

War as a Method of Conflict Resolution: The Link Between Social Beliefs, Ideological Orientations, and Military Attitudes in Russia

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When international conflicts arise, there are numerous ways of resolving them—1 of which is war. The study of attitudes toward war as a method of conflict resolution can therefore reveal interesting and valuable information. Previous research has shown a strong positive relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and attitudes toward war. However, the relationship between social dominance orientation, which predicts social and political attitudes, and attitudes toward military campaigns varies from 1 research study to another. In this study, we used a modified method of measuring social dominance orientation, taking into account the specifics of international relations. Using the cognitive–motivational dual-process model of prejudices, we hypothesized that dangerous and competitive world beliefs are linked to right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation in international relations, which, in turn, are related to attitudes toward war as a method of international conflict resolution. We measured social worldviews, ideological orientations, and attitudes toward war among Russian adults ($N = 897$). Structural equation modeling confirmed the hypotheses but also revealed that social worldviews are linked to attitudes toward war not only through ideological orientations but also directly. In addition, it showed that the link between social worldviews, ideological orientations, and attitudes toward war is moderated by the gender and age of the study's participants. The implications of the results for conceptions of the cognitive–motivational dual-process model of prejudices are discussed.

Public Significance Statement

The article describes the interaction of social beliefs, ideological orientations and attitudes toward war as a way of international conflicts resolution. It provides insights about the role that social dominance orientations in international relations plays in the approval of military conflicts.

Keywords: dangerous world belief, competitive world belief, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientations in international relations, attitudes toward war

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Intergroup conflicts have occurred throughout human history and often lead to severe economic and political consequences. There are different methods of resolving these conflicts, but violent solutions attract greater attention and are viewed as more important events than are peaceful ones. For instance, in studies in which residents of different countries selected the main events of world history, the leading places on the lists were taken by events connected with violence—wars and revolutions (e.g., Liu et al., 2005, 2009; Techio et al., 2010).

Large-scale military campaigns provoke public debate, during which people form attitudes toward military action. Previous research has shown that people with different ideological orientations support different attitudes toward war. However, whereas the positive relationship between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and attitudes toward war is reproduced in most studies, the connection between the social dominance orientation and attitudes toward military operations has received less confirmation.

We assumed that the lack of a stable link between social dominance orientation (SDO) and attitudes toward war may be related to the way this ideological variable is measured. In this study, we analyzed the relationship between social beliefs, ideological variables, and attitudes to war. However, we used a methodology of measuring social dominance orientation that takes into account the specifics of international relations.

Cognitive–Motivational Dual-Process Model of Prejudices

The cognitive–motivational dual-process model of prejudices, which establishes the relationship between social beliefs, ideological orientations, and prejudices toward social groups (Duckitt, 2001, 2006; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002), provided the theoretical basis of our study. According to the model, people have social beliefs—ideas about the social world—that gradually formed during socialization and reflect an evaluation of the danger and competitiveness of public life. The adoption of social beliefs encourages a person to achieve particular motivational goals. These beliefs are outlined below.

Dangerous world belief (DWB) ranges from the perception of human society as absolutely safe, stable, and secure to very dangerous, unpredictable, and threatening. People with low DWB strive for personal freedom and autonomy, whereas people with high DWB seek social control and security. Competitive world belief (CWB) ranges from the perception of people as being naturally disposed to kindness and cooperation at one end of the spectrum to being inclined to manipulation and competition at the other. People with low CWB strive to help and share with others as equals, whereas people with high CWB seek power, superiority, and dominance over others.

Motivational goals, in turn, help people accept ideological orientations. Belief in a dangerous world would be expressed in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), which includes three interrelated attitudes: support for social conventions, submission to conventional authorities, and aggressiveness toward conventional targets as defined by social authorities (Altemeyer, 1988, 1996). Belief in a competitive world would be expressed in social dominance orientation (SDO), which describes a general attitudinal orientation toward a social hierarchy in which some social groups

dominate and others submit to them (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006).

Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation provoke prejudice toward various social outgroups (primarily women, homosexuals, migrants, ethnic and racial minorities, and residents of other countries). However, individuals with high RWA and SDO are inclined to disparage outgroups for different reasons: group-based dominance and superiority in the case of SDO, and social cohesion and collective security in the case of RWA. Thus, the links between DWB and RWA, and between CWB and SDO, reflect two different ways of forming prejudices.

Overall, the dual-process model has received empirical support. First, studies conducted within this model have shown that there is a medium positive link between DWB and RWA, and a strong positive link between CWB and SDO (Perry, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2013). Second, numerous studies carried out within the framework of theories of authoritarian personality and social dominance have demonstrated that RWA and SDO are positively associated with prejudices toward particular groups and with generalized prejudices (Hodson & Dhont, 2015; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).

However, these studies have limitations. First, in many works, separate parts of the model are examined—namely, the link between social beliefs and ideological variables and the link between ideological variables and prejudice. Second, studies have age and cultural specifics. In particular, a recent meta-analysis (Perry et al., 2013) showed that most studies to test the dual-process model were conducted in New Zealand, the United States, Germany, and Belgium. In three quarters of the cases, the questionnaires were completed by undergraduates.

Social Beliefs, Ideological Orientations, and Attitudes Toward War

Recently, the dual-process model has been used for measuring attitudes toward war. Presumably, this is because, according to some studies, negative attitudes toward outgroups are connected to the approval of military action aimed at those groups. In particular, RWA and SDO are linked to perceived intergroup threat (Asbrock, Christ, Duckitt, & Sibley, 2012; Hadarics & Kende, 2017; Hodson, Hogg, & MacInnis, 2009; Matthews & Levin, 2012). Perceived threat is, in turn, positively linked to justification of military action (Bilali, 2015; McFarland, 2005).

Furthermore, RWA and SDO (Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Jackson & Gaertner, 2010; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015; Lindén, Björklund, & Bäckström, 2016) are positively linked with the dehumanization of some social groups (e.g., residents of other countries, migrants, and terrorists). Dehumanization, in turn, is positively linked with supporting torture and military action against these people (Bruneau, Kteily, & Laustsen, 2018; Kteily et al., 2015; Lindén et al., 2016).

In general, studies in which the dual-process model was used to study attitudes toward war have the same limitations as do studies on group prejudice. First, the main participants of such studies were students from American, Australian, and some European universities. Second, the researchers focused on separate parts of the model. In particular, we found only one study in which three

elements of the model—social beliefs, ideological orientations, and attitudes toward the war in Iraq—were simultaneously considered (Crowson, 2009).

The main attention of scientists working within the framework of the dual-process model was drawn to the link between ideological orientations and attitudes toward war. Studies have shown that right-wing authoritarianism is positively linked to attitudes toward individual military campaigns (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Crowson, 2009; Crowson, Debacker, & Thoma, 2005, 2006; Dunwoody, Plane, Trescher, & Rice, 2014), as well as military action as a way to resolve international conflicts in general (Bizumic et al., 2013; Van der Linden, Leys, Klein, & Bouchat, 2017).

The link between attitudes toward war and social dominance orientation, though, is more contradictory. In particular, according to some data, SDO is linked to more positive attitudes toward hostilities in Iraq (Cohrs et al., 2005; Crowson et al., 2006; Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit, & Leeson, 2006) and military action in general (Van der Linden et al., 2017). However, according to other sources, there is no connection between these variables (Bizumic et al., 2013; Crowson, 2009; Crowson et al., 2005; Dunwoody et al., 2014). The question is why this is happening.

On the one hand, people with high social dominance orientation strive to establish group hierarchy. To achieve that goal, they may resort to violence. For example, some studies have shown that SDO is linked to a more positive attitude toward the use of violence within a given country (e.g., support for the use of excessive force by the police; Gerber & Jackson, 2017) and justification of violent forms of political protest (Lemieux & Asal, 2010). It is logical to expect that this pattern would manifest in international relations.

On the other hand, the classic survey used to measure SDO includes items on relations between social groups in general. In that situation respondents might give different answers depending on what groups they are thinking about. In many countries today there is an ongoing discourse about equality between groups that share a country (e.g., between men and women, heterosexuals and homosexuals, various ethnic and religious communities). Consequently, people may be thinking about group hierarchy within a country while they are filling out the survey.

Meanwhile, studies devoted to militaristic attitudes usually examine attitudes toward military conflicts that occur between countries. In this case, the link between social dominance orientation, measured using the classic questionnaire, and attitudes toward war depend on what groups that respondents are thinking about. If they think about equality in their country, it's crucial how much the respondents equate intergroup relations within the country with relations between countries. Therefore, it can be assumed that attitudes toward war are more strongly linked to the approval of social hierarchy between countries than to the approval of the intergroup hierarchy in general.

The Current Study

In this study we have taken into account the limitations of previous research on attitudes toward war conducted within the framework of the dual-process model. First, we considered three elements of the dual process model—social beliefs, ideological

orientations, and general attitudes toward war. Second, we measured attitudes toward social hierarchy between countries and toward different groups within the same country. Third, the participants of the study were people of various ages and sexes living in different regions of Russia.

We hypothesized that social beliefs linked to ideological orientations: DWB positively linked to RWA (Hypothesis 1a) and CWB positively linked to SDO in international relations (Hypothesis 1b). In turn, the ideological orientations linked to attitudes toward war in general: RWA (Hypothesis 2a) and SDO in international relations (Hypothesis 2b) positively linked to attitude toward war as a method of international conflict resolution. The research question is how these relationships are maintained in different gender and age groups.

Our study was conducted in 2015, during a period of Russian history when attitudes toward war were a major part of discourse in Russia. During that time, two war-related topics were discussed in the media on a regular basis: the war in Donbass (Eastern Ukraine) and the 70th anniversary of the victory in World War II. Victory Day in Russia is also closely linked to the celebration of the modern armed forces, with the Victory Day parade being viewed as a demonstration of military might. Due to the 70th anniversary commemorations, the topic was even more prevalent than in other years. As such, the topic of attitudes toward war was highly relevant at that time.

Method

Participants

The sample consisted of 897 respondents living in the Russian Federation (51.5% men), ages 18–80 years ($M = 46.2$, $SD = 12.4$). The participants took part in the study on a voluntary basis.

Measures

Participants completed online questionnaires for measuring DWB, CWB, RWA, and SDO in international relations, attitudes toward war as a method of international conflicts resolution, as well as two additional scales that were not used in further analysis.

The data were collected with an electronic web-based questionnaire in June 2015. An online version of the questionnaire was created on the website <https://virtualexs.ru/>. Links to the questionnaire were placed on two Russian-language Internet sites: www.voxru.net and www.subscribe.ru. The analysis used the data of respondents who answered all the questions and indicated that they live in Russia.

Dangerous world belief. Belief in a dangerous world was measured by a scale developed by J. Duckitt (Duckitt et al., 2002). The Russian-language version of the scale (Gulevich, Anikeenok, & Bezmenova, 2014) included 12 items (six direct and six reverse), such as “Our world is a dangerous and unpredictable place in which the values and way of life of decent people are under threat” (direct item) and “Our world is a safe and predictable place, and most people do not harm others” (reverse item; Gulevich et al., 2014, p. 84). Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with these statements on a 5-point scale from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 5 (*completely agree*; $\alpha = .83$).

Competitive world belief. Belief in a competitive world was assessed with a scale developed by J. Duckitt (Duckitt et al., 2002). The Russian-language version of the scale (Gulevich et al., 2014) included 12 items (six direct and six reverse), such as “It’s a dog-eat-dog world where you have to be ruthless at times” (direct item) and “The best way to lead a group under one’s supervision is to show them kindness, consideration, and treat them as fellow workers, not as inferiors” (reverse item; Gulevich et al., 2014, p. 85). Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with these statements on a 5-point scale from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 5 (*completely agree*; $\alpha = .80$).

Right-wing authoritarianism. To measure political authoritarianism, we used a scale created by B. Altemeyer (Altemeyer, 1988). The Russian-language version of the scale included 30 items (15 direct and 15 reverse), such as “The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just ‘loud mouths’ showing off their ignorance” (direct item) and “It is wonderful that young people today have greater freedom to protest against things they do not like and to ‘do their own thing’” (reverse item; Altemeyer, 1988, pp. 22–23). Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with these statements on a 9-point scale from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 9 (*completely agree*; $\alpha = .83$).

Social dominance orientation in international relations. To measure SDO, we used a short modified version of the scale developed by Sidanius and Pratto (1999). When creating a version, all items of the original version were translated into Russian and reformulated. In particular, the word *groups* was replaced by the word *nations*, and in some statements the words *human society* were added. In addition, some items that respondents understood differently, or that were more suitable for evaluation relations within the country (e.g., equal income), were changed. After analyzing the results of the full version of the questionnaire, we distinguished statements that were included in the short version.

The short modified version included 10 items (five direct and five reverse) regarding the international hierarchy, such as “It’s okay if some nations have more a chance in life than others” (direct items) and “Equality between nations is for the benefit of human society” (reverse items; see Appendix A; Gulevich, Agadullina, & Khukhlaev, 2018, p. 424). Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with these state-

ments on a 7-point scale from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 7 (*completely agree*; $\alpha = .86$).

General attitudes toward war. Attitudes toward war as a method of international conflict resolution were assessed with the Russian Attitudes Toward War Scale (Nevryuev, 2018). When creating the scale, the content of English-language methods measuring the general attitude to the war was analyzed (e.g., Bizumic et al., 2013). An analysis of the modern Russian discourse devoted to this problem was also carried out. The final scale includes 12 statements on six topics: the possibilities and consequences of war, moral justification of war, economic consequences of war, societal consequences of war, and positive and negative humanitarian consequences of war (see Appendix B; Nevryuev, 2018, p. 473). Participants were asked to rate these statements on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 7 (*completely agree*; $\alpha = .80$).

Results

Preliminary Analysis

Means and standard deviations of social beliefs, ideological orientations, and attitudes toward war are presented in Table 1. Calculations were made using the IBS SPSS Statistics software (Version 23). Analysis carried out with the help of one sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test showed that the distribution of all variables differs from the normal one. Therefore, nonparametric criteria were used to determine gender and age differences in these parameters.

The Mann–Whitney test was used to compare men and women. This showed that men exhibit higher levels of CWB ($U = 86,086$, $p < .001$), higher levels of SDO ($U = 84,221$, $p < .001$), and more positive attitudes toward war ($U = 77,781$, $p < .001$) than do women. The Kruskal–Wallis test was used to compare three age groups (ages 18–36, 37–55, and 56–80) that were designated via cluster analysis. It showed that CWB ($H = 11.414$, $p = .003$) and SDO ($H = 9.482$, $p = .009$) diminish with age.

Correlation analysis was performed using the Spearman’s non-parametric test. Intercorrelations between all variables are presented in Table 2. Calculations were made using the IBS SPSS Statistics software (Version 23). The results show that DWB is positively related to RWA ($r = .086$, $p = .010$), CWB is positively

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics Between Worldviews, Ideological Orientations, and Attitudes Toward War Among Respondents of Different Sex and Age

Variable	All respondents		Gender				Age					
			Male		Female		18–36		37–55		56–80	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Dangerous world belief	3.24	0.59	3.26	0.60	3.22	0.59	3.30	0.63	3.23	0.60	3.21	0.54
Competitive world belief	2.24	0.56	2.30	0.58	2.17	0.52	2.32	0.57	2.25	0.56	2.13	0.51
Right-wing authoritarianism	5.37	1.22	5.41	1.23	5.33	1.21	5.29	1.21	5.41	1.24	5.37	1.28
Social dominance orientation in international relations	2.73	0.87	2.84	0.93	2.61	0.79	2.87	0.89	2.72	0.88	2.61	0.84
Attitudes toward war	2.65	0.78	2.80	0.83	2.50	0.70	2.58	0.83	2.71	0.76	2.61	0.77

Note. Sample: $N = 897$.

Table 2
Correlations Among Worldviews, Ideological Orientations, and Attitudes Toward War

Variable	1	2	3	4
1. Dangerous world belief	—			
2. Competitive world belief	.151***	—		
3. Right-wing authoritarianism	.086*	-.089**	—	
4. Social dominance orientation in international relations	.076*	.474***	-.024	—
5. Attitudes toward war	-.031	.394***	.159***	.444***

Note. Sample: $N = 897$.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

correlated with SDO in international relations ($r = .474, p < .001$), and both RWA ($r = .159, p < .001$) and SDO in international relations ($r = .444, p < .001$) are positively linked with attitudes toward war.

Main Analysis

To test our hypotheses, we used structural equation modeling. The calculations were carried out with the MPlus 7 program (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2012) using the maximum likelihood estimator. The description used standardized regression coefficients. The first model fully corresponded with the hypotheses: DWB and CWB served as independent variables, RWA and SDO in international relations as potential mediators, and attitudes toward war as a dependent variable (see Figure 1). However, this model had a poor fit, $\chi^2(5, N = 897) = 83.310, p < .001$; comparative fit index (CFI) = .860; Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) = .748; root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .132; 90% confidence interval [CI: 0.108, 0.158]; standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) = .047.

Therefore, a second model was created, in which direct connections between social beliefs and ideological orientations were added. The overall pattern of results depicted in Figure 2 shows that dangerous and competitive world beliefs linked to attitudes toward war not only through ideological orientations but also directly. In particular, CWB was positively, and DWB negatively, related to attitudes toward war. As the results show, this model provided a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(3, N = 897) = 7.765, p = .0511$; CFI = .991; TLI = .974; RMSEA = .042; 90% CI [0.000, 0.080];

SRMR = .016. The comparison of the links in the modified model for different gender and ages using the Wald test showed that all of the connections are universal.

Analysis of the direct and indirect effects of social beliefs on general attitudes toward war (see Table 3) were made using the MPlus 7 program. The description used standardized regression coefficients. The standard errors for the indirect effects were estimated with bootstrapping. Analysis showed more direct effects of DWB (–.114) and CWB (.270) than indirect effects (.019 and .152, respectively). Furthermore, there was consistent mediation with the positive direct and indirect effects in the case of CWB. However, there was inconsistent mediation with the negative direct and positive indirect effects in the case of DWB.

Discussion

In this article, we set out to investigate the relationship between social worldviews, ideological orientations, and attitudes toward war as a method of international conflict resolution. We based our concept on the cognitive–motivational dual process model, according to which belief in a dangerous and competitive world is positively related to right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. These ideological orientations, in turn, are linked to more hostile attitudes toward national outgroups. We examined these ideas in relation to attitudes toward war.

In general, the results of the study have shown that social worldviews are connected to ideological orientations. In particular, a dangerous world belief is associated with high right-wing authoritarianism, and a competitive world belief is linked to high social dominance orientation in international relations. However, CWB is linked to SDO more strongly than is DWB to RWA. These data correspond to a recent meta-analysis that displayed a strong correlation between CWB and SDO but a moderate correlation between DWB and RWA (Perry et al., 2013).

Ideological orientations in turn are associated with attitudes toward violent resolution of intergroup conflicts. Positive link between RWA and war attitudes corresponds with studies in the United States (Bizumic et al., 2013; Crowson, 2009; Crowson et al., 2005, 2006; Dunwoody et al., 2014), Germany (Cohrs et al., 2005), and France (Van der Linden et al., 2017). It can be assumed that this link manifests itself in those countries and in those time periods, when widespread social conventions approve the resolution of international conflicts by force.




Figure 1. The relationship between worldviews, ideological orientations, and attitudes toward war in general: the initial model. Above the arrows: standardized regression coefficients, in square brackets are the upper and lower levels of the 95% confidence interval, in parentheses – standard error and p -level.




Figure 2. The relationship between worldviews, ideological orientations, and attitudes toward war in general: the modified model. Above the arrows: standardized regression coefficients, in square brackets are the upper and lower levels of the 95% confidence interval, in parentheses – standard error and p -level.

The positive link between SDO and attitudes toward war matches the results of studies that have shown that SDO is linked to approval of aggression within one’s country (Berke & Zeichner, 2016; Gerber & Jackson, 2017; Lemieux & Asal, 2010) and between countries (Cohrs et al., 2005; Crowson et al., 2006; Heaven et al., 2006; Van der Linden et al., 2017). At the same time, our results contradict studies that have shown a lack of a link between SDO and attitudes toward war.

In our opinion, the strong connection between SDO and attitudes toward war, which was discovered in our study, is associated with the use of the modified scale for measuring SDO. We used the classic questionnaire as the basis but modified the statements so that they clearly indicated that a social hierarchy between countries is being considered. Thus, we encouraged respondents to express their attitudes toward equality between nations and not toward equality between groups within a given country.

However, our results indicate that ideological variables only partially mediate the connection between social beliefs and attitudes toward war. There is a direct link between (a) dangerous and competitive world beliefs and (b) attitudes toward violence in international relations. In particular, CWB is associated with more positive attitudes toward violent ways of resolving intergroup

conflicts, and DWB is linked with more negative attitudes. In other words, the direct and indirect links between CWB and attitudes toward war are aligned, whereas the direct and indirect links between DWB and attitudes toward war contradict each other.

In our opinion, these results allowed us to assume that people who believe in a dangerous world might use different means to achieve control and security, depending on different ideas about the government. People who believe that the government can protect them from danger exhibit a high level of authoritarianism and show a positive attitude toward war. At the same time, people who do not believe in the government’s capabilities are trying to avoid military solutions to conflict, which only increase the danger and unpredictability of such a situation.

Thus, our study allowed us to identify some of the links between social beliefs, ideological orientations, and attitudes toward war that are not described in the dual process model. However, it has several limitations. First, it was cross-sectional, but this is shared by the majority of studies that have examined the links between social beliefs, ideological orientations, and intergroup attitudes. This happens because social beliefs and ideological orientations are traditionally regarded as relatively stable variables that are formed gradually during socialization and do not change under short-term experimental influence (Duckitt, 2001). However, the results of such studies are difficult to interpret unambiguously in terms of cause–effect relationships.

Second, we based our approach on the assumption that war is a violent way of resolving international, rather than domestic, conflicts. This was due to the widespread discourse in Russia, in which wars are more often seen as armed conflicts that occur between different countries (e.g., World War II, the Afghan war, the Syrian war). However, it can be assumed that social beliefs and ideological orientations may be differently linked to attitudes toward military actions within one country compared to military action between different countries. Thus, in future studies it will be interesting to see the connection between social beliefs and ideological orientations with attitudes to different forms of military actions.

Table 3
Direct and Indirect Effects From Social Worldviews and Attitudes Toward War

Effect	Estimate	SE	95% CI		p
			LL	UL	
Direct effects					
From CWB to SDO	.270	.032	.206	.334	<.001
From DWB to AW	-.114	.030	-.172	-.055	<.001
Indirect effects					
From CWB to SDO	.152	.017	.118	.186	<.001
From DWB to AW	.019	.009	.001	.037	.043

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit; CWB = competitive world belief; SDO = social dominance orientation; DWB = dangerous world belief; AW = general attitudes toward war.

Third, we conducted the study on a sample that, although large, was unrepresentative of the Russian population. Because the research announcements were posted on forums where political issues are discussed, it can be assumed that people interested in issues related to internal and international politics took part in the research. On the one hand, this gave us the opportunity to attract respondents of different genders and age groups who live in different regions of Russia and are interested in the topic of the study. On the other hand, they do not accurately reflect the population in the country as a whole. Thus, in future studies, we would recommend the use of more representative samples.

Fourth, in this study we have for the first time used a modified version of the scale for measuring SDO and found a positive link between social dominance orientation and attitudes toward war. However, some studies have shown that SDO is differently related to attitudes toward other countries among people living in countries with relatively high and low status (e.g., Levin, Pratto, Matthews, Sidanius, & Kteily, 2013). Therefore, in future studies it would be reasonable to analyze the relationship between SDO in international relations and attitudes toward war among residents of different countries.

Fifth, the methodology that we used to measure general attitudes toward war included several different components—an assessment of the justification and effectiveness of war, as well as the humanitarian, economic, and social consequences of military actions. Some studies (e.g., Jackson & Gaertner, 2010) have suggested that justification and consequences may be mediators of the connection between right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and evaluation of the effectiveness of military actions. Thus, in future studies, it would be helpful to look at the relationship between social beliefs, ideological variables, and the various components of attitudes toward war.

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Appendix A

Modified Social Dominance Orientation Scale

1. Every nation should stay in its place in human society.
2. All nations should have an equal chance in life.
3. To protect the interests of one nation it is sometimes necessary to use force against other nations.
4. We should strive for different nations to have equal opportunities for life and development.
5. It's okay if some nations have more of a chance in life than others do.
6. Equality between nations is for the benefit of human society.
7. For one nation to succeed in life, it is sometimes necessary to do things that other nations do not like.
8. It's necessary for different nations to strive to have an equal standard of living.
9. It's good when some nations have more rights than others do.
10. Our ideal should be equality between nations.

Direct items: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 (Dominance subscale).

Reverse items: 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 (Antiegalitarianism subscale).

(Appendices continue)




Figure A1. Results of confirmatory factor analysis. Above the arrows: standardized regression coefficients, in square brackets are the upper and lower levels of the 95% confidence interval, in parentheses – standard error and p -level. Model fit: $\chi^2(34, N = 897) = 133.120, p < .01$; comparative fit index = .972; Tucker–Lewis index = .963; root-mean-square error of approximation = .057; standardized root-mean-square residual = .034.

Appendix B

Russian Attitudes Toward War Scale

1. War is the best way to resolve international conflicts.
 2. War allows for protecting the weak and achieving the observance of human rights.
 3. War promotes progress.
 4. War brings out the best in people.
 5. War is a demonstration of weakness, an inability to reach one's goal through other means.
 6. Participating in military action is a useful experience that helps a person understand life better.
 7. International conflicts must be resolved through negotiation, without resorting to violence.
 8. There are no excuses for war.
 9. War brings out the worst in people.
 10. War stimulates the economies of the participating countries.
 11. War is for the protection of people affected by injustice.
 12. War makes people cynical and deprives them of faith in the kindness and justice of the world around them.
- Direct items: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11.
Reverse items: 5, 7, 8, 9, 12.

(Appendices continue)




Figure B1. Results of confirmatory factor analysis. Above the arrows: standardized regression coefficients, in square brackets are the upper and lower levels of the 95% confidence interval, in parentheses – standard error and *p*-level. Model fit: $\chi^2(48, N = 897) = 265.912, p < .01$; comparative fit index = .914; Tucker–Lewis index = .881; root-mean-square error of approximation = .071; 90% confidence interval [0.063, 0.080]; standardized root-mean-square residual = .046.