

## **Russians on the Correlation Between the Interests of the State and Human Rights. An Empirical Analysis**

*Natalya TIKHONOVA*

*Abstract.* This article analyzes the state and dynamics of the Russian people's perceptions of the relationship between the interests of the state and human rights in the period from the mid-1990s to 2017. Based on results of a number all-Russian representative studies, it demonstrates that in the 1990s when the state refused to fulfill some of its key functions society remained convinced, due to the inertia of the normative-axiological system, that the state interests prevailed over human rights. However, at the end of the 1990s, Russians began to change their traditional attitude to the right of the state to realize its interests at the expense of human rights. Similarly, they started to take a different view of the legitimacy of state violence in relation to its citizens, as well as to the right of man to protect his interests by all means available. This process accelerated in the 2000s to reach the point when, for the first time in the recent history of Russia, the priority of state interests as opposed to human rights lost its domination. Today, society in Russia is split into two opposite groups (approximately 20% of the total population each) and the "silent majority" with no clear opinion on the issue. This means that Russia has come close to the "quiet revolution" with the potentially huge repercussions because the norm of the priority of state interests over human rights serves the cornerstone of the "institutionalized matrix" of societies of the neoetacritic type. The article demonstrates that those who support the idea of the priority of human rights in Russia are not interested in political rights and democratic freedoms—they are concerned mainly with socioeconomic rights. This group (and Russians as a whole) is convinced that the Western development pattern is unsuitable for Russia.

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**N. Tikhonova**, D. Sc. (Sociology), professor, professor-researcher, National Research University—Higher School of Economics; senior researcher at the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. E-mail: ntikhonova@hse.ru. This article was first published in Russian in the journal *Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya* (Polis. Political Studies), No. 5, 2018. The research was supported by Russian Science Foundation (project No. 14-28-00218-II) and carried out in FRSC of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

*Keywords:* public conscience, human rights, state interests, socio-cultural modernization, political modernization, evolution of Russians' mindset, norms and value system, socio-cultural dynamics.

**DOI:** 10.31857/S013454860004080-6

The socio-political processes unfolding in Russia in terms of the evolution of its population's norms and values can be interpreted through the prism of various theoretical approaches (modernization, cultural specifics of civilizations, etc.). My efforts to comprehend and interpret the data of nearly thirty national sociological surveys<sup>1</sup> in which I was involved as the head or one of the participants in the last few decades convinced me that their internally non-contradictory explanation can be received only with the help of the conception of modernization. I understand modernization in its neo-modernization interpretation,<sup>2</sup> that is, as "a process unfolding in varied forms and in view of the specifics of national cultures and historical experience of peoples that brings traditional societies to the state of modernity not only by means of economic, political, social and cultural but also socio-cultural modernization." The latter means "creation of new normative-axiological systems and meanings including first of all spread of individualism and values of successfulness, and the rational type of thinking that together create the basis for new social institutes formation" [12, p. 25].

At first glance, the efforts to apply modernization theory to Russia in which the Church was separated from the state over 100 years ago and the process of urbanization was completed over 50 years ago (when the urban outnumbered the rural one) look ill-fitting. In the last few decades, however, as suggested by the structure of employment, the primary sector of economics is gradually growing in Russia while the share of the secondary sector is contracting. Economic growth is very unstable and, as a rule, is not based on competitive principles. The right of private property depends on the relationships with power and is conventional. The share of the rural population is too high for an industrialized country and makes up about a quarter of the population, not changing for almost 40 years. It was 30 years ago that the growth of the number of literate people stopped; the share of religious people is rising, etc. These and many other facts mean that the modernization takeoff of Stalin's time that had brought the country into the ranks of industrialized powers at the cost of a huge loss of lives, by the 1970s lost its vigor, and all later efforts at reform could not remove barriers, which blocked it.

The uncompleted processes of socio-cultural modernization in Russia are one of the highest barriers (see, for example, [12; 13; 14]). Communal landownership and the type of social relationships into which the absolute majority of the country's population was involved survived until the early 20th century. Ninety years ago, the majority of Russians could not read or write. Judging by sociological data the majority of the adult population of Russia experienced primary socialization in villages and urban-type settlements. Meanwhile to become firmly

rooted, new values and norms require a lot of time, much more than the lifespan of one generation.

The modernization processes in Russia are stalling not so much because of the norms and values<sup>3</sup> of common people but because of the society typical of Russia where power and property are blended, with power playing the main role in this construct [16; 9; 10; 11]. At the individual level, the values of modernity can be or are actively accepted, or at the very least, the traditionalist system of values is rejected. These processes contradict the type of the society in Russia and its system of norms. Hence, an axiological conflict of kind that forces Russians to revise not only their ideas about personal relationships and success, but also the informal norms, which regulate the man-state relationships and determine what people think about the best possible model of state. This is directly related to what Russians expect from the state and what they think about it.

Here I have analyzed the specifics of certain key norms related to the man-state relationships in Russia and the specifics of their dynamics in recent years as well as its assessment in the context of the theory of neo-modernization. The latter reveals the specifics of transition of different civilization areas of the world from the highly varied types of traditional societies to much more varied societies of modernity. In this context, the fact that these norms are not always observed is unimportant. I have posed myself the task to understand how the ideas about the correlation between the interests of the state and human rights are changing in Russian culture rather than to reveal how human behavior changes in these circumstances.

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From the point of view of Russian normative-axiological system and the related institutions the model of the society observable in Russia is typical of traditional societies moving towards the epoch of transformations. This conclusion is suggested by the results of several research projects related to Russia's cultural specifics. Here I have in mind the studies of norms and values carried out by prominent Russian scholars and research groups including Nikolay Lapin and Lyudmila Belyaeva, Vladimir Yadov and Elena Danilova, Nadezhda Lebedeva and Aleksandr Tatarko, Vladimir Magun and Maxim Rudnev, Natalya and Yury Latov and others. These studies have been carried out over the years using a variety of methodologies<sup>4</sup> and data sets, and surveys have sometimes even been monitoring in nature.<sup>5</sup>

It seems that this model of a society based on the blending of power and property is best defined as neo- or late-etacratic. The "institutional matrix" [3] typical of this type of societies is based on this specifics and allows to describe them as societies in the process of modernization. I have described more than once norms and ideals characteristic of the Russian version of this model, which determine the relationships between the state and the individual as well as the Russian specifics of socio-cultural dynamics [12; 13; 14]. Other authors, too, characterized this system of norms and ideals and applied their results to different social

groups (see, for example, [7; 8]). That is why I will not dwell here in detail on its description and will limit myself to saying that *the state within the framework of this system of norms is an instrument of realization of the interests of a macro-community, which are more important than the interests of its individual members*. Thus, *the state should be guided by the interests of macro-community*. Unlike Western citizens, Russians believe that it is not specific groups of individuals who should defend their interests in the fight against each other, including through parliamentary democracy institutions. The state that stands above these private interests and expresses a common interest should balance the interests of different groups and pursue a policy based on public consensus aimed at the benefit of the people as a united community. The right and duty of the state to represent the interests of the macro-community as a whole mean that its citizens should demonstrated maximal loyalty to the state. They should recognize its right to interfere in their private lives even if this interference violates their rights.

The legitimacy of the special role of the state, however, in the system of norms and values of the Russians (up to and including the legitimacy of state violence) is based on the consistent performance by the state of its key functions. *The Russians consider them as an adequate reflection and realization of the strategic interests of the macro-community and the efforts to ensure the minimal everyday needs of citizens. To do this the state should have at its disposal adequate resources that ensure its domination in economics* [12; 13; 14].

Judging by the data obtained through studies, these ideas about the role and functions of the state and the related informal norms that regulated the attitude of the citizens to the state remained highly prominent in social consciousness (including the younger generation) at least until the early 2010s [7; 12]. In 2012,<sup>6</sup> 60% of Russians were convinced that the state should defend the interests of all people as opposed to the interests of an individual. Even more people (78%) insisted that the enterprises that infringed on the interests of the state should be nationalized; 51% and 50% correspondingly agreed that the freedom of the media should be limited and that to realize its interests the state should directly influence the judicial system. At the same time, being loyal to the state, Russians even then believed that the individual should not passively wait for favors from the state. He should have the right to defend his interests.

The share of those who agreed that the individual should have the right to actively defend his interests in the form of strikes and mass rallies was 55%. It was one and a half times lower than the share of those who recognized the right of the individual to insist on his interests contrary to the position of the majority (77%). About one-third (37%) believed that man should not have the right to strikes and mass rallies if they threaten public order. In view of the fact that the survey was conducted several months after the stormy fall of 2011 these figures should be interpreted as highly ambiguous. In the early 2010s, there were two models of priorities in public consciousness: the priority of the interests of the state and its right to insist on its interests by all means, and the priority of the interests of the individual who has the right to fight for his interests even if this might threaten public



order. The younger generation demonstrates a slightly bigger preference for the latter even if in the early 2010s there was no radical opposition between it and the middle and older generations.

The changes in the relevant indices of the period between the mid-1990s and the early 2010s reflect the dynamics of this contradiction that allowed, at the same time, the diktat of the state and the right of common people to fight for their interests. In 2012, as compared with the mid-1990s,<sup>7</sup> the share of those convinced that man should have the right to insist on his position and actively defend it increased by 6-7%. Meanwhile, the survey revealed a decrease in the share of those who believed that (1) the state had the right to limit the media freedom if they infringed on its interests (by 6%); (2) to protect state interests the government has the right to bring pressure on courts (by 5%); and (3) the state should nationalize enterprises, which prejudices its interests (by 2%). These changes occurred in the 2000s, throughout the 1990s these figures had remained practically the same. Between 1995 and 1998, despite the mounting dissatisfaction with the development strategy pursued by the country's leaders and the shrinking confidence in the state as a whole these figures changed only by 1-2%. This means that *the mechanism of changes in this sphere started in the late 1990s, was gradually gaining momentum in the next decade. As a result, early in the 2010s, long before the economic crisis of 2014-2016 the share of those who supported the priority of individual interests as opposed to state interests has noticeably increased as compared with the 1990s.* Alongside this, the share of those who sided with the idea of the priority of the interests of state and its omnipotence dropped considerably, even if the norm of the priority of the interests of state rather than human rights survived.

What did happen to the popularity of the norms that ensured the legitimacy of the Russian model of the state-man relationships in the mid-2010s, a far from simple period for Russia? Judging by available information in this period, *the movement away from the idea of the omnipotence of the state toward the priority of human rights greatly accelerated.* The share of those who believed that the government should be able to directly influence the courts of justice dropped from 51% in 2012 to 32% in 2017.<sup>8</sup> The share of those who believed that the individual should have no right to take part in strikes and mass rallies to defend his interests if these actions might threaten public order dropped from 37% to 29%, etc.

*These changes liquidated the formerly clear domination in the minds of Russians of any position related to the priority of state interests as opposed to the human rights.* Over one-third of the total population has no clear opinion about the issue; the rest are divided into two roughly equal opposite groups (see Fig. 1). This means that in Russia the shift traditional for the epoch of modernization changes has moved the norms of the priority of collective interests closer to the priority of individual interests and the point of "unstable balance."

Table 1 demonstrates that there is no longer a clear idea about the priority of the interests of the state as opposed to human rights. Not all those who insist on the priority of the interests of the state/human rights are very consistent in their approaches: there is about half of them in both groups.




Fig. 1. What Russians think about the correlation between the interests of the state and the individual, 2017.

The above suggests two important conclusions. *First*, judging by the empirical data the model of the relationships between the state and the individual typical of societies of the traditional type began disintegrating; this explains the contradictory and highly ambiguous positions of Russians on the issue. *Second*, today, much in what Russians think about certain facts of the opposition between the interests of the state and human rights depends on the context; each and every case might be differently assessed. This means that the normative model of the relationships between the state and man that corresponds to the stage of modernity marked by increased individualism has not yet taken shape in Russia. The nature of “Russian modernity” as a specific project of social development that Russia could have offered to the world is still unclear. One thing, however, is absolutely clear: it will not copy the Western model with its higher interest in democratic

Table 1

**Ambiguous ideas of Russians from groups with different mindsets about the correlation of interests of the state vs. human rights, 2017 (%)\***

Groups	Supporters of the priority of state interests	Those who disagree with the priority of state interests	Undecided
Supporters of the priority of human rights	20	55	22
Disagreed with the priority of human rights	49	19	11
Undecided	31	27	68

\*The shaded sectors indicate the cores of the groups who demonstrate consistency in choosing between the interests of state and human rights.


procedures at the expense of the socioeconomic rights of man. The role of collective interests in this model will directly depend on the position and conduct of the Russian elites. As distinct from the position of the president, in recent decades their activity has been splitting, rather than consolidating, society by promoting individualistic values and sentiments. In any case, it will not be the model that we can observe today; it will *considerably widen the legitimate forms of struggle of individuals and social groups for their rights*. These forms will reflect the new ideas about the acceptable “rules of the game” taking shape in Russian society.

The specifics of the current stage of transformations of the normative model of the man/state relationships in Russia are fully revealed by the analysis of what Russians think about the correlation between their rights and interests that relies on the special indices, the Index of the Priority of the Interests of the State/Human Rights (The PIS/HR Index) based on a seven-point scale. I relied on three indices: (1) the attitude to the norm according to which the interests of the state should dominate human rights, (2) the attitude to the norm according to which human rights should dominate the interests of the state, and (3) the attitude to the possibility of limiting the rights of individuals in the interests of the state.

The -3 point corresponds to the opinions of the most consistent supporters of the priority of state interests; the 3 point corresponds to the ideas of the most consistent supporters of the priority of human rights. The points between -1 and 1 mean that there is no a more or less clear position on the issue. Further on I will treat as opposite groups those of the Russians whose points are found within the -3 to -2 interval<sup>9</sup> and the Russians with the indices of 2-3 points. Today, their numerical strengths are more or less equal (about 20% of the total).<sup>10</sup> Moreover, fig. 2 shows that the population is equally spread to both sides of the scale's center which means that the Russian society is split into two practically equal groups.

At the same time in 1998, when the trust in the state was at an extremely low level while President Yeltsin's rating of job approval dropped below 10%, the number of those who agreed that the state should defend the interests of all people as opposed to the interests of an individual was nearly four times bigger than the number of those who disagreed with the violation of the rights of an individual for the sake of common interests. This means that in the last 20 years the public reconsidered the importance of human rights as correlated with state interests. For the first time in the history of Russia, the norm of the priority of state interests in relation to human rights retreated. In view of the gathered momentum (of which I have written above) we can expect further fairly radical shifts in this respect.

The fast changes that tip the balance between the supporters of the opposite ideas about the correlation between the interests of the state and human rights are driven first of all by the dynamic ideas of the younger generation and are also related to other generations<sup>11</sup> (see Fig. 3). The Russians born before the end of the 1950s who spent the longer period of their lives in the Soviet Union (in which the state overall corresponded to the traditional ideas about its meaning and functions) insist on the priority of the interests of the state. The middle generations are divided into practically equal groups of those who support and those who reject



*Fig. 2. Breakdown of Russians by the PIS/HR Index, 2017 (%).*

the idea of the priority of state interests vs. human rights. The youth, the generation below 25 in the first place, is convinced that human rights come before the interests of the state.

In October 2017, the share of those among the young people below 30 who supported human rights was twice as large as among the supporters of the priority of state interests; in the group of 61 and older, the correlation was the opposite. In the early 2010s, on the other hand, the age was less prominent when it came to the ideas about the state interests/human rights correlation: in the age groups of 18-25 and 60 and older the majority accepted domination of the interests of the state as opposed to human rights.

This probably means that as new generations will be entering adult life the imbalance between those who support the priority of state interests vs. the priority of human rights will become even more obvious. Such a situation might undermine the value unity of generations that was in Russia up to the early 2010s. Moreover, five or seven years later those who support the priority of human rights will dominate the supporters of the priority of state interests across the country. In some groups (first of all, among the younger groups in big cities) this domination will be absolute. The changes in the basic norms that regulate the relationships between the Russians and the state will be indicative of a revolution the scopes and repercussions of which will be colossal since all institutions rely on their legitimizing norms.

Today, it has become obvious that the attitude to the priority of state interests or human rights is closely connected with other basic normative components of Russians' mindset, including those of their opinions that define the judicial system as illegitimate. The number of those who believe that the government should have the right to influence the judicial system in the interests of the state is 3.5 times bigger among those who support the priority of state interests (see Table 2). Those among them who are convinced that "rigorous demands of social groups of all sorts to the government might negatively affect general wellbeing" and that "citizens should not have the right to organize strikes and rallies if they threaten social order" are twice and more as much as those who support the priority of human rights. There are 1.6 times fewer people who think that "each citizen under




Fig. 3. The share of representatives of groups with different mindsets among Russians of different ages, 2017 (%).

any circumstances has the right to defend his interests through strikes and rallies” among those who support the priority of state interests than among those who are convinced that human rights should be treated as a priority: there are 70% among the latter and 44% among the former. The minority, however, is still rather big. In fact, there are only two norms among those mentioned in Table 2, the attitude to which qualitatively distinguishes the representatives of the two polar world-view groups under consideration: the right of power to put pressure on the courts and the right of citizens to defend their interests by any active means and methods. Their dynamics points to their drawing closer rather than widening the gap.

The nature of the differences in the normative systems of those who support the priority of state interests as opposed to the human rights priority and current trend in this area indicate that very soon justified protest actions will become legitimate in the eyes of both groups. This will change the attitude of the entire population to the legitimacy of state violence and to infringement on the rights of an individual in view, in the first place, of the rising demand for independent courts.

What is of particular note, *the basic norms in the sphere of the relationships between man and the state are more or less equally popular in both groups*. These norms, on the one hand, demonstrate the specifics of the development of the Russian society. It is customary to assume, for example, that the opposition should be present in Russian political field, yet it should not fight the government or compete with it for power but to correct its initiatives or point to the faults and urgent problems outside the government’s field of vision. On the other hand, in the conditions of inefficiency of certain institutions of contemporary Russian society, these norms reflect the demands to power to become more efficient that have already taken shape in all population groups. One of them is the demand that the judicial system should proceed from the principle of equality of all and everyone before the law (see Table 2). In any case, these norms are related to the activities



of the institutions that in future will be responsible for the Russian version of modernity and that are still absent from Russia.

The attitude to the priority of state interests vs. human rights depends also on assessments of specific events or certain state leaders made by the representatives of both groups. For example, these groups differently assess Vladimir Putin and his potential. The majority (78%) of those who insist on the priority of state interests are convinced that he will improve the standards of living during his fourth presidential term; among those who insist on the priority of human rights only 47% think so. These groups disagree on Putin's ability of improving the situation in the social sphere: 72% among the supporters of the priority of state interests against 45% among their opponents. These groups also have different visions of Putin's ability of solving such problems as reducing corruption and establishing rule of law and order, on the one hand, and overcoming social inequality, on the other (corresponding indicators are 63% and 41% for corruption and 51% and 32% for social inequality). No wonder, among those who insist on the priority of human rights 36% support the president against 63% among their opponents.

*Table 2*

**The share of supporters of certain norms in various worldview groups, 2017**

(%; arranged according to the gap in the shares of supporters of corresponding norms)

<b>Norms and assessments</b>	<b>Supporters of the priority of state interests</b>	<b>Supporters of the priority of human rights</b>	<b>Gap, times</b>
The government should be able to directly influence the courts of justice if the state interests demand this	53	15	3.5
Citizens should not have the right to organize strikes and rallies if they threaten social order	44	19	2.3
Rigorous demands of social groups of all sorts to the government might negatively affect common wellbeing	49	22	2.2
The opposition should not criticize the government but help it function	71	63	1.1
Russia needs a judicial reform to make courts of justice impartial	82	90	0.9
True democracy is impossible without political opposition	56	68	0.8
Each citizen under any circumstances has the right to defend his interests through strikes and rallies	44	70	0.6

*The supporters of the priorities of human rights skeptically perceive model of Russia's development personified by Putin.* This explains why 62% of those who demand changes insist on the priority of human rights; the corresponding share among those who support the priority of state interests is 48%. They expect some cardinal changes—reorientation from ensuring the military might of the state to ensuring wellbeing of common people; decreasing inequality and reducing corruption (see Fig. 4). With a glance to the type of society in Russia, these aspirations mean in fact a “quiet revolution” of expectations followed by the restructuring of a number of social institutions.<sup>12</sup> This is all the more true as the demand for change is most prevalent among young people: in October 2017, 62% of Russian below 25 and 59% of the 26-30 age group said that changes were badly needed.

*It is wrong to say that democratic values figure prominently in the value scale of those who support the priority of human rights as opposed to the supporters of the priority of state interests—they are much more concerned with economic freedoms.* Twenty-five percent of them are ready to go out into the streets to defend economic rights against 19% ready to defend democratic values in street rallies and manifestations. These people are not interested in politics: only 21% of them closely follow what is said about politics, much fewer than among those who support the priority of the interests of the state (31%). Orientation to the West is not high on the scale of preferences of the supporters of human rights priority: drawing closer to the West and drawing out of foreign policy isolation are not what important for them (11%). The diluted version “of the West-oriented” position that presupposes that Russia, irrespective of its relationships with other countries, should move toward the life style typical of Western countries stirs up no enthusiasm. It is supported by 41% of those who insist on the priority of human rights and 28% of their opponents, so in Russian society there are no big social groups that will support the Western road to modernity, and Russia should look for a road of its own.

In recent years Russia has been demonstrating what, at first glance, looks as a paradox: in the context of consolidation of society on the platform of patriotism a rather active reinterpretation of the importance of human rights and their correlation with the interests of the state is going on. Society is split into two opposite groups (each about 20% of the total population) and the “silent majority” with no clear opinion on the issue. In Russia this means that a “quiet revolution” with huge repercussions has begun. More than that: the swift changes in the balance between those who support the priority of state interests and those who support the priority of human rights are registered among the younger age groups. This means that in the near future we will see further shifts, especially obvious in big cities, Moscow in the first place. In these conditions, the question of new informal norms that are being shaped today, that regulate the man-state relationships and legitimize all sorts of actions deserve special attention, even if so far is has not attracted attention of political scientists and sociologists.

At the same time, it is important to grasp the meaning of the position of those who support the priority of human rights in Russia. Their position differs greatly from that occupied by the traditional human rights activists who concentrated at




Fig. 4. Attitude to certain norms in various worldview groups in 2017 (%).

political rights and democratic freedoms. In Russia, those who support human rights are interested in socioeconomic, rather than democratic, rights. The number of those who support the priority of human rights and who are convinced that the government should not be able to put pressure on the judicial system even for the sake of state interests is much bigger than among those who support the priority of state interests. The same fully applies to the conviction that every citizen should have the right to defend his interests through strikes and mass rallies. Positive assessments of the current situation in Russia and President Putin's activities are more typical of those who defend the priority of state interests; those who support the priority of human rights are mainly skeptical.

This suggests a conclusion: for the majority of those who can be described as common people, the state remains, with certain important reservations, an instrument of realization of the interests of the human community living in the Russian territory. This explains their support of the state's right to "legitimate violence." In the last quarter century, the repeated attempts of the Russian elite to turn this majority into the "sleeping guard" and the fact that the state consistently performed its social obligations contrary to what society thought of social justice brought the traditional model of the state-the individual relationships to a crisis. By the same token, this accelerated the revision by social consciousness of the role of the state and the correlation between its interests and human rights. In fact, this was inevitable in the process of modernizational transformations. It is still unclear how the norms on which the model of the relationship between the state and the individual accepted by Russians as legitimate will look. In the coming decade these norms will be taking their final shapes.

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## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Here I have in mind the studies carried out by one and the same group that worked in different years at the Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems, The Institute of Sociology, RAS and the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Scientific-Research Sociological Center of RAS. The results will be partly used in the article with corresponding references.



- <sup>2</sup> It should be specified in this connection that the majority of Russian researchers occupy the positions of neo-modernism when talking about modernization of different spheres of social life in Russia: economic (Yevgeny Yasin); (ethno)political processes (Emil Pain and Leokadia Drobizheva); demographic problems (Anatoly Vishnevsky); the social-cultural sphere and institutes (Aleksandr Akhiezer, Nikolay Lapin, Tatyana Zaslavskaya, Vladimir Boykov, Svetlana Kirdina, Sergey Tsirel); in the sphere of culture (Igor Poberezhnikov, etc.). The logic of the general development of corresponding studies in Russia has gradually shifted the attention from the analysis of economic modernization to the problem of socio-cultural modernization. Today, the steadily increasing number of academics looks at the state of socio-cultural modernization as the causes of slow and slowing economic and political reforms.
- <sup>3</sup> Here I define norms as a certain absolutely necessary element that should oppose the values as emotionally and ethnically tinged elements of culture.
- <sup>4</sup> I have in mind, first and foremost, the methods of Shalom Schwartz и Geert Hofstede, widely used in the world in different interpretations (both classical and modified) as well as certain methodologies suggested by Russian scholars.
- <sup>5</sup> Studies of the dynamics of gender roles and distribution of power in the family and Russian society speak of the same [5].
- <sup>6</sup> I rely on the data of the all-Russia studies "What Russians Dream of?" carried out by the Institute of Sociology, RAS (March-April 2012, sampling of 1,750).
- <sup>7</sup> Here I refer to the data of the all-Russia studies by the Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems "Mass Consciousness of Russians during social transformations: reality vs. myths" (October 1995, N=1,462).
- <sup>8</sup> Hereinafter, if not otherwise stated, I rely on the data obtained in the course the seventh wave of the All-Russia Monitoring of the Institute of Sociology FNIIS RAS carried out in October 2017 (N=4,000, representing the population of 18 and older by regions (territorial-economic regions according to the Federal Service of State Statistics of the RF); inside them, by gender, ages and settlement types).
- <sup>9</sup> Consistent supporters of one of the alternative points of view discussed here demonstrate -2 and 2 points according to the PIS/HR Index; they are ready to retreat in individual cases in which the norm that regulate the state-the individual relationships which they support should be applied.
- <sup>10</sup> All other Russians remain "in between" with no clear ideas about the issue, which is divided into two sub-groups. One (26%) has no clear positions on the problem of the priority of the interests of state or of human rights. The members of the other (37%) have a vague and far from clear opinion on the issue; this was reflected in our scale as -1 and 1 points.
- <sup>11</sup> Other factors play a lesser role in the process than the age. This is true of the places where people live. In Moscow, for example, in October 2017, 26% consistently supported the priority of human rights, against 17% in the countryside. Educational level is even less important: the maximal share of those who insisted on the priority of state interests was 22% among people with higher education and 17%, with secondary general education. Users of digital technologies are much stronger affected by the ideas about the priority of state interests, yet the factor of age in this connection might be even more important: elder generations are less "digitally educated" than the youth.
- <sup>12</sup> On the deep-rooted causes of the "quiet revolution" see [1].

*Translated by Valentina Levina*