

Chapter 1

The Industrialization of Creativity and Its Limits: Introducing Concepts, Theories, and Themes



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Abstract In this introduction we explore how creativity, loosely referring to activities around the visual arts, music, design, film, and performance, is mobilized by states and governments as a “resource” for economic growth. The creative economy discourse emphasizes individuality, innovation, self-fulfillment, career advancement, and the idea of leading exciting lives as remedies to social alienation. Drawing on the chapters in this volume, this introduction questions this discourse, exploring how political shifts and theoretical frameworks related to creative economy in different parts of the world at a time when the creative industries become more and more “industrialized.” We present the interdisciplinary contributions of volume that navigate a variety of geographical contexts, ranging from the United Kingdom, France and Russia to Greece, Argentina, and Italy, and explore issues around art biennials, museums, DIY cultures, technologies, creative writing, copyright laws, ideological formations, craft production, and creative co-ops.

Keywords Creativity · Creative economies · Cultural industries · Cultural economies

1.1 The Industrialization of Creativity and Its Limits: Introducing Concepts, Theories, and Themes

In 2006, Rotterdam art collective BAVO published *Plea for an Uncreative City*, a manifesto-like call for “launching a cultural counterweight against the current launching of Rotterdam as cultural capital of the Netherlands.” In its plea, BAVO disputed the ideological underpinnings of the creative economy, the rosy discourse of which promised to regenerate the City of Rotterdam in the context of its status as a European cultural capital. Their critique against creative policy argued that “rather

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than optimizing the welfare level of the largest possible group,” it prioritized “specific groups,” including the usual suspects of “artists, designers, ICT-nerds . . . managers, yuppies, CEOs”; in other words, creative policy was elitist. BAVO’s salvo against the creative economy called on citizens to drop their participation in the “creative circus” and instead be “uncreative”; they wanted the city to “embrace its poverty” and cultivate a more inclusive and emancipatory urban imaginary.

BAVO’s manifesto summarized critiques against the ideology, agendas, and outcomes of the creative economy as articulated by anti-gentrification activists and critical scholars in response to the British New Labour government’s canonization of creative policies in the late 1990s and their subsequent global dissemination. Briefly, the main points of these critiques were that policy foregrounding the seemingly noble concept of creativity as a solution to social ills is exclusionary, generates inequality, enables gentrification, contributes to the myth of the creative genius, and favors the already-haves over the have-nots. More broadly, these critiques said that the creative economy renews capitalist actuality by evoking in it a “new spirit” of openness, participation, and flexibility (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007); essentially, it makes capitalism and structural exploitation look more fun.

Recent critiques against creative economy policy and discourse have come from within its ranks, as even its most enthusiastic and active proponents now question some of their previous beliefs. This is the case of Richard Florida, the sociologist guru of the creative economy, who famously argued in the early 2000s that the economic potential of cities is directly related to their coolness, diversity, and talent as well as their ability to attract hip and unconventional bars and restaurants, festivals celebrating the non-binary, multicultural spaces, and large numbers of entrepreneurs and creatives (Florida 2002: 744–751). While this idea became the dogma and rationale of creative policies during the 2000s, Florida admitted in a more recent book that his insights were wrong in several respects (2017). The cool crowds do not guarantee less inequality and exploitation; on the contrary, they can turn neighborhoods into ghettos for the rich. Who can afford to live in city centers full of hipster cafes designed for tourists and the middle class? Throughout the creative years of the post-2000s, as Florida now suggests, “the less advantaged members of the working and service classes, as well as some artists and musicians, were being priced out” of downtown neighborhoods; urban centers then harvested “a new kind of homogeneity of wealthy people, high-end restaurants, and luxury shops” and “a lopsided, unequal urbanism in which a relative handful of superstar cities, and a few elite neighborhoods within them, benefit while many other places stagnate or fall behind” (2017: iv–v). Even if Florida, the architect of creative cities and the creative economy, has not fully disqualified his earlier thesis, we can conclude that there is now a growing scholarly consensus that an uncritical celebration of creativity is problematic.

In this introduction, we critically assess the present-day industrialization of creativity following its widespread dissemination to different parts of the world. For purposes of clarity and analytical depth, we have divided this book into three parts that correspond to key aspects through which the creative economy and its ramifications can be approached: (1) sustainability in relation to growth and labor,

(2) ideology in relation to self-expression, aesthetics, and politics, and (3) industrialization in relation to the tensions between creativity and market forces. In the first part, the authors problematize the benevolent nature of creative industries in terms of growth paradigms and relationships between employers and employees, focusing on the lived realities that creative economies impose upon different national settings. In their different ways, these contributions ask for whom creative economies are public-spirited, humane, and sustainable. The second part focuses on the ideology of self-expression and aesthetics as drivers of economic configurations in the everyday practices and processes of economic restructuring. Here, the contributors ask how creative policies interpellate and subjectify cultural producers amid economic transformations and how those producers respond. The third part explores the industrial logic of creativity and its implications for capital, financial, and managerial strategies, asking how the fields of technology, innovation, and law interfere with creativity discourse. Overall, the chapters of this volume track and speculate on how larger circumstances, political shifts, and theoretical frameworks may or may not transform creative economy practices and discourses around the world as creative industries become increasingly industrialized. Before we delve into these three parts and the various empirical contexts in which they have developed, we will tackle some key sociological and political-economic approaches that summarize this volume's understanding of creativity.

1.2 Understanding Creativity

First, to ask a recurring question, what is creativity? From a cultural sociology perspective, the term loosely refers to activities that fall under the labels “visual arts,” “music,” “design,” “film,” and “performance” and that primarily aim to and are evaluated on their capacity to produce forms of effect and social meaning (Banks 2007; Hesmondhalgh 2007). In policy-orientated engagements, creativity is usually connected with the objectives of economic growth in societies transitioning to a postindustrial model (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 2005). This model gives rise to state- or market-driven propagation of individuality, the virtues of innovation and self-fulfillment, aspirations for personal and career advancement, unalienating work, and upward social mobility connected to an overarching wish to lead exciting and meaningful lives.

In popular parlance and liberal-positivist literature, “creativity” implies newness, innovation, and originality, promising feelings and emotions of unexpectedness and surprise; to be creative means to be on the right side of things, to be open-minded, innovative, tech savvy, and au courant. Yet, creativity is not an objective condition; its framing depends on the value systems different groups of people employ in the narratives they use to talk about it. Almost any practice in any context can be conceptualized as novel and creative, depending on how and by whom these concepts are framed. To offer an example from conceptual art, Richard Serra's 1968, 3-minute video *Hand Catching Lead* was not considered creative by anyone

other than the artist's inner circle. Broader audiences were bored by its depiction of an outstretched hand trying to catch pieces of falling lead and might have even thought it was the work of a madman. Yet, in the years to come, the video rose to fame, as did Serra's reputation as a brilliant conceptual artist. It was showcased in several major international museums and was released on DVD in 2006 by the Centre Pompidou. Serra's works are now celebrated as groundbreaking creative pieces in museums, art schools, and similar venues that define what is creative and what is not.

Likewise, social anthropologists and sociologists have long argued that creativity is a social process rather than an abstract attribution (Bourdieu 1993; Harstup 2007; Hallam and Ingold 2007). Creative producers can never completely transgress the iron cage of social constraint (Friedman 2001); if they do, their works are deemed incomprehensible or even insane. They must draw from "the total matrix of relations in which [they are] embedded and into which [they] extend" (Hallam and Ingold 2007: 9). Within specific fields—the artistic field, for instance—each producer is amenable not only to the history but also what Bourdieu called "the space of possible" that a field offers for recognizing various creations as creative (1993: 176). This was very neatly demonstrated, as Bourdieu put it, by the art of Marcel Duchamp, who showed that "the production of the producer as artist is the precondition for the production of these objects as works of art" (1993: 61). According to this line of thought, creativity is not the work of a single genius but rather that of a collective, social, and cooperative process. Creativity, as any other discursive designation, is primarily a product of power relations.

Although creativity is not an essence, and its semantics shift through time, the designation of a practice or an individual as creative always implies some essentially positive difference over other practices and individuals: for the creatives to exist, there must be a binary opposite, i.e., an uninspired, uncreative mass. This designation prioritizes the idea that creative people utilize exceptional capacities to differentiate themselves from everyone else, whether in art, business, or advertising, and these capacities are always somehow connected to neoliberal market values. Here, a good reference point is Nicholas Garnham's well-known critique of the designation "creative" in neoliberal policy discourse versus the more inclusive and potentially emancipatory "cultural" (2005). Yet, as we will discuss in a later section, this technology—or what Angela McRobbie called the "creativity dispositif" (2016)—has been undergoing its own legitimacy crisis and transformation in recent years as a result of broader political-economic developments. This does not mean that creative economies are a thing of the past; on the contrary, the proliferation of creative activities and clusters in contemporary metropolitan downtowns goes hand in hand with the development of tourist economies, the Airbnb invasion, cheaper flights, the lust for beatified ruins, and the submission of whole urban ecologies to the "imaginary of gentrification" (Lindner 2018: 275).

1.3 The Political Economy of Creativity

In historical terms, creativity as a productive model responded to the broader global sociopolitical and economic shifts of the early 1970s, the traces of which are still visible. In this paradigm, creativity is in tune with what that the Austrian political economist Joseph Schumpeter described as “creative destruction” (1942). Put briefly, for Schumpeter, destruction is intrinsic to capitalism, which requires the periodic erasure of previous structures that define the social relations of production, machinery, and the laws and norms that enable the economy to create new norms that give rise to more efficient, profitable, and innovative processes of production. This occurs as capitalism reaches crises that require the restructuring of the accumulation process. As described by Vincent Miller (2011: 48) and others, there are five waves of innovation during the history of capitalism broadly distinguished by the use of technology and energy: “the first is the so-called Industrial Revolution, based on machines, factories, and canals (initiated in 1771; birthplace: Britain); the second is ‘the age of steam,’ related to the use of coal, iron and railways (1829; birthplace: Britain); the third is ‘the age of steel’ connected to the development of heavy engineering (1875; birthplace: Britain, USA, and Germany); the fourth marks the age of the automobile, characterized by the use of oil, petrochemicals, and mass production (1908; birthplace: USA); and the fifth is the ‘age of information’ defined by communication technology (ICT) (1971; birthplace: USA)” (Perez 2002, in Kostakis 2019: 4). While creativity may be broadly assumed to be part of all these historical waves of creative innovation and destruction, the kind of creativity discussed in this volume relates to developments occurring on a global scale from the early 1970s onward. In this sense, if we follow the five-wave scheme above, creativity, as we know it today, falls into the fifth category, which is characterized by a post-Fordist mode of production that is flexible, decentralized, global, and open (Harvey 1989).

A central historical moment of creativity as a productive model arose during the efforts of capital to overcome the world’s early-1970s stagnation of growth, which was triggered by the so-called oil crisis. That moment marked the slowdown of economic growth in the West following the Second World War and was further accompanied by social unrest. According to the standard account by autonomist Marxist theorists (e.g., Berardi 2009) and others (e.g., Harvey 1989), the industrial workforce, which was experiencing rising living standards, demanded fulfilling work and a better share of profits. Western governments and businesses responded to the crisis by attempting to meet both workers’ demand for autonomy and capital’s demands for innovation and economic restructuring, which meant the progressive dismantling of welfare and protectionist policies established in core Western states after the Second World War (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007; Harvey 2007: 22). Economic restructuring thus occurred by optimizing the creative drives and desires of the workforce as well as the countercultural lifestyles and aspirations of people in the 1960s and 1970s, all the while developing policies that enabled more market freedom. In this context, innovation, technological progress, and creativity are not

ahistorical but rather politically driven processes advancing amid conflicting economic interests and social antagonism. The media political economist Nikos Smyrniotis argues that as the globalized capitalist system came to rely mostly on technological innovation, developments such as the Internet, which emerged from the countercultural creative and collaborative spirit of the 1970s, would be monopolized and controlled by multinational corporations, notably Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft, the so called GAFAM (Smyrniotis 2018). In effect, however, the monopolization of the Internet also occurs because of the depoliticized character of the so-called Californian Ideology—the spirit of which gave rise to these corporations—that favored distance from party or collective politics and a focus on innovation and entrepreneurship as vehicles of social change (Smyrniotis 2018).

The advocates of the ideological–political doctrine of neoliberalism, for whom the economic crisis of the 1970s was a strategic moment to advance their agendas, held similar views and aspirations with regard to the necessity of innovation and entrepreneurship for social change, stressing the primacy of market mechanisms in all aspects of social life (Slobodian 2018). Neoliberalism meant the effective depoliticization of the economy and, along with it, the de-democratization of politics. Economic and political elites stressed the virtues of the free market and strove for the development of legal frameworks, institutions, and public norms that would conform to their vision of a market-oriented society. In this context, entrepreneurialism, mobility, and innovation became mandatory characteristics in people who wanted to survive and potentially prosper in a highly competitive world. The advent of neoliberalism, the cult of innovation, generalized competition, and the dismantling of welfare resulted in the augmentation of social inequalities, rising levels of exploitation, and the spreading of social insecurity and regimes of exclusion, thereby creating a surplus of people the economy deemed redundant (Bauman 2004). Since then, the national state framework has been crucial in sustaining the free market structure through the organization of institutional and normative regimes mediated by global institutions and rules.

1.4 Part I: Sustainability—Creative Growth, Labor, and Skills

Departing from critical reviews of creativity that situate it within a broader politico-cultural framework, this book’s introduction questions the sustainability of the creative economy in terms of its labor and growth models. First, the widespread discourse among activists and critics on the limits of capitalist growth in the context of accelerating climate change and an impending environmental catastrophe (e.g., Malm 2019) can twist the idea that creativity should be mobilized for economic growth, which, as Mark Banks and Paula Serafini note in their contribution to this volume, is a “foundational premise of creative economy thinking.” In their chapter,

“Towards Post-Growth Creative Economies? Building Sustainable Cultural Production in Argentina,” they debunk the popular belief that the creative industries are “ecologically ‘greener,’ ‘cleaner,’ or simply more benign than other, more traditional industries,” arguing that they are “highly resource-dependent, energy-intensive, and often seriously polluting.” They go on to offer alternative models of cultural collectives working in Argentina that challenge capitalism’s growth imperative and commit to horizontal, de-accelerationist, and democratic practices. As their chapter emphasizes, Argentina’s alternative economies and post-growth strategies are important, as this is a country that has gone through severe economic crises in recent decades and one in which the neoliberal experiment of unlimited growth has clearly failed.

At the same time, while creative work is generally framed as a win–win scenario in which “one is paid to do what one loves,” scholars note that, apart from its potential autonomy, it can also resemble and nurture serfdom practices (Homan 2014: 637). Studies have stressed that decent remuneration in creative sectors is often the exception rather than the rule (Brooke and Wissinger 2017). Nevertheless, the myth of ideal creative work casted in the mold of the creative dispositif over-stresses exceptional cases by interweaving the lure of success with the scenario of leading a potentially autonomous life. This dispositif works to both discipline and stimulate creatives in a highly insecure and competitive labor environment (Brooke and Wissinger 2017) in which the “scope of uselessness” (Sennett 2006: 83) broadens and possibilities for upward social mobility are limited.

According to a recent account by Adam Arvidsson (2019), this broadened scope of uselessness and disposability has created a class of “new petty producers” who combine “market orientation with an orientation to alternative values like ‘authenticity,’ ‘impact,’ or ‘freedom’” (2019: 3). He further wrote:

The disappearance of stable industrial jobs in the West (and increasingly also in Asia as factories automate), and the transformation of the countryside in Africa and South America due to new enclosures along with climate change, is creating a new generation of outcasts without much to expect from traditional life forms. Increasingly they are joined by middle-class university graduates, who are forced into freelance careers. Together these new “masterless men” have given rise to a new sector of commons-based petty production (17).

The ambivalence of creativity regarding its vocational, career-orientated, and life-fulfilling prospects is highlighted by creative labor’s political economy and its supposedly positive nature. Crucially, in their chapter “Creative Workers in Permanent Crisis: Labor in Croatia’s Contemporary Arts and Culture,” Jaka Primorac, Valerija Barad, and Edgar Buršić raise the significant question of who can afford to work in this sector. The authors argue that the flexibility and work precarity that creative professions in Croatia entail are ultimately a matter of luxury: “in order to work precariously in this sector, workers must have middle-class backgrounds, otherwise they cannot afford to work precariously.” In other words, a middle-class identity and aspirations of self-fulfillment set the stage for creative labor before becoming an iron cage in which more and more project work is required so producers are able to continue working.

Likewise, Margarita Kuleva's contribution "The Only Place Where One Can Feel Connected to an International Context and Still Speak Russian: Hybrid Creative Work in Post-Soviet Contemporary Art Institutions" is an effort to "de-Westernize" critical labor studies by focusing on what she calls the "hybrid creative work" of full-time employees in Russian nongovernmental art centers. According to Kuleva, workers in these institutions, which aim to express a post-Soviet and meritocratic ethos in Russia's cultural field, contend on an "ideological battlefield" shaped by the combination of "neoliberal creative entrepreneurialism and the Soviet heroization of work." Creative work in these institutions emerges as a labor-intensive activity in which workers are expected to be permanently available. Therefore, creative work, as with any other type of labor, needs to be understood as inherently ambivalent and embedded within the broader work frameworks of capitalism rather than those of exceptional activities.

Regarding creativity's conceptualization as either a commonly acquired skill or an elitist and exceptional mind-set acquired by talented individuals, Cecilia Ghidotti's "Creative Writing Courses are Useless: Creative Writing Programs and the Italian Literary System" focuses on the recent rise of creative writing degrees and their public perception in Italy while drawing on the example of the Turin-based Holden School. As a recent academic discipline that differentiates itself from other literary studies, creative writing aims to develop a specific field of training meant to cultivate the skills and imaginations of aspiring writers. Ghidotti argues that learning to write literature (e.g., poetry) is generally seen as impossible because it is connected to the elitist idea of a culture of modernist tastemakers and is further marked by underlining beliefs about talent and charisma, i.e., qualities usually attributed to geniuses. However, according to Ghidotti, this view fails to grasp the political economy dimension of these ventures. Instead, critics must focus on the development of skills to produce popular content, connecting creative writing degrees with the broader creative labor market, and assessing the criteria and processes of inclusion or exclusion from the literary field.

1.5 Part II: Ideology—Creative Self-Expression and Aesthetics

Ideology is closely related to the supposedly inherently positive nature of creative economies. How are cultural producers and the general public influenced by the creative discourse and its aesthetic economies to believe that creativity is good, and how do these agents react? In their chapter, "The Art Biennial's Dilemma: Political Activism and Spectacle in Aesthetic Capitalism," Panos Kompatsiaris and Nada Endrissat discuss how the rising number of art biennials, which are de facto markers of creative and intellectual coolness in any cityscape, relates to neoliberal policy agendas of opening locales to international visibility and tourism. For them, "the high aesthetics" of aesthetic capitalism "are supposed to antagonize market relations

and incorporate the low aesthetics of social media, marketing, and everyday culture to provide the experience of a mega-event.” Highbrow, post-conceptual art and branding techniques are brought together to attract eyeballs in an age of accelerated commodification of attention (Bueno 2016). The proclaimed social engagement of these events is itself ideological, as it needs to be packaged in a specific way to appear radical to art audiences and beyond.

While focusing on the case of Greece’s prolonged economic and political crisis (2009–2018), Yiannis Mylonas’s chapter “Creativity in the Service of Economic Recovery and National Salvation: Dispatches from the Greek Crisis Social Factory” shows how the term “creativity” was publicly mobilized during the crisis years to promote a model of economic restructuring based on self-reliance, individualism, and entrepreneurialism. Mylonas shows how a “creativity cult” emerged during these years and has been developing through the reformed policy programs of neoliberal restructuring and the “spectacles of entrepreneurial success stories” about start-ups, gastronomical revolution, and local authenticity to beautify the misery of the crisis and produce entrepreneurial subjectivities and individualistic worldviews. At the same time, creativity in the Greek context is promoted in parallel with notions such as meritocracy and sustainability, which form both conservative and progressivist touchstones in a neoliberal and governmental discursive repertoire.

Concurrently, the configuration of entrepreneurialism in conservative political morals and projects goes hand in hand with the emergence of new forms of social conservatism that entail the frequent mobilization of creativity and culture for nationalist projects. For example, theorist Ilya Budraitskis (2017) argued that the Russian government has begun operationalizing cultural production to express a timeless and eternal idea of Russianness that is somehow markedly different from the identity of the West. Here, as Budraitskis notes, cultural conservatism is an instrument of neoliberalism for domestically legitimizing Vladimir Putin’s government. Similarly, in Tatiana Romashko’s contribution to this volume, “The Production of Cultural Policy in Russia: Authority and Intellectual Leadership,” she traces the transformation of this governmental discourse from the period of 1990s liberal decentralization to the “conservative centralization” that began in 2011 and continues as of this writing. For Romashko, this instrumentalization of culture attempts several things at once, namely to “legitimize the federal government,” “establish cultural borders between Russia and [European Union] countries,” and “reduce ‘Russian society to a single national identity.’” The conservativeness of Russia’s new right appears in tandem with the broader global rise of the strongman, forcing us to further question our previously unbridled optimism that views globalization as a liberating force, both economically and socially.

However, ideological interpellations can be negotiated and replayed. With his chapter “Do-it-Yourself Manifestos: Ethics and the Quest for Authenticity,” Evangelos Chrysagis examines the manifestos of do-it-yourself (DiY) practitioners in the United Kingdom, where recurring quests for self-expression and authenticity constantly emerge in a “surplus” form amid efforts to capture, tap, and commodify creative energy. Following a literature review on manifesto writing, Chrysagis explains how the recent increase in manifesto formats in cultural production has

been accompanied by the promotion of ethical values that overshadow the more instrumental understandings of art and music that policy makers and leading industries pursue. In an era where creativity has come to signify an economic asset framing market-oriented discourses, the three manifestos Chrysagis studies demonstrate that DiY practices and culture, despite the all-pervasiveness of capitalism (or maybe because of it), stand as a useful example of an ethical mode of self-expression. In this regard, the manifestos that Chrysagis explores denote an intention to oppose dominant meanings and cultural forms, seek alternatives, and resist established aesthetics, practices, and their recuperation by the mainstream, despite the risks and pitfalls of co-optation that this quest may entail.

1.6 Part III: Industrialization—Creative Markets and Technologies

The last part of this volume explores how tensions around industrialization occur from the general development of technologies and the market in relation to creative policies and discourses. In Bernard Miège's chapter, "Creative Industries: A Large, Ongoing Project, Still Inaccurate and Always Uncertain," the author taps his pioneering studies on cultural and informational industries to provide us with an overview of their historical development and the mutations they underwent when policy makers began to emphasize creativity. Here, the rise of the creative industries is understood as a global politico-economic project for a generation of economic growth with great heterogeneity, spatially, and in terms of productivity. Miège presents a typology for understanding the distinctions between informational, cultural, and creative industrial production, drawing on a political economy perspective. Creative work is often slower and more artisan-based than informational work, and may not always rely on digital technologies. Such features define the reproducibility and the predictability of informational, cultural, and creative products. These are also connected to the allocation of revenues created through processes of production, circulation, and consumption. Further, there are macroeconomic differences between the cultural and creative industries (e.g., between filmmaking and craftsmanship). Given this, various challenges regarding the development of the creative and cultural industries arise and are connected to issues related to the rise of monopolies (such as the aforementioned GAFAM), the effects of competition on smaller producers, the impact of industrialization on content production, and the rise of amateur/audience users and informal production.

In line with the work of the "French school" on cultural industries, Ilya Kiriya's chapter, "From Craft to Industry: Industrializing the Marginal Domains of Cultural Industries," argues that certain aspects of what was considered craft production have become increasingly industrialized as business models have begun to adjust to new demands for audiences and funding. Kiriya explores cultural domains, such as theater and performing arts, that exist on the margins of industrialization due to

difficulties in their technical reproducibility. Digital technologies are changing this by allowing the standardization and reproduction of such cultural forms of production on a mass scale, making them more like the content industries. In effect, this development leads to the financialization of such sectors due to the potential revenues industrialization promises. Kiriya examines different understudied crafts sectors, such as performing arts (e.g., musicals), comedy, and educational practices, and he discusses the changes that their industrialization brings in their reproducibility as well as the division of labor and business model they use. Of crucial importance are processes of aggregation and mediatization, which enable the industrialization of previously marginal crafts mainly through digital technologies and social media.

The monetization of content production as a key feature of the creative and cultural industries model is the main topic of Vincent Bullich's chapter, "Intellectual Property Rights and the Production of Value in a Creative Economy." Indeed, intellectual property rights provide a legal framework for the commodification of creative ideas and the production and sustainability of creative services and products as singularities that can generate profit in a competitive and globalized market environment. The valorization of the creative product emerges from the identity of the producer, which is often what makes a given product attractive to buyers (as we saw above with Serra and Duchamp). The production of singular commodities out of creative ideas is organized by the law, which safeguards the identity of the creative object and regulates the conditions of its ownership. However, intellectual property rights are not a necessary precondition for the development of creative production. The law is meant to protect the product's authenticity from counterfeiting strategies through a monopolistic framework in the market. Here, Bullich notes the importance of the state in maintaining the free market edifice that manifests in the deeply political character of what is usually understood as the neutral site of economy.

Finally, in Patrick-Yves Badillo and Dominique Bourgeois's contribution, "Innovation and Media: Googlization and Limited Creativity," the authors examine the current processes of innovation that occur in the media industries. By empirically focusing on the Swiss media, the main innovations they observe are connected to what they call "Googlization," which is understood as a digital management process with the objective of attracting more online traffic and gathering more data to generate more profits. While examining relevant literature on innovation and by using Schumpeter's creative destruction model to examine how innovation occurs, they conclude that innovation in the media industries has been more destructive to the old model of media production and less innovative and creative to the potential production of more high-quality informational and cultural content. Therefore, this volume's last section on creative industrialization as a process that involves tensions around markets and technological developments follows from the previous two sections, which question the dominant logic of creativity as a supposedly self-generating, neutral, and value-free concept.

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