

## February in the Shadow of October: Historiographic Results and Research Challenges

*Valentin SHELOKHAYEV,  
Kirill SOLOVYOV*

*Abstract.* This article sums up the results of the study of the history of the February Revolution over the past two decades and identifies future research challenges. It focuses on works of a conceptual character which purport to break new ground.

*Keywords:* February Revolution, October Takeover, Nicholas II, the Provisional Government, Soviet (Council) of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

**DOI:** 10.31857/S013454860008

The year 2017 marked the centenary of the February Revolution. For a hundred years it has been overshadowed by the October Takeover. Suffice it to look at the extent to which research studies and documentary publications devoted to the latter outnumber the former. Things began to change in the last two decades when the history of the February Revolution began to attract the interest both of scholars and the general public [67]. A good many monographs, collections of articles, documentary publications were brought out, dozens of international and Russian scientific conferences were held which undoubtedly made a substantial contribution to the study of a wide range of scholarly problems.

The ongoing change of research attitudes led to a broadening of the range of the subjects studied, and provided access to more Russian and foreign documents and materials. At the same time there appeared many pseudo-scientific works which regurgitate the time-worn ideas about “secret plotters” and “Masons” who

---

**V. Shelokhayev**, D. Sc. (History), professor, senior research fellow, head of the 19th–early 20th Centuries Russian History Center, Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences. E-mail: valentin4141@mail.ru; **K. Solovyov**, D. Sc. (History), senior research fellow, Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences. E-mail: kirillsol22@yandex.ru. This article is part of the project of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research “Social Thought in Russia: from the Earliest Times to the First Third of the 20th Century. Collective Monograph in 4 vols.” (17-01-00237). It was first published in Russian in the journal *Rossiyskaya istoriya*, No. 1, 2018.

allegedly provoked the events of February 1917 and briefly brought the liberal opposition to power. By the same token, Russian liberals are traditionally accused of inability to control the tendency to anarchism and extremism in the country, thus facilitating the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in October 1917.

The anniversary of those events prompts historians, first, to review the results of the study of the history of the February Revolution over the past two decades and, second, to identify the research challenges for the future. The aim of this article is to present works of a conceptual character which claim to break new ground since it is impossible to cover everything that has been published recently.

The new generation of scholars continues to be interested in the underlying social and political processes that brought about the collapse of the monarchy. The first challenge is to ensure a comprehensive approach to the study of all the spheres of the Russian economy, the dynamics of the social structure of Russian society, the material, sociocultural and legal status of its various strata [51]. Shifts in the country's political system, various aspects of the activities of the executive and legislative branches, political parties and non-governmental organizations have come in for scrutiny [20; 21; 39; 50; 76]. A close look has been taken at the status of the "top" (the Emperor, his entourage, the mechanism of making administrative and military strategic decisions at the level of supreme power and the cabinet of ministers, the selection and placement of top and middle-level government cadres) [48] and the "lower orders" (marginalization, material status, sharpening conflicts in domestic life and at work). The study of ethnic and faith problems has become much more active [3; 8; 30; 45]. Significant results have been achieved in the study of foreign policy and military matters.

Even so, in spite of some progress, discussion on certain issues continues unabated. As before, historians argue about the level of economic and social development of Russia after the reforms of the 1860s, the evolution of its political system after the First Russian Revolution (1905), the stratification of Russian society, the position of various social strata, classification of political parties, assessment of their plans for changing the country's social structure, etc. The state and behavior of the political elites, including the sovereign and his entourage, are the subjects of a lively discussion. The search continues for the "enemy (enemies)" of supreme power ("liberal conspirators" and "Masons" acting in concert with the representatives of allied embassies, "traitors" within the army top brass who have broken their oath). Some works tend to portray the last emperor as "an innocent lamb" surrounded by incompetent ministers and generals. However, absolving the supreme power of historical responsibility for the destiny of the Russian state in 1917 is obviously a futile undertaking.

The scholarly polemic revolves around the pivotal issue: Could Russia have avoided the 1917 Revolution? Some scholars are convinced that the overall socio-economic and political trend of development offered a realistic chance for evolutionary transformation. But if not for the First World War, Russia could have continued to develop along the path it already seemed to have embarked on. In other words, the "evolutionists" consider the First World War to be the defining

factor. In the opinion of other authors, the First World War and the February 1917 Revolution were the results of the country's development after the 1861 reform. They see the war not as the primary cause, but as a catalyst of the processes resulting from the inability of the political regime to find an optimum way out of the crisis situation, a way that would meet the historical needs of the state. Indeed, the authorities rejected alternative models of transforming Russia proposed by the conservatives, liberals and socialists. As a result the traditional method of violent destruction of the outdated political system "from below" moved to the top of the agenda (as happened more than once in the European countries in the 17th—19th centuries).

The authors have little hope that the champions of one or the other point of view will change their minds any time soon and reach a consensus. However, in order to break the deadlock the scholars should abandon their predilection for speculative constructs so beloved by historians.

The realization of this or that alternative of post-reform development was closely bound up with the state of the political system and the position of the key actors, including the Russian Emperor. Particular attention should be paid to the last Tsar's mentality and his openness (or otherwise) to contemporary reality. Available sources (diaries, correspondence, public speeches, eyewitness accounts) warrant the conclusion that the autocrat belonged largely to the previous epoch. He hoped to preserve intact the political system which he had inherited from his father and to bequeath it to his son. Therefore the Tsar was afraid that the government would become too independent and tried to keep it "on a short leash." On this issue he enjoyed support of his entourage and family. Indeed, Nicholas II's correspondence with his wife shows that appointments were sometimes made under the influence of "irresponsible individuals" such as Grigory Rasputin, which, of course, discredited the authorities. All this highlighted the archaic nature of the political regime which could not be fixed by endless "ad hocery": firing of prime ministers, ministers, governors and so on. No matter how hard the Tsar tried to pick "loyal and dedicated assistants," no matter how he placed them, all the same the result was cacophony, not symphony [69, pp. 641-714]. As a result, the Tsar shared the fate of his European predecessors (English and French kings in the 17th—18th centuries) and his royal contemporaries (Austro-Hungarian and German emperors). True, the latter had better luck than the Russian Emperor who, together with his family, passed through all the tragic circles of inferno on earth.

As a rule, the political systems incapable of meeting the challenges of their time drag with them to the bottom the associated state institutions and the peoples of the empire who live through a national tragedy. By refusing to form a "popular trust" government led by a liberal bureaucrat or a public figure, the Tsar missed the chance, if not of rectifying but at least of temporarily mitigating the crisis situation in the country. In the last days and hours before his abdication the Emperor proved to be indecisive and made no attempt to organize resistance to the revolutionary chaos. He was obviously more concerned about the fate of his close ones than about the destinies of Russia. Many attribute the Tsar's abdication to

his wish to avoid a revolutionary bloodbath. But they forget that unrest had begun in the Russian capital several days earlier and the authorities could have nipped it in the bud. This was not done. The Tsar's entourage and the government had to blame everything on the "betrayal" of the generals who broke their oath, a "conspiracy" of liberals and radical revolutionary "rabble-rousers."

As for the events in Petrograd in February-March, Soviet historians had chronicled every hour and every minute of them [14; 15]. Present-day literature merely adds isolated facts which do not change the well-known overall picture. Today some scholars are still engaged in the cloying argument as to whether or not there were machine guns on Petrograd's roofs during the February days [69, pp. 641-714], report gruesome details of the murder of policemen in the capital and its environs, and describe rampaging crowds, etc. Many more facts can be added. But the question that suggests itself is this: how did this "spontaneous unrest" with its bloody and gory extremes arise? Clearly, it did not happen at once, it had been brewing for a long time. The "lower orders," taking advantage of the fecklessness and indecision of the authorities began to give vent to the pent-up negative energy in traditional forms of mass violence over the enfeebled and prostrated enemy. All this proved just one thing: the principles of social consensus never took root on the Russian soil, opponents invariably preferring the use of force to dialog. The Revolutions of 1905-1907 and 1917 were the work of one and the same generation which knew very well its friends and foes and used the same fighting methods. It is no accident that the experience of the First Russian Revolution was used to revive the political parties and mass organizations and to form the Soviets (Councils).

In the midst of revolutionary mayhem the representative institutions—the State Duma and the State Council—found themselves on the back foot. Historians have done a great deal to show the real role of these structures in the February Revolution [25; 26]. That role should not be exaggerated. Pavel Milyukov, one of the leaders of the Progressive Bloc, could go on delivering his harangues against the crown and the government, but the Duma was impotent without mass support. Only spontaneous protests that destabilized the capital provided the Progressive Bloc leaders with a unique opportunity to fill the political vacuum that had emerged.

Modern historiography has shown in minute detail, literally by the day and by the hour, the role of the State Duma Provisional Committee in forming the first Provisional Government headed by Prince Georgy Lvov [59]. One can give credit to those who have studied the complicated and contradictory process of forming a new government. At the same time we see a revival of the old tendency, whose roots can be traced to the émigré [38] and later foreign historiography, of representing the February Revolution as a political coup that happened at the top. Meanwhile the contemporaries (with the exception of traditionalists and conservatives) perceived the February Revolution of 1917 as a logical historical phenomenon with deep roots in the country's post-reform development [29, p. V; 79, pp. XI-XII; 81]. Incidentally, theoreticians and politicians of the moderate socialist

parties shared that liberal assessment. They were convinced that in the specific Russian conditions a transition to the socialist phase of the revolution was impossible without a prolonged period following the February Revolution.

Credit is due to modern historiography for a successful attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the substance of the programs of all the Provisional Governments [4; 46; 58, pp. 361-413]. The analysis gives grounds for claiming that the new government managed to work out and propose to society a rational model of transforming Russia. The theoreticians and politicians representing the new regime can be criticized for the way they went about implementing their strategy. However, that a strategy existed is not open to question. It was basically aimed at forming in Russia a new social system which gave priority to individual rights and freedoms and the rule of law. A rational solution was offered to national and religious problems, which, in theory, should have helped to preserve the unity of the Empire.

Soviet historians have tended to focus on the confrontation between the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies while present-day Russian historians seek to identify the "common ground" between them [57]. Considering the position of the moderate socialist parties which determined the course of the Soviets there was real chance of the Soviets coordinating their actions with the Provisional Government (especially when it was headed by Aleksandr Kerensky). That this did not happen is arguably due to the clash of personal ambitions of the political actors.

Modern historians pay much attention not only to the upper echelons of power, but also to the complicated and contradictory process of the formation of middle- and lower-level echelons [28, pp. 59-78]. The process of the formation of power structures was more intensive and purposeful in those regions where a network of local self-government had already been in place for some time. An opposite picture was observed in the regions where local self-government had been formed only recently or even simultaneously with the spread of the revolutionary process "from the center to the periphery." The formation of power structures in the ethnic regions met with many difficulties, with either pro-independence forces or the advocates of autonomy within a united state gaining the upper hand [16; 23; 31; 47; 75].

Power institutions were formed amid an unprecedented growth of mass social organizations of various types and persuasions. Modern historians have done some good work not only in counting the number of such organizations, but also in revealing the characteristic features of their activities [7; 18; 82].

The political parties in February-March and the following periods present considerable interest. Unlike the Soviet historiography, which has done much to study the activities of socialist organizations, modern scholars have tended to pay more attention to conservative and liberal associations and the profiles of their leaders (for more see [17, pp. 133-143; 34; 33, pp. 187-195; 35; 36; 32; 37, pp. 90-98; 38, pp. 79-94; 41; 54, pp. 84-90; 78, pp. 73-82]). As of this writing, an all-round analysis has been made of the set of reasons which led to the political demise of

conservative and right-wing liberal political parties (Octobrists, Progressists). A convincing case has been built to explain the leading role of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets) in working out the government policy in the period after February [72, pp. 504-611].

We find a more objective and differentiated approach to determining the place and role of socialist-leaning political parties at every stage in the development of the revolutionary process in 1917. The detailed analysis of the theoretical concepts of the Social-Revolutionaries (SRs), Mensheviks, and anarchists revealed what all these groups had in common at the democratic stage of the revolution [43, pp. 112-120; 50; 57; 71; 80; 83; 85].

Needless to say, modern historians have identified the ideological and political “disconnects” between moderate socialists, and yet they say with one voice that the February Revolution was “their revolution.” On the whole modern historians have got rid of the monochromatic approach of the Soviet historians to describing Russian Social-Democrats. That positive trend already manifested itself during the preparation of *Essays on the History of CPSU (Ocherki KPSS)* and gathered momentum in the following period. This comprehensive analysis has shown the Social-Democratic movement as a historically complicated intertwining of old and new social-democratic ideas of the historical destinies of Russia and prospects of its development, clashes of personal ambitions of the social-democratic leaders on many issues of tactics and strategy, ideological-theoretical and programmatic problems [73, pp. 32-41].

The characteristics of various forms of mass movements and methods of revolutionary struggle get much space in the modern literature. The emphasis has shifted to the traditionally spontaneous character of mass movements [9, pp. 5-27; 10; 12, pp. 53-64; 11] and to identification of some archetypal forms of the behavior of their participants. The impact is stressed of multifaceted and multilevel flows of information in which facts are intertwined with fiction and rumor. Disseminated on the frontline and in the rear they further rocked the already rickety political system, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty of victory at the front, sowing panic among civilians in the rear [1, pp. 17-32]. Much attention is paid to revolutionary symbols, the new rhetoric, and various forms of social behavior in Russia [24; 42]. Works devoted to new forms of social associations engendered by the revolutionary epoch (Soviets, factory committees) merit attention [27; 86]. Similar processes of self-organization of the masses took place not only in the rear, but also at the front where associations of soldiers and seamen were formed. Russian society in any case was demonstrating its capacity to self-organize. So the claims that the February Russian revolution was all about destruction, mass violence, drunken nightmare and robbery are grossly exaggerated and distort the real picture. There is no point in denying various abuses that happened during the course of mass actions, but they need not obscure the creative character of the revolution as a method of restructuring society.

The February Revolution in Russia began and grew in the context of the First World War which could not but brutalize the morals and worsen the living

conditions of huge masses of the population [13]. All wars, especially world wars, create extreme situations which change the destinies of millions of people, destroying their former ideas of the world, their lives and personal histories. Wartime extreme situations have a direct impact on the human psyche by plunging people into despair, on the one hand, but also generating, if only illusory, hopes for a change for the better [2, pp. 340-414, 677-713]. For many the revolution appeared to offer a way out of the vicious circle into a new and not yet well understood social and political being.

Historians have yet to answer the question, when did the February Revolution end: was it the formation of the Provisional Government, or did it continue until the convocation of the Constitutional Assembly which was to promulgate a democratic constitution for a free Russia? [22, pp. 8-136] For the very fact of the formation of the Provisional Government meant the start of a movement toward a constitutional assembly which would have put a legal seal on the results of the February Revolution and draw the line and give a fresh start to the formation of a full-fledged political and legal system [65; 66; 77]. This proves that the February Revolution was not a one-off event lasting ten days, but a protracted process that was violently interrupted by the October Takeover. This period saw the activities of several Provisional Governments, periods of its cooperation and confrontation with the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The February Revolution was not confined to the two capitals, Petrograd and Moscow [64], it was an all-Russia phenomenon [56; 60; 70]. Moreover, the February Revolution had wide international resonance. First, it is universally recognized that since March 1917 Russia had become one of the freest countries in the world, a "beacon" for the world community. Second, within the historically short space of time that the Provisional Government existed it developed and offered to the public a comprehensive program of democratic changes that affected every aspect of the country's life [58, pp. 361-413]. Third, the victorious revolution of February-March 1917 created a groundswell of mass enthusiasm prompted by expectation of a bright and very near future. That was undoubtedly a further challenge to the already embattled Provisional Government. It assumed an impossible burden of clearing a huge backlog of age-old problems within a very short space of time. The new government intended to do it with due respect for all the legal formalities that had to do with individual rights and freedoms, the problems of power and property. Besides, the government had to improve the well-being of the majority of the population, settle the serious ethnic and religious problems, hold the front and launch a victorious offensive of the Russian army. The ambitious scale of the plans was due to the lack of experience of running a huge country and (more importantly) the extreme conditions in which the state was to be run.

The situation in the country was becoming less and less predictable, calling for out-of-the-box solutions with every passing month (and with every passing day after the July events). However, the Provisional Government, hamstrung by the need to agree its decisions with the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, became mired in endless discussions. Frequent cabinet reshuffles, with the

socialists constantly gaining ground, objectively diluted the initial liberal-democratic course pushing the government toward radicalism, which scared the urban middle classes and the political organizations that stood behind them. As a result, the liberals were losing ground as they could no longer count on the former support of the democratic strata in the cities, and still less in the rural areas.

It also has to be borne in mind that the Provisional Government from the outset had no genuine leader capable of making strong decisions. Neither Georgy Lvov nor Aleksandr Kerensky were able to assume this mission [70]. Nor did the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies have such a leader. As a result, the Provisional Government and the moderate socialists were losing control of the situation in the country which was heading toward a national crisis. It could be resolved in one of two ways: either by establishing a military dictatorship or a dictatorship of left-wing radical parties [52, pp. 118-181]. Both outcomes were fraught with a civil war whose harbingers manifested themselves during the July events in Petrograd when left-wing radicals decided to use "bayonets" to test the Provisional Government and in the process split the socialist camp. July 1917 marked a turning point in the history of the February Revolution. From that moment on the political process began fast losing its nationwide character. Until July the main political players, in spite of important differences among them that emerged long before the February Revolution, tried to find a consensus by jointly working out and introducing democratic changes in the country. However, after July the illusions concerning joint fruitful activity vanished. One manifestation of this was the split among the socialist-oriented parties and increased activity of extremists who began to question more and more the national character of the February Revolution. Extremist forces increasingly sought to push the revolutionary process in the country from the peaceful constitutional and rule-based way towards violent social revolution. By October of 1917 a bloc had by and large been formed of left-radical socialist groups (Bolsheviks, Internationalist-Mensheviks, left-wing internationalist SRs, anarchists) who committed themselves to a violent overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of a dictatorship.

In conclusion let us formulate some theoretical and methodological questions without which the further study of the February Revolution is unlikely to produce any meaningful results. At the top of this list of problems is the question of the nature and type of the February Revolution and its logical link with the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907. It is precisely in this context that it is critical to answer the question: was the February Revolution a typical bourgeois-democratic revolution similar to those that took place in Western Europe in the 19th century, or was it a new type characteristic of the 20th century; were the First and Second Russian Revolutions typical of the countries of the "second echelon" of modernization and to what extent the October Takeover was a logical continuation of the February Revolution?

In spite of the abundance of works devoted to the prerequisites of the February Revolution up until now little attention has been paid to comparing the theoretical and programmatic ideas of the political parties and assessing their models for



restructuring Russia. Whereas the history of the conservative and liberal parties in the February Revolution has been meticulously studied (in the past two decades a huge body of documents and materials on the history of the main all-Russian parties and organizations has been brought into the public domain thus giving a push to their further scientific analysis; some works are devoted expressly to the period of the 1917 revolution: [53; 62; 63; 61; 55; 19]), the same cannot be said about the all-Russian socialist and especially national parties (materials on their history have yet to be published).

There is still considerable untapped potential of sources concerning all the “levels” of power, characteristics of the tangled relations between different Provisional Governments and the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, between the Provisional Government Commissars and mass public organizations. There are still untapped sources for the study of the process of the formation of local government and self-government bodies. Particular attention should be paid to the history of national political parties considering that the last two decades have seen the publication of many works in the former Soviet republics expressing opposite views concerning these organizations. Those who study the party-building processes in the ethnic regions of Russia after February 1917 should pay attention, first, to the world view of the local political elites; second, to the preceding period in the history of the national parties; and, third, their interaction with the all-Russian associations.

Work should be welcomed and encouraged to create information and statistical bases characterizing from various angles the scale of the workers’ [74; 84] and peasants’ [44] movements, the forms and methods of the struggle resorted to by various social strata, the evolution of their demands as the revolutionary process in the country unfolded. The efforts of modern scholars in this sphere have offered deeper insights and in some cases produced scientific discoveries. Special mention should be made of the studies conducted at the Lomonosov Moscow State University (MGU) special laboratory under Leonid Borodkin [5; 6]. Thus, modern scholars in Russia have real prospects for the further study of the February 1917 Revolution which would take it out of the shadow of October 1917.

### References

1. Aksenov V. B. Revolution and Violence in the Minds of Contemporaries: Rumors and Emotions of the 1917 “Honeymoon.” *Rossiyskaya istoriya*. 2017. No. 2, pp. 17-32.
2. Astashov A. B. *The Russian Front in 1914—Early 1917: Military Experience and the Present Time*. Moscow: Noviy khronograf, 2014. (In Russian.)
3. Bakhturina A. Yu. *Borderlands of the Russian Empire: Governance and Nationalities Policy During the First World War (1914-1917)*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004. (In Russian.)

4. Beloshapka N. V. *The Provisional Government in 1917: Mechanisms of Formation and Functioning*. Moscow: Dialog-MGU, 1998. (In Russian.)
5. Borodkin L. I., Konovalova A. V. *The Russian Stock Market in the Early 20th Century: Exchange Rate Dynamics Factors*. St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2010 (In Russian.)
6. Borodkin L. I., Valetov T. Ya., Smirnova Yu. B., Shilnikova I. V. “*Not by Ruble Alone*”: *Labor Incentives for Textile Workers in Pre-Revolutionary Russia*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010. (In Russian.)
7. Bradley J. *Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia: Science, Patriotism, and Civil Society*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2009.
8. Buldakov V. P. *Chaos and Ethnos. Ethnic Conflicts in Russia, 1917-1918: Causes, Chronicle, Commentary, Analysis*. Moscow: Noviy Khronograf, 2010. (In Russian.)
9. Buldakov V. P. The Empire and Turmoil: Reinterpreting the History of the Russian Revolution. *Rossiya i sovremenniy mir*. 2007. No. 3.
10. Buldakov V. P. Quo Vadis? *Crises in Russia: a New Take*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2007. (In Russian.)
11. Buldakov V. P. *The Red Riot: the Nature and Consequences of Revolutionary Violence*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010. (In Russian.)
12. Buldakov V. P. Revolution as the Problem of Russian History. *Voprosy filosofii*. 2009. No. 1.
13. Buldakov V. P., Leontyeva N. G. *The War that Engendered a Revolution*. Moscow: Noviy Khronograf, 2015. (In Russian.)
14. Burdzhhalov E. N. *The Second Russian Revolution: Moscow. Front. Periphery*. Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1971. (In Russian.)
15. Burdzhhalov E. N. *The Second Russian Revolution: Petrograd Uprising*. Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1967. (In Russian.)
16. Buttino M. *The Revolution in Reverse: Central Asia Between the Fall of the Tsarist Empire and the Formation of the USSR*. Moscow: Zvenya, 2007. (In Russian.)
17. Chkhartishvili P. S. Black Hundreds in 1917. *Voprosy istorii*. 1997. No. 8, pp. 133-143.
18. *Civil Identity and the Sphere of Civil Activities in the Russian Empire. Second Half of the 19th—Early 20th Centuries*. B. Pietrov-Ennker, G. N. Ulyanova (eds.). Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2007. (In Russian.)
19. *Congresses and Conferences of the Constitutional-Democratic Party*. In 3 vols. Vol. 3. Book 1. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000. (In Russian.)
20. Demin V. A. *The Russian State Duma (1906-1917): Mechanisms of Functioning*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996 (In Russian.)
21. Demin V. A. *The Upper House of the Russian Empire, 1906-1917*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006. (In Russian.)
22. *February 1917 Revolution: Problems of History and Historiography. Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference*. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg Electrotechnical Univ. LETI, 2017. (In Russian.)

23. Fedyushin O. *The Ukrainian Revolution. 1917-1918*. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007. (In Russian.)
24. Figes O., Kolonitskii B. *Interpreting the Russian Revolution: The Language and Symbols of 1917*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1999.
25. Gaida F. A. *The Liberal Opposition in Quest of Power (1914—Spring of 1917)*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003. (In Russian.)
26. Gaida F. A. *Power and the Public: Dialog on the Paths of Political Development (1910-1917)*. Moscow: Russian Foundation in Support of Education and Science, 2016. (In Russian.)
27. Gerasimenko G. A. *The First Act of People's Power in Russia: Public Executive Committees (1917)*. Moscow: NIKA, 1992. (In Russian.)
28. Gordeyev P. N. Provisional Government Commissariat Above the former Ministry of the Imperial Court. *Rossiyskaya istoriya*. 2017. No. 2, pp. 59-78.
29. The Government Coup. *Vestnik Evropy*. 1917. No. 2, p.v.
30. Iskhakov S. M. The February Revolution and Russian Muslims. *1917 in the Destinies of Russia and the World. The February Revolution: from New Sources to New Interpretations*. Moscow: Russian History Institute, 1997, pp. 189-207. (In Russian.)
31. Iskhakov S. M. *Russian Muslims and the Revolution (Spring of 1917—Summer of 1918)*. Moscow: Sotsialno-politicheskaya mysl, 2004. (In Russian.)
32. Ivanov A. A. "The Black Hundred Lost Underground": the Russian Right in the 1917 Revolution. *Rossiyskaya istoriya*. 2017. No. 2, pp. 42-59.
33. Ivanov A. A. "On the Bones of a Terrible Rout." The Activity of N. E. Markov, Leader of the Right, in the Second Half of 1917. *The 1917 Revolution in Russia: New Approaches and Views*. St. Petersburg: Russian History Chair, Herzen Russian State Pedagogical Univ., 2015. (In Russian.)
34. Ivanov A. A. "The Revolution's First Shot." V. N. Purishkevich and the Overthrow of Emperor Nicholas II. *The 1917 Revolution in Russia: New Approaches and Views*. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State Univ. of Industrial Technologies and Design, 2010. (In Russian.)
35. Ivanov A. A. *The Last Defenders of the Monarchy. The Right-Wing in the Fourth State Duma during the First World War*. St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 2006. (In Russian.)
36. Ivanov A. A. *The Political Right in the Russian Parliament: From Crisis to Debacle (1914-1917)*. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Alians-Archeo, 2013. (In Russian.)
37. Ivanov A. A., Stogov D. I. The Black Hundred and the Bolsheviks: Right-Wing View of the October Triumphantists. *The 1917 Revolution in Russia: New Approaches and Views*. St. Petersburg: Russian History Chair, Herzen Russian State Pedagogical Univ., 2009. (In Russian.)
38. Katkov G. M. *The February Revolution*. Moscow: Rus. Put joint venture, 1997. (In Russian.)
39. Kiryanov G. M. *Russian Parliament Members in the Early 20th Century: New Politicians in a New Political Environment*. Perm: Perm Book Publishers, 2006. (In Russian.)

40. Kiryanov I. K. Right-Wing Parties in Russia Before and During February—March 1917: Causes of Crisis and Collapse. *1917 in the Destinies of Russia and the World. The February Revolution: from New Sources to New Interpretations*. Moscow: Russian History Institute, 1997. (In Russian.)
41. Kolonitsky B. I. Right-Wing Extremists in March-October 1917 (Based on Petrograd Press Materials). *The National Right Before and Now*. Part 1. St. Petersburg: No publisher, 1992. (In Russian.)
42. Kolonitsky B. I. *Symbols of Power and the Struggle for Power: On the Political Culture of the Russian Revolution of 1917*. St. Petersburg: Liki Rossii, 2012. (In Russian.)
43. Kononenko A. A. Modern Russian Historiography of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. *Otechestvennaya istoriya*. 2004. No. 4, pp. 112-120.
44. Konovalov V. S. The Russian Peasantry during the War and Revolution. *1917. Revolutionary Russia. Symposium of Reviews and Abstracts*. Moscow: INION RAN, 2009, pp. 105-152. (In Russian.)
45. Kotyukova T. V. The First World War and the Participation of the Peoples of the Russian Empire (the Case of Turkestan). *The First World War: View Across a Century*. Moscow: MNEPU, 2011. (In Russian.)
46. Kovalenko N. A. *Central Power and Governing Apparatus in Russia: Mechanisms of Formation and Functioning (February-October 1917)*. Moscow: Univ. Humanities Lyceum, 2000. (In Russian.)
47. Krasovitskaya T. Yu. *Ethnocultural Discourse in the Revolutionary Context of February-October 1917: Strategies, Structures, Personalities*. Moscow: Noviy Khronograf, 2015. (In Russian.)
48. Kulikov S. V. *Bureaucratic Elite of the Russian Empire Before the Fall of the Old Order (1914-1917)*. Ryazan: P. A. Tribunsky, 2004. (In Russian.)
49. Lukyanov I. V. *At the Sources of Russian Parliamentarism*. St. Petersburg: Liki Rossii, 2003. (In Russian.)
50. Makarov N. V. *Russian Liberalism in the Mirror of Anglo-American Historiography*. Moscow: Monuments of Historical Thought, 2015. (In Russian.)
51. Markevich A., Harrison M. Great War, Civil War, and Recovery: Russia's National Income, 1913 to 1928. *Journal of Economic History*. 2011. Vol. 71. No. 3, pp. 672-703.
52. Medushevsky A. N. Russian Bonapartism as an Object of Comparative Study. *Proceedings of the RAS Institute of Russian History*. Issue 4. Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 2004. (In Russian.)
53. *Mensheviks in 1917*. In 3 vols. Moscow: Progress-Akademia, 1994-1997. (In Russian.)
54. Mikhaylova E. M. Right-Wing Parties in the Discourse of Two Revolutions: Victory in 1905 and Defeat in 1917. *The 1917 Revolution in Russia: New Approaches and Views*. St. Petersburg: Russian History Chair, Herzen Russian State Pedagogical Univ., 2009. (In Russian.)
55. *Minutes of the Central Committee and Overseas Groups of the Constitutional-Democratic Party*. In 6 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998. (In Russian.)

56. Narsky I. V. *Life Amidst a Catastrophe: Daily Life of the Urals Population in 1917-1922*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001. (In Russian.)
57. Nenarokov A. P. *Right-Wing Menshevism: Revelations of the Russian Social-Democrats*. Moscow: Noviy Khronograf, 2011. (In Russian.)
58. Nikolayev A. B. Reforms of the Provisional Government. *Reforms in Russia from the Ancient Times until the End of the 20th Century*. In 4 vols. Vol. 3. Second Half of the 19th—Early 20th Centuries. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2016. (In Russian.)
59. Nikolayev A. B. *The State Duma in the February Revolution: Historical Essays*. Ryazan: P. A. Tribunsky, 2002. (In Russian.)
60. Novikova L. The Russian Revolution from a Provincial Perspective. *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*. 2015. Vol. 16. No. 4, pp. 769-785. (In Russian.)
61. *Parties of the Right. Documents and Materials*. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998. (In Russian.)
62. *The Party of Left Social-Revolutionaries. Documents and Materials*. In 3 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000. (In Russian.)
63. *The Party of Social-Revolutionaries. Documents and Materials*. In 3 vols. Vol. 3. Parts 1, 2. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000. (In Russian.)
64. *Petrograd at the Turn of the Epochs: the City and Its Inhabitants During the Revolution and the Civil War*. St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 2000. (In Russian.)
65. Protasov L. G. *All-Russia Constitutional Assembly: History of Its Birth and Demise*. Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1997. (In Russian.)
66. Protasov L. G. *The People of the Constitutional Assembly: Profiles in the Interior of the Epoch*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008. (In Russian.)
67. Pushkareva I. M. The February 1917 Revolution in Russia: Problems of Historiography of the 1990s. *Russia in the 20th Century: Reform and Revolutions*. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 2002, pp. 241-267. (In Russian.)
68. Rumyantsev A. G. "Police Machine Guns" in February 1917: Myth and Reality. *The 1917 Revolution in Russia: New Approaches and Views*. St. Petersburg: Russian History Chair, Herzen Russian State Pedagogical Univ., 2015, pp. 37-53. (In Russian.)
69. *Russia During the First World War*. Yu. A. Petrov (ed.). Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2014. (In Russian.)
70. Sapon V. P. The Party Landscape of the Nizhny Novgorod Guberniya after the February Revolution (March-April 1917). *The 1917 Revolution in Russia: New Approaches and Views*. St. Petersburg: Russian History Chair, Herzen Russian State Pedagogical Univ., 2016, pp. 91-96. (In Russian.)
71. Savelyev P. Yu. *The Genesis of the RSDLP: Historiography and Sources*. Moscow: Information and Publishing Directorate of the Moscow State Regional Univ., 2016. (In Russian.)
72. Shelokhayev V. V. *The Constitutional-Democratic Party in Russia and in Emigration*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2015. (In Russian.)

73. Shelokhayev V. V. Reformatting of the Party Space in Russia in 1917 (Historiographic Results and Research Challenges). *Rossiyskaya istoriya*. 2017. No. 2, pp. 32-41.
74. Sobolev G. L. *The Proletarian Vanguard in 1917: Revolutionary Struggle and Revolutionary Consciousness of Petrograd Workers*. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg Univ. Press, 1993. (In Russian.)
75. Soldatenko V. F. *The Civil War in the Ukraine (1917-1920)*. Moscow: Noviy Khronograf, 2012. (In Russian.)
76. Solovyov K. A. *Legislative and Executive Power in Russia: Mechanisms of Interaction (1906-1914)*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2011. (In Russian.)
77. Starodubova A. L. *Legal Conference of 1917: Main Areas of Activity*. Candidate's Dissertation. Moscow: Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems, 2000. (In Russian.)
78. Stogov D. I. The Case of a Monarchist Counter-Revolutionary Conspiracy in the Context of the July 1917 Political Crisis. *The 1917 Revolution in Russia: New Approaches and Views*. St. Petersburg: Russian History Chair, Herzen Russian State Pedagogical Univ., 2012. (In Russian.)
79. Struve P. B. Liberated Russia. *Russkaya Mysl*. 1917. No. 2.
80. Suslov A. Yu. *Social-Revolutionaries in Soviet Russia: Sources and Historiography*. Kazan: A. N. Tupolev Kazan State Technical Univ., 2007. (In Russian.)
81. Trubetskoy E. N. Anarchy and Counter-Revolution. *Russkoe slovo*. 1917. 25 April. No. 91.
82. Tumanova A. S. *Social Organizations and the Russian Public in Early 20th Century*. Moscow: Noviy Khronograf, 2008. (In Russian.)
83. Tyutyukin S. V. *Menshevism. Pages of History*. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002. (In Russian.)
84. Yarov S. V. *The Proletarian as a Politician: Political Psychology of Petrograd Workers in 1917-1923*. St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 1999. (In Russian.)
85. Yegorov A. N. *Russian Liberals in the Early 20th Century and Power. Historiographic Discussions*. Cherepovets: Cherepovets State Univ., 2007. (In Russian.)
86. Zlokazov G. I. *Menshevik-SR All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Soviets in 1917*. Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1997. (In Russian.)

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*