaching jobs becoming increasingly precarious and bureaucratic pressure mounting, teachers' resistance to the "student retention" policy is waning: "The key parameter for our university is to preserve the student body. A student fails on-the-job practice? It's the teacher's fault. Students are not afraid of expulsion, they know they'll be retained until the end" (No. 15, professor).

Predictably, this contradiction is exacerbated when a university's performance is assessed only on its achievements and practically does not take into account the situation with academically failing students. One may as well raise the question of opening resilient schools[3] for which every student is precious and needs to be pampered. Such a policy enables universities to develop and retain youth in their cities. Such universities are very important for territorial development and national security, and therefore are entitled to state financial support.

The institutional approach to the problem of academic failure of students highlights another angle of its sociological interpretation, i.e., the contradictions between higher education and other institutions. The first contradiction is due to the gap between the quality of pre-university education and the requirements

of higher education. The break in the continuity between the two levels of Russian education is not a new problem. It became apparent in the early 2000s, and was exacerbated with the introduction of the USE with its formalized evaluation procedures and the practice of "coaching" for an exam. Indeed, the fact that this contradiction has remained unresolved for two decades has led to various forms of educational failure of contemporary students. This position is fully shared by the members of the academic community: "Educational failure of students is caused by training geared to passing the USE. The USE is formulaic, the school encourages formulaic thinking and leads to patchy knowledge. School and later university students are unable to think and analyze. What can a university do with these kids within four years? It has to teach them the ABC of the school program whereas it is supposed to train them for a degree" (No. 10, professor, head of department).

Applicants try to bridge the gap between school and university by various institutional means. These include private tutoring, legal and illegal practices of transfer to more prestigious schools, notably schools attached to leading universities. Soft skills and meta-disciplinary competences are drilled at various training sessions, and science and education centers for gifted schoolchildren. Well-to-do parents from small towns and villages move to large cities and megalopolises for the sole purpose of giving their children quality education and thus improving their chances of entering and studying at university. The expansion of the space of institutional "bridges" goes hand-in-hand with a growing rate of educational failure of students [9]. Do such practices solve the problem of student failure? They probably do at the individual level but certainly not at the institutional and systemic level.

The second institutional contradiction reflects the gap between educational policy priorities and the interests of university communities. State policy is biased toward supporting only high-achieving students who can potentially contribute to the achievement of higher education's ambitious goals. Because of chronic underfunding, measures to overcome academic failure are not reflected in the structure of spending on higher education and the development of students' potential. This situation is mirrored in the university development strategies and budgets. However, because educational failure is seen as an unequivocally negative phenomenon[4] two pathways of solving the problem suggest themselves, both ineffective: to change the area of institutional responsibility by shifting the burden to the academic community and/or to simulate success. Both methods are extensively used in practice.

To work with scholastically failing students, teachers have to use their own professional and time resources without pay: "When I said at the teachers' office that I have to read a student's work ten times and the work is still bad they misunderstood me (you've got to be mentally ill if you have to read and reread stuff so many times). 'We have a report to write and here you are holding us up with your problem students'" (No. 21, associate professor). Such "volunteer" practices create "institutional traps" for teachers who are often declared to be inefficient as teachers and scientists. Those teachers who are unwilling or unable to commit

their personal resources to work with poor students have to bow to the pressure of the student-retention policy and join the "production" of educational simulacra who imitate academic success [13]. Such institutional collapse acquires a permanent character.

The third institutional contradiction has to do with the gaps between higher education and the labor market when students' academic failure translates itself into the weakening of mechanisms of career choice and educational motivation [14]. The low level of professional self-determination, dissatisfaction with the chosen program, university and profession, lack of positive employment perspectives after graduation form a negative attitude to education and negative motivation: "I think the first reason of student failure is lack of interest in the profession and the second reason is a vague idea of what the profession is all about?" (No. 9, associate professor).

The gap between higher education and the labor market is a problem extensively covered in the sociological literature. However, because it has not been resolved it needs to be analyzed in the context of student educational failure as a social phenomenon within the system of institutional interfaces and relations. While dysfunctional pre-university education creates prerequisites for student academic failure, the loss of an organic connection between higher education and the labor market exacerbates student failure and is a predictor of professional failure after graduation.

The fourth institutional contradiction stems from a lack of organic integration of the Russian higher education into the market economy and the entrenchment of consumerism as its new ideology, as a result of which the meaning of education as a terminal value is at odds with the new model of higher education.

A generalization of the interview materials yields the following conclusion. Educational success cannot be reached if: (1) the culture of knowledge and education has ceased to be central to the system of social values; (2) education has ceased to be a sphere of self-realization and an effective social lift; (3) education is not considered a sphere of productive labor; (4) meritocracy is not the basis of the model for achieving social success. All the above-mentioned value changes have transformed the mechanisms of educational motivation, educational interests and students' behavior strategies. The youth is keenly aware of the discrepancy between the declared fundamental value of higher education and social reality which has no place for it in this capacity.

The behavior of many educationally failing students is based on education nihilism, which denies the very value of education. Paradoxically, it goes hand-in-hand with a wish to be admitted to university and get all the trappings of higher education. Educational consumerism is thus closely linked with a consumerist attitude to higher education expressed in the formula: "It doesn't matter where I study as long as I don't have to study."

The above-mentioned institutional contradiction creates what we believe to be the most malignant form of students' educational failure. It spawns sophisticated forms of imitation of educational activity and academic cheating and triggers the process of de-intellectualization of Russian students. The problem is that the

institutional model into which the Russian higher education is packed today prevents it from fully getting rid of the subjects of educational failure.

Conclusion

Our sociological interpretation of student educational failure purports to provide a comprehensive analysis including three levels: communal, organizational and institutional. We believe that this method of sociological analysis may contribute to a practical solution of the problem. This approach reveals that educational failure of Russian students is not an exclusively pedagogical problem and is not reflected only in individual personal practices. It has broader social implications and therefore must be recognized as a fundamental problem of present-day society. Its solution calls for a change in the state's education policy with regard to provincial universities and for efforts to support academically failing students there.

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Notes

[1] In 2020, the top 25 universities in terms of the quality of enrollment in budget-funded education (average USE score 80+) included 17 universities in Moscow, five in St. Petersburg and one each in the Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and Perm Kray (branches of NRU Higher School of Economics). 85% of participants in school Olympiads in 2020 were admitted to universities in Moscow and St. Petersburg [23].

[2] In 2015, the TIMSS measured outgoing students' education in mathematics and natural sciences.

[3] We have borrowed the term from school education. Resilient schools operate in sensitive environments with difficult student bodies.

[4] An excessive dropout rate indicates failure to meet the government-set target and entails its reduction, hence a cut of government-funded places in universities.

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Global Constitutionalism: Integration or Fragmentation of International Relations During an Economic Recession?

Andrey MEDUSHEVSKY

Abstract. During the pandemic crisis and subsequent economic recession, the liberal idea of the global constitutional order and governance came under severe criticism from many different angles. This theoretical construct was said to be no more than a formal reflection of the late liberal triumphalism that has nothing to do with the current international order based on the disintegration of international law, growing economic and military rivalry, progressive separation of global regions, fragmented international regimes, and the prevalence of egoistic great power motives. I subject all those arguments to scrutiny, criticism, and reinterpretation, discussing such topics as global legal development, the constitutional reconfiguration of the international order, global regionalism, and the role of global governance institutions in the legal regulation of economic order. I show that the unstable balance between integration and fragmentation of the international legal system in the period of crisis could be used to promote very different versions of globalization, stimulating competition of the world elites over the design of future global governance and demonstrating the importance of a new coordinated global policy of law.

Keywords: global constitutionalism, constitutionalization and fragmentation in international affairs, transnational law, global governance, regionalization, sovereignty, authoritarianism, national legal traditions, real and false universalism, legitimacy, economic recession, policy of law.

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Globalization is witnessing two conflicting trends: the integration and disintegration of world legal regulation. The first trend takes the form of the theory of global constitutionalism, which advocates the universalization of legal principles and norms through the convergence of international and national laws to create a new supranational global legal system. The second trend is represented by opponents of legal globalization who see the prospect of the disintegration of legal relations, and the fragmentation of international regimes and global governance. The challenge is to determine the role of the current economic and political instability in the balance of these two trends.

After the end of the Cold War, in the period of economic development based on the liberal model of the market economy, the dominance of the theory of global constitutionalism was not called into question such that only its forms and rate of advancement were discussed. However, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the upheavals of the world economy that followed, there has been growing skepticism about integration trends. These intensified particularly in the recent period in connection with the destabilization of the European Union after the migration crisis and Brexit, the Trump administration's moves to withdraw from international treaties, and the spread of trade wars, protectionist tariffs, and various sanctions regimes. Talk about the end of globalization increased during the COVID-19 pandemic and predictions of a world economic recession.

And yet the discussion is not over. The logic of the ongoing processes is multi-directional: The weakening of integration processes in some areas may be accompanied by their strengthening in other areas; the fragmentation of international regimes at one level may be offset by integration efforts at other levels; the intensity and dynamics of integration (disintegration) processes is determined not only by general, but also by sectoral forms of their economic and political organization.

The aim of this article is to outline the prospects of global constitutionalism in the context of an economic crisis and to determine to what extent it can be influenced by coordinated legal policy. Accordingly, I consider the processes of the convergence of international and national laws; their controversial embodiment in the integration and fragmentation of transnational legal institutions; the creation of sectoral regimes of global economic regulation and governance; the attitude of global regions to this process and the adaptation strategies of nation states; and the prospects of global legal regulation and governance.

Convergence of International and Constitutional Law
as the Basis of Globalization

The notion of the convergence of international and national law has gained real currency, with some claiming that the international order has already been constitutionalized and that some kind of a global constitution already exists. Still, the concept of global (international) constitutionalism is controversial. Its interpretation depends, on the one hand, on whether international law is seen as for-

mal, individualistic or pluralistic; on the other hand, it includes the interpretation of global constitutionalism as a real development trend or, on the contrary, as simply "an intellectual experiment"; finally, it depends on the interpretation of global constitutionalism, which is seen as the idealism driving constitutionalization procedures (the body of extra-legal values), as the process of implementing these idealistic components of constitutionalism, and as the outcome of the constitutionalization process [27]. As Rossana Deplano rightly points out, the existing concepts of global constitutionalism cannot be seen as a valid approach to fragmentation, because they seek to restore the coherence of international law without regard for normative conflicts [15, p. 77].

The key issues in this debate are as follows: the scale and substance of the convergence of international and constitutional law; the limits of the possible incorporation of constitutional principles and norms in international law or, on the contrary, the impact of the latter on the constitutions of nation states; the correlation and dynamics of conflict processes of constitutionalization and fragmentation of international law; the formation of a multi-level constitutionalism, which involves the building of a hierarchy of global, regional, and national regulation; the determination of the actors of international constitutional regulation and the global governance system within and beyond state borders (international organizations, transnational companies, nonprofit organizations, civil initiatives, etc.); forms and strategies of promoting global constitutionalism projects (soft or hard law, reforms of international law and institutions, revision of constitutionalism, introduction of a new legal infrastructure, international diplomacy); the obstacles and hazards that may crop up along the way (the threat of uniformity, discrimination of individual regions, groups, and minorities); and assessment of the results and prospects of the transformation of the legal system [1].

This is the perspective from which the merits and demerits of the theory of translegal communication can be profitably discussed:

(1) Should it be based on international law, considering its vagueness, diversity of interpretations and undemocratic character (some challenge the very notion that it is law and binding on international actors)? Or, on the contrary, should one proceed from traditional constitutionalism (which upholds the principles of sovereignty as a necessary condition) or convergence (enshrining constitutional norms as international legal ones and the gradual emergence of a new branch of global or transnational law).

(2) It needs be understood to what extent existing approaches can reconcile opposing and divergent trends in the form of constitutionalization and the fragmentation of international law.

(3) It is necessary to determine to what extent the dominant international law structure (the EU's European law) can be extended to other international legal regimes and form the basis of its global positioning (avoiding the danger of reproducing Eurocentrism in new legal forms).

(4) Should this structure be based on formal legal or political priorities (considering the ongoing erosion of international law, which, as its critics say, strengthens the dominance of great powers which de facto do not consider themselves bound by international treaties)?

(5) It is necessary to establish the role in this process of a consolidated inter-
national strategy and legal policy aimed at promoting global constitution-
alism in the period of crisis.

Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Lead to the Integration or the Isolation of Legal Regimes?

A relevant question in the era of globalization is to what extent the interna-
tional legal system has constitutional parameters consistent with those found in
national law. Everybody agrees that the transnational legal situation is determined
by the progressive convergence of international and national law in the frame-
work of constitutionalization, i.e., basically the process of interpreting aspects
of international norms by analogy with constitutional ones and giving them a
corresponding degree of protection. However, there is still uncertainty regarding
the meaning of constitutionalization and how to use it in theory and institution-
al practice. Questions that can be legitimately asked include the meaning of the
call for constitutionalization, what exactly should be constitutionalized, how to
control the process and does it really form a new legal order such that "cosmopol-
itan-minded" scholars could feel more confident in prescribing constitutionaliza-
tion as a means of creating a "normative catalogue" [5].

It is fair to assume that the concept of constitutionalization contributes to
the understanding of the horizontal dimension of legal transformation as distinct
from the traditional vertical dimension (individual states) and allows for iden-
tifying constitutional trends in forming international organizational structures,
procedures and functions of justice institutions [24]. For years, the problems of
constitutionalization—as a process unfolding outside national states—has been
discussed almost exclusively in relation to the European Union, but today the
discussion is moving to the global level to determine what, in principle, the con-
stitutional world order can and must include. However, what we find at the global
level is rather a smorgasbord of "constitutional fragments" that have yet to be
integrated.

Thus, with the exception of some proposals (largely thought to be myths and
utopias) we are looking not at creating a superstructure on top of states and interna-
tional alliances but rather at the sectoral constitutionalization of various internation-
al organizations, at promoting it in a particular (economic) department of regulation
[13] and revising the structure of international relations in line with constitutional
law. The international community recognizes international law as a real process,
that involves various actors. The key ones are international organizations, institu-
tions, and courts, which perform certain functions of producing law and court deci-
sions, but also transnational corporations, international nonprofit organizations, and
groups of intellectuals capable of promoting meaningful projects.

There are several interpretations of the constitutionalization of international
law. *First*, public international law defines it (Erika de Wet) as an attempt at legal
control of policy within international law to compensate for the erosion of this

control within state constitutional systems. To this end, it has been proposed to transfer to the international level concepts traditionally reserved for national constitutions [14].

Second, classical constitutionalism (Martin Loughlin) suggests transforming the meaning of the historically established constitutional tradition against the backdrop of the decline of the nation state and in the future adapting this meaning to international legal regulation [29].

Third, classical normativism or "compensatory theory" (Anne Peters) constructs a concept of mutual complementarity of different levels of global legal regulation that need to be coordinated to harmonize integration processes [35].

Fourth, the sociological approach to the problem (Gunther Teubner) calls for the spontaneous development of fragmented societal systems, which trigger the process of selection of the norms of an emerging global order [44].

Fifth, the institutional (or pluralistic) approach (Neil Walker) focuses not so much on values, principles, and norms as on restructuring the totality of structures, institutions, and actors involved in exercising power outside the state [45].

Sixth, the functional approach (for example, Christine Schwöbel) proceeds from the assumption that constitutionalization may trigger positive as well as negative processes (uniformity, restraints on democracy and legitimacy, infringement on minority rights) and its results depend on the conscious efforts of society and its elites [42].

Seventh, the constructivist approach in international relations (Thomas Kleinlein) holds that constitutionalization is mainly a process of change of identities and normative self-restraint (self-entrapment) involving states and other international actors [25].

The adoption of one particular version of constitutionalization determines not only adherence to a known theoretical schema, but also a pragmatic commitment to promoting a certain policy of law.

Fragmentation of International Constitutional Law: A Challenge or Addition to Constitutionalization?

Contemporary literature highlights various interpretations of the correlation of the processes of constitutionalization and fragmentation. I have identified the following five positions.

First, the standard understanding that the two concepts are mutually exclusive: the growth of fragmentation and isolation of international legal systems automatically reduces constitutionalization and, vice versa, its weakening attests to the prevalence of integration trends over disintegration trends.

Second, they are interpreted as intersecting processes: Constitutionalization (unless it is seen as movement toward a single world "super-constitution") is itself a fragmented process within international law that increasingly influences national constitutional law. Its result as of today is a system of sectoral regulatory regimes of international organizations and corporations, since in reality "we find (only) constitutional fragments" [36].

Third, these concepts are interconnected: fragmentation is both a challenge and a method of constitutionalization, their interaction in various areas of international law being rather a matter of practice ("practical inquiry"), and constitutionalization itself merely a commitment for the future (constitutionalization "as a claim") [20].

Fourth, it has been suggested that constitutionalism (the concept of international law) cannot be an instrument of overcoming fragmentation without state levers of legal regulation (which are absent in international law as distinct from national law). Fragmentation is rather an instrument of managing a normative conflict than resolving it [15, p. 88].

Fifth, there is a growing body of political opinion that holds that constitutionalization is a negative process that leads to the uniformity of norms, interpretations, and decisions within a single legal culture, i.e., imperialism of the dominant Western culture; a form of "neo-colonialism" [11, p. 3] that seeks to level out other legal cultures or various minorities. In this view, fragmentation is a natural response to this challenge and a positive rather than a negative trend in international law inherent in the theory of global constitutionalism and governance [49].

Arguably, the fragmentation of international law is not the bald negation of legal globalization. As a means of managing normative conflict, it lends itself to various interpretations: as awareness of the possibility to regulate tension between unity and diversity; as a problem stemming from procedural matters, and from that viewpoint, as the shift of technical scrutiny from the national to the international level; as interaction between conflict rules and institutional practices culminating in the erosion of international law in general [15, p. 88].

Transnational Regulation and Governance Institutions in Securing International Economic Processes

Global constitutionalism envisages a revision of the traditional view of nation state constitutionalism by enshrining fundamental constitutional rights in international documents. The process began in the first half of the 20th century, for example, with the adoption of the Montevideo Convention (on the Rights and Duties of States 1933 (1934) 165 L.N.T.S. 19, Art. 1). Subsequently, especially after World War II, it took the form of systematizing these rights in the economy, and universalizing their interpretation and judicial protection [41]. Integration processes progressed in particular in the world economy, prompting the term "economic constitutionalism." This refers to the system of international legal safeguards and trade treaties and institutions, which theoretically ensure the rights and equality of all participants (World Trade Organization, WTO). Also, the judicial review of disputes (a system of international arbitration courts), the creation of global economic regulation and support structures (the International Monetary Fund, IMF; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD; the European Central Bank, ECB; and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT).

This system of international institutions, formed on the basis of the Wash-

ington Consensus, claimed to be applicable to the whole world but has now met with fierce criticism. (1) This system of international institutions failed to prevent the 2008 economic crisis and its consequences (some argue that it in fact laid the groundwork for it and triggered it). (2) Criticism is partly prompted by the fact that the US, which developed these rules of the game (the Bretton Woods system), effectively failed to follow them, putting into question the free market principle, printing money uncontrollably, building up national debt, adopting the policy of protectionism and starting trade wars. (3) "Revisionist states" (China, Russia, the BRICS countries) questioned the fairness, impartiality, and thus the legitimacy of this consensus and proposed alternative economic and currency regulation institutions. These processes of integration and disintegration form the basis of the system of transnational economic constitutionalism. They raise the question: To what extent can the correlation of global, transnational, and national principles of legal regulation be described in habitual constitutional or quasi-constitutional categories?

Three characteristics of the process of transnational constitutionalism stand out. *First*, the development of transnational constitutions or quasi-constitutional agreements as a result of the consitutionalization of international regimes. The stock examples are the UN Charter combined with the main human rights treaties, sectoral agreements regulating global trade (WTO), and regional agreements (e.g., the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA). The most important step in this direction is considered the EU Constitutional Treaty, the Draft establishing the Constitution of Europe (2005), developed by the European Convent, which included constitutional principles (fundamental social rights, quasi-federalism, regulation of the common European market, separation of powers, judiciary review of laws, mechanisms for coordinating the economic and financial regulation policies of member states, etc.). Although the document was not adopted, its main provisions were incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, often seen as the constitutional consensus on European integration issues [1].

Second, the broadening of transnational legal dialogue. Dialogue is proceeding on three tracks: national state legislatures and courts are called upon to follow international norms, including the decisions of international tribunals; they refer to the laws of other nation states, including decisions of foreign national legislations and courts; international tribunals refer to other international regimes or rulings of international tribunals. The key role in this dialogue is reserved for international courts (the International Court of Justice), human rights courts (the European Court of Human Rights or Inter-American Court of Human Rights) and regional courts (the European Court of Human Rights), as well as national constitutional courts [18]. As part of this legal dialogue, the EU develops standards for solving the most controversial topical issues, the migration crisis, prospects for the euro zone, and priorities of the financial policies of the European Central Bank and national banks.

Third, global governance in the framework of national constitutions. The triumph of liberal constitutionalism in the late 20th century consolidated the general principles of democracy and parliamentarianism. As a result, the majority of states throughout the world have similar constitutions and adhere to common standards

of constitutional language. Constitutions may serve as platforms on the basis of which national actors, especially parliaments and judges, can interact with each other. The functioning of transnational constitutionalism has several key aspects: management of global markets; renunciation of absolute sovereignty, and facilitation of multi-lateral inter-parliamentary dialogue.

One proposed version of constructing global constitutionalism is the creation of new centers for its production. The existing structure of international law, according to its critics, suffers from a "deficit of constitutionalism," as witnessed by the insufficient effectiveness of the UN: The UN Security Council is unable to prevent a war in the event of a conflict between its permanent members. Historically, this model was a result of World War II and was promoted by American projects of a world constitution, the Chicago Project (1948) [39], but it did not take into account the positions of other regions. In the virtual absence of a single world legal system, its role has until recently been performed by a group of the most powerful actors: the governments of G7 countries (more recently G20), multinational corporations, the WTO, financial capital structures, major mass media and think tanks.

Interacting with one another, these actors, in the opinion of critics, comprise a gigantic power complex or unofficial global power underpinned by the US military. However, the task of the world community is not to preserve this system of international law, but to create alternative "anti-hegemony" centers of global constitutionalism capable of overcoming the historical, economic, and institutional disproportions from the position of global civil society, its actors, and associations. One such center has been proposed for Northeast Asia (China, Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, Russia's Far East, and Japan) whose representatives adopted a joint document, Northeast Asia Regional Action Agenda (Tokyo Agenda), setting forth this constitutional agenda [23].

African and Latin American states have proposed a number of alternative initiatives. One of them became known as the "post-liberal" approach, illustrated by the New Latin American Constitutionalism—for example, the constitutions of Ecuador (2009) and Bolivia (2007) [6]. Most structures associated with this regional trend reflect a new approach to ecology and public property, share some post-liberal approaches to constitutional design, including new development paradigms inspired by aborigines, pluralistic state organization, and novel communitarian models of democratic participation in decision-making [8]. Another initiative is the African Union's project to establish an International Constitutional Court, which would create a universal legal mechanism of rights protection. The project, proposed by the 20th African Union Summit in 2013, is based on democracy as "information participation" and not representative delegation [17, p. 142]. The creation of the International Constitutional Court is intended to secure the "right to democracy," interpreted not in terms of classical human rights (based on individual expectations), but in terms of a specific idea of democracy as a universally recognized form of governance that is vital for the survival of the human race and as such merits global international protection through a "plural access" mechanism [8]. A number of alternative global constitutional initiatives combine ecological, social, and general democratic components of regulation.

Outside Western Europe, the problems of global constitutionalism are addressed by the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) organization. It criticizes the Western legal mainstream, citing the "threat of recolonization," and advocates the reform of international law and its institutions from the perspective of developing countries (the Global South). It also highlights concrete problems of the transparency and accountability of international institutions and transnational corporations, including the use of rights language to protect rights in extra-territorial jurisdictions and to promote sustainability and equality [10]. The critical theory of law that underlies this trend is convincing in criticizing the Euro-centric version of global constitutionalism, but its representatives have yet to come up with a clear formula of what elements of "non-Western law" can form the basis of a new global legal order. The paradox is that while opposing globalization, anti-globalists have to use its achievements (the network of centers, communications, terminology, and expert services).

The transnational constitutionalism project meets with conflicting assessments in terms of its content, structure, development stages, and results. *Content-wise*, differences of approach to this phenomenon stem from the identification of this trend with the traditional concept of international (or constitutional) law or, on the contrary, denial of such identity (considering transnational legal integration to be a fundamentally new type of law). *Structurally*, there is no consensus on the key link in the system of global regulation and governance—i.e., whether it should be a national, regional or international parliament-type institutions and, accordingly, what principles should determine democratic legitimacy. *Stage-wise*, the main disagreements are over how long the phenomenon has existed: Some see it as a linear process that has been going on for a century, at least from the time international law emerged; others see it as a phenomenon engendered by the latest stage of globalization, notably the creation of the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, and other transnational institutions.

Assessments vary even more *in terms of the results achieved.* The advocates of multi-level constitutionalism speak about the advancement of the market economy and democracy, while its opponents about its curtailment. The latter highlight the growing uncertainty in key areas of legal regulation: between nation states and associations; between public and private spheres; between external and internal norms. The overall result of uncertainty, they claim, is the relativization of the legal principles of classical parliamentarianism and the consciousness of constitutionalists who should learn to think in new categories of transnational law [22].

Conflicting Interpretations of Global Constitutionalism from the Perspectives of Macro-Regions: The Global Center-Periphery, West-East, and North-South

The topic of disproportions of global regulation and fragmentation of international order is addressed in the framework of various traditional typologies of global constitutionalism: based on religion, ideology, law families, degree of in-

tegration in international law, etc. Globalization tends to divide legal regimes in the framework of large transnational regions, which acquire their own identities and enduring social traits. In terms of global constitutionalism, the most important juxtapositions are between macro-regions—i.e., the global Center and Periphery, West and East, as well as the Global North (the Western civilization) and Global South (non-Western countries).

The Center-Periphery dichotomy roughly contrasts the urbanized, educated, and technologically advanced West and underdeveloped agrarian periphery. This scheme also identifies the concept of the semi-periphery, which includes the countries that seek to overcome their historical backwardness through rapid modernization, which often turns out to be superficial because it is confined to borrowing technologies. As a result, the constitutional-legal disproportion between regions persists in spite of the adopted common standards, thus confirming the relevance of the dilemma formulated by Hernando de Soto in the form of the question: Why do capitalism and democracy exist in Europe and North America and nowhere else? The general answer to this question is the inability of political regimes in the periphery (the "developing countries") to establish a workable legal system and legal institutions that can effectively maintain it. This answer, however, represents a logical vicious circle: Backwardness cannot be overcome in the absence of a legal system, and the latter cannot be established because of backwardness. In this approach, global constitutionalism means the simple transfer of advanced legal ideas and practices of the Center to the periphery and semi-periphery, which are doomed to be constantly catching up, not being able to complete development in a foreseeable period of time. Critics see this concept as an apologia of the liberal mainstream, its main defect being that it reduces matters to the technological breakthrough of the European Center while ignoring other components of legal development. If a different comparison criterion is adopted (for example, preservation of the cultural tradition), the Center and the Periphery may easily swap places just like the interpretation of the priorities of constitutionalism.

From the perspective of the critical law school, the formal logic of global constitutionalism is opposed by a range of civilizational, cultural-anthropological, linguistic, economic, and political characteristics, which prompt a discussion of the possibilities and criteria of integration processes. The first of these arguments has to do with the relationship between the principles of universalism and regionalism, and is summed up in the question, is international law Eurocentric or universal?

The Eurocentric approach is criticized and declared to be an anachronism, and the answer is in favor of universalism. Following this line of reasoning, one should speak not about the space of expansion of international law in its traditional European meaning, but about the constitutionalization of international law on the basis of different legal cultures and mechanisms of relations between them. The criteria of interaction between cultures that are commonly mentioned are the processes that they share: integration, fragmentation, borrowing, adaptations, translation, etc. The second argument has to do with the search for common criteria of assessing legal phenomena that, as a matter of principle, should not proceed

from any one historical model and should adhere to a value-neutral approach to everybody (which highlights the need to study legal terminology). Modern law, following that logic, cannot be seen as a product of only one (Western) culture but recognizes the existence of other cultures and common legal practices in various countries, which play an important role in shaping international law and its fundamental concepts. The third argument consists in the reconstruction of what is an antithesis of Eurocentrism, the body of values, principles and norms declared to be "non-Western law." All this shows that genuine legal globalization is impossible as economic adaptation of the pre-eminent (Western) tradition, but only as a synthesis of the legal traditions of all regions if it is to become legitimate.

In critical legal studies, the Global West is opposed to the Global East. The Global West is mainly the situation in Asia, "the Asian approach to international law" or "the Asian vision" of its constitutionalization. However, opinions differ as to whether there is such a thing as a single Asian approach to international law. Some consider it to be a legitimate question [21]. Others deny this approach because Asian legal systems are very diverse [10]. But the idea of overcoming Western dominance is shared by a representative group of international analysts whose position was presented at Doha conferences. According to Surendra Bhandari, a modern scholar, the thesis on the single Asian version of legal globalization rests on seven main characteristics: prevalence of common concepts; common identity; collective interests; common norms and facts; common process and common results. Asia as a region, the advocates of this approach argue, may play various roles in international law and in building global constitutionalism: They range from that of a passive recipient to participant in discussion to active partner and designer of global constitutionalism [4]. A separate issue in this discussion is the role of religion in forming identity: Can it be common, for example, for followers of Islam, Orthodoxy, Buddhism, and so on, and if so, how are common interests defined (not to mention, of course, conventional anti-Westernism)?

The West-South dichotomy is no less controversial. The Global South refers to all the regions historically, culturally, and politically opposed to the Global North—i.e., in fact the Global West in the broadest sense [30]. On the issues of the production of constitutional design, the Global South is discriminated against; it is left out of descriptions of the international or global legal order as being irrelevant geographically and as an actor. Critics attribute this to historical stereotypes formed by the mid-20th century and above all to the prevailing view (upheld by numerous American and German participants in the discussion) that the addition of the Global South does not add anything to the concept of global constitutionalism. As a result, the world of global constitutionalism is constricted by ignoring the "constitutionalism of outcasts" [48].

The approach of the critical school reconstructs the conflict between Western and non-Western narratives of global constitutionalism. It focuses on the problems of "decolonization of international legal areas of knowledge and thought," the West's "historical responsibility" for the colonial past, revision of Western stereotypes concerning sovereignty, colonialism, and slavery, as well as historically conditioned inequality between the Global North and the Global South. The

fact that the Western mainstream ignores these provisions, Vidya Kumar believes, turns global constitutionalism into a variety of liberal models (liberal constitutionalism, liberal internationalism, and liberal humanitarianism), which does not rule out neo-colonialism in building a modern global order. This accounts for the phenomenon of settler-colonial constitutionalism, which has influenced the constitutions of many countries, including Canada, Australia, Peru, Kenya, South Africa, Zambia, the US, and Israel [48].

One issue in the international discussion of global constitutionalism is bridging the gap between the "Western" and "non-Western" interpretations. A comparison of global constitutionalism in its European interpretation (perceived by critics as Eurocentric) and East Asian approaches pursues several goals: to clarify, reformat or even reject the accepted cognitive framework and to ground or develop its normative agenda [43]. A number of meaningful questions have been formulated: Is it at all possible to avoid Eurocentrism on the basis of the authentic interpretation of constitutionalism? Are East Asian perspectives of global constitutionalism similar to those prevalent in Europe? To what extent is Confucianism responsible for the adoption of the humanistic principles of Western constitutionalism? Is it possible to renounce the thesis that constitutionalism is an exclusively Western phenomenon in light of the positive experience of some Asian countries—for example, the constitutional justice system in South Korea? On the whole, the contributors to the dialogue feel that this analysis puts into question the thesis concerning the prevalence of the authoritarian-bureaucratic trend in Asia [43].

Global Constitutionalism and Sovereignty: Nation States' Adaptation Strategies

The strategies of regional legal cultures hinge on the attitude to the dominant version of global constitutionalism, i.e., its Western version. These range from total adoption by the Western countries as their own (EU model), to its flat rejection for the sake of national legal identity (China), to assimilation (Japan), to adaptation to national institutions (South Africa), to catch-up development (Latin America) and various hybrid versions (post-Soviet region).

First, there is the total rejection of the dominant version of global constitutionalism in favor of an alternative (non-liberal) perspective. China is a consistent opponent of global constitutionalism and governance, considering them to be a continuation of Western imperialism in a new intellectual wrapping. China, in the opinion of Western experts, is the last bastion of the Westphalian international system of international law, a champion of sovereignty and authoritarian governance. It counters the Western liberal human rights model with an alternative structure based on Asian values of Confucianism, the priority of economic and social rights over political and civil rights, meritocracy over democracy, and of education over democratic elections.

Western scholars often describe China's approach to international law as exceptional or "deviant" because it runs counter to the set of rules or morals ascribed

to the emerging global legal order. This creates a dilemma: On the one hand, global constitutionalism envisages joint development of common rules and norms by all actors (representation of the global demos) irrespective of their positions. On the other hand, China does not take part in setting the rules and norms that should apply to it, and that puts into question the entire structure of global constitutionalism. Chinese authors in general consider constitutionalism to be the West's "Trojan horse" in China, which would slow down its development [9, p. 101].

Second, there is the strategy of assimilating global legal institutions by national ones. Japan's position is intermediate, its constitutionalism being a cross between Western (US) and national traditions. According to Japanese authors, a revision of the country's identity as a result of the borrowing of American constitutional ideas has offered a unique opportunity to combine Western and Japanese values and legal traditions. Japan's commitment to the principle of pacifism (Art. 9) and involvement in the activities of global civil society are perceived as its contribution to global constitutionalism. Global civil society is thought to be prepared to share the value of Art. 9 and to build on its potential [23].

Third, the strategy of catch-up constitutional development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The key non-Western democracies are thought to be India, South Africa, South Korea, Japan, and Brazil. The prospects of the preservation of the liberal international order are sometimes thought to depend on the position of the countries known as "the five rising democracies" of India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia [38]. However, today, analysts note departures from democracy in these countries. They say that Turkey is becoming a "constitutional dictatorship" (from the results of the April 16, 2016, referendum which strengthened the authoritarian grip of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan), the power crisis in Brazil (impeachment of the president and the coming to power of the conservative authoritarian leader Jair Messias Bolsonaro; the change of India's development trajectory under populist Prime Minister Narendra Modi; corruption scandals in South Africa (under President Jacob Zuma); and authoritarian tendencies in Indonesia [47].

There are problems with the adaptation of the Western model of constitutionalism in Africa, where the liberal model of human rights in its pure form is not gaining traction, as well as in Latin American countries, which seek to adopt "post-liberal values," "transformative justice" and see various attempts to politicize constitutional justice. There is a group of states that pursue various forms of non-democratic development: the so-called breaking states, which embrace theocracy, communism, ethnic-religious strategies or are primitive tyrannies simulating constitutionalism.

Amid the diversity of strategies of constitutional globalization (or its rejection) the problem that comes into focus is that of democracy—i.e., whether it should be interpreted in the context of the Western notion of the law-governed state or with due account of the historical identities and challenges of modernization pursued by authoritarian political power. On the one hand, legal regimes tend to become more uniform, with more than two-thirds of the world's countries having embarked on the path of parliamentarianism by enshrining these institu-

tions in their constitutions. On the other hand, there are growing divergences in the interpretation of democracy and parliamentarianism as two clusters of constitutions emerge: constitution-centric (liberal) and state-centric (statist) [28, pp. 1163-1164, 1173].

The growing demand for a just international law system makes it necessary to take into account the impact of civilizational factors on the world order, economic stability and global legitimacy (international, transnational, and trans-civilizational legitimacy are not the same things), the search for international (and transnational) mechanisms of overcoming the egoism of the strongest states [33, p. 30]. The critical international law theory stresses the position of Third World countries in rethinking international law from the perspective of criticism of pro-Westernism, anti-colonialism, and national self-determination of post-colonial states [2; 31; 46]. The creation of modern international institutions is seen as a result of the decline of imperial attitudes, which, however, persist in some ways [32; 34]. The interconnection has been highlighted between the theory of justice and law-making [40] with particular emphasis on political constitutionalism [3].

Law Policy as the Coordinated Search for an Optimum Model of Transnational Regulation and Governance

Instability of the relationship between integration and disintegration trends in the world economy and politics brings uncertainty to the prospects of legal regulation—i.e., the balance between positive and negative aspects of global (transnational) constitutionalism.

The positive aspects are as follows: the emergence of transnational constitutions (such as the EU project) affords a more direct bottom up access of citizens to law, enabling the individual to circumvent the traditional state bureaucracy; international treaties create the basis for a stable world economy and global governance; the establishment of a new multi-constitutional and quasi-constitutional framework challenges the traditional balance of power between states and makes the dominance of one state increasingly difficult. This shift has an impact on transnational governmental and non-governmental institutions, stimulating dialogue between transnational and national parliaments and courts, and promoting democracy on various levels of global governance, i.e., international, regional, national, and local.

The perceived negative sides are: one-size-fits-all approach to developing legal standards, which do not reflect regional and historical features; imbalances of economic regulation owing to the West's preponderance over other regions; legal regulation becomes more complex, impeding the exercise of rights; weakening of democratic citizen participation, since part of state sovereignty is transferred to the supra-national level; the transfer of powers from national parliaments to international bureaucratic institutions; the transfer of power from democratically elected parliaments to unelected courts, above all international ones, demonstrating the phenomenon of "rule of the judges" when "the dialogue of courts" supplants

real public and parliamentary dialogue and leads to the politicization of justice; progressive "pluralization of standards" of constitutional justice, which belies the appearance of unity, the erosion of subsidiarity, and ultimately the deficit of democratic legitimacy as a result of the more powerful transnational actors ganging up on the law-governed state.

As a result of global crises (as witnessed by the virus pandemic and economic recession), the balance of the advantages and shortcomings of transnational regulation tends to shift in the negative direction. The regulatory role of transnational communications (especially electronic ones) is preserved and strengthened, while the efficiency of international institutions diminishes. The progress of democracy, economic cooperation, and general global security slows down. International dialogue is suspended. Global governance gives way to internal state regulation, weakening democratic and strengthening mobilization institutions and traditional bureaucratic structures. Integration processes in global constitutionalism temporarily give way to disintegration and fragmentation of regional and national legal regimes.

Awareness of this trend prompts diametrically opposite forecasts: collapse of globalization (at least as a product of constitutional international law) or its triumph through the strengthening of informal global regulation structures at the expense of formal ones (various theories of a hidden "world government" or "a world conspiracy" that implies an unheard-of level of "organization"). In reality, both hypotheses are unduly simplistic because fragmentation of international relations, as shown above, essentially does not mean abandonment of globalization, but rather an adjustment of its negative traits and a commitment to promoting it in other forms. Once mutual estrangement and confrontation reach their peak, the political actors of the world will be forced to seek a compromise of interests in order to survive. Thus, the pendulum may swing in favor of global constitutionalism as a formula of compromise that suits the more significant power elites.

The problems of global constitutionalism are not engendered by the current crisis. They stem from the "deficit of legitimacy" of transnational institutions. A number of factors are key in overcoming these difficulties. *First*, if the international order is to be democratically legitimate, it needs to be inherently moral, i.e., the relationship between the principles and legal status of nation states (parliaments) and nonstate actors [26]. *Second*, international production of laws (to consolidate the status of supra-national actors in the process) calls for securing common interests, if not in the normative form then at least in terms of the relevance of this goal in the future. *Third*, it is necessary to ensure a level of international cooperation that would establish a new hierarchy of the legal order—i.e., delegation of decision-making to extra-state institutions beyond the control of individual member states [25]. If the current crisis, unlike the previous (2008) one, acts as a stimulus for solving these tasks, we will see a new level of integration processes and global governance.

The search for a new model of transnational regulation and governance requires a goal-driven legal policy. It could be based on the consolidated position of international actors if not on substantive, then at least on formal rules of the

game, institutions, and decision-making procedures. This prompts the need to eliminate unregulated zones of global governance, above all at the intersection of transnational and national legal trends ("crosscutting issues") such as cosmopolitan constitutionalism, pluralism, human rights, labor migration, shifting borders, and the scopes of authority of international institutions [16]. It would make sense to create an international mechanism to control conflicts of interest and resolve them in various spheres (public, corporate, and financial) and at all levels of government from the local to the global [37]. It is necessary to work to resolve the contradictions of global legal regulation and governance that arise in the course of its formation (the emergence of blocking norms and "veto players") [19]. At stake is the preservation of democracy and the law-governed state at the international level or their loss as a global Leviathan emerges [12, pp. 1-2]. The creation of international centers for coordinating legal policy offers a practical solution to the problem of rational choice in the globalization situation.

Conclusion

Integration and disintegration processes create a situation of shaky equilibrium in the world. On the one hand, the integrating role of international law is increasing in key areas: constitutionalization of the international order; development of sectoral international acts on the constitutional level and institutions that regulate various spheres of transnational economic activity; constitutionalization of international relations; a movement from diplomacy to law; harmonization of domestic (state) norms and practices with due account for international trends; and global governance. On the other hand, the process of the growing fragmentation of international law reflects the disappointment or disenchantment of part of the world community with the results of globalization. The fragmentation trend was highlighted by the pandemic and economic recession, which put into question the validity of international structures.

As a counterweight to the prevalent interpretation of global constitutionalism, alternative (including antiglobalist) approaches have been proposed that envisage a different program of integration processes, an agenda of transnational institutions and regional perspectives—i.e., the Global East, South, and the continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, various concepts of peripheral, hybrid or imitation forms, and a shift from law to diplomacy. However, they have yet to propose meaningful solutions to the problem of global legal integration, thus prompting some regions or states to look for their own strategies of adapting to the emerging global order. The overall design and language of the concepts of global constitutionalism and attempts to embody them in international law remain largely "Western," which is natural considering their Western provenance. Critics should therefore clearly identify the reasons why global constitutionalism is rejected, whether it is rejected because of its Western origin or because it is constitutional (i.e., guarantees individual rights).

In summary, the claims about the end of globalization in general and global constitutionalism in particular appear to be premature and unfounded. It is true that from a legal viewpoint, integration processes have reached a point when their forms, content, and instruments of advancement need to be adjusted. In that respect, the pandemic crisis and the economic recession were a wake-up call that exposed the shortcomings of global governance (manifested above all in a deficit of trust, information, and global coordination), which can be eliminated through the joint efforts of international institutions, states, and civil society.

The fragmentation of international regimes—sectoral, regional or functional—is thus not so much an alternative to constitutionalization (as many would have us believe) as an instrument of adjusting it in significant areas. Fragmentation increases precisely in the areas where there is a vacuum of trust, legitimacy or a low level of institutional regulation. The prevalence of the processes of fragmentation over integration is a challenge but not an indictment of globalization. Indeed, it is an invitation to all the global players to take a long hard look at its rules and develop them where they are lacking, to address the problem of ensuring the legitimacy of international institutions, to give room to all dialogue participants who have long been deprived of a voice for historical, cultural or geopolitical reasons. This is the right time to ask the question: What global law does humankind need?

Ideally, there is a consensus that democratic legitimacy, which underpins constitutionalism in nation states, must be present at the international level as well. But there is no consensus on how to secure it. A rational choice must be preceded by an answer to the following questions: How preferable is integration to fragmentation? What should be its forms, considering their benefits and costs for the parties to the dialogue? What should the participants sacrifice in order to advance it? Content-wise, is the traditional system of liberal economic values still fundamental or should priority be given to the "post-liberal" values of ecology, solidarism, equality, and collective rights, including cultural, historical, and economic characteristics of various regions? In terms of political preferences, should global constitutionalism incorporate traditional mechanisms and standards of democratic production of norms or create new ones? Can the forms of representative democracy at the global level be analogous to national forms in spite of the structural differences between them? Should international integration be based only on democratic values or can it also be on an undemocratic basis? Finally, what should international institutions and centers for working out recommendations on these issues look like?

Global (transnational) constitutionalism is therefore not so much about a decision but about an experiment in search of an optimum balance of global, transnational, international, and national law-making institutions, the result being open-ended. The current crisis has ushered in a new phase in the competition of world elites over the issue of the future structure of global governance, highlighting the importance of a coordinated legal policy. The stability and strength of constitutional guarantees of global development in the near future will depend on the handling of these issues.

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Constitutional and Legal Foundations of Russia's Economic System in the 20th and Early 21st Centuries (Concerning the 2020 Constitutional Reform)

Igor LEVAKIN

Abstract. This article examines the constitutional-legal foundations of Russia's economic system in the 20th and early 21st centuries in connection with the 2020 constitutional reform. It reveals a recurring pattern whereby practically every Russian Constitution (whether Soviet or bourgeois) has reflected essential changes of the forms of property ownership, modes of production, distribution, exchange and consumption of material goods and the social class structure of society. The 2020 reform of separate articles, without a fundamental change of the 1993 Constitution of the RF, reflects this pattern and seeks to elaborate the constitutional-legal principles of economic system in the current legislation and legal practice. The novelty of the approach is that it purports to reveal the objective regularities of the constitutional-legal reforms of Russia's economic system.

Keywords: constitution, legislation, legal framework, socio-economic system, socialism, capitalism, constitutional amendments.

Russia's law-making has addressed two of the most influential economic systems: a planned economy based on state ownership (socialism) and a market economy based on private property (capitalism).

Initially, socialism from the beginning of the 20th century until the mid-1920s was aimed at building communism, for which purpose means of production were nationalized and a planned economy was formed; a regime of socialist legality was enforced (cf. [12]).

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Late 20th-century capitalism proclaimed as the supreme value human rights and freedoms implemented in civil society based on market relations; the principles of liberalism, natural rights, and the laws and norms of civil institutions reflected potential realization of individual goals (cf. [9]).

The 21st-century mixed economy functions as a regulated market: a portion of the economic resources are centralized and distributed by the state to compensate for the lapses (weaknesses) of market mechanisms; constitutional norms imply a balance of state, societal and individual goals (cf. [21]).

The object of this article is threefold: (1) constitutional-legal foundations of the Soviet socialism from the beginning of the 20th century until the mid-1920s; (2) the constitutional-legal norms of the transition from the socialist economy to capitalism in the late 20th century; and (3) constitutional-legal foundations of Russia's economic system in the early 21st century.

The goal of the study is to reveal the cause-and-effect relationships between the socio-economic relations and the foundations of their constitutional-legal regulation at each of the aforementioned stages of social development and in the context of the ongoing constitutional reform. This goal is achieved through a historical-logical analysis of the constitutional-legal regulation of Russia's economic system.[1]

Constitutional-Legal Foundations of the Economic System of Soviet Socialism in the Early 20th Century to the Mid-1920s

The revolutionary events of 1917 were caused among other things by substantial economic and social factors: the poverty of the vast majority of the working people, food crises, technological backwardness, etc.[2] Sergey Witte admitted that at the start of the second decade of the 20th century the country's economy "was still at the beginning of the industrial-trade stage of the national economy" [22, p. 41]. The choice was to be made between modernizing the main means of production and ceasing to play an active role in the historical arena and becoming dependent on the developed countries and their monopolies. At the same time, "Russian capital and the social class and the parties representing this capital were too weak to tackle the tasks of rapid industrialization… [R]evolution became a necessity, a vital need of the people" [3, p. 24].

Economic modernization made demands on human, material and financial resources: addressing the issue of the Tsarist and Provisional Government's loans, recruiting massive human resources for the building of communications and heavy industries; and land reform (Black Partition), etc. Only revolutionary—radical and violent—change of the social system accompanied by a transformation of the economy could enable the Bolsheviks to cardinally solve the pressing socio-economic tasks. To suppress anyone who disagreed with the coup and its methods, a dictatorship was established "in the shape of a mighty All-Russian Soviet power" implementing a sweeping transformation in pursuit of a goal never set before: "to organize society as a whole" and turn the state into a huge corporation— in other words, socialism.[3]

Socialism was being built according to a plan whose rough outlines were contained in the first RSDLP program of 1903, the resolution of the Third RSDLP Congress of 1905, and later in key documents (decrees On Nationalization of the Major Enterprises, On Land, On the Nationalization of Foreign Trade, etc.) passed after the Bolsheviks came to power.[4] The Declaration of the Rights of Working and Exploited People, which would be included, *in toto*, in the 1918 Constitution of the RSFSR, abolished private ownership of land, and declared "all the forests, the subsoil and water of nationwide significance, as well as all livestock and tools, model landed estates and agricultural enterprises" to be national property. Factories, mines, railways and other means of production and transport were put under the control of the Soviets, banks were nationalized, the tsarist government's loans were annulled, etc. (cf. [7]). The sweeping transformation of life was justified by the goal of "eliminating exploitation of man by man" (Art. 3, 9).

The economic situation, however, spelled the need to step up the exploitation of the people (cf. [25]). Thus, the coercive policy that came to be known as Wartime Communism—the ultimate expression of the aspiration to build a new socio-economic system in the context of the Civil War of 1918-1921—included total mobilization (military, political and economic); an extreme degree of centralized control; requisitioning of surplus food on the class principle; nationalization of industry (from small to large-scale); a ban on foreign trade and curtailment of commodity-money relations.[5] The policy was aimed at "destroying the parasitic social strata and organizing the economy through universal labor duty" (Article 18). The situation was succinctly described by Lev Trotsky, one of the top revolutionary leaders: "For a communist, the actual principle of labor duty is unquestionable: 'He who does not work neither shall he eat.' Since everybody needs to eat, everybody is obliged to work. Labor duty is inscribed in our Constitution and our Labor Code" [44].

The military regime enabled the Bolsheviks to hold on to power, but the economy was deteriorating, calling for a "relaunch," a New Economic Policy. The NEP introduced in 1921 by decision of the 20th RCP (B) Congress allowed a temporary departure from the constitutional goal of "expropriating the bourgeoisie" (Article 79 of the 1918 Constitution), and the (re-)introduction of elements of market relations albeit under the control of the new power.[6] Vladimir Lenin explained that the NEP did not change the single state economic plan, but changed the approach to its implementation: the restoration of commodity-money relations would give a boost to the growth of productive forces.[7]

Simultaneously "the establishment of the foundations and the overall plan of the whole national economy, the identification of industry sectors and industrial enterprises of national importance" were taking place, measures were taken to centralize the economy envisaged by the 1922 Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to spur "internal economic success" the republics were joined into a single state, the USSR was created and its first Constitution was adopted in 1924.[8] In 1929, the 16th Party Conference approved the First Five-Year Plan which envisaged a speedy industrialization of the USSR and extreme centralization of the economy: the question of the balance of market and

dirigiste methods of economic management was dropped from the agenda.[9] In 1929-1930, economic autonomy of state enterprises was curbed and the market infrastructure was liquidated. By the second half of the 1930s nothing was left of the NEP, which tolerated elements of the market economy (cf. [10]).

Industrialization and collectivization of agriculture brought about radical changes in the Soviet socio-economic system in an incredibly short space of time: the social-class structure of the population changed, the private sector was destroyed, providing one of the key prerequisites for the revision of the 1924 USSR Constitution and the 1925 RSFSR Constitution. The Stalin Constitution of 1936 established the victory of socialism in the USSR (totalitarian regime based on stringent centralization of control of government bodies and nationalization of the economy).[10] The text of the Constitution now included the concept of "the economic basis of the USSR," i.e., a planned socialist economy system and socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production"[11] (Article 4) (cf. [18]). Hard and often forced labor of the population laid the foundation for a number of socio-economic rights: to work; to leisure; to material security in old age and in case of illness or loss of labor capacity, etc. (cf. [4]). The USSR Constitution of 1936 and the RSFSR Constitution of 1937 corresponded to the mobilization character of the Soviet socio-economic system before and after the emergency period of the Great Patriotic War (cf. [36]).

The period between 1953 and 1964 known as the Thaw saw attempts to find new sources, methods and set new benchmarks for the development of industry, agriculture and construction in a somewhat humanized socio-economic system (the GULAG system was dismantled in 1956).[12] As early as 1961, the 22nd CPSU Congress was presented with a CPSU Program which proclaimed a new stage in the Soviet history, the period of "full-scale communist construction": building on the still existing momentum of the mobilization economy nuclear, space, radio electronics, the chemical industry and instrument-building were developing.[13] Within the following two decades the USSR was expected to have unheard-of productive forces, surpass the technological level of the developed countries and have the highest per capita output. Communism would be built (on May 7, 1960, the USSR adopted the Law on Abolishing Taxes on Wages and Salaries (cf. [37]). Such utopian targets were increasingly at odds with reality. Nikita Khrushchev's voluntarism prevented a sober assessment of the foundering, obsolete and wasteful economic management system.[14]

An attempt at economic reform with introduction of elements of market regulation, which went down in history as "the Kosygin reforms" was made on September 30, 1965, when a resolution On Ameliorating the Management of Industry was passed, and again on October 4, 1965 with the resolution On Improving Planning and Enhancing Economic Incentives for Industrial Production [17]. However, one-off measures were no longer capable of preventing the degradation of the socio-economic system of the "all-people state of developed socialism" proclaimed by the "Brezhnev Constitution" of 1977. The period from the 1970s to the mid-1980s was marked by snowballing economic problems (shortage of food and consumer goods); in addition, the USSR became embroiled in an extremely

wasteful arms race and an unpopular Afghan war. A profound socio-economic decline known as "stagnation" set the stage for dramatic systemic change (cf. [30]).

Constitutional-Legal Causes of Transition from the Socialist Economy to Capitalism in the Late 20th Century

The April 1985 Plenary Session of the CC CPSU changed the fate of the USSR and the whole world socialist system. It called for "improving the organizational structures of management, liquidation of superfluous links, streamlining of the apparatus and increasing its effectiveness" [19, p. 12]. The General Secretary of the CC CPSU demanded an "acceleration" of the economy, an increase of labor effectiveness and productivity. But there was still no talk about fundamental changes of the socio-economic system although the word perestroika (restructuring) was used there for the first time. It was a harbinger of the movement for a deep reform of the USSR [41].

The Perestroika of 1986-1989, a forced liberalization of the socio-economic system of "developed socialism," was taking place under extremely adverse circumstances: low oil prices, heavy military spending (in spite of the "new thinking") and a resource-driven economy oriented toward the defense and heavy industries, which failed to meet basic consumer needs. Many reforms were ill-thought out: the voluntary anti-alcohol campaign launched on May 16, 1985, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR On Intensifying the Fight Against Drunkenness and Alcoholism and Eradicating Moonshining spawned black-marketing and popular resentment; legalization of self-employment, the switch of state-owned enterprises to cost accounting and self-financing, the creation of cooperatives and joint ventures of groups of producers together with foreign capital created a criminal business "class" and further corrupted the party and economic elite (*nomenklatura*) (cf. [11]).

The hopes of the stewards of the Soviet Perestroika pinned on the convergence of the socialist and liberal market systems collapsed. The hope was fueled by the notion that convergence would be brought about by an awareness of the "unprecedented real danger of self-destruction" due to various threats.

Andrey Sakharov believed that "the only path toward a radical and final elimination of the thermonuclear and ecological demise of humanity and the solution of other global problems is a mutual rapprochement of the world systems of capitalism and socialism, which would encompass economic and other relations" [38].

A symbiosis of advanced market mechanisms and genuine socialist achievements of existing socialism never materialized although an attempt to lay a legal framework of a convergence economic system was made in the 1978 Constitution of the RSFSR which, in its December 9, 1992, edition, envisaged market relations providing for the development of private (legal persons and citizens), collective (common ownership and participatory shared ownership), state, municipal property and the property of non-governmental organizations (Article 10). Opinions on the causes of the failure of convergence may vary, but most probably the elites

which had seized power and property in Russia and other future sovereign states never set themselves such a task.

As Yegor Gaidar wrote: "Changing the mechanism of property distribution… This is the social meaning of privatization" [6, p. 136]. In other words, the main aim was not to improve the well-being of the people (socialism) and not to make the economy more efficient and promote its constant growth (capitalism), but to redistribute property.[15]

Arguments as to whether socialism and the USSR could have been preserved continue. But, first, the later USSR did not have a huge mass of rural folk who had moved to the city and were prepared to work for a pittance for years,[16] and second, the dominant "class" of bureaucracy jumped at the opportunity to quickly convert power into property and bourgeois comfort (cf. [43]). The 70-odd-year socialist experiment came to an end: degenerate after years of "stagnation," unhappy about being alienated from property, the party and economic elite legalized capitalism.

On May 1, 1987, the law On Individual Labor Activity of the Citizens of the USSR came into force, and on June 30 of that same year the Law on State Enterprise introduced cost accounting and a measure of autonomy in choosing economic partners. Officially, the modern history of Russian capitalism began with the adoption of the Law on Cooperation in the USSR of May 26, 1988, and the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR of July 18, 1991, No. 406 On Measures to Support and Develop Small Enterprises in the RSFSR which, for the first time since the NEP, provided a legal framework for the creation and operation of private enterprises. Boris Berezovsky, a high-profile personality of the 1990s, let slip in an interview that the law on cooperatives precipitated the collapse of Soviet power (cf. [31]). Indeed, a new era of capitalist relations in Russia had arrived: the Law of the RSFSR of December 2, 1990, On Property in the RSFSR and the Law of the RF of July 3, 1991, On Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation introduced private property, proclaimed equality of all forms of ownership, i.e., liquidated the system of socialism that existed in Russia.

The dismantling of the socialist economic system was marked by events in the center of Moscow on October 4, 1993, and on December 12 of that year the RF Constitution enshrined the main forms of the liberal market socio-economic system.

Constitutional-Legal Foundations of Russia's Economic System in the Early 21st Century

The Constitution of the RF of December 12, 1993 does not have a section devoted to the economic system (as distinct from the USSR Constitution of 1977 and the RSFSR Constitution of 1978), thus giving economic actors great, but not unlimited scope [5].

The RF Constitution precludes total nationalization of the economy: it guarantees free movement of goods, services and money, supports competition and

freedom of economic activity (Part 1, Article 8); protects the economic rights of individuals and forbids monopolization of economic activities (Article 34); forbids deprivation of property without a court decision and stresses that the law protects private property (Article 35); all forms of ownership are protected, while private property is primary (Part 2, Article 8); guarantees compliance with international treaties (Part. 4, Article 15), private land ownership (Article 36); protects entrepreneurial activities, including against unfair competition (Part 2, Article 34), etc. [2, pp. 17-21].

The Constitution, which declares the Russian Federation to be a social state (Article 7), allows limited state interference in the process of distribution of material goods, for example, to ensure social protection of all members of society and specific population groups. The principle of the social state calls for legal enforcement mechanisms, but at the end of the day the effectiveness and scale of social protection depend on real economic opportunities. For example, the vestiges of Soviet labor and social legislation helped to prevent the full burden of market reforms from falling on the population at the height of the 1990s market reforms, the time of primary accumulation of capital. Only the economic upturn that followed the 1998 default gave a boost to living standards. The economic climate improved thanks to the state's effective measures to combat violent crime as well as the legislative reform of the early 2000s: the second part of the RF Tax Code which introduced a 13% flat tax scale; the Land Code of the RF which legitimized private land ownership; the Labor Code of the RF which dropped some outdated restrictions inherited from the planned economy; and other measures of state support of some sectors of the economy. The growth of economic indicators and of living standards was aided by the growth of oil and gas prices: the price of Brent oil hit an all-time high of $143.95 before settling at a plateau of $70-80 per barrel on March-December 2010 [27]. The Russian Federation became an ambitious "energy superpower" and a mighty economic player—the concept of a mixed economy was realized. However, the fall of energy prices in the context of external economic sanctions dealt a blow to the key extractive sector of Russian capitalism. As a consequence, the national currency rate plummeted to half of its previous value in 2015 (cf. [28]), real incomes have been falling for years, accumulated pensions have been frozen indefinitely and finally, "the pension reform" raised the pension age in 2018 (cf. [24]).

It looks as if, driven by infantile legal notions, which ignore the dynamics of global technological development processes, the vital need for Russia to be part of international division of labor and the potential for self-development of the RF Constitution, proposals are being made to socialize the economy under the following slogans: priority of social over personal interests in the course of economic activity; priority development of Russian business entities and localization of capital and resources on the territory of the Russian Federation; state regulation of economic activity that meets the common good and interests of Russian citizens and economic development of the state.

Partly as an answer to the legitimate demand of the population for state social support amendments were introduced in the RF Constitution of December 1993

under the RF Law On Amendment to the Constitution signed by the RF President on March 14, 2020 (cf. [32]). In the socio-economic sphere conditions are to be created for "sustained economic growth of the country… protection of the dignity of citizens and respect for the working man, a balance of the rights and duties of the citizen, social partnership, economic, political and social solidarity are guaranteed" (Article 75[1]); the Constitution guarantees a minimum wage not less than the living minimum; indexation of pensions at least once a year under the procedure established by the federal law; a system is to be formed of "the provision of pensions of citizens on the basis of the principles of universality, justice and solidarity of generations" (Parts 5, 6 of Article 76); prerequisites are being created for the implementation of "the principles of social partnership in the sphere of regulation of labor and other relations directly linked with them" (Clause e.4, Article 114) and so on (cf. [23]).

From the formal legal point of view, the economic foundations of the constitutional system remain unchanged, however, the norm of solidarity tweaks the initial (liberal) constitutional order. Its further transformation in practice would depend on the goals set by the RF President who, according to the 2020 amendments, exercises general control of the RF Government (Article 83, Clause б) and effectively the supreme executive power body. Under the amended Constitution the RF government shall ensure the conduct of a single socially oriented state policy (Article 114, Part 1, Clause в), contribute to the development of entrepreneurship and private initiative; ensure the implementation of the principles of social partnership in the sphere of regulation of labor and other relations directly linked with them (Article 114, Part 1, Clauses e.3, e.4) as well as the Federal Assembly of the RF whose scope of authority in controling the executive has been somewhat expanded because now the State Duma is empowered to approve candidates for Deputy Prime Minister and some Ministers of the RF Government (Article 103, Clause a.1) and so on (cf. [34]).

Conclusion

The dialectic of the constitutional-legal foundations of economic relations attests that Russian constitutions as fundamental legal acts combine in their content economic and ideological goals: "Rights can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby" [16].

(1) Soviet constitutions and legislation from the beginning until the mid-20th century legalized nationalization of the means and objects of labor for modernization of pre-industrial socio-economic relations: the goal was set of building a classless society of a new type. The mobilization-type socialist economy managed to develop fairly well up to a certain point, i.e., the transition from the industrial to the post-industrial socio-economic system.

(2) During the transition to the post-industrial era in the late 20th century the economic system of existing socialism lost its momentum (the command-and-administer was not enough of a stimulus for competition and innovation; living stan-

dards were declining) and ultimately collapsed. In the early 1990s, the law-maker felt that the stagnant economy could be rescued through market reforms and the building of an "open society"; private property, entrepreneurship were legitimized, privatization processes were legalized, etc. This was the concept of the liberal economy as enshrined in the Constitution.

(3) The new challenges of the 21st century make it incumbent upon the RF Constitution to contribute to the emergence in the Russian Federation of a modern, socially oriented and competitive economic system capable of creating "smart" technologies and functioning during "special periods" of commodity, financial, epidemiological and other crises; as an answer to these challenges, the 2020 amendments to the Constitution legalize the concept of solidarity: a mixed economy based on cooperation of social groups and broad social guarantees.

To sum up: Practically every new Russian Constitution (be it Soviet or bourgeois) reflected substantial changes in the forms of property, modes of production, distribution, exchange and consumption of material goods, and in the social class structure of society. The 2020 reform of only some chapters and articles, without a fundamental change of the RF Constitution, accounts for this regularity. Obviously, it also envisages the constitutional-legal foundations of the Russian economic system continuing to develop up to a certain point, adjusted by amendments through current legislation and law enforcement. In other words, the goal is a progressive social transformation, which should be assessed according to its results.

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Notes

[1] A detailed coverage of the entire range of enactments of the Soviet and Russian Government bodies which can also be referred to the economic sphere is beyond the scope of this article. On the top and central bodies of state power and management see [35].

[2] Early transition from the era of steam and coal to that of electricity and oil (from technology II to technology III) was imperative. See more on the patterns of mutual influence of constitutional and economic development in [14; 15].

[3] An example of a nationwide plan was the famous plan of the GOELRO (State Commission on the Electrification of Russia) adopted on December 22, 1920 by the 8th All-Russia Congress of Soviets (endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars on December 21, 1921)

[4] On November 7, 1917, the Second All-Russia Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies adopted an appeal To Workers, Soldiers and Peasants which proclaimed, among other things, free handover of the land of landowners, the Crown and monasteries to peasant committees; workers' control over production, etc. Subsequently the following acts were passed: Statute on Workers' Control adopted by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTSIK); VTSIK decrees: On Nationalization of Banks (December 27, 1917); on Socialization of Land (February 9, 1918); Decrees of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK): On Nationalization of Foreign Trade (April 22, 1918); On Nationalization of Large Enterprises in Mining, Metallurgical, Metal-Working, Textile and other Leading Industries (July 28, 1918) and other (cf. [20]).

[5] In March of 1919 the Bolshevik Party at its 8th Congress adopted a Program of the RCP (B). It read in part: "One of the key tasks is maximum unification of the country's economic activity under a nationwide plan" [29].

[6] VTSIK issued a Decree of May 22, 1922, On the Main Private Property Rights Recognized in the RSFSR, Protected by Its Laws and Defended by the Courts of the RSFSR. The 1922 Civil Code contained Article 52: "The following types of property are distinguished: a) state (national or municipal), b) cooperative, c) private." The NEP was supported by legal acts of financial, industrial and agricultural regulation [33].

[7] The NEP plan envisaged, first, recovery of agriculture and small industries; then recovery of large-scale industry; then reform of agriculture on socialist lines; and creation of the material-technical base of socialism (cf. [13]).

[8] The 1925 RSFSR Constitution established that all land, forests, the subsoil, water as well as factories, railways, waterways and air transport and communications are "the property of the state of workers and peasants" under special laws of the Union of SSR and supreme bodies of the RSFSR (Article 15).

[9] Joseph Stalin called 1929 The Year of the Great Breakthrough: capitalist elements in the economy were finally eliminated, and a crash industrialization program was launched under a Five-Year Plan (cf. [42]).

[10] The adoption of the Constitutions of the USSR (1936) and the RSFSR (1937) was based on a complex of economic and political reasons (for more see [1]).

[11] However, the Main Law of 1936 allowed small private farming and artisan units based on personal labor, and protected personal property (Articles 9, 10); the socialist principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" was observed (Article 12).

[12] Work in Stalin's labor camps should be seen in the broader context of coercive labor in the Soviet economy in the 1930s-mid—1950s (cf. [8]).

[13] The Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on June 11, 1964, passed a new Civil Code that contained some provisions that were not in the 1922 Civil Code of the RSFSR.

[14] According to some estimates, 69.5% of the population lived below the poverty line in 1958 (cf. [39]).

[15] Soviet industrialization was aimed at transition from technology III to IV, transition from steam to electricity, and the use of oil resources. However, the Soviet leadership failed to come up with and implement a plan of transition to technology V (the era of computers and telecommunications) (cf. [40]).

[16] At the time of the collapse of the USSR, about a quarter of Russia's population were rural dwellers. At the time the Soviet Union was formed, four-fifths of the population were rural dwellers (cf. [26]).

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Social Sciences and Global Turbulence: Rebooting the Mainstream

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Abstract. After the collapse of the bipolar world, the global hierarchy of social sciences saw the emergence of a neoliberal mainstream based on three axiomatic pillars: Western dominance, capitalism (the free market), and liberalism (the value of individual autonomy). Today, we see growing criticism and the disintegration of the mainstream with its claim to providing universal descriptions and legitimization of modern societies, which have reached the end of history in the form of open-access liberal market democracies. The purpose of this article is to discover how transformations of the prevailing political and economic orders, configurations of the subjects of geopolitical dominance, and their legitimizing metaphors determine the direction of changes in the social sciences mainstream. The hypothesis of the study is that the prevailing principles of stratification and distribution of public resources will be less and less related, value-wise and institutionally, to capitalism, the market, and democracy, since the latter are unable to deliver broader opportunities for the majority population in practice.

The global change in social ontology, the structure of economic reproduction, and legitimate foundations of the political order tend to diminish the credibility and relevance of mainstream concepts focused on the axiomatics of market values and liberal rhetoric. Intellectual attempts to restore the relevance of the neoliberal mainstream through the construction of local utopias (the flat world, creative class, knowledge economy, etc.), the introduction of complementary concepts of civil repair (Jeffrey Alexander), socio-cultural trauma (Piotr Sztompka), poor governance, dependence on

previous development (path dependence) or gauge (Nikolay Rozov) are unable to prevent the growing conceptual stretch. The formation of a society without tangible economic growth and a declining need for mass labor inevitably leads to the transformation of the mainstream. Alternative and peripheral theories that describe the contours of a global future mainly in non-market, non-capitalist and, possibly, non-liberal categories are becoming more influential. These are concepts that establish new formats for the distribution of public resources that are less and less connected to the market, democracy, and the hegemony of the West and increasingly to rental mechanisms, distributive political regulation, and the differentiated value of various social groups for the nation state.

Keywords: social sciences, mainstream, metaphor, alternative, crisis of legitimization, center-periphery, rent, rental society, social ontology, social stratification.

Conventional wisdom has it that "science is interested in what is stable and typical, and the main task of the language of any science, along with that of communication, is to prepare the object of study for the use of mathematical methods of interpretation. Modern science does not exist outside such methods" [39, p. 68]. We believe that such reductionist claims are applicable only to natural sciences, which allow for the complete separation of subject and object. Such a task is impossible to accomplish if social sciences aspire to define goods for society and/or the individual, which are inevitably included in the object of study. Indeed, this is an insoluble task even in quantum physics, where it is impossible to measure an object without changing it.

The main goal of social sciences is to propose solutions to social problems based on insight into socio-political phenomena and processes. By the same token, social sciences legitimize the political order, a function that natural sciences do not have [43, p. 251]. The dominant paradigm within which such study and legitimization take place will hereinafter be called the socio-political or social science mainstream. Political science, sociology, economics, and social sciences in general have common meta-paradigm foundations formed before they were divided into disciplines, which underpin common basic ideas of the individual and society, of the sacred and the profane [16]. The mainstream as the value nucleus is formed at the intersection of all the problem areas of social sciences at a specific time in history. It has a synthetic nature. There exists a (not always evident) link between sociological, economic, and political science paradigms and specific ideologies and utopias, political-economic systems and interests of certain social groups, as well as claimants to class and geopolitical dominance. The paradigmatic foundations of the mainstream are formed proceeding from the interests of the dominant class, geopolitical, and economic subjects. As they lose their dominance, the research issues and

solutions offered by the mainstream become less and less relevant. At the same time, as the influence of the former subjects of dominance wanes and the heuristic value of scientific theories meeting their interests diminishes, prerequisites are formed for the emergence of new scientific paradigms. Thus, the mainstream represents society seen through the prism of the class interests of the dominant groups and their ideas, which at a given historical moment determine the social norm and foundations of the socio-political and economic order [45].

Thus, social theories and ideologies are the result of the observation and assessment of the social reality through the eyes of the actors in this reality. Social shifts/changes are directly linked with changes in the lineup of these actors, which begin to see social reality in a different way and modify their habitual notions of it. In this perspective, the background factors of expanded heterarchy spaces and the launch of social changes are social ontology and stratification, as well as ideologies of collective subjects connected with their interests and expressed in the ideas of a certain value spectrum [26]. The ideas, concepts, and ideologies of rising social groups increase their influence in the hierarchy of political knowledge and gain a scientific status, replacing the discredited theories of the former hegemons that are reduced to the status of false consciousness, ideologies, and myths. Thus, the rise and fall of the social science mainstream is determined by the configuration of the following main factors: the globally dominant political-economic order and its legitimizing ideologies; the concrete historical character of geopolitical dominance and its subject.

Factors of the Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Mainstream

In the methodological context spelled out above, the period from the mid-19th century until the early 1990s is characterized, on the global scale, by (1) the dominance of capitalism (which has not been unlimited after the 1917 Russian Revolution and World War II); (2) geopolitical dominance of the West; (3) and the high degree of pluralism of political orders and legitimizing ideologies both inside and outside the West, although diversity diminished markedly after World War II. All this predetermined the development of national social science schools, above all in the USSR (the development of the Marxist theory and the building of a non-capitalist society), the key European countries (Great Britain, France, Germany, and others) and the US. However, throughout most of the 20th century, political and ideological diversity prevented the development of the global mainstream. By the end of the 20th century, the global economic and political order had become significantly more uniform. Amid the overall dominance of capitalism, the countries that had tried to build an alternative world economic order collapsed or became integrated in the global capitalist macro-system as its semi-periphery. Ideologically and politically, by the end of the 20th century, the USSR, its satellites, and the communist ideology generally suffered a debacle. For a while, the world saw the uncontested geopolitical sway of the US, open or tacit acceptance of the idea of the self-regulating competitive market as the most

effective economic model, recognition of liberal democracy as the best political regime, and of the liberal democratic ideology as the best at meeting the interests of the majority of the planet's inhabitants.

Even so, it has to be stressed that the neoliberal discourse was from the outset an attributive discourse based as it was on the notion that capitalism was flawed and degraded. It proceeded from the acknowledgement that genuine, healthy capitalism had been fundamentally spoiled by the state regulation of markets, leftist ideas of the welfare state, and high taxes on business. As a result, Western societies lost their core bourgeois virtues and the achievement-oriented Protestant ethic, which could be brought back through sheer will and corresponding policies. In other words, it was from the outset a flexible and pragmatic variety of the general discourse on fixing capitalism.

In the context of the dominance of the discourses of transit, modernization, the self-regulating market, unlimited growth, and the end of history, there emerged the neoliberal mainstream—a hierarchy of global knowledge based on three pillars: the dominance of the West, capitalism, and liberalism. From the very start of the apologia of Western unipolarity, it was naïve to believe that the global triumph of the US and the West in general would last long, since world history, economics, and politics do not tolerate eternal winners. Even the transit and modernization discourses implied that such dominance could not be eternal because backward countries would inevitably adopt the institutions, ideologies, and practices of the leading countries with all ensuing consequences. By now, all the foundations of the post-bipolar mainstream have become critically vulnerable due to the change of the balance of class and geopolitical subjects. Its key concepts are becoming less and less relevant as the value-related and institutional foundations of the global society's political and economic order continue to change.

1. Capitalism is increasingly revealing global limits to infinite economic growth and signs of the free market having exhausted its potential as competition sharpens and the market more and more often has to be regulated by non-market methods—e.g., the global commodity markets (oil, agriculture, gold, diamonds), pharmaceuticals, and technologies regulated by transnational oligopolies of producers or even by inter-state cartel agreements such as OPEC+ whose existence contradicts the principles of free competition. Against the backdrop of the crisis of self-regulated markets and mounting criticism of the free market idea both from the left and the right (because it had promised growing opportunities for all, but ended up providing such opportunities only for a few social strata and societies of the capitalist system [42, p. 47]), there appeared alternative theories of the rent society [17] and post-capitalism [29]. Criticism is fueled by the universal shrinking of the resources and mechanisms of the social state.

The obvious global limits of free markets prompt a turn from justice based on the potential growth of opportunities for all competitors in the markets of capital, goods, and labor, to the left model of fairness as the most egalitarian access to available resources. The sensitivity of modern societies to such ideas has been on the rise since the 1970s and has been prompted by the growing income and wealth inequalities and the stagnation of the real purchasing power of the working pop-

ulation in Europe and the US [34]. Moreover, the resource, technological, demographic, and other limits of growth dictate a strategy of redistributing resources. The political logic of redistribution is gaining legitimacy on the global scale, i.e., between the declining and rising hegemons and within modern societies. Progressive taxes on inheritance and big property are becoming more popular. Until recently, the latter were the sacred cow of capitalism, but today even in the US they have more and more advocates as a result of the communitarian turn dictated by economic stagnation.

At present, living resources are increasingly redistributed according to non-economic political scenarios written not by the invisible hand of the market, but by very real political subjects whose interests are far from universal. Besides, it turns out that "the development success stories of China and India, and, before them of Japan and the Eat Asian tigers … can tell us nothing about the relative merits of market liberalism and social democracy" [36, p. 30]. The economic and ideological transformations of market capitalism are increasingly reflected in the language of social studies from the standpoint of new social subjects such as the precariat (Guy Standing), Bohemian bourgeoisie (David Brooks), the creative class (Richard Florida), multitudes (Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt), the underclass, NEET (Not in education, employment nor training), etc. The new concepts record irreversible changes of social ontology, but at the same time indicate the amorphousness and instability of the new social groups that so far are rather the consequences of the disintegration of the habitual economic classes than enduring elements of a future social stratification. The language to describe the new social structure has yet to be formed because the new ontology has not yet taken final shape: What we see is rather an interim situation of uncertainty and loss of trust in the former descriptions. Hence the socio-political rhetoric of the social sciences replete with new coinages, metaphors, and various post-, neo-, quasi- and so on. In the course of rent transformation of global capitalism, society is gradually developing an alternative idiom of description worked out by the new social groups.

2. Liberalism ceases to be an unshakeable meta-foundation of the basic coordinates of political ideologies and associated ethical and managerial decisions. Increasingly, it presents itself in its radical neoliberal version, which cannot be an ideological basis of a broad social consensus connected with the mechanisms of democratic harmonization of interests and communitarian values [14]. In that sense, neoliberalism marks a virtual return to the narrow undemocratic notion of equality of the classical 19th-century liberalism with all sorts of qualifications and minimal electoral participation of non-elites. The growing dysfunctionality of habitual value-related and ontological coordinates of the liberal consensus of great modern ideologies exacerbates the problems of legitimizing the political order in the Western countries. This order is losing its support base even as the middle class shrinks, more and more often not due to the market but due to the state (China, Russia) and is increasingly challenged by non-systemic movements and alternative value coordinates of policy [24]. Liberalism has more than once revealed the narrowness of its values and ideological ideas reflecting the interests of concrete historical class subjects and the methods of distributing social resourc-

es. It tries to present them as unhistorical and universal through unconvincing arguments about abstract individuals surrounded by a veil of ignorance, which makes it possible to make just decisions in the interests of all [37].

Political, economic, and ethical regulators, such as the ethics of virtue, corporate, and double standards and populism, are becoming ever more widespread as alternatives to liberalism [28]. Finally, representative democratic institutions cease to be a valid argument in favor of political participation because the military and labor value of the mass population is diminishing [13]. The transformation of the social structure leads to an institutional crisis of representative democracy. The latter is manifested through the rise of various brands of national-populism, which reacts to new social demands and symptoms of the systemic crisis of market capitalism, but can hardly meet them in the long-term perspective. There is frequent criticism of the elite democracy model and of political elites, which have privatized the public sphere that has (with the exception of sporadic flashes of non-systemic activity) ceased to be the domain where the interests of the majority and of significant social groups are voiced. The expansion of the specific model of *homo economicus* to all spheres of society's life leads to a situation where "one important effect of neoliberalization is the vanquishing of liberal democracy's already anemic homo politicus, a vanquishing with enormous consequences for democratic institutions, cultures and imaginaries" [3, p. 119]. Finally, the very notion of freedom, rooted in the social ontology of liberalism and in the liberal-conservative-socialist consensus of reformed capitalism of the second half of the 20th century, has outlived itself, both in the positive and negative sense. Freedom, though associated with liberalism, is not confined to its liberal interpretation, because liberalism has no monopoly on the idea of freedom. The ancient world had its own idea of freedom; the Renaissance and Reformation had a neo-Roman idea, to say nothing of the left-wing invariants of the liberal idea. In the broad sense, freedom implies access to opportunities. If access shrinks for the majority of people, or if the spectrum of what is accessible and desirable changes due to various circumstances, the idea of freedom loses its appeal. The new paradigm of the political science mainstream thus implies a new idea of freedom.

Under such circumstances, procedural or electoral democracy becomes an imitation institutional skeleton, while the real content and goal of policy even in developed democracies are increasingly determined by the particular interests of an influential minority [22]. The elites in model Western societies subject the basic principles of the functioning of democracy to numerous manipulations through expert reviews and plebiscites [41]. Many researchers write about the crisis and decline of representative democracy and an exaggerated assessment of its positive impact on society's life (Colin Crouch [8], Peter Mair [23]). Comparative statistics for 135 states over the last 30 years compiled by Christopher Claassen show that the spread of democratic procedures and institutions does not guarantee stable democracy. Indeed, paradoxically, consistent democratization often creates internal contradictions and de-consolidation, and undermines trust in democratic institutions as the demands of all kinds of minorities challenging the majority escalate. The elites then start to play their own game, supplanting rule by the people,

while society takes democratic gains for granted such that they do not need to be constantly reasserted by collective democratic practices [7]. This accounts for the recently growing popularity of the radical discourse of replacing electoral democracy with democracy by lottery, when decision-makers are chosen and appointed in a random fashion. This mitigates the universal natural tendencies manifested in the iron law of oligarchy (Moses Ostrogorsky), when power, opportunities, and resources are over time concentrated in exclusive groups in the hands of few [5].

3. The decline of the influence of the US and Europe is manifested in the denial of the thesis that equates the West with the ideal political system as a constructed political myth. The political interests of the West and the liberal political order are gradually being differentiated. It is becoming increasingly difficult to sell American hegemony, which has been growing since 1945, as the march of democracy and liberalism, because in reality it is nothing but a mechanism for building military-political and economic hierarchies and balances in a bipolar world and promoting exclusive national interests in the post-bipolar period [44]. The liberal international order is more and more often described as a false collective imaginary, which the West is no longer able to sustain [35]. Ian Bruff notes the growing authoritarian tendencies of neoliberalism in modern Western societies, where the safety of citizens (securitization policy) is used as a pretext for increasing control of the state by the elites and the inevitably conflict-generating public space of democracy is constricted [4].

The 21st century is witnessing a dramatic rise of the military, economic, and demographic power of the non-Western countries whose interests diverge from those of the West and are ever more convincingly cast in alternative models of political, cultural, economic, and historical legitimization. For example, in 2016, China published its own 11-volume version of world history of economic thought, which is an alternative to the Western history [2]. These models often go beyond the hierarchy of global political values and institutions established by the West. Besides, amid growing protectionism, marginalizing economic policies, tightening migration policy, the rise of nationalism and populism, the crisis of the social security systems, Western societies often turn out to be less free, market-oriented, democratic, and open than their political rhetoric claims. Western societies, held up as models of development for all the other societies, increasingly diverge from their public ideal. They experience the pressure of the same negative background trends as other societies. They face market saturation, economic slowdown, shrinking labor markets, growing non-economic competition and material inequalities, the contracting social state, etc. As a result, Western societies are struggling to reproduce democracy, markets, and capitalism, which used to be their inherent attributes. At the same time, the multiplying practices of all kinds of double standards erode faith in the universality and practicability of implementing the principles of democracy, freedom, equal rights, equality, non-interference, freedom of movement, fair play, etc. Meanwhile, the success of societies that in one way or another diverge from the liberal, market, and democratic canon is becoming ever more evident. Moreover, they have no intention of becoming part of the Western value system and institutional hierarchy because attempts to copy

Western institutions and transit no longer bring the desired results to non-Western societies. They merely make one think that the West's advantages are due not only or largely to liberal-democratic values, institutions, and practices, but to military might, political pressure and their central position in the capitalist world system that brings extra-economic bonuses to its beneficiaries and regulators.

Accordingly, political and economic theories that present the West as the source of value and ontological constants lose their explanatory and legitimizing potential. As a result, we see the processes of systemic disintegration of the neoliberal political science and economic mainstream, which claimed the universality of its descriptions of modern societies that have allegedly reached the end of history in open-access market liberal democracies. The key challenge to the mainstream is that the observed transformations of socio-political realities in modern societies, seen as exceptions and deviations, are not really exceptions and deviations. Accumulated deviations in the economy, social structure, changes of geopolitical balance, collective identities, etc.—these are all signs of the emergence of new social regularities or enduring old ones, which the subjects of the neoliberal political science mainstream try not to notice or describe as temporary pathologies, archaic, marginal or peripheral phenomena. However, such exceptions have become so numerous as to dictate a revision of the mainstream itself.

Within the mainstream, protracted crises of modern societies that divert them from the normative ideal of liberal democracy are described in civil repair discourse (Jeffrey Alexander [1], Piotr Sztompka [40]). It proceeds on the premise that the growth of observed deviations and the socio-cultural trends that defy adequate description in terms of habitual categories are temporary crises. Repair discourses are formulated as local utopias appealing to creativity (of classes, cities or economies), digitilization, networking, robotics, innovation, nanotechnologies, gentrification, smart technologies, the knowledge economy, intellect capitalization, the flat world (Thomas Friedman, see [18]). All such concepts are called upon to demonstrate that the market/capitalism has not lost its ability to expand the resource space of all participants. In reality, these new market success stories turn out to be stories of the rise of various minorities against the backdrop of the sustained stagnation of available resources and life perspectives for the majority. It is assumed that any crises and exceptions will be magically overcome and society will be back on the habitual value and institutional track of liberalism, market, and democracy from which it tends to be increasingly derailed. Indeed, when some empirical phenomena stray too far from the former reality described by the dominant economic discourse, researchers fall back on such concepts as "the Japanese economic miracle," "Asian tigers," "the Dutch disease," etc. Miracles, diseases, tigers, etc. are metaphors from the realm of the supernatural. To include such phenomena in verbal models, economists resort to magical artefacts using the fantasy style as deftly as the famous father of the genre, John Tolkien [33, pp. 8-9].

These ideas and methods of the economic mainstream are practically shared by populists who today increasingly challenge the establishment. The rising populism, both of the right and left, is a political embodiment of the repair discourse

addressed to the masses [15]. Such confidence of the representatives of the neo-liberal political science mainstream in the immutability of the current and desired social order may make one wonder. It prevents an answer being given to the question about the true causes of social changes by dismissing them as diseases and pathologies: unworthy governance, dependence on previous development, the rut effect, the socio-cultural model of "the Soviet man" and other lamentable anomalies. However, the social norm is always constructed expressing the dynamic social consensus, which may sooner or later be recalled, revised or may fall apart in favor of new collective communities and dominant ideas of desired principles and rules of communal life. In the context of radical global changes, the neoliberal mainstream, which copies formalized and reductionist mathematical research methods, is increasingly at odds with the complex and contradictory social reality and the new patterns of its reproduction [12]. These patterns in human society are relative and cannot be established once and for all in a situation of constantly changing subjects, goals, and cultural and resource contexts. The social composition of society, hierarchies of collective interests and even the goals of the same people change with the movement of history. Therefore, any mainstream theory ceases to correlate with real political processes and patterns, presenting an ideological context that challenges the hypothesis that, once established, social laws are universal and unhistorical.

After Neoliberalism: Variants of an Alternative Mainstream

The growing multipolarity of value and institutional hierarchies makes scenarios and priorities of the further development of humankind more and more variegated. Similar processes are also taking place at the level of socio-political and economic theories, which capture social regularities. New hierarchies of political knowledge will be formed under the impact of the new social ontology. The key questions of the degree and the very possibility of future uniformity of new hierarchies and its leading subjects remain open. These subjects may include political elites of non-Western states (Russia, China, Brazil, India, etc.), transnational corporations, networks of global cities, as well as new social groups that transcend the habitual class dichotomy of the market society—for example, the precariat, rent groups, new social estates formed by the state, etc. Finally, it is unclear whether the new subjects will be interested in actively attempting to make their utopias general or whether the political science mainstream will survive in a modified form by broadening the circle of its beneficiaries.

In the social sciences, the most convincing vision of the causes of the crisis of the neoliberal mainstream and its possible alternatives is offered by those who see the world economy, law, global politics, and the ideological constructs legitimizing them as elements of a single whole. These are first and foremost various versions of the world system analysis (Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, Samir Amin, Georgi Derluguian, and others), which enable a systemic description of the determining influence of historical, geographical, cultural, and

economic factors on the development of the political science mainstream. Various versions of neo-Marxism are also fairly close to these methodological principles (Fredric Jameson, Pierre Bourdieu, Michael Burawoy, David Harvey, Antonio Negri, Thomas Piketty, Boris Kagarlitsky etc.). These trends form a value-related and theoretical-methodological alternative to the neoliberal political science mainstream. The history of political and economic sciences arranges itself as an ideologically engaged hierarchy of knowledge. The relativeness of this hierarchy is very apparent when rival versions of political science are relegated to the predominantly ideological domain, with one's own version considered largely or entirely scientific. Thus, for example, Soviet political science generated texts devoted to the struggle against the bourgeois ideology, inequality, and exploitation of the working class, while apologists for the free market wrote prolifically to prove the ineffectiveness of the command economy and to expose totalitarianism. Peter Orekhovsky notes the growing cognitive stagnation of the mainstream: "A growing share of works are devoted to an apology of the regime of private property, freedom, creativity and at the same time to the criticism of dirigisme, isolationism, and egalitarianism; meanwhile, another body of works is devoted to the propaganda of the strong state, social altruism, and justice, leavened with criticism of predation and egoism. At a certain point, the former kinds of works become official mainstream and the latter 'heterodox trends' or underground, but from time to time they swap places, performing the role of ideologies that both society and economic science need" [33, p. 4]. In effect, both these approaches belong to the repair discourse. Repair if not of capitalism in its idealized shape with corresponding values and virtues, then of a reformed capitalism of the second half of the 20th century. Because both these varieties of capitalism (libertarian and regulated) mutually spoil each other, the repair discourse turns out to be "looped" and indestructible.

It is worth noting that some liberal paradigm works and approaches objectively contribute to its demythologization and critical revision. For example, Mancur Olson's neoinstitutionalism expressly calls the state "a stationary bandit," even under democracy [32]. The popular book of Douglass North, Barry Weingast, and John Wallis on open access natural states and societies is a controversial attempt to conserve the mainstream mythology of Western social sciences while unwittingly exposing it by pointing out the main structural elements of this mythology [31]. Finally, the famous "culture matters" thesis objectively attempts to explain the economic effectiveness of other cultures comparable to that of the West by retrospectively ascribing to them Western characteristics [9].

Today, the discussion on the critique and reinterpretation of the political science and, more broadly, social science mainstream is unfolding on various levels, beginning from a revision of the normative principles of neoliberal political philosophy and ending with the development of alternative classifications of political regimes and institutions. The global economic crisis as part of the systemic crisis of capitalism and the declining influence of the West have brought into sharper focus the problem of the relevance of the theories and methodologies that constitute the social science mainstream (Ian Shapiro [38], David Harvey [19],

Colin Crouch [8], Vladimir Efimov [11], Peter Orekhovsky [21] and others). For example, in 2018, a major conference organized by the Leontief Center [10] was devoted to the latest challenges to the mainstream of economic theory. Researchers more and more often attack the methodology of political science rooted in the dominant theories of rational choice, natural equilibrium of the competitive market, reductionist mathematical models, institutional theories, etc., which are called upon to legitimize the hierarchy of societies based on liberal-democratic imaginaries rather than convincingly explain, let alone predict, the social transformations happening in the real world. As Australian economist John Quiggin caustically remarks, "if the Great Depression, the dotcom boom and bust, and the current Global Financial Crisis are all consistent with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, the hypothesis can't tell us much of interest about anything" [36]. The crisis of the social science mainstream is analyzed in the latest works devoted to the rise of the West. They draw on vast factual material to put forward hypotheses whereby the historical growth of both Western and non-Western economic subjects took place contrary to the neoliberal recipes of development, which modern world hegemons are imposing on the periphery of the world system [6].

The institutional theories of the Western economic mainstream describe modernity as a simple transition from bad institutions to good ones (open society, open access order, inclusive institutions) initiated by the English Glorious Revolution of 1688 and strengthened property rights which underpinned subsequent economic growth and the industrial revolution. More detailed studies reveal that this interpretation of the beneficent impact of market-democratic political and economic institutions on economic growth is ideologically vulnerable and reductionist. Thus, during the century following the Glorious Revolution, the share of the English state in the GDP soared from 1-2% to 8-10%, with the money used not to develop infrastructure or education, but for military purposes and to service the state debt. No shift toward better protected rights of tax-payers was observed, and England's economy developed not because but in spite of sharply increased taxes and government spending. The historical narrative offered by pan-institutionalism proceeds from the assumption that in pre-industrial societies, property rights did not exist even formally and at best existed only on paper, being constantly targeted by predatory attacks on the part of the elites. Numerous historical studies show this narrative to be a fiction: Protected property rights are as old as the world and have existed in dozens of countries at different periods. But if the Northian scheme is deprived of this prop, the whole structure collapses [20, p. 28].

The moral, political, and economic weakening of Western hegemony and relativization of legitimizing social theories are slowed down by the preservation of an uneasy consensus among global players who seek to hold back change and socio-political experimentation. The final breakdown of the consensus within the West due to the emergence of new class subjects, as well as between the West and the rising non-Western influence centers, leads to more open conflict and competitive scenarios of economic, political, cultural, and probably military interaction in the world. The process of these communications may bring about a fundamental revision of the hierarchy of the world political order and the theories

that legitimize it. At the same time as the former subjects of domination grow weaker and the heuristic power of the scientific theories that meet their interests diminishes, conditions emerge for the formation of new paradigms. Obviously, the points of growth of socio-political knowledge will be connected with the loss of trust in the values of the global liberal politico-economic order, critique of its foundations, and attempts to work out more convincing alternative paradigms. In the complex modern society, the situation is compounded by the ever present conflict between its conceptual descriptions from various class and geopolitical perspectives. We can see a similar conflict of descriptions on the global scale in the center-periphery hierarchy of societies included in the capitalist world system on various terms and oriented toward various accessible resources. The current global competition for control and re-division of spheres of influence takes the form of diplomatic, political, and military conflicts exacerbating the confrontation between leading power centers, including at the level of normative descriptions of the global world, and criteria of modernity, progress, and a just society.

In such ontological and historical contexts, the credibility of the core polit-ical science mainstream hinges on its ability to adequately reassess changes of the global social ontology and the principles of social stratification. There is a growing demand among the new social groups for alternative principles of social stratification and distribution of resources geared not to class and market but to rent and social estate mechanisms as the key *market metaphor* is more and more often displaced by the alternative mechanism of *rent access*. The emergence of *a society without economic growth and mass labor* leads to the transformation of the political science mainstream in favor of theories that describe the global future in largely non-market and non-capitalist and perhaps non-liberal catego-ries. Alternative variants of the distribution of public resources and the concepts describing them will involve a revision of approaches that guarantee a decent living standard for the majority in a situation of stagnation or very slow growth of the overall resource base. A new social order would make it possible to integrate *dangerous social classes* and *superfluous people* and to transform the political science mainstream. It should be able to understand socio-political and economic processes, which form the value and institutional nucleus of the new social order. Concepts, ideologies, and theories that can describe the new social state as a rent and social estate category are becoming more and more relevant. The COVID-19 pandemic has been a catalyst of social changes, including such that were seen as marginal in the framework of the neoliberal mainstream (direct government sup-port of business; social policy oriented toward universal basic income; restriction of individual rights and freedoms in favor of security, etc.) [27].

Against the background of ontological factors, i.e., sharpening of global non-economic competition for resources, the emergence of new world subjects, changes of the social and economic structure of societies, the neoliberal mainstream is entering a phase of disintegration. It becomes layered, generating (1) various na-tional and civilizational versions aligned with the interests of new power centers and (2) versions that meet the interests of the new social groups instead of the habitual economic classes, which express the interests either of capital or of labor.

Reflection of the Neoliberal Mainstream in Russian Political Thought

The value and methodological priorities of Russian political science are in many ways conditioned by the processes taking place in world and Russian politics [25]. For a long time, the main trend in the development of Russian political science was determined by borrowing (often uncritically) from the vast body of Western mainstream theories from which Russian social science had been previously isolated for ideological reasons. That period saw the dominance of methodological and worldview principles of transit theories, which took for granted the perspective of transition to ideal types of democracy and capitalism patterned on the developed countries. Russian researchers who shared the prevailing universal categories of society description noticed mostly the deviations from the social ideal. These include totalitarianism (authoritarianism), growing social backwardness (Aleksandr Akhiezer), the fusion of power and property (Natalia Pliskevich), unworthy governance (Vladimir Gel'man), neopatrimonialism (Shmuel Eisenstadt, Aleksandr Fisun, Nikolay Rozov, Mikhail Ilyin), neofeudalism (Vladimir Shlapentokh, Yaroslav Startsev), and corruption. Such deviations were expected to be overcome through transit, modernization, and movement toward an open access society, the pinnacle of the value-institutional hierarchy of West-centric political knowledge. A more important problem, however, was that such institutional backwardness was gradually discovered in societies at the center of the capitalist world system. The mechanisms of real reproduction and interaction of elites in Western societies turned out to be more archaic to form a theoretical blind zone. In the ideological optics of the neoliberal mainstream, Western societies are idealized. Yet over time, it is giving way to alternative views of what is normal society, generated outside the West. Consequently, the intellectual devices of the mainstream, including attribution of social backwardness to peripheral societies, scholastic play at the liberal-democratic norm and deviations from it, will increasingly be called into question as global hierarchies of power and knowledge are revised. This means that with the change of intellectual perspective, pathology/backwardness will begin to be noticed in the nucleus of the socio-political realities of mainstream hegemons [30]. Thus, the non-liberal, undemocratic, and non-market nucleus of hegemon societies, which the mainstream previously noticed only in peripheral/backward societies, will begin to be registered as an empirical fact, normalized as a universal format of political communication and institutions that had been undone only in ideological self-descriptions and the rhetoric of Western societies.

In general, what prompted the ideological self-descriptions of the Western society in which the undemocratic nucleus had allegedly been overcome and replaced with a different one? They were triggered by the situations when the rising national bourgeoisie was fighting for power and influence and needed the support of the masses against the old elites, then against geopolitical rivals, and more recently against the Soviet threat. However, this did not mean that the bourgeoisie itself was in favor of open access. Over the centuries, the bourgeoisie, living under the protection of absolutist and constitutional monarchies, was not loath to

integrate into the natural closed-access order, buying noble titles, privileges, etc. In other words, ideological self-descriptions as adherents of open access were a matter of expediency, a fact that invariably manifested itself when the bourgeoisie felt protected by a strong government. Just look at the advocacy of various eligibility regimes, experiments with Fascism and oligarchization of modern democracies. In the context of the global crisis of the free market, these legitimizing self-descriptions are devalued and peel off as something optional.

In this global context, the character of national political science is to a large degree determined by a country's position in the world economy and its role in global politics. Attempts to uphold or change this position call for a new ideology that is an alternative to the globally dominant one or at least for a version that is different from the mainstream. Russia's semi-peripheral position in the global economy entails corresponding changes in the social structure. This makes it impossible to provide its plausible normative description in modern class and market categories of the neoliberal mainstream. The fact that it is impossible to relevantly analyze Russian society attests that the neoliberal paradigms of political knowledge have exhausted themselves: They do not have adequate non-pathological descriptions of the social phenomena and interactions that form the fabric of Russian society and not the society it ought to be according to external progressors. Increasingly, an alternative to the superficial classifications in the categories of what ought to be is being provided by descriptions of the social structure and political order of the Russian society through concepts and metaphors of quasi-estates and quasi-markets, rent and redistribution, and non-market principles of resource allocation (*razdatok*) (Simon Kordonsky, Olga Bessonova, Yury Plyusnin, Svetlana Barsukova etc.). To some extent, disenchantment with the efficiency of the direct grafting of Western theories onto national soil produced a groundswell of civilizational and nationalist concepts that stress the socio-cultural uniqueness of the USSR and Russia that can be fathomed only through special methods—a kind of political science of the Russian world (Aleksandr Panarin, Sergey Kara-Murza, Vadim Tsymbursky and others).

The neoliberal idiom of the mainstream describes and legitimizes the moribund ontology of the Western society. Thus, it makes no sense for Russian society to be on the periphery of expiring classifications of political regimes and hierarchies of descriptions whose ideological dimension precludes a positive legitimization of any Russian political order. There is no point for Russian social scientists to strain to find quasi explanations of various deviations of Russian society from the ideal model of the liberal-democratic political ontology of Western capitalism. For not only Russia but the rest of the world, including the West, deviates from this model. The position of Russian society in the optics of the neoliberal mainstream is one of a dependent periphery. However, the breakup of the America-centric world offers a chance for alternative concepts in which the backwardness imputed by the neoliberal mainstream may turn out to be an advantage in the search for languages and legitimizing concepts of a new political order.

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The crisis of the political science mainstream is a consequence of the global restructuring of earlier power, economic, institutional, intellectual, and moral hierarchies. It is seen as a crisis only by the leaders of the crumbling hierarchies, which are losing their former positions. The situation of transition from one order to another gives rise to heterarchy as various value and institutional alternatives emerge. The normative language of description changes as the key element of soft power, which creates a whole picture of the world, a picture that does not always accord with reality and indeed is intended to change it. In the case of the neoliberal mainstream, we are looking at the language of description, which has already changed the global world in favor of its beneficiaries. Therefore, the societies of the center of the world economy perceive it as an adequate description of the world, which cements the established value and institutional hierarchy of power/knowledge/resources. The main generators of global alternatives are the societies of the world's semi-periphery and new social groups that have either been sidelined from leading positions or have for the first time gained political and economic weight that makes them eligible to enter the pool of beneficiaries of a different political order.

The revision of the global hierarchy of knowledge and power may show that liberal-democratic and market values and institutions, which were seen as the universal nucleus of Modernity, are but a veneer providing an ideological justification of the global Western hegemony. The weakening of military-political and economic hegemony, as well as the worsening crisis of the neoliberal mainstream, reveal that the value-related and institutional nuclei of Western and non-Western societies have more similarities than differences. The common nucleus is reproduced mainly through antiquated non-market mechanisms carefully disguised by neoliberal elites, which in the public discourse are consigned to the reality outside the hegemon societies and are ascribed only to peripheral and backward societies that need modernization and correction. Ideological negation of their value and institutional nucleus based on the mechanisms of power/property and the hereditary state-assisted distribution of social resources whose share in the GDPs of major Western economies is as high as 40-50%, is the key contradiction of the neoliberal mainstream. It is becoming more and more difficult to fend off criticism of this paradox as many non-Western societies achieve success, influence, and wealth in spite of the real or imagined problems with market, democracy, and liberalism. The main issues are who, how, and with regard to what will in the foreseeable future try to set standards for the socio-political and economic structure of society. In what spheres will universal standards of norms, values, and institutions be required at the national and local levels? To what degree will competing societies be described not so much in ideological categories as in categories that are more down-to-earth and relevant to the day-to-day life of billions of people: hunger and affluence, comfort and opportunity, freedom in daily life, health, life satisfaction, etc. After all, convincing ideological and scientific categories are always rooted in quotidian life. The decline of the mainstream warrants a return to the study of

established social practices and institutions, values and groups that underlie the social orders in various "wrong" societies, which are the home of the overwhelming majority of people. Heterogeneous political orders may ensure harmony and a life as good as (and sometimes better than) in correct societies, without resorting to the liberal-democratic ontology of the ought. This situation exposes the unreliability and superficiality of the legitimizing market metaphors and discourse atop the body of reciprocal, distributive, rent-estate, and other exchanges that form the basis of any modern political order, including liberal democracies.

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The Case Against Metaphysical Retributivism

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    Abstract. This paper makes a case against metaphysical retributivism, i.e., the belief that the existence of physical evil (suffering) can be causally explained and normatively justified by being interpreted as a just punishment for the moral evil committed by those who suffer. First, the author introduces a disjunctive distinction between the humanistic and non-humanistic normative theories of moral good and evil. Then, he justifies his anti-retributivist thesis with regard to the former and the latter. Humanistic theories according to which an activity can be morally evil only if it inflicts physical evil on other agents logically imply that physical evil is a precondition of moral evil and, therefore, cannot be merely one of its consequences. This is demonstrated both with respect to the linear (e.g., "Abrahamic") metaphysical scenarios and the circular ones (e.g., ancient or esoteric). Besides, according to these theories, the infliction of very intensive physical evil presupposed by metaphysical retributivism cannot be morally justified even if it is formally just. On the other hand, non-humanistic normative theories logically imply that the very content of the notion of moral evil is in no way related to the notion of physical evil. However, in that case moral and physical evil are essentially heterogeneous and incommensurable. Therefore, a proportional correlation between them, which is a necessary prerequisite for a just and morally justified retribution, cannot be established.

    Keywords: just punishment, moral evil, physical evil, retributivism, theodicy.

    1. In this article I propose to set forth the argument, which in my view proves that metaphysical retributivism in all its forms is logically inconceivable and morally unacceptable. By *metaphysical retributivism* I mean the worldview position whereby:

(1) the very existence of physical evil, i.e., pain and suffering,[1] in this world is *causally explained* by its being just punishment for a moral evil committed by the suffering subjects;

(2) the infliction of this physical evil is a *morally positive* (i.e., morally justified or even obligatory) activity on the part of various supra-natural (i.e., not empirically given) moral agents who administer or sanction the punishment (for example, God, gods or angels, etc.) or perhaps on the part of some impersonal retributive system (such as a karmic one); and therefore the existence of physical evil is *normatively justified* and fully compatible with asserting value positiveness of objective reality and (in the framework of the theistic worldview) with the existence of the absolutely good God.

I am not looking here at the problem of justification of *social* retributivism. The latter theory does not purport to causally explain and normatively justify *the existence* of physical evil by referring to its retributive function, but merely asserts that the causing of such evil by some real (i.e., empirically given) agents to other agents in a situation when in general this kind of evil already exists in the world regardless of their will can be morally justified if it is institutionalized just punishment.[2]

2. The overall structure of my argument against metaphysical retributivism is as follows. I distinguish two types of normative theories, which establish what exactly is moral evil and why, the "humanistic" and "non-humanistic." I then demonstrate that the content of the concept of just retribution changes substantially depending on whether we proceed from the normative standards of the humanistic or non-humanistic type. Next, I assume in turn that either the humanistic or non-humanistic standards are right and show that on either of these assumptions metaphysical retributivism is logically inconceivable and morally unacceptable. Because in accordance with the proposed dichotomy the normative standards of moral evil can be either humanistic or non-humanistic, or, in extremis, mixed, metaphysical retributivism turns out to be logically inconceivable and morally unacceptable in any case.

3. Central to this argument is my distinction between humanistic and non-humanistic normative theories. Its prerequisites and content need prior explanation. I use as a working model of the general theory of values a modified version of the so-called Fitting Attitude account,[3] whereby *good in general* can be described as a fitting object of a positive attitude (pro-attitude) on the part of a subject or subjects[4] and *evil in general* as a fitting object of a negative attitude on their part. I call such a description a *formal* notion of good and evil. This notion is formal because it does not answer the following two questions: (1) *what exactly* is a fitting object of a positive or negative attitude? and (2) what are the *normative standards* for establishing whether a positive or negative attitude of any possible subject to any object is *fitting*? In my opinion, there is no universally accepted answer to these questions with which all rational subjects agree *de facto*.[5] On the contrary, in reality different subjects, proceeding from substantively different *normative standards* of good and evil, form different or even antagonistic ideas of *what exactly* good and evil are.

Thus, the totality of fitting objects of a positive or negative attitude actually admitted by this or that value discourse, is the *material* notion of good and evil and the normative standard proceeding from which this discourse answers the question of whether they are fitting is the *normative notion* of good and evil. The notion of specifically *moral* good and evil can be arrived at by specifying material and formal notions of good and evil *in general.*[6] On the one hand, the material object of a positive or negative attitude in this case cannot be just anything, but only first, external and internal *activity* of rational agents for which they are deemed to be responsible (in this or that concrete discourse) and second, various factors that influence or depend on this activity (character, principles, laws, etc.).[7] On the other hand the formal *notion* of specifically moral good and evil can be made more concrete by saying that moral good is a fitting object of *specifically moral* approval and moral evil—of *specifically moral* censure for all moral agents. What are the distinctive traits of moral approval or censure (as distinct from a positive or negative attitude to an object in general)? In my opinion, a satisfactory answer can be based on the so-called attitudinal[8] concept of morality whereby when somebody *morally* approves or censures a certain activity, they do not just express their personal reaction with varying degrees of emotional involvement, but always consider it proper and extremely important that all the other rational agents share this approval or censure, and manifest it through what may be called "moral sanction,"[9] i.e., various emotional and behavioral reactions which (unlike legal sanctions) have no institutional form.

4. The *normative* notions of moral good and evil, which are basic for various types of ethical discourse and are called upon to explain *why* or *on what grounds* various types of activity of rational subjects must elicit such a *specifically moral* reaction on the part of all the moral agents may have substantially different content. Various classifications of normative conceptions can be created depending on which aspect of substantive differences is taken as a reference point. The most popular classification of this kind divides them into deontological and teleological (consequentialist) theories.

I propose here an alternative division of all normative conceptions into humanistic and non-humanistic. I call *humanistic* all the normative theories in which the ultimate normative ground for recognizing an activity to be morally positive or negative is its being *humane* or *anti-humane.* Whether it is humane or anti-humane depends on whether it *in fact*[10] tends to contribute to *physical* good or evil, i.e., to pleasure (and/or elimination of suffering) or to suffering (and/or elimination of pleasure) of certain subjects.[11] On the contrary, in the context of *non-humanistic* normative theories the moral significance of any activity has nothing to do with whether it leads to physical good or evil for any subjects, but depends entirely on the compliance with *humanistically neutral* normative standards postulated in a given discourse. These are the standards the content of which does not include the notions of physical good and evil and/or humanity and anti-humanity (for example, God's will, God's law, objective perfection of human nature, logical universalizability of the maxim of an action, etc.). Pluralistic normative theories which appeal both to humanistic and non-humanistic normative

reasons are in principle conceivable, but are doomed to be mired in contradictions if these reasons are deemed to have equal status.[12]

5. For my argument to be successful, it is sufficient that, on the one hand, this classification of normative theories be simply *possible*, and on the other hand that my conclusions follow from it. At the same time, I believe that this classification is essentially *necessary* if we are to properly clarify the concept of just retribution. Indeed, this concept is based on "*the idea of sanction*" [13] which presupposes that an agent who has committed a *moral* evil deserves to suffer a *physical* evil. The rationale behind this idea is apparently the assumption of a kind of *equivalence* between these varieties of evil whereby it is precisely *because* an agent has committed some *evil* that she deserves to suffer some *evil*.[14] I will call the assumed equivalence between moral and physical evil *retributive correlation*. However, the content of the notion of moral evil changes radically depending on whether we proceed from humanistic or non-humanistic moral norms, which in turn radically changes the conceptual meaning of retributive correlation.

6. From the humanistic point of view *only* anti-humane activity can be morally wrong, *precisely* because it is anti-humane. Let us leave aside all possible egoistic versions of the humanistic discourse, i.e., both the full-fledged ethical egoism in the vein of Epicurus and egoistic components of universalist theories such as utilitarianism.[15] In this case the *material* notion of moral evil in the humanistic discourse would include only those forms of activity which inflict physical evil on *other* subjects, and precisely because according to the *normative* notion of moral evil its ultimate standard is solely *social* anti-humanity. Accordingly, retributive correlation can have only the following content: if one agent has wrongfully[16] perpetrated *physical* evil toward another agent, thereby committing a *moral* evil, for this precise reason the agent deserves to experience physical evil equivalent to that caused to the other. Thus, humanistic retribution is intrinsically *intersubjective,* i.e., allows suffering to be inflicted on *one* subject solely because that subject has caused suffering to *another* subject. Nothing like it is envisaged by non-humanistic retribution, as will be shown below in paragraph 13. In the meantime let us assume that humanistic normative standards are right and that just retribution can only be humanistic. From this it follows directly that the very existence of physical evil in this reality cannot be *causally* explained as just punishment for a moral evil committed by the suffering subjects and therefore metaphysical retributivism is logically inconceivable. And indeed, this causal explanation implies that free agents commit a certain moral evil and it is *only by virtue of this* that the metaphysical system justly punishes them by inflicting physical evil, so that the latter *would not exist at all* if these agents had not committed moral evil.[17] This means that it is moral evil that makes the existence of physical evil possible. But from the viewpoint of humanistic normative standards *moral* evil itself can consist only in activity that inflicts *physical* evil on other subjects. Thus, logically the humanistic concept of moral evil already implies the notion of physical evil and, consequently, it is rather physical evil that is the precondition of moral evil. But then it would be impossible to say that physical evil would not have existed if there did not exist moral evil. On the contrary, in a world without physical evil

it would have been impossible to inflict it, hence moral evil corresponding to humanistic normative standards would be unthinkable.

7. This argument may be called into question considering that traditional metaphysical scenarios can be divided into linear and cyclic. I call here *linear* those scenarios that are characteristic above all of Abrahamic religions. They assume a one-off "cosmic" or "sacred" history in which God first creates the world and then the activity of creatures leads to the emergence of evil in this world, prompting a retributive reaction from God. In the end, all this results in an eschatological reordering of the world, implying in one form or another a final victory over evil. *Cyclic* metaphysical scenarios are characteristic of many ancient religious and philosophical teachings (Greco-Roman or Indian) and of the later esoteric tradition. In these scenarios, the material cosmos, including its inherent evil, exists in some form or other eternally, along with a higher spiritual reality on which it depends metaphysically, but periodically goes through substantively similar stages of cyclic development, while individuals within it pass through numerous reincarnations in various bodies.

8. In my view, the argument set forth in paragraph 6 is obviously valid for linear metaphysical scenarios. These scenarios usually concede that initially God created the world without any evil in it, but at a certain point evil made its *first* appearance in being as a result of free activities of creatures. The implication is that first the creatures commit a moral evil or a "sin" and it is *only in response to this* that God introduces physical evil into being as a just punishment for "sin" and partly as a "medical-pedagogical" instrument of rectifying it.[18] But if physical evil *first* appears in being *exclusively* as a retributive-pedagogical reaction to previously committed moral evil, obviously, this moral evil *logically cannot* consist neither in the actual causing of physical evil to other subjects nor even in an intention to cause it.[19] In this case, from the point of view of humanistic normative standards it *is not moral evil at all*, which means that it is impossible, on the one hand, to claim that moral evil is the cause of the existence of physical evil in this world, and on the other hand, to regard physical evil as just punishment. Insofar as any *first* moral evil implied in linear scenarios is *not genuine* from the humanistic point of view, the punishment for it, i.e., the introduction of physical evil as such into being, in principle cannot be either just or morally justified.[20] Subsequent *individual* transgressions fail to explain *the general fact* of the existence of physical evil, but merely follow from it because according to humanistic norms they may only consist in causing this evil. Individual sufferings (at least *en masse*) can hardly be interpreted as just punishment for such wrongdoings because all sentient creatures in this world, including those that in principle cannot be moral agents, from the very beginning of their existence are exposed to suffering and in fact often experience it before some of them manage or have an intention to commit any socially anti-humane act whatsoever. On the other hand, if individual wrongdoings are recognized as moral evil not on the basis of their being anti-humane, then once again this evil is not genuine from the humanistic point of view.

9. Things are less obvious in the case of cyclic scenarios. It may seem at first glance that given *eternal* transmigration of souls from body to body a certain form

of metaphysical retributivism becomes conceivable even according to humanistic standards. Imagine that the suffering of any subject is a just punishment for the moral evil they have committed (probably in one of previous incarnations) and that this moral evil consisted in causing the suffering of another subject who in turn suffered for having inflicted suffering on another subject, and so on and so forth *ad infinitum*. Cyclic scenarios can well afford this kind of infinity. Yet even in this case, metaphysical retributivism is unable to explain *the general fact of the existence* of suffering in this world. This can be illustrated by the following thought experiment. Let us imagine three possible worlds corresponding to the cyclic scenario:

A, where the maximum intensity of suffering is about equal to the physical pain from a scratch or an abrasion (let us assume that the intensity of such pain is one antihedon, i.e., one unit of measuring suffering).

B, where the maximum intensity of suffering is equal to the highest possible in this world (as when a sentient creature burns alive, etc.), which for the sake of argument may be equated to 100 antihedons;

C, where the maximum intensity of suffering is approximately the same as that suffered in the traditional Christian hell or purgatory, which for the sake of argument may be equated to 1,000 antihedons.

In each of these worlds we can imagine an infinite cause-and-effect chain in which physical evil caused by one agent to another is just punishment for the moral evil committed by that agent, this moral evil in turn consisting in causing physical evil to another and so on. It is clear, however, that the maximum possible intensity of *any* physical evil in this chain would equal 1 antihedon for A, 100 antihedons for B and 1,000 for C. This is simply a brute given characterizing the structure of each of these worlds because it is impossible to explain it *causally* by appealing to moral evil. Even if we agree that any concrete physical evil experienced by any agent in any of these worlds is just punishment for a moral evil already committed by that agent, that does not begin to explain why the maximum intensity of physical evil should amount to this or that particular magnitude in A, B, C, etc.[21] because *any* degree of such intensity is logically compatible with just retribution. Accordingly, if we compare these worlds with a possible world D, in which the maximum possible intensity of suffering is equal to zero, we have also to admit that the fact that the intensity of physical evil in some of the possible worlds is a *quantitatively positive* value is a brute given that cannot be explained causally by citing any moral evil.

10. The argument in favor of *moral unacceptability* of metaphysical retributivism from the standpoint of humanistic normative standards is briefly as follows: according to these standards, brutal retribution is morally unacceptable even if it is formally just; but metaphysical retribution (in the real world) must by definition be brutal; hence, it is morally impermissible in accordance with humanistic moral norms. *Brutal retribution*, in my frame of reference, is the infliction of very intensive physical evil for the purposes of retribution. I also call *brutal* the physical evil of this kind. The concepts of brutal physical evil and brutal retribution are logically vague in that the exact degree of intensity which turns

non-brutal evil into brutal evil can hardly be established in an unconventional way. However, such vague concepts are quite sufficient for the purposes of this argument. For example, going back to the three possible worlds in paragraph 9, we may agree that the maximum physical evil possible in A is non-brutal, while the maximum physical evil possible under B and C is brutal. Likewise, it is clear that the problem of physical evil the traditional religious-philosophical consciousness has tried to solve by allowing metaphysical retributivism consists not so much in why sentient creatures suffer from minor scratches or a runny nose as in why they have to live in a world where they can burn alive, die from cancer, be subjected to atrocious tortures, etc. I regard all these very intensive kinds of suffering as intuitively evident examples of brutal physical evil. Thus, when metaphysical retributivism explains the existence of such forms of suffering or even more intensive suffering in hell by treating them as just punishment for moral evil, it thereby permits *precisely brutal* retributivism (at least among other things) to which a fitting analogy in the case of social retributivism would be, for example, executions by dismemberment, burning at the stake, etc.

11. It remains to demonstrate why brutal retributivism is morally unacceptable from the standpoint of humanistic normative standards. To this end let us distinguish the formal justice of punishment from its overall moral justification. I will call formally just the punishment corresponding to the ideal of *proportional* justice whereby just punishment for a moral evil has to be the infliction of suffering *quantitatively commensurate* with that evil. For it is obviously unfair to cause *an arbitrary amount* of suffering for a specific moral evil. One has also to distinguish between ordinal and cardinal proportionality.[22] *Ordinal proportionality* implies that a more grave moral evil deserves greater retributive suffering and vice versa, whereas *cardinal proportionality* implies that each specific moral evil deserves a specific amount of retributive suffering commensurate with precisely that evil (for example, in accordance with the talion law). Ordinal proportionality is not sufficient to formally justify punishment because logically it is compatible with inflicting infinitely various (i.e., in essence arbitrary) amounts of suffering for one and the same moral evil in the framework of alternative retributive systems, while not permitting a choice between them.[23] Therefore the formal justice of a punishment must imply its cardinal proportionality. It may well be that in the case of linear metaphysical scenarios with assumption of humanistic normative standards metaphysical retribution cannot be even formally just. For the assumption that each agent undergoes in this life exactly the amount of suffering that she has inflicted on others obviously runs counter to common experience. The assumption of infernal torments merely compounds the problem because, considering its incredible intensity and even more so eternity (if the latter is admitted) it is inconceivable that anyone in this life is able to inflict on others an equivalent amount of suffering. My thesis, though, is rather this, that any punishment, hence metaphysical retribution as well, may *not* be morally justified even if it is recognized as being formally just.

12. On the intuitive level, this thesis is already implied by standard counterexamples against the talion law which insist, for example, that it would

be immoral to rape a rapist to punish him,[24] although this punishment would seem to correspond more than any other to the demands of formal justice (inasmuch as it is possible in empirical conditions). However, this thesis may be bolstered by what I would call *the paradox of punishment*, which arises precisely if humanistic normative standards are adopted. The paradox consists in the fact that punishment has the same characteristic which actually makes any act morally wrong, and that is social anti-humanity (A).[25] But in that case it must itself be deemed morally wrong on the same normative grounds. Needless to say, in this form the paradox of punishment patently denies the very possibility of retributivism. The initial postulate of retributivism (in the humanistic context) consists in this, that any action *x*, which along with A *also* has the character of formally just retribution (R) must not, owing to the presence of R, be assessed exactly like any action *y* which is characterized *only* by A. Let us assume that this is so and that retributivism is possible. But if we proceed from *consistently* humanistic normative standards then A *always* remains the normative grounds for considering *x* to be morally negative. In this case the assertion that *x* is morally justified on the basis of R, although it is also characterized by A, merely means that *x is more* morally positive on the basis of R than it is morally negative on the basis of A.[26] It seems logical, however, that with the growing intensity of A the moral negativity of *x* also increases until it may *outweigh* the moral positivity characterizing *x* by virtue of R. This opens up a possibility for the humanistic idea that brutal punishment is morally unacceptable even if it is commensurate with the crime in terms of formal justice. Let us imagine the case of punishing a maniac sadist who has killed her victim after prolonged and perverse torture. The agent who would turn out to be able to inflict an equivalent punishment on such a person in line with the formal justice criteria would clearly have to manifest as much cruelty as the person being punished. From the humanistic point of view, the problem here is no longer whether the criminal has deserved such retributive suffering, but that whoever administers or sanctions such punishment is capable of such brutal inhumanity, which is in any case morally abhorrent *simply by virtue of its brutality* even if it meets the criteria of formal justice.

13. Let us now imagine that non-humanistic normative standards are right. In this case, all the arguments against metaphysical retributivism in paragraphs 6-12 lose their force. But this does not mean that it makes sense. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to clearly understand the specificity of non-humanistic interpretation of moral evil as distinct from the humanistic interpretation and how it influences the content of retributive correlation between moral and physical evil. From the perspective of non-humanistic normative theories, any activity is morally wrong *exclusively* on the basis of *humanistically neutral* normative standards (cf. paragraph 4). This means that even when an activity deemed to be wrong by the non-humanistic discourse is de facto anti-humane, *this is not grounds* for pronouncing it to be morally wrong. Let us cite a concrete example to clarify this point. Suppose a non-humanistic discourse, say, theological voluntarism, as a rule morally censures murder. Then it is usually true for this discourse that:

I. Murder is a morally wrong act.

II. Murder is ungodly, i.e., contradicts God's will.

From the perspective of theological voluntarism, being ungodly (II) is the characteristic of an act that constitutes the *only* and *sufficient* normative ground for pronouncing it to be morally wrong (I). This ground is humanistically neutral in the elementary sense that *by itself* it does not imply anti-humanity: the victims of any murder suffer because it causes them physical evil, and not because it *ex hypothesi* contradicts God's will. Let us also agree that the following statement is factually true and is not challenged by the advocate of theological voluntarism:

III. Murder is a socially anti-humane act (at least in essence).[27]

Because *only* II is the grounds for I, III is *irrelevant* for asserting I. To generalize, social anti-humanity as a characteristic of morally wrong activity may be present (as in the case of murder) or it may be absent (as in the case of various sexual and/or anti-ascetic "sins," for example, homosexuality, masturbation, sloth, dejection, etc.), but this *has nothing to do* with the possibility of the existence of moral evil. This is borne out by the fact that if some anti-humane activity, such as murder, is recognized as being godly, then, in the logic of theological voluntarism, it becomes morally right although its anti-humanity does not go away.[28] Thus, on the one hand moral evil may exist in the total absence of anti-humanity and on the other hand it may be absent when anti-humanity is there. But then it is true not only that the moral evil of any anti-humane activity is not based on its actual anti-humanity, but also that this anti-humanity is not a characteristic of the moral evil ascribed to anti-humane activity, i.e., there is nothing anti-humane in this evil *itself*. In that sense it can be said that theological voluntarism considers to be a moral evil something that never inflicts physical evil on anyone (i.e., *exclusively* ungodliness of any activity). These conclusions apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to any variety of non-humanistic ethical discourse.

14. I will describe as *objectivist* the moral evil that does not cause physical evil to anyone in the sense of being a moral evil not on the basis of anti-humanity even if it is in fact present in morally wrong activity and especially if it is not present, which is all too easy to imagine in a non-humanistic normative context. Because, as was shown in paragraph 13, any moral evil corresponding to non-humanistic normative standards is essentially objectivist, the meaning of retributive correlation if they are assumed should be modified in the following way: if an agent has committed an objectivist moral evil, the essence of which has nothing to do with the *physical* evil then on the strength of this the agent deserves experiencing *physical* evil. However, the physical suffering inflicted still has to be *cardinally proportional* to the moral evil the agent has done. Otherwise one would have to admit that the agent deserves *an arbitrary amount* of physical evil, which is incompatible with the formal justice of punishment (cf. paragraph 11).

I submit that in this case formal justice is logically unimaginable. This thesis is a version of the traditional anti-retributionist argument whereby any just retribution is logically unthinkable simply because moral and physical evils are essentially incommensurable values which defy any cardinal proportionality.[29] This is not so evident in the case of humanistic retribution because moral evil

punished by inflicting physical evil *m1,* itself consists in inflicting physical evil *m2* so that quantitative commensurability of *m1* and *m2 may seem* to be the possible basis of cardinal proportionality between moral and physical evil.[30] By contrast, because objectivist moral evil essentially has *nothing* in common with physical evil, in particular, does not involve causing physical evil to anyone, moral and physical evils turn out to be *absolutely heterogeneous* in essence, and the attempt to establish quantitative equivalence between them makes no sense. There does not exist any concrete amount of suffering *objectively*, i.e., in the nature of things, equivalent to various concrete forms of objectivist moral evil (for example, this or that degree of sloth or dejection, etc. if we stay at the material level of the non-humanistic discourse or ungodliness of an act, logical non-universalizability of its maxim, etc. if we turn to its normative level).[31] And of course it makes no sense to appeal to the fact that in some cases non-humanistic discourse deems it proper to punish precisely for what are in fact anti-humane forms of activity such as murder because, as I have shown (paragraph 13), even in these situations we are looking at punishment for an objectivist moral evil not based in any way on the de facto anti-humanity. If someone is still not convinced, the only logical alternative is that it is in these cases that non-humanistic discourse somehow becomes humanistic. But to the extent that this is so the arguments adduced in paragraphs 6-12 again become relevant to it.

15. The argument formulated in paragraph 14 can be summed up in the following way: any retribution can be formally just only if it is cardinally proportional; non-humanistic retribution logically cannot be cardinally proportional; consequently, it cannot be formally just. But this means that on assumption of non-humanistic normative standards metaphysical retributivism is logically inconceivable. Allowing metaphysical retributivism is tantamount to the statement that the existence of physical evil in this reality can be causally explained as the result of *just* punishment for the moral evil perpetrated by the suffering subjects. But such causal explanation is obviously impossible when such punishment cannot be seen as just. Because according to retributivist normative standards formal justice of punishment is a *necessary* condition of its moral justification[32] this argument proves that any non-humanistic retribution, including a metaphysical one cannot be morally justified proceeding from retributivist standards. I have thus demonstrated that metaphysical retributivism is logically inconceivable and morally unacceptable, both according to humanistic (paragraphs 6-12) and non-humanistic (paragraphs 13-15) normative standards: in other words, in any case.

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Notes

[1]   I call *any* pleasure or suffering in general "physical" good or evil, respectively.

[2]   For critique of social retributivism see, for example, [8; 1; 24; 22].

[3]   For the classical formulation see [5]. See also, for example, [15, pp. 10-16].

[4]   Depending on the number of such subjects one can talk about individual, collective or universal good.

[5]   This is not to say that there can be no objectively correct answer to these questions. This merely means that if it exists not all subjects agree with it in fact.

[6]   For a number of reasons I make no distinction between evaluative and deontic concepts (see [21]) and therefore between the concepts of moral good and evil and moral right and wrong.

[7]   Elsewhere, when speaking about possible objects of moral judgment I will explicitly refer only to the activity of moral agents, but implicitly also to these factors.

8 Cf. [3, pp. 82-95].

9 Cf. [20, p. 129].

10 It has to be stressed that I do not use the words "humanity" and "anti-humanity" as terms of *value judgment.*

11 Such normative theories can be egoistic, altruistic and universalist depending on whether the reference is to the pleasure and suffering of the agent, other agents or all agents (affected by the activity being judged).

12 For example, Epicurean ethical egoism or classical utilitarianism are humanistic normative theories, theological voluntarism, perfectionism or Kant's concept of categorical imperative are non-humanistic, and Hastings Rashdall's ideal utilitarianism can probably be interpreted as a mixed theory.

13 Cf. [9, p. 179].

14 Cf. famous Aeschylus's principle δράσαντι παθεῖν (Choephorae, 313, см. [23, p. 294]), i.e., "the doer must suffer" (my translations of quotes here and elsewhere—*A.S.*).

15 It should follow from these theories that it is (either exclusively or among other things) the activity contributing to the physical evil of the agent that is morally wrong, and precisely on this ground, while just retribution consists in causing the agent additional physical evil for this. I consider such ideas to be absurd and will elsewhere ignore them. Cf. Kantian critique [11, pp. 150-151].

16 From the viewpoint of various additional factors that may be taken into account in this or that ethical discourse: for example, when the infliction of suffering is unprovoked, i.e., active and not reactive (e.g. does not constitute self-defense); undeserved; deserved but disproportional; deserved but unauthorized; not inflicted for the sake of a greater good or to eliminate a greater evil, etc.

17 In that sense, de Maistre, for example, speaks of "physical evil which would not have existed if the intelligent creature had not made it necessary by abusing its liberty" (*mal physique, qui n'existerait pas si la creature intelligente ne l'avait rendu necessaire en abusant de sa liberte*)" [14, p. 24].

18 I consider the "medical-pedagogical" explanation of the existence of physical evil as impossible as the retributive one, but I do not argue here in favor of this thesis.

19 As a rule, this is not envisaged by the corresponding metaphysical scenarios. Thus, the essence of sin by Adam and Eve can be seen in anything but its social anti-humanity. This sin, of course, cannot be regarded as a moral evil *on the ground* that it leads to universal *retributive* suffering because for this suffering to constitute a just punishment moral evil should already exist by itself; otherwise it would be sufficient not to punish for this moral evil for it to cease to be moral evil (cf. the Kantian argument mentioned in n. 15).

20 Even if we put aside the other problematic aspect of this punishment, i.e., its collective character.

21 Theoretically, the number of such worlds can be infinite.

22 See [18, pp. 13-14].

23 For example, if murder is a more serious crime than theft, the ordinal proportionality principle is met both by the retributive system which jails a murderer for a year and a thief for 15 days and by the system which punishes a murderer by burning him alive and a thief by cutting off his hand, etc. *ad infinitum*, but this principle says nothing as to which of these punishments is correct and why. Cf. [18, p. 124].

24 See, for example, [12, p. 120; 19, p. 193; 24, pp. 65-66].

25 See, for example, [8, p. 119, 213].

26 An alternative interpretation of this situation, which is possible in the context of holistic normative theories, may assume that *x* either is no longer morally negative on the basis of A, or is even morally positive, also on the strength of A *precisely because* A is combined with R (cf. [4, pp. 8-9]). But admitting this means a departure from *consistent* normative humanism which I assume to be valid in this part of my argument.

[27] I say that an activity is anti-humane "in essence" if it is anti-humane always or for the most part. Even if murder is not always anti-humane (cf. the counterexample in [6, p. 80]), I think it is obviously anti-humane for the most part. Any activity can be anti-humane accidentally.

[28] Cf., for example, Damascene: "Murder is evil because it only behooves God to separate the soul from the body, for He has joined [them], but if I kill by God's will this is morally right, for all that is from the Good is good (εἰ δὲ φονεύσω ὑπὸ θεοῦ κελευόμενος, καλόν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθόν)" (Contra Manichaeos, 14, 58-61; см. [13, p. 360]).

[29] For example, [2, pp. 36-37, 58-60; 7, p. 233; 16, p. 289; 9, pp. 181, 187-188; 12, pp. 119-120; 19, pp. 189-214; 10, pp. 161-163; 24, pp. 95-97]. Common attempts to solve the problem go beyond the scope of purely retributivist logic, see [18, pp. 123-154, 183-200].

[30] Cf. [17, pp. 62-63]. This leaves unsolved many problems which I am not discussing here.

[31] I challenge those who disagree with this to indicate this amount of suffering and provide universally valid rational grounds for this claim.

[32] I have shown in paragraph 11 that it is not necessarily a *sufficient* condition for moral justification of punishment.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Air, the Physics of *Sensus Communis*

Oleg ARONSON

Abstract. Based on the ways in which people's behavior and perception of space changed during the COVID-19 pandemic, I focus on the special attitude toward air, which goes beyond the common perception expressed in the body of scientific knowledge and poetic metaphors. In this new dimension of air, and proceeding from the ideas of the Presocratics and Gaston Bachelard, I consider the possibility of revisiting the logic of the elements, which has been supplanted in culture by atomistic rationality and metaphysical abstractions. In the elements, movement and transformation prevail over essence, cause, and purpose. I hold that the elements have no essence and manifest themselves only through clashing and mixing with other elements. Thus, during epidemics, the element of air comes into contact with the element of community. I contend that material manifestations of non-individual "common sense" (*sensus communis*) may be found at this intersection. Within this frame of reference, social and ethical relations acquire a "physical dimension" (in the sense of Aristotle's *physis*) and lend themselves to being interpreted in dynamic terms of forces and energies. This approach also makes it possible to discover many other elements, which are in contact with deindividualized *sensus communis*. Such areas of contact between elements (turbulence zones) manifest themselves in the anthropomorphic world in the shape of scientifically inexplicable phenomena, theoretical phantasms or incredible ("silly") correlations that used to be the domain of magic but today are the domains of neural networks and big data.

Keywords: air, *sensus communis*, community, the elements, *physis*, number, turbulence, epidemic, Bachelard, Aristotle, Kant.

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The thought of space conjures up a sense of emptiness, even if it is filled with objects. We think of space without objects as an empty room that needs to be furnished, or as the Universe, far removed from our daily life. We move about town and go to the country taking highways and byways, on land and through the sky with hardly any sense of the resistance of space. We are held back by the weather, laziness or fatigue, by borders and warning signs, but for some reason we feel compelled to make ourselves at home in the space around us, as if the emptiness of the word itself needs to be filled. Formerly, meaning sufficed. Today, it does not. There needs to be movement. Not only appropriation, movement, change of position, but transformation of space itself. But in order to change, it must not be empty. Even if we do not find things in it.

And now an epidemic has been declared. We are being confined to a room that many found hard to leave even before. Some are chair-ridden by age or illness, some—freelancers—are glued to their computers with Wi-Fi. What has changed? We are told that the space around us—where the people are—has become dangerous. We are told not to leave home, and that if we do venture out, we should wear masks, observe social distancing, enter elevators one by one, obtain a pass to enter the subway, and go shopping according to a schedule. No cafes or cinemas. We are told that the virus is everywhere. Even if you take all precautions, it penetrates your home on the soles of your shoes. We hear this, and what we see confirms this observation: People in protective suits spray liquids in front of your windows. But nothing convinces us more than the the protetive suits, like the type we have seen on the American TV show *Chernobyl*. More and more pictures and words on the Internet inform you that the space around you is dangerous. People think of the plague, cholera, and "the Spanish flu." They read the memoirs of survivors.

The smell of the air is an important sign of plague. A plague-stricken city does not smell like a city. Gradually, we cease to be aware of the city smell; the city becomes just space. But the smell of plague is a sign that the space has been transformed. The city smells of dead bodies. The air signals that it is a different space. The air, which is as invisible as the virus.

COVID-19 also brings new smells into our world—the smells of medical masks and antiseptic. But that is not what changes space. We see deserted streets, closed shops, and empty buses and subway trains. We have seen something like this in genre movies. This is not what changes space. It is the air that changes space. We still do not see it and do not sense it until the wind touches our skin. Or disturbs our hair, puts out a match or brings a whiff of unfamiliar perfume.

To us, air is either wind or the sky, which (as we were told in school) is blue because of rays refracted by a mixture of the gases that form Earth's atmosphere. The wind makes the air felt due to a difference in temperatures, the movement of invisible matter generating images of movement and change: the wind of revolution ("Wind, wind all over God's world" in Alexander Blok's poem *The Twelve*), but also "heavenly color, blue color" (in Nikoloz Baratashvili's lyrics for a popular song). These are poetic embodiments of the frequency characteristics of sunlight touching the world of invisible air particles. Physics, chemistry, physiology,

and poetry are just some of the methods by which we appropriate air. Even the smell of corpses during a plague.

Scientific formulas and poetic metaphors have imbued air with content. They make it a thing in space. It is handy and humanized so much as to be real in the invisibility of its atoms or to be lofty in its local contact with the human body. But is it really air?

The COVID-19 epidemic is a journey to the world of non-physical and non-poetic air. Air makes itself known as distance, as the menace of space itself, which ceases to be neutral and becomes contagious, a world of inevitable dangerous contacts. Like AIDS before. But controlling sexual conduct is not the same as controlling breathing. The world of human breathing has become a world of breathing the virus. This global breathing is rhythmic; the rhythm revealing itself in the waves of COVID.

The air around us has ceased to be neutral and empty. It has acquired density and dynamics. All of a sudden, we can sense it as an environment on the other side of breathing and the sky. On the other side of poetry and science. On the other side of linguistic tropes and states of substance.

Breath, flight, fall, bottomless sky, according to Gaston Bachelard, leave the trace of air as matter in language. He maintains that the element of air separated from its substantiality is manifested in poetic imagination oriented not toward concepts but toward changeable images (see [4]). Bachelard's original phenomenology of the image, which he called at times a "psychoanalysis of the elements" and a "direct ontology," has to do with the link between language and space. It is a step from phenomenology of the spirit to phenomenology of the soul. The soul, which breathes but does not think.

This moment of breathing and spiritual uplift (creative energy), of lending movement to the world is the moment of the secular return of the divine pneuma, which today can be described as a poetic moment. But does poetry have access to the elements, as Bachelard believed? His version of the image makes perception simple and naïve, pre-conceptual and pre-rational. Such images make one think of the origins of human speech. Only, where Rousseau saw singing (and Tolstoy added that it was *collective* singing), Bachelard saw the soul, which is preparing to become consciousness.

Bachelard's elements are packed into the world of imagination; they are internalized. They introduce initial order into the "dark" world of impulses separating them from the elevated purity of spirit. This is their fundamental difference from the elements as understood by the Greeks, who were equally remote from the passions of the soul and from theoretical reason. When Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* describes the efforts of the Presocratics as a naïve search for the material arche, which he sees merely as a substratum of all that exists, opposing it to Hesiod's "chaos" and Parmenides's "love" [1, p. 43], one can see how close Bachelard is to Aristotle in spite of all his attempts to resurrect the world of elements for thought. Aristotle departs from the idea of thinking in terms of elements, that is, thinking based on the world. He is interested in causality and the dynamics of thought forms, which commits all his metaphysics to the

human aspect of the world. Bachelar's poetic imagination is also committed to this aspect.

During the pandemic, when air ceases to be homogeneous, when it simultaneously threatens (in contacts with people) and cleans (in airing rooms), when it moves from the world of poetic dreams and scientific experiments to the social sphere, then in order to bring back the logic of elements, it may make sense to go back to Anaximenes or Diogenes, bypassing the theoretical obstacles set in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The logic of the elements opposes the atomized world. It is the logic of the action of forces and not of cognition and reflection. The word "logic" need not worry us because it comes from *logos*, which to us means "word" and "knowledge." Suffice it to recall that for Heraclitus, *logos* was "fire."

Socrates gave priority to the human aspect of the world. Anaximenes and Diogenes trusted not people but air. From the human substance were born such categories as soul, spirit, consciousness, and subject. Can we consider the human world (ethics, politics, poetics, theory) to be an element, the first letter, the arche of the world? Or is it a way of neutralizing the forces over which man has no power? Today, like it or not, we are inclined to answer the second question in the affirmative.

It all begins with the distinction between physics and metaphysics. Aristotle's physics proceeds from *physis*, and metaphysics from *hyle*. It would be unfair to call one "nature" and the other "matter." Rather, these are two names of the world. The first is the world of non-human forces given to us in the hum of rhythms, noises, and resonances. The second is the world that human beings make their own and develop, in which laws and regularities are born, in which being and spirit are capable of harnessing the elements.

Noise and resonance. Bachelard stresses the word *retentissement*, which Eugène Minkowski uses to connect the poetics of the image and the physics of the cosmos. It is translated into Russian as "response" (*otklik*) which accords with the French philosopher's phenomenological principles [4, p. 8]. However, today we cannot help hearing this word as "resonance" through which we cognize the elements. We can even speak about "noise" in which the semantic dimension of image is lost, and cosmos becomes incommensurate with man non-anthropomorphic.

Bachelard tried to find a syntax of elements in human imagination. In fact, through the elements of fire, earth, water, and air, he aspired to revive the lost *physis* of ancient Greeks, which has miraculously survived in modern poetry. Although he trusts phenomenology and Jung's theory of archetypes as explanatory models, he leans toward the view that the names of elements are variants of various types of movements and the characters of speeds. Fire is transformation, becoming; water is differentiation and plasticity; earth is stability and rest. Finally, air is pure mobility lacking foundations. As Bachelard puts it, in the case of air, "movement takes precedence over matter," as a result of which it turns out to be "thin matter" itself ([2, p. 23]; see [3]). It is much easier to lend substance to all the other elements by isolating a substratum from them. This is particularly true of earth, which still defines philosophy in various conceptions. In other words, the polemic within philosophy turns out to be a polemic of geophilosophies: the

movement of deterritorialization of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (the imma-
nence of earth given in concepts) versus Martin Heidegger's "poetic" stability of
the peasant world (transcendence of truth given in the experience of existence on
earth). Water and fire have also been extensively used as manifestations of being
("the new," "time"), in pop culture (think of "A Song of Ice and Fire"), and as
political and poetic metaphors.

   Air is a more complex case. It combines the need for life (breathing rhythms)
and the tantalizing plasticity of chaos (with Nietzsche, "freedom is airy joy": It
was there, in the Swiss mountains, that "the heady air of freedom played a wicked
trick on Professor Pleischner" in the TV show *Seventeen Moments of Spring*). Air
is banal. Its being is thin. Its matter is extra fine. Only *apeiron*, which borders on
abstraction, is finer. Air is unnoticed until it comes into contact with movement,
with another element. Touch, in turn, requires air. That is why the gloves meant to
protect us from virus-infected surfaces are also connected with air, the extra-thin
layer that envelops objects, envelops people… We can talk about such invisible
fine matter even when contact with other elements occurs.

   The zone where elements mix is indicated by the hypothetical substances,
which have been successively rejected by classical science: phlogiston (the air
cover of fire), fluids (the air, which makes fluids plastic) and, finally, ether (air as
space, which has the property of earthly stability). What was a sphere of experi-
ence for alchemy and astrology, which harked back to the physics of elements,
the resonance of milieus (earth matter and cosmos), was rejected by science pre-
cisely because it believed that truth was one and sought to overcome mobility,
multiplicity, and compositeness in favor of the essence of the thing and purity of
experiment. Thus the elements of the world became convenient and aesthetically
sublime phenomena. Both saw man as a generic entity—man who at once domi-
nated the world and overcame his natural limitations.

   Thus, air has been reduced to the function of supporting life and simultane-
ously has become atmosphere, a metaphor and a poetic reverie. In either case, it
ceases to be *movement*. Or rather, its movement acquires *purpose*. In imparting a
purpose to the worlds of forces, impulses, and transformations of his philosoph-
ical predecessors Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* introduces a point of stability and
rest common to all. However, where Aristotle (and the centuries-long European
culture after him) see its causes and purpose in motion, Empedocles, for exam-
ple, speaks about *filia* and *neikos*, i.e., "friendship" and "strife" ("attraction" and
"repulsion" in physics). For him both friendship and strife are *metexis*, or "co-par-
ticipation" that accompanies all phenomena of change, indicating a conjunction
of different characters of movements typical of different elements. In general, el-
ements reveal themselves only in combination, mixing, resonance. They are only
able to manifest themselves in partaking and mutual rejection. There is no essence
of air (or fire or earth) but only various effects of their compositions, chiasms.

   During pandemics, wars, and revolutions we sense such a sharing or con-
nectedness of people who are remote from each other socially and psychological-
ly. This is not mutual attraction (friendship understood psychologically) but the
movement of sharing itself. We can talk about collective fear, a sense of justice or

desire of freedom as causes and purposes, but much around us makes us wonder whether such schemes are justified. It may well be that community itself has to be conceived in the forgotten logic of the elements, which comes back to us together with mass society, the processes of depersonalization and dehumanization taking place in it along with the crisis of institutions and ecological catastrophes.

Community, which reveals its link with air (pandemic) or fire (revolution), acquires its rhythms and movements, its figures of sharing. That is why community, which we still think of as a collection of individuals endowed with feelings, reason, and poetic imagination, looks less and less as a derivative of human culture. Rather, it is close to the Pythagorean element of number, only in its modern interpretation. In other words, freedom and solidarity, equality and justice are not so much ethical categories as the material mathematics of *sensus communis* (what Immanuel Kant called a "shared feeling" attributing to it an aesthetic dimension as opposed to the "common sense" of English philosophers). *Sensus communis* refers not to the human faculties of feeling, reason, and imagination, but to the experience of the mixing of elements to one of which (*community*, otherwise mass, number, multitude) human beings are indirectly a party.

We are used to thinking that number is a practical result of introducing order in the diversity of the world. It has been instilled in us by scientists for whom mathematics has become an instrument of cognition, when a mathematical formula and theoretical propositions about nature and social good are equally abstract. It is not by chance that freedom and justice are described in terms of abstractions like geometrical points, straight lines or algebraic equations. Number as an element is something different. In this capacity, it is part of the illimitable world of what exists. We begin to understand this other logic when the information world is filled with daily reports about the number of infected and dead, protesters and detentions, killed and repressed. Number and "shared feeling" are elements of matter equally "insentient" concerning human emotions and experiences. They partake of the air, which people do not breathe.

How can we capture the signs of the elements, that is, the forces external to our human world with its infinitely growing entropy? Perhaps we should relearn physics, which studies dissipative states, open systems, and turbulence processes. Since the time of Aristotle's separation of metaphysics from physics, the latter, in its search for truth, has increasingly become a model of the world in which what we call "theory" unwittingly relies on metaphysical foundations. This model does not describe turbulence. The forces at work there are not identified by theory and metaphysics.

Physics helps Deleuze and Guattari when they rely on Ilya Prigogine's concept of chaos theory. However, for Prigogine and for Deleuze, the world implicitly remains a continuous space, and its complexity is manifested in the transition to the molecular level, the level of the chaotic self-organization of matter. Modern studies of turbulence and the adherents of kinetic theory, David Levermore and Nader Masmoudi (cf. [5]), tell us that there is the effect of the forces that contradict our theoretical and cognitive capacity, including that which has to do with the description of molecular processes. This is not about the separation into the mo-

lar and molecular, but rather about molecules grouping themselves in connection with the speed of their own movement, producing non-homogeneous space, various types of its density and viscosity. (Aleksandr Popov of Russia is developing Levermore's ideas in this area, cf. [6].) All the dynamic processes (tension, clash of forces) occur at the interface of spaces in various types of spatial heterogeneity and therefore do not easily lend themselves to description and appear (though only appear) to be anomalous.

Pilots have the term "clear sky turbulence." That is the most common case of air turbulence when there are no apparent grounds for it. Its cause is the heterogeneity of air itself. This heterogeneity, this lamination, eludes both science and poetry. This is the space where the movement of forces, the mixing of movements, and the conjunction of elements occur.

The same is true of *sensus communis*: It cannot be described proceeding from our individual sensible experience and various theories of the subject. The subject appropriates action or locks it in upon itself (like Bachelard in "poetic imagination"). As a result, the act becomes powerless and being becomes a luxury, especially when its name is "Nothingness." The thinness and poverty of the being of air correlates rather with *das Man*, the world of the masses. It is so impoverished as to be almost not worth our enlightened attention. It is the space of inappropriable noise. Noise, which destroys the meaning of information, leaving it in a highly heterogeneous state. This heterogeneity and totality of the information space make it similar to air with its unpredictable turbulence. The digital space of the modern world is the true matter of *sensus communis* where information noise turns out to be more intensive than the meaning of information, which reduces everything to individual models of perception and the search for an acting subject. The heterogeneity of this noise engenders rhythmic impulses and resonances, which we grasp via correlations, an infinite number of "silly" correlations contradicting our knowledge. From the physical viewpoint, such correlations, which defy attempts to establish a link between them, are a mixing of spaces, the "co-participation" of diverse currents in movement and not in being, in elements and not in atoms.

We note that the present pandemic spreads not only through air, but, magically, through information channels. Air and the digit correlate like mass and number. The virus exposes these correlations. And the virus itself, at the end of the day, is something mixed and borderline, either a substance or a force (information about the future transformation of the cell). Extra fine matter. Like air.

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The "Great Crisis" in the History of Linguistics and How It Was Overcome

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Abstract. The period from the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th century saw a major crisis in the history of linguistics. Some linguists were dissatisfied with the positivist paradigm related to comparative-historical linguistics. Opinions on how to overcome this situation varied, but at that time, the paradigm proposed by Ferdinand de Saussure prevailed. This article looks into the reasons why this happened.

Keywords: comparative linguistics, history of linguistics, linguistic theory, positivism, Ferdinand de Saussure, structuralism.

It is a truth universally acknowledged that the history of perhaps every science has periods of calm, when specialists work within an established scholarly paradigm, and periods of paradigm change when old ideas and methods are felt to be unsatisfactory and new approaches are searched for. The search varies from proposals to change fragments of the dominant paradigm while preserving its main principles to attempts to revise all the principles.

In the history of the science of language, one example of a dramatic change of paradigm was the crisis of the research program of positivism, which had held sway in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, and various proposals concerning the way out of the crisis.

Arguments on the theories and methods of linguistics were conducted for most of the 19th century (Wilhelm von Humboldt, Franz Bopp, Heymann Steinthal, August Schleicher and others). Perhaps the last flare-up occurred when Hermann Osthoff and Karl Brugmann formulated their "laws that know no exceptions," which met with opposition on the part of some linguists. By the 1880s,

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the arguments largely gave way to a "lull," although dissident views cropped up, more often than not on the periphery of academic life, for example, in Kazan. A kind of consensus was established that was closely linked with positivism, which at the time dominated philosophy and the majority of sciences.

Needless to say, the science of language in the last quarter of the 19th century was not confined to positivist linguistics. The earlier naturalist trend in linguistics continued to exist. It was particularly noticeable in France [28]; its most prominent representative in the 1870s-1890s was the British scholar Max Müller. His publications (see their analysis in [28, pp. 158-222]) combined the then advanced ideas (rigorous separation of linguistics from philology, discussion of gender linguistics) and traditional 19th-century discourse on the origin of language and stage typology. Positivists dismissed these problems as "metaphysics." This applied to many original ideas of Müller. For example, he raised the issue of the link between linguistic typology and classification of political societies: agglutinative systems were characteristic of nomadic societies, while the flexional system typified state languages [28, p. 174]. All the main provisions of his theory were bald declarations and did not lend themselves to verification. Positivists no longer regarded the biological trend as a serious adversary. This was how *The Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary* assessed Müller: "His lectures on general linguistics, now totally obsolete, fell short of the level of science of his time from the beginning" [7, Vol. 39, pp. 359-360].

While naturalism was ebbing out of the science of language, the followers of W. von Humboldt were still there. However, as Valentin Voloshinov [33, p. 262] would later claim, "the trend was growing shallow," becoming reduced to individual psychology, and would only experience a "powerful flowering" later with Karl Vossler.

Positivism included above all the influential school of German neogrammarians, but there were also linguists from other countries, notably Vilhelm Thomsen in Denmark and Philip Fortunatov in Russia. As one critic of positivism in linguistics would later write, neogrammarians, as distinct, for example, from their immediate predecessors, "were indeed sterile in theoretical thinking" [6, p. 345], although they did a good deal of work in discovering and interpreting individual facts and continued to deliver undoubted and very significant results. As Voloshinov wrote, they "worshipped facts" [33, p. 218].

As Ernst Cassirer, an opponent of positivism, wrote in 1923, for the proponents of this trend to "gain knowledge of any process … meant nothing other than to dissolve it into its components" [9, p. 169]. At its early stage the neogrammarian school insisted that the sound laws were immutable but this proposition receded into the background later, especially since critics constantly came up with examples of exceptions. However, it was not only a matter of examples: consistent development of positivism rejected theoretical provisions in general. "As the pure positivistic ideal came to be more strictly formulated in science, the insistence on explaining the natural process by the universal laws of mechanics receded in favor of the more modest endeavor to describe it in such laws" [9, p. 170].

As one later critic pointed out, the positivist approach, which in turn proceeded from earlier ideas, was "interested almost exclusively in directly observable phenomena… Everywhere they proceed from the concrete and more often than not confine themselves to it" [8, p. 40]. For the positivists "we should expect and demand nothing more from the laws of language than such a comprehensive expression of empirically observed regularities" [9, pp. 170-171].

For all these reasons, neogrammarians rejected Ferdinand de Saussure's early ideas about elements that had left no trace in records. They conceded that elements not fixed in records (asterisked protoforms) could be reconsturcted, but it was important for them to identify every reconstructed sound with some observable sound. However, the physiological character of the results of Saussurean reconstruction remained unclear. Thus, as Andrey Zaliznyak points out [35, p. 300], he "demonstrated the structual principle whereby the place of a phoneme in the system ... is a more essential characterisic than its probable phonetic look." However, for the positivists, putting the result of reconstruction in a fixed framework was more important.

At a time when a new paradigm had already taken shape, members of the old school rejected innovators precisely because of their departure from established principles. An early pupil of Philip Fortunatov accused Nikolay Trubetskoy (and other representatives of the new paradigm) of "weakness," "play-reasoning without history" and inability "to do preparatory work for the study of accumulated data on the history of languages" (Aleksandr Thomson's 1934 letter to Boris Lyapunov, quoted from [24, p. 175]). Neogrammarians, for example, Berthold Delbrück, believed that a good description of language facts was compatible with any theory.

In general, neogrammarians carried the historical approach characteristic of the 19th century science to its limit. The most theoretical book reads in part: "As soon as ever we pass beyond the mere statements of single facts and attempt to grasp the connexion as a whole, and to comprehend the phenomena, we come upon historical ground at once" [20, p. xlvi]. Hermann Paul identified two parts in the science of language: language history proper and the science "which occupies itself with the general conditions of the existence of the object historically developing, and investigates the nature and operations of the elements which throughout all change remain constant" [20, p. xxiii], i.e., respectively particular and general linguistics, both historical sciences. Historical grammar is opposed to descriptive grammar; it "registers all the grammatical forms and rules used in a given language community at a given time"; "historical grammar took its rise from the older descriptive grammar" [20, p. 1]. Only the descriptive approach is possible in studying modern languages, while the explanation of recorded facts should be historical and concern itself only with determining their origin, which Cassirer and others did not recognize as a valid explanation.

Neogrammarians and like-thinking scholars concentrated on solving two questions raised by their predecessors, and in this they achieved considerable results. First, in the reconstruction of proto-languages based on the comparative-historical method. Second, in the study of historical changes of languages closer to

our time on the basis of the analysis of written records (in this area linguistics was gradually detaching itself from philology, working out its own methods). Sometimes the languages of pre-written and written times were assigned to two different disciplines.

However, positivist linguistics was not confined to the reconstruction of protoforms or to historical linguistics in general. This period saw the emergence of two disciplines, one of which moved beyond the requirement of obligatory historicism completely and the other partially. These were experimental phonetics and dialectology. The former is able to study only that which happens here and now. Yet positivist linguistics established this discipline. For example, Thomson became the founder of experimental phonetics in Russia. In 1902, there was already a distinction between anthropophonics and psychophonetics (in later terminology, phonetics and phonology) and Sergey Bulich wrote that psychophonetics, as distinct from the already developed anthropophonics, "does not yet go beyond the domain of scientific *pia desiderata*," while anthropophonics "is essential for historical and comparative phonetics, something long understood in the West, where every linguist doing comparative studies has a solid background in the physiology of sound, or anthropophonics" [7, Vol. 71, pp. 240-249]. In other words, the primacy of phonetics based on experiments using instruments was recognized, while phonology "on paper" was thought at best to be a matter for the future.

However, experimental phonetics, in going beyond the purely historical approach, stayed in the framework of positivism insofar as it concentrated on registering observable facts. This discipline was the first in the history of linguistics to begin studying what was happening in reality; the study of the perception of speech, let alone the processes in the brain, was still a long way off. But an important step had been made.

As for dialectology, it got an impulse from A. Schleicher's proposition that historical linguistics could not afford to ignore dialects, which might have preserved what had not reached us in records. By the end of the 19th century, interest developed in the data of dialects for their own sake. Descriptive dialectology started developing in many countries. In Russia, for example, the Moscow Dialectological Commission, formed in 1903 and headed by Nikolay Durnovo and Dmitry Ushakov, gathered a large body of material on a large number of Russian dialects and classified them. All this went beyond the framework of positivism.

On the whole it can be said that the main principle of positivist linguistics was not even historicism, which was characteristic of other areas of science in the 19th century as well, but its concentration on what Viggo Brøndahl [8] called "phenomena that can be observed directly" or derived from them according to rigorous rules. The "worship of fact" and banishment of "metaphysics" reigned supreme.

During this period, the study of modern languages was conducted sporadically, but was often left to the practitioners, while many issues of theoretical linguistics, including historical ones, were almost ignored. After Schleicher there was no interest not only in the study of the origin of language, which was taboo, but in the problem of the causes of language changes or the grounding of methods of comparative-historical linguistics postulated by Schleicher and based on the idea of a

family tree of languages. Anyone who raised these issues in the framework of the old paradigm, like Jan Baudouin de Courtenay at the start of his career, quickly put himself beyond the pale.

To be sure, even in the framework of the old paradigm linguists could go beyond the established limits contrary to their general propositions. This was true not only of phonetics and of dialectology. Fortunatov, in addition to reconstructions, engaged in typology and (simultaneously) the theory of grammar. Similar examples are contained in Paul's book. However, the limitations were largely respected, as witnessed for example by the book on the history of linguistics available in Russian translation [30] in which history is confined to the description of the emergence and evolution of the comparative-historical method. In the Russian edition, Rosalia Shore had to make additions, for example, about Humboldt, to complete the picture.

However, even in the framework of the two main tasks neogrammatical approaches met with criticism, especially over the simplified concept and schematization of the historical development of languages seen as a linear process. Sometimes criticism came from neogrammarians themselves. One of the early major publications maintained that only that comparative linguist "can arrive at a correct idea of the way in which linguistic forms live and change" who "for once emerges from the hypothesis-beclouded atmosphere of the workshop in which the original Indo-European forms are forged, and steps into the clear air of tangible reality and of the present" [19, pp. 218, 219]. However, the call was not heeded and neogrammarians remained in the workshop. Like their predecessors, they made an absolute of the material of written records and only occasionally turned to modern languages and dialects when they found there something that had not survived in the records.

Another feature of positivist linguistics that distinguished it from the approach of predecessors was their rejection of the comprehensive approach and concentration on linguistic problems proper. This was due to a variety of reasons. First, a natural process was going on of working out the methods of historical linguistics, above all the delimitation of linguistics from philology, the study of texts. As it happened, this process was most succinctly defined by Müller, as opponent of positivism. He wrote that "in philology language is treated simply as a means" while in the science of language "language itself becomes the sole object of scientific inquiry" (quoted from [31, p. 49]). However, comparative linguists also followed these principles. Second, neogrammarians and their followers were combating "metaphysics," the use of unverifiable theoretical propositions often borrowed from other sciences: philosophy, biology, history, etc. The links with these sciences were ignored. A partial exception was psychology, which was enjoying a period of intensive growth. Neogrammarians, especially Paul, the most theoretical of them, argued in favor of the individual psychological nature of language, though this led them to concentrate on individual facts.

From as early as the 1880s this approach came under fire. In late 19th century, Hugo Schuchardt was the foremost critic of neogrammarians. He constantly highlighted the simplistic approach of this school, especially its thesis on the phonetic

laws that had no exceptions, an approach the neogrammarians themselves were gradually departing from. He also condemned these linguists for their emphatic empiricism, their refusal to reveal cause-and-effect relationships in the histories of languages and for not giving "much consideration to comparisons between unrelated languages" [26, p. 67]. The latter problem was also taboo among neogrammarians who considered genetic classification of languages the solely scientific one while other comparisons of languages were associated with stage "metaphysics" which had been cast aside. Schuchardt's own interest in this study prompted him to formulate the ergative principle, which became key for subsequent linguistics, and to do some pioneering studies of it. He also stressed that "each of these sciences [individual linguistic sciences] merges with general linguistic science" [26, p. 68], whereas neogrammarians were preoccupied with particular questions which precluded "metaphysics." At the same time Schuchardt, a powerful critic, rightly pointed out that the neogrammarians were too literal in interpreting the law and refused to use the laws even as convenient working devices without offering an alternative method. Thus he denied any regularities in language changes. Schuchardt continued to treat linguistics as a historical science and did not go beyond the old paradigm although he criticized vehemently, and in the end failed to create a significant scientific school.

That era also saw criticism of positivist science from an angle that harks back to Humboldt. Thus, we read in K. Vossler's work [34, p. 327]: "Language is studied not in the process of its emergence but in its state. It is considered as given and complete, i.e., in a positivist way. It is subjected to an anatomical operation"; "living speech is broken up into sentences, sentence members, words, syllables and sounds." This approach is compared to the anatomical approach to the human: "It always remains mechanical destruction of the organism and not natural dismemberment." In reality "the reverse kind of causality takes place: the spirit abiding in speech constructs the sentence, sentence members, words and sounds—all together"; "the history of language development is none other than a history of spiritual forms of expression" [34, pp. 328, 329].

To be sure, critique of the positivist paradigm here is global, touching as it does not only on the ideas of neogrammarians directly targeted by Vossler as well, but on many features that were common not just for 19th-century linguistics, but for all European science of language beginning from Alexandria. At the same time, he was conscious of linguistics as a historical science. His ideas, rather popular in the early 20th century, later receded to the periphery of linguistics; even so, they influenced Mikhail Bakhtin and Voloshinov.

In 1923, after the publication of Saussure's book neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer published a book that represented one of the volumes of a major work devoted to various types of symbolic functions, i.e., principles shaping the spirit and creating the world (along with religion, science, art, etc.). The author wrote that his purely philosophical approach to language continued Humboldt's traditions that were later distorted by bringing in psychology [9, p. 70]. Cassirer's work is valuable on account of its outline of the history of the philosophy of language from the general point of view. He is more interested in philosophy than

in linguistics. Still, the book cites many facts from many languages, especially the languages of "primitive peoples." However, they come at second hand and are often inaccurate. This is true of most of his examples from the Japanese language. Here is but one of them: "A sentence such as 'it is snowing' is rendered in Japanese as 'snow's falling (is)'" [9, p. 272], although the most frequent sentence found in every dictionary is Yuki ga furu ("snow is going").

That is not the main issue. Cassirer's aim is to reveal the "fundamental tendency of language" [9, p. 318], which gradually forms, in any language, the concepts of space, time, number, etc. He writes: "While languages differ in their perspectives of the world, there is a perspective of language itself" [9, p. 285]. In other words, there is a single perspective that all languages approach at different speeds and in different ways. We are looking at what seems to be an overcoming of the idea of stages. Thus, the early stages of maturing of languages are the mimetic, the analogical, and the truly symbolic [9, p. 190]. Some traits of the early stages may disappear in some languages and survive in others: for example, tonal languages, like Chinese, preserve a connection with the "mimetic sphere" [9, p. 193]. In the development of the concept of time, according to Cassirer, the primary distinction will always be between "now" and "not now," followed by completed and uncompleted, continual and momentary action, etc. [9, p. 218].

The year when the first edition of Cassirer's book saw the light of day also saw the appearance of Nikolay Marr's "new teaching on language," which was another attempt to revive the stage theory. Cassirer's idea was somewhat different from Humboldt's or Marr's: although he considered the movement from the concrete to the abstract the leading principle of development, he did not rule out that different stages could coexist in parallel. Therefore, he did not offer a catalog of concrete stages. Still the similarity was there; it is no accident that Marr borrowed some ideas from Cassirer.

Cassirer was a fierce opponent of positivism and advocated an explanatory approach. However, in his search of the new, he came up with ideas that were already obsolete. The very reference to "the languages of primitive peoples" was untimely. He admitted that "modern linguists have gradually abandoned the attempt to surprise the secret of the genesis of language by exploration of primeval times" [9, p. 266], yet he was swimming against the current. While his ideas influenced the development of idealistic philosophy, they made no lasting impact on linguistics.

One has to mention such an uncompromising opponent of the old paradigm as Marr. Initially influenced by Schuchardt, he then struck out on his own, setting himself the task of creating "a new teaching on language," i.e., a new paradigm. Even his critics had to admit that he was occasionally right in his polemic with the neogrammarians [29, p. 142]. Leaving aside the political labels (a constant feature of the later Marr), we find that his critique is not much different, for example, from the views expressed as early as 1925, when it was time to usher out neogrammarianism, by Grigory Vinokur, a scholar of a new generation who espoused a new paradigm. He wrote that the sound laws did not reveal the cultural-historical content of language. It was a history of sounds and not of language, the results of

reconstructions could not be verified, the problem of the social in language was not addressed, and comparative studies contributed nothing to the study of contemporary processes [32, pp. 11-13].

But Marr's critique was more global. Vinokur refers to problems that were to varying degrees touched upon in early 20th century linguistics, but Marr harped on the problems that it had not addressed: the origin of language, "the pre-history of human speech," humankind's future single language and the central place of semantics in linguistics, a thesis later promoted by his pupil, Vasily Abaev. Structural linguistics was not equipped to tackle any of these problems.

Marr rejected the studiously empirical approach of the neogrammarians, and still considering linguistics a historical science, sought to reveal general patterns in the development of languages. To this end, he drew on the vast empirical material such that all his works contain a huge amount of examples from diverse languages which, however, often turn out to be "undigested." He himself admitted that "the Japhetic teaching on language is based not on 'theory' but on a massive body of data away from any generally accepted theoretical constructs. I am bold enough to assert that I am presenting only what various bodies of language data dictate and have dictated" [17, Vol. 1, p. 198].

Marr felt that standard grammars simplified the reality of language. He constantly criticized the historical linguistics of his time for its preoccupation with written sources (which was true) and urged the need to shift research "from written norms to the norms of common living speech and its living dialects" [17, Vol. 1, p. 270] and "to non-written languages of culturally enslaved peoples" [17, Vol. 3, p. 34]. Such pronouncements, of course, went down very well in the Soviet Union of the 1920s-1930s, and the shift Marr referred to was in many ways already taking place, though not so much in historical linguistics as in synchronic descriptions of modern languages, which were being done without Marr.

Linguistics in Alexandria and in Marr's time alike reduced language to a system of rules, ignoring the spontaneous forces at work in language. Already Humboldt [13, p. 49] was unhappy about this approach: "*Language* … is the ever-repeated *mental labor* of making the *articulated* sound capable of expressing *thought*. In a direct and strong sense, this is the definition of *speech* on any occasion; in its true and essential meaning, however, we can also regard, as it were, only the totality of this speaking as the language… It is precisely the highest and most refined aspect that cannot be discerned from … disparate elements and can only be perceived or divined in connected discourse… The break-up into words and rules is only a dead makeshift of scientific analysis." Vossler, rejecting the "anatomical approach," wrote in much the same vein. Marr used other expressions (in his milieu the "spirit" was not the preferred word) but he had the same message: taking into account the vast, diverse and contradictory language material in its totality.

In spite of all this, Humboldt's ideas, wonderful in themselves, were not very helpful for concrete research in Humboldt's or in Marr's time. They were only used, if at all, after adaptation: think of Humboldt's and Aleksandr Potebnya's concept of the inner form. "In spite of the fact that Humboldt's ideas were highly

regarded throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries, they were practically not reflected in concrete descriptions of the history and structure of various languages" [10, p. 21]. There was a rich theory but no method. Vossler's school merely declared the need to take into account the totality of speech acts and concentrated on one, albeit very important, problem of the reflection of human individuality in language.

Marr rejected the existing rules, but failed to replace them with anything convincing. He tried to embrace all the language phenomena he knew, but had no method and invented various explanations not based on facts and often downright fantastic; they were in many ways prompted by factors outside science. As one of his pupils later wrote, with Marr "synthesis clearly prevailed over analysis and generalizations over facts"; he had a very active creative center and no blocking center [1, pp. 98-99]. After a brief period of success, Marr's ideas sank into oblivion. It is indicative that the vicissitudes of public attitudes towards his main critic did not in any way change the assessments of these ideas by linguists.

The ideas of the aforementioned critics of positivism in linguistics (Schuchardt, Vossler, Cassirer, Marr), for all their differences, had something in common. They were all unhappy about the neglect of theory, the narrowness of approach and in many ways the themes of the positivists, and their critique was largely convincing. They sought a broader view often characteristic of earlier thinkers. These problems were important and serious but they were unable to work out a method of tackling these problems, sometimes for lack of material and sometimes for the difficulties of its systematization. Two options presented themselves: either to limit the tasks (Schuchardt studied ergativity, and Vossler and his school individual stylistics) or, as often happened in earlier periods, to squeeze material into the framework of some a priori and unprovable propositions, a feature shared, for all their differences, by Cassirer and Marr.

In Russia in the late 19th century, the critics of the dominant paradigm were Nikolay Krushevsky and Jan Baudouin de Courtenay. Contemporaries might have noticed, above all, the similarity of their ideas to those of neogrammarians. This was their assessment in the encyclopedic entry of the time titled "New Grammatical School" (an alternative name of the neogrammarian school): "In Russia the New Grammatical School has a following in the so-called 'Kazan' school of linguists headed by Professor Baudouin de Courtenay and the late Krushevsky. Its founder, Baudouin de Courtenay, is, however, a totally independent scholar who developed similar principles independently from the neogrammarians… In some respects these scholars have made important corrections and additions to the neogrammarians' teachings" [7, Vol. 41, pp. 265-268].

However, as it became very clear later, these were more than mere "corrections and additions," cf. this from Krushevsky's posthumous publication: "What would we say about a zoologist who would start the study of his subject from fossil animals, from paleontology? Only the study of modern languages can lead to the discovery of various laws of language, now unknown because they are either impossible to discover or far more difficult to discover in dead languages than in modern languages. Finally, only the study of modern languages can establish

the interconnection between individual laws… If it is more natural to begin the study of linguistics with the modern languages, then I hope I need not go to any length to prove that the native language should be preferred to any other modern language. The method of linguistics, as of any other science, is best studied in practice" [15, p. 289]. The divorce of positivist linguistics from practice was noted by its other critics as well.

It will be noted that Krushevsky challenges not only the historical focus of contemporary linguistics but also its empiricism. It avoided generalizations and laws were usually understood as formulas of specific sound shifts in concrete languages. Paul, however, was an exception again. He identified laws of semantic shifts operating in different languages (meaning extension, contraction, metaphor, and metonymy).

Baudouin de Courtenay went even further. As early as 1870, he wrote: "To represent the inner history of language in its full development" it is necessary "to consider the structure and composition of present-day language in all its diversity" [4, Vol. 1, p. 45]. This was already a departure from the university science tradition, which left "the study of the structure and composition of present-day language" to the practitioners. In 1877-1878, his Kazan course program introduced an important differentiation: "The laws of balance in language are studied by statics, and the laws of movement in time, the laws of historical movement of the language by dynamics" [4, Vol. 1, p. 110]. Not only "the movement of language" but also its balance is important, and "statics" is not a purely descriptive discipline: Baudouin de Courtenay, for example, wrote about static and dynamic sound laws [4, Vol. 1, p. 88]. Statics is primary: "The changes of sounds are conditioned … by static factors" [4, Vol. 1, p. 82]. He argued that preference for modern languages should be introduced into practice: "By instilling in the minds of the students a conscious attitude to the living language of the time we can try, through analogous inferences, introduce them into the study of so-called history of the language" [4, Vol. 2, p. 134]. But Baudouin de Courtenay still believed that language could only be fully understood in its history. This is the proposition he put forward in 1897: "In language, like in nature in general, everything lives. Everything moves. Tranquility, rest, stagnation is appearance; it is a particular case of movement when change is minimal. The statics of language is merely a particular case of its dynamics" [4, Vol. 1, p. 349]. We can see a commitment to a systemic approach. A new paradigm was beginning to be formed.

Disenchantment with the habitual ideas and methods was becoming more and more widespread. Later, when the new paradigm was established some, for example, Albert Einstein's gymnasium teacher of classical languages, Jost Winteler, and Tomas Masaryk, the future president of Czechoslovakia, tried to trace Saussure's ideas to their predecessors.

However, the paradigm finally formulated by Ferdinand de Saussure turned out to be the most valid scientifically although some credit for its formulation must go to Krushevsky and Baudouin de Courtenay, as well as Saussure's pupil Albert Sechehaye in an earlier book [27].

The history of the impact Saussure made on science in the 20th and 21st

centuries turns out to be somewhat convoluted. During his lifetime, after his book written in his youth he published very little, though he influenced Antoine Meillet, Sechehaye and other prominent scholars through his lectures. After the first publication of his *Cours de linguistique generale* in 1916, the impact of his ideas for almost a century was associated only with that book, which went through several editions and was translated into many languages (his early *Memoire* was remembered thanks to that book). Subsequent publication of his archive showed, however, that the published text of *Cours* did not give a full idea of his views, because much was left out of it for various reasons. Today we sometimes come across the opposite extreme: the ideas contained in rough drafts and letters are almost held to be more important than the concept that influenced the development of world linguistics in the 20th century. Needless to say, everything should be taken into account.

Saussure as he comes across in *Cours* was seen by contemporaries and immediate successors with a plus or a minus sign, but exclusively as the founder of structural linguistics, a scholar who in spite of some contradictions offered a rigorous and consistent concept based on a systemic attitude to language. In the light of *Cours* his early *Memoire* was perceived, where one can find an anticipation of his later ideas, which A. Zaliznyak brilliantly did in the preface to the Russian edition of *Memoire* (1977).

However, the scholar's path was more tortuous, as detailed by Boris Gasparov [11] who cites, among other things, Saussure's letter to Meillet of January 1894 [16, p. 95]. Before that, having already published *Memoire*, he went on his first expedition to Lithuania to study the history of stress in the Lithuanian language. There he first encountered a large body of oral material. In his letter, he admits a methodological crisis: the raw material of dialects finally convinced him that the positivist approach based on the logical ordering of empirically observed facts was impossible. In the years that followed, he started writing rough notes on language that eventually led him to the ideas of *Cours*, in which Saussure attempted to revise the epistemological foundations of the science of language. Saussure tried to cast aside empiricism and build a general theory: it is no accident that he has few factual examples. This was a departure from the neogrammarians' system of values, which preferred to address particular questions. Building a theory was a laborious process. Saussure did not intend to publish his ideas, because he had not brought them into a system.

Saussure, overwhelmed by the chaos of language Humboldt wrote about (although he was aware of its existence, as seen from his rough drafts), so in *Cours* he singled out a permanent stable fragment he called language (*langue*). And he referred all the rest, all this chaos, to the sphere of speech (*parole*). "Speaking … is the sum of what people say"; "in speaking there is only the sum of particular acts" [25, p. 19]. "Speech is many-sided and heterogeneous … we cannot discover its unity" [25, p. 9]. External linguistics "can add detail to detail without being caught in the vise of a system" [25, p. 22]. "I shall deal only with the linguistics of language" [25, p. 20], for which he made a plea in his lectures. Although Linguistics of Speech was included in the education plan, he never delivered this lecture.

However, it may have appeared to his followers that for a linguist there is nothing worthy of attention except that which Saussure called *langue*, and that chaos was not an object of science. All the more so since much of what linguists traditionally studied indeed pertained to *langue*.

Perusal of Saussure's rough notes, of course, changed much in the way he was understood. Even so, his reception in the world was based on *Cours*. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye may have introduced their own views, but there is no doubt that Saussure himself deliberately set forth in *Cours* the concept which, while extending the object of linguistics to include synchronic studies, greatly narrowed it by refusing to study *parole*: "We can dispense with the other elements of speech" [25, p. 15]. As I have noted, the study of human speech activity in its totality was impossible during Humboldt's time, or in Saussure's time, while Marr, who set this task, failed to fulfill it. Saussure singled out only that side of the task which was the most relevant for his time, and included most of the traditional linguistic problems (including historical ones) in whose study progress could be made. True, some attempts to study what Saussure called speech were made by Alan Gardiner, Karl Bühler, Sechehaye and others. But they focused not on the chaos and not on all speech activity, but only on the most regular rule-governed part of *parole* (organized speech, according to Sechehaye). Experimental phonetics was probably furthest from the study of *langue*, but as will be shown below, it did not occupy a major place in structuralism.

The paradigm proposed by Saussure did not of course come out of thin air. I have mentioned the ideas of Krushevsky and Baudouin de Courtenay. A pupil of the latter had every reason to say: "Regarding the last book of Saussure, which made such a big splash, it can safely be said that has no new propositions that we have not known from the teaching of Baudouin de Courtenay" [21, p. 185]. Arguably, this teaching indeed had more ideas than Saussure's concept: "The deepest of all was probably [the theory] of Kruszewski and Baudouin de Courtenay … since they included a frankly comparative-historical component" [12, p. 287]. However, this "wealth" and "depth" were the last things that were needed in the near-term perspective. I have cited the words of Baudouin de Courtenay that "the statics of language is merely a particular case of its dynamics." Sechehaye expressed a similar idea: "The disciplines pertaining to the state of language ... provide only a partial explanation of their object, an explanation that is necessary, but not sufficient" [27, p. 113].

The path of building synchronic linguistics proposed by Saussure turned out to be promising. He said that the linguist "can enter the mind of speakers only by completely suppressing the past, The intervention of history can only falsify his judgment" [25, p. 81]. This view was shared by the structuralists who recognized the purely static concept of the phoneme espoused by Baudouin de Courtenay. Vilém Mathesius [18, p. 90] wrote: "Baudouin ... created a notion of the phoneme which belongs to the foundations of modern linguistics. But he failed to draw all the conclusions for a linguistic method and a linguistic system that followed from his novel concept for … he paid too much attention to the fact of constant change in language."

Saussure's ideas had the future on their side if only because they were sim-

pler than the concepts of his contemporaries. Simpler not so much in the sense of simplicity of presentation (although it was simpler, for example, than that of Sechehaye; we should keep in mind that Saussure aimed his lectures at students) as in the sense of reducing the problems studied to a limited number of parameters. "F. de Saussure (and even more so his followers) changed the object of research, doing it in a wonderful and very simple way: this is synchrony and this is diachrony; this is language and this is speech" [22, p. 343]. Neogrammarians too sought rigor but the rigor covered too narrow a range of problems. Now a clear-cut statement of priority problems paved the way for the study of many (but far from all) problems of synchronic linguistics. The intellectual climate of the time undoubtedly facilitated the victory of structuralism. After the First World War structuralism as a scientific method became widespread in various sciences, linguistics being one of the first among them. The connection between linguistic structuralism and the formal school in literary scholarship, for example, has long been known. In Russia, the same people, Roman Jakobson and Evgeny Polivanov, pioneered new approaches in both cases.

The boundaries of linguistics in structuralism simultaneously expanded and contracted. They expanded owing to the renunciation of mandatory historicism, and contracted owing to the consistent separation of language, according to Saussure, from all the rest, ultimately from chaos. According to Charles Bally, for the scholar to "get a good chance of capturing the real state of the language system," "he should not have the faintest idea of the past of that language, he should totally ignore the connection of language with culture and society in which that language functions such that the scholar's attention should be concentrated solely on the interaction of language symbols" [3, p. 39]. Leonard Bloomfield wrote in 1936 that the language studied by linguists was "noise produced by the organs of speech" (quoted from [5, p. 14]).

A good deal has been written about the differences of the new linguistic paradigm from the former ones. For example, in 1939 when interim results could already be summed up, V. Brøndahl identified five main differences. First, science in the previous century was historical, while modern science was primarily synchronic. Second, the former proceeded from individual phenomena and the latter identified structures. Third, the former laid down laws, and the latter is concerned not so much with laws as with models. Fourth, the former is based on induction and the latter on deduction. Fifth, the former was evolutionary and the latter recognized leaps [8].

The first two differences were mentioned more often than the others. The biggest controversy was over the sharp division between synchrony and diachrony, which even some of Saussure's followers (for example, Shore) did not accept, whereas the juxtaposition of language and speech was almost universally accepted.

However, Brøndahl failed to mention some of the differences between the old and new paradigms. This is best observed in the sound aspect of language, which has been best studied in classical structuralism. For more than a century it has had two disciplines, which Baudouin de Courtenay called anthropophonics and psychophonetics, later replaced by the terms "phonetics" and "phonology." The for-

mer discipline studies various sound phenomena and the latter only linguistically relevant ones (notions of relevance may of course vary, but phonology, unlike phonetics, selects what it studies). As pointed out above, phonetics took shape in the positivist period and was experimental from the beginning, while phonology was founded by the immediate forerunners of structuralism and flourished during the period of structuralism. In phonology, the physical and physiological features of sounds were becoming less and less important as relations between phonemes became the main object of study. Phoneticians used the attribute "paper" to describe phonologists' studies.

A vivid illustration is Aleksandr Reformatsky's well-known book on the history of phonology [23]. Although the author repeatedly stresses the unity of phonetics and phonology his focus is only on history of the latter beginning with Baudouin de Courtenay and the history of experimental phonetics is only mentioned in passing. The ideas of those Russian scholars who, like Lev Shcherba, were simultaneously phoneticians and phonologists came in for detailed description only from the phonological point of view. Among specialists outside Russia, much was said about phonologists (of the Prague and descriptivist schools) who were remote from experiments, and very little about the English school of phoneticians. And yet it was the most advanced in the first half of the 20th century. Henry Sweet is not mentioned, and Daniel Jones is mentioned as a representative of the phonological concept which Reformatsky rejected [23, p. 40]. The fact that scientists of the structuralist period (and sometimes, by inertia, of the later periods) ignored experimental phonetics is mentioned by Ekaterina Velmezova [31, p. 79].

Obviously, structural phonologists were not overly interested in the physical properties of phoneme correlates. That is, what was happening in reality was considered to be secondary (and in general immaterial), and yet it could be significant for positivists. This was the key feature of structural linguistics. This is not to say that they did not use intuition implicitly, but it was often considered a distracting factor. Some structuralists, like Josef Kořínek, believed it was a mistake to take into account language sense as it was too primitive.

Needless to say, the triumph of structuralism, like the earlier triumph of positivism, did not mean that other linguistic paradigms disappeared. I leave aside the Marr paradigm, which enjoyed the greatest success after Saussure. Even Humboldt's ideas still had a following in Germany although on the whole his ideas were sidelined. They enjoyed some popularity in the Soviet Union until the late 1920s (which is in general characteristic of crisis periods) [2], but later came to be regarded as outdated. Only the thesis on the relevance of comparisons of non-kindred languages was developed by Schuchardt (who was remote from Humboldt) and later by Mathesius, Reformatsky and others [2, pp. 699-702].

The old positivist paradigm concentrated on the reconstruction of proto-languages has survived into the present (although it has lost its privileged status). Over the past century, it has greatly expanded its area of research and is no longer confined to Indo-Europeanism. Having added new methods (internal reconstruction, glottochronology) to its arsenal it still proceeded from Schleicher's theory,

which boils down to the proposition that languages diverge but do not cross in spite of the criticisms on the part of prominent scholars of various periods (among them were Baudouin de Courtenay, Sechehaye, Trubetskoy, and Polivanov). They pointed out the unproven and a priori character of the axioms of comparative studies. For example, Sechehaye [27, p. 43] wrote: "The linguistics of facts managed to deliver remarkable discoveries independently. Theoretical science merely followed it." This applied, among other things, to the regularity of phonetic laws which defies "rational explanation," and "if we still believe in the fruitfulness of this principle it is only because it exists and is useful and not because we have understood it." While Sechehaye merely said that the principle was unproven Baudouin de Courtenay considered it false. He wrote that the two variants of the concept of the language family tree "cannot withstand criticism, for on the one hand they are based on the supposition that language exists independently of man, and on the other hand, they fail to take into account the complexity of linguistic facts," and he considered its renunciation to be "emancipation from the authority of sorcerers and soothsayers of all kinds and the liberation from preconceptions" (trans. by Edward Stankiewicz, see in Russian [4, Vol. 2, p. 7]).

And yet, however shaky the concept was theoretically, neither Baudouin de Courtenay, nor other theoretical linguists ever came up with a convincing alternative. "Theoretically barren" neogrammarians and their followers, perhaps for this very reason, did not see a problem there and spread their constructs to ever new language families. The new methods in the 20th century were also created empirically. I remember that in 1966 the mathematician Aleksandr Wentzell, who taught the probabilities theory at the structural and applied linguistics department at Moscow University, devoted one lecture to glottochronology and demonstrated that all of it was based on unproven or unprovable grounds. Nothing has changed since then. This is proof that for two centuries now the "linguistics of facts" has outstripped scientific theory. This is not to say that theory is impossible in principle. Sergey Starostin in his later years thought about it and communicated with geneticists and other natural scientists. But for now, this is still the situation. This is not the only such case in linguistics. The idea of the differences between flexional, agglutinative and isolating (amorphous) languages was formulated by the Schlegel brothers more than two hundred years ago; they provided a grounding ("the stages concept") which was later abandoned, but the actual empirically discovered difference remained, and fresh attempts have been made to explain it.

And yet, alternative programs have been proposed even after the structural paradigm was established. In Russia, one of them was set forth in Valentin Voloshinov's book *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (Mikhail Bakhtin probably took part in developing the concept). The book is fiercely polemical toward "abstract objectivism," to which it refers the majority of linguistics trends of the time, with Saussure's *Cours* as its clearest expression. These ideas are countered by Humboldt's ideas as interpreted by Vossler. The objective existence of language in Saussure's sense is denied: it is "merely an abstraction arrived at with a good deal of trouble," i.e., "the product of deliberation on language" [33, p. 67]. It may be useful for practical purposes (language teaching and interpretation of

texts) but the abstract system "leads us away from the living, dynamic reality of language and its social functions" [33, p. 82]. The Humboldt–Vossler trend was considered more productive, but it had to be complemented by the study of speech communication and dialog. The study of "the reality of language" in its completeness was urged, but no concrete ideas on how it should be done were forthcoming. The book was forgotten soon after its publication, but was recalled in the 1970s, when the dominance of the structural paradigm was coming to an end.

The "great crisis" of linguistics of the early 20th century was overcome. The structural paradigm as formulated by Saussure had prevailed over several competing versions. However, although it was thought by many to be eternal in the mid-20th century, it later yielded center stage to other paradigms. It is not my purport to discuss the process as a whole, but I would merely like to name two features of language science in recent decades mentioned by Aleksandr Kibrik [14, pp. 19, 20]: "An adequate model of language should explain what it is 'in reality'… Everything that has to do with the existence and functioning of language comes within the purview of linguistics." The first property, which is not characteristic of 19th century linguistics, managed to manifest itself in positivist science without challenging its principles, but structuralism departed from it. The second property was not found either in positivism or in structuralism, which set different limitations, and attempts to lift them are being made now.

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Life-Changing and Coexperiencing Psychotherapy: Comparative Analysis of Approaches

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Abstract. The author offers a comparative analysis of two psychotherapeutic approaches: the life-changing approach of James Bugental and the coexperiencing approach of Fyodor Vasilyuk. She identifies their common features, unexpected parallels, and fundamental differences caused by various methodological approaches and opinions about the nature of the correlation between philosophy, science, and practice. Significant attention is paid to the anthropological foundations of the two variants of existential-humanitarian psychotherapy. Different approaches to understanding the nature of the subjective as a primary (Bugental) and as a secondary phenomenon produced by sociocultural impacts (Vasilyuk) are identified, as well as the differences in the interpretation of the psychological foundations of personal agency and the mechanism of making a person into the "author" of their life. The aims and pathways of psychotherapy as one of the most important questions are also discussed.

The attitude of both therapists to the initial problem of the client that should be resolved and their awareness of the final goal of psychotherapy are also discussed. The obvious disagreements are caused by their differing interpretation of the function of meaning in the work of therapists. Vasilyuk treats the identification of meaning as the ultimate aim and value of coexperiencing psychology, while Bugental treats meaning as a tool for restoring contact between the client and their subjectivity. According to Bugental, the client follows the call of their "concern" as the inner source of the psychotherapeutic process. The identification of meaning as the ultimate aim of psychotherapy cannot be defined due to the multitude of meanings of the subjective and the mobility of meaningful structures. In Vasilyuk's coexperiencing psychotherapy, movement toward meaning is closely tied to efforts to develop the client's verbal thinking and conscience to overcome

the "schemes," to increase awareness and the differentiated nature of psychic life, and raise the level of its arbitrariness. In this respect, he followed the tradition of the cultural activity approach. Toward the end of his life, Vasilyuk tried to revise the fundamental principles of coexperiencing psychotherapy; he introduced certain transformations that moved it closer to Bugental's ideas and intensified its existential-religious aspect.

Psychotherapeutic Approaches

James Bugental and Fyodor Vasilyuk belong to the same existential-humanistic trend in psychotherapy, hence their ideological closeness. Sergey Bratchenko has presented the ideas of Bugental in their fullest in Russian psychological literature [1; 2], while psychologists and historians of psychology have just started to study Vasilyuk's work in detail. The two schools are fairly close: Both follow humanistic values, both study the individual in the context of their relationships with the world, both relied on phenomenology, both used understanding methods orientated at experiencing as a direct method of psychotherapeutic work with the client. Bugental wrote: "I care less about behavior and more about human experiencing" [3, p. 223]. Their approaches are no less different mainly where their methodological foundations are concerned. Bugental relied on existential philosophical tradition (Søren Kierkegaard, Gabriel Marcel, Martin Heidegger, and others), existential psychology (Rollo May), and psychoanalysis. Vasilyuk's philosophical foundations of the methods of coexperiencing are an intertwining of existential influences (Dasein of Heidegger, "being-in-the world" of Ludwig Binswanger, ideas of Jean-Paul Sartre, Karl Jaspers, Paul Tillich, Nikolay Berdyaev, Merab Mamardashvili), Christian and synergetic anthropology (teachings of Metropolitan Anthony of Sourozh (Bloom), Pavel Florensky, Sergey Horuzhy and others) [17] and general psychological ideas based on Lev Vygotsky's cultural-historical theory and the activity theory of Aleksey Leontiev. Selected methodology determined, to a great extent, the categorical entity and the general logic of the theoretical constructs and practical solutions of their authors. The correlation between *psychology* and *psychotherapy* reveals the differences in the methodological positions of Vasilyuk and Bugental. Bugental treats them as two different spheres like science and art. While science is oriented at objective knowledge, art deals with the subjective as a special reality, which is invariably bigger that the most precise objectivity: "What we have are two fields uncomfortably living together in the same words—psychology, psychotherapy. The mar-

riage is not working out well" [3, p. 223]. Vasilyuk, for his part, tried to overcome the schism between theory and practice. His coexperiencing psychotherapy relied on the general psychological theory of consciousness of Vygotsky and Leontiev, and enriched science with a concrete-psychological theory of consciousness and *perezhivanie* (experiencing) that makes it possible to work with specific empirical material.

Anthropological Foundations of the Psychotherapeutic Approaches of Bugental and Vasilyuk

Fyodor Vasilyuk invariably recalled that any psychotherapeutic trend relies on anthropology. James Bugental was of the same opinion. He was convinced that the subjective as an internal flow of experiencing (including emotions, perception, memories, fantasies, foresights, bodily awareness, urges, planning and solutions, etc.) was the most important factor of human life [4]. The subjective is the psychological foundation of human life. It is not identical to the ideal; it is concentrated in the body and performs an important task of building up the world and our place in this world. Bugental insisted that our definition of the self and the world is arbitrary. Each person weaves "the pattern of their existence" themselves. The "I am the world" construct mediates our actions. We can do only what corresponds to our construct, yet each construct is *objectivation* and, therefore, contraction. Within their subjective, an individual is invariably bigger that their *objectivations in the external world*. Therefore, all resources of significant changes in life should be sought for in the subjective.

We live within the subjective yet have to pave our way in the objective world. Bugental connects the ability of the subjective to move outside its own limits to be realized in the external world with the concept *spiritedness*: "Spiritedness is the force of our being truly subjects, and it is this which impels us forward into living" [3, p. 241]. *Intentionality* is an inalienable aspect of spiritedness expressed in goals and intentions. Blocked intentionality caused by the loss of connections with the fullness of the subjective means an existential "death" of the subject and is perceived as dispiritedness and as bleak and useless existence.

Bugental's conception of the subjective stems from the ideas of existentialists, in particular of Kierkegaard, who was the first to criticize, in harsh terms, the objectivism of philosophy and science. He argued that abstract thinking pushes aside all challenging situations in which the existing individual might find themself. It is indifferent to a *concrete* individual. Any comprehension of one's own existence requires a concerned *subjective thinker* rather than objective observer. The subjective is the *spirit* and *passion*. Only a person's passionate interest in their own existence makes them act. This explains why subjectivity is inalienably tied to *agency* (see [5]). Bugental is of a similar opinion. The subjective strives to actualization in the external world; this is its nature. This does not happen only because the individual themself *refuses* to realize their intentions. The refusal to experience important potentials is perceived by them as a *loss*. The individual, as

it were, sinks into mourning. He is depressed and unable to act. In this case, Bugental recommends building psychotherapeutic work with the client as a therapy for grief. Together with Carl Rogers, Bugental attributes the rejection of actualization to the gap between the client's subjective life experience and their construct "I am the world." This inconsistency demands that the construct be revised. Man is the only living creature with an existential requirement to *change his own image*, says Bugental [4].

The anthropology on which the coexperiencing approach of Vasilyuk rests is fundamentally different, where the interpretation of the subjective is the primary concern. Bugental opposes the subjective as individual to the generally valid. Vasilyuk, in fact, elaborates the thesis formulated by Vygotsky "the individual is the highest form of the social." He traces the historical nature of the complex simple human experiencing relying on the socially elaborated "schemes of consciousness" and using the cultural means of expression, and reveals their internal dialogism. "Certain content orientation of the experiencing process is not a natural feature of the human psyche… But to acknowledge the historical nature of the experiencing processes is half the job. The actually psychological formulation of the problem is to apply to the analysis of experience the general scheme of socio-historical determination of the psyche, already tested by Vygotsky and his pupils on a variety of psychological material, namely, to understand experience as a process mediated by 'psychological tools' that are artificial, social entities by their nature, mastered and internalized by the subject in the course of communicating with other people" [14, p. 160]. According to Bugental, *agency* is man's primordial feature, which the psychotherapist only frees by removing all blocks. Vasilyuk, for his part, wrote that "raising" and consolidating the client's personality is one of the main tasks of coexperiencing psychotherapy, which allows us to define it as the *therapy that forms*, *educates, and develops the individual*.

For Bugental, sociocultural influences are just ancillary material from which each person constructs his life. Vasilyuk followed in Vygotsky's footsteps to write that cultural means and forms of behavior mastered by man change his nature. Personal development is not a lineal process but the *transfiguration* of man. It relies on the development of *consciousness* and *arbitrariness,* the psychological foundation on which man becomes the *author* of his life. The term "transfiguration" is a Christian and religious term that offers space for something different, not only for development but also for a certain "secret" of the individual.

The Goals of Psychotherapy and Ways to Achieve Them

Bugental ambitiously called his psychotherapeutic method *life-changing*. He believed that therapy should let the client realize that he can do more and that there is choice where he previously felt constrained. Therapy leads the client toward a clear awareness of their being, their possibilities and limits; it restores their contact with their subjectivity, which helps them build up their own unique

authentic life. The life-changing therapy is designed to consolidate the individual's *presence* in the world. Presence or the quality of being is another important category of existential philosophy. In the 20th century, it was actively developed by Marcel [8] and Heidegger [6]. Bugental offered his own, psychological, interpretation of this concept. Presence is the individual's sensitivity in relation to internal and external experience and their *ability to respond* to external impacts, to reveal themself without mask and protection. The high level of presence gives a feeling of fullness of life and stirs up spiritedness.

Meaning is the final aim and highest value of coexperiencing psychotherapy. Vasilyuk treats spiritedness as an attribute of meaning: experiencing, which inevitably appears when meaning has been found.

Bugental, likewise, wrote about *meaning*: "Meaning is the ultimate currency of communication generally and of psychotherapy particularly" [3, p. 101]. He treated meaning not so much as a goal but as a *means* of psychotherapy. Meaning cannot be accepted as the final aim of psychotherapy because the subjective has many *meanings* and *many interpretations*. Bugental supported his position with various interpretations of meaning of the client's dreams at different stages of psychotherapy. An important criterion of a successful psychotherapeutic process is deepening and widening the meaning of the analyzed event rather than finding its only, correct, meaning.

Bugental suggests that the client should not be encouraged to concentrate on their problem as born, to a great extent, by their old and inadequate constructs. It is an illusion to believe, Bugental thinks, that there is a solution to every problem. The therapist should concentrate on confrontation with the client's actual life-world, which they have created for themselves and which creates an *opposition* to positive changes in life. Therapy might either remove the negative symptoms and problems or not, yet, in any case, their destructive impact on the client's life will be diminished.

Vasilyuk's coexperiencing psychology, on the other hand, attaches special importance to the correct building up and preservation of the *structure of psychotherapeutic situation* (Fig. 1), dealing with the client's complaints, requests, and problems (Fig. 2), their attitude to the problem, tracking the dynamics of changes in the goals of therapy, and understanding the causes of trouble.


Fig. 1. The structure of the psychotherapy situation

Fig. 2. Dealing with the client's complaints, requests, and problems

Life-changing therapy does not, in fact, addresses a problem. It deals with the task of liberating the client's potential embedded in their subjectivity, and it relies on man's inborn ability defined by Bugental as "concern." The notion of "concern for self" appeared in Antiquity and was resurrected in the 19th century by Kierkegaard. He was the first to formulate the question of concern of the individual for their inner self as the *concealed internal* "to be the self that he is in truth" [7, p. 20]. In the 20th century, this theme was further developed by Heidegger and Michel Foucault. Bugental discussed concern as an ability actualized when the individual is confronted with a situation that offers no ready answers. Concern is a sum-total of feelings and attitudes of the individual who ponders about how they are living. Concern is an intuitive awareness of what is most important at any given moment and which therefore requires attention. Concern is the force that adds energy and directs the individual. The individual who is present in the world in their totality and who is driven by concern cannot select a wrong road and wrong actions. It should be said that the psychological characteristics of concern (direct experiencing, emotional hues, urge, direction) described by Bugental coincide with the *meaningful motives* in Leontiev's activity theory on which Vasilyuk relies in his interpretation of meaning. This means that despite different terminology caused by the authors' different sets of methodologies and concepts, Bugental's call of concern and Vasilyuk's idea of the inspiring power of meaning is probably the same psychological reality.

On the Road Toward Meaning

Vasilyuk openly acknowledged that Carl Rogers' person-centered therapy was the only contemporary trend that influenced his work. Compared with Rogerian therapy, his coexperiencing therapy is a much more technically equipped system. It uses a wide variety of means and methods borrowed from many highly varied psychotherapeutic schools: cognitive-behavioral, emotional-imagery, bodily-oriented therapy, psychodrama, etc. He commented that "not all methods had been created so far" and that the main thing was an understanding of why they were created and which aims they served. They might be tactical or strategic, and the latter should be connected with moving the client to meaning as the highest aim and value of coexperiencing psychotherapy. The task of finding meaning as an aim of psychotherapy is closely connected with an understanding of the place and function of meaning in the structure of man's mental activity.

In crisis situations, under the pressure of grave circumstances, the individual is confronted with the task of comprehending the past, transforming it into their experience, their wealth, and resource of continued life. This is the task of acquiring meaning. In fact, this is a creative project of oneself, which presupposes a solution beyond the limits of direct existence based on personal agency. It was existentialists (Sartre and Binswanger) who interpreted man as a project. The task of projecting one's own life is a very special type of activity that requires a lot of inner work, primarily of consciousness. In the cultural activity tradition on

which Vasilyuk relied, consciousness and meaning are interconnected. Indeed, it is enough to point to Vygotsky's idea about the meaningful structure of consciousness and the interpretation by Leontiev of personalized meaning as a component of consciousness that determines its bias. Meaning as a unit of consciousness is internally contradictory. It is a unity of affect and intellect, an "emotion with a thought." Consciousness is a special psychic structure. The psyche of a baby is not differentiated; it cannot understand relationships, its meanings are diluted and diffused. Vygotsky connected the development of consciousness with the inter-relationship of language development and thought.

Viktor Frankl in his day insisted that meaning could not be given to man. It is individual, and only the individual themself can find it. This means that the psychotherapist should give them the freedom to accomplish this. This explains why in the search for meaning, Vasilyuk chose an indirect path—development of consciousness and thinking of his client on the basis of culturally developed means while consolidating their personality that is coping with the challenging task of "self-construction." Coexperiencing psychotherapy supplies them with the necessary means—external (cultural) and internal (psychological)—needed to reveal the meaning. The rest depends on the client, which explains why the result of psychotherapy is not guaranteed, so to speak.

In view of the above, we can identify several trends in coexperiencing therapy:
(1) developing verbal thinking
(2) working with consciousness, which includes upgrading the level of realization of experiencing and the degree of differentiation of consciousness per se
(3) actualization of personality as a point of freedom "here and now"
(4) consolidating the client's personality in dialogue with the Other
(5) wider arbitrariness of mental life and acquisition of authorship of one's own life

Let us discuss how these strategic lines are realized in the procedures, techniques, and methods of coexperiencing psychotherapy.

Developing verbal thinking. The way the client describes their problem, the words and phrases of speech they uses, reflects their method of thinking about his problem. Vygotsky demonstrated that thinking and speech in adults are not independent functions; they intertwine into specific, verbal thinking. Coexperiencing psychotherapy uses these specifics. Indeed, if the client is asking for help, this means that they are convinced that they cannot cope with their problem on their own. Coexperiencing psychotherapy offers several strategies for widening the client's thinking capacity, including working with paradigms of thinking. In psychotherapy, Vasilyuk defined as paradigm the method by which the client's experiencing is described, and he identified several of them: energetic, spatial, temporal, genetic, and information-cognitive [14]. The therapist begins with identifying the predominant paradigm of the client's thinking on the basis of an analysis of his speech and continues working either within this paradigm by strengthening its positive pole (from emptied to full; from decline to rise, from compression to expansion, etc.) or introducing additional paradigms absents from the client's

structure of thinking. This widens its meaningful field and opens new vistas of problem comprehension. Adaptation to the psychotherapy of Aristotle's teaching about the four types of causality is another trend of working with thinking. This teaching describes practically all possible methods of thinking about reality. Elaboration of the client's program in line with four types of causality widens, to the greatest extent, the chances of discovering the meaning of a negative symptom. The basic techniques of coexperiencing psychotherapy help, in turn, develop the imagery-poetic (empathy), research (clarification), and philosophical (maieutics) types of thinking as the main methods of the cognition of reality created by society [9; 12; 16].

Working with consciousness. In the cultural-historical tradition, personality development is conditioned by the development of its consciousness. In some of his works, Vygotsky directly associated the personality and self-consciousness of man. Coexperiencing psychotherapy is one of the few psychotherapeutic trends that pays special attention to the client's consciousness and works with it. According to Vasilyuk, the first model of experiencing was associated with the identification of levels of experiencing by the degree of their presence in consciousness: unconsciousness, direct experiencing, awareness, reflection. The basic techniques of coexperiencing psychotherapy allow the psychotherapist to work with all levels of experiencing (Fig. 3).

Maieutics	→	Reflection
Clarification	→	Awareness
Empathy	→	Experiencing
Interpretation	→	Unconscious

Fig. 3. Basic techniques used by coexperiencing psychotherapy
and the levels of experiencing

Leontiev identified two forms of consciousness: the image-consciousness and the process-consciousness. Coexperiencing psychotherapy works with both: as a process—with the help of the techniques of empathy, clarification, and maieutics, and with images of consciousness on the basis of Vasilyuk's "Psychosemiotic tetrahedron" model of the image structure [11]. The process helps develop the client's reflective thinking; working with images helps to cope with the deficit of the poles of the image structure (significance, meaning, object, sign/word), trace down their representation in senses, thus widening its inner content.

Techniques and procedures designed to increase inner differentiation of the client's consciousness are an important part of work with conscience in coexperiencing psychotherapy. Vygotsky deemed it necessary to point out that consciousness develops from the originally diffusive, non-differentiated consciousness of a baby to the gradually complicating multilayered structure of consciousness of a cultured adult. According to Kurt Lewin and Vygotsky, everything what in psychology is normally defined as "infantilism" is caused by inadequate differentiation of psychic life. The higher differentiation of inner life means the freer the individual. "Dissection and differentiation of psychic life ensures the richness of the

methods of the perception of reality of any individual… In a certain sense, there is functional equivalence between a higher degree of differentiation of personality and its greater flexibility in certain situations and tasks. In other words, the nature of reality perception determines the nature of action in relation to this reality" [19, p. 241]. In psychotherapy, differentiation of the client's consciousness and personality begins when their psychic material is divided into "here and now" and "there and then." In this way, their consciousness identifies and acquires content related to the present and past in their life, in effect formulating psychological time. This frees the client's personality from the clutches of past experience. "Here and now" is the client's point of freedom. In Vasilyuk's approach, the main means of differentiating mental layers of different times is the model of the registers of consciousness [13]. This model not only identifies various strata of consciousness, but it makes it possible to restore their ties, thus opening possibilities for free motion of thought between registers without fixing on traumatic experiences. This restores the free flow of experiencing, which is in fact the ultimate aim of coexperiencing psychotherapy. "We want freedom of personality and freedom of experiencing" [18, p. 27].

Personality development and consolidation. "Raising" and consolidation of the client's personality is the leitmotif of psychotherapeutic efforts of coexperiencing psychotherapy. How can the client's personality be awakened? How can something of which the therapist and their client know nothing be found? The client's ability to talk about his experiences is a real starting point in psychotherapy as a practice of "curing by word." Therapists practicing coexperiencing psychotherapy rely on this ability. In psychotherapy, actualization of the client as a subject of verbal thinking, as a story-teller, is the first form of developing personality. "I the narrator" is talking "here and now" about "I personage" experiencing certain events "there and then." This separation transforms the suffering part of the client's personality into an object of reflection of "I the narrator." In the course of therapy, "I the narrator" discovers that they can think and talk about their life in a new way, create it from the very beginning first in words and then in real life. This transforms them from a passive victim of circumstances into an active author of their life. At that point, therapy can be discontinued.

The dialogic nature of a personality is one of the axioms of coexperiencing psychotherapy. Personality is invariably a personality of contact; it takes shape in dialogue with the Others to whom it addresses its experiences. Coexperiencing psychotherapy uses different means to develop personality into a personality of contacts. The therapist can take a position, which corresponds to a higher level life-world than that of their client. This can be the position of a coach/instructor in relation to the infantile client or the position of a wise Teacher in relation to a realistically minded client, etc. In this way, the therapist outlines the zone of the nearest development of the client's experience to stir up positive abilities of a more developed life-world. There is another method: the ideal figures of Love, Protection or Forgiveness are introduced into the psychotherapeutic space to give the client a chance to reveal the as yet unrecognized potential in contact with one of them. This gives the client a chance to look at themself using different optics:

I am bigger, better, more talented and many-faceted. Other methods invite the client to test himself in new roles: a teacher (the "Pedagogical Identification of the Symptom" method), a writer (autobiographical methods) or theater director [17]. Having assumed a new role, the client actualizes corresponding abilities that bring them outside the old behavior patterns and old ideas about themself. This means that in coexperiencing psychotherapy, the Other, the therapist, first and foremost, is not a neutral figure who unemotionally "mirrors" the client's process, but an equal participant in the process of communication, a carrier of new cultural means and thinking "schemes" who shows the way toward new horizons of consciousness.

From awareness to arbitrariness. Vygotsky interpreted the connection between consciousness and action in these terms. When we become aware of something in us, we acquire the possibility to manage it arbitrarily. This fully applies to psychic functions, to emotions, and the behavioral responses of the individual. Coexperiencing psychotherapy is guided by the same principle. Its basic techniques can be described as a great contribution to the development of the client's arbitrariness. Empathy leads to an awareness of feelings, which makes them more controllable; clarification increases the client's awareness of psychic processes and actions, while maieutics, an awareness of one's own convictions, helps master them [9; 12; 16]. Awareness and, as a result, arbitrariness are achieved at the expense of activating the positions of the Observer in clarification, maieutics, and the techniques of "tracing" bodily sensations and images. Symbolization plays an important role in the development of arbitrariness. Coexperiencing psychotherapy uses the name of experiencing, image, sound, melody, bodily posture, dance, etc. as a symbol. Vygotsky characterized art as "an expanded 'social feeling' or technique of feelings." Therefore, symbol is an element that performs the same function; the process of symbolization is creation.

The majority of methods used by coexperiencing psychotherapy appeals to the client's arbitrary activity, the "Pedagogical formulation of the symptom," "Symptom put on stage," "Psychotechniques of choice" [15], the narrative techniques suggested by Vasilyuk's pupil and colleague Oleg Shvedovsky "Compass of life design," etc. do more than just increase the client's awareness. Very much like the "Symptom put on stage," they allow the psychotherapist to extract unconscious information caused by negative state.

The above has convincingly demonstrated that Vasilyuk's coexperiencing psychotherapy not only relied on the methodology of the cultural activity approach but enriched its psychotechnical component. In coexperiencing psychotherapy, the movement toward meaning as a unit of consciousness is realized by developing and differentiating consciousness itself.

Meaning as a "Voice" of the Subjective

Unlike Vasilyuk, Bugental did not treat the category of "meaning" as something especially valuable, but rather as an auxiliary function. His delib-

erations on the nature of meaning, however, deserve attention. He invariably commented that the meaning of experiencing was determined intentionality, while emotions were special signs pointing at the spheres requiring special research. However, "the finger pointing at the moon is not the moon" [3, p. 119]. Understanding of meaning is a product of the unification of content, process, and aim. Technically, that can be achieved by processing the client's information at different levels of generalization by "changing optics" (intermitting close-ups and long-shots in discussing the problem). It should be said that Vasilyuk also used this method, called in coexperiencing psychotherapy, "zoom—long shot" and "zoom—close-up."

The fundamental differences between Bugental and Vasilyuk are related to their assessments of linguistic possibilities when it comes to comprehending meaning. Vasilyuk relies on the cultural-historical tradition, which (in the footsteps of Karl Marx) looks at language as "practical consciousness." Hence a connection: language—consciousness—meaning. Bugental looks at language as a form of objectivation, which invariably narrows down meaning and loses it, at least partially. He insisted that any language is a metaphor, and what we will never fully express in words is what is really important in our life [4].

Here is another important difference between the authors' methodological attitudes. In one case, it is associated with the desire to supply man, to the greatest extent, with cultural means before he enters independent life (Vasilyuk's coexperiencing psychotherapy.); in the other, it is to liberate the individual, to the greatest extent, from any instructions imposed on them from the outside that suppresses the voice of their concern (Bugental's life-changing psychotherapy): "We must go out into the world, out into the dangers and opportunities, go without a map, without a compass, without enough food, protection, anything" [3, p. 274].

"Moving Toward Each Other"

In the last years of his life, Vasilyuk turned to comprehending the strategy and tactics of coexperiencing psychotherapy in the context of prolonged work with the client and unexpectedly took several theoretical steps that makes it possible to talk about his ideas drawing considerably closer to Bugental's approaches. Vasilyuk came to the conclusion that the category of experiencing is too narrow, it is not exact enough and, therefore, as inadequate, should not be used to describe the client's real experience. He raised the question about a more general explanatory category [21]. Bugental discerned this quality in the category of the subjective that reappears empirically as result of experiencing.

Vasilyuk suggested that the conceptualist apparatus of coexperiencing psychotherapy should be widened by introducing the "practice of the self" concept borrowed from Foucault. In fact, it is a different name for reality defined by Bugental as concern activity. The title of one of Foucault's last interviews *The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom* brought together both notions.

It was within the same logic of revision of this approach that Vasilyuk raised

the question about the aims of coexperiencing psychotherapy. At the dawn of a new approach, meaning was declared to be an aim of coexperiencing psychotherapy. In his last years, Vasilyuk talked about a search for a strategic image of man (an ideal I of client) that would determine specific working tactics. In his opinion, this ideal cannot be discovered nor created by the efforts of one therapist. This can be done by cooperation with the transcendent principle. The turn to the transcendent contradicted the anti-spiritualistic methodology of the cultural activity approach but fully corresponded to the Christian line of existentialist philosophy. Apparently, this corresponded to Vasilyuk's deep spiritual requirements and philosophical sets. Here he moved closer to Bugental, who wrote of a "wild God" and a "God of mystery" and defined the individual as a mystery inside a mystery. In some of his last speeches, Vasilyuk spoke of "intuition of personality as a mystery." In 2014, speaking of the problem of personality, he quoted Clive Lewis that each man is anchored in God in his own way: to God, he is different from the others, created according to a special pattern, and God responds differently to each, treating each as a mystery—the mystery of a new name [20]. In a very mystical way, this movement toward each other unexpectedly brought two outstanding psychologists, Bugental and Vasilyuk, together at one point—the date of their death (September 17, 2008, and 2017, respectively).

Conclusion

The problem of the correlation between philosophy, scientific theory, and practice is one of the most complicated and debated issues in psychology. The psychotherapeutic approaches of Bugental and Vasilyuk demonstrate different solutions. Bugental's approach is a synthesis of philosophy and "art" of psychological practice; he tries to avoid an attempt to construct an objectively orientated general psychological theory, even if this theory is present in his approach. Vasilyuk's coexperiencing psychotherapy is a carefully elaborated psychotechnical practice that consistently develops from the basic provisions of the cultural activity theory of consciousness as its concretization in the field of the empirical. A philosophical or ontological context of this approach is required by the conception of life-worlds with active (Leontiev's theory of activity) and existential roots (Heidegger, Binswanger, May, and others). The movement toward metaphysics that intensified in Vasilyuk's last years of life could be detected in the fine balancing between the cultural-historical principle of social determination of consciousness that brought it to the concept "practices of self" and the desire to leave the frames of real existence by moving to the transcendental. While Bugental's approach is traditionally defined as existential-humanitarian, Vasilyuk's approach can be called existential-active, with a synergetic development trend.

The synergetic and existential aspects of this approach define the strategy of coexperiencing psychotherapy. The activity aspect associated with the arrangement of "practice of himself" is its tactics. Hence the unavoidable closeness of two trends of psychotherapy initially oriented at different methodologies. The

possibility of shifting from purely activity positions to the sphere of spiritual-existential subjects in Vasilyuk's approach was implicitly created by the logic of the development of cultural-historical theory as "peak psychology" of personality that ascends to the highest aspects of human life. In this sense, the "transformation" of Vasilyuk's opinions can be discussed not so much as a retreat from the cultural-historical tradition but as its logical continuation.

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Practical Philosophy: Past and Present

Ludmila KRYSHTOP

Abstract. This is a review of Vladimir Shokhin's book *Philosophy of Practical Reason*: *Agathology Project*, published by Vladimir Dal Press in 2020. The review surveys the current state of research in the field of practical philosophy. It notes that practical philosophy today is in a state of deep crisis manifested in the lack of solid studies of its foundations and structure. The monograph under review fills that gap. This review considers the structure of the monograph, its main ideas and provisions, and the conclusions at which V. Shokhin arrives. It dwells on the merits of the book and draws attention to the universality and fundamental character of the study, as well as the ambitious tasks the author sets for himself and largely fulfills. It stresses the thoroughness of the historical-philosophical part of the study, which considers not only the main Western philosophies, but also ancient Indian and Chinese philosophical views. It expresses some polemical observations and wishes concerning the author's further research in the field. Shokhin's work will be of interest not only to the narrow circle of specialists in the field of ethics, but also to a broader readership.

Keywords: Vladimir Shokhin, practical philosophy, ethics, agathology project, good, goods.

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The monograph under review is a solid piece of scholarship of impressive depth and thoroughness. It is notable for many reasons. Let us consider some of them.

The best way to begin is to say that it is a rare piece of research in terms of style and content and in terms of the ambitious tasks Vladimir Shokhin sets for himself. "Practical philosophy," which once engaged the minds of great thinkers and was valued on a par with and sometimes above "theoretical philosophy," is living through a crisis of its foundations and self-identification. This is manifested in multiple ways. Above all, it is the fact that "practical philosophy" as such, its essence and structure, command little attention. Indeed, the word combination itself is considered outdated and has long been consigned to the "archives." What is its proper meaning? Even that question does not have an unambiguous answer. We may of course recall the answers (explicit or implicit) given by Aristotle and Kant. But that is hoary antiquity, which may only interest historians of philosophy and hardly any "real" philosophical scholars who are called upon to cerebrate on the topical problems of our time, "practical philosophy" not being one of them.

So we are left with numerous studies devoted to various spheres traditionally relegated to practical philosophy. The diversity, however, is somewhat peculiar because it lacks profound theoretical reflection and self-reflection. The degradation (Shokhin does not mince his words there) especially leaps out at you in the sphere of ethics which, though it never fully encompassed practical philosophy, has always been considered its nucleus. Here the diversity of modern studies can easily be divided into two classes.

The first class includes bona fide historical-philosophical studies. They consider ethical concepts (or fragments thereof) of various epochs and thinkers, sometimes identifying links with the broader context, but sometimes confining themselves to a particular aspect of the development of philosophical thought. In an overwhelming majority of cases, such historical-philosophical works are concerned with individual stages in the development of philosophical thought. This approach to the history of philosophy as pure reconstruction today is earning it a bad reputation: it is sometimes thought to be an "archival" and narrow discipline. However, if we pursue this line, we would end up considering the crisis in historical-philosophical science in general, a subject which Vitaly Kurennoy explored, with regard to the Russian research space, as early as 2004 [7]. But that is beyond the scope of this review. Let us merely stress that such studies sometimes fail to clear up the fundamental principles of practical philosophy as represented by ethics; they are even less concerned with how ethics is connected (if at all) with the other spheres of practical philosophy. As a result, they should be considered theoretical in that they are divorced from real life practice, but at the same time, they do not begin to grapple with really theoretical problems.

The second class of ethical studies is even more popular (judging from the annual number of publications and the number of pages) and even more destructive of the development of "practical philosophy" proper. These are variegated "practical ethical" studies. This class of studies is not open to criticism of being too theoretical in the sense of being divorced from practical life and of being

detached from other areas of practical philosophy (especially law). Yet it has to be said that as a result of the booming popularity of "applied studies," we have less and less not only of practical philosophy, but of ethics proper (in the traditional sense). As the author of the book being reviewed here points out, even in deontology, reflections on the ethical are increasingly supplanted by reflections on law and reflections on duty via the calculation of rights and obligations which are more familiar to modern humanity and more habitual for modern discourse [11, pp. 6, 321, 370]. Having said that, "applied studies" are such because they apply to something fundamental, which in turn is used in applied studies. If the "applied" becomes an end and a foundation, not much can emerge from this approach. Just like a bank deposit, if money is only withdrawn without adding anything, sooner or later it will run out, so "practical philosophy" oriented toward applying past theoretical achievements obviously needs to be replenished. It is the chief merit of Shokhin's work that it can claim to have accomplished such replenishment. Another important merit of the book is its profound grounding in the best historical-philosophical sense. Although the author's theoretical goals are of a fundamental nature, he does not plunge headlong into theoretical reasoning of his own without first exploring what earlier thinkers have built or tried to build. An approach as laudable as it is rare. As the author rightly notes, philosophy (especially its modern variety) is prone to "amnesia" [11, p. 58] which often leads to "reinventing the wheel," and consists in "each next 'Columbus' not wanting to know anything about earlier 'Vikings' who were ahead of him" [11, p. 54]. It has to be noted that the study under review does not have as much as a hint at "a new Columbus": it does not just mention, but expounds in detail previous attempts to build an "agathology" (Friedrich Schleiermacher's ethics of the highest good and earlier projects of Johann Georg Heinrich Feder and Christoph Friedrich von Ammon) as well as some modern approaches to it [2; 9; 10]. This prompts the author to report his change of heart concerning the role of the historical in philosophy, he now believes that the historical should precede the logical [11, p. 9]; he sees this as a fundamental difference of the book under review from his previous book devoted to the same body of problems [10]. In our opinion, the "agathology" project has only gained from this.

The monograph has a transparent and logical structure and falls into three content blocks. The first part (*Prolegomena*) deals with the problem of object structure of philosophy, looks at the modern state of affairs and notes its crisis. The author attributes it to lack of theoretical reflection, accompanied by "thoughtless planting of trees" which degrades the forest, and to the proliferation of "genitive case philosophies" [11, pp. 13, 17]. It also offers a brief survey of the interpretation of practical philosophy from antiquity to the 20th century [11, pp. 19-49]. Perhaps the only shortcoming of this section is repetitiveness, with repetitions later built almost verbatim into the monograph's third part. But these repetitions are few and far between.

The second, and largest, part of the book (*History*) is a historical-philosophical disquisition on the evolution of the concept of good/goods from antiquity to the beginning of the 19th century. It is stunning in its thoroughness and broad

sweep: the author does not confine himself to European civilization but also looks at the philosophical traditions of ancient India and China. At the same time, there is a certain imbalance in the treatment of the material. The emphasis is on the two main ethical paradigms, the Aristotelian and the Kantian, while the other concepts (including ancient Indian and Chinese) merely add insignificant details to what is already a wonderfully coherent picture. However, this situation is justified by "the heart of the matter" and "inner logic" of the discourse. The section devoted to the agathology of J. Feder (1740-1821) and C. Ammon (1766-1850) at the end of that part is somewhat out of sync with the overall chronology.

The third part (*Theory*) fully elucidates Shokhin's own position. This part is the most conceptual and, in our opinion, the most interesting. However, even here the author does not launch into building the castles of his speculations but buttresses his reasoning with detailed renderings of the positions of modern philosophers on the basis of primary sources and a detailed analysis of the literature (for the most part little known and not readily available in Russia). All this helps to outline the author's own view of the modern situation in the field of practical philosophy that is ethics. In a nutshell, but without over-implification, the main conclusion from this part is that the three paradigms being analyzed (deontologism, consequentialism and the ethics of virtues) should be supplemented by a fourth program, the agathological one [11, pp. 353-375].

In spite of its many merits (perhaps because of them) the study invites some polemical objections and remarks. Here are some of them. One of the key, and debatable, conclusions from the analysis of Kant's ethical system turns out to be that duty is central to it, somewhat displacing the concept of good. Shokhin ascribes to Kant what he considers to be a dubious achievement: he argues that it was Kant who "initiated the distancing of good from the ultimate foundations of morality, which many have come to see only in following the law and corresponding maxims" [11, p. 277]. The theme of distancing from goods, which alone can point to the goal of virtues and all activity, crops up again in the third part, highlighting the problem of "Kant's axe."[1] Citing, among others, the notorious example of the Nazis, Shokhin claims that "diligent fulfillment of duty can sometimes be repulsive" [11, p. 371], and this happens because Kant's ethics to a large extent loses the teleological perspective. This is nothing if not debatable.

Indeed, charges of amorality have often been leveled against Kant's ethics on the basis of his notorious article *On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy*. However, this attests to a fairly superficial reading of Kant's texts because they ignore the "teleological" orientation toward an ideal system which Kant declared in the first *Critique* and consistently developed in his later critical works. It has to do with the "system of self-rewarding morality" in which morality "is inseparably bound up with the system of happiness," since in it "freedom, partly moved and partly restricted by moral laws, would itself be the cause of the general happiness" [4, p. 679]. This ideal of the highest good is an important but sometimes underestimated aspect of Kant's ethical system. The moral law prescribes to every individual to contribute to the achievement of the Kantian ideal (see [3, p. 228]) which prompts a totally different reading of "Kant's axe"

situation. If the world were ideal, there would be no need to reflect on lying and malfeasance because there would be no miscreants. But because the world is not ideal, each person should do their best to bring this ideal closer. Thus a ban on lying (even when telling the truth is fraught with the death of a friend at the hands of a malefactor) is necessary because a lie, even if well-intentioned, distances the world from the ideal state, whereas truth brings this ideal state closer, if only by an inch. It is up to the reader to agree or disagree with Kant. However, it is hard to find a clearer teleological perspective oriented toward good (in this case, the highest universal good).

The detailed analysis of Kant's differentiation of the German notions of *Wohl* and *Gut* deserves the highest praise. However, one gets the impression that Shokhin considers this difference to be Kant's invention, which later thinkers built on [11, pp. 286, 290-291]. This circumstance should at least be looked into more closely since the word *Wohl* is not a specifically Kantian term, having been used before him.

The part devoted to Christoph Ammon's agathology is exceedingly interesting. In my opinion, it would make sense to pay a little more attention to it, in order to stress the connection between his thought and Kant's. Many aspects of Ammon's views would seem to repeat Kantian thoughts, albeit sometimes in an original way. Similarly, it is regrettable that the author omits the figure of the German enlightener Christian August Crusius (1715-1775). That thinker would fit neatly into the reflections on good and goods, partly because he pointed out circularity in the Wolffian definition of good through perfection [1, p. 332] (this is mentioned in [11, p. 327]). No less interesting is Crusius's distinction between physical and moral goods, which, as he thought, could help to break the Wolffian circle. He defines the former as what we wish (we describe something as good precisely because we wish for it), while moral goods are the things we should wish for (even though we do not always do so). Crusius refers to the latter as true goods ,whereas the former often turn out to be false goods, although sometimes they may coincide (the ideal case, which attests to true virtue). Eventually this distinction leads Crusius to God and his holy will, which determines what is good and what we should wish for. Bringing in the Cruisian concept would have been another vivid illustration of the author's idea that recognition of the hierarchy of goods consistently leads to theonomic ethics [11, p. 370]. There is yet another reason why, in the context of the book under review, it would not be inappropriate to consider Crusius's moral philosophy. That thinker is little known and not well enough studied today, and yet his contribution to the development of philosophical thought in the 18th century is hard to overestimate. On closer inspection, we find in Crusius many of the provisions traditionally attributed to Kant. They are truly pivotal for Kant's ethical system: above all the division of practical prescriptions into the law of virtue (moral law), which is imperative, and the rules of common sense, which depend on the goal pursued and for that reason are conditional. Kant and Crusius have in common the approach to human free will. Crusius, like Kant, maintained that if we cannot prove its existence, we likewise cannot disprove it; however, it is the moral sphere that convinces us that human will is free (for more on Crusius,

see [6, pp. 187-222]). It is for this and many other reasons that the figure of Crusius merits special attention.

Summing up, I would like to stress again that the monograph *Philosophy of Practical Reason* is a study that has very broad appeal and may attract many types of readers. Those who love arguing with the author and proposing solutions to the pressing problems of philosophy and society will have great scope and rich material for reflection and polemics. Lovers of the history of philosophy, too, will not be short-changed. Besides, Shokhin's book is full of insightful remarks on a variety of issues that are not directly related to his central topic but are no less valuable for that. For example, he writes about the birth and establishment of the concepts of "ontology," "axiology," "philosophical theology," the justification (or rather lack of it) of the term "German classical philosophy" still current in Russia, the problem of distinguishing the philosophy of religion from philosophical theology, the emergence and self-determination of the analytical tradition and much else. The fact that Shokhin turns to the current problems of democratic societies, such as tolerance toward refugees who have flooded Europe, humane treatment of criminals, the active spread of feminism (often going to absurd lengths), etc. is "icing on the cake." One should mention the author's characteristic audacity of judgments, as manifested in this final chord of his work: "Meanwhile, the gulf between rights and these goods leads directly to self-destruction, in which law has become a means of protecting any needs of the individual. A civilization in which terrorists have the right to win legal cases against the state and use the unilateral right to life—which under the modern laws of 'civilized countries' facilitates taking life away from their victims, while the legal system practically destroys the institution of family, making inroads on heterosexual relations in general—cannot be described as anything but suicidal" [11, pp. 383-384]. Shokhin's sparkling style and abundance of vivid comparisons and examples that everyone can understand put this book within the intellectual reach of both specialists and lay readers.

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Note

[1] This expression, which is becoming more and more popular, is used as a shorthand reference to the situation Kant described in the article *On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy* (1797). According to Kant, if a murderer chasing your friend who is hiding in your house asks you about the friend's location, you must tell the truth (i.e., essentially betray your friend). For if you lie, Kant argues, you will bear the guilt for all the consequences. And one can imagine a more dramatic development of the situation (which is what Kant himself does). For example, while you were talking to the murderer your friend might have escaped from your house and the murderer, believing that your friend is not in your house, would continue his search in other places and perhaps find your friend in some other place and kill him. According to Kant, you will bear the guilt for this because you have violated the moral law. If you tell the truth and the murderer kills your friend, that should in no way form any guilt in you because you have followed the moral law and bear no responsibility for the imperfection of the world caused by wrongful acts of other people (see [5]).

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

ACADEMIC JOURNALS

Editorial note: We continue to inform you about the contents of the leading RAS journals specializing in Social Sciences and the humanities, which are published in Russian, and confirm our readiness to help our readers order translations of any article mentioned below.

VESTNIK ROSSIYSKOY AKADEMII NAUK
(Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences)

No. 1, 2020: **A. Alekseev, N. Kuznetsova.** Investment dynamics as a factor of the transformation of the Russian economy; **A. Grinev.** The use of scientometric indicators to evaluate publishing activity in modern Russia; **E. Salitskaya.** The problem of the unprotected content of scientific work. do we need a "copyright" on ideas?; **E. Balatsky, N. Ekimova.** Geopolitical meridians of world-class universities; **V. Maslova, V. Chekalin, M. Avdeev.** Agricultural development in Russia in conditions of import substitution; **V. Rumyantsev, A. Izmailova.** The current status and problems of the lake fund of Asian Russia; **A. Rulev, A. Pugacheva.** Formation of a new agroforestry paradigm; **S. Naugolnykh.** Plants of the first terrestrial ecosystems.

NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA
(Modern and Contemporary History)

No. 1, 2021: **I. Davydov.** How is the history of the Church possible? ("Church history" as an independent discipline in the light of epistemology); **K. Elokhin.** Historiography of Cuban heraldry in the 20th—the beginning of 21st centuries; **A. Balezin.** Books by Tanzanian historians of recent decades: contribution to the postcolonial library; **A. Yastrebov.** The liturgy of power: some aspects of the religious policy of Venice in relation to the Orthodox Greeks in the Modern Age; **R. Kondrashuk**. Cleopatra's charms: the ancient beau ideal in the American press at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries; **V. Sogrin.** The two-party system in the history of the US. From G. Washington to modernity; **E. Polyakova.** Russia–Ireland: the hard path to mutual understanding; **A. Khodnev.** Colonialism, imperialism, and the League of Nations; **B. Atchkinasi.** G. Clemenceau and the problems of "strong

power" in France (1914-1919); **M. Medvedeva.** When an intellectual becomes a collaborationist: Jackues Benoist-Méchin and his "History of the German army"; **N. Ankudinova.** The internment of Belligerent military personnel in neutral Ireland during World War II; **M. Makhmutova.** Specific features of the Polisario front as a non-state actor; **Z. Pokudov, E. Sadykova.** Analysis of the regionalization of military political interests of the US and EU on the example of the intervention in Libya in 2011; **V. Veselov.** The development of US nuclear strategy at the beginning of the 21st century; **M. Petrova.** The international position of Russia at the beginning of the Seven Years' War in the instructions of the College of Foreign Affairs to residents in Regensburg and Gdansk; **L. Lannik.** Diagnostics of the regime: German military analytics about the Hetmanate; **M. Bukharin.** New documents on the history of the exploration of East Turkestan from the Turfan-Sammlung; **A. Naumov.** Ideological and political origins of the J. S. Nye's concept of soft power.

ETNOGRAFICHESKOYE OBOZRENIYE
(*Ethnographic Review*)

No. 5, 2020: V. Rostovtseva, M. Butovskaya et al. Number of siblings, birth order and their impacts on individual cooperativeness in adulthood: an experimental study among Buryats of Eastern Siberia; **E. Nosenko-Stein.** "Fatal" diagnosis and rites of passage: self-representation of disabled people and their statuses in contemporary Russia; **A. Agababyan, M. Sysoeva.** Between the Shapsug and the Abkhaz: actualization of identities of the Ubykh Clan Chéren; **E. Tolmacheva.** Ivan Poliakov's collection as the first experience of integrated photo research of Western Siberia; **V. Vasiliev.** Five days among the Orochis; **E. Kuzina, K. Korchagin.** Octavio Paz and Indian avant-garde: on reception of Claude Lévi-Strauss' work in the 1960s; **K. Turekeyev.** Karakalpaks' magical beliefs associated with children's rituals; **B. Gomboev.** Bargut Oboo in Eastern Mongolia; **A. Sirina, V. Davydov.** The Ethnographer Boris A. Vasiliev and his essay "Five days among the Orochis": Writing Strategies in Soviet Ethnography.

VOPROSY FILOSOFII
(*Problems of Philosophy*)

No. 12, 2019: F. Azhimov. Hermeneutics as metaphysics (narratological aspects of interpretation); **R. Sabancheev.** Cultural memory as a narrative phenomenon (hermeneutic aspects); **T. Lipich.** Russian literary-philosophical romanticism of the first half of the 19th century (hermeneutics of love); **A. Rubtsov.** Ideas as internal experience from psychohistory to psychoideology of the Russian idea; **E. Shcherbakova.** Conscious and unconscious in ideology; **O. Granovskaya.** Berlin and Bakhtin: pluralism, polyphony, and the criticism of relativism; **S. Nikolsky.** "…To live in death and return": on the Andrey Platonov's artistic philosophy; **D. Shmonin.** Theology and scholastics: brinks of philosophical interpre-

tations; **I. Kurilovich.** On the question of the subjectivity of the philosopher in the art of phenomenology (reflection on a book); **V. Bazhanov.** Numerical cognition in cognitive research perspective; **O. Vorobieva, F. Nikolai.** Critical theory, neuroscience, and study of affect: issues of trans-disciplinary dialogue; **A. Rodina.** Transcendental basis of physics on the example of "closed theory" by K. F. von Weizsäcker and V. Heisenberg; **V. Kutcherov, I. Gerasimova.** Petroleum genesis: competition of paradigms; **A. Rutkevitch.** Genealogy of intellectuals by Alexandre Kojève; **L. Kornilaev.** The specifics of criticism on E. Lask's philosophy in Russia; **E. Soloviev.** Young Luther and his ninety-five theses, part 2; **T. A. Olesen.** Schelling: a historical introduction to Kirkegaard's Schelling, translated into Russian by D. Loungina and D. Mironov; **D. Loungina, D. Mironov.** German philosophic community response to Schelling's lectures: some additions; **A. Zhavoronkov.** Social aspects of Kant's anthropology and their influence on the 20th century sociology: problems and cases; **Jin Na.** Leo Strauss political philosophy; **A. Nyssanbayev, S. Nurmuratov.** Spirituality as a phenomenon of culture; **A. Glinchikova.** Religion and politics in modern foreign literature.

No. 1, 2020: **A. Kokoshin.** On some methodological issues of the study of wars; **T. Shchedrina, B. Pruzhinin.** "Back to Aristotle": the dignity of knowledge as a problem of epistemology; **G. Drach.** Aristotle's philosophy as a historical and cultural event; **E. Shashlova.** Aristotle in the lectures of Alexandre Kojève: the master-slave dialectic; **A. Kozyrev.** About Aristotelian principles in the philosophy of Vladimir Soloviev; **A. Rakitov.** The structure of science and supposed perspectives of its development; **V. Rozin.** Reflection of the bases of interdisciplinary study of sociality; **N. Bryanik.** The concept of structural law and the methodology of structuralism in non-classic science; **V. Bychkov.** The echoes of symbolism in Vladislav Khodasevich's aesthetics; **E. Sinelnikova, V. Sobolev.** Petrograd philosophical society and journal *Mysl'*; **T. Dlugach.** Vladimir S. Bibler and the principle of logic; **R. Svetlov, I. Tantlevsky.** The "Odyssey" of the notion of wisdom in ancient thought and some regularities of the concepts of wisdom in the Bible; **E. Falev.** Peter Wilberg and the concept of existential medicine; **N. Trubnikova, M. Babkova.** The history of Japanese Buddhism in *Konjaku Monogatari-Shū*. Part I: School founders and temple builders; **M. Kolyada.** Human power in *Konjaku Monogatari-Shū*; **S. Rodin.** Conceptualizations of natural habitats' influence on the formation of the people's character in Japan: *Jinkokuki* and *Shin Jinkokuki* texts' and studies' analysis; **A. Meshcheryakov, E. Sakharova.** The Japanese state anthropomorphization and emotional life (second half of 19th century—1945).

CHELOVEK
(*Human Being*)

No. 5, 2020: **R. Apressyan, D. Michel, P. Tishchenko, O. Popova** et al. Pandemic challenges and medicine disasters. Roundtable at the Chelovek journal; **A. Sudakov.** J. G. Fichte's metaphysics of gender as an ethics of love; **A. Razin.**

The ideas of ideal and subject: from Antiquity to Modernity; **A. Ipatova.** Social inclusion of older people: barriers and opportunity; **E. Zolotukhina-Abolina, M. Makarenko.** Forgiveness and self-forgiveness: moral and psychological unity; **A. Rubtsov.** Millennials of the postmodern age. Will the new generation change the world; **T. Artemyeva.** The concept of natural law in the noble discourse of the Enlightenment; **H. Petrovsky.** Violence: imaging strategies.

PSYKHOLOGICHESKIY ZHURNAL
(*Psychological Journal*)

<u>**No. 4, 2020:**</u> **A. Zhuravlev, D. Kitova.** Attitude of residents of Russia to information on the COVID-19 pandemic (on the example of users of internet search systems); **T. Kornilova, M. Shestova, E. Pavlova.** The relationship of emotional creativity with implicit theories and emotional-personal sphere; **V. Tolochek.** Continuum of "missiles-ability-professional important qualities-competence": open questions; **I. Mironenko, A. Zhuravlev.** Empirical and applied works in the scientific heritage of B. D. Parygin (the 90th anniversary); **I. Yeliseyeva, Yu. Oleynik, Yu. Radchenko.** From the history of military psychological research in the Red Army in the 1920s; **V. Latynov, E. Shepeleva.** Applied aspects of the use of algorithms of digital psychometrics; **V. Nikishina, E. Petrash, A. Morgun, I. Zapesotskaya.** Transformation of parameters of communications in the communicative behavior of youth in social networks; **N. Chuprikova.** Mental reality and the subject of psychology; **V. Lepskiy.** Philosophical and methodological foundations of socio-psychological consequences of new technologies; **A. Chernyshev, S. Sarychev, S. Elizarov.** On the question of the socio-psychological consequences of introducing new technologies and identifying promising areas of research.

OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI I SOVREMENNOST (ONS)
(*Social Sciences and the Contemporary World*)

<u>**No. 6, 2020:**</u> **Yu. Danilov.** Politics as a factor of financial development; **D. Yevstafiev, L. Tsyganova.** Post-global socio-cultural development: the issues of localization of models; **I. Kravets.** Dignitatis Humanae, modern constitutionalism and legal existence: philosophical and anthropological, constitutional, international legal and socio-political aspects. P. 2; **N. Radina, J. Balakina.** Society and the pandemic: theoretical and methodological foundations of psychological research; **A. Avilova.** Chinese capital in the EU: the case of Portugal; **S. Kuvaldin.** Polish economy: competitive advantages and factors of sustainable growth; **M. Volodina.** Educational policy in Arab countries as a factor of nation-building (on the example of Morocco, Algeria and Lebanon); **D. Fomin-Nilov. N. Svetlov.** Impact of the food embargo on the return on investment in Russia's agriculture; **E. Animitsa, I. Rakhmeeva.** Methodology of analyzing the region's regulatory

environment; **V. Sidorin.** Marx and Kant: historical materialism in search of a theory of morality; **A. Korotayev, K. Novikov, S. Shulgin.** Impact of education on reproductive behavior through individual values; **N. Mastikova.** Attitude of Russian and European youth to immigrants (based on ESS data 2006-2018); **S. Rogov, A. Gromyko.** Recommendations of the participants of the expert dialogue on NATO-Russia risk reduction in Europe.

POLITICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (POLIS)
(*Political Studies*)

<u>No. 3, 2020:</u> **A. Korybko, V. Morozov.** Pakistan's role in Russia's Greater Eurasian partnership; **A. Khudaykulova, M. Ramich.** "Quad 2.0": Quadrilateral dialog for counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific; **K. Efremova.** ASEAN as a potential actor in global governance: prerequisites, opportunities, and prospects; **E. Morozova, I. Miroshnichenko, I. Semenenko.** Identity policies in rural local community development in Russia; **M. Nazukina.** The institutionalization of ethnicity in the identity policy of Russian republics: conceptual analysis; **A. Sungurov, N. Kozlova, D. Mamagulashvili.** Public Chambers as institutions for interpreting the Paternalistic model of interaction between authority and society: experience of the Tver region and St. Petersburg; **S. Barsukova, E. Denisova-Schmidt.** Political "investments" by businesses in Russia, or Why does business finance election campaigns?; **V. Gutorov.** Once more about values and "Capital"; **D. Terin.** Political trust, satisfaction and perceptions of the causes of poverty: the role of normative aspects of institutions in the production of trust; **E. Antyukhova.** Actor model of global educational policy; **A. Chvorostov.** What is democracy and how it can be measured?; **E. Khakhalkina.** The institution of prime minister and the future of the UK party-political system.

GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO
(*State and Law*)

<u>No. 12, 2019:</u> **M. Kleandrov.** A verdict of not guilty? A verdict not guilty? Or something else?; **S. Bratanovski.** Administrative and legal aspects of the organization and activity of political parties in Russia; **B. Ebzeev.** "Hard" and "soft" law in the constitutional order of Russia (new meanings in understanding the sources of law); **A. Voronov.** Administration in the Russian Federation (philosophical and legal basis); **O. Pankova.** Problems of correlation and differentiation of administrative proceedings of administrative offences; **E. Talapina.** About human rights universality; **A. Mokhov.** Innovation and innovative activity: concept and essence; **E. Sviridova.** Legal risks of investing in innovative patentable results of scientific and technical activity; **S. Ivanova.** Problems and prospects of development of the legislation of the Russian Federation on reinsurance; **I. Yanina.** Public danger of careless causing of environmental crimes; **P. Yakushev.** Cohabitation

of men and women: problems of institutionalization in the context of traditional values; **O. Soldatkina.** Digital law: Features of the digital environment and subjects; **S. Smirnykh.** Children's rights in modern international law; **F. Sinitsyn.** "Collaborationism": historical and legal analysis of terminology; **K. Rodionov.** Do we all know about the treaties of the tenth century Kievan princes Oleg (911) and Igor (945) with Byzantium? P. 2; **V. Semenchuk.** Assistance of legal entities to bodies carrying out operational and investigative activity; **A. Malko, N. Krotkova** et al. The variety of forms of state building (review of the All-Russian scientific-practical conference "Composite states: experience and prospects for development," Penza State University, May 29-30, 2019); **Yu. Arzamasov.** Rulemaking process in the regions of the Russian Federation (on the example of the Republic of Crimea and the federal cities of Sevastopol).

VOPROSY EKONOMIKI
(*Problems of Economics*)

<u>No. 1, 2020:</u> **R. Enikolopov.** Evidence based development economics: Nobel Prize in economic sciences 2019; **A. Belykh, V. Mau.** Economic reforms in Russia: Theoretical aspects and the practice of XIX—early XX century; **D. Shults.** Behavioral economics and DSGE-modeling; **A. Abramov, A. Radygin, M. Chernova, R. Entov.** The "dividend puzzle" and the Russian stock market. P. 1; **S. Moiseev.** Consequences of interest rates benchmarks reform; **D. Konoplev.** The asymmetry of information waves in economic thinking: the experience of financial crises; **T. Cherkashina.** Measurement of population income: variants of estimating biases; **A. Shastitko.** Between the Scylla of despotism and the Charybdis of social norms (on the book by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson "Narrow corridor: States, societies, and the fate of freedom").

MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNIYE OTNOSHENIYA
(*World Economy and International Relations*)

<u>No 2, 2020:</u> **P. Yakovlev.** Risks of a global recession in the face of globalization crisis; **S. Dmitriev.** Protectionist vector of Trump administration trade policy; **V. Milovidov.** Performative trumponomics and the financial market; **S. Shein.** The role of conservatism in the development of right-wing populism in Europe: The UK case; **A. Lagno, O. Mikhailova.** "Polish-Polish war": reasons and consequences for the political system; **N. Kondrat'eva, D. Khromakov.** EU pharmaceutical market: problems of competition; **A. Chetverikova.** The Visegrad countries in the EU: economic results; **D. Nechaev.** Priorities of neoindustrialization of Russia; **A. Kupriyanov.** The Indian ocean naval symposium; **Xu Wenhong.** Challenges to cyber sovereignty and response measures; **D. Kazarinova, G. De Luca.** Migration issue in Italian political discourse: case of empirical study; **M. Gutenev.** Science diplomacy of Great Britain in the Arctic; **T. Deich.**

Africa's place in the Chinese initiative "One Belt, One Road"; **A. Lukin.** Russia-XXI: view from the closest abroad; **V. Mikheev.** China's development model: What is it?

SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (SOTSIS)
(*Sociological Studies*)

<u>No. 9, 2019:</u> **E. Colombo.** Toward a global social sciences? Some preliminary reflections; **L. Mikeshina.** Epistemology and Russian sociology: Interaction in the development; **S. Yaroshenko.** On the possibilities of applying the underclass theory in Russia; **V. Isaeva.** Deprivation theory as a tool to study non-traditional religiousness; **Zh. Toshchenko.** The precariat phenomenon: theoretical and methodological premises of its study; **R. Anisimov.** Precarious employment in Russia: specifying major indicators; **A. Kuchenkova.** Secondary employment in the context of precariatization on the Russian labor market; **I. Shevchenko, P. Shevchenko.** Gender features of precariousness; **N. Romanovskiy.** Dangerous class? Debate is not closed (reflecting on the problem); **L. Rybakovskiy, N. Kozhevnikova.** International migration of the population of Russia: exchange of the population with the Post-USSR Countries; **S. Ryazantsev.** Modern migration policy of Russia: challenges and approaches to improvement; **A. Topilin.** Self-preservation of ethnos: revisiting the migration functions; **L. Mukharyamova, Zh. Saveleva.** Availability and fairness of health protection for elderly people (in popular and expert assessments); **R. Gallyamov, Yu. Kuznetsova.** The quality of medical care in a Russian region: a comparative analysis of "subjective" indicators; **K. Sadykova.** Family in the modern world; **O. Vasina, S. Ezhov, E. Moskalchuk.** Interdisciplinary approach to the study of contemporary ethnic problems.

<u>No. 10, 2019:</u> **R. Braslavskiy.** Disciplinary institutionalization and reconfiguration of sociological theory; **S. Kirdina-Chandler, M. Kruglova.** "Society," "state," and institutional matrixes: a case in interdisciplinary meso-analysis; **V. Schulz, T. Liubimova.** Class warfare in France: neo-marxist interpretation of social protests; **P. Shields, N. Rangarajan, M. Casula.** A working hypothesis: searching for truth in a post-truth world. P. 1; **S. Kravchenko.** Digital risks, metamorphoses, and centrifugal trends among the young people; **N. Zarubina.** Russians' everyday perceptions of money and finance in laughter discourse through different years; **A. Noskova, A. Proskurina.** Rankings in universities: an empirical MGIMO case; **B. Ananyev.** May 1968 events: some effects half a century later; **M. Martynov.** Socially oriented non-profit organizations—acquiring legitimacy?; **I. Mersiyanova, N. Ivanova, D. Malakhov.** The relationship between volunteerism and charitable giving: intergenerational context; **V. Chuprov.** Russian school of the sociology of youth: a view on 50 years of history; **E. Arif.** Cultural repertoires of consumption in youth veg-community (a St. Petersburg case); **A. Baranowska.** Military sociology in Poland: Features of formation and

development; **M. Baranovsky.** Trust in military organization (a sociological survey); **E. Shults.** Shmuel Eisenstadt's sociology of revolution; **I. Shmerlina.** The case of Russian phytosociology.

VOSTOK
(*Oriens*)

<u>No. 6, 2019:</u> **S. Amirov.** Modern approaches to the research of Halaf culture (Northern Mesopotamia); **A. Jankowski.** The extent of the ancient marshes of Southern Mesopotamia; **S. Malykh.** The phenomenon of Ancient Egyptian minor cemeteries in the context of the discoveries of Russian archaeologists in Giza Necropolis; **E. Kitov, S. Bolelov, A. Balakhvantsev.** The return to Ancient Chorasmia: explorations of the joint Karakalpak-Russian complex archaeological expedition on the Ustyurt Plateau and at Bol'shoy K'irk-K'iz; **M. Lebedev.** "Follow the layer": stratigraphy as a source on the history of the temple complex at Abu Erteila; **A. Omel'chenko.** Researches of the Bukhara archaeological expedition in Paikend; **K. Berzon.** The war between Demetrios I and Alexander Balas in the light of classical and cuneiform evidence; **N. Gozalova.** Abbas Mirza and reforms of the Iranian army in the first quarter of the 19th century; **V. Naumkin.** Russian diplomat-occultist at the consulate of the Russian empire in Jeddah; **A. Alikberov, Sh. Shikhaliev.** Sufi Tariqats in the Caucasus: a system-communicative analysis of culturally-complex societies; **V. Sautov.** Islamist "wave of turbulence" in Syria: to the core of the problem; **K. Petrova.** Features of radical Islamism and extremism in modern India; **A. Lukin, D. Novikov.** Greater Eurasia: from the pole of confrontation to the development community; **T. Atabaki, L. Ravandi-Fadai.** The rise of red orientalism and the fall of the red orientalists; **V. Mirzekhanov, Ph. Trunov.** The evolution of German strategy toward the Syrian direction: political-military aspects; **T. Denisova.** Old Malay texts concerning the Chinese in the Malay world; **A. Iasenovskaia.** Three Neo-Assyrian amulets from the collection of the Pushkin State museum of fine arts.

VOPROSY LITERATURY
(*Problems of Literature*)

<u>No. 1, 2020:</u> **O. Zaslavsky.** Om the meaning of "the Alexandrian column"; **V. Shaposhnikova.** Pushkin's *The Captain's Daughter* [*Kapitanskaya dochka*]: Why is the fort called Belogorskaya?; **B. Kurkin.** Persona inferna—a mask from hell. The Pretender in Pushkin's tragedy *Boris Godunov*; **L. Kertman.** Tsvetaeva reads Tolstoy. Leo Tolstoy in Marina Tsvetaeva's reading and creative consciousness; **S. Lyutova, I. Dronova.** Marina Tsvetaeva's dowry; **E. Chelpanova.** Female Christian prose today: a failed search for new women's subjectivity?; **A. Zhuchkova.** Who's holding up the sky? On *Rymba*, a novel by A. Bushkovsky; **N. Zelezinskaya.** Young adult literature as a mirror of the society; **V. Zubareva, E. Kon-**

stantinova. "The moment you start experimenting with the word its soul is gone"; **N. Reznichenko.** When "history belongs to a poet…": Ivan Bunin's *Cursed Days* [*Okayannye dni*]: a chronicle or a myth?; **B. Bisson.** Boris de Schloezer: a translator's paradox; **A. Penkina.** O. Mandelstam's reference to Dante in *The Fourth Prose* [*Chetvyortaya proza*] and *Journey to Armenia* [*Puteshestvie v Armeniyu*]; **L. Xinmai.** Translations, research and reception of Solzhenitsyn's works in China; **E. Trimoruk.** Personal time. Lyubishchev's system, Daniil Granin's recommendations.

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