

- Lipset, Seymour M. (1994). "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 59. pp. 1-22.
- Meleshkina, Elena (1999). "Russian Voters: Attitudes, Choice and Voice." In Vladimir Gel'man and Grigorii V. Golosov (eds.). *Elections in Russia, 1993-1996: Analyses, Documents and Data*. Berlin: edition sigma. pp. 172-199.
- Meleshkina, Elena (2000). "Rossiiskii izbiratel': Ustanovki i vybor." In Vladimir Gel'man, Grigorii V. Golosov and Elena Meleshkina (eds.). *Pervyi elektoral'nyi tsikle v Rossii, 1993-1996*. Moscow: Ves' mir. pp. 177-211.
- Melville, Andrei (1999). *Demokratiicheskie transity (teoretiko-metodologicheskie i prikladnye aspekty)*. Moscow: Moskovskii obshchestvennyi nauchnyi fond.
- Miller, Arthur H., William M. Reisinger and Vicky L. Hesli (1998). "The Russian 1996 Presidential Elections: Referendum on Democracy or a Personality Contest?" *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2. pp. 175-196.
- Proverka (1999). "Proverka na demokratiiu." *Vremia*, Vol. 221, No. 368. p. 3.
- Public Opinion Foundation (Soobscheniia Fonda obshchestvennoe mneniie) (1998). *Bulletin*, No. 305. Moscow.
- Rosenbaum, Walter A. (1975). *Political Culture: Basic Concept in Political Science*. New York: Praeger.
- Rukavishnikov, Vladimir, Luke Halman and Peter Ester (1998). *Politicheskie kultury i sotsial'nyie izmeneniia: Mezhdunarodnye sravneniia*. Moscow: Sovpadeniie.
- Sedov, Leonid (1999). "Krizis vlasti v Rossii i puti ee evolutsii." *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nyie peremeny: Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia*, No. 4. pp. 20-23.
- Semenenko, Irina (2000). "Transformatsiia kriteriev samoidentifikatsii v sotsiokulturnom i politicheskom prostranstve: zapadnaia paradigma i rossiiskii kontekst." *Polis*, No. 3. pp. 80-89.
- Stone, William F. and Paul E. Schaffner (1988). *The Psychology of Politics*, 2nd edition. New York/Berlin: Springer Verlag.
- Urnov, Mark (1999). "Nekotorye faktori adaptatsii rossiiskogo obshchestva k situatsii posle avgustovskogo krisisa 1998." *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nyie peremeny: Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia*, No. 2. pp. 7-11.
- Yadov, Vladimir (1998). *Strategiia sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia. Opisaniiie, ob'iasneniie, ponimaniie sotsial'noi real'nosti*. Moscow: Dobrosvet.
- Zorkaia, Natalia (1999). "Politicheskoie uchastiiie i doveriie naseleniia k politicheskim institutam i politicheskim lideram." *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nyie peremeny: Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia*, No. 1. pp. 24-27.

Regional Aspects of National Elections in Russia

Rostislav Turovsky

The second electoral cycle provided a new opportunity for regionally specific analysis of elections in Russia. The Russian electoral space is discussed in this chapter as a geographical formation characterized by territorial differentiation. Structural and functional geographic analysis of elections is almost unlimited due to the extremely complex and exhaustive division of the country. If one is to seek cross-sectional and time serial regularities and trends in Russia, the choice of an electoral map made up only of a patchwork of federal units must be avoided. The high degree of heterogeneity within them produces inaccuracy in the analysis. The geography of elections can be adequately analyzed only on the basis of data for compact localities. We make use of cities and administrative districts whose heterogeneity can be assumed to be less significant in a nationwide analysis. This treatment of basic structural units of electoral space as electoral process components is in line with current political geography usage. According to the literature, a nation-wide political process consists of numerous local processes, with the resulting total sum always being greater than the arithmetic sum (Agnew, 1987).

A geographical analysis of an electoral campaign is divided into three stages. In the first and elementary stage, information about the election and its results is distributed among spatial units: regions, cities, districts and other territorial units. The result is an electoral map of the country. In the second stage, a geographical model is constructed, making use of information collected and distributed among spatial units. This model can be used for the generalization and interpretation of the electoral map to reveal the most significant regularities in the geographical distribution of votes. The third stage is a geographical analysis of the election through identification of meaningful links between election results in spatial units and demographic, socioeconomic, historical and cultural characteristics of these units.

The initial stage of the electoral-geographical analysis of the second electoral cycle can be found in many works (McFaul et al., 2000; Turovsky, 1999/2000, 2000b; Vybory, 2000). There is no need to discuss detailed statistics for these elections in regional terms and there is even less need to do so at the level of the units of the federation. It is far more important to solve the tasks of the second and third stages and to develop a dynamic geographical model of regularities in the 1999 and 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections.

The objective of a geographical analysis of any social process is to identify the impact of the geographical position on a place by its characteristics. The hierarchical, dimensional and dynamic structure of geographical space is interpreted using one of the most effective geographical models, the center-periphery model. This model treats any social process in its territorial perspective tracing the emergence and dissemination of new phenomena or innovations. Developed on this basis is a conception of space polarization that involves identification of innovation generating centers and peripheries that assimilate or reject innovations (Gritsai et al., 1991). Thus hierarchical relationships between centers and peripheries are developing and continuously reproduced.

It is much easier to identify the center than to differentiate and stratify the more extensive periphery. The center must continuously reproduce its functions, i.e., it must undergo uninterrupted qualitative transformation that enables it to remain an innovation-producing core (Friedmann, 1966). The center as a spatial phenomenon is not a single geographical unit but an array of centers united by common functions. The complex and heterogeneous nature of peripheral behavior, on the other hand, calls for a distinction between the "close" periphery influenced by the center and the "far" periphery living its own life (*ibid.*). Some authors suggest that regions should be divided into creative, adaptive and conservative regions (Gritsai et al., 1991), the first being a source of innovations (center), the second assimilating them (close periphery) and the third upholding the tradition (far periphery). The last of these may be a former innovation system whose evolution has ceased.¹ The semi-periphery is a special middle layer between the core and the periphery that combines creative and adaptive functions (Taylor, 1989; Wallerstein, 1991).

According to Stein Rokkan, differentiation of nominally uniform, homogeneous space proceeds along three lines: military-administrative, economic, and cultural. Hence processes within it include fragmentation (division into units or components with stable and flexible borders), expansion and compression of fragments, and reorganization of the territorial structure accompanied by changes in interior borders (Rokkan, 1975, 1980; Rokkan and Urwin, 1983). The system of center and periphery relationships describes the vertical architecture of the territory, i.e., its hierarchic structure and polarization. For research purposes it would be helpful if the administrative and economic hierarchy of space were united into a single geo-political-economic structure presenting center and periphery relationships in simple form. Geographical analysis of elections enables one to avoid the problem of a formal regional structure (like Russia's division into federal units) and to deal simultaneously with the country in

1 The conservative far periphery can be treated as non-adaptive, i.e., choosing rejection as a specific response to innovation.

its exhaustive differentiation and with it as a complex system of localized territorial units occupying different positions within vertical relationships.

Rokkan (1980) suggests the following parameters for synthetic evaluation of the central or peripheral positioning of places: (1) the administrative status (capital city, regional administrative centers down through the political divisions); (2) the level of socio-economic development (indicators of economic development and of standard and quality of life); and (3) intensity of communication links (nodal or peripheral position within transport and information systems). The synthetic evaluation of places on the basis of these parameters allows their positioning within the general center-periphery system. As a first approximation, the following positions can be distinguished in Russia:

- first-level centers: capitals, cities with one million residents and more;
- second-level centers: other regional administrative centers;
- semi-periphery: medium-size cities other than administrative centers;
- close periphery: small towns, urban-type villages, and suburbs;
- far periphery: villages located far from large cities and backcountry small towns.

Various divergent cases of excessive gaps in the economic and political-administrative status need to be analyzed separately. These include, for example, small enclaves or techno-polities which, though not being administration centers, stand out due to their high development level, or capitals of certain federal units that are small remote towns and even villages.

In addition to the vertical measurement of geographical space, the ordinary horizontal three-dimensional measurement exists. The structure of a flat surface is analyzed primarily through geo-cultural parameters (the third line of spatial differentiation according to Rokkan). The geo-cultural space is built largely according to the area principle as a mosaic of ethno-cultural areas. Although some authors have developed the idea of its own polarization (in connection with the generation and dissemination of cultural innovations), this seems superfluous for our purposes and we shall assume that geo-cultural space is a horizontal mosaic. In the case of Russia, we consider two macro-regions – the ethnic Russian core and the non-Russian periphery.² Each of these has its own inner pattern and is divided into numerous sub-ethnic Russian areas (Turovsky, 1998) and territories where many peoples of Russia reside grouped according to linguistic and confessional distinctions.

2 Assessment of the periphery in geo-cultural terms lacks value premises. An ethnic periphery within a state is essentially a parallel center (sub-center), but in terms of a given state's politics it is still periphery, i.e., a territory connected to the nucleus and having explicit ethno-cultural distinctions.

To sum up, the three-dimensional geographical space is both a horizontal mosaic of homogeneous areas and a vertical system of centers and peripheries or, to use different terms, it consists of nodal areas that are functional hierarchical systems formed around various kind of nodes (Rodoman, 1999). Electoral space as one of its derivatives is a combination of overlapping areas and spatial networks.

Distortion of the geo-political-economic-cultural environment of a country brings about distortions in its electoral space. What these distortions are and how strong they are is the subject of electoral-geographic analysis. We could follow the authors who suggest that the geography of voting is to be analyzed using splits (gaps), thereby artificially emphasizing spatial polarization and taking the analysis to the level of global and inevitably simplified trends. The literature usually discusses the North-South and the West-East splits (Taylor, 1989). However, a closer study of electoral space prompts us to use a territorial gradient model that highlights gradual transitions (gradients) between the poles within a territorial system. As a result, instead of a fixed polarization picture we shall have an uninterrupted spatial continuum with two cores: innovation centers and clearly manifested ethno-cultural areas, and transitional spaces between them.³

Let us emphasize once again that the area principle should be combined with the nodal one. In the former case we speak in terms of spaces like North or South, different areas with their own geographical names, and this can produce geographically continuous zoning. In the latter case we analyze voting in centers and peripheries with a resulting inclusive classification according to electoral behavior. The relationship between these two principles depends on specific conditions of a given country.

The development of the electoral process in post-communist Russia makes the center-periphery model preferable. In an ideal typology it can be viewed as a process of dissemination of political innovation (liberal democratic ideas) from generating centers that meets with resistance from the conservative periphery, inheritor of Soviet political culture. Another argument in favor of the use of this model is the vagueness of our geo-cultural space if viewed horizontally. Therefore in this study, we shall proceed from the nodal principle, and meaningful geo-cultural gradients will manifest themselves as the analysis goes deeper.

3 The concept of uniformity cores is used in Russian geography.

Voting Types in the Second Electoral Cycle

In Russia where the party system is still very unstable, it makes no sense in geographical analysis to discuss voting for individual electoral blocs in parliamentary elections or even for individual candidates in presidential elections. Localized and personality elections (elections for the State Duma in single-member districts, for governorships, and for heads of local self-government) require different methods of geographical analysis as they are largely determined by local factors. These elections are not in a proper sense national but are rather the sum of local election campaigns. Their distinctive features are dealt with in detail elsewhere (Turovsky, 2000a, 2002). The focus of this chapter is upon election results that demonstrate basic patterns of political and ideological differentiation in the Russian electoral space (Zubov and Kolosov, 1994). These include elections to the State Duma by party lists and elections for the presidency.

In contemporary Russia three ideal types of voting seem to have been formed: the conformist (support of the pro-presidential government party), the leftist and the liberal type. Each of these types represents votes cast for more than one party or candidate; nevertheless, one party or candidate may dominate any of the types. As a measure of the voting types, we shall identify territories where the respective percentages of votes are notably higher than the average for Russia. (We choose the excess threshold to be at 1.2 times the average.) First, our task is to see how positioning of a place in the system of center-periphery relationships influences types of voting. We shall also consider the geo-cultural peculiarities of these types.

The conformist type of voting was represented in the 1999 parliamentary election by votes cast for Unity, Fatherland – All Russia (OVR) and Our Home Is Russia (NDR). These political forces were formed with the support of the authorities and represent a party reflection of the ruling group. Unity was virtually directed by the Russian national leadership; Fatherland – All Russia articulated the interests of regional leaders; and Our Home Is Russia was a remnant of the former party of power (see Likhtenhtein in this volume). In the 2000 presidential election, this type of voting was dominated by support for Vladimir Putin.

The degree of electoral space polarization within conformist voting proved to be very high. The spread in votes among units of the federation was from 89.4 per cent in Ingushetia to 25.7 per cent in Samara Province; and for districts and cities it was from 99.5 per cent in Karabulaksky District of Ingushetia to 7.8 per cent in Kamyshlinsky District of Samara Province. The electoral poles in the presidential election at the level of federal units were Ingushetia (85.4 per cent)

and Kemerovo Province (25 per cent), and at the district level, Nurlatsky District of Tatarstan (97.8 per cent) and Kamyshtinsky District (10.2 per cent).

The analysis of voting returns shows that conformist voting is most typical of rural areas in the national republics, i.e., the ethnic far periphery of the Russian space. These are above all territories where voting is completely manageable by regional and local elites: rural districts in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia and Dagestan that demonstrated the highest possible level of loyalty to the government party. The same was typical, however in a lesser degree, of rural districts in Kabardino-Balkaria and Mordovia and in the parliamentary elections, of Tuva (due to the particular popularity of Unity⁴). Thus, by the second electoral cycle, the periphery had become a salient pole of Russia's conformism. Characteristically, republican administrative centers with a lower share of titular population showed more moderate results (with the exception of Nazran and Makhachkala that have a low share of ethnic Russians and, less so, Nalchik).

The ethnic Russian electoral space is characterized by a somewhat lower degree of polarization. Only several rural districts of Saratov Province stand out. The governor's influence on election results has been traditionally strong there (for instance, in Baltaisky District, the birthplace of Governor Dmitry Ayatskov). These districts are similar to ethnic backcountry areas in their electoral behavior. The fact of rural areas, as a rule, remote ones, prevailing among the more conformist-inclined regions became a typical feature of the second electoral cycle. The rural periphery of Novgorod and Vologda Provinces and Northern and Northwestern Russia in general, as well as the northern part of Central Russia (Kostroma, Yaroslavl and, to a certain extent, Tver regions) and the Volga-Vyatka area (a part of Kirov Province) became a particularly distinctive pole of loyalty. Even Cherdynsky District of Perm Province, which proved to be the most loyal area, historically and culturally belongs to the Russian North.

The share of urban Russians among territories with the highest degree of conformism is rather small. A special case is a group of republican capitals, such as Nazran, Makhachkala, Nalchik, and Kazan and, with certain reservations, Vladikavkaz and Kyzyl. All these centers are characterized by a high percentage of titular population, i.e., they are centers of ethnic periphery rather than of Russia's space as a whole. The exception is Kazan, a center of the first level but with certain ethnic specifics. Otherwise, small and medium-size towns, i.e., semi-periphery and close periphery, demonstrate conformist attitudes. Particularly conspicuous here are metallurgy centers (Magnitogorsk, Nizhny Tagil, Cherepovets, Norilsk and Serov), oil producing centers (Surgut) and some small administrative centers of autonomous areas, such as Khanty-Mansiisk, Anadyr and Kudymkar. Basically, the most reliable support was provided to the gov-

4 This was probably due to the Tuva origins of Unity party leader Sergei Shoigu.

ernment party by small towns in the industrial Urals and by the oil and gas producing Tyumen area, as well as by the northern part of European Russia, and the southern seaports Novorossiysk and Tuapse.

At the second-order level, and certainly at the first-order level, conformist voting was not pronounced. Except for controlled Kazan, large cities are not characterized by this type at all. Moscow stands out in the parliamentary election with its consolidated voting for the OVR, but it demonstrated less loyalty to Putin in the presidential election.

To sum up, the conformist type of voting proves to be most characteristic of the ethnic periphery (both rural and urban but less so for the latter) and also for the periphery and semi-periphery in the Russian North and partly in the new development areas in the East. In the latter, however, the territorial distribution of conformism is irregular and is strongly determined by local conditions. A particularly uneven distribution can be observed in cities where neighboring centers may be far different due to their unique combination of socio-economic and political-administrative conditions.

The *leftist type of voting* in the 1999 parliamentary election was defined as voting for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) or one of a number of small electoral blocs of radical left orientation. It is appropriate to consider voting for Gennady Zyuganov in the presidential election separately from voting for say Aman Tuleev. The final picture is more accurate because the obvious polarity in the presidential election was between Vladimir Putin and Gennady Zyuganov.

In the 1999 parliamentary election, leftist proclivity among the electorate ranged from 78.4 per cent (Magaramkentsky District of Dagestan, an ethnic Lezghin area bordering on Azerbaijan) to 0.1 per cent (Karabulaksky District of Ingushetia). For federal units, it ranged from 47.6 per cent in Karachaevo-Cherkessia to 2.7 per cent in Ingushetia. Ethnic peripheries acted as the poles also in the presidential election. The range was from 72.5 per cent in Teuchezhsky District of Adygea to 1.6 per cent in Nurlatsky District of Tatarstan. Among federal units, the highest result was in Lipetsk Province (47.4 per cent) and the lowest was in Ingushetia (4.6 per cent).

The ethnic periphery in Russia is heterogeneous. Although much of it evinces an extremely high loyalty to the authorities, some areas express leftist commitments. This was especially clear in the parliamentary election in Dagestan. The south, particularly the areas populated by ethnic Lezghins, voted leftist by more than a two-thirds majority whereas Kumtorkalinsky District on the plains gave the left only slightly more than 10 per cent and the mountainous areas populated by Avars and Dargins supported it even less. The regions with the strongest leftist orientation were the peripheries of North Ossetia, Karachaevo-

Cherkessia and Adygeya. Leftist voting in these areas was unsteady; in the presidential election it frequently gave way to conformism that resulted from "voluntary coercion," i.e., pressure both direct and indirect exerted by regional and local elites. In non-Russian areas within ethnic Russian regions that experienced no such pressure, on the other hand, some of the highest percentages of votes were cast for the forces of the left. These included the ethnically Bashkir and Tatar Safakulevsky District in Kurgan Province, the ethnically Bashkir Argayashsky District in Chelyabinsk Province, and the ethnically Tatar Krasnooktyabrsky District in Nizhny Novgorod Province.

Generally, the periphery, i.e., the rural areas in the South of Russia, continues to be the left-wing pole on the Russian electoral map. Included above all are the rural areas in the southern half of Central Russia, such as the red belt of Bryansk, Orel, Kursk, Belgorod, Lipetsk and Tambov Provinces. Rural areas of Krasnodar and Stavropol Provinces, Volgograd and less so Rostov Province, can be described as the southern core of the red belt. Similar to them in ideological typology and in cultural history are rural areas in Penza and Ulyanovsk Provinces and the southern part of Nizhny Novgorod Province. In the elections of both 1999 and 2000, leftist voting tended to be around 60 per cent in Khlevensky and Izmailovskiy Districts of Lipetsk Province, Shablykinsky District of Orel Province, and Khvastovichsky District of Kaluga Province. Leftist leanings were less pronounced in the rural periphery in the Volga Area and North Caucasus. Except for a few striking examples such as the Beloglinsky District of Krasnodar Province, the area is less inclined toward voting for the left.

The agricultural periphery in the south of West Siberia and the South Urals (Altai, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Kurgan and Orenburg Provinces, and some rural areas in Chelyabinsk Province) demonstrates a high degree of red leaning. In the presidential election it was Sharlyksky District in Orenburg Province and Kamensky District in Altai Region that provided the second and third largest vote totals for Gennady Zyuganov. He received over two-thirds of his votes there. This area has its own red belt in the rural periphery from Orenburg to Novosibirsk and Barnaul but with a gap in Tyumen Territory, the southern part of which is politically and economically influenced by its industrialized northern part. Other spots of the leftist type of voting are found in the periphery further east – in Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Chita and Amur Provinces, Primorye, Sakhalin and other areas. In the 1999-2000 elections, a left voting core was in formation to the east of the Yenisei.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to associate the leftist type of voting exclusively with the rural periphery. In the 1999 and 2000 elections it appeared at all levels of the center-periphery nation-wide system in Russia. At the level of the

semi-periphery, the communist candidate won more than half the votes in Yel'ts and Zheleznogorsk in Kursk Province and Mednogorsk in Orenburg Province. Moreover, some elements of the center are becoming leftist. Of particular interest here is the example of Omsk, a city of the first order, where Zyuganov gained over 40 per cent of the vote. Among cities of the second order, leftist voting was substantially more pronounced than in the country as a whole. These included many red belt administrative centers – Orel, Bryansk, Lipetsk, Tambov, Kursk, Belgorod, Penza and Ulyanovsk. But this group also included some administrative centers of East Siberia (Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude) and South Urals (Orenburg). In an historically innovative center such as Irkutsk, this was unexpected. Gravitation toward the left was evident in centers of the national autonomous regions that had predominantly ethnic Russian populations (Saransk, Yoshkar-Ola, Maikop, Cherkessk, Gorno-Altaysk and Birobidjan) as well as in the more ethnically non-Russian city Cheboksary, the capital of traditionally red Chuvashia.

It is possible therefore to speak of the dissemination of the leftist type of voting from the periphery to semi-periphery and even of its evident presence in the center. Several quite different kinds of territories have pronounced leftist voting. The most prominent among them is rural periphery in the south of Central Russia, West Siberia and South Urals, and partially in the Volga Area and North Caucasus, East Siberia and the Russian Far East, i.e., almost the whole southern part of Russia. Another geographical area consists of cities, including administrative centers in the rural areas. Small and medium industrial centers scattered around almost the whole of the country selectively represent the third geographical category. These are most frequently found in the South and the East of Russia.

The liberal type of voting is best analyzed using data from the parliamentary election, since in presidential elections liberals divided their votes among Vladimir Putin and a number of other candidates. In the parliamentary election, however, several electoral associations with a liberal orientation can be identified. These include the Union of Right Forces (SPS), Yabloko and the Conservative Movement of Russia.⁵

This type of voting was unevenly distributed geographically. In the parliamentary election, votes for liberal parties ranged from 51 per cent in Yavlinskii District of Samara Province to 0 per cent in some areas of Dagestan (Yuzhno-Sukhokumsk, Kumtorkalinsky and Levashinsky Districts). Percentages among federal units were from 28.6 per cent in St. Petersburg to 1.6 per cent in Dagestan. This type of voting appears to be less integrative and determining than ei-

5 It is inadvisable to discuss the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko separately in an electoral geography study, given their similar social and geographical base.

ther of the other two types. Rather it has a supplementary nature. Nevertheless, liberal votes succeeded in cutting in between the two basic poles and sometimes ousting one of them.

One feature of the liberal type of voting is that it belongs to the center. This was confirmed once again in the 1999 and 2000 elections. Unusually high support in some rural areas of Samara Province is explained by local factors, i.e., loyalty of the regional periphery to Governor Konstantin Titov who was at the time one of the leading figures in the SPS. Otherwise, liberal voting was a clear characteristic of a territory belonging to the innovative center. Virtually all first order centers – Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities with a population of a million or more – produced high rates of liberal voting. Among centers of the second order in all regional centers around Moscow, with the exception of Smolensk, the same was true. This orientation was also noticeable in all administrative centers of the northern half of European Russia, but it was far less pronounced in the southern part of Russia. Apart from leading centers, such as Rostov, Samara, Volgograd and Saratov, only Stavropol had a significant liberal vote. In the Urals and further East, the liberal type of voting was typical for administrative centers except for peripheral ones – Chita, Blagoveshchensk and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. At the innovative center level, it is most pronounced in leading industrial cities of the Urals, such as Yekaterinburg and Perm. These cities with a million or more residents are joined by some smaller centers whose social history causes them to imitate the capital-city model of electoral behavior. These include Tomsk, Arkhangelsk, Petrozavodsk, Novgorod, Tver, etc.

Even in the semi-periphery, however, liberals do not fare so well. The exceptions are centers of the oil and gas industry in the Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets autonomous areas (Noyabrsk, Kogalym, Strezhevoi and others). Some industrial company towns of the second order, such as Snezhinsk and Seversk that belong to the Ministry of Atomic Industry, and Chernogolovka located in Moscow Region, have liberal tendencies.

Other voting types are observed less in Russian regions and they need hardly to be dealt with here. The nationalistic type of voting – for Vladimir Zhirinovskii and his Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) – almost eroded completely by the 1999-2000 elections. Then it was to be found only in far periphery islets such as Chita Province, the Kuril Islands, certain other areas of Siberia and the Russian Far East (Novosibirsk Province and Primorye), and in a number of small military communities. Conspicuous among the latter is Novaya Zemlya, a military testing ground, where the nationalist vote was slightly more than a quarter of the total. The nationalist vote survived at 15-20 per cent of the electorate only in a few isolated areas where remote location, the presence of

LDPR activists, and the personal popularity of Zhirinovskii among the military influenced the voters.

Geographical Modeling of Russian Elections

Now, on the basis of available data for the territorial distribution of votes, a conceptual model of Russian electoral geography can be developed. It will be built on the triad of basic voting types – the conformist, the leftist and the liberal. We shall generalize from the facts on the basis of vertical differentiation of the Russian electoral space. The essence of geographical modeling of an electoral process consists in describing regularities linking the geographical position of a place with its electoral characteristics.

The most obvious political feature of an *innovative center* is its developed liberal stratum. It is the key indicator of a classical capital city electoral behavior. No such Russian city has a liberal majority, but these innovative centers are more liberal than other places. The list of most liberal territories almost coincides with the list of administrative centers, except for those of republics and peripheral autonomous areas. The only exclusions among first order centers are Kazan and Voronezh; exclusions among second order centers include a small number of administrative centers of southern and eastern regions. The conformist type of voting is far less developed in the innovation centers than in the periphery. Even though a larger number of voters in the center still remains loyal to the authorities than votes liberal, conformist voting is far from being the distinguishing feature of the center. This can be described as notable inherent electoral stratification of the center into segments of comparable significance.

In the 1999 parliamentary election, Moscow demonstrated a high degree of conformism, but this was due to the popularity of the Fatherland – All Russia party and one of its leaders, Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Conformism in this case was encouraged by administrative resources and by personality, and it had a weaker link to Putin. In a number of regional centers, Unity succeeded. For the most part, these were small centers of second order located deep in the provinces. This trend was particularly typical of the eastern regions of the country where Unity triumphed in the expressly peripheral cities of Magadan, Blagoveshchensk and Chita, and in Kemerovo among the larger cities. It was similar in European Russia. In regional centers of the periphery – Kirov, Pskov, Kostroma, Ivanovo, Kursk, Penza, Astrakhan and Izhevsk – Unity did well, but Volgograd was the only large city where Unity attained a signal success.

In the presidential election of 2000, Vladimir Putin was certainly the winner in the innovative centers but behind this formal statement of fact are significant

details. The vote for Putin in regional administrative centers was almost nowhere substantially higher than nation-wide. If cities with specific ethnic populations are excluded, only two relatively big regional centers – Murmansk and Astrakhan, the northern and the Caspian Sea gates of Russia – were pronounced in their loyalty to Putin. The conformist type of voting then is typical of Russian centers only as a voting type prevailing in Russia as a whole. There are no special features of this type. Even so, the leftist voting typical for a number of centers of second and occasionally first order is a matter for further research.

A special feature of the 1999-2000 elections was the parallel advance of the liberal and leftist voting types. In some cities the left and liberal polarization of the electorate was accompanied by an erosion of its middle stratum represented by conformists. This trend was partly explained by a high degree of political and ideological awareness among urban residents due in part to their disillusion with Unity, perceived to be representing the government. It is best illustrated by Siberian cities such as Omsk and Novosibirsk. In Omsk, the leftists won 32.1 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary election, the liberals won a quarter, and the government party got just 22.4 per cent. In the presidential election Genady Zyuganov was 10 percentage points ahead of Vladimir Putin. In Novosibirsk the leftists won almost 30 per cent, the liberals 26.9 per cent, and the government party 26.6 per cent. In 2000, Vladimir Putin was a mere 4 percentage points ahead of the communist leader. Characteristically, in both cities Grigory Yavlinskii attained good results that were indicative of the liberal electorate's stability and low level of loyalty to the administration.

The situation in the *periphery* was distinguished for its heterogeneous nature. The periphery demonstrates a geographical stratification into the left (conservative) and the conformist (adaptive) tendencies. So far the former is predominant. Very rural areas, particularly in the southern parts of Central Russia and Siberia, mainly represent the leftist periphery. They tend to be agrarian locales, with less favorable climates and in need of government support. Many voters there opt for a socialist, i.e., paternalist model. Yet, there also was conformist voting in favor of Unity and later of Vladimir Putin. Its core consisted of rural areas in the Russian North, particularly in former territories of the Novgorod Republic. The influence of the left has always been rather weak in this part of Russia. In the post-communist elections, it evolved from a liberal to a conformist area (Turovsky, 1999/2000). The reawakening of St. Petersburg as an innovative center of the new ruling group in Russia certainly played a role in this process. This polarization of the periphery between North and South is still subject to a fermentation process. Nevertheless, it reflects a profound socio-cultural heterogeneity, due to historical differences, to wooded versus agricultural areas, and to taiga versus steppe.

The non-Russian ethnic periphery is a special part of Russia's political space. Although not very large in population, it is very diverse in ethnic and cultural terms. It is also characterized by its own stratification into the conformist and the leftist segments. Conformism in some parts of the ethnic periphery is conditioned by the influence of local bureaucracies that have favored the national government party in their own self-interest. This is typical of those ethnic peripheries that are less integrated into the Russian geo-cultural space, e.g., the North Caucasus, the Volga-Urals (Tatarstan and Bashkiria), Tuva, and Mordovia. The management of the electorate represents an articulation of ethnic identity partially concealed and distorted by the administrative resources. Ethnic areas that are more fully integrated and russified vote in patterns closer to neighboring ethnic Russian districts, but tend slightly more to the left. For example, the rural areas of Chuvashia are more fully a part of the red belt than the neighboring areas of ethnically Russian Nizhny Novgorod Province. In the North and the East many ethnic areas, e.g., Yakut, Buryat, and Altai, display strong leftist leanings.

The *semi-periphery* is often changeable, with differing forces contending for support with varying success. Both consolidation and stratification were found in the semi-periphery in the 1999-2000 elections, but the first effect was the stronger. The conformist and leftist voting types are combined in various shares and the liberal type appears in individual cases. Cities in newly developed areas and emergent industrial centers are most typically examples of semi-peripheral centers. Many of them have a significant liberal stratum. This is particularly true for metallurgy, oil, and gas centers and for the motor industry area of Togliatti. These are by no means economically prosperous centers.

In the 1999 parliamentary election, diverse industrial centers in Irkutsk Province and Kuznetsk coal basin energetically supported Unity, but other parts of the semi-periphery were under the influence of the left. These tended to be long-developed centers in southern Russia (Yelets, Murom, Kineshma, Arzamas and Novocheboksak) or similar areas in Siberia (Biisk, Kansk and others). Leftist voting is typical of cities in national republics. For example, it is characteristic of the multi-ethnic industrial centers of Bashkiria (Sterlitamak, Neftekamsk, and Salavat).

For the semi-periphery, the North-South geo-cultural differentiation is far less distinct than in the periphery. Typically southern cities, quite different cities in the Russian Far East (Komsomolsk-na-Amure), a large group of Primorye cities, and centers in the Urals (Zlatoust, Miass) are all brought together in the semi-periphery. The most demonstrative examples, however, are the oil cities (Nefteyugansk, the primary area of production of the YUKOS company, and Muravlenko). It is worth noting that two cities in the semi-periphery – conform-

ist Surgut and leftist Nefteyugansk – are politically far apart but located close to each other geographically. This is evidence that the semi-periphery is sensitive to the influence of local factors and is more subject to electoral instability.

Geographical Analysis of Elections: Voting Factors

Now it is necessary to identify the basis of the proposed geographical model of electoral process interpretation. Factor analysis serves to refine a geographical model. It enables one to reveal the most significant features that determine election results in this or that region (Gimpelson and Chugrov, 1995). Employing correlation analysis of electoral characteristics and quantifiable socio-demographic indicators, electoral differentiation can be analyzed in causal terms. This helps to reveal regularities in terms of functional dependence of voting on socio-cultural factors. Three key variables are used in the factor analysis: living standards (per capita income), the level of urbanization (the share of rural population), and the age structure (the ratio of pensioners to active working-age persons).⁶ Only territories, regions and federal cities are included. National republics and autonomous areas show excessive dependence of electoral behavior on management by regional and local elites.

The leftist type of voting is clearly correlated with the percentage of rural population. Rho reached +0.70 for the parliamentary election and +0.64 for the presidential election. Since rural areas are defined as the periphery, this indicates the peripheral nature of voting for the left. Voting for the left is also related to the percentage of pensioners: rho is +0.40 for the parliamentary election and +0.34 for the presidential election. Social well-being, as measured by per capita income, is less closely correlated: rho is -0.28 for the parliamentary election and -0.24 for the presidential election. First, the rural periphery continues to be the main support for the left forces in spite of its geo-cultural differentiation. Second, voting is strongly influenced by the demographic pattern; a higher share of older people in the population entails greater leftist voting. Third, poor regions are more likely to foster leftist voting than richer ones.

A fairly distinct and fundamentally different dependence is observed in the case of the liberal voting type. The most significant correlation is with urbanization. Rho for the share of rural population in the parliamentary election is -0.58. The role of living standards is also significant. Rho for per capita income is +0.39. These findings confirm the association between the liberal type of voting and regions with cities and wealth.

6 Data are from the State Statistics Committee for 1999.

Table 1: The electoral map of Russia (based on the second election cycle results)

Territory type	Electoral characteristics	Most illustrative examples (uniformity cores)
Centers of first and second order: capitals, administrative centers of federal units, as a rule with a higher standard of living.	Combination of the liberal, leftist and conformist types of voting in comparable shares with the former two growing stronger. The liberal type far exceeding the average for Russia (the liberals' strongholds).	Liberal sub-type: Yekaterinburg, Perm. Left liberal sub-type: Omsk, Novosibirsk. Conformist sub-type: Murmansk, Astrakhan; for Unity: Magadan, Blagoveshchensk, Chita.
Ethnic sub-centers: capitals of national republics with a high share of titular population.	Enhanced conformism with possible outbursts of suppressed left and liberal voting types in the event of poor administrative impact.	Makhachkala, Nalchik, Ufa, Kazan. Leftist outburst: Cheboksary.
Quasi-centers: ZATO, technopolities, atompolises.	Combination of liberal and conformist voting types (the liberals' second stronghold).	Seversk, Snezhinsk.
Northern (typical) semi-periphery: medium-sized cities, industrial centers with no administrative pressure, not necessarily with high living standards, frequently simply poor cities.	High level of conformism, in some cases including elements of liberalism (strongholds for Unity) and with some reservations for Vladimir Putin.	Cities in the North of European Russia and in newly developed regions: Nizhny Taghil, Cherepovets, Surgut, and Norilsk. For Unity, less prosperous cities: Ust-Ilimsk, Ust-Kut, Mezhdurechensk, and small towns in Magadan Province.
Southern and partly eastern (left) semi-periphery: medium-sized cities with strong opposition leanings.	Leftist voting type prevailing in combination with conformist voting.	Cities in the long-developed part of Russia more to the south, in many cases firmly linked to rural areas (Yelets). Cities in national republics (Sterlitamak, Neftekamsk). This type may be expanded to include protest voting centers in the East (Nefteyugansk, Arsenyev).
Southern (typical) periphery: rural areas, as a rule, poor, with a high share of pensioners.	Leftist voting type dominating with conformism gradually growing. A stronghold for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Gennady Zyuganov.	Southern agricultural regions, as a rule not wealthy nor crisis stricken: southern part of Central Russia, Lower Volga Area and North Caucasus, South Urals and southern part of West Siberia, partly southern part of East Siberia and the Russian Far East.

Table 1: The electoral map of Russia (based on the second election cycle results) (cont'd)

Territory type	Electoral characteristics	Most illustrative examples (uniformity cores)
Northern (conformist) periphery: rural areas, close to left periphery in socio-economic terms, but separated from them geographically.	Absolute domination of conformist type (second, though numerically weaker, stronghold for Vladimir Putin and Unity).	Rural areas in the Russian North (European Russia to the north of taiga zone border, in particular Novgorod and Volgda regions).
Conformist ethnic periphery.	Conformist type dominating and sometimes reaching highest possible levels. Voting secured by local authorities' influence (administrative resources) and suppression of leftist voting type.	Rural areas in the majority of Muslim republics, as well as Mordovia, North Ossetia and Tuva.
Left ethnic periphery.	Leftist type dominating (in the absence of effective administrative resources).	Rural areas in non-Muslim republics and some republics in North Caucasus (Adygeya, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Dagestan in parts). National districts in ethnic Russian regions.
Deviating cases in ethnic Russian regions appearing due to employment of administrative resources and special popularity of local people among candidates (subject to change from time to time).	Voting for parties and candidates under the impact of administrative resources and/or other local factors.	Rural areas in Samara Province, Kuznetsk coal basin.

It is far more difficult to find a connection between conformist voting and socio-economic characteristics. The vote for Vladimir Putin is virtually uncorrelated with geographical indicators. Percentage of rural population is related only at +0.02. Putin's support was distributed across centers and peripheries. Voting for Putin was slightly more likely in areas with a greater number of older people and a lower level of average income, so the periphery component was still somewhat stronger. Presumably, Putin's electoral success owes much to the semi-periphery and close periphery, particularly the northern periphery. The relationship is clearer for Unity. The negative correlation with proportion of urban population (-0.45) and per capita income (-0.44) and the positive correlation with share of older people (+0.31) show that the electoral-geographical niche for Unity is a poorer city of older people. This in fact is the semi-periphery. In an analysis of the parliamentary election of 1999, we noted an electoral-geographical niche for the conservative pro-communist vote in advanced, large

cities (Turovsky, 1999/2000). A positive correlative link to poverty together with urbanization is also true for the nationalistic type of voting.

Correlations are conditional to some extent. A geographical analysis of elections should take into account non-quantifiable factors that may have a corrective effect on the final result. Factors identified in election geography theory, such as the friends and neighbors effect, the election campaign effect, or the local issue effect, should be examined (Taylor, 1989). These factors in Russia are strongly localized. The friends and neighbors effect, already noted for Putin in St. Petersburg and for Zyuganov in Orel Province, proved even stronger in neighboring areas (Leningrad and Lipetsk Provinces, respectively). In several national republics, the conformist type of voting became prevalent thanks to actions of the local authorities. This factor was behind the support for Konstantin Titov in the presidential election and for the SPS in the rural areas of Samara Province and for Aman Tuleyev throughout Kemerovo Province.

On the basis of the above analysis a conceptual map of Russian electoral space can be built through a combination of the nodal and the areal principles. A conceptual map differs from a geographical map in that it can be presented in the form of a table (see Table 1).

Territorial Evolution of the Russian Electoral Space

In order to make a more precise analysis of the Russian electoral map the diachronic approach is required. It consists essentially in developing a model of territorial evolution of the Russian electoral space, including its comparison with the first electoral cycle of 1993-1996. This is the fourth or temporal dimension of the geographical space. It is possible to analyze the evolution of the electoral process using Torsten Hägerstrand's (1967) concept of innovation diffusion. With its help we can reveal territorial specifics in the development of new electoral phenomena and transformation of the old ones, as well as specific features of the transfer of voters (and territories associated with them) in the process of forming new electoral phenomena as successors to the old ones.

The electoral dynamics of territories can be viewed as a result of two basic types of diffusion: contagious and hierarchical (cascade) diffusion. In the former case the phenomenon is disseminated in a continuous flow across the entire territory, and in the latter case it goes from periphery to periphery through a nodal network. Innovation diffusion is a transformational process going in waves: an innovation may be completely shifted to the periphery and with time become a tradition, whereas something new would be formed in the periphery (hence the concept of "diffusion of outdated innovations" which are no longer

viewed as innovations by the periphery). It is also obvious that innovation diffusion stems from many centers, rather than from a single one, and that is why the entire process is figuratively described as orange molding.

Alternative elections in the USSR and Russia launched the first innovation wave that traveled across the country and was in almost complete conformity with the initial periphery-periphery socio-geographic pattern. Indicative in this sense were elections of 1989-1993 in which liberal-democratic innovation almost completely coincided with centers of the country and caused rejection of the conservative "Soviet-style" periphery and corresponding polarization of the electoral space (Turovsky, 1996). A complicated process of expansion and an erosion of the innovation space followed since innovation diffusion is an evolutionary rather than a linear process. Investigation of the first electoral cycle demonstrated even stronger polarization of the electoral space with creative regions being supplemented by adaptive regions and becoming more loyal to innovation, but on the other hand, the conservative periphery turned into a stable consolidated formation (Kolosov and Turovsky, 1996).

The second electoral cycle differs from the first in terms of innovation diffusion. First of all, there was powerful peripheralization of political loyalty. There was nothing new in the process, it first started in the ethnic periphery and was noted there back in 1995-1996 (voting for Our Home Is Russia and for Boris Yeltsin) (*ibid.*). As ethnic elites found their place in the new system, they made use of administrative resources to transform the ethnic periphery into an enhanced loyalty zone. Thereby the initial innovation wave penetrated the ethnic hinterland by a cascade movement. However, the local population did not assimilate it directly but only via the arguments of regional leaders. In 1999 and 2000, this process reached its peak due to a dramatic growth of conformism in the ethnic periphery. Simultaneously a new process of conformism – peripheralization – developed in ethnic Russian peripheral and semi-peripheral regions. It was predetermined by mutual political adaptation between the ruling regime and the periphery, and Unity became an exponent of this trend.

As a result of the evolution within the ruling regime, the initial innovation wave was divided into a conformist and a liberal trend. The public dissociation of the government party from the liberals firmly locked in the periphery for conformism that manifested itself in support for Unity and later for Vladimir Putin. In this way the backcountry began simply to replace its Soviet conformism demonstrated in the 1989-1991 elections with a new, post-Soviet conformism. The ethnic hinterland⁷ was the first to succeed in such replacement. It was fol-

7 Most illustrative in this sense is the example of Tuva that supported Nikolai Ryzhkov in 1991 and then became one of the mainstays of the Russian government party and gave 70.8 per cent of its votes to Unity.

lowed by the more dynamic northern part of Russia which acts today as an adaptive region (in the 1991 presidential election, it showed a fairly reserved attitude toward Boris Yeltsin). The greatest changes were observed in the northern countryside, and loyalty notably increased in many semi-peripheral industrial centers. This process resulted in the above-mentioned apparent splitting of periphery and semi-periphery largely according to the geo-cultural principle. On the one hand, the conservative Yeltsin-style periphery was preserved as rejecting liberals and voting for communists. On the other hand, it was in 1999 and 2000 that a new, adaptive Putin-style periphery appeared, assimilating innovations in their new guise.

This process manifests itself in an even more illustrative way in electoral trend analysis. One of the key results of the 1999-2000 cycle was greater loyalty in the periphery and growing opposition sentiments in centers and cities in general. In the 2000 presidential election, a large-scale expansion of the supporters of the government party took place in almost every traditionally red region of the southern part of European Russia, the Volga Area and so on (Turovsky, 2000b).⁸ And this process was more pronounced in the countryside. In the North, the process has already led to some qualitative shifts and the emergence of a Putin-style loyal periphery; in the South, the conservative periphery became substantially less consolidated. At the same time, loyalty of the semi-periphery which became a support for the new government power, increased. Thanks to the formation of Unity, the semi-periphery was wrenched from its former leaders, Vladimir Zhirinovskii and Alexander Lebed'. Therefore the nationalistic type of voting strongly manifested there in 1993-1996 was replaced with conformism represented by the Unity (Turovsky, 1999/2000).

Meanwhile, an inner transformation began within the periphery. The innovation wave stimulated by the Kremlin went basically to the periphery and in the periphery remained true to its liberal component. However, it became locked there and evinced no substantial tendency to expand according to the innovation diffusion pattern. A reassessment of the innovation process was initiated that manifested itself in the progressive development of innovation represented by a new leader of the liberal camp, the Union of Right Forces.⁹ This suggests that the liberal type of voting, and more specifically voting for the SPS in 1999-2000, was a sign of the inner transformation of the periphery, but its border turned out to be a barrier to its dissemination across the country.

8 This process was observed in the most conservative regions of the eastern and southern parts of Russia.

9 In 1999, liberal voting was stronger than in the 1995 parliamentary election in almost all major cities. In such cities as Yekaterinburg, Perm, Novosibirsk, Tomsk and Nizhny Novgorod, the share of liberal voters more than doubled.

Enhanced leftist, pro-communist sentiments were another indication of the inner transformation and fermentation in the periphery. This was graphically demonstrated by parliamentary and especially presidential election results. A shift to the left was noted in industrial regions in the North and the East of the country even in the parliamentary election¹⁰ (ibid.). In the presidential election a new red belt quite unexpectedly appeared in Siberia and the Russian Far East where support for Gennady Zyuganov was notably higher in a large group of eastern regions than in Russia as a whole (Turovsky, 2000b). A shift to the left was conspicuous in regional centers. Irkutsk is one example: Zyuganov obtained 37.5 per cent compared to 18.5 per cent in the whole of Russia during the first round of the 1996 presidential election.

This process also affected a part of the semi-periphery, particularly in the south of the Russian Far East where a spontaneous shift to the left engulfed practically the entire territory. For example, Zyuganov won an additional 20 percentage points or so in Primorye cities such as Dalnegorsk and Arsenyev. But even in politically more stable Khabarovsk Territory a shift to the left was notable – almost by 10 percentage points in Komsomolsk-na-Amure. The most radical transformation occurred in Nefteyugansk. This region turned from a bulwark for Yeltsin (Zyuganov got a mere 11.7 per cent in 1996) to almost a red belt (Zyuganov won 36.8 per cent in 2000).

Thus, the second election cycle reflected a new, transitional situation. The initial liberal-democratic innovation in the course of its movement around Russia was transformed into the government party exploiting electoral conformism and adapting to backcountry requirements. In this state it remained frozen in the periphery; the semi-periphery shifted away from the periphery. Erosion of the conservative backcountry started with its leftist leanings preserved but they weakened notably.

Meanwhile, complicated transformation processes emerged in the periphery reflecting its tendency to search for a *modus vivendi* in a new geo-electoral situation. On the one hand, the periphery attempted to enhance its innovation function, which resulted in strengthening radical liberalism. Thereby it had somewhat reinstated its position at the times of perestroika when the periphery was a powerful re-transmitter of liberal values. On the other hand, the leftist renaissance started in the periphery as an opposite ideological quest. Thus, partial peripheralization of the government party brought about symmetrical radicalization of the periphery that was in search of new innovation roles for itself. Simultaneously with the above processes, territorial polarization of the election space weakened due to a partial convergence of extremes.

10 This was a distinguishing feature in Chelyabinsk, Perm, Sverdlovsk and Irkutsk regions, Khabarovsk and Primorye territories, Murmansk Province and the Republic of Komi.

Some Conclusions

Our analysis shows that description of the Russian electoral space requires a combination of the areal and nodal (network) principles. According to the latter principle, positioning of a territory in the center-periphery system largely determines its electoral options. Geographical modeling and correlation factor analysis revealed that the leftist type of voting is characteristic of the periphery, the liberal of the center (core) and the conformist of semi-periphery. Thus, the role of territory in the geo-economic and administrative spaces essentially affects voting returns. Let us note here that geographical interpretation of election results using the center-periphery model correlates with existing explanations based on the analysis of socio-demographic parameters: for instance, a higher living standard is characteristic of nodes and of larger and more important ones at that.

At the same time there is another dimension of geo-electoral differentiation, the geo-cultural dimension that is less pronounced in Russia. Two gradients, "North-South" and "ethnic Russian core/non-Russian periphery" are noticeable in Russia's space. For instance, the North-South gradient reveals itself in differentiation of the periphery as well as the center and semi-periphery, as the South, other things being equal, is as a rule more conservative than the North. The liberal type of voting is less prominent in southern centers; whereas northern semi-periphery and periphery are as a rule more conservative than in the South. Curiously, this gradient, formerly associated with European Russia, is now evident in Siberia and the Russian Far East with a notable shift to the left being observed in its southern half. The sources of this fundamental split should obviously be searched for on the geo-cultural map of Russia because the agrarian South has always been a bulwark of conservatism, whereas the North has been historically more dynamic and more adaptive towards values of liberty.¹¹ Relationships between Russian and national territories also play a determining role in the formation of the Russian electoral space, depending upon which ethnic periphery is literally torn between the conformist and leftist voting types.

The fourth dimension in our system is developmental and it is connected with electoral space dynamics. Here substantial shifts in both network and areal terms can be observed. In the former approach a shift to the left and secondary strengthening of liberalism are evident in the center with conformism growing in the periphery. At the same time a more detailed analysis of this process reveals apart from the usual North-South gradient also the West-East gradient

11 That is why in studying the electoral map of Russia it is helpful to bear in mind the borders between northern and southern dialects of Russian, between *render* and *corvee* areas, etc.

(long- and newly developed territories in Russia). For instance, a shift to the left among voters turned out to be more typical of the East than of the West, whereas the growth of conformism was more typical of the North than the South.

Further prospects of Russia's electoral space development will depend on its political system evolution. If the government party retains the conformist dominant character, then the results of peripheralization of conformism will be consolidated and will promote the government party's reliance on the periphery, semi-periphery and, partly, the center. Return to liberalism, on the contrary, can strengthen the authorities' position in the periphery. However, it is not clear what would be the response to such a turnabout in the periphery, including the ethnic periphery, in view of the coolness in relations between the capital and the republics. The process in the left wing is in a similarly incomplete state. The center's shift to the left in principle fits well into the West's model, but there the left forces are differently positioned as a vanguard and are an innovative rather than a conservative force. In the context of Russia and the Russian left wing, this process cannot yet be described as a long-term trend. To sum up, in terms of the geography of elections the 1999-2000 cycle was not a critical one. Rather these elections can be described as transitional, and tendencies formed do not seem to be irreversible. Apparently, what we have here is an interdependent system of incomplete transformation of the political system and the electoral space interacting like communicating vessels.

References

- Agnew, James (1987). *Place and Politics. The Geographical Mediation of State and Society*. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Friedmann, John (1966). *Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gimpelson, Vladimir and Sergei Chugrov (1995). "Modeli elektoralnogo povedeniya rossiiskikh regionov (Opyt mnogomernogo statisticheskogo analiza itogov vyborov 12 dekabrya 1993 g.)" *Vsemirnaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, No. 4. pp. 22-32.
- Gritsai, Olga, Grigory Ioffe and Andrei Treivish (1991). *Tsentr i periferiya v regionalnom razviti*. Moscow: Nauka.
- Gudgin, Graham and Peter Taylor (1979). *Seats, Votes and the Spatial Organisation of Elections*. London: Pion.
- Hägerstrand, Torsten (1967). *Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kolosov, Vladimir and Rostislav Turovsky (1996). "Elektoralnaya karta sovremennoi Rossii: genezis, struktura i evolutsiya." *Polis*, No. 4. pp. 33-46.

- McFaul, Michael, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov (eds.) (2000). *Rossiya v izbiratel'nom tsikle 1999-2000 godov*. Moscow: Gendal'f.
- Rodoman, Boris (1999). *Territorialnye arealy i seti*. Smolensk: Oikumena.
- Rokkan, Stein (1975). "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe." In Charles Tilly (ed.). *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 562-600.
- Rokkan, Stein (1980). "Territories, Centres, and Peripheries: Toward a Geoethnic-geoeconomic-geopolitical Model of Differentiation within Western Europe." In Jean Gottmann (ed.). *Centre and Periphery*. Beverly Hills/London: Sage. pp. 163-204.
- Rokkan, Stein and Derek Urwin (1983). *Economy, Territory, Identity*. Beverly Hills/London: Sage.
- Taylor, Peter (1989). *Political Geography. World-economy, Nation-state and Locality*. London: Longman.
- Taylor, Peter and Ron Johnston (1979). *Geography of Elections*. London: Penguin.
- Turovsky, Rostislav (1996). "Politicheskoye rassloenie rossiiskikh regionov (istoriya i faktory formirovaniya)." In Victor Kuvaldin (ed.). *Partiino-politicheskiye elity i elektoralnye protsessy v Rossii*. Moscow: Tsentr kompleksnykh sotsialnykh issledovaniy i marketing. pp. 37-52.
- Turovsky, Rostislav (1998). *Kulturnye landshafty Rossii*. Moscow: Heritage Institute.
- Turovsky, Rostislav (1999). *Politicheskaya geografiya*. Moscow/Smolensk: Smolensk University Press.
- Turovsky, Rostislav (1999/2000). "Parlamentskiye vybory 1999: regionalnye osobennosti." *Politiia*, No. 4. pp. 102-121.
- Turovsky, Rostislav (2000a). "Osnovnye itogi vyborov v odnomandatnykh okrugakh." In Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov (eds.). *Rossiya v izbiratel'nom tsikle 1999-2000 godov*. Moscow: Gendal'f. pp. 257-274.
- Turovsky, Rostislav (2000b). "Regionalnye osobennosti prezidentskikh vyborov 2000." *Vestnik MGU*. Series 12, No. 4. pp. 38-54.
- Turovsky, Rostislav (2002). "Itogi i uroki gubernatorskikh vyborov." In Rostislav Turovsky (ed.). *Politika v regionakh: gubernatory i tsentry vliianiya*. Moscow: Center for Political Technologies. pp. 8-43.
- Vybory (2000). *Vybory Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2000. Elektoralnaya statistika*. Moscow: Ves' mir.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1991). *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zubov, Andrei and Vladimir Kolosov (1994). "Chto ishchet Rossiya? (tsennostnye orientiry rossiiskikh izbiratelei 12 dekabrya 1993 g.)" *Polis*, No. 4. pp. 93-112.