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Contemporary Debates over Language
Policy regarding Ethnic Minorities in
Latvia and Ukraine: The Discourse of
Russian-Language Press.

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Introduction

The Soviet Union disintegration in 1991 and the end of the “cold war” have profoundly changed the political outlook of the world. All former USSR republics got a sovereign status which allowed them to choose their internal and foreign policy agenda and the further trajectory of their political development. This period has also significantly influenced language policy in contemporary Latvia and Ukraine. The authorities in the USSR gave few chances for both the Ukrainian and Latvian languages to be represented at the political and public levels within the countries. The main characteristic of that period was the complete dominance of the Russian language in all spheres of public life. Despite its privileged status and the high level of political representation of ethnic Russians, Latvia and Ukraine have always been characterized as being multiethnic and heterogeneous societies. In both countries, Latvian and Ukrainian were established as the only state languages which resulted in increased tensions within these states.

As a result of this policy, the largest minority group in Latvia and Ukraine is now constituted by ethnic Russians. Thus, more than 11 million of those who marked their “nationality” as “Russians” during the last Soviet census in 1989 remained in the territory of Ukraine, but did not get any special status for the Russian language. The Soviet national policy has also a significant impact on contemporary situation in Latvia. The country has always experienced influxes of migrants from different parts of the USSR. In 1989, before the Soviet Union collapse, Latvians constituted only 52 % of the population. Consequently, controversial demographic situation, ethnic diversity, establishment of Ukrainian and Latvian as the only state languages without taking into consideration a huge group of Russian-speakers, enhanced a historical chance for both Latvia and Ukraine to conduct the politics of nationalizing states, in terms of Rogers Brubaker’s theory of nationalism. He considers them as «states that conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for particular nations, yet as, “incomplete” or “unrealized” nation-states, as insufficiently “national” in a variety of senses».¹

It means that Latvian and Ukrainian politics after the restoration of independence are characterized by decisive attempts of both governments to promote the interests of the so-called “core” nation; language policy has turned into an effective instrument of conducting the politics of nationalizing state. It is also supposed to be the key marker of national identity and a means of promoting the interests of the “titular nationalities”. This fact caused significant resistance of other ethnic groups living in the territories of both states, Russian-speakers in particular, who had been in privileged position before the Soviet Union collapse. Thus, **the current relevance of the topic** is demonstrated in continuous and ongoing debates over the language situation in Latvia and Ukraine. Language tensions after the USSR collapse are still one of the

¹ *Brubaker R.* Nationalizing States in the old “New Europe” and the new // *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 19. No 2. April 1996. P. 412.

dominant topics in all political discussions which attract meticulous attention of the general public, mass media, politicians and human rights organisations. It is also important to note that the term “minority” is not used in the demographic sense in this work. The correlation between the majority and different minorities is often the question of constructing boundaries and power distribution. Thus, minorities are supposed to be those groups who are positioned as “weak” publics, in terms of Nancy Fraser’s division between “strong” and “weak” ones, although this group can be a numerical majority. “Weak” publics do not allocate the resources that will be sufficient to influence the distribution of power; they participate only in opinion-formation but not in decision-making².

Two research problems need to be encountered in the course of my analysis. A challenging question that should be considered in this research project is to build up the coherent and well-structured theoretical and factual basis of my paper. Despite a great many of academic publications devoted to the thorough analysis of scientific and political debates over Ukrainian and Latvian language policy, there is still a lack of neutral and unbiased articles on this burning problem, where Russians, Latvians or Ukrainians are not described as the “victims” of both the Soviet regime and contemporary politics of nationalizing state. The second problem that can be approached in the following research project is connected with the practical realization of language policy. A lot of analysts who scrutinize the language situation in two post-Soviet countries claim that there is discrimination against ethnic minorities and Russians in particular which can possibly lead to ethnic tensions and conflicts. Such an unstable situation is fueled by mass media that have resources to articulate the interests of a certain group of the population. So the attempt to shed light on a complicated situation with language use in Latvia and Ukraine and to reveal the logic of language policy representation in Russian-language presses after 1991 has been made.

The problems of language policy and ethnic minorities have a long history of academic interest. The most significant authors in this field are J. Fishman, C. Ferguson and E. Haugen. The definition of language planning elaborated by Joshua Fishman seems to be relevant for the current research. According to his definition, language planning is regarded as «*nationality* planning as well, and in this respect, it is different form industrial or agricultural planning which, at best, begin as *national planning*»³. The Soviet Union collapse and a drastic change in political, economic, social and cultural design of new independent states have been extensively analysed by both foreign and Russian social scientists. The most significant authors who contributed to deeper understanding of language tensions intensified after the USSR dissolution and thoroughly analysed the reasons of a painful reaction to the governmental attempts to make Latvian and Ukrainian the only state languages

² Fraser N. Rethinking the Public Space: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy // Social Text. 1990. No. 25/26.

³ Fishman J. Language Modernization and Planning in Comparison with Other Types of National Modernization and Planning // Language in Society. 1973. Vol. 2. No.1. P. 31-32.

are M. Alpatov, D. Arel, D. Laitin, A. Wilson, L. Bilaniuk, R. Brubaker, I. Druviete and D. Strelēvica-Ošīņa.

However, despite an extensive amount of literature devoted to post-Soviet studies of language policy and ethnic minorities, there is a certain lack of coherent, precise works that elaborate complex analysis of language policy, connecting the Soviet context, legislation and linguistic preferences with discourse analysis of current debates in mass media that is a powerful tool in political and social agenda-setting. Moreover, most of the works are focused on either the Baltic States or Ukraine, while the following research gives a broader perspective on the processes of language policy representation in public space. As language policy in two post-Soviet countries is a striking and extremely controversial problem, and many appeals are made in connection to morally embedded notions, a lot of publications in Russian-language press that were selected for my analysis represented politically biased positions, which created an obstacle for balanced research. This project is one of the few works where an attempt has been, made to conduct a comparative investigation of the Latvian and Ukrainian cases.

Latvia and Ukraine were chosen for comparative investigation of language policies because of several reasons. First of all, both countries had been developing in the same socio-historical context of the Soviet Union and, consequently, the first years of independence were marked by decisive attempts to reinterpret the experience of the past and conduct language policy that would protect the languages of the “core” ethnic groups. This fact gives a historical chance to conduct the politics of nationalising states⁴. However, the strategies of promoting the interests of the core groups, in terms of Brubaker’s definition of a nationalizing state cited above, were different. In Latvia not only language became the key marker of national identity; a controversial notion of citizenship has turned into a means of political exclusion of some groups of the population which are largely constituted by ethnic Russians or Russian-speakers. The complexity of the Ukrainian case is that linguistic and ethnic boundaries do not coincide in the country; they are supposed to be less rigid than in Latvia. Further analysis of the common and distinct features will give an opportunity to reveal also the discursive strategies of language policy representation in Russian-language newspapers after 1991.

Therefore, **the object** of my research is the discourse of language policy regarding to ethnic minorities in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union disintegration. Several daily Russian-language newspapers were chosen for the empirical analysis: Latvian *Chas*, *Telegraph*, *Vesti segodnya*, *Business and Baltia* and *Edinstvo*, Ukrainian *Delovaya Ukraina*, *Den*, *Pravda Ukraini* and *Fakti and Kommentarii*). I suppose that Russian-language media sources seem to be the most relevant data for the following research project devoted to language policy in regard to ethnic minorities, because they serve both as the means of articulating the interests of minority groups and balancing between the majority and other groups of the population. **The subject of my research** is

⁴ Brubaker R. Op. cit.

the processes of constructing the social problem of language policy in the discourse of Russian-language newspapers in both countries. My major research question is whether the problem of language policy regarding ethnic minorities is a socially constructed problem in the discourses of Russian-language press in contemporary Latvia and Ukraine? Therefore, **the aim** of the following research project is to reveal the representation strategies of language policy in relation to ethnic minorities in the discourses of Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers after 1991.

The research objectives that arise from the aim of the current research are:

- To describe the historical and institutional context of contemporary debates on language policy in Latvia and Ukraine (the impact of the Soviet national policy, the analysis of laws, international conventions, the Ukrainian and Latvian Constitutions);
- To elaborate a descriptive model of contemporary language policy toward ethnic minorities in Latvian and Ukrainian print media;
- To describe the mechanisms of constructing of language policy in Latvia and Ukraine as a social problem;
- If the initial hypothesis is proved, a clear necessity to describe the discursive strategies of constructing language policy as a social problem arises;
- To describe what styles of claims-making approval/disapproval are used by Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers published in the Russian language;
- To mark out the main social and political actors (organisations, individuals, politicians etc.) that participate in the discourse formation, production and reproduction;
- To find out commonalities and distinct features of the discourses of language policy related toward ethnic minorities.

The hypothesis: language policy related to ethnic minorities in contemporary Latvia and Ukraine is constructed as a social problem in the discourses of Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers published in the Russian language.

The theoretical framework of the following research programme is social constructivism which considers that the social reality as not a given and stable phenomenon, but rather a constructed notion. The constructivist approach to the studies of ethnicity and nation were also elaborated in my paper based on the frequently cited definition of nation by B. Anderson that is «...an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign»⁵. The primordialist view on ethnicity seems to be an irrelevant

⁵ Anderson B. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso. 1983. P.5.

tool for studying the process of language policy representation in mass media, whereas considering that ethnic groups and nations are a stable phenomenon with particular economic, social, cultural and even psychological characteristics⁶. The initial assumption of my research is that both Latvian and Ukrainian nation cannot be regarded as stable, non-changeable phenomenon; they are changing in the course of history and their political development. The main interest of this research lies not only in the sphere of analyzing the linguistic situation in two countries; the main focus is *how* contemporary Latvian and Ukrainian nations are constructed and what discursive strategies and means are applied in these cases. The theory of social problems construction offered by John Kitsuse and Malcolm Spector are used in order to reveal which social actors were the most important claim-making groups in Ukraine and Latvia on the issue of language policy after the Soviet Union collapse.

The method of discourse analysis seems to be the most relevant and fruitful methodological approach to the studies of language policy in Latvia and Ukraine after gaining independence. It is supposed to be a key instrument of analyzing the strategies of language policy representation by Russian-language newspapers. In my paper the research programme of a German sociologist Reiner Keller was applied. This programme is called “sociology of knowledge approach” (SKAD) and regarded as a fully-fledged research algorithm based on the works of Michel Foucault and Berger and Luckmann. Language (vernacular) games in terms of J. Kitsuse and P. Ibarra’s theory of social problems construction provide the researcher with an instrument to describe the social processes in course of analysis.

The primary data for the empirical analysis are Russian language press in both countries. Despite decisive attempts to promote the use of Ukrainian and Latvian in public space, newspapers in Russian still constitute a valuable source of information. They are read throughout the countries by a significant proportion of the population. Mass media are not only a means of informing the population but also a powerful instrument of representing the interests of different social actors; mass media themselves participate in forming, producing and reproducing various discourses. Thus, Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers mentioned above were chosen for the empirical analysis.

In my research project **the secondary data** are also included: the research projects conducted by the European University in St. Petersburg, the statistical data of the last Soviet census (1989) and contemporary Ukrainian and Latvian censuses were used. A variety of scientific articles devoted to the problems of language policy and ethnic diversity were thoroughly analyzed in order to get a comprehensive picture of the current problems connected with the status of the Russian language, protection, preservation and development of the languages of other ethnic minorities. These important measures are connected with the state language policy implemented through legislation. That

⁶ Бромлей Ю.В. К вопросу о сущности этноса. URL: http://scepsis.ru/library/id_836.html (Дата обращения 03.03.2013 г.)

is why, a brief analysis of Latvian and Ukrainian legislation on language policy was also carried out.

The following research project consists of three chapters. The first chapter offers a theoretical overview. Social constructivism as a broader and encompassing framework along with the social constructivist approach to nation-states were taken into consideration. Moreover, the theories of social problems construction were connected to the empirical study of language policy in Latvia and Ukraine. The second chapter presents a comparative overview of the language situations in both countries touching legislation, ethnic distribution and the impact of the Soviet experience of the ongoing debates in Latvian and Ukrainian mass media. The third chapter includes the general overview of the theories of discourse analysis, the significance of studying print media in social sciences and a thorough analysis of Russian-language newspapers in Latvia and Ukraine in the selected periods of time connected with important ethno-political events in both independent states. These periods encompass the approval and change of the language laws in both countries (for instance, July 1999 in Latvia and August 2012 in Ukraine where language legislation was reformed). The sampling includes also the periods when the most significant international documents were signed such as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (May 2005 in Latvia and December 1997 in Ukraine) and the European Charter for Minority or Regional Languages (June 2003 in Ukraine). The selected publications encompass also specific ethno-political events that are key a feature of either Latvian or Ukrainian case (for instance, protests against minority school education reforms that happened in February 2004 in Latvia).

The scientific novelty of the following research project consists in several important contributions:

- The research programme elaborated by a German sociologist Reiner Keller was applied for the empirical analysis of the selected publications. This fully-fledged and coherent mechanism of social research represents one of the few works in the large field of discourse analysis, where concrete advice were developed in order to help a social scientist to conduct discourse analysis of various sources of information.
- A comparative perspective provided us with the general overview of how language policy as a key feature of national identity can be implemented in two different post-Soviet countries. Previously, a lot of works concentrated mostly on the Baltic States or Ukraine, an attempt to compare these two cases was made.
- Different discursive and linguistic strategies in Russian language press representation of language policy were revealed. Kitsuse and Ibarra's classification of vernacular games proved itself to be a promising tool for an empirical analysis of mass media. This theoretical framework is an effective instrument of making an empirical investigation along with discourse analysis of the printed media.

Approbation of the work: this paper is a continuation of the research project presented at the 3rd interuniversity conference in April, 2011 (Higher School of Economics) in the section “Political Sociology” and the 1st Smolny Readings in April, 2012. The article «Correlation between Language Policy and National Policy in Ukraine» was honored the right to be published in the collection of the best works of the International contest in memory of Galina Starovoitova. The summer internship at the European Centre for Minority Issues in Flensburg, Germany and the autumn semester at the University of Bielefeld provided me with a chance to collect the appropriate materials for my thesis paper.

1. The Theories of Social Constructivism in Relation to Nation, Ethnicity and Social Problems

1.1. Social Constructivism in Social Science

The key characteristic of social sciences such as sociology, the full spectrum of political sciences, international relations, philosophy is their extensive concentration on society and human nature. Social constructivism has become an influential theoretical framework in different academic disciplines; various approaches are encompassed under the label “social constructivism”. For instance, the theory of a Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky is also considered as a part of this bigger theoretical framework. However, one of the most prominent books in the field of social constructivism is the book of American and German sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann «The Social Construction of Reality» (1966). This book is a solid theoretical basis for doing a research using the social constructivist paradigm and language policy in relation to ethnic minorities in contemporary Latvia and Ukraine in particular, because the initial assumption of my research project is that the language situation *is constructed* by different actors and represented in the form of political struggle over the status of different languages after the USSR disintegration.

The main proposition of this book is that knowledge serves as a product of social and cultural construction. Everyday knowledge, including individuals’ skills, experience and stereotypes, illustrates tremendous importance for the circulation of knowledge in society. Considerations of different meanings and their construction are marked in the interplay between individuals and other forms of social interaction. Berger and Luckmann state that all knowledge is the result of social interactions. From the point of view of the authors, social reality is objective and subjective at the same time. Everyday knowledge is the product of individual interaction; the system of values and knowledge are sedimented in social norms, practices and institutions. That is why these social formations are perceived by member of a society as the objective phenomenon.

However, social reality is subjective because it is created by individuals themselves.

The objective reality is constituted by social institutions which are formed on the basis of habitualization (making everyday experience habitual). Every member of society has his/her own typifications, which are, consequently, constructed by our everyday experiences, stereotypes, norms and rules of social interaction. Typifications are of utmost importance for interpreting other people' behaviour. Thus the social structure is regarded as a general sum of typifications and constantly repeated patterns of social interplay. As a result, the society is considered as a human product and objective reality, and individuals – as social products and creators simultaneously.

For the purpose of this research, the concepts of identity and the role of language in construction of social reality need a more thorough analysis. Berger and Luckmann assume that «identity is formed by social processes. Once crystallized, it is maintained, modified or even reshaped by social relations. The social processes in both the formation and the maintenance of identity are determined by the social structure»⁷. In general, Berger and Luckmann consider identity not as the stable phenomenon; identity formation is a changeable and flexible process and can develop in the course of history. Moreover, as the theoreticians of discourse analysis later stress, identity has become a battlefield, the place of political contestation and competition of different groups and their interests (See R. Keller, 2004). Language represents objectivations and typifies everyday experience. Language is supposed to be the key instrument of social interaction and understanding by members of one society. «Because of its capacity to transcend the “here and now” language bridges, different zones within the reality of everyday life and integrates them into a meaningful whole»⁸.

Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann argued that “a sign [has the] explicit intention to serve as an index of subjective meanings ... Language is capable of becoming the objective repository of vast accumulations of meaning and experience, which it can then preserve in time and transmit to following generations... Language also typifies experiences, allowing me to subsume them under broad categories in terms of which they have meaning not only to me but also to my fellowmen”⁹. Thus, language plays an extremely important role in the integration of different social groups and their socialization. According to Rogers Brubaker's theory of nationalism, language has also turned into the key marker of national identity in the system of Eastern European nationalisms.

«The Social Construction of Reality» has become a cornerstone in the framework of social constructivism and fostered a significant development of its ideas in the methodology of social sciences and discourse-analysis. The

⁷ Berger P., Luckmann T. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. NY: Anchor Books, 1966. P. 194.

⁸ Berger P., Luckmann T. *Op. cit.* P. 54.

⁹ Berger P., Luckmann T. *Op. cit.* P. 70.

research programme on discourse analysis (SKAD approach) created by Reiner Keller is largely based on the theoretical legacy of Berger and Luckmann. Moreover, social constructivism as a broader methodological paradigm was found an application for the theories of nationalism and ethnicity which are a central component of the following research project devoted to language policy in Latvia and Ukraine after 1991.

1.2. Social Constructivism in Theories of Nationalism and Ethnicity

Contemporary world is considered to be the international system of nation-states where the borders of a state coincide with a nation living on this territory. It is still obvious that ethnic and national conflicts exist in the modern world, regardless of the fact that the main priority of international law and the system of international organizations is to protect mankind from the threat of force and violence. Therefore, national problems, the categories of ethnicity and nation are vital questions that should be addressed to the international community. Moreover, these issues are widely discussed among social scientists, despite considerable misunderstanding of nationalism studies by researchers. In the following section the attempt is made to classify and characterize the classical theories of nationalism and different approaches to the role of language in nation-building formation in the readings of Hans Kohn, Ernest Gellner, Miroslav Hroch, and B. Anderson.

The general argument of these works is the definition of nationalism and nation. The main theoretical approaches to nationalism are primordialism and constructivism. Primordialism is regarded as the theory of nationalism that claims the phenotypical origins of national solidarity; it is the argument which contends that nations constitute an ancient, natural phenomenon. The nation is understood as a stable, non-flexible object with fundamental characteristics including linguistic, cultural or even psychological features which are involved in the process of separation of one ethnic group from another. Particularly, the Soviet ethnographic school with its main representatives such as Sergei Shirokogorov and Julian Bromlei was criticized for its understanding of an ethnic group as a stable community, ignoring linguistic and cultural diversity within the borders of one territorial unity in the Soviet period¹⁰. Bromlei defines «ethnos» as «people's association who share common and relatively stable cultural peculiarities and mental order as well as an awareness of their unity and endogamy»¹¹. Perennialists emphasize that nothing appears from the scratch and, therefore, nations existed in ancient times; it is not the concept of the Modern Time. In this paper I use the term "ethnic minorities" instead of "nationality" that is also regarded as the outcome of the Soviet legacy, where

¹⁰ *Тышков В.А.* Реквием по этносу: исследования по социально-культурной антропологии. URL: http://valerytishkov.ru/cntnt/publikacii3/knigi/rekviem_po/rekviem_po1.html [Дата обращения: 22.05.2013]

¹¹ *Бромлей Ю.В.* К вопросу о сущности этноса. URL: http://scepsis.ru/library/id_836.html (Дата обращения: 03.03.2013 г.)

the term “nationality” is applied to ethnic groups, whereas ‘citizenship, belonging to a particular nation-state is traditionally understood under the term ‘nationality’ in social science. Thus, the concept of “ethnic minorities” seems to be a more relevant descriptive tool for the purpose of my research.

According to Rogers Brubaker’s chapter «The Origins and Nature of Nationalist Theory», the philosophical roots of primordialism can be traced in the works of J. G. Herder who was one of the main representatives of the German Romanticism. «He bases his nationalism on culture and attaches exceptional importance to language as the means of uniting people, the key marker of the national identity and pride. He called this community *Volk* and described it as a political and cultural formation with its own scale of values, virtues and beliefs. Herder believed that the only rational form of government was the national state based on a *Volk*». Herder also determined the further development of the nationalist thought¹².

On the contrary, modernists assume that the phenomenon of nation was born in the modern era; Ernest Gellner is among them, claiming that nation is an inevitable part of the social transformation. Gellner starts his book «Nations and Nationalism» with the definition of this concept. «Nationalism is primarily a political principle that holds that the political and national should be congruent»¹³. Nationalism appeared because of the sociological necessity in the modern world. The change from the agroliterate society to the industrial society causes birth and development of nationalism. In the agrarian phase of development the rulers have no incentive to produce homogenized culture that is one of the inevitable parts of a nation. There appears a need for impersonal communication and a high level of cultural standardization that provides an opportunity to manage newly emerged forms of society. «In fact, nations, like states, are a contingency and not a universal necessity. Neither nations nor states exist in all times and in all circumstances. But before they could become intended for each other, each of them had to emerge, and their emergence was independent and contingent»¹⁴. This modernist thesis of Gellner underlines the difference between the state and nation and their cohesion at the same time.

The social constructivist approach to nations was enriched by the concept of nation elaborated by an American sociologist B. Anderson. One of the most widely cited notions of the book «Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism» is the definition of a nation as «...an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign»¹⁵. The members of one nation do not even have everyday face-to-face contact with other representatives, but they have some common features which constitute the process of imagining their solidarity. Such uniting factors, from the point of view of Anderson, are culture in general, particularly high

¹² Brubaker R. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. P. 50.

¹³ Gellner E. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. P.5.

¹⁴ Gellner E. Op. cit. P.6.

¹⁵ Anderson B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. P.5.

literary standardized language, print capitalism, common history and historic memory, intellectual elites, the spread of literacy and print newspapers and magazines. Anderson is one of the outstanding representatives of constructivism that finds the origins of a nation in its culture. Culture in this view is the mixture of linguistic, social, and historic artifacts that offers people an opportunity to imagine a unified community.

The birth of nationalism did not start in the Renaissance or in the period of German romanticism, as many primordialists claim; the concepts of nationalism and, therefore, nation were born at the end of the 18th century. According to the main argument of the book «Imagined Communities», print capitalism led to the spread of information in masses that gave different people a chance to imagine their belonging to one nation. Even reading a short message in a newspaper about an accident by members of one community simultaneously, creates the feeling of belonging to one particular unity. Thus, nationalism is the process of creating social and cultural boundaries; their construction is directly connected with political power. Nationalist projects of political community are a constructed phenomenon.

In comparison with Anderson's thesis that nations are constructed, Hans Kohn defines nationalism in a more abstract way. «Nationalism is the state of mind. Nationalism is the idea, an *idée-force*, which fills man's brain and heart with new thoughts and new sentiments, and drives him to translate his consciousness into deeds of organized actions»¹⁶. Nationalism in Kohn's view is an idea seeking to establish a sovereign state. As a result, the concepts of nation and state are deeply intertwined.

Czech historian and political theorist Miroslav Hroch offers a coherent overview of the origins of nationalism and concentrates largely on the definition of national movements that needs to be cited further. «I term these organized endeavors to achieve all the attributes of a fully-fledged nation a national movement. For nationalism is something else: namely, that outlook which gives an absolute priority to the values of the nation over all other values and interests»¹⁷. Hroch argues with Gellner and states that most national movements emerged much earlier than the industrial society of the modern era. The growth and development of national movements coincided with the process of social communication and mobility within the general transformation of society. Three main causes of the national movements are social and political crisis of the old regime, arguments between influential groups of population, and the crisis of the religious authority. Like Gellner, Hroch supports the premise that the process of the nation formation was inevitable. Nation is the mixture of different factors, including economic, political, linguistic, religious, geographic and other factors.

¹⁶ *Kohn H.* *Western and Eastern Nationalisms* / Ed. By John Hutchison and Anthony Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. P. 162.

¹⁷ *Hroch M.* *From National Movement to the Fully Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996. P. 62.

Meanwhile, the following research project requires a more careful investigation of the role of language in forming nationalist claims and creating a nation which are of utmost importance in all theories of nationalism. Hans Kohn argues that establishing the state language is an integral part of creating a nation. The question of language is particularly significant in the constructivist theory and Anderson's idea of «imagined communities». Anderson finds the origins of nationalism in culture and in language particularly. The latter encourages members of one nation to imagine their solidarity. Establishing a high literary standardized language is a necessary condition for effective management of society and cultural homogenization. It is the marker of national identity and a means of differentiation between several communities.

Ernest Gellner creates a binary model that consists of the agrarian society and the industrial society. A lot of dialects exist instead of a high standardized language in agricultural society. The folk culture is not based on literate forms. With the spread of literacy written language is fixed in dictionaries and is used in all public spheres of life. Gellner created a famous formula that language is the dialect with the state. It means that a certain dialect has a chance to become a language when it possesses its own national state. For instance, Ukrainian was regarded as the dialect of the Russian language for a long time not only because of its “backwardness” but also because it did not function within a sovereign nation-state. In Hroch's system, language and its extensive studies are an integral part of the national movement formation. In contrast to constructivists, primordialists assume that nation is identical with language group and has stable characteristics.

So the main difference between the authors mentioned above consists in their understanding of nationalism and its origins, varying from social factors such as social mobility and communication to cultural features including language, common history and print capitalism. The key debate in the theory of nationalism is the controversy between modernists and perennialists. On the one hand, modernists such as Ernest Gellner and B. Anderson suppose that nationalism is not a long-living phenomenon; it was developing in a particular period of time called the industrial era (Gellner) or in the modern period (Anderson) with the presence of particular factors, including specialization of labour, the development of print capitalism and the creation of high literary standardized languages and, therefore, homogenization of culture, and the emergence of the first national movements (Hroch).

On the other hand, perennialists (and largely primordialists) apprehend nation as an early phenomenon that existed in ancient times; the nature of this collectivity is described as perennial, having stable and non-flexible characteristics (for instance, the Soviet ethnographic school) and national character. Anthony Smith's theory of nationalism is highly sophisticated to define in terms of modernism or perennialism, because he agrees that nation is a modern concept but has pre-modern origins. Much attention in his theory is paid to history which is a necessary prerequisite in all nationalistic claims. This view is connected to a large extent with Anderson's idea of history as an

integral part in all nationalist theories and one of the unifying forces which give enhance a chance to imagine a community.

Generally speaking, despite significant differences in the understanding of the origins of nationalism by the authors mentioned above, the notion of language plays an extremely significant role in all theories of nationalism. Modernists and constructivists (Gellner, Anderson) argue that language is the means of imagining a political community and the marker of national identity. Perennialists claim that the language and ethnic group coincide. Primordialists tend to perceive language as a phenotypical characteristic which is attributed to a particular ethnic group.

Scrupulous attention of the theorists of nationalism to the notion of language and its role in shaping national identity seems to be a reliable indicator of the overwhelming necessity to deeply analyze the theories of nationalism and the social constructivist approach in particular. The latter is applicable not only to the studies of nationalism but also to the investigation of the theories of social problems. Whereas language policy in regard to ethnic minorities is the key component of the nationalist agenda in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union collapse, the theories of social problems that will be analysed in the following section can serve as an effective methodological tool for deeper understanding of social and political processes that are characteristic to the post-Soviet nation-states formed after 1991.

1.3. Social Constructivist Approach in the Theories of Social Problems

One of the most frequently used concepts in the modern world is the notion of social problems. Very diverse phenomena can be described under the label “social problems” – prostitution, drugs abuse, alcoholism, the rights of homosexuals, violence, ecological disaster and even the threat of state dissolution. The most challenging question arises when social scientists make an attempt to work out the theoretical approach that can be regarded as the most relevant to the studies of these complex social phenomena.

An American sociologist and one of the most influential representatives of symbolic interactionism Herbert George Blumer elaborated the theory of social problems. The critical point of his sociological discussions is that creation of social reality is an ongoing, continuous process. According to Blumer, social problems are considered to be a process in which certain situations are defined as undesirable, dangerous or threatening. Therefore, social problems are results of collective interpretative and labeling¹⁸. Blumer distinguishes 5 stages of social problems formation: emergence, legitimation, mobilization of action, formation of an official action plan and transformation. At the point of emergence, the society acknowledges some phenomena to be a social problem. The latter needs the support of members of the society in order to be

¹⁸ Blumer H. Social Problems as Collective Behaviour // Social Problems, 1971. Vol. 18. P. 298-306.

recognized as full-scale social problem. Mobilization of action includes involvement of people in resources to attract attention to some particular events in public discourse which can result in public discussions, advocacy, evaluation, advancing of proposals etc). The next stage is regarded as formation of an official action plan which is produced by strong publics as the result of bargaining. The last step is the transformation of the official plan and its empirical implementation by those groups of the population that are involved in decision-making (for instance, the government).

Nevertheless, the theory of Herbert Blumer lies in the field of social construction and gives a profound overview of the strategies and stages of social problems formation; it seems to be rather controversial. The phenomenon of social problems is strongly associated with its production and functioning in the public space which includes political space as well. What the "society" acknowledges as a social problem can vary from country to country, from cities to villages and what actors are involved in this acknowledgment of the problem and what social and political actors are involved in decision-making on particular events are the leading questions that should be addressed by social researchers. The transformation of the official plan does not necessarily lead to its empirical implementation. The major problem of Blumer's approach consists in the fact that does not offer coherent and precise instruments for empirical research of social problems. However, John Kitsuse and Malcolm Spector went further in their theoretical and empirical analysis and provided a broader outlook on this controversial issue. They worked out a full-scale methodological paradigm that included not only the theoretical foundations of social problems but also a promising tool of analysis.

Thus, the initial assumption of the following paper is that such social problems as language policy, discrimination against the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine and Latvia are considered to be a constructed phenomenon. That is why the theory of social problems construction offered by Kitsuse and Spector seems to be a more relevant and appropriate theoretical basis for the following research project.

In the introductory part of their book "Constructing Social Problems", Kitsuse and Spector emphasize that «there is no adequate definition of social problems within sociology, and there is not and never has been a sociology of social problems»¹⁹. Both authors played a prominent and indispensable role in developing the social constructivist approach to social problems research. They elaborated a well-grounded and structured framework that goes beyond the functionalist theory and other approaches that previously dominated in social science. The definitions of social problems varied from one researcher to another, so that there was no consensus on what should be understood under this term; social problems were largely conceived as objective conditions. Kitsuse and Spector proposed a radically new scheme and definition of this concept. «Our definition of social problems focuses on the processes by which

¹⁹ *Kitsuse J., Spector M. Constructing Social Problems. New Brunswick (USA) and London (U.K.): Transaction Publishers. Fourth Printing, 2009. P. 1.*

members of a society define a putative condition as a social problem. Thus, we define emergence of a social problem is contingent upon the organization of activities asserting the need for eradicating, ameliorating, or otherwise changing some condition. *The central problem for a theory of social problems is to account for the emergence, nature and maintenance of claims-making and responding activities*²⁰. They repeatedly emphasize that their theoretical approach is based in the studies of claim-making activities. «Claim-making is always a form of interaction: a demand made by one party to another that something should be done about some putative condition»²¹. In its essence, this activity is political because different social and political actors struggle for defining the reasons and the means of handling particular social problems. Different interests articulated by various groups are often open field of contestation between different parts of the population.

Unlike the previously dominating approaches, where the definition of social problems as an objective phenomenon came into focus, the aim of a sociologist, from the social constructivist point of view, is to reveal the whole process of constructing the social problems and its acceptance by different actors. Social researchers should investigate *how* the people act accordance with social conditions but not the conditions themselves.

As it was underlined above, the key feature of constructing social problems is the existence of claim-makers. They are considered to be those who assert that a social problem exists and needs amelioration by persons in authority. Kitsuse and Spector identify several types of claim-makers which are of extreme importance in my research devoted to language policy and ethnic minorities in contemporary Latvia and Ukraine. Among the most important claim-makers are victims directly affected by the consequences of some social problems and suffer from negative conditions. For instance, the controversial notion of "Russian-speaking people" is widely manipulated by politicians and mass media where this part of the population is often portrayed as suffering from discrimination against the Russian language and whose rights are severely violated. Problem bearers are individuals and groups who are the source of the social problem but often do not admit it and attempt to imagine them as victims. Dilettantes (social activists, volunteers) are also included in Kitsuse and Spector's analysis of claim-makers. They can be representatives of human rights organizations or communities that are formed on the basis of the common interests (for instance, the Russian community which articulates the interest of Russian speakers in Ukraine). Professionals (journalists and businessmen) earn their money working with social problems. Administrators or agencies, as Kitsuse and Spector name them, participate in decision-making and its implementation. «Many such agencies are mandated to serve the public, to answer their complaints and to solve their problems <...> Agencies have their own idea of their work they are authorized to do and the clientele who can legitimately demand their services»²². Different specialists can also be

²⁰ Ibid. P. 75-76.

²¹ Ibid. P. 78.

²² Ibid. P. 83.

among claim-makers; this category includes lawyers, doctors, teachers etc. For instance, in order to legitimate the claims of the Russian-speaking people to establish Russian as the second state language, experts' opinions, the statistical data provided by diverse institutions can also be used as an effective tool. Professional associations, international organizations on behalf of the European community, the political leaders of other countries can also assert that a particular problem exists. The following list of claim-makers includes diverse groups of the population and can be expanded depending on the social problem discussed in the society.

Kitsuse and Ibarra also offer a well-structured and comprehensive framework for analyzing social problems by concentrating on motifs or language games. Motifs are recurrent figures of speech and themes that highlight or summarize a central element of a social problem that often includes morally permeated phrases and metaphors (e.g. crisis, catastrophe, abuse, scandal, threat)²³. Kitsuse and Ibarra emphasize that the construction of social problems is hardly imaginable without using moral judgments or appeals to the general public because a great many of social problems are deeply intertwined with the notion of justice and various perceptions of equitativity. For instance, the investigation of motifs in discourses produced by newspapers or magazines, the tone of articles, the structure, and rhetorical questions can reveal what actors are included or excluded from decision-making on social problems, who the recipients of information are and whose position the selected publications represent. Idioms are also widely used in mass media in order to legitimize the position, present a persuasive argument or refer to emotions and shared symbols. Different strategies can be used here – for example, the rhetoric of loss: some valuable object or state is running the risk of losing value and needs protecting being unable to protect itself (e.g. nature, environment, innocence, purity, morality, and legacy). Other linguistic means include entitlement (claims that everyone should have equal access to resources including public institutions), endangerment (with the main focus on possible threats to health and security), unreason (focusing on intentional misrepresentation and deceit) and calamity (images of disasters and catastrophes, enhancing the moral panics).

According to Kitsuse and Ibarra's understanding of social problems which is explained and thoroughly analysed in their article «Claims-making Discourse and Vernacular Resources», response is an inevitable component of claims-making activity²⁴. There exist two basic strategies of responding to the claims: acceptance of claims which is expressed in calling to action and rejection of claims or blocking actions. Kitsuse and Ibarra mark out different language games used in response to the claims. Sympathetic counterrhetorics is used when the problem is recognized but remedial action is considered unnecessary. This counterrhetorics is subdivided into several subcategories. When the problem is naturalized in public discourse, an inevitable character of

²³ Ibarra, P.R. and Kitsuse, J. I. Claims-making Discourse and Vernacular Resources. In J. A. Holstein and Miller (Eds.) // Challenges and Choices, 2003. P. 17-50.

²⁴ Ibid.

the problem is emphasized. Counterrhetotics of costs involved means that expenses dealing with the problem are declared to exceed the benefits. Declaring impotence is regarded as impoverishment of available resources in solving the problem. Pespectivizing also plays a significant role in rejecting to claim-making, because claims about the problem are represented as subjective opinions. And finally tactical criticism presupposes accepting the problem but rejecting the means of dealing with it that the claim-makers suggest.

Unsympathetic counterrhetotics consists of several modes such as antipatterning (declaring the claim to be not a full-scale social problem, but rather only a number of isolated events), telling anecdotes (indicating a specific incident that contradicts the claim (e.g. references to personal experience), counterrhetotics of insincerity (suspecting hidden motives of the claim-makers) and hysteria (deproblematization of the claim by connecting it with irrational, emotional factors)²⁵.

One of the central points of Ibarra and Kitsuse's constructivist approach is that social problems are the arena of political manipulations and competition for agenda-setting. That is why they analyze different techniques of describing events that are used to legitimize the positions and arguments of various interest groups and social actors involved in the process of negotiation and decision-making. The most substantial source of information on social problems is mass media that also perform an active role in political and social agenda-setting. Ibarra and Kitsuse conduct a thorough analysis of vernacular resources and concentrate on various styles of claims-making. For instance, claims can be made in civic, legalistic, scientific, political, comic, theatrical and even subculture styles. Civic style is characterized by claims made out of outrage or moral indignation and presupposes speaking on behalf of "the people"; these statements create an impression of naturalness, spontaneity, even lack of organization. Legalistic style is used in texts when references to law, justice and rationality are made. In comic style journalists commonly apply sarcasm, exaggeration or irony in order to emphasize the significance of the claim and ridicule the counterarguments. The main characteristic of subculture style is that claims come from diverse segments of society based on gender, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, race, lifestyle etc. Scientific and political styles are often used in mass media because they seek to represent the public opinion on behalf of politicians and scientists who use statistics and other research data in order to legitimate their point of view and support one of the positions. This broad overview of the main concepts of Kitsuse and Ibarra's theory of social problems and language games that are widely used by different social and political groups to form current agenda-setting gives a social scientist a remarkable chance for deeper understanding of social problems. The concepts introduced by both authors in their article «Claims-making Discourse and Vernacular Resources» as well as the theoretical framework of the social constructionism in relation to social problem elaborated by Kitsuse and Spector provide social researchers with an effective tool to thoroughly analyze and

²⁵ Ibid.

scrutinize social problems. Moreover, the strategies of claim-making activity mentioned above seem to be directly applicable to investigating the highly controversial problem of language policy related to ethnic minorities in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union disintegration.

Summary of the Chapter I

The first chapter presented a general overview of the main theoretical concepts and approaches used in the following research project. Social constructivism based on the prominent book «The Social Construction of Reality» by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann provided the researcher with an effective methodological tool for the studies of the processes of knowledge production and institutionalization of different meanings²⁶. The main proposition of the book is that social reality is said to be constructed; social norms, values and institutions are the products of individuals' habituations that are embedded in people's experience and social interactions. The authors claim that the social construction of reality is a changeable and flexible process of interaction between different parts of the society that can potentially lead to the struggle over particular meanings and interpretations. Thus, the problem of language policy in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union disintegration represents nowadays a perfect example of how various social and political actors are engaged in the process of knowledge production and reevaluation of the past experience which turned into an open field of contestation (for instance, the discussion devoted to the interpretation of the Soviet experience).

The second part of the chapter dealt with the social constructivist approach to nations elaborated by E. Gellner and B. Anderson. After the Soviet Union collapse, Latvia and Ukraine enhanced a historical chance to conduct the politics of nationalizing state, in terms of Rogers Brubaker' theory of nationalism. The primordialist view on nations which concentrated on the stable and non-flexible characteristics of each ethnic or national group was criticized by its inability to explain complicated social processes after the USSR collapse. Thus, I assume that contemporary Latvia and Ukrainian national projects are a constructed phenomenon. It is alleged that the social constructivist approach provided the researcher with an effective instrument to study the ongoing political debates over national development in both countries. Anderson emphasized also that language is the key marker of national identity and the core element of nation-building processes.

Finally, the constructivist approach to social problems elaborated by John Kitsuse and Malcolm Spector was analysed in the following research project. They proposed a radically new approach which concentrated largely on claim-making activities rather than the emphasis was put on social problems as the objective conditions. In Kitsuse and Spector' theoretical framework claim-making plays an important role because claim-making includes both a demand that is made on the behalf of a particular group of individuals and a claim

²⁶ Berger P. and Luckmann, T. Op. cit.

addressed to the groups that are involved in decision-making on a certain problem. Moreover, Kitsuse and Ibarra provided a coherent and well-structured basis for the empirical analysis of social problems construction. Language games elaborated by these authors seem to be an important contribution to the social constructivist approach to social problems. Generally speaking, the combination of the theoretical approaches mentioned above within the overall paradigm of social constructivism seems to be the most relevant instrument for the analysis of language policy in regard to ethnic minorities in Latvia and Ukraine after 1991. Moreover, an overwhelming necessity to analyze the impact of the Soviet national policy on contemporary development of Latvia and Ukraine arises.

2. Language Policy in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union disintegration

2.1. Impact of the Soviet National and Language Policy on Contemporary Political Development in Ukraine and Latvia.

The Soviet national and language policy is one of the most topical questions that need to be thoroughly scrutinized because of its enormous influence on the current political development of the former republics. The end of the Soviet period was marked by the secessionist movements that spread all over the USSR and endangered its future development. «Only with the advent of glasnost' and a relatively open press and media did the existing tensions among the ethnic groups come to the fore». ²⁷

Thus, a brief overview of the historic processes that led to a deeply controversial public debate on language policy is a substantial part of my research project. The aim of this investigation is to reveal the logic of the Soviet national policy and single out the most important historic periods that had an impact on contemporary language situation in Latvia and Ukraine. An American researcher Carol Schmid points out that «the present minority problem is, however, of different proportions. More than 50 years of Soviet occupation, policies of linguistic Russification, and the precarious demographic situation have exacerbated the debate over citizenship, language policy, education policy, and national identity»²⁸.

Language policy is considered to be the key marker of national identity in the social constructivist perspective that was scrutinized in the previous chapter. Consequently, the question of language planning has become a debatable topic in either political or public discussions after the dissolution of

²⁷ Dreifelds s. Latvia in Transition. Demography, Language and Ethnic Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. P. 142.

²⁸ Schmid C. Ethnicity and Language Tensions in Latvia. URL: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10993-007-9068-1?LI=true#> [Accessed 11.03.2013]

the Soviet Union. Language policies as well as political boundaries of national communities are not stable phenomena; they tend to be changing throughout the history of a nation. Miroslav Hroch, contemporary nationalism researcher, stresses that «nation-building as a process set within a wider social and cultural history—treated not as so many singular and unrepeatable events, but as part of a broad transformation of society that is amenable to controlled generalizations»²⁹. Contemporary history of both Ukraine and Latvia is far from being a simple and non-controversial case and still is a field of active contestation and reinterpretation. As P. Järve notes, «post-independence language policy can only be understood in response to the weighing of two significant factors – the presence of large groups of Russian speakers on one hand, and Latvia’s aspiration for membership in the European Union on the other»³⁰.

Generally speaking, Latvia had been under the authority of different states and empires for a considerable amount of time and could fully enjoy political independence only since the restoration of its sovereign status in 1991. Thus, an overwhelming necessity arises to present the main stages of Latvia’s historic development which considerably influenced language policy after 1991 and compare with the Ukrainian case.

A great many of contemporary nationalism researchers such as B. Anderson, Rogers Brubaker, Dominic Lieven e t.c., underline that the process of national identity formation was not politically and ideologically neutral in the context of the Russian Empire and later of the Soviet Union. An American historian Terry Martin and the author of the book «The Affirmative Action Empire» made a valuable contribution to understanding the nature of the Soviet “phenomenon”. He points out that paradoxically the Soviet Union was an empire but the authorities neglected this assumption; Martin uses the term “the affirmative action empire”³¹.

Terry Martin connects the notion of the Soviet “affirmative action empire” with the United States where this policy originated. This of granting privileges such as quotas and special rights for previously disadvantaged groups of population who faced political, social, racial, gender or cultural discrimination was implemented in the authorities’ attempt to compensate the consequences of historic injustice and redress the balance in a new political order. The Soviet Union was not a classical example of an empire like the Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian; it existed as an empire and simultaneously neglected it. New ethno-territorial logic of the Bolsheviks was reflected in creation of national republics, promoting their national cultures and languages, developing education and science in languages of the so-called “titular” nations, incorporating national elites in the central communist party. Martin argues that «the Bolshevik strategy

²⁹ *Hroch M.* From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-building Process in Europe / Ed. Mapping the Nation. New York and London: Verso, 1996. P.79.

³⁰ *Järve, P.* Two Waves of Language Laws in the Baltic States: Changing of rationale? // *Journal of Baltic Studies.* 2002. Vol. 33. P. 78-110.

³¹ *Martin T.* The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001.

was to assume leadership over what now appeared to be the inevitable process of decolonization and carry it out in a manner that would preserve the territorial integrity of the Old Russian Empire»³². For example, the politics of promoting the Ukrainian language and culture was called Ukrainization. Thus, an important step towards deeper understanding of the Soviet national and language legacy is to uncover the historic context and show how the policy was implemented not only in the early Soviet Union but also in the Russian Empire.

Tatiana Zhurzhenko supports the thesis about the institutionalized discrimination of ethnic Ukrainians in the Russian Empire. «In the Russian Empire, where 85 % of the Ukrainians lived, Ukrainian language rights were also strictly limited. Publication of books and newspapers was restricted; theatre performances were subject to complicated regulations; schooling in Ukrainian was prohibited; and the language of the juridical system and the local administration was Russian»³³. This discriminative situation dominated all over the Russian Empire. Languages of titular nations were virtually eliminated from all spheres of public life; Ukrainian was called dialects of Russian and was not recognized as separate languages. «To some extent, the language reflected the mainly agricultural state of Ukrainian society; Ukrainian was the language of the peasants and of those very narrow strata of intelligentsia which came from the peasants and served their interests: priests, teachers, sometimes doctors»³⁴. The Ukrainian language was also a symbol of a low social status. Recognizing this language as rural and “backward”, the imperial centre did not give the local population any chance to develop their language³⁵.

Nonetheless, the Ukrainian nationalism had been developing from the 19th century and was connected with the name of Taras Shevchenko; national movements spread in big cities, among people of art, philologists and historians who made an attempt to create the Ukrainian language. The most prominent organisation of that time was a society called “Prosvita” (Enlightenment) that was established in 1868 in order to create an opposition to anti-Ukrainian measures of the imperial centre and to develop Ukrainian culture and language among people. The similar movement emerged in Latvia in the 19th century and was called “national awakening”. «A certain standardization of the Latvian language, as it may be believed, was spontaneously taking place already during the pre-written stage, i.e., until the 16th century. Since the 17th century, when the first normative grammars of Latvian appeared, one can speak of more or less conscious language standardization»³⁶.

³² *Martin T.* Ibid.

³³ *Zhurzhenko T.* «Language Politics» in *Contemporary Ukraine: Nationalism and Identity Formation* / Ed. A. Bove. Vienna: IWM Junior Fellows Conference. Vol. 12. URL: <https://www.iwm.at/publ-jvc/jc-12-02.pdf> (Accessed: 25.05.2013)

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Миллер А.И. Россия и русификация Украины в XIX веке. Россия и Украина: историй взаимоотношений / под ред. А.И. Миллера, В.Ф. Репринцева и Б.Н. Флори. М.: Школа «Языки русской культуры». 1997. С. 145-156.

³⁶ *Blinkena, A.* The Latvian Language: Some Problems of Its Development and Existence // ALFA 1994/95. Vol. 7/8 Actes de language française et de linguistique. Universitas Dalhausiana. Halifax, Canada. P. 463-469.

Thus, the period of standardization is the key component of the national development and a powerful means of “imagining” communities. The pre-standardization period, as the authors of the article «Some Aspects of the Sociolinguistic Situation in Latvia: Causes and Effects» claim, is characterized by deliberate attempts of the clergy to translate religious texts into Latvian, although they were significantly influenced by German forms and constructions³⁷. In the 19th century the translation of religious books and collection of folklore units was replaced by a fully-fledged standardization movement. «The ideologists of this movement, dubbed Neo-Latvians, were the firsts university-educated Latvians – K. Valdemārs, K. Barons, J. Alunāns, A. Kronvalds, etc. – who started devoting attention to the legal and linguistic aspects of language policy in territories inhabited by Latvians. Their struggle for an official status of the Latvian language, as well as against foreign influences on it, became an essential task for the newly-developing Latvian intelligentsia»³⁸. 1861 became a turning point in Latvian “awakening” movement, because twenty intellectuals applied to governmental bodies to ensure the maintenance of the Latvian language. The main characteristics of standardization period are the creation of the vocabulary of the modern language, developing scientific terminology in Latvian, and purification from foreign influences.

«According to the Neo-Latvian viewpoint, only the national language can adequately serve as a symbol of self-identification with the national culture»³⁹. The centuries of forced Russian, German, and then Soviet domination revealed the question of the very existence of both the Ukrainian and Latvian nations. Andrew Wilson tried to compare the nationalist discourse in Ukraine and the Baltic states in his book «Ukrainian nationalism in the 1990s. «If anything, this theme [ethnos survival] is even stronger in Ukrainian than in Baltic nationalism, as most of Ukraine has been under Russian influence for much longer, and Ukraine failed to obtain the vital breathing space provided by independence in the interwar period»⁴⁰. Meanwhile, Ukraine remained the part of the Russian Empire and then was an object of manipulations before the establishment of the USSR, Latvia declared its full independence on the November, 18, 1918. This period is designated as the “second awakening” of the Latvian national consciousness.

«During the period of independence (1918-1940), the minorities in Latvia enjoyed equal rights in all spheres of life. The only thing that mattered was an individual’s loyalty and commitment to the welfare of the country. The state granted free primary and secondary education to all minorities in their mother tongue. The minorities organised political parties, set up societies, and held religious services, theatre performances in their native languages»⁴¹. The aim

³⁷ *Druviete, I., Strelēvica-Ošiņa D.* Some Aspects of the Sociolinguistic Situation in Latvia: Causes and Effects. Contemporary Linguistics. 2008. Vol 65. No. 1. Spring P. 93.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Wilson, A.* Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A minority faith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997. P. 151.

⁴¹ *Druviete I., Strelēvica-Ošiņa D.* Op. cit. P. 94.

of the Latvian government was to make Latvian a means of integrating the society, as well as to eliminate the political, cultural, and economic impact of the nations which dominated over Latvia for a long time. «Only after 1935 the positions of Latvian as the only state language were strengthened to a sufficient extent, but language policy still lacked a strategic conception»⁴². Thus, the country authorities used an independent status in order to conduct its own domestic and foreign policy, and language problem was one of the most essential at this moment.

Unlike Latvia, Ukraine was a part of the USSR and did not have any sovereign status. As a result, the overall language policy in the interwar period in Ukraine was an outcome of the Bolsheviks' attempt to establish complete control over the country. In 1923 national territories were formed in the new state of the Soviet Union. «In each national territory, the language of the titular nationality was to be established as the official state language»⁴³. Special measures for developing and promoting non-Russian languages were implemented in all Soviet republics. Central authorities were also concerned with the problem of political legitimacy of the Bolsheviks regime; as a result, they granted privileges for local political elites. This politics was called *korenizatsia* or "indigenization"⁴⁴.

The legacy of the WW2 is still regarded as highly controversial. An especially painful time for Latvia was the year 1940 when the territory of the country was under full-scale invasion of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The aim of this work is to give a historic overview of Latvian and Ukrainian development which influenced language policy in both countries but not to plunge deeply into the interpretation of historic facts. During the third "awakening movement" at the end of the 1980s and the reassessment of the Soviet history, the Latvians took a firm position that their territory was illegally occupied by the USSR army which had a dramatic impact on the whole historic development of the country. «The Latvians had been under stress and on the defensive since the 1940 occupation of their country»⁴⁵, «the development of the independent state of Latvia was interrupted in 1940 for more than 50 years of Soviet occupation»⁴⁶ - these formulations seem typical for discussing the Soviet experience in Latvia. The Soviet historiography portrayed the annexation of the territory of Latvia as a voluntary act and not as a deliberate attempt to incorporate the country into the territory of the Soviet Union. Obviously, this scientific approach served the needs of the ruling Communist party and gave no chances to express alternative points of view. Contemporary Russia as the Soviet state successor continues to maintain the argument of voluntary annexation of the Baltics. According to the official position of the government, incorporation of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania was made in accordance with the

⁴² Ibid. P. 95.

⁴³ *Martin T.* Op.cit.

⁴⁴ *Martin T.* Op. cit.

⁴⁵ *Dreifelds J.* Latvia in Transition. Demography, Language and Ethnic Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. P. 142.

⁴⁶ *Druvieta I., Strelēvica-Ošiņa D.* Op. cit. P. 95.

norms and principles of international law⁴⁷. A silent consent and the Communist monopoly on historic interpretation and vision of reality were replaced by heated debates in mass media about what really happened during the WW2 in both Russia and Latvia when they gained an independent status.

In 1940 Ukraine was also in the centre of political manipulations and controversies. «In 1939 and 1940 the Western regions (Galychna, West Volyn and Bukovina) were attached to Soviet Ukraine as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union»⁴⁸. The following pact included also the secret protocol where the Soviet and German spheres of interests in Eastern Europe were designated. «The war served as an excuse for repressions against ethnic minorities which were not loyal enough to Soviet power»⁴⁹. Repressive politics of Stalin gave no chances to revive the Ukrainian national movement and develop its culture; Russian became the language of intercultural communication within the territory of the USSR. It dominated in all public spheres, including education, the legal system and science throughout the Soviet period with some innumerable exceptions.

Latvia faced almost the same problems during the Soviet period. In spite of the fact that all languages were declared to be equal, the real situation was completely different. «Step by step, the ideas about the special qualities and superiority of Russian were implemented, in often-repeated slogans such as the following: “the Russian people have liberated other peoples and have provided them with fraternal help”...»⁵⁰ Those Latvians who wanted to climb up the career ladder (vertical mobility) were obliged to speak Russian, and this led to a slow but considerable decrease of Latvian speakers and the loss of interest for studying the national language. On the one hand, Moscow inspired the development of national cultures and languages, incorporated the political elites of the Soviet republics into the structure of the state; on the other hand, the central authorities were obsessed with the problem of creating so-called “Soviet” people regarding a universal nationality including representatives of all ethnic groups existed in the Soviet territory.

When Mikhail Gorbachev came into power in 1985, the Soviet state had already been in a weakened position which undermined the basis of the old political regime and gave rise to national movements in the Soviet republics, especially in the Baltic States. An American historian Ronald Suny analyzed the reasons of the Soviet Union collapse in his book « The Revenge of the Past. Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union» and argued that «national self-determination to the point of separation had been enshrined in a constitutional guarantee of a right of secession from the union, a time bomb that lay dormant through the years of Stalinism, only to explode with

⁴⁷ Combs D. Inside the Soviet Alternate Universe. Pennsylvania State Press, 2008. P. 258-259. URL: <http://books.google.ru/books?id=U9twRiRKd6wC&pg=PA258&dq=&hl=ru#v=onepage&q&f=false> [Accessed 11.03.2013]

⁴⁸ Zhurzhenko T. Op.cit.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Druviete I., and Strelēvica-Ošīņa D. Op. cit. P. 96.

the Gorbachev reforms».⁵¹ Thus the dissident movements evolved spontaneously with the weakening of the totalitarian regime and the politics of “glasnost” which was initiated by Gorbachev in late 1980s; they were subdivided mostly into two major groups constituted by revolutionary secessionists and intellectuals who created human rights organizations and stimulated the discussion about neglecting the rights of nationalities. Heated debates in both Ukraine and Latvia led to nationwide referendums on political self-determination; human rights organisations, political parties, and nationalist movements which appeared spontaneously stood in opposition to the official Communist party that wanted to preserve the Soviet sovereignty by fair means.

«On July 16, 1990, opposition activities culminated in the Supreme Soviet ‘almost unanimous declaration of sovereignty (355 in favour, 4 against, one abstention), which claimed primacy for Ukrainian laws on Ukrainian territory and the right to a republican army. The parliament also declared “free development of the cultures of all nationalities residing in Ukraine”, “regulation of emigration processes”, “the functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life”»⁵². The same trend developed throughout the Soviet Union; mass demonstrations were registered in all ex-Soviet republics and were extremely harsh in the Baltic States. One month earlier than in Ukraine, the Declaration of Sovereignty was approved by the Latvian Supreme Soviet. The Popular Front of Latvia was the most influential political force in the late 1980-s and after the restoration of independence; this political party argued in favour of a sovereign country and market reforms. In opposition to the Popular Front of Latvia stood the International Front of the Working People of the Latvian SSR. Representatives of this political organization protested against independent Latvia and argued that the country should have remained part of the Soviet Union. Latvia reached the fully independent status only in December, 1991, when the Soviet Union *de jure* did not exist any longer.

Therefore, the historic legacy of the Soviet national and language policy is extremely controversial and needs careful investigation. Thus, deep analysis of contemporary language debates in post-Soviet countries cannot be held without an attempt to plunge into the historic background that gives an opportunity to find the origins of “national question”. The logical step in my investigation of language policy in regard to ethnic minorities is to describe contemporary situation in Latvia and Ukraine after 1991.

2.2. The Politics of Nationalizing States in Latvia and Ukraine after 1991.

In 1991 the choice of state language became the key problem in all nation-building projects. For instance, Latvian researcher Juris Dreifelds notes

⁵¹ Suny R. G. *The Revenge of the Past. Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. P. 143-144.

⁵² Chinn J., Kaiser R. *Russians as the New Minority. Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States*. West view Press, 1996. P. 145.

in the book «Latvia in transition», «after the declaration of sovereignty in 1990, and especially after the establishment of independence in August 1991, Latvians were able to take measures to strengthen the political presence of their group and stop the uncontrolled in-migration of aliens»⁵³. A Latvian researcher from Baltic Institute of Social Sciences Evija Klave postulates in her work devoted to language choice, discourses and practices that «along with the change in political regime and ideology, a language hierarchy change occurred and several important ethnopolitical turning points (amendments to citizenship law, Latvia's accession to the European Union, minority education reform) had an impact on language use in public and private environments and on the attitudes of both of the largest ethnolinguistic communities in Latvia towards these dominating languages»⁵⁴.

Rogers Brubaker explains that in the Soviet period the Russian language had privileges and a high status in all public spheres. Russian was the language of intercultural communication in the Soviet Union; nowadays it remains the means of connecting people in the former political space of the USSR. After 1991, Russians displayed a clear tendency to perceive the former territories of the Ukrainian SSR as their “own”. This is one of the reasons determining not only the economic, political and territorial, but also psychological changes in people's attitude after the Soviet Union collapse. Consequently, Russians tend to demand collective privileges and special rights in newly formed states, and in some particular cases – even territorial autonomy (the typical example here is the Crimea).

In almost all former Soviet republics the languages of “titular” or core-building nationalities were established as the only state languages (Nevertheless, one of the exceptions is the Belarusian case; in Belarus after the public referendum in 1995 Russian was given an official status of the second state language along with Belarusian). As it was previously underlined, after the USSR collapse Russian turned into the language of a national minority, as it happened in Ukraine, or gained the status of a foreign language, as it occurred in the Baltic States. As a result, a great many of Russian speaking people were recognized as a language minority.

Rogers Brubaker points out in his famous book ‘Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe’ that the dominant language always tries to force out the languages of cultural minorities in the situation of bilingualism⁵⁵. Consequently, after establishing an independent status, the Ukrainian and Latvian languages were identified as the markers of state sovereignty and independence. It means that Ukraine and Latvia have taken measures in order to promote Ukrainian and Latvian as the only state languages.

⁵³ Dreifelds J. Op.cit. P. 142.

⁵⁴ Klave E. Language Choice and Usage in social interaction in Latvia: discourse and practice // Ethnicity Studies. 2011. Vol. 1-2.

⁵⁵ Brubaker R. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003.

Before turning to the question of language policy in Ukraine and Latvia after 1991, we should define the term of nationalizing state in order to consider contemporary situation with ethnic minorities and the overall language situation in Latvia and Ukraine. Rogers Brubaker considers them as «states that conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for particular nations, yet as, “incomplete” or “unrealized” nation-states, as insufficiently “national” in a variety of senses. Almost all of the twenty-odd new states of post-communist Eurasia are nationalizing states in this sense»⁵⁶. Thus, both Ukrainian and Latvian foreign and domestic policy can be regarded as the politics of nationalizing states seeking to promote the interests of the “titular” groups of the population. Following the logic of a nationalizing state, the Ukrainian language and subsequent Ukrainization of schools, universities, mass media and other public spaces have become the key marker of national identity and a factor of social exclusion. For instance, those Ukrainian residents who did not have a sufficient command of the state language, experienced significant difficulties in communicating with the governmental bodies. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian language has turned not only into the main component of Ukrainian national identity after the Soviet Union disintegration but also into the marker of the country’s political independence. It appears to be pretty obvious that the debates over the status of the Russian language or other ethnic minorities in Ukraine are not a matter of exclusively linguistic research or historical overview; it has become an open field of contestation where the interests of different social actors are intertwined. Thus, the politicization of language matters attracted so much attention from social scientists and mass media.

Harvard historian Roman Szporluk also made a substantial contribution tackling the problem of national identity formation in Ukraine in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union; he emphasizes the significant role of the international community in this process. The desire for independence is driven by «...making a capital out of one’s own central place. To have standing in the world, even in such matters as sports, music, or science, requires political independence. The making of modern Ukraine accordingly needs to be viewed in an international context»⁵⁷. Therefore, the main characteristic of the Ukrainian identity at the beginning of the 1990s is an overwhelming desire to turn from the “world periphery”, as it happened during the period of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, into a fully-fledged sovereign state. The logical step in my investigation of Ukrainian language policy is to uncover its main characteristics including ethnic composition and regional polarization.

⁵⁶ *Brubaker, Rogers*. Nationalizing States in the old “New Europe” and the new // *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. April 1996. Vol. 19. No 2. P. 412.

⁵⁷ *Szporluk R*. Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State // *Daedalus*. Summer 1997. Vol.126. No 3. P.86.

2.3. The Characteristics of Language Policy in Ukraine after the USSR Disintegration.

2.3.1. Ethnic and Linguistic Composition of the Population.

Independent Ukraine is considered to be a multinational state with the representatives of more than 130 different national and ethnic groups. According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, the overall population of the country is 45, 457 million people. 67, 5 % and 29, 6 % of Ukrainian residents marked Ukrainian and Russian respectively as their mother tongue. Representatives of ethnic minorities include Russians (17, 28 %), Belarusians (0, 57 %), Moldavians (0, 54 %), Crimean Tatars (0, 51 %) etc.⁵⁸

Generally speaking, social scientists who contribute to the question of language policy in Ukraine pick out several main characteristics of the language situation in the country. According to the analysis conducted by researchers from the European University in St. Petersburg in 2003, the language panorama in contemporary Ukraine is characterized by *three main factors*. «These factors include subdivision of the population into two main groups – Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking – that do not coincide with the ethnic borders»; territorial and social polarization of language preferences on the Ukrainian territory; formal and controversial legislation in the sphere of language use⁵⁹. The main difficulty in the first case lies not only in the distinction between “Russians” and “Ukrainians” but also between Ukrainophiles and Russophiles because ethnic lines do not coincide with linguistic borders. As a result, researchers are supposed to take all these three factors into account, including linguistic variety, regional and political polarization. It is obvious that «the Ukrainian society has a much more complicated language structure and consists of monolingual Russophones and Ukrainophones»⁶⁰. However, there are thousands of Ukrainian residents who speak “surzhik” which is regarded as neither Russian nor Ukrainian; it constitutes the mixture of both languages. The example of “surzhik” clearly indicates a pressing necessity for the Ukrainian language standardization⁶¹.

If a reader draws a historical analogy between contemporary state of affairs and the first half of the 19th century, the similarity can be revealed in the common problem of language standardization. On the one hand, deliberate attempts are made to develop scientific terminology in Ukrainian, because the main characteristic of the Soviet period was that the majority of books and

⁵⁸ Official Results of the 2001 Ukrainian Census // State Statistics Service of Ukraine. URL: <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/> [Accessed 25.03.2013]

⁵⁹ Вахтин Н.Б., Жиронкина О.Ю., Лисковец И.В., Романова Е.В. Отчет по результатам исследовательского проекта «Новые языки новых государств: явления на стыке близкородственных языков на постсоветском пространстве». 2003. URL: <http://old.eu.spb.ru/ethno/projects/project3/003.htm> (Дата посещения 11.03.2013г.)

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Bilaniuk, Laada. Speaking of Surzhyk: Ideologies and Mixed Languages // Harvard Ukrainian Studies. 1997. Vol. 21. № ½.

articles were published in Russian, while few chances were given for developing the linguistic apparatus of different academic disciplines in Ukrainian. Thus, the Soviet Union collapse raised the urgent question of using the specialized terminology in the state language. Another complicated problem that was confronted by the Ukrainian political elites appeared to be the challenge of various dialects of the Ukrainian language. That is why the government's concerns about promoting Ukrainian as the only state language were connected not only with an attempt to overcome the Soviet experience and set up the nation-building project based on Ukrainian national identity, but also with the problem of language standardization and development. On the other hand, "surzhik" is hardly conceivable as a separate language. This fact poses serious obstacles for developing high literary standardized Ukrainian language.

As it was previously outlined, the language situation in contemporary Ukraine is characterized by a sharp division of the Ukrainian society in two main groups – Ukrainian and Russian-speaking population. «Many areas of the country continue to use Russian as an everyday language, most notably in the capital city, Kiev, and in Crimea, an autonomous republic in the South of Ukraine»⁶². It means that, despite deliberate attempts to establish Ukrainian as the only state language called Ukrainization, Russian is still widely spoken, mostly in the private sphere. The use of Russian varies significantly in different regions of Ukraine because of regional polarization that will be briefly analyzed further. According to the Ukrainian census conducted in 2001, an overwhelming majority considers Russian as their mother tongue in Eastern and Southern Regions in Ukraine (for instance, 77 % of the respondents in the Crimea, 48 % in Donetsk and Donetsk region) while Western regions or "*oblast*" are associated with a rather low level of the Russian language competence (only 3, 8 % of respondents from Lviv and 2, 9 % in Uzhgorod)⁶³. NGOs and different political forces concentrate largely on the problem of discrimination of Russian-speaking people and forceful Ukrainization that divides the society into two lines – "for" or "against" the Russian language. Despite numerous attempts of the government to influence the situation, the "language" question was often used during the parliamentary and presidential elections as the means of political manipulation. Unfortunately, ratification of the European Charter for Minority or Regional Languages did not bring an end to the fight of proponents and opponents of Ukrainization.

The politics of Ukrainization exerts a profound impact on all spheres of public life, not only on mass media. The question, whether the political measures to create Ukrainian national community based on one language and common history, have been successful and effective, is a complex issue to be further investigated. The thesis of Ian Bremmer and Anna Fournier, outstanding researchers in the field of ethnic interaction and linguistic diversity in Ukraine, seems to be highly controversial. They analyze ethnic relations and Russians'

⁶² Mckishnie A. Language Revitalization in Ukraine: Geo-Culturally Determined Success // Germanic and Slavic Studies in Review 1.1. 2012.

⁶³ Official Results of the 2001 Ukrainian Census. Op. cit.

resistance to forceful Ukrainization come to the conclusion that the dichotomy “Russian OR Ukrainian?” does not make any substantial division⁶⁴.

As Bremmer and Fournier note, despite territorial and language division of the population, there is a high possibility of Russophones’ and Ukrainophones’ mutual understanding, due to language issues seems to be exaggerated by mass media and politicians, which is confirmed by statistical research⁶⁵. Thus, according to the results of the research conducted by sociologists from the European University in St. Petersburg, «symbolic character of public debates about violation of the Russophones- or Ukrainophones rights is verified by statistical data: only 9, 2 % of the respondents marked out discrimination against Ukrainian-speakers and 9, 4 % pointed out that discrimination against Russian-speakers is a characteristic feature of Ukrainian politics»⁶⁶. On the other hand, the problem of the Russian/Ukrainian dichotomy is not purely linguistic; as it was underlined at the beginning of the chapter, the state language is regarded as the key marker of national identity, that is why the struggle between previously dominated Russian and currently dominating Ukrainian lies in the sphere of power distribution and political interests of different actors involved in decision-making on the question of language use. Generally speaking, Fournier and Bremmer’ thesis is regarded as an essentialist idea where the core assumption that the ethnic and linguistic borders of some particular groups are stable is accepted.

The logic of nationalizing states implies governmental measures to strengthen the position of the state language that was previously underdeveloped. Since the establishment of independence in Ukraine, the number of Russian schools has been decreasing, deliberate attempts have been made to encourage people to learn Ukrainian. Nevertheless, as many researchers prove, the influence of the Russian language in Ukraine is still very strong, leading to a relatively unstable and explosive situation of bilingualism in the country. Andrew Mckishnie discusses the successes and struggles of the ongoing language revitalization effort in Ukraine. He describes overall success of Ukrainization in geo-cultural terms, “with language being used as a tool in constructing a new national identity”⁶⁷. In terms of public space Ukrainization, officials and the state bureaucracy are less effective. «In Eastern and Southern Ukraine, where efforts have been much less successful, this is due to Russian still having a strong influence in many spheres’ of people’s lives, including business and education, as well as that many people in these parts of Ukraine identify more strongly with Russian culture than they do with Ukrainian»⁶⁸. As Alexander Krouglov notes, «many students in Ukrainians schools still prefer to use Russian as a language of communication in informal and class-room

⁶⁴ Fournier A. Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine // Europe-Asia Studies. 2002. Vol. 54. № 3. P. 421.

⁶⁵ Bremmer J. The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine // Europe-Asia Studies. 1994. Vol. 46. No. 2. P. 261-283.

⁶⁶ Вахтин Н.Б., Жиронкина О.Ю., Лисковец И.В., Романова Е.В. См. там же.

⁶⁷ Mckishnie A. Op. cit.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

settings»⁶⁹. However, it is not surprising that the influence of the Russian language in Ukraine is still significant; if the country chose to follow the trajectory of sustainable democratic development, it seems to be impossible to totally eliminate the influence of the language which has previously the means of inter-ethnic communication and is still widely used in all spheres of public life by approximately 11 mln. ethnic Russians and millions of Ukrainians who identify themselves with the Russian culture.

Generally speaking, the question of Russian as the second state language has always been in the centre of heated political debates since Ukraine gained its independence. It is presupposed that in such an ethnically heterogeneous country as Ukraine with the two dominant groups of the population – Ukrainians and Russians, the question whether to introduce several official languages or not has become a key dilemma.

The former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and the current President Viktor Yanukovich included the requirement to provide a higher status for Russian in their political platform. All these promises have never been realized in full measure by both political leaders. Nevertheless, the presidential success of Leonid Kuchma was largely based on the vision of Russian as the second state language. Polarization of linguistic preferences is the core characteristic of contemporary language policy that are reflected in the results of the presidential and parliamentary elections.

Meanwhile, the problems of other ethnic minorities but for Russian as a whole are mostly ignored by mass media and politicians. Taras Kuzio, a prominent researcher of Ukrainian politics, points out that «the lack of survey data has been coupled by neglect of the Rusyn phenomenon. There have been few Western academic studies of Trans-Carpathia and Rusyns»⁷⁰. Rusyns constitute a group of population on the Carpathian region in Ukraine, partially in Poland, Slovakia and former Yugoslavia republics. The Soviet historiography apprehended the Rusyn ethnic group as a part of the bigger Ukrainian culture. As a result, the language of Rusyns was considered a dialect of Ukrainian and oppressed by the authorities of the Russian Empire and later by the Soviet Union. There was simply no such a category as “Rusyns” in the USSR. In contrast to this view, the American tradition understands Rusyns as a separate culture with its distinctive features, including the language.

After 1991 the problem of re-defining cultural borders has turned into a political one and the Rusyn’s question attracted more attention from mass media and political leaders. «The Rusyn revival is not a unique phenomenon in Europe, Magocsi believes, because it follows the general trend in the 1990s which coincided with the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe

⁶⁹ *Krouglov A.* War and Peace: Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine // *Journal of Language and Politics*. 2002. Vol. 1-2. P. 221-239.

⁷⁰ *Kuzio T.* The Rusyn Question in Ukraine: Sorting Out Fact from Fiction // *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 2005. [URL: http://www.taraskuzio.net/Nation%20and%20State%20Building_files/national-rusyns.pdf] [Accessed 31.03.2013]

and the de-centralization of traditional nation-states»⁷¹. Kuzio analyses thoroughly and scrutinizes the literature on Rusyns which he finds scarce, insufficient and strongly biased. Those authors who support the pro-Ukrainian side tend to perceive Rusyns as the part of Ukrainian culture, while their opponents, Rusyn-oriented declare the possibility of secession from Ukraine because of distinct cultural and linguistic features. One of the main problems with Rusyns is that they are widely dispersed not only in the Ukrainian territory but also in neighboring countries. Taras Kuzio concludes that «The Rusyn question has been demonized by its Ukrainian opponents because of the insecurity many of them feel about their own nationality, language, and culture, despite living in an independent state. As nation-building is still an on-going process in Ukraine, and Ukrainophones still feel threatened by the domination of the Russian language and the large numbers of Russian speakers, the Rusyn question is usually condemned as a political movement instigated by hostile neighbouring countries or foreign scholars. At the same time, the strength of the Rusyn movement has been exaggerated by Western scholars and proponents of a separate Rusyn identity inside Ukraine. The available limited official and parallel census data show that the Rusyn revival in Trans-Carpathia is limited in scope»⁷².

The Crimea and the complicated ethnic composition have been extensively studied by social scientists because of numerous separatist challenges and possible threats to Ukrainian sovereignty. Moreover, the Crimean region is one of the most russified because of historical reasons. That is why long-lasting presence of a big number of ethnic Russians in the South of the country has always been a problem for independent Ukraine. Deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944 to other parts of the Soviet Union is one of the most traumatic moments of the history of this ethnic group. The formal reason for forcible deportation was the supposedly collaborationist movement with the German Nazis and betrayal of their motherland. Thousands of the Crimean Tatars died in exile because of starvation and diseases.

With the advent of “glasnost” and Gorbachev’s reforms, the Tatars’ national movement got a chance for revival and mass return to their motherland. According to the 2001 census, 248 000 Crimean Tatars live in Ukraine thus constituting a significant part of the population⁷³. Mica J. Hall analyses cultural identity of this ethnic group and the language that they use in everyday life. The development of the Crimean Tatar identity was interrupted by forced deportation to other Soviet republics. «As part of increasingly intense efforts by CT to establish and reinforce their ethnic identity, their dialect of Russian, which I will call Crimean Tatar-Russian (CT-R), has served to

⁷¹ See R.P. Magocsi, *The End of the Nation-State? The Revolutions of 1989 and the New Europe* (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 1994).

⁷² Kuzio T. Op. cit.

⁷³ Official Results of the 2001 Ukrainian Census // State Statistics Service of Ukraine. URL: <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/> [Accessed 25.03.2013]

preserve their linguistic and cultural identity»⁷⁴. The great influence on the Russian language on Crimean identity is largely connected with the legacy of the Soviet national and language policy. However, the main language spoken by this ethnic group is Crimean Tatar language which belongs to the Turkic language family. The international community has been largely concerned about several cases of discrimination based on religious grounds, because the Crimean Tatars are mostly represented by the Muslims and not by Orthodox Church which dominates in this region. Nevertheless, the problems of the Crimean Tatars as well as the discussions on the Soviet legacy and overcoming the traumatic experience of the past have rarely been the subject of heated debates and political considerations. Thus, the main characteristic of contemporary language policy in Ukraine is extreme politicization of the status of the Russian language in comparison with scarce attention to the needs of other ethnic minorities.

2.3.2. Regional Polarization of Linguistic and Political Preferences in Ukraine

A lot of researchers claim that “regional polarization” is considered to be one of the dominant factors that influence the overall political situation in Ukraine. Paul Kubicek subdivides Ukraine into 5 parts in the article «Regional polarization in Ukraine: Public opinion, voting and legislative behaviour»⁷⁵. The regions distinguished by Kubicek are the South, the Crimea, the East, the West and the Centre. The Eastern region and the Crimea have the highest number of ethnic Russians. These regions are russified, or “sovietized”, to a large extent, using the author’ terminology⁷⁶. Because of historical reasons, Western Ukraine is oriented towards integration with Europe; the percentage of ethnic Russians is the lowest in this region. The central region of Kiev is characterized by ambiguous problems: on the one hand, the number of Ukrainians is higher than in the East; on the other hand, the Russian language can be heard more often than Ukrainian. This asymmetrical situation is also the key component of contemporary language policy in the country. Ethnic and linguistic lines do not coincide in Ukraine. For instance, Russian-speakers can be found among both ethnic Russians and Ukrainians.

In order to test the initial assumption and prove that regional polarization exists in Ukraine, Kubicek analyses the results of the parliamentary elections held in 1994. At this time, Western regions supported the parties which were in favour of Ukrainian as the only state language and decreasing intervention of Russia into Ukrainian politics. The highest number of nationalists could also be found in the West. In contrast, the Crimea and the Eastern regions supported the ideas of socialism and closer ties to Russia.

⁷⁴ Hall M. J. Crimean Tatar Russian as a Reflection of Crimean Tatar National Identity // The Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of Nationalities. New York, Columbia University. April 12, 2002. URL: <http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/mhall.html> [Accessed: 31.03.2013]

⁷⁵ Kubicek P. Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour // Europe-Asia Studies. 2000. Vol. 52. No. 2. P. 273-294.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

The authors of the project “Electoral Geography. 2.0”⁷⁷ Alexander Kireev and Aleksei Sidorenko presented graphically the results of the presidential elections held in 2010 and distribution of the votes in different regions. The initial assumption about the marked tendency for regional polarizations was proved. The two candidates – Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko succeeded in attracting the electorate in accordance with their political agenda. Tymoshenko was associated with supporting Ukrainian as the only state language, while Yanukovych made the second attempt to come to power with a promise to give Russian the status of the second state language. In the Eastern regions he won the overwhelming majority of the votes – in the Crimea – 78, 24 %, in Donetsk oblast – 90, 44 %, in Luhansk – 88, 96 %. In contrast, Tymoshenko experienced almost the same situation in the West of the country. 76, 25 % of the electorate in Rovno and 86, 2 % in Lviv supported her pro-state rhetoric⁷⁸. Therefore, regional polarization seems to be an extremely important factor that has influenced the overall course of political development in Ukraine. The Orange Revolution that happened in late 2004 and the subsequent elections marked a watershed in linguistic debates in post-Soviet Ukraine. Language has become the major component of Ukrainian national identity. Yanukovych who won a victory in 2010 presidential campaign claimed a higher status for the Russian language in public space in 2004 as well, although Viktor Yuschenko supported further Ukrainization efforts in the country.

2.3.3. Legislation on Language Policy in Ukraine

First and foremost, language policy is connected with the official measures in order to determine how different languages should be used in the territory of one state. This appears a relatively rare case, when the population of one country is homogeneous in ethnic and linguistic terms; the international community is constituted largely by ethnically heterogeneous states. Therefore, language policy deals not only with the use of official or state language(s) but also with the languages of national groups and minorities.

Official language policy is implemented through legislation. The most fundamental legal document of independent Ukraine is the Constitution approved in 1996. According to Article 10, «the state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language. The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine, in Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities if Ukraine, is guaranteed».⁷⁹ Based on this legal provision, the government takes

⁷⁷ Kireev A., Sidorenko A. Electoral Geography. Mapped Politics. URL: <http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/> [Accessed 23.05.2013]

⁷⁸ Kireev A., Sidorenko A. Electoral Geography. Mapped Politics. Ukraine. Presidential Election 2010. URL: <http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/u/ukraine/ukraine-presidential-election-2010.html> [Accessed 23.05.2013]

⁷⁹ Constitution of Ukraine // Official website of Viktor Yanukovych, President of Ukraine. URL: <http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/constitution.html> [Accessed 27.03.2013]

responsibility for promoting and developing of the state language and emphasizes the special status of Russian.

Another important legal document that should be mentioned in research devoted to contemporary language policy in Ukraine is the Law on Languages adopted in October 1989 (amended in February, 1995) which had been in force until 2012 the Law “On the principles of the state language policy” was approved. It is stated in the Preamble that «The Ukrainian SSR vests the Ukrainian language with the status of the state language in order to support the comprehensive development of spiritual creative forces of the Ukrainian people and guarantee its sovereign national state future. The development of the understanding of the social value of the Ukrainian language as the state language of the Ukrainian SSR and the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication of the peoples of the USSR among citizens regardless of their national affiliation shall be the duty of the state, party and public bodies and mass media of the Republic»⁸⁰. It is repeated again that the Russian language occupies a significant place in communication between representatives of different people.

Professor of Law from Birkbeck University of London Bill Bowring scrutinizes Ukrainian legislation in the sphere of language policy and arrives to the conclusion that this Law has a lot of contradictions and unclear formulations. «It is very hard to make any juridical sense of the fourth sentence of the Preamble. It is not clear what is meant by the ‘social value’ of Ukrainian and Russian. And the formulation concerning Russian as ‘the language of interethnic communication of peoples of USSR’, even in the Law as amended in 1995, is not only redundant but also hard to understand»⁸¹. The main critical questions that arise in the process of analyzing the Law on Languages adopted in 1989 are: what is the “social value of the Ukrainian language?”, why is it stated that the development of Russian and Ukrainian should be reinforced regardless of the people’s national affiliation, on the one hand, and why Russian is called the language of “interethnic communication”, the means of communication between different *ethnic groups*, on the other hand? It is obvious that this law inherits the Soviet tradition of understanding Russian as an effective tool of uniting people. Moreover, the phrase “spiritual creative forces of the Ukrainian people” seems to be highly ambiguous and is lacking precision. It sounds also in rather a primordialist way. This vague formulation of legislation enhances the chance of deliberate manipulations by different groups of the population in both directions – either by those who will stress upon Russian as a means of “interethnic communication” or by those who pay more attention to the “social value of the Ukrainian language”. The controversial provisions of the Law on Languages and an overwhelming necessity to renew the language legislation forced the Ukrainian government to adopt a new law that would regulate the use of languages in its territory.

⁸⁰ Bowring B. The Russian Language in Ukraine: Complicit in Genocide, or Victim of State-building? // University of London, Birkbeck College – School of Law. 9 January, 2012. URL: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1981913> [Accessed 27.03.2013]

⁸¹ Bowring B. Op. cit.

Anna Fournier supports Bill Bowring's argument on a more primordialist perception of ethnic minorities in Ukrainian legislation: «A trend observed in the formulation of Ukrainian language laws is the primacy of ethnically based boundaries. The linguistically based Russophone identity (encompassing Russians and Ukrainians) is not represented, i.e. there exists no category for it and no basis for defending its rights»⁸². Thus, the terms "Ukrainophiles" and "Russophiles" are more applicable to the analysis of contemporary language policy in Ukraine. However, it is obvious that the situation in Ukraine is much more complicated because of the three main characteristics mentioned at the beginning of this chapter – the lack of coincidence between ethnic and linguistic borders, extreme politicization of the language question and controversial legislation in the sphere of language policy. «There is clearly a gap between those who consider that Russian is just one minority language among many others, and those advocating that Russian must continue to play an important role as being the language spoken by a very high proportion of the Ukrainian population and having traditionally been the language of inter-ethnic communication in Ukraine»⁸³. Despite the fact that a lot of attempts have been made to solve the problem of Russian-speaking people since Ukraine gained independence, the question of language use and the status of Russian continues to be a controversial point in political debates.

On the 15th May 2003, The Verkhovna Rada approved the law «On the Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages». The law came into force on the 1st of January 2004. The European Charter is a legal document and a unique instrument which was adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1992 in order to ensure protection, preservation and development of regional or rare languages in Europe. The history of Ukrainian ratification is an extremely controversial issue, because the possibility of Ukraine to join the European Charter met a strong opposition from several political actors. From the point of view of Pavel Baulin, the chairman of the Russian bloc, the Charter was ratified with such amendments that were supposed to foster Ukrainization and give very few guarantees for the representatives of other national groups to protect their languages⁸⁴.

According to the official interpretation of the European Charter, the languages that need governmental support are those under threat of disappearance. It means that the Russian language does not have any legal protection and cannot enjoy any special status in Ukraine. Bill Bowring claims that the existing instruments of minority protection such as the European Charter of The Framework Convention treat minorities as ethnically homogeneous groups of people, in a more essentialist way. «The implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages

⁸² Fournier A. Op. Cit. P. 421.

⁸³ Bowring B. Op. cit.

⁸⁴ Украина Шенгенская: И так, что же даёт нам Европейская Хартия Региональных языков, ратифицированная украинским парламентом. [Электронный ресурс] URL: <http://www.zaistinu.ru/old/ukraine/proffy/ukrhartia.shtml> (Дата обращения 27.03.2013г.)

encounters numerous problems in Ukraine <...> The main purpose of the Charter is to protect the languages threatened with extinction. The object of the Charter is language as an ethno-cultural phenomenon. Thus, the official translation of the Charter is incorrect: it considers not norms concerning “minority languages” but “languages of minorities”»⁸⁵. This observation makes a significant difference between the initial goals of the Charter and its implementation in Ukraine. Moreover, complicated ethnic and linguistic distribution of the population creates additional obstacles for the correct interpretation of the Charter.

The year 2004 was truly remarkable not only for the Orange revolution that brought the question of Ukrainian democracy to the current political agenda, but also for vigorous debates concerning the issue of mass media. In April, 2004 The National Council of Ukraine stopped to register newspapers, magazines and TV-programmes, which did not use the state language. Russian films were not prohibited from broadcasting, but an obligatory condition was the availability of subtitles in Ukrainian. «The conflict between the proponents and opponents of Ukrainian subtitles has objective prerequisites – both Russian-speakers and Ukrainian-speakers want to watch films in their native language. The situation is even aggravated by the fact that both sides are not willing to recognize the right of each side»⁸⁶. On the one hand, people who got accustomed to watching movies in the Russian language claimed that their right to obtain information in their mother tongue was severely violated by the state initiative. On the other hand, those who maintained the state measures to promote Ukrainian in public space were in favour of watching movies in the official language. These debates reflect the main arguments of both sides that are often repeated in mass media.

The law «On the principles of the state language policy” was adopted in July 2012 and became a large step towards liberalization of the state language legislation. The approval of this document was accompanied by heated debates among the members of the *Verkhovna Rada*; almost every legislative initiative connected with languages provoked such an ambiguous reaction. The law was initiated by the deputies from the “Party of Regions” Vadym Kolesnichenko and Serhiy Kivalov and signed by the President Victor Yanukovich. The proponents of the law claimed that it would decrease a negative impact of forceful Ukrainization on the population, whereas the opponents of this decision pointed out a possible threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and foresaw ethnic cleavages in the country. «In addition, the author [Kolesnichenko] of the law proposed to apply the provisions of the law to regional languages and national minority languages even if they are native to less than 10% of Ukrainian citizens from the general population of a specific territory, but “in certain cases and taking

⁸⁵ *Totskyi B.* Regional and Minority Languages in Ukrainian Legislation. URL: http://www.academia.edu/1221616/Regional_and_minority_languages_in_Ukrainian_legislation [Accessed 11.04.2013]

⁸⁶ Ukrainization of the Film Distribution// Kiev Centre of Political Studies and Conflictology “Analyst”, 01.02.07. URL: <http://www.analitik.org.ua/current-comment/int/45bf2086427ad> [Accessed: 28.03.2013]

into account specific situations»⁸⁷. Kolesnichenko's formulation can also be regarded as ambiguous and vague, because no clear explanations what should be understood under "specific situations" were given. For instance, in Western regions where the proportion of Russian-speakers is the lowest and where it cannot reach the required 10 % of the population, the Russian language should also be introduced as regional one, which contradicts the whole logic of giving "regional" status in *some* oblasts. According to the deputy's proposition, every Ukrainian oblast can establish Russian as the regional language, and it can lead to the outrage of those politicians who have been forming the nationalist agenda since the restoration of Ukraine' independence.

The law came into force in August, 2012. It states that Ukrainian is the only state language. However, languages of other ethnic minorities such as Russians, Bulgarians, Belarusians, Armenians, Crimean Tatars, Rumanians, Poles, Rusyns, and Hungarians etc. can be freely used in those territories where more than 10 % of the population considers them as their mother tongue (they are described in the law as "regional languages")⁸⁸. As it is reported in the Ukrainian newspaper "KiyvPost", several Ukrainian regions declared Russian the regional language. For instance, «Odessa Regional Council has declared the Russian language a regional language under the law of Ukraine on the principles of the state language policy. Deputies of the regional council approved this decision at a special sitting on Wednesday, August 15»⁸⁹. Odessa is considered as one of the most russified *oblasts* in Ukraine, where the proportion of Russian-speakers is higher than of those who speak Ukrainian. Thus, the Russian language was given a chance to be represented at the governmental level and generally in the public. Yanukovich emphasized the significance of the law for the development of both the Ukrainian language and the languages of ethnic minorities. He appealed to the general public and other politicians, assuming that political debates should not distract people's attention from the current problems of Ukraine⁹⁰.

Generally speaking, language policy in regard to ethnic minorities in Ukraine can be characterized by several factors that were thoroughly analysed in this section: the subdivision of the Ukrainian population into two major groups including Russian- and Ukrainian speakers, ethnic diversity, controversial legislation in the sphere of language use, regional polarization of linguistic preferences reflected in the results of the presidential and parliamentary elections.

⁸⁷ Kolesnichenko proposes amendments to language law // By Interfax-Ukraine, 7 September 2012. URL: <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/kolesnichenko-proposes-amendments-to-language-law-312636.html> [Accessed 11.04.2013]

⁸⁸ The law «On the principles of the state language policy" (the Ukrainian version). URL: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-17/print1331482006276224> [Accessed 25.04.2013]

⁸⁹ Odessa regional Council declares Russian regional language. By Interfax-Ukraine, 15 August 2012. URL: <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/odessa-regional-council-declares-russian-regional-language-311567.html> [Accessed 11.04.2013]

⁹⁰ Янукович подписал закон «Об основах государственной языковой политики» // РБК Україна, 08.08.2012. URL: <http://www.rbc.ua/rus/top/show/yanukovich-podpisal-zakon-ob-osnovah-gosudarstvennoy-yazykovoy-08082012172800> [Accessed 25.03.2013]

2.4. Language Policy in Latvia after the Soviet Union Disintegration

2.4.1. Ethnic Composition of Contemporary Latvia

The Soviet demographic policy has a significant impact on the current state of affairs in Latvia. The country has always experienced influxes of migrants from different parts of the USSR. Thus, according to the statistical data, «Latvians constituted 77 % of the total population during Latvia's independence period in 1935, 83 % just before the final occupation by the Red Army in 1945, but only 62 % in 1959, 54 % in 1979, and 52 % in 1989»⁹¹. Ethnic Latvians continue to dominate in rural areas, whereas being a minority in big cities. For the whole society and politicians the problem of ethnic Latvians' minoritization became one of the most urgent after the restoration of independence. Like in the Soviet period, where the two biggest groups of the population were represented by ethnic Latvians and Russians, contemporary Latvian state has the similar ethnic composition. In this changing situation of a new political order and hierarchy Russians found out themselves in a weakened position of the minority which was aggravated by the fact that thousands of Russians, living in Latvia, suddenly turned into non-citizens of their state. As Brubaker points out, an important component of nationalizing states is the attempt to protect the interests of the core nation, seemingly discriminated and underdeveloped before. «To compensate for this, the new state is seen as having the right, indeed the responsibility, to protect and promote the cultural, economic, demographic, and political vitality of the core nation»⁹². Consequently, nationalization of the state can take different forms. For instance, in Latvia language policy (including educational reforms), citizenship and the question of inclusion/exclusion and reinterpretation of the history have become the core elements of this strategy.

Considering ethnic distribution of the population is the key component of doing research on contemporary language policy in Latvia. Comparing the results of two recent censuses, held in Latvia in 1989 and 2011 respectively, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the number of those who marked their ethnic belonging, or "nationality" in Soviet terminology, as "Latvians" is increasing, whereas the general population of the country is decreasing (from 2 666 567 residents in 1989 to 2 067 887 people in 2011). Russians constituted 33, 9 % of the total population in 1989, 29, 2 % in 2001 and 26, 9 % in 2011. This tendency is an evidence of the decreasing number of ethnic Russians in Latvia after the restoration of independence. Among members of other national minorities are Belorussians, Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanians, Jews, Romany, Estonians, Germans, Lives, e t.c. In 2011 representatives of different national or ethnic groups constituted 10, 9 % of the total population which is a significant

⁹¹ Dreifelds J. Op. Cit. P. 143-144.

⁹² Brubaker R. Op. Cit. P. 432.

indicator of ethnic heterogeneity and diversity in the country⁹³. «About 56 % of the members of national minorities of Latvia, especially Russians, still do not hold Latvian citizenship. Either they hold a special status as so-called “non-citizens” (over 53 %) or else they are foreign (for example, Russian) citizens or stateless (3%) »⁹⁴. As I will illustrate further, this fact has become a major concern of European institutions such as the Council of Europe and OSCE and one of the most arguable points in Latvian-Russian relations after 1991.

According to the statistical data (the 1989 census), «only 21, 1 % of Russians living in Latvia knew Latvian. 65, 7 % of Latvians knew Russian, the highest rate for indigenous nationalities in any republic». ⁹⁵ There was simply no need to learn Latvian, because the achievement of a high societal and professional status required excellent command of Russian. With the revival of national consciousness and deliberate attempts to establish the Latvian national state, the language turned not only into the key marker of national identity, but into the instrument of political recognition and independence.

These actions to promote the Latvian culture and language found support from a significant part of the population. However, a lot of Russians were resistant to governmental measures. Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser describe the response of Russians to being a minority. «Latvia illustrates an extreme in our comparison of the non-Russian successor states: a regime that aggressively promotes the interests of the titular nation. This position triggers a minority reaction which has potential long-term consequences on Latvian developing institutions. The government’s exclusionary political agenda is most obvious regarding citizenship – the main irritant between Latvians and Russians». ⁹⁶ In 2010 researchers from University of Latvia presented their book «How Integrated Is Latvian Society? » which is supposed to be a serious attempt to estimate the results of integration policy in Latvia in different spheres, including ethnic and linguistic identity of the people. The complexity of the current situation in Latvia is, on the one hand, that a lot of Latvians tend to be concerned with the demographic problem, as the result of the previous policy, and language promotion of the Latvian language. On the other hand, a significant proportion of ethnic Russians feel discriminated in terms of language use. Thus, the authors of the project «How Integrated Is Latvian Society? » claim that «the Integration Programme states more that the cornerstone of integration is people’s readiness to accept the Latvian language as the state language. Because linguistic identity is the most important component in the ethnic self-understanding of the Russian minority, the linguistic aspects of the Integration Programme are perceived by many Russians as potentially being discriminatory, this despite the fact that “the Russian language is almost

⁹³ Population Census 2011 - Key Indicators. Central Statistical Bureau of *Latvia*. URL: <http://www.csb.gov.lv/en/statistikas-temas/population-census-2011-key-indicators-33613.html> [Accessed 23.03.2013]

⁹⁴ Pan C., Pfeil B. S. National Minorities in Europe. Handbook. Series: Ethnos (Book 63). Purdue University Press, 2004. P. 109.

⁹⁵ Dreifelds J. Op. Cit. P. 157.

⁹⁶ Chinn J., Kaiser R. Russians as the New Minority. Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States. West view Press, 1996. P. 109.

completely dominant among Russian families and in informal communications. There are Russian language media and educational institutions»⁹⁷. However, the main problem that Russians are confronted with throughout the whole period of renewed Latvian independence is the process of acquiring an official status of the country's citizen. In other words, there is quite a high a number of newspapers, magazines, and books in Russian available for the general public. However, a lot of Russians living in the Latvian territory cannot enjoy the full spectrum of rights (especially political) due to the status of non-citizens.

2.4.2. Legislation on Language Policy

As it was previously mentioned, the major problem with the Latvian case arises in the existence of tensions that occurred between two largest groups of the population – Latvians and Russians – caused by the change in political, economic, and cultural order after the restoration of independence in 1991.

Research on Latvian language policy after 1991 often reflects different political preferences and the main arguments of each side, which creates a serious obstacle for presenting a relatively balanced picture of the current language situation. On the one hand, Latvian researchers Ina Druviete and Dace Strelēvica-Ošiņa claim that «in the Russian-speaking public some deeply rooted stereotypical views about the superiority of Russian as the language of internationalism still prevail; another problem is the lack of multilingual traditions in Russia as well as the legacy of an imperial way of thinking»⁹⁸. On the other hand, Michele E. Commercio characterizes Latvian language policy as «an explicit commitment to promote the state language; it became increasingly aversive in terms of its impact on Russian speakers and aims to eliminate *de jure* and *de facto* use of Russian despite the fact that 67 % of the country's population speaks Russian»⁹⁹. The authors of the article further prove that, despite deliberate attempts of the Latvian government to promote the state language, there is no vivid discrimination against Russian speakers, while Commercio defines the overall policy in terms of discrimination of Russian in the public sphere that *de facto* exists. Obviously, both views contradict each other, to some extent. That is why the possible response to this challenge is seen in a careful attempt to scrutinize different points of view on contemporary language policy in Latvia.

The most fundamental documents in the sphere of language use are the Constitution of Latvia, fully reinforced in 1993, and the Law on the State Language adopted in 1999. However, the reforms of language use had already started after the collapse of the Soviet Union. «The country] second language law, which was adopted in 1992, altered the direction of its linguistic regime

⁹⁷ How Integrated Is Latvian Society? An Audit of Achievements, Failures and Challenges / Ed. By Nils Muižnieks. University of Latvia Advanced Social and Political Research Institute. Riga: University of Latvia Press, 2010. P. 262.

⁹⁸ Druviete I., Strelēvica-Ošiņa D. Some Aspects of the Sociolinguistic Situation in Latvia: Causes and Effects. Contemporary Linguistics. Spring 2008. Vol 65. No. 1. P. 103.

⁹⁹ Commercio M. E. Russian Minority Politics in Post-Soviet Latvia and Kyrgyzstan: the Transformative Power of Informal Networks / Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010. P. 63.

dramatically <...> The 1992 legislation diminishes the use of Russian and expands the use of Latvian in many ways»¹⁰⁰. First of all, all state employees must have good command of Latvian. Moreover, if a person aims at applying for the state institutions consultation, it should be realized only in the state language or accompanied by a notarized translation. Thus, Latvian was established as the state language, largely displacing Russian to the private sphere.

According to Article 4 of the Constitution, «the Latvian language is the official language in the Republic of Latvia»¹⁰¹. Simultaneously, the article 114 states that «persons belonging to ethnic minorities have the right to preserve and develop their language and their ethnic and cultural identity». The same provisions can be found in the Law on the State Language aiming to ensure: «1). The preservation, protection, and development of the Latvian language; 2). The preservation of the cultural and historical heritage of the Latvian nation; 3). The right to use the Latvian language freely in any sphere of life; 4). The integration of national minorities into Latvian society while respecting their right to use their mother tongue or any other language; 5). The increase of the influence of the Latvian language in the cultural environment of Latvia by promoting a faster integration of society (Article 1)»¹⁰². Then the Article 4 determines that «the state shall ensure the preservation, protection, and development of the Latgalian written language as a historically established variety». All other languages, except Livonian, are considered to be “foreign”. Therefore, the aim of this law is to protect the only state language and strengthen the position of Latvian in society as well as preserve two other languages that have common historic roots with Latvian. In contrast, Ukraine defines the special status for the Russian language in the Constitution; the main Latvian document does not mention any special rights for Russians-speaking residents, automatically giving Russian the label of a “foreign language”. However, the use of minority languages is not limited by legal provisions and is not restricted in the private sphere.

The Law on Citizenship approved in June, 1994 has also become became a cornerstone in debates between international organisations such as the Council of Europe, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union, and Latvia. It is important to stress the significance of debates over citizenship in the overall policy of nationalizing state and language policy, because those residents who wanted to confirm their status of a Latvian citizen were supposed to pass special language exams and prove their proficiency in the state language. Consequently, language requirements turned into an instrument of exclusion of huge groups of population who did not have any command of Latvian. «The Latvian Supreme

¹⁰⁰ *Commercio M. E.* Op. cit.

¹⁰¹ The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. Adopted by the Constitutional Assembly of Latvia on 15 February 1922. Amended on 15 October 1998; 30 April 2002; 23 September 2004; 15 December 2005. Official text of the Constitution in the English Language. URL: <http://www.saeima.lv/en/legislation/constitution> [Accessed 22.03.2013]

¹⁰² Official Language Law. Adopted by the Saeima on December 9, 1999. Translated by Terminology Centre. Riga. URL: http://www.valoda.lv/en/downloadDoc_436/mid_566 [Accessed 22.03.2013]

Council introduced a citizenship bill immediately after independence in 1991 <...> In spite of their differences, the two sides agreed on a fundamental point: only citizens – the 1 776 000 individuals who could trace their lineage directly or through parents or grandparents to the interwar republic – could determine the naturalization process for others»¹⁰³. Until 1994, Latvia had no legislation on citizenship. Then the parliament proposed the plan for naturalization with the system of quotas, when all residents who wanted to go through naturalization process were subdivided into several groups. This decision provoked heated discussions not only in the Latvian parliament but also in European institutions and Russia. «European Commission recommendations, which were based on the Europe Agreement, were designed to make certain that Latvia employed a balanced approach to language proficiency requirements, particularly in the private sector»¹⁰⁴. The main objections of European organisations were strict language requirements and absence of privileges for elderly people, naturalization quotas, and protection of national minorities.

Ina Druviete Ina and Dace Strelēvica-Ošiņa point out that «the language requirements in the Law on Citizenship in Latvia do not differ from those of many other countries. Language tuition programmes were developed already since 1988; about 450 000 people have already acquired the state language proficiency certificate required for professional duties. However, only about 200 000 persons have completed the naturalization procedure and become citizens»¹⁰⁵. In spite of the attempts of the authorities to establish special courses and schools which would help the people to acquire basic skills in Latvian, naturalization was held at a slow pace. This fact caused considerable concerns and criticism of European organisations. «The European Union and numerous influential member states, following advice from the HCNM, had issued clear signals that the liberalization of the citizenship law was necessary if Latvia were to achieve progress in accession negotiations»¹⁰⁶.

The situation remains be uncomfortable and vulnerable to lots of non-citizens in Latvia mostly constituted by former USSR migrants. The Parliamentary Assembly of OSCE concludes in press statement after the parliamentary elections in 2006, «Approximately 400,000 people in Latvia, some 18 per cent of the total population, have not obtained Latvian or any other citizenship and therefore still have the status of “non-citizens.” Non-citizens do not have the right to vote in any Latvian elections, although they can join political parties. To obtain citizenship, these persons must go through the naturalization process, which had been completed by 50,000 since the 2002 Saeima election. The fact that a significant proportion of the adult population does not enjoy voting rights, represents a continuing democratic deficit. The OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe and

¹⁰³ Chinn J., Kaiser R. Op. cit. P. 113.

¹⁰⁴ Schmid C. Ethnicity and Language Tensions in Latvia. URL: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10993-007-9068-1?LI=true#> [Accessed 11.03.2013]

¹⁰⁵ Druviete I., Strelēvica-Ošiņa D. Some Aspects of the Sociolinguistic Situation in Latvia: Causes and Effects. Contemporary Linguistics. Vol 65. No. 1. Spring 2008. P. 101.

¹⁰⁶ Muižnieks N. Max van der Stoep and Latvia // Security and Human Rights, 2011. No. 3. P. 258. URL: www.shrblog.org/cms_file.php?fromDB=92&forceDownload [Accessed 27.05.2013]

the Council of Baltic Sea States have all recommended that consideration be given to permitting non-citizens to vote in municipal elections»¹⁰⁷. Thus, the international community is concerned with the alarming situation in Latvia which does not give an opportunity for lots of local residents to participate in political life of their country, and this creates various obstacles to Latvia's democratic development. Not only European institutions are concerned with this challenge but also the Russian government. The fact that thousands of Russians do not have any official status in the country resulted in a very emotional and critical reaction where the most commonly encountered statements were "a shameful law", "persistent (chronic) problem of non-citizens"¹⁰⁸.

One of the declared aims of the citizenship programme and language laws is to promote societal integration of different groups living in the Latvian territory. Michele Commercio makes an attempt to estimate the results of this integration policy in two post-Soviet republics – Latvia and Kyrgyzstan and arrives to the conclusion that the overall language policy in the latter case can be defined as tolerant, while the example of Latvia is associated with rigid language policy. «While the government' formal programme does address the need to protect minority rights, it simultaneously identifies widespread proficiency in Latvian as the means to achieve integration»¹⁰⁹. Whereas Russian was the language of intercultural communication and societal integration during the Soviet period, Latvian has become a powerful political instrument after the restoration of independence.

The overall politics of the Latvian government after 1991 resulted in a dramatic shift towards the membership of the country in European and international organisations. As the result of the public referendum held on 20th September, 2003, Latvia officially joined the European Union. «Legislative provisions on minority rights, although a contentious issue, have developed progressively since the early 1990s, largely as a result on international interaction and the desire of political leaders to join the EU and NATO»¹¹⁰. Accession to the EU imposed additional legal obligations on the Latvians government, in terms of human rights protection, and democratic development of the country e t.c. As a result, Latvia has acquired legally binding provisions which the state is supposed to make in accordance with the Treaties of the European Union and its laws.

The minority school reform initiated in 2004 gained particular attention from the international community and Russia. «The Law on Education establishes that a minority education programme is one of the specialized types of education programmes in public education. (Article 38 (2)1). Article 41

¹⁰⁷ Parliamentary Assembly of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Press statement. Latvian Election Transparent and Professional but Issue of "Non-citizens" Remains. URL: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/latvia/21362> [Accessed 19.03.2013]

¹⁰⁸ Латвия ужесточает закон о гражданстве // Актуальные комментарии. URL: <http://dev.actualcomment.ru/news/22075/> [Accessed 22.03.2013]

¹⁰⁹ Commercio M. E. Op. cit. P. 66.

¹¹⁰ Analytical Report PHARE RAXEN_CC Minority Education. Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies. Minority Education in Latvia. Vienna. 2004. URL: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/275-EDU-Latvia-final.pdf [Accessed 23.03.2013]

elaborates on these Minority education programmes, and stipulates that 1). Educational programmes for ethnic minorities shall be developed by educational institutions in accordance with State educational standards on the basis of general educational programme models approved by the Ministry of Education and Science; 2). Educational programmes for ethnic minorities shall include content necessary for acquisition of the relevant ethnic culture and for integration of ethnic minorities in Latvia. 3). The Ministry of Education and Science shall specify the subjects of study in the education programmes for minorities which must be acquired in the official language.”»¹¹¹

The initial proposition from the government was to increase the state language component by declaring that 60 % of classroom hours must be taught in Latvian in schools for national minorities. This amendment brought thousands of Latvian residents in the streets, including school-children and their parents in active protest movements in February 2004. «Due to the ambiguous wording of the proposal, this passed its second reading last week, critics’ fear that classes for the preservation of minority identity refer only to language and literature classes»¹¹². The government officials appeased the general public that the situation with the ambiguous formulation in the law would be resolved in the third reading, leaving a free choice of subjects in minority languages. On the contrary, the Russian-speaking opposition mostly affected by this amendment, expressed deep concerns about the impact of this law on the whole educational system in Latvia and protection of national minorities by granting them the right to study in their native language. Human rights organisations were also involved in the negotiation process. The experts from the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies presented the analytical report on minorities’ language representation in the educational sphere. Their main point of criticism of the reform was that « it should be directed at the lack of significant participation by the minorities themselves, as well as the overly politicized positions of some proponents and opponents of the reforms»¹¹³. Constructive criticism should be also directed to the government that is responsible not only for the protection and development of the state language but also for the creation of schools for representatives of national minorities. There also exist a significant number of Russian-language schools along with Latvian-language ones, but members of other ethnic groups suffer from the lack of classes taught in their mother tongue.

In May, 2005 Latvia ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities which became a considerable step towards the harmonization of the situation with national minorities and different ethnic groups. However, the Convention was signed in 1995 but it took a long time to achieve consensus in the sphere of language policy. As researchers from the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences note, «discussions about the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities have involved a fairly harsh

¹¹¹ Analytical Report PHARE RAXEN_CC Minority Education. Op. cit.

¹¹² *Eglitis A.* School reform amendment sparks outrage // The Baltic Times. Riga. January 29, 2004. URL: <http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/9351/> [Accessed 23.03/2013]

¹¹³ Analytical Report PHARE RAXEN_CC Minority Education. Op. cit.

exchange of ideas about the way in which national minorities should be defined. People have asked, for example, whether Russians should be seen as a national minority»¹¹⁴.

The document was ratified with several important exceptions – it was not allowed to use the languages of national minorities in the names of streets and other topographic names as well as in municipal and governmental institutions. The definition of the term “national minorities” encompassed only those people who were recognized as Latvian citizens. As it was mentioned in this chapter, the highest proportion of the members of national minorities is exactly among “non-citizens”. That is why the following definition of “national minorities” led to vigorous political debates.

Three clear positions dominated among representatives of the Latvian parliament¹¹⁵. Thus, the politicians who represented the radical right part of Latvian political spectrum were largely against ratification of the Framework Convention and pointed out that France was regarded to be an excellent example of dealing with ethnic minorities (France is the only member of the European Union which did not sign either the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the FCNM considering that there are simply no ethnic or national groups in its territory). The fraction of the “First party” insisted on ratification of the Convention with the only exception to topographic names. The left opposition was also in favour of ratification but only for citizens of Latvia. «Main arguments against the ratification mentioned during the parliamentary debate were the following: 1). the legislation of Latvia already provides sufficient protection for national minorities; 2). the term "national minority" is not defined in legislation; 3). ratification of this convention is not an indicator of the level of democracy and respect to human rights, as several European countries have not even signed the Convention; 4). it is exclusively up to the government to decide when the ratification of the Framework Convention could be initiated»¹¹⁶. These objections were partly recognized and taken into account in the process of negotiation and during the parliamentary debates.

2.4.3. Language Policy relating the Latgalian Minority in Latvia

The government attention to the change in hierarchical Latvian-Russian political order, the politics of nationalizing state, and overriding concerns about promoting the state language gave the question of other minorities' protection scant coverage both in mass media and in the academic world. Sanita Lazdiņa and Heiko Marten discuss the issue of the Latgalian language in their article «Latgalian in Latvia: A Continuous Struggle for Political Recognition». Latgalian

¹¹⁴ Integration Practice and Perspectives / Ed. by Zepa, Brigita. Baltic Institute of Social Sciences. Riga. 2006. P. 8.

¹¹⁵ Сейм Латвии ратифицировал конвенцию по защите национальных меньшинств // Информационное агентство «Regnum». 27.05.2013. URL: <http://www.regnum.ru/news/460778.html> [Accessed 24.03.2013]

¹¹⁶ Report on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in the Republic of Latvia // Latvian Human Rights Committee. Riga. 2002. URL: http://www.minelres.lv/coe/report/Latvia_NGO.htm [Accessed 24.04.2013]

speakers constitute the third language community in contemporary Latvia, despite little information about their political representation and protection. The authors of the article argue that «the debate on Latvian and Russian has been a considerable obstacle to discussing Latgalian issues. In light of this debate, other linguistic debates were heard far less often in Latvia in recent years, and other minorities have found it difficult to gain a voice»¹¹⁷.

Latgalian refers to “historical written variety of Latvian” and is the only language, except the state one and Livonian which is spoken by very few people in Latvia, is mentioned in the Constitution. Therefore, the authorities take the responsibility for preserving, developing, and protecting of this language. «Latgalian is a Baltic variety which has developed separately from other varieties over several hundred years. Originally spread over large parts of today’s Latvian territory, Latgalian tribes settled in the Eastern area of contemporary Latvia as the rural population under changing rulers»¹¹⁸. Both Latvian and Latgalian are considered to be separate languages, but their fate is common in the sense that they had long been under pressure, and only in the period of the first Latvian independence gained a chance to revive their national consciousness. During the Soviet period, Latgalian was eliminated from all spheres of public life. After the restoration of independence, Latgalian deserved scarce attention, despite governmental efforts to establish the higher status the Constitution; it lacks prestige of Latvian, political and economic strength of Russian. Nevertheless, Sanita Lazdiņa and Heiko Marten argue that Latgalian has the full potential to be an important political instrument in the country. As many minority languages, Latgalian is used largely in the private sphere.

«One of major successes of Latgalian activism was official recognition of Latgalian orthography in 2007. At the international level, the official assignment of a International Organisation for Standardization language code in 2010 was seen as a major success by Latgalian activists, and lobbying by LatBLUL (Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages) also ensured the inclusion of Latgalian in the 2011 national census»¹¹⁹. Despite these modest achievements, Latgalian activism seems to face a lot of challenges. For instance, Latgalian activists reached a consensus between them and the Latvian parliament by initiating the working group on Latgalian. «The working group began meeting in the summer 2010. Many activists were disappointed by the fact that the group did not initiate any real policy changes but instead just created a list of tasks for developing Latgalian issues before its work was interrupted by early general elections in September 2011»¹²⁰. The most pressing problems, from the point of view of researchers, are the failure of the Latvian government to respond to the needs of the Latgale population and, consequently, their dependence on the state measures to protect the language. «Economic obstacles play an additional role, with Latvia experiencing financial difficulties that have resulted in heavy cuts in

¹¹⁷ Lazdiņa S., Marten S. Latgalian in Latvia: A Continuous Struggle for Political Recognition // Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe. 2012. Vol. 11. No 1. P. 67.

¹¹⁸ Lazdiņa S., Marten S. Op. cit. P. 69.

¹¹⁹ Lazdiņa, Sanita and Marten, Schrader. Op. cit. P. 75-76.

¹²⁰ Lazdiņa S., Marten S. Op. cit. P. 77.

public spending. As the poorest region in Latvia, Latgale suffers from particular problems such as high unemployment, low salaries and social problems»¹²¹. Thus the aim of the Latvian authorities is to develop well-grounded and coherent language policy, paying attention to the needs of other ethnic and national minorities. The aim of the Latgalian activists is a continuous attempt to find new ways of expressing their political will, develop and protect their cultural heritage at both local and national level. If the Latvian government distracts its attention from the problem of Russian-speakers, it will be also an excellent chance to find the place for Latgalian in public debates.

2.4.4. The Referendum on the Russian Language in February, 2012

The course of Latvian foreign policy since the restoration of independence aimed at rapid integration with European institutions; respect for human rights and freedoms became an important indicator of sustainable democratic development of the country. Thus, the Latvian government could not overestimate the recommendations of the Council of Europe and the European Union in terms of national minorities' protection, which became an additional argument in favour of the ratification of the Framework Convention.

Despite this notable achievement, the Latvian authorities faced substantial criticism from the Russian opposition and human rights organisations. For instance, the Latvian Human Rights Committee published the analytical report on the situation with national minorities. The experts arrived to a conclusion that respect for minority rights was declared both in the Constitution and in international legal documents which Latvia signed and ratified, but certain steps should be made in order to strengthen the system of minorities' protection and maintain their culture and language: «The main barrier to successful implementation of the Convention's principles are certain provisions of the Language Law and the Education Law, in particular the prohibition to use minority languages in state and municipal institutions, as well as the envisaged elimination of the state-supported secondary and vocational education in minority languages scheduled for 2004-2006»¹²². All these objections were regarded as serious obstacles to harmonization of the situation with national minorities in Latvia by both human rights organisations and European institutions. The Russian government had also great concerns about the future of the so-called "compatriots", who remained in the Latvian territory and were suffering from different forms of discrimination at both local and national level, because of a decreasing number of schools where Russians could get education in their mother tongue. Along with the restriction to 60-40 % correlation of Latvian and Russian in the school curricula, initiated in 2004 by the Latvian government, several exceptions in the Framework Convention prolonged political and public debates in the sphere of language use for a long time.

¹²¹ Lazdiņa S., Marten S. Op. cit. P. 84.

¹²² Report on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in the Republic of Latvia. Op. cit.

February, 2012 became a turning point in the overall language policy in contemporary Latvia. The referendum on the status of the Russian language was initiated by Russian-speakers' movement called Native Tongue. The initiators of this campaign in favour of Russian tried to convince the general public that the referendum was an effective tool to fight against discrimination and violation of human rights. The question that was addressed to the Latvian population was «Do you support the adoption of the Draft Law "Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia» that provides for the Russian language the status of the second official language? » The constitutional amendments were connected with Articles 4, 18, 26, 101 and 114 that were supposed to grant Russian the official status and the right to be represented in all spheres of public life in Latvia.

From the point of view of the Russian-speaking opposition, this fact influenced significantly the results of the referendum that were not in favour of recognizing Russian as the second state language. According to the final results of the referendum, more than two thirds of the Latvian citizens who came to the polling stations to vote were against Russian as the second official language (74, 8 %). 24, 88 % supported the initial proposal with the majority votes in favour of Russian in the region of Latgale.¹²³ The results of the referendum produced heated debates in both mass media and among the politicians. Thus, BBC reports the outcome of the Latvian referendum trying to present the objective picture from both sides – Latvian and Russian. «The referendum has been described as "absurd" by Latvian President Andris Berzins, who said most people were more concerned with the country's recovery from a severe recession. He pointed out that «there's no need for a second language. Whoever wants, can use their language at home or in school," he said»¹²⁴. The words of the President reflected the general position of the Latvian government to the problem of language policy which can be described as tolerant and non-restrictive use of the Russian language in the private sphere, but the need to establish Latvian as the language of the state. The analysts commonly point out that the results of the referendum indicate «the strength of feeling among many ordinary Latvians, who are keen to distance themselves culturally from their former Soviet rulers»¹²⁵. Nevertheless, inability of a great many of Russians to participate in the referendum and, consequently, change the political situation in the country, seems to be a serious obstacle to the objective results and improvement of the situation with national minorities.

Reinterpretation of the history, manipulation with cultural artifacts, conscious attempts to create the state based on the Latvian cultural identity, exclusionary character of the Law on Citizenship are the key components of the

¹²³ The Official Results of the Referendum in the Republic of Latvia held on 18 February, 2012 // The Central Election Commission of Latvia. URL: <http://www.tn2012.cvk.lv/report-results.html> [Accessed 25.03.2013]

¹²⁴ Latvia Rejects Making Russian an Official Language // BBC News, 19 February 2012. URL: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17083397> [Accessed 25.03.2013]

¹²⁵ Latvians Say "No" in Russian Language Vote // Euronews, 19 February 2012. URL: <http://www.euronews.com/2012/02/19/latvians-say-no-in-russian-language-vote> [Accessed 25.03.2013]

political life in contemporary Latvia. The overall post-independence foreign policy of Latvia is a decisive step towards integration with European organisations and NATO. With the accession to the EU, Latvia tried to follow the recommendations of the Council of Europe and OSCE in the sphere of national minorities' protection and achieved modest success in its attempt to make the Latvian language the means of societal integration. On the one hand, significant steps were made to harmonize the situation with national minorities. However, political tensions in the sphere of language use are still among the most discussed problems in contemporary Latvia that needs a pragmatic and comprehensive solution.

2.5. Comparison of Language Policies in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union Disintegration

Contemporary Latvia and Ukraine constitute two of the most complicated cases of language policy in today's world. This paper provides the overview of language situation in Latvia and Ukraine. Linguistic issues that turned into political ones in independent Latvia and Ukraine, share some common characteristics, which will be discussed further.

1). After the restoration of independence, both Latvian and Ukrainian political elites were largely concerned with constructing a new political order and hierarchy, where representatives of "titular nationalities" would enjoy the full spectrum of rights and freedoms. Contemporary language situation in both countries is indelibly linked to the history of the USSR. The central authorities gave few chances for developing national cultures and languages, even though it was declared that all "titular" nationalities should develop under favourable conditions. Forced Russification in terms of establishing Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication significantly decreased chances for the revival of national cultures and languages; Russian dominated in all spheres of life. That is why the restoration of independence revealed disadvantages of the previous national policy that resulted in heated debates on the status of the Russian language. The Soviet legacy and authorities' obsession with the idea of Latvian or Ukrainian national state based on one state language made this question highly politicized. In terms of Rogers Brubaker' theory, both Latvia and Ukraine conduct the policy of a nationalizing state. It means that both countries develop such a trajectory of political development that aims at promoting their national cultures and languages that were previously discriminated; in most cases, at the expense of Russian. And this fact, consequently, causes political tensions with the Russian Federation, because millions of "compatriots" remained in the territories of both states. These people are regarded as ethnic Russians only in some cases; they can be both politically or culturally affiliated to Russia.

2). The second common characteristic is directly connected with the first one. The political leaders of both countries pay scrupulous attention to the change of political hierarchy. Latvians and Ukrainians, who had to learn

Russian in the previous decades, nowadays are free to establish their national language as the state one. As it was mentioned above, the state language was chosen to be the means of societal integration. The status of the Russian language has been the subject of continuous political debates throughout the whole history of independent Latvia and Ukraine. Indeed very little attention was paid to other ethnic minorities that constitute ethnic diversity in both states. The problems of the Crimean Tatars and Rusyns in Ukraine as well as Latgalians' political representation were rarely the subject of state concerns, despite the fact that the special status of Latgalian is implemented in the Constitution. The initial proposition of this research is that special attention to the status of the Russian language, attracted by mass media and politicians can be explained by extreme politicization of this question, where the distribution of power relations between previously dominating Russians and the core nationalities provided a focus of the ongoing debates.

3). In the theoretical section of the thesis a necessity to use the constructivist studying language policy in Ukraine and Latvia was introduced. I use the frequently cited definition of a nation as an "imagined community" by B. Anderson as the core of my analysis. Thus, ethnic and, consequently, political borders seem to be not a stable phenomenon; they are changing throughout the history. Thus, I assume that contemporary nationalization programmes implemented by Latvian and Ukrainian political elites is a *constructed project* where language is considered to be the key marker of national identity. Such cultural artifacts as the common language, nationalist historiography, and mass media are the key features of Ukrainian and Latvian national projects. However, a widely discussed question of citizenship in Latvia also plays a significant role in constructing political boundaries. Citizenship has turned into the marker of exclusion based on the historical proposition – those who did not have any ties with inter-war independent Latvia experienced difficulties in obtaining an official status in their country of residence. Nationalist historiography is an attempt to reinterpret the historical events and their significance for Latvian and Ukrainian development. Therefore, deliberate efforts to call the annexation of the Baltic States to the Soviet Union as "occupation" are considered to be the means of overcoming the Communist past. Finally, I made up the conclusion that language was seen not only the key marker of national identity but also an instrument of political recognition and sovereignty of the Ukrainian and Latvian states.

4). In both Latvia and Ukraine Russians constitute the second largest groups of the population. The problem with the Ukrainian case is that it is difficult to classify "Ukrainians" and "Russians" in terms of ethnic belonging. The fact that linguistic and ethnic lines do not coincide in this country is postulated by many researchers. The common characteristic of both countries is that the reaction of Russians who constitute a new minority nowadays is more often sharp and emotional. Brubaker links such a vulnerable reaction to

the state measures with the feeling of “psychological belonging”¹²⁶. Despite the USSR collapse, many Russians tend to perceive Ukrainian and Latvian territories as their “own”. That is why Russian foreign policy aimed at supporting “compatriots” in the near abroad is perceived by many Ukrainian and Latvian politicians as “neo-imperial” and as a possible threat to the state sovereignty.

5). In 1991 both Ukraine and Latvia started to implement legal provisions in the sphere of languages. The most important documents are the Constitution and Law on the State Language adopted in 1999 in Latvia and the Law on Languages approved in 1989 in Ukraine which had been in force until 2012, when the new Law “On the principles of the State Language Policy” had been introduced. The laws that were ratified in the 1990s have a strong point that the state is responsible for protection, preservation and development of the state languages. According to the Ukrainian Constitution, Ukrainian is the only state language, while there is a special amendment to a particular status of the Russian language. In Latvia only Latvian has an official status along with Latgalian and Livonian. Both Ukraine and Latvia ratified international documents that ensure legal protection of ethnic minorities (Ukraine ratified both FCNM and the European Charter for Minority or Regional Languages, while Latvia accepted only the first one). Heated political debates and discrimination against Russian-speakers was the subject of international concerns from the Council of Europe and human rights organization.

Despite these common characteristics that are largely connected with overcoming the Soviet legacy, Ukrainian and Latvian language policies have some distinct features.

1). Both countries determine a different status for the Russian language. Before 2012 Russian did not enjoy any special privileges in Ukraine. However, Ukraine ratified the European Charter, and the legal provision about protection of Russian existed in the Constitution, a lot of researchers claimed that the state did not take full responsibility for protecting national minorities. In 2012 harsh debates accompanied the approval of the Law “On the Principles of the State Language Policy” which gave a chance for the representation of Russian in the public in those Ukrainian regions, where more than 10 % of the population used Russian or any other minority languages. In many Eastern regions and the Crimea which are traditionally more russified, the state services started to work in Russian. This was a greater step towards liberalization of language legislation which caused resistance of pro-Ukrainian nationalists. In Latvia the situation is ambiguous. According to the Constitution, Russian does not have any special status; it means that the language gains automatically the status of “foreign”. The European Charter has not yet been ratified by the Latvian government. Nevertheless, a large step towards a democratic solution of the language problem was made, when the Russian activists initiated the

¹²⁶ *Brubaker R.* Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 2003.

referendum on Russian as the second state language in Latvia. The overwhelming majority of those who participated in the referendum (excluding non-citizens where Russians constitute the majority) voted against Russian as the second official language. Nevertheless, this event played a significant role in sustainable democratic development of Latvia. Ukraine has never conducted the referendum of the status of Russian.

2). One of the distinct features of Latvia and Ukraine is the difference in their international legal status. Latvia finally joined the European Union in 2004, while Ukraine expressed the desire to do it. The EU puts additional obligations on reforming the legislation in the member-states. Not only economic criteria allow joining the European Union, but also respect to human rights is regarded to be objective criterion. The problem of non-citizens provoked political debates among the Latvian authorities and the Council of Europe, OSCE and EU. Latvia's foreign policy after the restoration of independence was oriented towards quick integration with international organisations. That is why, the country's government was inclined to follow the recommendations on human rights protection. Ukraine is more heterogeneous and diverse in terms of regional development, language preferences and perception of Ukrainian national identity. As it was previously mentioned, Ukrainian regions vary significantly in ethnic and linguistic composition which created a serious obstacle for Ukrainian integration. Therefore, Western and Central regions, because of historical reasons, are oriented towards integration with Europe. In contrast, people who live in Eastern and Southern regions tend to support closer ties to Russia and express the feeling of nostalgia for the Soviet Union. This creates an ambiguous political situation and provokes heated discussions about the future development of Ukraine.

3). The factor of regional polarization in Ukraine should be taken into account in the analysis of contemporary language policy. There is a clear correlation between ethnic distribution of the population, their linguistic preferences and the results of the parliamentary and presidential elections. Thus, Eastern regions and the Crimea, which are more russified, tend to support those candidates who promise a higher status for the Russian language. The electorate of the Western and Central regions vote for those candidates and political parties that maintain Ukrainian as the only state language and reconstruction of Ukrainian national identity. In Latvia there is no clear correlation between ethnic distribution and language preferences. The largest groups of the Russian-speakers can be found in the largest Latvian cities which are Riga, Daugavpils, and Rezekne, where the number of ethnic Russians is even higher than ethnic Latvians. «Riga, the capital city, contains over a third of the total population of Latvia and has been responsible for an overwhelming proportion of the output of publishing, higher education and culture»¹²⁷. The share of ethnic Latvians in Riga in 1994 increased to 37, 7 %¹²⁸. According to the 2001 Latvian census, the Latvians constitute 43, 8 % of

¹²⁷ Dreifelds J. Latvia in Transition. Demography, Language and Ethnic Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. P. 146.

¹²⁸ Ibid. P. 147-148.

the total population in Riga¹²⁹. As a result, Russians continue to be one of the dominant groups of the population, especially in big cities.

3. Discourse Analysis of Russian-Language Newspapers in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union Disintegration.

3.1. Theoretical Foundations of Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis belongs to a broader theoretical framework of social constructionism (or social constructivism) that combines different multidisciplinary approaches. Despite the fact that social constructionist approaches are manifold and diverse, there are some common characteristics covered by term “constructivism”. The key premise of this theoretical frame is that social reality cannot be understood as a stable phenomenon; it is constructed and is changing in the course of history. Louise Phillips and Marianne Jørgensen present a detailed and comprehensive overview of the most significant theories of discourse and their connection to social constructivism. «Discourse is a form of social action that plays a part in producing the social world – including knowledge, identities and social relations – and thereby in maintaining specific social patterns»¹³⁰. This view is opposed to the primordialist or essentialist one that was discussed in the 1st chapter. Thus, neither social reality nor discursive practices cannot be considered as pre-given or “natural”. The question is *how, why and under whose/which influence* they change is a long-standing problem for social researchers.

The point of departure for those who decided to conduct a research using the method of discourse analysis is the theory of discourse elaborated by French philosopher Michel Foucault. His ideas made an enormous contribution to both theoretical and empirical framework of discourse research. Foucault was one of the most influential representatives of French post-structuralism movement together with K. Levi-Strauss and R. Barth. His ideas are largely based on previously dominated structuralism and include the notion that contemporary system of knowledge should be understood as a unity, but not as separate entities of thoughts and ideas. Discourse should not be analysed from the point of view of its meaning; in contrast, discourse is supposed to be a reflection of deep-rooted presuppositions and beliefs.

«Foucault defines discourse as follows: We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation. Discourse is made up of a limited member of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined... discourse in this sense is not an ideal,

¹²⁹ Итоги переписи населения Латвии 2001 г // Демоскоп Weekly. № 33-34. 10-23 сентября 2001 г. URL: <http://demoscope.ru/weekly/033/evro01.php> [Дата обращения: 31.03.2013]

¹³⁰ Jørgensen M., Phillips L. Discourse Analysis. Theory and Method. London: SAGE Publications, 2002. P. 5.

timeless form, it is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history <...> (Foucault 1972: 117)»¹³¹. Foucault “archeologically” studied «the rules that determine which statements are accepted as meaningful and true in a particular historical epoch»¹³². Thus, the historical context plays a significant role in discourse formation, because systems of beliefs, power relations and interpretation of different events can be changed in the course of history. That is why, discourse production is influenced by existing regimes of knowledge that are, consequently, affected by power relations. Therefore, the sphere of discourses is always a battlefield, political and social contestation between different actors. Those actors who obtain power, have the capacity to determine what should be regarded as “true” or “false”¹³³.

Turning to the topic of my research, the most vivid example of discourse theory application discussed above, is the situation that occurred in Latvia after the Soviet Union disintegration. A dramatic shift happened not only at the political level, but also at the historical and ideological niveau. Thus, the previously dominated concept of the voluntary annexation of the Baltic States to the USSR was substituted by “occupation” discourse, where Soviet actions were portrayed as illegal and harmful for the overall course of Latvian political and cultural development. The restoration of independence, considerable changes in the political regime and power distribution resulted in a completely different interpretation, restructuring social reality and redefinition of what should be understood as “true” of “false”.

The main idea of Michel Foucault’s theory of power and knowledge, in the interpretation of Phillips and Jørgensen, is that «...in power our social world is produced and objects are separated from one another and thus attain their individual characteristics and relationships to one another»¹³⁴. In Foucault’ view, “truth” is produced by power relations. «Power is responsible *both* for creating our social world *and* for the particular ways in which the world is formed and can be talked about, ruling out alternative ways of being and talking»¹³⁵. Power relations are also expressed through language. In this sense, language is regarded as an indispensable tool that constitutes the social world.

The correlation between power, knowledge, formation, and discourses has also become the central point of critique of an American philosopher and political scientist Nancy Fraser. Discourses that deal with power distribution, restructuring of the social order exist in the public sphere. That is why an overwhelming necessity to thoroughly investigate this problem is the point of departure of Fraser’s analysis. She criticizes the widespread statements about the “end of history” and “triumph of liberal democracy” and J. Habermas’s concept of public space in her article «Rethinking the Public Space: A

¹³¹ Cited in: Jørgensen M., Phillips L. P. 12.

¹³² Ibid. P. 12-13.

¹³³ Foucault M. *The Archeology of Knowledge* / Trans. By Sheridan Smith. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.

¹³⁴ Jørgensen M., Phillips L. Op. cit. P. 13.

¹³⁵ Op. cit. P. 14.

Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy»¹³⁶. Fraser concentrates on the critique of the Habermas's concept of "ideal public space". Thus, an ideal type contains rational discussions that cannot be restricted. At the same time, only public (and not private interests) must be debated, and single unity must be formed.

Obviously, there is a logical disconnection between these notions, because the existence of rational and unrestricted discussions is hardly imaginable within a single unity and one "public". Nancy Fraser makes four critical assumptions on the main ideas of Habermas. She claims that public space cannot be constituted by one unity. Public space is not the state; it is a field of social interaction, where different non-governmental actors are involved. Nancy Fraser claims the existence of completely distinct spheres of social life which presupposes the existence of *weak and strong publics*. "Weak" publics are «publics whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion-formation and does not also encompass decision-making»¹³⁷. In contrary, "strong publics" are «publics whose discourse encompasses both opinion-formation and decision-making»¹³⁸; they are connected with governmental institutions. Thus, in the context of the current research "weak" publics can be regarded as the discourses produced by ethnic minorities or non-citizens that constitute a significant part of the population in Latvia. "Strong" publics are those social and political actors that shape decision-making; this can be realized through state measures and language laws, as it happened in Latvia and Ukraine after 1991.

3.2. Discourse Analysis and Mass Media Research

For the purpose of my research, the most relevant source of information is print media that are represented by Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers published in the Russian language. Social scientists gain considerable advantages, when they apply methods of media investigation in their research. According to Mautner's overview of different mass media, a thorough analysis of newspapers, magazines, booklets, brochures, posters, billboards, reports etc. seem is a promising tool for the studies of social phenomena and mass communication: «It is already 'out there', ready to be gathered, and does not require time-consuming transcription before analysis»¹³⁹. Thus, the role of mass media is difficult to overestimate. They seem to be not only a key data source but a means of producing various discourses. Whereas discourses function in the public space, newspapers, magazines, TV-shows etc. give a remarkable chance for different social and political actors to form their agenda-setting. Mass media are also deeply intertwined with the concept of social problems, which was discussed in the theoretical section, because they serve

¹³⁶ Fraser N. Rethinking the Public Space: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy // Social Text. 1990.No. 25/26.

¹³⁷ Fraser N. Op. cit. P. 75.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

as an effective tool of information distribution, legitimation of political regimes, representation of different opinions and interests of various groups of the population, commonly being one of the most influential actors in public space themselves.

In general, mass media represent a key source of information. That is why, the study of mass media production, consumption, and social impact is of utmost importance. «Their very ubiquity, coupled with intensity of usage, public attention, and political influence, should generate an intrinsic interest among social scientists»¹⁴⁰. Mass media are produced in diverse forms including electronic, audio- and video materials. One of the obvious advantages of print media is also its availability. Unlike Internet resources that can be relocated or deleted and audio materials that are more difficult to collect, print texts cannot be changed because of an observer's paradox. Moreover, they definitely vary in circulation, discussed topics, the public who receives their messages, and reflect the social mainstream. These factors contribute to choose print media as a more reliable and stable source of information.

However, as it was underlined by the previous generation of media researchers (see T. A. van Dijk, 1985), there exists a lack of coherent and well-structured theories and methodological tools to study print media. Teun Van Dijk makes a substantial contribution by analyzing different approaches to mass media research in his notable work «Discourse and Communication». He emphasized that there were several reasons for the lack of media studies¹⁴¹. Media research were largely dominated within linguistic and other sister-disciplines such as stylistics, semiotics etc. The second reason pointed out by van Dijk is that media research have emerged within social sciences which concentrated extensively on macro-phenomena and were regarded as too abstract to be applicable to the studies of actual texts. Finally, the third reason for the lack of coherent media research is that the investigation was conducive to a large amount of data, and quantitative methods are largely applied.

Along with the development of media studies, discourse analysis and content analysis started to be elaborated by social scientists. Van Dijk states that «discourse is no longer just an 'intervening variable' between media institutions, or journalists on the one hand, and an audience on the other hand, but also studied in its own right, and as a central and manifest cultural and social product in and through which meanings and ideologies are expressed or (re)produced»¹⁴².

Discourse analysis gives an opportunity to shed light on various social problems that had been studied in more global terms. Van Dijk states the importance of a multidisciplinary approach in studying and analyzing discourses that are produced and reproduced by mass media and newspapers in

¹⁴⁰ Mautner G. *Analyzing Newspapers, Magazines and Other Print Media* / Ed. by Ruth Wodak and Michal Krzyzanowski. New York: Palgrave Macmillan., 2008. P. 32.

¹⁴¹ *Discourse and Communication. New Approaches to the Analysis of Mass Media Discourse and Communication* / Ed. by Teun A. van Dijk. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1985. P. 2-3.

¹⁴² *Ibid.* P. 7.

particular. Ruth Wodak, one of the leading representatives of critical discourse analysis, claims that «the term *discourse analysis* has in recent decades penetrated many disciplines, such as sociology, philosophy, history, literary studies, cultural studies, anthropology, psychology and linguistics»¹⁴³. The structure of a newspaper, its tone, utterances and messages that are oriented towards different groups of population is a form of text processing and play a significant role in discourse formation. «We should investigate which linguistic, cognitive and social factors impinge on this process»¹⁴⁴. Van Dijk supports his argument that discourse analysis should be developed within different disciplines and more attention should be attracted to studies of media texts. «Conversely, models of communication, media structures and uses, a micro-level approach, such as the one proposed in discourse analysis, may be fruitful. Fruitful also for a thorough study of typical ‘macro-problems’, such as cultural and communicative dominance patterns (the media of) in our world»¹⁴⁵. Thus, discourse analysis of mass media is one of the most relevant instruments for studying social phenomena. Despite enormous attention to this method and an extensive amount of literature, devoted to the studies of discourses, there is still a lack of well-structured and comprehensive research programmes for empirical analysis. Reiner Keller’ sociology of knowledge approach that will be discussed in the following section is one of exceptions from the general rule.

3.3. Reiner Keller’s Research Programme on Discourse Analysis

One of the most prominent modern theoretists of discourse analysis who has made a considerable contribution to its practical realization is German sociologist Reiner Keller (Augsburg University). He develops discourse analysis in order to serve the needs of political scientists, sociologists, linguists who deal with the discursive formation of reality. Keller takes into consideration the main theoretical approaches to discourse in his article «Entering Discourse: A New Agenda for Qualitative Research and Sociology of Knowledge»¹⁴⁶ which is considered to be an important introduction into the discourse analysis paradigm. «Therefore, the article proposes a sociology of knowledge approach (SKAD, *Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse* in German), located in the social constructivist tradition of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann; such an approach is able to account for discourses as processes of symbolic ordering and to take up questions of discourse research raised by French philosopher Michel Foucault»¹⁴⁷.

¹⁴³ Wodak R. Introduction: Discourse Studies – Important Concepts and Terms / Ed. by Ruth Wodak and Michal Krzyzanowski. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. P. 4.

¹⁴⁴ Discourse and Communication. New Approaches to the Analysis of Mass Media Discourse and Communication. Op. cit. P. 6.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Keller R. Entering Discourses: A New Agenda for Qualitative Research and Sociology of Knowledge. *Qualitative Sociology Review*. 2012. Volume 8. Issue 2. URL: http://www.qualitativesociologyreview.org/ENG/Volume22/QSR_8_2_Keller.pdf [Accessed 03.03.2013]

¹⁴⁷ Keller R. Op. cit.

Subsequently, he analyses different theoretical approaches to discourse analysis. «As far as I can see, there are two further candidates to address questions of meaning-making via the concept of discourse. I suggest calling them discourse theories – including the philosopher M. Foucault or the political scientists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Discourse theories are designed to analyze the social formation of circuits of culture, power/knowledge relationships or political struggles for hegemony, and articulation of collective identities on more global levels of social orderings»¹⁴⁸. Keller makes a critical overview of various multidisciplinary theories of discourse, including the linguistic point of view and the political science perspective. He claims that discourse approach that is traditionally used in political studies rather deals with the power asymmetry and articulation of interests by different political and social groups. Linguists concentrate more on language use in various contexts. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) whose main representatives Ruth Wodak, Sigfried Jäger is the combination of the above mentioned linguistic approach and an attempt to reveal the constituent parts of ideology. A more fundamental view which relies on larger social arenas and sociocultural processing is the approach of Michel Foucault. «Foucault's fundamental achievements was first to look at discourses as socio-historically situated "practices", manifest as textual data and not as development of ideas or lines of argumentation, and second, to "liberate" discourse analysis from linguistic issues»¹⁴⁹.

Taking all critical remarks on previous theoretical approaches into account, Keller creates the programme of discourse analysis research which he calls SKAD. He stresses in another article devoted to discourse analysis that «the approach of *Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse* does not pretend to offer "a true Foucauldian application" of discourse research. It rather presents a research programme that adopts some of Foucault's general proposals for understanding discourse as a social phenomenon»¹⁵⁰. Keller emphasizes that the main distinction between *Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse* and other theoretical approaches is that SKAD concentrates not only on a linguistic or sign-formation level of analysis; it is supposed to be only one part of the overall analysis. It also involves an investigation of social actors, institutionalized practices and processes which participate in discourse production and reproduction; this level goes far beyond simple text analysis, it's the combination of different approaches. The most fundamental aim of discourse analysis is to answer the question, what knowledge, common characteristics, causal relations and subject positions are maintained as "real" or "true" through discourse. Another important question for social researchers is what resources are involved in the discourse production (for instance, story lines, moral or aesthetical narratives). Power resources are commonly associated with money, knowledge and symbolic capital which play a significant role in the articulation of interests.

¹⁴⁸ Keller R. Op.cit.

¹⁴⁹ Keller R. Op.cit.

¹⁵⁰ Keller R. Analyzing Discourse: An Approach From the Sociology of Knowledge // Form Qualitative Social Research. 2005. Vol. 6. No 2. Art. 32. URL: <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/19/41#g2> [Accessed 03.04.2013]

«The hypothesis I want to pursue here, is, as follows: Berger's and Luckmann's sociology of knowledge provides a theoretical framework, which makes it (or elaborate) within a sociology of knowledge approach to discourse»¹⁵¹. In Berger's and Luckmann's theory language plays a significant role because it is involved in construction of social reality. Phrases and word combinations provide societies with an opportunity to accumulate experience, share the system of values within several generations. Language is used as an indispensable tool of accumulating various meanings.

From Keller's point of view, discourse analysis is associated with extensive studies of the processes of social construction, symbolic orderings in institutionalized spheres of social life and knowledge objectivation through appropriation of reality definitions by different social actors. «Discourses are simultaneously both an expression and a constitutional prerequisite of the (modern) social world; they become real through the actions of social actors, supply specific knowledge claims, and contribute to dissolution of the institutionalized interpretations and apparent unavailabilities»¹⁵². Keller emphasizes that discourses are produced and reproduced within social practices and appear in different forms – for instance, texts, discussions, messages, and images. Thus *social actors* are involved not only in articulating the interests but also in responding to them (the author uses the term "addressees" to designate social recipients). «The term "practice(s)" depicts very generally conventionalized action, patterns, which are made available, in collective stocks of knowledge, as a repertoire for action <...> SKAD considers several forms of practice: discursive practices are communication patterns which are bound to a discourse context»¹⁵³. Another important notion that Keller applies in his programme of discourse analysis is the concept of "dispositif" (or "disposal"). Keller argues that «the social actors who mobilize a discourse and who are mobilized by discourse establish a corresponding infrastructure of discourse production, and problem solving, which can be identified as a dispositif»¹⁵⁴. He also notes, discourse research is interested in different dimensions of social interactions.

Keller is one of the few scholars who developed the well-structured and logical scheme of doing a discourse analysis research, despite an extensive amount of literature on this question and various theoretical approaches existing within the framework of "discourse". The problem how to do a detailed investigation using the method of discourse analysis remains the central issue for those political scientists, sociologists and philosophers who want to "unmask" the logic of social actors' statements and propositions. Thus, Keller argues that «discourse research has to be considered as the process of data construction and interpretation». ¹⁵⁵ He emphasizes that data collection, their

¹⁵¹ Keller R. Op.cit.

¹⁵² Keller R. Op.cit.

¹⁵³ Keller R. Op.cit.

¹⁵⁴ Keller R. Op.cit.

¹⁵⁵ Keller R. Diskurs-forschung. Eine Einführung für SozialwissenschaftlerInnen // Qualitative Sozialforschung. Band 14. Wiesbaden, 2011. P. 76.

processing and final conclusion that are an inevitable part of discourse analysis cannot and, moreover, should not be completely free from author's construction of different meanings. However, it does not mean that discourse analysis neglects an opportunity to conduct precise and accurate research. Like all qualitative methods, it deals with researcher' interpretation, but only to some extent. In order to make this procedure clear and correct, social scientists are inclined to follow the programme of discourse analysis.

The analytical steps that he distinguished will be briefly discussed in my paper in order to apply them for the purpose of studying the correlation between language policy and ethnic minorities in contemporary Latvia and Ukraine.

1). Discourse analysis begins with an attempt to determine the field of research. Collecting data for discourse analysis is the most essential component; discourses can be studied and scrutinized through different sources – discussions, laws, political speeches, narratives, newspapers, Internet websites, news, conversations and even such practices as demonstrations and social movements. All these various resources constitute the data corpus (*Datenkorpus*) for further analysis and interpretation of the obtained results. However, data collection should be combined with the probe of the research field (*Sondierung des Untersuchungsfeldes*), preliminary research question(s) and hypotheses which can be possibly changed during the research. This step also includes retrieval of theoretical information and investigation of events, social actors, positions and social practices that play a significant role in the research field.

2). The second step that is singled out in Keller's "Introduction into Discourse Research" is called *Korpusbildung* (data compilation). In order to collect the appropriate number of articles, publications, utterances or political speeches, one must refer to the research objectives. The criteria of a data choice should also be clarified in the following step. The difference between the first and the second steps consists in the compression of the data that were selected for further analysis.

3). When the stage of data compilation is finished, the data for *Feinanalyse* (detailed analysis) should be selected. Detailed analysis of the statements is understood as the work on interpretation; it is an open process of information gathering. The two important criteria for qualitative research should be met – the criteria of minimal and maximum contrast.

4). The next steps to be followed by researchers are connected with the detailed analysis of collected data. These steps encompass different methodological tools such as analysis of a separate utterance, investigation of the historical or social context of particular events, conversational or rhetorical structure, and interpretation-analytical reconstruction of each utterance. The most relevant questions concerning the contents of the statement that social scientists are supposed to address are *what?* And *how?* (For instance, what additional meanings of some phrases can be grasped in the process of

discourse analysis? How the interests of different social groups are articulated by mass media?) Starting with simple reading of separate documents and texts, social scientists who use discourse analysis, continue with the paraphrase, then they turn to analytical classification, detailed interpretation, and, finally, they are supposed to draw generalizations and make up a conclusion. In this step coding or mind-maps are of extreme importance. This gives a chance to find out the link between the text corpus, categories and concepts. Coding includes deliberate steps to disclose the most relevant categories, social actors or discursive practices that are involved in the discourse-formation.

5). The following step deals with revealing the social and historical context of a statement. Keller points out that the central questions here are «Who, how, where and for whom some particular statements are produced?»¹⁵⁶ In this step social researchers concentrate on the relations between those who produce and those who receive the statement, institutional settings and ground rules, medial and the general economic, social and political context. Thus, the most relevant questions are: What resources are involved in discourse production? What is the institutional field and power distribution between different actors?

6). Every statement has a certain formal and linguistic structure. That is why, SKAD also deals with signs and language. Unlike other discourse analysis programmes, SKAD relies on investigating the link between the statement production, institutionalized social interaction and social reality construction. The questions that should be addressed by social researchers in this step can be formulated in the following way: What is the tone of each statement? Does the text contain rhetorical questions, metaphors? Does it reveal the logic of political debates and the arguments of different sides with the help of linguistic means? What visual images are used in selected articles, books or video-materials? Reconstruction of statement meanings marks the difference between linguistic discourse analysis and SKAD.

7). The next analytical step that should be made is an attempt of interpretation¹⁵⁷. There is no need to present the overall research process, but intermediate results can be described with the help of tables, diagrams, graphs, semantic networks or in a tree-like scheme. Here the researcher deals with phenomenal structures, interpretative frames and narration lines that are articulated in the text. «The Concept of *Deutungsmuster* (“frame”) refers to typified clusters of disparate elements of meaning, production, the core configuration of signs, symbols, sentences and utterances which create a coherent ensemble of meaning». ¹⁵⁸ By phenomenal structure it is meant that the structure of a phenomenon is constituted by discourse. «This phenomenal structure includes cognitive devices like the concepts used to name an object,

¹⁵⁶ Keller R. Op. cit. P. 99.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. P. 101.

¹⁵⁸ Keller R. Analyzing Discourse: An Approach From the Sociology of Knowledge // Form Qualitative Social Research. 2005. Vol. 6. No 2. Art. 32. URL: <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/19/41#g2> [Accessed 03.04.2013]

the relations between those concepts etc»¹⁵⁹. Narrative structure is closely connected with phenomenal structure and interpretation scheme, because it frames the whole story line and explains the sequence of events. Story lines are an effective tool of organizing the discourse structure and categories of analysis. «Social actors make use of story lines in order to form discourse coalitions through different field of practice».¹⁶⁰

8). The last step that should be undertaken by analysts is to make up a conclusion. At all previous stages, data were collected, categorized, placed within a container of the social and historical context and interpreted. An overwhelming necessity to summarize and scrutinize the results arises at this stage of discourse analysis. As Keller notes, further analysis opens new horizons for answering the questions connected with power relations, hegemony and the role of separate actors and events in the discursive field¹⁶¹. The forms that the presentation of the final results can take vary significantly. The most common representation of the research outcome has the form of a normal text with careful description of analytical steps and connected citations from the analysed material. It can also be presented in a table where the relations between different social actors are clarified, and the whole process of conducting discourse research is explained.

3.4. Representation of Language Policy Regarding Ethnic Minorities in Russian-Language Newspapers in Latvia and Ukraine in the 1990s

Mass media are regarded both as the key source of information and one of the most powerful actors in current agenda-setting. Thus, print media, newspapers in particular, were selected for empirical analysis of language policy in relation to ethnic minorities in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union disintegration. The main criteria for the selection of the printed materials were important political events connected with language policy or ethnic minorities in both countries (for instance, approval of the Law on Citizenship in Latvia or the language laws in both countries). Particular periods of time were selected that correspond to the research aims and objectives. I have chosen Russian-language newspapers (daily or the ones that are issued several times a week), because they are supposed to articulate the interests of minority groups and mediate between the majority of the population, attracting attention of the general public to their problems. They are introduced in Tables 1 and 2 (see Appendix 2).

In analyzing particular periods of time that do not coincide in Latvia and Ukraine, the way in which important events were reflected in Russian-language newspapers came into focus. Particular attention should be attracted to the

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Keller R. Diskurs-forschung. Eine Einführung für SozialwissenschaftlerInnen // Qualitative Sozialforschung. Band 14. Wiesbaden., 2011. P. 115.

major participants that form, produce and reproduce discourses in Ukrainian and Latvian public space. They commonly include governments of the states, political parties, non-governmental organisations, international institutions, and social movements that articulate their interests in newspapers. Studies of the contents of the discourse and discursive strategies are of utmost importance for the purpose of the current research. An overwhelming necessity also arises for an attempt to classify different linguistic strategies (or language games) as distinguished by Kitsuse and Ibarra's theory of social problems that were applied in the Russian-language press. The general methodological framework for the following research is the social constructivist approach. The research programme elaborated by Reiner Keller will be used for uncovering the strategies of language policy representation in the discourse(s) of Russian-language newspapers. One of the most significant steps in analyzing Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers is to give a general overview of the media space in both countries.

General Characteristic of Russian-Language Newspapers in Latvia

Ilze Šulmane presents the general overview of the Russian language media in Latvia and states that «the Russian language media in Latvia do not fulfill the functions of typical minority outlets. The Russian press represents not just the citizens of a certain minority, with specific interest and needs (media in their native language, the desire to satisfy cultural interests, and interests in news from Russia), but also non-citizens, who see the newspapers as a resource in accessing the public sphere and a bastion during the times of change»¹⁶². Political instability and the loss of their privileged status highlighted a considerable need of this part of population for the Russian language press; newspapers also serve as the key source of information in their mother tongue.

The Russian language media space in Latvia is quite diverse and fairly powerful in terms of the covered audience and the social and political impact on the Latvian residents. However, the main obstacle for conducting research was a lack of Latvian newspapers published in early 1990s which represent a broader political, social and cultural context of language policy. Free access to Russian-language newspapers of that period was provided for *Edinstvo* and *Business and Baltia*. The slogan of the first newspaper can be formulated as "for untied socialist Latvia!"; its average daily circulation amounted in 20000 copies in 1991. It seems to be pretty obvious that this media source is used to articulate the socialist ideas and criticize the "perestroika period" that resulted in the Soviet Union collapse. *Business and Baltia* represented itself as an international newspaper; the main focus of this newspaper is manifested in the very title. The target audience of this media source was businessmen, legal experts and economists. The daily circulation was 19500 copies in the middle

¹⁶² Šulmane I. The Russian Language Media in Latvia. Latvian-Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions / Ed. by Nils Muižnieks. Riga: Latvian University, 2009. P. 64.

of the 1990s; the paper was published 4 times a week¹⁶³. Despite a lack of material, devoted to language problems in this newspaper, this is one of the few Russian-language print media that still exist in contemporary Latvia.

«At the beginning of the decade [2000-s], there was considerable instability in the market for Russian language newspapers. Several dailies and regional papers ceased publications or change their name (Panorama Latvii, Respublika, and Vechernaya Riga) »¹⁶⁴. The three major newspapers published in the Russian language are daily *Telegraf*, *Chas* and *Vesti Segodnya*. «The Russian daily *Telegraf* tries to be a Western-style newspaper. Initially it was the thickest Russian language newspaper, with relatively high levels of circulation <...> In 2006, *Telegraf* changed to a tabloid format, but continued to present itself as a neutral, high-quality daily newspaper»¹⁶⁵. In 2012 messages about the consolidation of the Russian-language print media appeared on the websites of different Latvian newspapers and news agencies¹⁶⁶. In November, 2012 the two biggest Russian-language newspapers united under one brand *Vesti Segodnya*, whereas *Telegraf* turned into a weekly. The main reasons for the consolidation of Russian newspapers in Latvia are seen in the current economic crisis that forced businessmen to choose a more profit-making format and, therefore, effectively control the circulation of Russian-language print media in Latvia. The process of consolidation is described as an inevitable outcome of political, economic and cultural development of the Latvian society. Before unification the daily circulation of *Chas* was of 16 00 to 22 000 and had the largest number of subscribers, according to the research data presented by Ilze Šulmane¹⁶⁷. The daily circulation of *Vesti Segodnya* is 23 900 copies and the total audience is constituted by 327 000 people¹⁶⁸. All the newspapers described above are the object of my research in different periods of time (see Appendix 2).

General Characteristic of Russian-Language Newspapers in Ukraine

Ukrainian media space has significantly changed after the Soviet Union collapse. Diverse media resources are at a disposal of Ukrainian residents: they include newspapers, magazines, TV-channels operating in the Ukrainian, Russian and English languages. Russian-language newspapers attract significant audience of the country's population, especially in the Eastern and Southern regions, where the number of Russian-speakers is the highest. Moreover, Ukrainian newspapers published in the Russian language are both a source of the relevant information and a remarkable chance for different

¹⁶³ Latvian Newspapers. Information about "Business and Baltia". URL: <http://www.pks.lv/en/info/187/%D0%91%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%81%20&%20%D0%91%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%8F/> [Accessed 15.04.2013]

¹⁶⁴ Šulmane I. Op. cit. P. 65.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ В Латвии объединяются русские газеты «Час» и «Вести сегодня» // The Baltic Course. International Magazine for Decision Makers. 26.11.2012. URL: http://www.baltic-course.com/rus/drugie_otrasli/?doc=66489 [Accessed 15.04.2013]

¹⁶⁷ Šulmane I. Op. cit. P. 65.

¹⁶⁸ Паспорт издания. Вести сегодня – ежедневная общественно-политическая русская газета Латвии. URL: <http://www.ves.lv/vs/> [Дата обращения: 15.04.2013]

political actors to articulate their interests. Like Latvian Russian-language newspapers, Ukrainian press published in the second widespread language is not an example of typical minority media that seeks to represent a narrow cultural domain and preserve ethnic belonging of representatives of some particular groups. “Russian” newspapers in Ukraine are widespread along with the Ukrainian ones. According to the statistical data presented by the Book Chamber of Ukraine, the number of Ukrainian-language newspapers is higher than the number of the Russian ones in 2010 (1264 and 975 respectively), although the circulation of ‘Russian’ newspapers exceeds by 40 %.¹⁶⁹ It means that Ukrainian audience covered by Russian-language newspapers is higher which seems to be the key feature of Ukrainian media space. Russian media still have a powerful impact on the overall population and simultaneously serves as one of the means of articulating the interests of particular groups.

Several Ukrainian newspapers that offer the Russian variant or are published only in Russian were chosen; these periods are classified in Appendix 2 in order to reveal the discursive strategies of representation of important ethno-political events in the history of independent Ukraine. Like in Latvian newspapers, a certain lack of the relevant data sources was revealed, concerning the beginning of the 1990s which was marked by political turbulence, economic crisis and restructuring of social order. The newspaper *Delovaya Ukraina* was founded on 1st January, 1992 and appeared in print on Tuesdays and Saturdays, it was widespread in the Commonwealth of Independent States. In its description *Delovaya Ukraina* positions itself as a central newspaper designed for businessmen. The circulation was 14 000 copies in 1997, which was relatively small in comparison with other Russian-language media sources.

Another newspaper that was included in the list of analytical materials for the empirical research was *Golos Ukraini* which is published in two languages – Ukrainian and Russian. According to the information from the official website, this newspaper describes itself as a political source with a primary focus on covering the activity of the *Verkhovna Rada*; it is stated that the aim of *Golos Ukraini* is to present the most important legislative initiatives and to represent different points of view of Ukrainian political fractions, parties and coalitions¹⁷⁰. Ukrainian *Den* is daily newspaper that was first published in January, 1996. Its English-language version appeared in print in 1998; there exists also the Ukrainian language variant. The daily circulation of this newspaper is 60 000 copies; it is supposed to be one of the most popular Russian-language newspapers in Ukraine that contains experts’ evaluations¹⁷¹. The primary focus of *Den* is political and economic analytical materials. *Fakti I Kommentarii* is a tabloid Russian-language newspaper with the highest circulation in Ukraine

¹⁶⁹ Украинцы предпочитают русскоязычные газеты // «Новая» газета. 22.04.2010. URL: <http://www.novaya.com.ua/?/news/2010/04/22/173923-13> [Дата обращения: 22.04.2013]

¹⁷⁰ Газета Верховной Рады Украины «Голос Украины». Общая информация. URL: <http://www.golos.com.ua/Dynamic.aspx?page=3&lang=ru> [Дата обращения: 22.04.2013]

¹⁷¹ Ежедневная Всеукраинская газета «День». URL: <http://www.day.kiev.ua/ru/kontakty> [Дата обращения: 2.04.2013]

(approximately 1, 1 million copies). It was founded in 1997¹⁷². The main attention of the journalists of this newspaper is attracted to news and interviews rather than to analytical materials.

A brief analysis of the Russian-language press in Ukraine was undertaken in order to highlight the main advantages and drawbacks of the print media system after the Soviet Union dissolution. Generally speaking, the media outlook of Ukraine has significantly changed in recent decades. Interestingly, Russian-language newspapers continue to dominate in public space, and there is a considerable diversity of media sources in terms of coverage, themes, and target audience. However, a clear distinction between Russian-language newspapers in Latvia and Ukraine can be recognized. Unlike the Russian-language counterparts in Ukraine that are focused on more global and national events along with the state-language press (they largely supplement each other); Russian newspapers in Latvia represent an example of a minority media and tend to concentrate on more specific issues. Thus, «Latvian language newspapers take a more global view, while Russian language newspapers are more parochial, focusing mostly on Latvia's Russian-speaking community, Russia itself and its spheres of interest in the former USSR. Some Russian newspapers often illustrate open hostility toward the Latvian state»¹⁷³. It means that the correlation between Latvian-language newspapers and their Russian counterparts indicates an increasing trend of minoritization of Russian media space, whereas in the Ukrainian case the latter has largely widespread among both Ukrainophones and Russophones.

The Context of the Soviet Union disintegration

A brief analysis of the context of the Soviet Union disintegration and discursive strategies of its representation in Russian-language newspapers in Latvia and Ukraine seems to be one of the key elements of the following investigation. There is certainly a lack of available print resources just after the Soviet collapse. Nevertheless, an attempt is made to uncover the historical and political significance of this event in the selected publications. The newspaper *Edinstvo* has become a key source of information on the situation in August, 1991 in Latvia.

I have specified several groups of claim-makers in the process of analyzing the selected articles. The Latvian people were portrayed as the victims of the “perestroika” which caused *inter-ethnic hostility*, collapse of the socialist system; negative consequences of the Soviet Union collapse were the main focus of the articles. Politicians were also depicted as important actors in the chosen period. For example, the newspaper published the opinion of Igor Lopatin, the chairman of the coordination soviet¹⁷⁴. Another group that emerged within the discursive field just after the Soviet Union collapse is the

¹⁷² Газета «Факты и Комментарии». URL: <http://fakty.ua/> [Дата обращения: 22.04.2013]

¹⁷³ Procevska O, Ločmele K, Zelče V. Media Landscape: Latvia // European Journalism Centre. Last updated 08 November, 2010. URL: http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/latvia/ [Accessed 22.04.2013]

¹⁷⁴ Лопатин И. Куда идет страна? // Газета «Единство» (Латвия). No 21 (91). 15-21.08.1991.

so-called “architects of perestroika”, particularly Gorbachev and his adherents. “Overseas benefactors” (заокеанские благодетели) are also regarded as the influential social and political actors. Discursive coalition in this case is formed by “transatlantic benefactors” and “architects of perestroika” who were blamed of being the cause of the Soviet Union disintegration. Interestingly, the veterans of WW2 presented themselves as the victims of “perestroika”; this important category has not appeared in the further analysis.

Using the methodological tools offered by Kitsuse and Ibarra and the research programme elaborated by Reiner Keller, I described the style of the articles in the selected period of time (August, 1991) as civic, because claims are made on the “behalf of the people” (and veterans in particular), rhetorical questions are used to underline the importance of the Soviet legacy and mass media involvement in the current affairs in Latvia (*Whom to blame?, Dear friends, people of the Great Power!, What is our press thinking of the situation that occurred in the country? Did not you take the position of outside observers?*)

In the course of analysis several language games were singled out. For instance, **the rhetoric of endangerment** was expressed in the conditions that threaten safety. In this case, the categories of *inter-ethnic hostility, nationalist claims and separatism* come into focus. **The rhetoric of loss** was an attempt to describe the risk of losing values and a strong necessity for protection. In the article “What is the press thinking of?” the author, on the behalf of all veterans, appealed to the general public and Latvian press (using the categories *the threat of internal fascism, inter-ethnic hostility, the country’s collapse*) and emphasized that the loss of socialist achievements (and, consequently, underestimation of the victory in WW2) would lead to a tragedy¹⁷⁵. The categories of *diplomatic collusion* and moral reasoning expressed in such words as *tragedy and betrayal* were the key features of the discourse formed, produced and reproduced by Latvian newspaper *Edinstvo*.

An interesting observation can be made by introducing a comparative perspective. Ukrainian newspaper *Pravda Ukraini* was chosen to reveal the context of the Soviet Union disintegration and its impact on the overall development of independent Ukraine. The first issue of this newspaper was published on the 1st January, 1938; it is described as a republican political newspaper. The surveyed period is December, 1991. In contrast to Latvian *Edinstvo*, where the dissolution of the Soviet Union was portrayed as a *tragedy and betrayal*, the Ukrainian newspaper focused on the positive results of this historic event. Such categories as *independence of Ukraine, sovereignty, historical choice, democracy, referendum, Commonwealth of Independent States* were uncovered in the selected publications. Unlike the Latvian case, where the victims of the Soviet collapse were described as the whole Latvian people, it was rather difficult to single out a particular group of people that is portrayed as the victims (only in the citation of American “The Voice of America” the Soviet bureaucracy is described as a disadvantageous group).

¹⁷⁵ Красюк М. О чем думает пресса? // Газета «Единство». № 22(92)б 5-11.08.1991.

Politicians were also designated as the key actors in the analysis of *Pravda Ukraini*; the opinions of the world political leaders, ministers and presidents were published in order to emphasize that Ukraine had become a *newly-born independent state* and that the *world was full of burning enthusiasm*¹⁷⁶. The category of *referendum* seemed to be the most significant for establishing democratic Ukraine that would have respect for human rights and freedoms, guarantees for social justice, equality of all ethnic groups that constituted the people of Ukraine. *Commonwealth of Independent States* was seen as a key instrument of integrating the former Soviet republics; its openness is emphasized in the selected articles. The surveyed period was characterized by the mixture of different styles in terms of Kitsuse and Ibarra's language games. Civic style was used in the article where the outcomes of the Soviet Union disintegration and Ukrainian independence were discussed on behalf of the Ukrainian people¹⁷⁷. Such enthusiastic articles alternated with official documents and political speeches on establishing Ukrainian independence and its recognition by the international community. This fact made a significant difference between the Latvian and Ukrainian discourses of the Soviet Union disintegration.

The Law on Citizenship in Latvia

One of the most significant stages of Latvian political development after the restoration of independence is designated by the approval of the Law on Citizenship in June, 1994. The burning problem of non-citizens significantly influenced language policy related to ethnic minorities because a good command of the state language became a marker of political exclusion. The newspaper selected for empirical analysis is *SM-Segodnya*; contemporary *Vesti Segodnya* is regarded as its successor. The daily circulation of *SM-Segodnya* in the selected period of time amounted in 75 000 copies, the editor-in-chief was Alexander Blinov. In the process of analyzing the published materials the following categories were marked out:

Law on Citizenship	Assimilation	The right for citizenship
Russians	Latvian Nazism	Rewriting the history
European institutions	Apatrides	Cancellation of citizenship
State language	Registration	Russian language
Latvian language	Foreigners	National minorities
Naturalization	System of quotas	Ethnic relations
Protest	Recommendations	Discrimination.

A quick look at these categories immediately revealed some social actors or claim-makers in this discourse, or claim-makers, in terms of Kitsuse and Ibarra's theory of social problems construction. For instance, the victims of

¹⁷⁶ Родилась новая Украина – независимая, демократическая // Газета «Правда Украины». № 213 (14978). 5.12.1991.

¹⁷⁷ Бондаренко В. Итожим год, который прожит... // Газета «Правда Украины». № 223 (14988). 31.12.1991

the Law on Citizenship were constituted by non-citizens – Latvian residents who did not gain any official status in newly independent country. Professionals (journalists, sociologists, historians) also were powerful actors that participate in agenda-setting and in the formation and production of the discourse. Politicians (Latvian delegation in PACE and the Council of Europe, deputies of the Latvian Parliament) are directly involved in decision-making on the notorious law on citizenship in Latvia. In the selected period much attention was paid to the experts' opinions from European institutions (Council of Europe, OSCE, the European Union, and High Commissioner on National Minorities) that were largely focused on the arising problem of non-citizens and the protection of ethnic minorities. Administrators such as the Office of citizenship and migration affairs and the state bureaucracy took the responsibility for implementing the law on citizenship. Obviously, the notion of citizenship had become the centre of international attention as well as provoked heated political debates among different actors that were mentioned in this paragraph.

One of the dominant rhetorics in the discourse of the Russian-language newspaper *SM-Segodnya* is **the rhetoric of entitlement**. It is supposed that everyone should have equal access to resources, including public institutions and political participation. The Latvian Law on Citizenship caused the burning problem of non-citizens which was described by journalists in a negative perspective («*The Law on Citizenship is per se is the violation of the common sense and justice*»¹⁷⁸, «*Now I am nobody! The Latvian resident was striped of his citizenship*»¹⁷⁹). In order to support the argument that Latvian law strictly violated human rights and freedoms, official documents provided by the experts from the European institutions, who expressed growing concerns about ethnic relations and a complicated system of naturalization quotas, were also cited in the newspaper. However, the tone of the article devoted to the attempts of Latvia to join the European institutions and follow the recommendations of the European experts was rather sarcastic. The title of this publication is «Do not deceive Europe, ladies and gentlemen! » The official documents that should have been presented in Strasbourg were called *hypocritical, biased and perverted*. «In the analysis of the following statement European organisations can easily be affected by the *Latvian Nazism logic*, if they do not take the historical background into consideration»¹⁸⁰. In this case sarcastic and ironic style is used to diminish the arguments of Latvian politicians who were inclined to join Europe and, thus, *rewrite the history*, and underline that this law had become the reason of ethnic tensions and hostility among different groups of the population. Particular attention is also paid to the fact that Latvia was not ready to join the European community; that is why the country was supposed to quickly change the law in order to correspond to the democratic standards of these organisations («*We should not be stubborn and should take Europe into consideration, if we want to join it. We need Europe; Europe does not express a*

¹⁷⁸ Лига апатридов Латвии. Апатриды – в пикет // Газета «СМ-Сегодня». № 118 (12521). 18.06. 1994.

¹⁷⁹ Аркадьев Ал. «Теперь я – никто!» или о том, как «аннулировали» гражданина Латвии // Газета «СМ-Сегодня». № 107 (12510). 3.06.1994.

¹⁸⁰ Вежениекс Н. Не обманывайте Европу, господа! // Газета «СМ-Сегодня». № 106 (12509). 2.06.1994 .

great desire)¹⁸¹. If we return to the context of early 1990s, Latvia expressed the desire to quickly integrate in Europe. This statement reveals the logic of the course of Latvian foreign policy and main obstacles faced by politicians.

Sarcastic tone and comic style were also used in order to portray the Latvian reality and the procedure of getting citizenship within the bureaucratic system. In the article called «Introduction into DGI» (the new name of this organisation is the Office of citizenship and migration affairs) the author gives practical recommendations on how to interact with the state officials on the question of citizenship¹⁸². Exaggeration and irony are the key features of the text; negative attitudes towards this bureaucratic structure are expressed in different ways: honest citizens are opposed to *dishonest Department of citizenship and integration*; the metaphor of «*holy struggle for a pure nation*» and the comparison of the *struggle with the Department* and agricultural parasites («борьба с вредителями сельскохозяйственных культур») emphasize the significance of the claim and ridicule the Department of citizenship and integration as a completely ineffective instrument of implementing the citizenship law in real life. Rhetorical questions seem to be an expression of moral reasoning and referring to emotions and shared symbols («*Have you ever seen, how the Latvian citizen is being forcibly deported from...Latvia? – A stranger has shown some interest. – Probably you will see it soon*»¹⁸³. «*So should we prohibit our children to read the masterpieces of the world classical literature in original (in Russian)?* »)¹⁸⁴. These idioms were used on order to present the reality where not only ethnic Russians but also Latvians could easily lose their citizenship because of bureaucratic obstacles. Discrimination was also regarded as a key category in the selected publications: «*Our (non-citizens or apatride's) rights are ignored*»¹⁸⁵.

Generally speaking, the Latvian Law on Citizenship was portrayed by *SM-Segodnya* in negative light. For this purpose, different linguistic means including metaphors, rhetorical questions and comparisons were applied. The problem of non-citizens and the failure of the Latvian bureaucratic system seemed to be the most debated and emotionally attached categories in the selected publications. The mixture of different styles (comic, political, legalistic) served as a powerful tool of representing political exclusion of a significant proportion of Latvian residents. The notion of citizenship was described in a direct connection with the decisive attempts of the Latvian government to integrate in Europe. The overall newspaper discourse in the selected period is characterized by representing the approval of the citizenship law as a burning social problem that needs a clear-cut political decision.

¹⁸¹ Добровольская А. Совет Европы предупреждает: с таким законом о гражданстве Латвию в Европу не примут // Газета «СМ-Сегодня». № 116 (12519). 16.06. 1994.

¹⁸² Янсон Ю. Краткий курс по ДГИ // Газета «СМ-Сегодня». № 116 (12519). 16.06.1994.

¹⁸³ См. там же.

¹⁸⁴ Закис В. Колючая проволока против языка // Газета «СМ-Сегодня». № 108 (12511). 4.06.1994.

¹⁸⁵ Лига апатридов Латвии. Апатриды – в пикет // Газета «СМ-Сегодня». № 118 (12521). 18.06.1994.

Debates over the Language Law in Latvia

Heated political debates accompanied the approval of the Law on the State Language in Latvia in July, 1999. I chose Latvian newspaper *Telegraf* in order to reveal the discursive strategies of language policy representation in public space of that time. Obviously, language policy is closely intertwined with the approval of the language law which is regarded as a key instrument of legal protection. In the process of analyzing the selected materials the following categories were marked out:

The law on the language	The Latvian language
The Russian language	European organizations/ structures/authorities
Recommendations	Assimilation
Human rights	Foreign language
Accession to the European Union	Discrimination
European human rights standards	Compatriots
Russian-speaking population	Genocide
National minorities	Nationalists

Obviously, the categories mentioned above largely coincided with the notions singled out in the previous period concerning the law on citizenship. It means that these two complicated problems were directly intertwined not only in the historical and political context of Latvian development after the restoration of independence but also in discursive representations of language policy. References to the older law on citizenship was even found in one of the analysed publications: «*Previously the Law on Citizenship was a test of political reliability (firstly it was approved without taking European recommendations into consideration and, consequently, the door to Europe was closed, but they [Latvian politicians] had to change the last draft). Will it repeat with the law on languages? »*».¹⁸⁶

In the course of analysis, different groups of claim-makers were also distinguished. Diverse social and political actors were involved in the process of negotiation, decision-making and further discussion. Russian-speakers were supposedly recognized as the most important claim-makers in the discourse of language policy in the surveyed period. They were described as victims suffering from negative consequences of governmental efforts. Problem bearers were associated with a frequently used concept of *nationalists* and accused of initiating and adopting the draft of the Law, blamed for being guilty of ethnic and language cleavages in Latvia, proposing amendments to facilitate discrimination of Russian-speakers, violating human rights and ignoring recommendations of the European institutions. In some articles, the Russian government was described as a problem bearer too: it was blamed of inactivity

¹⁸⁶ Кульпинская В. Кто-то – про баню, а «Тевземец» - про закон о госязыке // Газета «Панорама Латвии». 08.07.1999. № 156 (2020).

towards the legal protection of Russian compatriots in Latvia. Politicians from both the Latvian and Russian sides were involved in the debates over this controversial issue. Russian politicians argued that this law discriminated large parts of the population, because higher education in the Russian language was *abolished*, Russian TV-programmes were *banned*; signs and name boards *painted over*¹⁸⁷. Human rights organisations (for instance, the Latvian Committee for Human Rights) and NGOs including cultural communities were also portrayed as significant claim-makers in Latvian discourse of language policy.

According to Kitsuse and Ibarra's classification of language-games, the Latvian discourse in the surveyed period of July, 1999 contained **the rhetoric of entitlement**. It was assumed that everyone should have equal access to different resources including political participation. The law on language was described as *awful and controversial*, *discriminatory*, or *draconian measures* against the Russian-speaking community in Latvia: *«It seems to be the evidence of government inclinations to use this law as an instrument of repressions in relation to national minorities»*,¹⁸⁸ *«The recommendations of High Commissioner on National Minorities were not taken into consideration, in particular, concerning the rights of minorities to get primary education in their mother tongue parallel to mastering the state language <...>»*.¹⁸⁹ The opinions of Russian politicians on the language law were included in some publications. Interestingly, in one of the published interviews, Gennady Selesnev, the former Chairman of the State Duma expressed the desire of the Russian government to accept the so-called compatriots. In this case, **declaring impotence** was one of the **counterrhetotics** used by the Russian government in order to state impoverishment of available resources in solving the problem (*«If Russia had been more economically developed and richer, the country would have open the doors for those Russian people who had expressed the desire to return. I know that there are a lot of such people. But the first question that arises is the problem with accommodation. That is why this is supposed to be the 'question of questions'»*).¹⁹⁰

Different combinations of styles were used in the selected publications in July, 1999. Civic style was used mostly to portray the claims made on behalf of the "people". Legalistic style dominated in those articles where appeals to international legal documents and Latvia's responsibility for protecting ethnic minorities were used. While this problem was highly politicized in the Latvian society, political style had become one of the promising tools in supporting the claim-makers who were affected by this law. Interestingly, in many articles rhetorical questions and emotional appeals were addressed not only to the whole Latvian people but to the Russian-speaking community that was blamed of being inactive in protecting their interests and rights (*«Do not you think, dear*

¹⁸⁷ Алтухов В. То ли еще будет...завтра // Газета «Панорама Латвии». 07.07.1999. № 155 (2019).

¹⁸⁸ Михайлова Н. Опять наш язык... // Газета «Панорама Латвии». 10.07.1999. № 158 (2022).

¹⁸⁹ См. там же.

¹⁹⁰ Селезнев Г. Мы не хотим, чтобы наших соотечественников держали в унижительном положении // Газета «Панорама Латвии». 13.07.1999. № 160 (2024).

reader, is there your fault? First we were called ‘Russian-speaking’, then ‘occupants’ and ‘migrants’ and finally ‘non-citizens’. We definitely like it. If you are pleased with such a situation, you will continue to tolerate it»¹⁹¹. The opinions of both Latvians and Russian who were affected by this language law were also included in this article. Important point is that the interests that were articulated in *Panorama Latvii* largely represented the opinions of those who were in opposition to the language law including Russian and Latvian politicians, the experts from European institutions. Letters from the common people also served as a means to articulate the interests of the population in Latvia. These letters were published in the same article, where Russian-speaking community was accused of being guilty of such a controversial situation.

Generally speaking, several commonalities in the representation of this burning problem can be revealed in comparison with the previously approved Law on Citizenship in Latvia. Both laws were depicted in Russian-language newspapers *SM-Segodnya* and *Panorama Latvii* in negative light, as potentially threatening the stability of the Latvian society. Various discursive strategies such as language games in terms of Kitsuse and Ibarra’s theory of social problems, rhetorical questions, appeals to the general public and to the Russian-speaking community were used in order to portray the issue of language policy as an urgent social problem that needs immediate reaction. In terms of Nancy Fraser’s classification of «weak» and «strong» publics, strong publics are obviously those groups that are involved in decision-making on this problem – politicians, the Latvian government, and partly European institutions, because they can impose some recommendations concerning language policy or ethnic minorities. «Weak» publics are, supposedly, the Russian-speaking community portrayed as the victim group, affected by the language law, to a larger extent.

Ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Debates on Language Policy in Ukraine

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is a legal tool to protect national minorities and ethnic groups, preserve their culture and facilitate more opportunities for its development. Ukraine ratified this important document in December, 1997; this period was selected for discourse analysis. In general, the publications of the selected period are characterized by extensive attention to the notion of language policy and ethnic diversity in Ukraine which is supposed to be the key focus of our investigation. The newspaper chosen for my analysis is *Delovaya Ukraina* whose target audience was represented by businessmen and intellectuals. The key categories that were marked out in the selected period of time are:

¹⁹¹ Михайлова Н, Дубровский В. Провозглашать такой закон нельзя // Газета «Панорама Латвии». 13.07.1999. № 160 (2024).

National interests	The Ukrainian language
The Russian language	Ukrainization
Former Soviet Union	Europe/European standards
Discrimination	Bilingualism
Human rights	Independence
Nationalists/nationalism	Colonization of spirituality (колонизация духа)

The key feature of this newspaper is that experts' opinions and evaluations were presented to the general public. *Delovaya Ukraina* published the articles of professors, financial reporters and historians who expressed their opinion on the current language problems in Ukraine after the Soviet Union collapse. They seem to be important claim-makers, knowledge bearers that use statistical, historical, economic data to form the political agenda-setting. It is not a surprising fact that the experts' points of view were used as a powerful tool of forming the political and social agenda; the contribution of linguists, political scientists, historians is difficult to overestimate in constructing the social reality or legitimatizing the political regime. The authors of the articles often used civic style and spoke on the behalf of Ukrainian "people" that was portrayed as the victim group which suffered from negative consequences of state language policy. In this case, the category of *Ukrainization* came into my focus; this concept was often accompanied in the texts by the words *violent, total, compulsory* which could be regarded as an indicator of negative attitude towards governmental efforts to promote the Ukrainian culture and language. Rhetoric of loss served for describing the situation when the role of the Russian language in Ukraine was undermined on the one hand and Ukrainian cultural heritage was underestimated in general: «*Ukraine does not gain any profits but loses them by politically isolating itself from Russia in economic and cultural terms*», «*It does not make any sense to limit the use of Russian in the country where approximately half of the population speaks this language*». ¹⁹²

Interestingly, some authors paid scrupulous attention to the Soviet legacy that was depicted negative light. 1997 appeared to be the time of young Ukrainian sovereignty; that is why, a lot of journalists appealed to the Soviet experience in their articles in order to determine a possible track of Ukrainian political development after the restoration of independence. The USSR authorities were blamed of limiting people's freedom including the freedom of expression; they were described as problem bearers, those who exerted a considerable impact on the overall policy of Ukraine after 1991: «*It (freedom) was limited by the one-party system, persecution of free-thinkers, low standards of living, prohibition of any communication with foreigners, scornful attitude of the state authorities*»¹⁹³. Along with interpretation of the Soviet legacy, possible integration of Ukraine with European organisations (ratification of the Framework Convention was a considerable step in consolidation with

¹⁹² Леонов В. Колонизация духа // Газета «Деловая Украина». 05.12.1997.

¹⁹³ См. там же.

Europe) was discussed. On the one hand, positive changes towards more “Europeanness” were designated (European landscapes, European assortment). On the other hand, journalists claimed: «*We are Ukrainians, aren't we?* » and accused the authorities of being ignoring cultural needs of the Ukrainian people («*Where are our women's jackets and undershirts, wide trousers (шаровары), belts and shawls? Are they worse than the foreign (заморские) ones?* »)¹⁹⁴. It can be possibly interpreted as the desire to escape from the Soviet past and create the Ukrainian society which will relate to traditional notions associated with being a European state (respect for human rights, non-discrimination, and sustainable economic development) and to save originality of the Ukrainian culture.

The question what the Ukrainian culture meant was the central focus of the articles published in December, 1997. Generally speaking, the Ukrainian case of language policy is one of the most complicated among ex-Soviet republics because of strong politization of this question. The first years of independence were marked by decisive attempts to reinterpret the Soviet history and find more distinct features of the Russian and Ukrainian languages which served as an instrument of political distancing from Russia and the Soviet experience. *Delovaya Ukraina* contested this position: historians, philosophers and linguists' opinions were used in order to state the cultural proximity of both languages – «*Ukrainian and Russian are kindred languages, they have the same roots, they are close to all our people; Ukrainian and Russian closeness does not violate the law on the state language*»¹⁹⁵. *Bilingualism* was described as an inevitable condition of Ukrainian development that was historically and politically rooted («*Ukraine has always been bilingual in the course of its history – in ancient times, in the feudal period, where the nation-states were formed, and the period of the so-called new history*»)¹⁹⁶. Ukrainian nation-state was described in rather essentialist way, where Russian and Ukrainian languages had been always culturally proximate. In this case, linguistic boundaries between both languages did not matter. References to the historical experience of Ukrainian development throughout the centuries were applied in order to emphasize both people's cultural relatedness. That is why, official bilingualism was seen as the only measure that could ensure sustainable economic development of the country.

Rhetorical questions were widely used in the selected publications (for instance, «*Whom do we deceive, ladies and gentlemen – ourselves, neighbours, the whole world?* », «*Why should we betray the Russian language?* »). These idioms represent morally embedded ways in which the problematic status of the Russian and Ukrainian languages was elaborated. Russian was described as a means of intercultural communication; that is why it should not be prohibited in the country. However, journalists of *Delovaya Ukraina* claimed that the cultural proximity of both languages gave a chance for mutual understanding, but at the same time they paid extensive attention to the status

¹⁹⁴ См. там же.

¹⁹⁵ Зоненко А. Так мы украинцы мы, аль...? // Газета «Деловая Украина». 03.12.1997

¹⁹⁶ См. там же.

of the Russian language. Several ways of drawing cultural and political boundaries between the Russian and Ukrainian people, where bilingualism was a key component of the country's development were designated by means of various discursive strategies.

3.5. Comparison of Russian-Language Press in the 1990s in Latvia and Ukraine

Several newspapers published in the Russian language in the 1990s (*Pravda Ukraini, Delovaya Ukraina, Edinstvo and SM-Segodnya*) were chosen for discourse analysis in order to reveal the strategies of language policy representation in Latvia and Ukraine. Thus, a logical necessity to mark out the common features and differences in discourses of language policy in both countries arises. The common peculiarities that were recognized in the empirical analysis of the selected publications are as follows:

1). In both Latvian and Ukrainian press language policy was a widely discussed phenomenon that represented as the key marker of national identity. However, particular attention was paid to the status of the Russian language, extremely politicized in the discourses of the Russian-language press in both countries.

2). Russian-language newspapers, chosen for the empirical analysis and published in the 1990s, largely represented the point of view of the Russian-speaking community and concentrated on promoting the interests of this ethnic and cultural group. The most vulnerable group of claim-makers (victims) was constituted by Russians or Russian-speakers.

3). The core ethno-political events such as the Law on Citizenship Latvia adopted in 1994 or the debates over the Law on the State Language approved in 1999 were described in negative light. For this purpose, a lot of language games, rhetorical idioms, and the mixture of sarcasm, irony and exaggeration of unfavourable conditions were used.

4). Morally embedded reasoning, speaking on behalf of the Ukrainian or Latvian "people"— appeals to the Russian-speaking community seem to be the key feature of Russian-language press in the selected period of time.

Despite some common characteristics, I made the conclusion that Russian-language newspapers in Latvia and Ukraine contained significant differences in representing language policy in relation to ethnic minorities in the 1990s.

1). Russian-language press in Ukraine is a source of information that is as frequently used by the population as its Ukrainian-language counterpart. Russian newspapers are widely read in Ukraine and therefore contain broader experts' evaluations and analytical reports on economic, social and political problems in the country. Despite relatively high circulation of Russian-language newspapers in Latvia, the statistical data reveal a growing tendency of their minoritization. Print media in the Russian language therefore concentrate on more specific interests of the Russian-speaking community.

2). Both Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers that described the context of the

Soviet Union collapse revealed the frequently used mechanism of “demonization” of the previous experience which was immediately reevaluated in both countries after the restoration of independence. However, Latvian newspaper *Edinstvo* depicted the USSR disintegration in negative light; for instance, in the form of appeals to the general public to reinterpret the *awful* Soviet legacy. In *Pravda Ukraini* the Soviet Union disintegration was portrayed in positive light; according to journalists, this event brought freedom and independence to Ukraine.

3). In Ukrainian newspapers Ukrainian “people were described as a group affected by and suffering from governmental efforts to promote Ukrainization, whereas bilingualism was considered as a *natural* phenomenon, an inevitable consequence of the country’s political and cultural development. I revealed a certain lack of attention to opinions of ethnic Latvians Russian-language newspapers in Latvia. Thus, the victim group largely affected by Latvian politics of nationalizing state was constituted by Russians and non-citizens in particular. The notion of non-citizens has never appeared in the Ukrainian context.

3.6. Representation of Language Policy on Ethnic Minorities in Russian-language Newspapers in Latvia and Ukraine in the 2000s

The Referendum on the Accession to the European Union in Latvia

After the restoration of Latvian independence in 1991, the political elites of the country were engaged with the transformation of political agenda and reinterpretation of the previous experience. A considerable step in forming the trajectory of political development in Latvia was taken in the 2000s with the referendum on accession to the European Union, held in September, 2003. It is important to note that the discussions, whether Latvia should join this organisation has become an important component of the country’s development throughout the history of its independence. Taking into consideration the observations made in the process of discourse analysis of Russian-language newspapers in Latvia in the 1990s, European institutions played an extremely significant role in the approval of the Law on Citizenship and the Law on the State Language. Decisive attempts of the Latvian government to join the EU were expressed in the active campaign in favour of accession to the EU which significantly influenced the overall results of the referendum. Accession to the European Union was seen as a *strategic goal* of Latvian development.

The newspaper chosen for the empirical analysis at this stage was daily *Chas*, one of the most popular Russian-language print sources in Latvia. The categories that were marked out in the surveyed publications are as follows:

European Union	Referendum
Euro optimists	Euro pessimists/skeptics
Opportunities/chances	European paradise
Expansion	Sovereignty

European myth
Welfare

Equality
National minorities

Obviously, these categories reflected various attitudes towards the accession to the European Union reflecting the opinions of those who were in favour of being part of Europe and those who expressed skepticism about possible benefits for the Latvian society, resulting from integration. Therefore, several major arguments both in favour and against joining the EU should be mentioned.

The arguments in favour of the European Union: common European market, great perspectives in all spheres, increasing the welfare of Latvian people, considerable prospects for business and young people (access to European education, travelling), freedom of movement within the EU, new legislation, societal integration, softening of the politics towards ethnic minorities and particularly the Russian-speaking community, social guarantees and more investment into the social sphere, tourism development etc. **The arguments against the European Union:** dramatic rise of unemployment, competition with more developed and bigger European countries, pressures on the economic sector, the loss of budget (more resources were supposed to be sent to the European Union than received from it), the dictatorship of Brussels, European bureaucracy, uncontrolled influxes of migrants, the loss of sovereignty etc. Taking these arguments into account, they encompass different spheres of life that could be possibly affected by accession to the EU. Thus, the opinions on this important event were subdivided between optimists and pessimists/skeptics. Latvian *Chas* tried to represent both sides; the opinions of Latvian and European politicians, businessmen and common people were published in September, 2003. Nevertheless, the journalists attempted not to portray the accession to *European paradise* as an inevitable feature of Latvian post-independent development, but rather offer a more critical outlook, attracting the attention of the public to possible consequences of this decision.

Depending on being in favour or against the EU, different groups of claim-makers were distinguished. In the publications that represented the accession to the EU in negative light, Latvian people were described as victims, and one of the possible threats to the country's further development seemed to be the loss of Latvian sovereignty: «*Unambiguously we are losing our sovereignty; that sovereignty which was established by the Constitution as the highest value. But we will not have political power; it will be given to the EU. Being a legal expert, I do not see any difference between both Unions – Soviet and European*». ¹⁹⁷ Every new member of the European structure was supposed to delegate some authority to political and economic organisations; however, negative attitude towards the EU was expressed in this paragraph because of several reasons. On the one hand, Latvian sovereignty was portrayed as the result of longstanding struggles for independence from the

¹⁹⁷ *Мараховский В., Михайлова М.* Независимой Латвии осталось жить каких-то 10 дней // Газета «Час» (Рига). 09.09.2003. № 210 (1844).

Soviet Union that deliberately annexed the Latvian territory to the USSR and created obstacles for Latvian sustainable development. On the other hand, the European Union compared to its Soviet predecessor, and some common features were found between these two political structures. Thus, the main fear associated with the accession to Europe was a threat of repetition of the Soviet traumatic experience.

Turning back to the arguments in favour or against the EU, the whole Latvian society should have benefited from its positive response in the referendum in those articles where this event was depicted in positive light: *«European help will be at your disposal. But it will not be given for no particular reason: if you strive for success, you have to conduct the reforms. The European Union is a very specific community. This is the association of interests of different countries. The overall power lies not only in the common market but in the same system of values, including plurality, democracy, human rights and mutual respect. The EU does not have anything common with the Soviet Union»*¹⁹⁸. In order to support this position, the opinions of different social actors were expressed. For instance, European legal experts and politicians who dealt with the expansion of the EU could be regarded as important participants in decision-making on the Latvian accession. The points of view of Latvian politicians were also taken into consideration in these publications. Interestingly, local businessmen also played a significant role as a group of claim-makers who asserted that the social problem of language policy existed. It seems to be pretty obvious that accession to the EU could possibly affect smaller and larger businesses in Latvia which caused controversial disputes among representatives of this group.

According to Ibarra and Kitsuse's classification of language games, the main rhetoric marked out in the selected publications in September, 2003 was **the rhetoric of loss**, expressed in the concerns about possible negative consequences of joining Europe. For example, the opinion of representatives of the Finnish public organisations was taken into consideration: *«In Latvia people like to say: When we join the European Union, we will live as in Finland, but the opposite can also happen. You can probably become poorer and we will also reach your level»*¹⁹⁹. The possible threat of *being entrapped* was depicted in Latvian *Chas*. However, not only political consequences but also economic ones seemed to be a major obstacle for successful integration in Europe. Unemployment, the rise of economic pressure from Brussels and keen competition with other member-states were described as inevitable consequences of this measure.

I came to the conclusion that Latvian journalists attracted particular attention to the burning problem of language policy and ethnic minorities that turned into an extremely politicized phenomenon in the country's post-

¹⁹⁸ Павлов С. Вступление в ЕС – это больно, но необходимо // Газета «Час» (Рига). 06.09.2003. № 208 (1842).

¹⁹⁹ Лебедева Н. Финны предупреждают: вы лезет в ловушку // Газета «Час» (Рига). 05.09.2003. № 207 (1841).

independent development. The articles published in *Chas* reflected mostly negative attitude towards governmental measures to promote the Latvian culture and language at the expense of Russian and simultaneously a positive response to joining the EU. The main argument in favour of European integration should be cited: *the EU would help the Latvian Republic to get rid of national narrow-mindedness and narcissism that were the characteristic features of our government*²⁰⁰, «*The European Union has promoted societal integration and improvement of the situation with ethnic minorities in recent years. If the majority votes in favour of accession, the recent development will continue*».²⁰¹ However, negative conditions of the state measures to decrease the influence the Russian-speaking population were emphasized in the selected articles: «*In reality, the votes of one fourth of the population, represented by the linguistic Russian community, were simply ignored*»²⁰². The political elites distanced themselves from the Russian-speaking minority and were not able to solve its problems. The fact that only the pressure of European institutions resulted in the improvement of the situation with ethnic minorities was repeatedly emphasized in *Chas*.

In general, the referendum on the Latvian accession to the EU is considered as one of the most important political events in the overall history of the country's development after 1991. The majority of the population supported this decision, and Latvia officially became a member-state in 2004. The referendum was widely covered in Latvian *Chas*. Both positive and negative attitudes towards integration in Europe were expressed in this media source. Nevertheless, the main focus of these publications was the rights of the Russian-speaking community that could be seriously threatened or improved after joining the EU. Different strategies of representation were singled out in the course of analysis. For instance, **the rhetoric of loss** was designated as the main motif of the selected publications. The mixture of civic and political styles constituted the specificity of analyzed publications: news was presented in Latvian *Chas* along with expert interviews presented in Latvian *Chas* which gave a remarkable opportunity to reconstruct the logic of political debates over the accession to the European Union. It should be stressed that the focus of the publications shifted from possible trajectories of Latvian political development, which was the major topic in the 1990s, towards advantages and drawbacks of European integration.

²⁰⁰ Радионов В., Карпушкин В. В поддержку ЕС // Газета «Час» (Рига). 17.09.2003. № 217 (1851).

²⁰¹ Муйжниекс Н. Евросоюз, общественная интеграция и национальные меньшинства // Газета «Час» (Рига). 19.09.2003. № 219 (1853).

²⁰² Федосеев Л. Русские не требуются? // Газета «Час» (Рига). 19.09.2003. № 219 (1853).

Approval of the Law «On the Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages» in Ukraine

Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in June, 2003 was a crucial point in all political discussions over language policy after 1991 in Ukraine. It was supposed that this important legal document aimed at protecting rare and regional languages should enforce political elites in Ukraine to pay scrupulous attention to the burning issue of the status of the Russian language and languages of other ethnic minorities. Here I analyzed the articles published in a Ukrainian newspaper *Den*. The selected articles encompassed the period of June and July, 2003. An attempt to include the materials published in July can be justified by the fact that some articles contained the experts evaluations, in response to those presented in June; it seems to be a significant contribution for reconstructing the logic of language policy representation in contemporary Ukraine.

Generally speaking, language issues related to ethnic minorities were widely covered in Ukrainian *Den*. A keen observation can be made when analyzing the tone of publications, especially in comparison with the previous periods and newspapers: now the Russian language is described somewhat negatively, and the journalists' assiduous attention to the language dilemma is rather biased in favour of the Ukrainian language. Unlike the newspapers, analysed in the previous sections, where much attention was given to the possible discrimination of the Russian-speaking community, *Den* represented another pole of linguistic discussions turning the "language question" into a highly politicized phenomena. It seems to be of utmost importance to pick out the most significant categories that were revealed in the course of analysis. These major categories are:

National minorities	Verkhovna Rada
European Charter	Human rights
Language policy	Russification/derussification
Ukrainization	Discrimination
Imperialism	Protection

While a lot of Russian-language newspapers tended to concentrate on the narrow interests of Russians as not only an ethnic but also as an expanded cultural group, the opinions expressed in *Den* were largely focused on possible *discrimination* of the Ukrainian-speaking part of the population: «*To my mind, the state language policy should satisfy the demands of the group of the Ukrainian-speaking population which is discriminated nowadays*»²⁰³. Consequently, the group of victims suffering from negative conditions was supposed to be Ukrainian speakers and not Russian speakers. In most of the publications the origins of the current language problem were traced in the USSR and, therefore, the Soviet leaders were declared guilty for such an

²⁰³ Денисенко В. «Дерусификация» на местности // Газета «День». 19 .06. 2003 г. № 104.

ambiguous situation with Russian and Ukrainian languages. I also came to the conclusion that experts' opinions served as a tool of legitimating certain political positions. For instance, the interview with Vladimir Malinkovich, the director of the International Institute for Political Research, and Leonid Ivanenko, mathematician from Kiev, were published in *Den* in order to present two sides of one question. The first expert claimed that «*both projects [of the European Charter] are far from being perfect and cannot suit to the vast majority of the population because it does not protect their rights. It is impossible to ignore the rights of millions of Ukrainian citizens who speak Russian, Moldavian, Romanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Polish, German etc.*»²⁰⁴. In contrast, the second expert argued that Ukrainian had to be protected, and one of the means of its protection was supposed to be the promotion of Ukrainian nationalism: «*Unfortunately, it is not enough to be just a Ukrainian in independent Ukraine. Those people, who worry about the fate of the nation, are forced to be Ukrainian nationalists*»²⁰⁵. Interestingly, not only the journalists' opinions were presented in the materials but also students' vision of the current language situation in Ukraine.

Different discursive strategies to maintain particular positions in political debates over the status of languages were singled out in the selected publications. First and foremost, the authors often appealed to statistics, laws and historical facts. For instance, Lyudmila Ryabokon used the statistical data on the number of schools that offered education in the languages of ethnic minorities («*Two million of Ukrainian school children are taught in the languages of national minorities. Our country is the only state in the world where the general education in all school subjects is provided to children of national minorities*»²⁰⁶). Klara Gudzik referred to the Soviet resolution aimed at improving the situation with the Russian language in the public and suggested to readjust this resolution to the current state of affairs. It means that the word 'Russian' should be substituted by 'Ukrainian' which guaranteed protection, preservation and development of the state language («*As the example that comes to mind, one can remember conscious attempts of global Russification in densely populated Ukraine*»)²⁰⁷. Russification was regarded not only as a historical fact but as the factor that influenced contemporary language policy and justified governmental efforts to promote Ukrainian in all social spheres. Using the classification of vernaculars elaborated by Kitsuse and Ibarra, the dominant rhetorics expressed in the newspaper *Den* were **the rhetoric of loss and the rhetoric of entitlement**. In this case, the Ukrainian language served as the key marker of national identity and sovereignty that needed protection from the state discrimination.

Thus, the main focus of the discussions in the selected media source in that period was the struggle for Ukrainian. On the one hand, «*the Ukrainian*

²⁰⁴ Шишов А. Уровень защиты. Как быть с ратификацией Европейской хартии языков? // Газета «День». 13.06.2003. № 79.

²⁰⁵ Вопрос «Дня» // Газета «День». 26.07.2003 г. № 128.

²⁰⁶ Рябоконт Л. Взрослые права // Газета «День». 22.07. 2003 г. № 124.

²⁰⁷ Гудзик К. Снова о нашем языке // Газета «День». 06.06. 2003 г. № 97.

language can be damaged by nationalism. Eager attempts to separate Russian and Ukrainian are not in accordance with the common sense. If one removes all words that remain hated Russian, we will not have anything»²⁰⁸. On the other hand, there were critical responses to this claim: «It is surprising for me, why does not the author protect Ukrainian? However, he knows what forces are against it and that many people cannot send their children to a Ukrainian school, buy a Ukrainian newspaper, watch a Ukrainian-speaking TV-show or cartoon in many regions»²⁰⁹. The common feature of both utterances is that the authors concentrated on protection of Ukrainian and its discrimination by Russian. That is why, the immediate solution to this problem was seen in decisive attempts to establish more Ukrainian-language channels, to promote patriotism and higher education in Ukrainian.

The mixture of different styles was also one of the discursive strategies used in the selected publications in order to represent the language situation in Ukraine as a burning social problem. Consequently, civic style was used in order to appeal to the Ukrainian-speaking part of the population that experienced the threat of losing its national identity and language. Legalistic and scientific styles seemed to be an effective means of legitimatizing one of the positions in contemporary debates over language policy. Widely used rhetorical questions, exaggeration and metaphors (for instance, the comparison of the Soviet people with zombies) served as promising tools in depicting the social reality, *unfavorable* for the Ukrainian language. The most crucial point in these debates is that the point of view supported by journalists in *Den* seems to be a reflection of an alternative point of view which dominated in the Ukrainian society. Unlike a great many of newspapers that describe the social reality, where the Russian-speaking community is discriminated and *Ukrainization* is seen as a threat to the state sovereignty, *Den* offers a remarkable opportunity to reconstruct the arguments of the opposite side that points out the existence of discrimination against Ukrainian speakers.

Protests against Minority Education Reforms in Latvia

The governmental initiatives to reform Latvian education by cutting the number of hours taught in the languages of ethnic minorities led to mass protests against this reform in February, 2004. This period was characterized by scrupulous attention of different social actors and mass media to a highly debatable topic of school education. For the purpose of revealing the strategies of representation of this important event in Russian-language press press, Latvian daily newspaper *Vesti Segodnya* was chosen. As it was mentioned above, this newspaper is one of the most widely read media sources in contemporary Latvia. The categories shaping the discursive field that were marked out should be represented in the following section:

²⁰⁸ Два взгляда на языковое равноправие. Кто вредит украинскому языку? // Газета «День». 06.06. 2003 г. № 97.

²⁰⁹ См. там же.

School reform	Repressions
Russian language	Anti-Russian politics
National minorities	Non-citizens
Discrimination	Equality
Law of Education	State language
Ministry of Education	Nationalism

These categories reflected both attitudes to the school reform and main actors involved in the process of decision-making. Interesting observation can be made while analyzing the materials published in February, 2004. Unlike in previous periods, where Russian-speaking community was portrayed as passive to decisive attempts of Latvian political elites to impose the implementation of the Law on Citizenship or the Law on the State Language, Russians' manifestations and protests indicated a growing trend of active participation in political life of independent Latvia. The group of protesters largely constituted by Russian-speaking children and their parents was regarded as victims, suffering from negative conditions: «*Unfortunately, Russian-speaking children are becoming the victims of political ambitions of the parliamentary majority*»²¹⁰. The situation with problem bearers – individuals and groups who were the source of the declared social problem – was far from being simple. On the one hand, different political forces and NGOs blamed Latvian political elites and the Ministry of Education for being responsible for a huge rise of protest movements in 2004: «*This situation was created because of stupid actions of the authorities*»²¹¹. On the other hand, some Latvian politicians claimed that «*representatives of the headquarters [Russian] worsen the situation in Latvian society by provoking children to participate in a strike; these actions do not only hinder educational process because children have to skip the classes, but the main thing is that they create hostility to Latvians and to the state*»²¹². Such ambiguous positions reflected controversial nature of political debates over the school reform in Latvia and find a person or a party that can be blamed of being guilty in this situation.

Vesti Segodnya presented different points of view on correlation between the hours that should be taught in Latvian and the languages of ethnic minorities; representatives of different political forces expressed their opinion on the current problem. However, the main focus of Latvian *Vesti Segodnya* shifted to the interests of Russian-speakers who, supposedly, suffered from negative consequences of this reform and were under threat of *discrimination*. Not only Latvian political leaders, Ministry of Education were involved in decision-making, but also representatives of international organisations such as the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe that expressed their concerns about the proportion of Russian in the school curricula and therefore violation of human rights. Russian politicians Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Georgiy Boos

²¹⁰ Элкин А. Власть готовит репрессии? // Газета «Вести сегодня». 06.02.2004.

²¹¹ См. там же.

²¹² См. там же.

were also described as significant claim-makers who spoke on the behalf of the Russian government interested in the future fate of Russian compatriots in Latvia. Experts' opinions (for instance, Sergei Markov, director of the Institute of Political Research who was named as one of the most *influential political scientists* in Russia) were used in order to portray the social reality described as hostile towards Russian speakers and emphasize inevitability of Latvian-Russian relations: «*In this case, they [Latvia, international community] will not manage without Russia because Russia is the culture, it is a non-typical way of thinking. That is why I am sure that Russian will be soon one of the languages of the European Union*». ²¹³

According to Kitsuse and Ibarra's classification of language games, the main rhetorical idioms, recognized in discourse analysis of the selected publications, were **the rhetoric of loss and the rhetoric of entitlement**. The Latvian state was depicted as a repressive machine that did not take the interests of other ethnic groups, except Latvians, into consideration: «*Our Ministry of Education is working under the state of siege. What can they do, if the authorities do not have any feedback from the people?*»²¹⁴, «*We struggle for the right of our children to get high-quality education in their mother tongue and master their knowledge of Latvian at the same time*»²¹⁵.

In the course of analysis different strategies of responding to the claims were recognized. For instance, the report about meeting of the former Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga with school children and students published in *Vesti Segodnya* gave an excellent chance to find out the ways of dealing with the discontent caused by the school reform chosen by "strong" publics. The technique used in the selected publications was **naturalizing the problem**. Former Latvian President recognized the existence of widespread protest movements, but claimed that it seemed to be a crucial part of country's post-independent development and a necessary measure for quicker societal integration: «*Later, during the meeting with journalists Vike-Freiberga confirmed that the law was acceptable and there were no reasons for its disapproval. She shrugged her shoulders and said that if the protests against the school reforms had continued, it would have been an inevitable phenomenon*»²¹⁶.

Journalists of *Vesti Segodnya* also published several articles where non-traditional means of attracting public attention were made. According to Kitsuse and Ibarra's theory of social problem construction, different styles were distinguished in order to represent negative attitude towards the initiative of the Ministry of Education to reform Latvian schools. Along with civic and legalistic style that were used mostly to refer to the general public and legitimize the existence of the burning problem of language policy in relation to ethnic minorities with the help of statistical facts or references to the Soviet laws, theatrical style served as an effective tool of claim-making through unusual

²¹³ Элкин А. Сергей Макаров: «Евросоюз – это новая империя» // Газета «Вести сегодня». 10.02.2004.

²¹⁴ Севидова Н. МОН – неприступный бастион? // Газета «Вести сегодня». 05.02.2004.

²¹⁵ Элкин А. Позорная разборка в Сейме // Газета «Вести сегодня». 05.02.2004.

²¹⁶ Красноглазо Н, Певнева, Е. Президент Латвии против русских школ // Газета «Вести сегодня». 11.02.2004.

means. In the article published on the 10th of February, 2004 creative attempts of Latvian school children to shoot a film that would depict the social reality in an alternative way and pour ridicule on the Latvian state that was blamed of being ineffective in promoting the school reform were mentioned²¹⁷. This video was widespread in the Internet and turned into a powerful instrument of the Russian-speaking community to promote its interests and participate in political decision-making. Generally speaking, the discourse of language policy on ethnic minorities in Latvian newspaper *Vesti Segodnya* can be characterized as an attempt to represent the school reform in extremely negative way. Different language games were distinguished in order to depict the social reality as unfavourable and intolerant to representatives of ethnic minorities.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine

The Orange Revolution that led to mass protests and manifestations from late November, 2004 to January, 2005 marked a watershed in Ukrainian political development after the Soviet Union disintegration. Unprecedented rise of people's outrage and their active involvement in political life of the country were caused by falsifications occurred during the presidential campaign and political confrontation between supporters of Viktor Yuschenko and Viktor Yanukovich. The Orange Revolution turned into a dramatic event which encouraged representatives of different political forces to think over a further trajectory of Ukrainian development. Language policy and heated problems of ethnic minorities had also become a crucial point in all political discussions in the period of November, 2004 – January, 2005. Ukrainian newspaper *Den* was chosen for the careful investigation of representation strategies of language policy and the role of language in shaping Ukrainian national identity.

It was emphasized in many surveyed articles that «*the state language is an important factor of consolidation of the society. It will be strange if the state does not ensure the implementation of constitutional measures aimed at the state language*»²¹⁸. It means that the Ukrainian language served as a powerful instrument to “imagine” the community which was of utmost importance in the period of the Orange revolution when reevaluation of the previous system of values and the hierarchy of political order occurred. Several categories were picked out in the process of discourse analysis of newspaper *Den*:

European integration	Orange Revolution
Independence	Freedom
Discrimination	Russian language
Democracy	State language
The European Union	

The Orange Revolution heated up the debates over the course of Ukrainian foreign policy, that is why, the question of accession to the European

²¹⁷ Эй, кунги, это не приколы! // Газета «Вести сегодня». 10.04.2004.

²¹⁸ Другие мнения // Газета «День» (Киев). 28.01.2005.

Union and other influential organisations was often articulated by various political forces. Journalists of *Den* tried to shed light on different positions regarding the Ukrainian choice and its future place in Europe. The common characteristic of euro skeptics and euro optimists is that both sides claim that Ukrainian accession to the EU will be complicated, and the country should overcome a lot of obstacles in political, social and economic spheres in order to be regarded as a fully-fledged member-state: «*It is necessary to persuade Europe that the membership of Ukraine will not be a burden for its members but will strengthen their structure*»²¹⁹. The attitude towards the results of the Orange Revolution in the newspaper *Den* could be characterized as positive: «*The Orange Revolution has already won a victory. It has broken a stiff mechanism of informational chaos; it will be impossible to turn to these conditions again. This victory united all of us. We experience a wonderful feeling of liberation, joy and happiness*»²²⁰. Thus, in the journalists' eyes, the Orange Revolution turned into a factor that consolidated the whole nation and encouraged Ukrainian people to be actively involved in political life of their country.

Different groups of claim-makers were designated in the discourse represented by Ukrainian newspaper *Den*. Obviously, politicians were actively involved in the Orange Revolution including both the proponents of Yuschenko and Yanukovych. However, the main ambiguity in the analysis of this period consisted in the fact that it was difficult to mark out a particular group of victims that suffered from negative consequences of the Orange Revolution. Generally speaking, the attitude towards this political event in the newspaper was positive, in contrast to those media sources where the Revolution was depicted as unnecessary and harmful to all Ukrainian people. However, in Ukrainian *Den* the opinions of those who supported Yuschenko and European choice of Ukraine were largely represented. In order to legitimize their position, experts' evaluations and references to law and statistics served as a promising tool of articulating the interests of those who were in favour of the Orange Revolution.

Language policy became a significant contribution to the overall discussion of this important political event. The possible position of Russian as the second state language was widely used in the speeches of Ukrainian politicians. The opinions presented in *Den* proved that the problem of language policy existed in Ukraine: «*Acuteness of reactions on the language topic reveals that the problem exists. It consists in the fact that the "language issue" was successfully used by politicians and political strategists. It was displayed in the previous electoral campaign and, probably, will show up in the coming one, too*»²²¹. This statement indicates that the "language issue" was regarded not only as a real social problem but also as a means of political manipulations which largely affected the preferences of Ukrainian citizens in favour of Yuschenko or Yanukovych. Another problem discovered in the selected newspaper was Ukrainian citizens' competence in speaking both Ukrainian and

²¹⁹ Акименко А. Где нас нет... Европейский выбор-2? // Газета «День». 13.01.2005.

²²⁰ Маркосян Е. У птицы счастья два крыла // Газета «День». 06.12.2004.

²²¹ Братъ «за язык». Кого и надо ли? // Газета «День». 28.01.2005.

Russian languages in the country. The article of Ukrainian philologist Lyudmila Stelmakh was published under the title «What is the language spoken in Ukraine? » in December, 2004. She concluded that not only political manipulations, but also Ukrainians' literacy had turned into a serious social problem: «*So what is the language spoken in Ukraine? I assume that one part of the population speaks Ukrainian, another part – surzhik, the others are far from being perfect in speaking the language which I cannot give a certain name*»²²². Stelmakh emphasized that Ukrainians had insufficient command of Russian and paid little attention to the problem of Ukrainians' incompetence in communication in their state language. It seemed to be an extremely controversial and ambiguous thesis, because, in fact, Ukrainian was the language largely affected by Soviet Russification, the language that suffered from negative consequences of governmental efforts to promote the Russian language. Undoubtedly, after the restoration of independence young, Ukrainian state faced a burning problem; a lot of citizens who were unable to communicate in the state language in a proper way. In contrast to this view, Stelmakh claimed that Russian spoken in many parts of the country was not perfect.

In Ukrainian newspaper *Den*, journalists also paid scrupulous attention to the possible discrimination of the Russian-speaking community. «*We assume that equal opportunities for both native speakers of Russian and Ukrainians are a necessary condition of making Ukraine a democratic, civilized European state*»²²³. This statement indicated that the language was seen not only as the key marker of national identity but also as the marker of Ukraine being a fully-fledged member of the European community. Thus, legal protection of the rights of ethnic minorities was supposed to be a necessary condition for the Ukrainian state to become a part of Europe. Concerning the problem of *discrimination* of Russophones, the newspaper *Den* largely represented the opinions of those who claimed the existence of discrimination of the Ukrainian-speaking community («*Is there any infringement of the Russian language in Ukraine, is not it?* »)²²⁴. In order to justify this point of view, the journalists of *Den* referred to the experience of France and to the statistical data on the number of Russian schools in Ukraine. It was claimed that France that regarded as a fully-fledged democratic state in Europe, did not guarantee any legal protection for any languages, except French, despite a great many of migrants living in its territory. This statement can be interpreted in the way that not only Ukraine, but mature Western democracies were not able to guarantee linguistic rights for representatives of other ethnic groups; that is why the issue of Russian speakers is declared to be exaggerated by politicians and mass media.

According to Kitsuse and Ibarra's classification of vernaculars, the major rhetorical idioms marked out in the selected publications were **the rhetoric of entitlement** and **the rhetoric of unreason**. In many articles analysed in the

²²² Стельмах Л. На каком языке говорит Украина? // Газета «День». 28.12.2004.

²²³ Братъ «за язык». Кого и надо ли? // Газета «День». 28.01.2005.

²²⁴ Другие мнения // Газета «День» (Киев). 28.01.2005.

period of the Orange Revolution, the main focus shifted to people's participation in the political life of the country. It was emphasized that Ukrainians suffered from *informational chaos and the pressure of the current regime*, and the Orange Revolution brought freedom, democracy and respect for human rights that had previously been endangered. Intentional misrepresentation of statistical data on a decreasing number of Russian schools and discrimination of the Russian-speaking community were depicted as the result of manipulations of those political leaders who struggled for a higher status of Russian. This **rhetoric of unreason** also served as a means of legitimatizing the state regime that promoted the Ukrainian language and culture.

The civic style was used in order to strengthen the argument that Ukraine benefited from this political event; the claims were made on behalf of all the country's population: «*I want our people to leave the revolution without blood which had never occurred in any country in the world. The main outcome of the Orange Revolution is the freedom of information and independence of Ukrainian citizens*»²²⁵. Legalistic style in terms of reference to laws and statistics also served as powerful tool of representing the Orange Revolution as one of the most crucial events in Ukrainian political development. The outcomes of the Revolution were described in positive light. Concerning the question of language policy in regard to ethnic minorities, the journalists of Ukrainian *Den* published the articles that contained the arguments of those who were in favour of either Russian or Ukrainian.

Ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Latvia

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was ratified by the Latvian government in May, 2005 and ensured legal protection of different national groups. Thus, the articles published in Russian-language newspaper *Chas* in May, 2005 were selected in order to reveal discursive strategies of language policy representation. The most important categories are as follows:

The Framework Convention	National Minorities
Human rights	Europe
Nationalism	Discrimination
Interethnic tensions	Amendments

Obviously, these categories were directly connected with the periods analysed in the previous sections. The concepts of *discrimination, human rights, national minorities and Europe* constantly appeared in Russian-language press throughout the whole history of independent Latvia. According to the classification of claim-makers elaborated by Kitsuse and Ibarra, it appeared to be possible to mark out several groups actively involved in political discussions on the issue of the Framework Convention. The group of victims represented in

²²⁵ Маркосян Е. У птицы счастья два крыла // Газета «День». 06.12.2004.

Latvian newspaper *Chas* was constituted by national minorities and particularly by the Russian-speaking community. Like after the approval of the Law on Citizenship in June, 1994 and in the debates over the language law in July, 1999, here Latvian politicians and parties that represented the nationalist agenda were blamed of being responsible for *interethnic tensions* intensification after the Soviet Union collapse. In order to depict this group of Latvian political leaders being guilty for the burning problem of national minorities and language policy, journalists of *Chas* compared the rise of nationalism with death agony which would destroy the order in independent Latvia: «*Though Europe gave a flick, she expressed a condescending attitude towards the tricks of Latvian peanut politicians (политуканы). But then an unreasonable child became an adolescent who was at odds with history and geography. As a result, metastases of nationalism penetrated into the whole Latvian society*»²²⁶. This fragment can be interpreted as the attempt to shift responsibility for an ambiguous situation with national minorities and their languages towards Latvian far-right politicians that conducted the politics of nationalizing state in an aggressive way. Decision-making and the process of negotiation on the Framework Convention also included Latvian politicians and European institutions. Latvian political landscape embraced not only by far-right parties having nationalist claims but also the party «For Human Rights in United Latvia» which represented the interests of national minorities and Russian speakers in particular.

The attitude towards the ratification of the Framework Convention in Latvian *Chas* can be characterized as ambiguous. On the one hand, political negotiations were described as beneficial for representatives of national minorities. On the other hand, the Framework Convention as a legal instrument that ensured protection of national minorities was not declared to be universal for all countries. Member states who signed this Convention retained the right to make amendments; this procedure created additional obstacles for its successful implementation. For example, the main problem revealed by Latvian expert Boris Tsilevich was the number of people who could be recognized as a national minority in certain territories. The question, whether 10, 20 or 30 % of the population in a particular part of Latvia could be considered as a national minority seemed to be also the matter of political hierarchy and redistribution of power: «*There is a direct evidence of double standards of our politics. Document will be finally ratified but with such amendments that will negate the whole essence of this law*»²²⁷.

The problem of how to define a national minority was also depicted by Latvian *Chas* as a serious obstacle for the successful implementation of the Convention: «*Our ministers suggested the following definition of national minorities: these are the **citizens** of Latvia which are distinct from Latvians in a cultural, religious and linguistic sense; they live in the Latvian territory for*

²²⁶ Каменев А. Агония? Правые политики завели страну в тупик // Газета «Час» (Рига). 17.05.2005. № 113 (2353).

²²⁷ Ошкая И. Борис Цилевич: «Совет Европы может не принять нашу ратификацию Конвенции о нацменьшинствах» // Газета «Час» (Рига). 17.05.2005. № 113 (2353).

*throughout several generations, claim their belonging to the Latvian state and society and want to develop their culture, religion and language»²²⁸. This definition seemed to be extremely problematic, from the point of view of *Chas*, political party «For Human Rights in United Latvia» and European institutions, because the following formulation did not encompass a large number of Latvian non-citizens. Much attention in this definition was attracted to the link between the Latvian state and national minorities; it was regarded as an obligatory condition for being recognized as a group distinct from Latvians.*

Regarding the classification of vernaculars, developed by Kitsuse and Ibarra, the main rhetorical idioms marked out in the selected period in Latvian newspaper *Chas* were **the rhetoric of loss and the rhetoric of entitlement**. It was emphasized that necessary mechanisms of legal protection did not ensure the development and preservation of the culture and languages of national minorities, because the amendment to the Framework Convention did not enhance a chance for national minorities to communicate with the authority in their native language: *«However, the question of using their native language in communication with official institutions has an immediate impact on their capacity to realize their rights, guaranteed by Latvian laws and the Constitution. As I mentioned before, I have serious doubts that the ratification with this amendment will be accepted by the Council of Europe»²²⁹. From experts' point of view, the ratification with these amendments was regarded as meaningless. The mixture of legalistic and civic styles served as an instrument of representing the issue of the Framework Convention as highly problematic. Nationalist claims expressed by the far-right parties were widely criticized in Latvian newspaper *Chas*. An interesting observation can be made as a result of comparing the periods analysed before. The politics of nationalizing state was subjected to criticism in all Russian-language newspapers selected for discourse analysis. Far-right politicians were accused of the burning issue of non-citizens status, never-ending debates over the language law and the Framework Convention and the intensification of interethnic hostility. The discourse represented in Russian-language press in Latvia can be characterized as a decisive attempt to depict the social reality unfavourable to representatives of different ethnic groups and Russians in particular, which can be partly explained by the specificity of this media source and its orientation towards the interests of Russian speakers.*

Referendum on the Status of the Russian Language in Latvia

February, 2012 was marked by an extensive number of articles in both Latvian- and Russian-language press devoted to the referendum on the status of the Russian language. The question whether Russian should become the second official language has always been an extremely debatable subject after the restoration of the independent status of Latvia. Newspaper *Telegraf* was

²²⁸ *Ошкая И.* Конвенция без меньшинств // Газета «Час» (Рига). 18.05.2005. № 114 (2354).

²²⁹ *Ошкая И.* Борис Цилевич: «Совет Европы может не принять нашу ратификацию Конвенции о нацменьшинствах» // Газета «Час» (Рига). 17.05.2005. № 113 (2353).

selected for the empirical analysis. I marked out several important categories of Latvian discourse of language policy:

Referendum	Russian language
Xenophobia	Ethnic conflict
Human rights	Equality
Non-citizens	Bilingualism
State language	Independence
Cultural policy	European norms
National minorities	Occupation
Discrimination	Ethnic confrontation

The classification of categories undertaken in this section brings me to the conclusion that the issue of Latvian referendum on Russian as the second state language was directly intertwined with different social actors involved in decision-making process and the most topical issues that Latvia was confronted with during the whole period of independence. The key characteristic of *Telegraf* consisted in the fact that it presented the positions of those both in favour and against Russian becoming the second official language. In contrast to other Russian print sources, analysed in the previous sections (*Chas, Vesti Segodnya*) that concentrated heavily on the promotion of the interests of the Russian-speaking community, *Telegraf* presented the arguments from both sides. Thus, discourse analysis of different Russian-language newspapers within the framework of Russian press in Latvia widened the spectrum of political positions on the referendum and language policy in general and provides me with an excellent chance to reveal the logic of those who expressed either negative or positive attitude towards the Russian language.

According to the classification of claim-makers offered by Kitsuse and Ibarra, diverse social actors were involved in the discussion of Latvian referendum. Obviously, the problem of granting Russian the status of the second state language largely affected Russian-speaking community in Latvia. Vladimir Linderman who initiated this referendum and those who supported his proposal declared Russians to be the victim group suffering from *discrimination, ethnic tensions and cultural policy* produced by the Latvian government. Public agents were blamed of provoking interethnic hostility which was claimed to be the consequence of unbalanced cultural policy and failed attempts to integrate *national minorities* in the Latvian society: «*It seems to me that representatives of the authorities are guilty, because those who have big resources are supposed to have more opportunities to influence the situation*»²³⁰. Interestingly, those politicians who expressed their negative attitude towards the initiative to grant Russian the status of the second language accused Latvian politicians who were in favour of the referendum of provoking social

²³⁰ Бердников А. Референдум – последствие причиненной русскоязычным травмы // Газета «Телеграф». 03.02.2012. № 25.

tensions among different groups of the Latvian population. For instance, current prime-minister of Latvia who represents the party "Unity" accused his opponents of being responsible for ethnic cleavages: «*Marginal persons, who wanted to break up our society, failed. To the contrary, the referendum allowed us to start the most serious and in-depth discussion about the basis of the state*»²³¹. Such a clash of opinions of Latvian politicians on the referendum issue indicated the extreme politization of this question, directly connected with the struggle for power.

Newspaper *Telegraf* presented the full spectrum of opinions within Latvian political space and also referred to the points of view expressed by Russian, Ukrainian and Estonian politicians. Estonia and Ukraine were regarded as the most complicated and controversial cases of cultural and language policy in the whole post-Soviet space, that is why the referendum in Latvia on such a traumatic question could possibly influence other ex-Soviet republics. The opinions of Russian political leaders and ministers were also taken into consideration in Latvian newspaper *Telegraf*. Non-governmental organisations played a significant role in asserting that the problem of protecting both Latvian and Russian languages existed. For instance, the speaker of the organisation «For the Latvian language!» claimed that «*people should go and vote. That is why the question what language should be the only one will never arise and any chance for newspapers to write that people in Latvia support bilingualism will be eliminated*»²³².

In February, 2012 not only different political views were expressed by the newspaper, but also the opinions of the Latvian clergy were taken into account. Representatives of several religious groups also expressed their opinion on Latvian referendum. *Telegraf* reported that no consensus on whether Russian should be granted the status of the second official language existed within the religious community. «*Political views of catholic priests coincided with the opinions of the majority of Saeima. That is to say the politics and the religion came together in the opinion on Latvian being the only state language in Latvia*»²³³. In contrast, the point of view of the Orthodox Church in Latvia expressed by archbishop Alexander could be regarded as the appeal to the Latvian government «*not to destroy the Russian language which has an enormous impact in culture and science because all significant books and works were translated into Russian and they are an inevitable part of Latvian culture and traditions*»²³⁴. The opinions expressed by Latvian clergymen were a rich source of material for further analysis and interpretation. Discourse analysis of their utterances gave me a chance to reveal the logic of how *cultural and, consequently, political boundaries* were constructed by the example of Latvian referendum. In the first case, Latvian Catholic Church expressed its

²³¹ Дунда А. Послевкусие референдума. Что думают политики и экономисты // Газета «Телеграф». 20.02.2012. № 36.

²³² «Вставай и иди!»... голосовать против русского языка // Газета «Телеграф». 09.02.2012. № 29.

²³³ Негодин А. Страсти по референдуму: понимает ли Бог по-русски? // Газета «Телеграф». 07.02.2012. № 27.

²³⁴ См. там же.

negatives attitude to the initiative and claimed that the Latvian nation should be based on one state language and rich Latvian traditions. In contrast, the Orthodox Church emphasized that Russian culture as the part of Latvian should not be neglected. The diversity of opinions revealed the process of *constructing* political boundaries on the basis of cultural affiliation. When either politicians or clergymen expressed their negative attitude to the referendum, they emphasized that Latvian and Russian cultures were distinct. On the contrary, those who were in favour of giving Russian a higher status assumed that Russian culture could not develop in isolation from Latvian. While all discourses were connected with power distribution, the opinion of the Latvian political scientist seems reasonable to quote: «*The question that is asked on the referendum is not about the Russian language; it is connected with the struggle for power*»²³⁵.

The opinions of experts such as political scientists, sociologists and historians were widely used in the selected publications in order to legitimize the political positions either in favour or against Russian. Mass media also played a significant role not only in the coverage of the context of Latvian referendum but also in the propaganda of certain political views. *Telegraf* also referred to other Latvian- and Russian-language newspapers. Representatives of the Latvian cultural elites such as artists, musicians and singers were also involved in the discussion, whether the referendum would eliminate discrimination of Russian speakers. European institutions also served as important social actors that obtained the power to influence decision-making in Latvia. Such an extreme variety of social actors and a wide spectrum of claim-makers indicated that the referendum on the status of the Russian language was a crucial point in heated political debates. The issue of Russian affected all parts of the population which seemed to be substantial evidence that the social problem existed and needed amelioration by persons in authority.

Telegraf published different opinions on the necessity of this democratic procedure in Latvia. On the one hand, the main arguments of those who were opposed to granting Russian the status of the second official language were expressed by Inese Vaidere, a Member of the European Parliament from 2004: «*Granting Russian the status of the second state language will lead to interethnic tensions and pose a threat to the positions of the Latvian language and culture*»²³⁶, «*It is possible to create a consolidated society based only on the respect to the fundamental values of the state including the language and culture of the **core nation***». ²³⁷ Interestingly, representatives of other ethnic minorities such as Belarusians and Roma expressed their negative attitude towards Russian becoming the second state language, because it would possibly lead to exclusion of the Latvian language from public sphere. Moreover, Vaidere's statement became a perfect example of how the politics of nationalizing state was legitimized and justified by Latvian politicians. As a

²³⁵ Островска И. Политолог: референдум – проверка на расстановку сил // Газета «Телеграф». 16.02.2012. № 34.

²³⁶ Европейские деятели не видят прав ущемления русских // Газета «Телеграф». 15.02.2012. № 33.

²³⁷ Линдерман поедет в Страсбург поспорить с Вайдере // Газета «Телеграф». 14.02.2012. № 32.

result, Latvian was seen as the key marker of national identity and the means of societal consolidation. On other hand, those political forces who expressed their positive attitude towards giving Russian the official status claimed that Russian speakers were under constant threat of *discrimination* and experienced a traumatic shift from one political order to another: «*The Russian community presented its position. Another side will inevitably take it into consideration. They [Latvian politicians] always said that the problem did not exist. They told this in Europe. But it seems impossible to hide this problem now*»²³⁸, «*the referendum on the status of the Russian language will take place just because the Russian community experienced the same traumatic situation as Latvians in the Soviet years*».²³⁹

These two utterances need a more careful investigation. The Latvian authorities that were blamed of failed attempts to take the interests of Russians into consideration claimed that the social problem of language policy did not exist in Latvia. In terms of Kitsuse and Ibarra's classification, **antipatterning counterrhetoric** was implemented by the Latvian government. For instance, politicians declared that the claim was not a full scale social problem, but rather only a set of isolated events. In contrast, the Russian side expressed great concerns with the situation. References to the history were made in order to portray the social reality unfavourable to Russian speakers after 1991 in Latvia. Like in the previous periods analysed above, the main rhetorical idioms were **the rhetoric of loss and the rhetoric of entitlement**. «*Latvia is the only country in the world, where there is an opportunity for the Latvian language, popular traditions and everything Latvian to exist*»²⁴⁰. Thus, if Latvia did not take measures aimed at the preservation of national culture, it would be probably destroyed. It means that Russian as the second state language posed a threat to the development of *independent* Latvia where the state language was seen as the most effective tool of promoting the interests of the "core" nation. The statements expressed by the representatives of the Russian community revealed the opposite logic. If the state did not take the interests of a huge number of Russian speakers into account, it would lead to their *discrimination* and repetition of the traumatic experience of the past. Granting Russian a higher status could harmonize the situation with other national minorities and soften aggressive politics of nationalizing state conducted by the Latvian government: «*Opposition of the Russian language to Latvian is the myth of the ruling clique in order to manipulate the society*»²⁴¹.

The results of the referendum where 2/3 of the population did not support the initiative provoked different opinions on this issue expressed by experts, politicians and businessmen. On the one hand, «*the disastrous results*

²³⁸ Русские больше не позволят обращаться с собой так, как раньше // Газета «Телеграф». 15.02.2012. № 323

²³⁹ Бердников А. Референдум – следствие причиненной русскоязычным травмы // Газета «Телеграф». 03.02.2012. № 25.

²⁴⁰ Дунда А. Послевкусие референдума. Что думают политики и экономисты // Газета «Телеграф». 20.02.2012. № 36.

²⁴¹ Русскоязычные хотят быть союзниками // Газета «Телеграф». 24.02.2012. № 40.

of the language referendum did not bring nationalistic politicians to reason»²⁴². On the other hand, «this referendum is blackmail. Latvians should not yield to this initiative»²⁴³. The common characteristic of both positions was that the language issue seemed to be an ongoing problem in independent Latvia that could not be solved by the means of referendum. Generally speaking, Latvian newspaper *Telegraf* expressed different points of view which is perceived as its definite advantage over other Russian-language media sources that pay extensive attention to the interests of Russians, ignoring an alternative point of view. It provided me with an opportunity to reveal the logic of argumentation from both sides. The general observation made on the basis of these publications was that cultural and, consequently, political boundaries were seen as the result of the ongoing process of the social reality construction. Depending on the point of view, different statements served as a promising tool for legitimatizing certain political positions and played a significant role in discourse formation, production and reproduction. Both parties claimed that the either Latvian or Russian were under threat of extinction which was exaggerated by politicians, experts and mass media.

Approval of the Law «On the Principles of the State Language Policy» in Ukraine

The Law «On the Principles of the State Language Policy in Ukraine» was approved by the Verkhovna Rada on the 3rd July, 2012 and signed by the President Viktor Yanukovich on the 8th August. The ratification of the law led to the confrontation between representatives of the ruling «Party of Regions» and its opposition. The initial proposition was to reform state language policy in Ukraine that has always been an inevitable part of controversial disputes in the Ukrainian society and therefore guarantee legal protection of the languages of national minorities. The languages which were widespread in certain Ukrainian regions could be granted the regional status. Because of regional polarization discussed in the previous chapter, which is the key characteristic of Ukrainian political development after reaching an independent status, several *oblasts* where Russian or other languages are spoken by a significant part of the population got the right to establish this language at the regional level in the public. Obviously, the initiative of Viktor Yanukovich and Vadim Kolesnichenko who elaborated the project of the law met determined opposition of those politicians that expressed their negative attitude to grant Russia the regional status.

Russian-language daily newspaper *Fakti I Kommentarii* was chosen in order to reveal the strategies of language policy representation in Ukrainian public space of the time. The following newspaper is one of the most widely read Russian print sources in Ukraine. In the course of analysis several categories shaping the discursive field were marked out:

²⁴² Линдерман: референдум не образумил националистов // Газета «Телеграф». 27.02.2012. № 41.

²⁴³ «Латышам нужно прекратить праздновать победу» // Газета «Телеграф». 23.02.2012. № 39.

Language law	National minorities
Russian language	State language
Nationalism	Opposition
Regional status	Language policy
Discrimination	Protests
Independence	Sovereignty
European Charter	

Obviously, the law signed by Ukrainian President affected different parts of the population and provoked intense debates on the issues of Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and attitude to the state language. The general characteristic of the selected newspaper was that published materials reflected the positions of both sides including those either in favour or against the new law on language policy. *Fakti I Kommentarii* was also chosen in order to represent a wider spectrum of Russian-language print sources and build up the more comprehensive picture of Ukrainian discourse of language policy after the Soviet Union collapse.

According to Kitsuse and Ibarra' classification of claim-makers, the victim group commonly portrayed as suffering from negative consequences of this law was Ukrainians. Interestingly, the previous periods were characterized by extensive attention of mass media to the problems of Russian speakers. Along with news, reports and announcements of political leaders oriented towards cooperation with Russia, *Fakti I Kommentarii* published alternative opinions of those who perceived the initiative of Yanukovich as a possible threat to Ukrainian *sovereignty and independence*. Lviv deputies accused the President and his proponents of deliberate Anti-Ukrainization: «*Hatred aimed at everything Ukrainian, discrimination of Ukrainians in terms of national belonging, repressions of Ukrainians will become a visiting card of the puppet regime of Yanukovich who inclines to undermine the Ukrainian sovereignty*»²⁴⁴. Great concerns expressed by Lviv politicians could be partly explained by the historic legacy and ethnic composition of Ukrainian West, because this part of the country has been traditionally more "ukrainized". That is why, granting Russian the regional status was seen as a serious threat to Ukrainian politics of nationalizing state aimed at promoting the interests of the "core-building" nation.

Fakti I Kommentarii published the opinions of those politicians who supported the approval of the Law «On the principles of the state language policy» and those who expressed their negative attitude. It seems to be obvious that Ukrainian politicians constituted a significant group of claim-makers. Taking into account the citation mentioned above, Yanukovich and his proponents were accused of being the major source of the emerging social problem. Public organisations and activists also played a significant role in shaping and

²⁴⁴ Львовские депутаты пожаловались украинскому народу на Януковича // Газета «Факты и комментарии». 30.08.2012.

producing and shaping the discourse of language policy in Ukraine. Thus, *Fakti i Kommentarii* contained the information about manifestations and protests of both Russian- and Ukrainian-language defenders. The opinions of experts and Ukrainian intelligentsia were depicted as a valuable source of information and knowledge on the language issues in contemporary Ukraine.

The attitude to the language law signed by the President in August, 2012 can be characterized as controversial and ambiguous. On the one hand, politicians from the West of Ukraine often referred to the negative Soviet experience and even left the parliamentary sessions as the sign of opposition to this law. For instance, the deputies from Ivano-Frankivsk claimed that «*our non-recognition is based on the fact that the Article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution was severely violated by little Russian President; violent measures of approving the law undermined the basis of the constitutional system of the state. During the 22nd year of Independence the main legislative body took a course aimed at undermining the national values and key characteristics of the state by posing a threat to the national soul which is the Ukrainian language*»²⁴⁵. Russian was called “*imperial language*” which could be regarded as a direct reference to the historic experience of Ukraine being part of the Russian Empire. This statement seems to be a perfect example of how Ukrainian is promoted to be the key marker of national identity. However, *the national soul* was associated largely with a primordialist view where the language served as the part of the national character. This opinion reflected the main arguments of those who were in opposition to the language law.

In contrast to this view, Ukrainian politicians who supported the regional status put emphasis on the positive outcomes of this measure: «*The following law guarantees free use of regional languages. The Russian language will gain the regional status in 13 Ukrainian oblasts, Crimean-Tatar – in the Crimea, Hungarian – in Zakarpattia oblast’, Romanian – in Chernivtsi oblast*»²⁴⁶. It means that Ukrainian citizens will be granted the right to choose the language of school instruction and communicate with the authorities in their mother tongue. Establishing certain languages as regional in several Ukrainian oblasts indicated that national minorities and ethnic groups that constituted a significant part of the population would have an opportunity to interact in their native language in the public. It was also claimed that this law could possibly solve the problem of regional polarization in Ukraine and give local governments more freedom in setting their political agenda. Nevertheless, Yanukovich promised to protect the state Ukrainian language and provide educational needs of national minorities: «*It is obvious that we are moving forward to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, it seems to be very important*», «*It is necessary that the law should create conditions for the equality of languages and it will respond to the European Charter*»²⁴⁷. Thus, this important legal

²⁴⁵ Ивано-франковские депутаты «восстали» против Верховной Рады // Газета «Факты и комментарии». 23.08.2012.

²⁴⁶ Сегодня 13 областей Украины получили региональные языки // Газета «Факты и комментарии». 10.08.2012.

²⁴⁷ Янукович: закон о языках не является догмой // Газета «Факты и комментарии». 14.08.2012.

document was seen as a promising tool of protecting national minorities in Ukraine.

In the course of analysis I marked out several dominant rhetorical idioms in the selected articles. Thus, the **rhetoric of loss and rhetoric of entitlement** were the most significant rhetorics of the discourse connected with the language law adopted in 2012 in Ukraine. Ukrainian politicians who expressed nationalist ideas emphasized that the state language was understood not only as the key marker of national identity but also a significant factor that determined further development of post-Soviet Ukraine. Approval of the law was depicted as a threat to state sovereignty and independence, and Russian ("imperial language") - as the major instrument of the Russian intervention in internal affairs of Ukraine. On the contrary, those politicians who supported Yanukovich claimed the importance of legal protection of national minorities and granting freedom to choose the language of instruction and communication in public to Ukrainian citizens. However, some regional authorities **declared impotence** and proved impoverishment of available resources to solve the problem. While the implementation of the language inevitably requires financial resources of the government, it was claimed that «*Ukrainian regions that are inclined to implement the norms of the Law on the principles of the state language policy have to find money for its realization themselves*»²⁴⁸.

In general, Ukrainian newspaper *Fakti i Kommentarii* constituted a fine example of relatively neutral journalistic style that did not either propagated to fight for Russian and Ukrainian or presented a politically biased point of view. Discourse analysis of the selected publications was deepened and enriched by materials of the following print source which gave me an opportunity to understand the logic of language debates in contemporary Ukraine. Like in the previous periods, the main rhetorical idioms picked out in the course of analysis were **the rhetoric of loss and the rhetoric of entitlement**. Nevertheless, the approval of the new law instead of the Soviet one became a considerable step towards the solution of the highly controversial problem of language policy in contemporary Ukraine.

Summary of the Chapter III

In the third chapter I conducted discourse analysis of Russian-language press in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union collapse. The method of discourse analysis following the guidelines of Reiner Keller was used. This technique represents a relevant analytical tool that enables the thorough consideration of partly overlapping, partly competing discursive fields produced by Russian-language newspapers in two European countries. The overall history of political Latvia's and Ukraine's political development concerning the issue of language policy in regard to ethnic minorities was subdivided into several important periods that were further scrutinized. An overwhelming necessity arises to reveal the similarities and differences in Ukrainian and

²⁴⁸ Областям, которые сделают русский язык региональным, придется самим искать деньги на его внедрение // Газета «Факты и комментарии». 15.08.2012.

Latvia discourses of language policy in the concluding part of the Chapter III. Firstly, the dynamics of the Ukrainian case needs the thorough investigation.

1). In both 1990s and 2000s the Ukrainian language was seen as the key marker of national identity, Ukraine's sovereign and independent status. It marked also a watershed between the previous Soviet experience where Ukrainian was ignored and the current state of affairs where much public attention was attracted to the problems of its functioning and competition with the Russian language.

2). The question of further political development and the place of Ukraine in the international community were of utmost importance for Ukrainian discourse of language policy relating to ethnic minorities. For instance, the year 2004 was depicted as a crucial point of Ukrainian political development that brought democracy and freedom to common people; in this period the key feature of Ukrainian discourse was the discussions about "European choice" of Ukraine.

3). The focus of Russian-language newspapers shifted from the reevaluation of the Soviet experience to the country's interest to integrate in Europe.

4). Russian-language press is represented by a wide spectrum of media sources that reflect different positions on the problem of language policy. For instance, newspaper *Den* put emphasis on possible discrimination of Ukrainian speakers in the country. To the contrary, *Delovaya Ukraina* contained the materials that focused on constructing the Ukrainian nation that had common roots with Russia and where bilingualism could be regarded as the key component of the country's development; the construction of the social problem of language policy was designated by the means of various discursive strategies.

5). Russia as Significant Other played an extremely important role in Ukrainian discourse of language policy not only in the 1990s but also in the 2000s. Russian politicians shaped Ukrainian and Latvians discourses of language policy; the selected publications focused on deep concerns expressed by Russian political leaders regarding the problems of "compatriots abroad".

The newspapers that were chosen for discourse analysis of the 2000s period, concentrated largely on the pre-election promises of Ukrainian politicians rather than on the radical reforms of language legislation (with the exception of August 2012 when the new Law «On the principles of the state language policy» was approved). However, the status of the Russian language continued to be the key problem in all political discussions in the 2000s. The next important that should be undertaken is to track the dynamics of Latvian discourse of language policy.

Latvian Discourse of Language Policy in the 1990s and the 2000s

1). The focus of Russian-language newspapers shifted also from the reinterpretation of the Soviet experience to the European choice of Latvia. From the very beginning of Latvia's development after 1991, the political elites intended to join the most influential international organisations such as the European Union, the Council of Europe and NATO. However, the official Latvian discourse of the Soviet experience was expressed in complete overestimation of the past experience and focused on neglecting the Soviet authority. Consequently, the Russian language as the marker of the traumatic experience turned into the object of political manipulations.

2). The Latvian state was depicted as a repressive mechanism in the periods of the 1990s and 2000s. Rigid cultural and, consequently, political boundaries between ethnic Latvians and Russians were the characteristic feature of the Latvian discourse produced and reproduced by the Russian-language press. Moreover, the notion of non-citizens has become the marker of political exclusion.

3). The Russian-language press that was selected for the empirical analysis served as an effective instrument to articulate the interests of Russian-speakers and non-citizens. This trend designated that Russian-language newspapers represented a typical example of minority media that seek to promote the interests of their cultural group.

It is assumed that the investigation of Ukrainian and Latvian cases should be provided in a comparative perspective. Thus, a clear necessity to mark out the similarities and differences in partly overlapping, partly competing discourses on language policy arises in the following section.

The Similarities in Ukrainian and Latvian Discourses on Language Policy

1). Russian-language newspapers were confronted with the same problem. Especially in the 1990s associated with the turbulent transformation and transition from the Soviet totalitarian regime to democracy, Russian-language press was involved in competition with Ukrainian- and Latvian-language counterparts. A lot of editions that existed in the 1990s in both countries failed to readjust to the principles of the market economy and went bankrupt. That is why, the common problem for the analysis of these cases was to build a reliable typological sample.

2). In the course of analysis the issue of language policy in regard to ethnic minorities was constructed as the burning social problem in both Ukrainian and Latvian discourses. Therefore, different strategies, language games and rhetorical idioms identified in the 3rd Chapter, were used in order to represent this issue as a full-scale social problem.

3). In both Latvian and Ukrainian discourses the main problem bearers, were designated as the government, the Ukrainian or Latvian authorities.

4). The most frequently used categories marked out in the course of empirical analysis in the selected periods of time in Russian-language press commonly include such notions as *discrimination, nationalism, the Russian language, the state language, independence, sovereignty, interethnic tensions, human rights, bilingualism and protests*. The constant repetitions of the categories in both Latvian and Ukrainian discourses indicates that two nation-states formed after the Soviet Union collapse faced the same problems of political transformation.

5). The common feature of Ukrainian and Latvian discourses of language policy was the presence of a large group of various claim-makers involved in the discussion of the language issues and political decision-making.

6). According to Kitsuse and Ibarra' classification of language games, the most frequently used rhetorical idioms in both Latvian and Ukrainian discourses of language policy were **the rhetoric of loss and the rhetoric of entitlement**. The first one was often expressed on behalf of the Ukrainian or Latvian population; some valuable object or state was running the risk of losing value and needed protecting being unable to protect itself. For example, this rhetoric was used when the discussion focused on the possible damage to the culture of the core-building ethnic group or the Russian culture. **The rhetoric of entitlement** also seemed a widely used rhetorical idiom when the emphasis was put on freedom of self-expression and equal access to resources including political participation of non-citizens. For instance, the year 1994 was marked by heated political debates over the status of non-citizens in Latvia. In Russian-language press the journalists concentrated on discrimination of this part of the population and their inability to take part in Latvian elections.

However, several significant differences in Latvian and Ukrainian discourses on language policy were also designated:

1). There exists the difference between the Russian-language press in Latvia and Ukraine. The three major newspapers in Latvia are *Telegraf, Chas and Vesti Segodnya*. In the course of analysis I came to the conclusion that these periodicals largely represented the interests of the Russian-speaking community in Latvia. *Telegraf* was the only newspaper that published quite diverse opinions on the problem of language policy and non-citizens; the journalists tried the more neutral evaluation of the current political processes but with a particular focus on the Russian part of the population. In contrast, Ukrainian newspapers published in Russian are as widely read sources of information as their Ukrainian-language counterparts. The Russian press analysed in the 3rd Chapter, represents a more diverse picture of political preferences concerning the language issue. For instance, Ukrainian newspaper *Den* published a lot of materials where the state language was portrayed as the main victim of the Soviet legacy and government's efforts to provide the regional status for Russian in 2012. Thus, Russian-language media sources in Ukraine seem to be more diverse than in Latvia.

2). In Latvian discourse of **European institutions** played a much more important role concerning the issues of language policy and ethnic minorities.

3). All government's initiatives in the sphere of language policy or ethnic minorities were described in extremely negative light by the Russian-language press in Latvia. It was postulated that the interests of Russian-speakers were severely violated in the country which caused considerable concerns of human rights organisations, European institutions and the international community in general. However, Russian-language newspapers in Ukraine presented more diverse opinions on the same subject.

4). Both Latvian and Ukrainian cases represent fairly distinct examples of post-Soviet political development.

Conclusion

More than 20 years ago the political landscape of the world underwent a radical reconfiguration. The Soviet Union collapse in 1991 led to the emergence of fifteen independent nation-states which were confronted with the problem of social, economic and political transformation. Ukraine and Latvia that became the focus of my research project enhanced a unique chance to choose the future trajectory of political development. In terms of Rogers Brubaker's theory of nationalism, political elites in both countries entered the politics of nationalizing states that is generally characterized by decisive attempts of the government to promote the national culture and language which are the key markers of national identity and the core components of nation-building projects in two European countries. This complicated situation connected with the change in political order and hierarchy inherited from the Soviet system was aggravated by the presence of significant minority groups in Latvia and Ukraine.

Both countries are traditionally characterized as heterogeneous societies with representatives of different ethnic and cultural groups. However, the status of Russians and Russian speakers that constitute a large part of the population has become the crucial point in all political discussions after the Soviet Union disintegration. Thus, the "language question" has turned into the object of political manipulations and the central problem of Latvia's and Ukraine's political development. Language policy in these two countries is one of the most complicated cases, needs thorough investigation. Whereas the state language policy in Latvia and Ukraine is largely oriented towards representatives of ethnic groups and promotion of their languages, much more controversies arise in regard to ethnic minorities.

Thus, the main focus of the present research project was language policy in relation to ethnic minorities in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union collapse. Mass media were supposed to be the primary data for the empirical analysis because they serve not only as the main sources of information but also operate as active participants in forming political agenda in

two European countries. I chose Russian-language newspapers in contemporary Latvia and Ukraine (*Latvian Chas, Telegraph, Vesti segodnya, Business and Baltia, SM-Segodnya* and *'Edinstvo, Ukrainian Delovaya Ukraina, Den, Pravda Ukraini and Fakti and Kommentarii*) for empirical analysis because, on the one hand, they seem to be the way to express and articulate the interests of ethnic minorities and Russians in particular, on the other hand, balance between the majority of the population and minorities and play an extremely significant role in shaping, producing and reproducing discourses on language policy in public space. My typological sample included the articles in Russian-language press that covered the most significant political events connected with language policy in both countries such as the approval of the Law on Citizenship in Latvia in 1994 or the ratification of the Law «On the Principles of the State Language Policy» in Ukraine in 2012. Thus, the research programme elaborated by Reiner Keller served as an effective methodological tool for the empirical analysis of selected publications. The advantage of this research design is that Keller successfully revised the diverse literature on discourse analysis and combined the theoretical provisions of Michel Foucault and Berger and Luckmann's «The Social Construction of Reality» with the clear and well-structured guidelines how to process the data and thoroughly analyze the selected materials. In contrast to other approaches analysed at the beginning of the 3rd chapter, Keller focused not only on the linguistic characteristics of discourses but also on the larger political and cultural context. The initial hypothesis of my research was formulated in the following way: language policy related to ethnic minorities in contemporary Latvia and Ukraine is constructed as a social problem in the discourses of Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers published in the Russian language.

In order to investigate the complicated cases of Ukraine and Latvia's language policy, the analysis of the relevant theoretical approaches was undertaken in the first chapter. Social constructivism based on Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's «The Social Construction of Reality» was chosen as a broader theoretical framework. It seems that the issue of language policy in Latvia and Ukraine after 1991 represents a characteristic example of how different social actors are involved in the processes of knowledge production and reinterpretation of the Soviet experience. The social constructivist approach to nations elaborated by B. Anderson, E. Gellner and R. Brubaker was also applied to the careful investigation of nation-building processes in former Soviet space. These authors emphasized the leading role of language in constructing the national project or "imagining" the community. I assume that contemporary nationalization movements in Latvia and Ukraine are deeply intertwined with the ongoing, flexible and debatable process of constructing the political boundaries based on cultural characteristics such as language, common history or citizenship. In Latvia citizenship has become the marker of political exclusion because representatives of ethnic minorities and Russians in particular were deprived of their right to participate in political life of the country. The theory of social problems construction developed by J. Kitsuse and M. Spector and the concept of language games elaborated by J. Kitsuse and P.

Ibarra provided us with an effective methodological instrument for discourse analysis of Russian-language press in both cases. In Kitsuse and Spector' theoretical framework claim-making plays an extremely important role, because social problems are perceived in terms of interactional process of claim-making that includes both a demand that is made on the behalf of a particular group of individuals and a claim addressed to the groups that are involved in decision-making on a certain problem. Meanwhile, language games facilitate the researcher to describe social and political phenomena that took place in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union disintegration. Generally speaking, social constructivism served as a promising tool for the deep investigation of complicated processes of Latvian and Ukrainian nation-building and the role of language in shaping the national identity.

The second chapter presented the general overview of contemporary situation in these countries and provided a comparative perspective on language policy regarding ethnic minorities. The explanation of language debates intensification can be traced in the USSR national policy. Contemporary language issues are indelibly linked to the history of the Soviet Union. Many researchers note that «concerned to undo the political, demographic and social legacies of half a century Soviet rule, language issues became one of the key features of separation from the Communist past, but also a key point of controversy, and, at times, of conflict»²⁴⁹. In the Soviet period the central authorities provided very few chances for the development of both Ukrainian and Latvian cultures. The Russian language was declared to be the means of intercultural communication and dominated in all spheres of public life. Moreover, excellent command of Russian was designated as the marker of prestige, whereas national languages of Latvia and Ukraine underwent a significant decrease of speakers. That is why, after the restoration of independence, the drawbacks of the previous national policy came into focus which resulted in vigorous political debates over the status of the Russian language. In this project I argue that the intensification of these discussions happened, because Russian was understood as the marker of the Communist past and its traumatic experience, especially in Latvia, and the previous political hierarchy where either Latvian or Ukrainian were underdeveloped and discriminated by the central authorities. I made the conclusion that both Latvian and Ukrainian nation-states after the Soviet Union disintegration seem to be *constructed projects* where the state languages were seen as the key markers of national identity and sovereignty. The shift from the previous domination of Russians and their language to the politics of nationalizing states in Latvia and Ukraine caused the outrage of Russian speakers and the extreme politization of this issue.

The second chapter also focused on the key characteristics of language policy in both European countries. The most essential features of Ukrainian language policy that were marked out in the course of analysis include regional

²⁴⁹ Hogan-Brun G., Ozolins U, Ramonienè M. and Rannut M. Language Politics and Practices in the Baltic States // Language Planning and Policy in Europe. 2008. Vol. 3.

polarization, subdivision of the population into two main groups – Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking, formal and controversial legislation in the sphere of language use. Regional polarization was represented in the results of the Ukrainian parliamentary and presidential elections. The “language card” and the promises of Ukrainian politicians such as Leonid Kuchma or Viktor Yanukovich to grant Russian the status of the second state language attracted a significant part of the electorate in Eastern and Southern regions that were traditionally more russified. In contrast, Viktor Yushenko and Yulia Tymoshenko performed the highest results in Western and Central regions where people mostly speak Ukrainian. Another characteristic of the situation in Ukraine that should be mentioned is that ethnic and linguistic lines do not coincide in the country, which creates additional obstacles for the coherent and balanced analysis of contemporary language policy. Thus, the terms “Russophones” and “Ukrainophones” seem to be a more relevant descriptive tool for the thorough investigation of this burning problem. The language legislation including the most important national laws such as the Law «On the Principles of the State Language Policy» and international documents such as the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages were also analyzed in the second chapter. The essential feature of the present Ukrainian legislation is that it enables fully-fledged protection of ethnic minorities, but the implementation of these norms seems to be rather ineffective. As it was found out in the course of analysis, a lot of formulations in Ukrainian laws lack precision and can be interpreted in primordialist view.

Contemporary language policy in Latvia has several important features. Like Ukraine, Latvia is a heterogeneous society where the second largest group of the population is constituted by Russians. However, other ethnic minorities deserved insufficient attention from the authorities and mass media, which seems to be an important indicator of extreme politization of the “Russian question”. Despite the legal protection ensured by the Latvian Constitution aimed at the Latgalian and Livonian languages, the interests of these minority groups were rarely the focus of public attention and political disputes. Unlike Ukraine, Latvia not only expressed the desire to integrate in Europe immediately after the restoration of independence, but joined the European Union in 2004 which imposed additional obligations in terms of human rights and ethnic minorities’ protection. Thus, European institutions played an extremely significant role in decision-making and political agenda-setting in Latvia. The country ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 2005, whereas the European Charter has not yet been approved. The distinctive feature of Latvian legislation in the sphere of languages consisted in the fact that Russian was not granted any special status; it was considered to be another foreign language along with Polish, German or Belarusian. This controversial legislation was aggravated by the burning problem of non-citizens that constituted almost 20 % of the population and could not participate in elections and decision-making; citizenship together with language turned into the marker of social and political exclusion. Moreover, the results of the referendum held in February 2012 indicate that 2/3 of the

population expressed their disagreement to grant Russian the status of the second state language. In terms of Nancy Fraser's concepts of "weak" and "strong" publics non-citizens and Russians in particular can be attributed to "weak" publics because of their inability to participate in decision-making in Latvia. However, "weak" publics are able to form political agenda-setting and take part in opinion-making. For instance, Russians could protest against the minority school reform, express the outrage to the governments' draft of the Law on Citizenship, but did not have the chance to make political decisions because of their limited capacity to vote.

The empirical analysis of Russian-language newspapers in Latvia and Ukraine was accomplished in the 3rd chapter. Theories of discourse are an important component of my research project that deserved more thorough investigation. Thus, I focused on several important theories of discourse including the concept of discourse elaborated by Michel Foucault. Significant attention was also paid to Reiner Keller's research programme which served as a promising tool to conduct the research on language policy in Latvia and Ukraine and the importance of studying mass media in social science. I subdivided the selected materials into several categories: firstly, I chose the most significant periods of Latvian and Ukrainian political development concerning the issue of language policy and ethnic minorities which are presented in the tables (see Appendix 2), then I concentrated on the period of the 1990s in both countries. This time was especially painful for young nation-states that were confronted with the difficulties of political and social transformation after the Soviet Union disintegration. In order to track the dynamics of language policy development concerning ethnic minorities in two European countries, I also focused on the period of the 2000s. The list of the questions for the empirical analysis and the concept of language games developed by Kitsuse and Ibarra were used for the thorough investigation of language policy representation in Ukrainian and Latvian mass media.

In the course of analysis I came to the conclusion that Russian-language newspapers that were selected for the thorough investigation significantly differed in Ukraine and Latvia. The three most important Russian-language newspapers in Latvia are *Telegraf*, *Chas* and *Vesti Segodnya* (the latter two were united under one name *Vesti Segodnya* in November 2012). I argue that these media sources seemed to be a perfect example of minority press and a growing tendency of Russian-language media minoritization in Latvia. They articulated the interests of the Russian-speaking community and tended to depict the government's initiatives (for instance, the minority school reform) in negative light, where the Latvian state was depicted as a repressive and discriminatory mechanism. With the exception of *Telegraf*, which presented diverse opinions on the same subjects in a relatively neutral way, *Chas* and *Vesti Segodnya* served as an instrument to propagate the minorities' interests. Russian media space in Ukraine included various sources of information that presented different points of view on the same problem. Ukrainian *Golos Ukraini*, *Delovaya Ukraina*, *Fakti i Kommentarii* and *Den* could not be characterized as the minority press, as in the case of Latvia. They were as

widespread as their Ukrainian-language counterparts. Thus, Russian-language newspapers in Ukraine served the needs of both ethnic minorities and the majority of the population.

Concerning the notion of “weak” and “strong” publics, the investigation of Latvian and Ukrainian discourses of language policy revealed that different social actors played the leading role in decision-making on this burning problem. Obviously, the “strong” publics that formed political agenda-setting in both countries were the Latvian and Ukrainian authorities, therefore, blamed of the failure to integrate ethnic minorities into the society. However, in Latvian discourse of language policy **European institutions** also played the role of decision-makers that could force the Latvian government to follow the recommendations on the problems of the citizenship question and ethnic minorities. However, these recommendations do not mean that the Latvian state should necessarily follow them. In Ukrainian discourse, Europe was largely depicted as a careful observer of political and social transformations but not as an active participant in decision-making. Thus, European institutions could be regarded as relatively “strong” publics in Latvian discourse of language policy (they can influence political decision-making in Latvia but cannot change the national legislation on language policy). “Weak” publics marked out in the course of analysis were constituted by representatives of ethnic minorities and Russians in particular; they were able to influence the situation by the means of protests and manifestations, but their primary role consisted in discussing this issue.

Both Ukrainian and Latvian discourses on language policy underwent a change in the periods of the 1990s and 2000s. I came to the conclusion that in both discourses in these periods the state languages were depicted as the basis of the Ukrainian and Latvians societies. Latvian and Ukrainian discourses of language policy were characterized by the fact that the focus of Russian-language newspapers shifted from the interpretation of the Soviet experience to the countries’ interest to integrate in Europe. For instance, Tatiana Zhurzhenko claimed that «Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine are not the same as in the 1991. Nowadays the minority links their Russian language to the Soviet past, the communist ideas or the project aimed at reunion with Russia. No matter how we assess the previous decade, Ukrainian political identity perceived by the majority of the population is one of the most important outcomes»²⁵⁰. It means that most Ukrainians do not have nostalgia for the Soviet past and express their attitude towards further integration in Europe.

In case of Latvia, political discussions over the future trajectory of the country’s development started immediately after the restoration of independence in 1991. However, the official Latvian discourse of the Soviet experience was expressed in complete overestimation of the past experience and focused on neglecting the Soviet authority. Consequently, the Russian

²⁵⁰ Журженко Т. Почему «русскоязычным» украинцам стоит голосовать за Ющенко? // Интернет-портал газеты «Украинская правда». 16 ноября 2004 г. URL: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2004/11/16/4382860/> (Дата обращения: 23.05.2013 г.)

language as the marker of the traumatic experience turned into the object of political manipulations. In contrast, Russian-language newspaper *Edinstvo* concentrated on the positive outcomes of the Soviet rule. The first years of independence were estimated in this media source in negative light. In 2000s, when Latvia was preparing for the accession to the EU, Latvian *Chas* and *Telegraf* published the articles where great concerns about the future development of the country within the European Union were expressed.

An interesting observation was also made regarding the question of constructing cultural and, therefore, political boundaries between the “core-building” groups and others. The dividing line between Latvians, Ukrainians and Russians was constantly changing in different publications. Nationalist historiography, statistical data, experts’ opinions served as a tool of constructing the Ukrainian national project and the factor that legitimized the current political course. For instance, some publications concentrated on distinctiveness of the Russian and Ukrainian cultures; alternative points of view, focused on discrimination of Russian-speakers, were also marked out in the selected materials. The same trend developed in Latvian discourse of language policy.

However, there were much less publications in Russian-language newspapers that focused on the cultural proximity of Latvian and Russian cultures. Cultural and, therefore, political boundaries in Latvian discourse could be characterized as more rigid than in Ukrainian one. The common feature of Russian-language press in Latvia was that ethnic Latvians were strongly opposed to ethnic Russians in cultural terms. Thus, the Latvian state was portrayed as a repressive and discriminatory mechanism. The tone of the publications, where the Latvian authorities were declared to be guilty in the ambiguous situation with language policy, could be described as negative. Like the Law on Citizenship and the Language Law approved in the 1990s, the school reform and the referendum on the status of the Russian language held in the 2000s were depicted as extremely *unfavourable* for representatives of ethnic minorities and Russians in particular.

Such a sharp division of opinions concerning the same subject clearly indicates that the Russian “question” is not only the matter of linguistic preferences but an extremely debatable and politicized question; it seems to be also a sign that nation-building processes in both countries are not yet completed. Thus, the role of Russia as Significant Other is difficult to overestimate in both Latvian and Ukrainian discourses on language policy regarding ethnic minorities. In some cases, when the discussion was directly connected with Russia’s involvement (for instance, it emerged in 1994 within the political debates over the problem of non-citizens), the Russian authorities were blamed of being inactive in protecting the interests of Russian compatriots abroad; they were designated as problem bearers along with the Latvian and Ukrainian authorities in both discourses of language policy.

The common feature of Latvian and Ukrainian discourses is that diverse groups of claim-makers, in terms of Kitsuse and Ibarra’s classification, were

designated. The victim group was constituted by Russian-speakers. However, in some Ukrainian periodicals Ukrainophones were described as the group which suffered from negative consequences of the Soviet rule. Representatives of different political forces in both Latvia and Ukraine articulated their interests in Russian-language press. In terms of Nancy Fraser's concepts of "weak" and "strong" publics, ethnic Russians or Russian speakers seemed to be the "weak" public that could participate in the discussion on a certain problem but were not able to be involved in political decision-making. The state bureaucracy was also portrayed as an important social actor involved in the implementation of the governments' decision. Professionals (businessmen and journalists) were actively engaged with the formation, production and reproduction of discourses, whereas experts' opinions served as the instrument to legitimize certain political positions. For instance, references to history were made when experts articulated the common cultural roots of Ukrainian and Russian people. The following list of claim-makers varied from one period to another but included the most important social actors mentioned above.

I applied the concept of language games elaborated by Kitsuse and Ibarra to my empirical analysis. Several common categories were marked out. For instance, the most frequently used notions included *discrimination, nationalism, the Russian language, the state language, independence, sovereignty, interethnic tensions, human rights, bilingualism and protests*. The possible explanation of this tendency was that two nation-states formed after 1991 were confronted with the same problems of political and social transformation. The main rhetorical idioms distinguished in the course of investigation in both Latvian and Ukrainian discourses of language policy were **the rhetoric of loss and the rhetoric of entitlement**. They were traced in almost every period selected for the empirical analysis. Young nation-states formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union were concerned with the promotion of their national cultures and languages and restructuring the previous political system. Unsteady and weak positions of both the Ukrainian and Latvian languages were the focus of the selected publications, expressed in **the rhetoric of loss**. However, the state nationalization policies caused Russians' discontent, who had been formerly the political majority. That is why, this rhetoric was used when journalists, politicians or experts claimed that the Russian language was losing its value and significance in both states and where Russian-speakers were under constant threat of discrimination. **The rhetoric of entitlement** served as the main tool of language policy representation as discriminatory towards Russians and other ethnic minorities who were not able to participate in political life of Latvia and Ukraine.

Generally speaking, the issue of language policy regarding ethnic minorities was constructed as a full-scale social problem which confirmed my primary hypothesis proposed in the introduction. I assume that the social problem of language policy regarding ethnic minorities was constructed in Latvian and Ukrainian discourses produced by Russian-language press, because this issue encompassed all parts of the population in both countries. I also distinguished different discursive strategies including rhetorical idioms,

metaphors, the mixture of claim-making styles (civic, political, legalistic, comic) etc. were thoroughly analyzed and scrutinized in the 3rd chapter. In both discourses either the “core-building” Latvians and Ukrainians or Russians were “victimized”, or depicted as the victims of the previous national policy and the current politics of nationalizing states. The peculiar feature of these discourses consisted in the exaggeration of the issue of language policy by different social actors that articulated their interests in Russian mass media in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union disintegration. Discourse analysis of the publications revealed the most exemplary arguments of both sides – those who supported Russian being the second state language and of those who were in favour of Ukrainian or Latvian as the only state languages. In many articles, it was emphasized simultaneously that the Russian language could be a possible threat to the state sovereignty and discriminated by the authorities that introduced their nationalization projects.

Interestingly, both Latvian and Ukrainian cases represented fairly diverse models of political development. Particular issues connected with language policy in regard to ethnic minorities were discussed in different periods of time. For instance, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities had already been ratified in Ukraine in December 1997, whereas Latvia went through the same procedure in May 2005. Thus, the comparative perspective provided me with an important instrument to estimate the overall results of the politics of nationalizing states and its impact on the state language policy.

The main outcome of this investigation is that I managed to describe partly overlapping, partly competing discursive fields produced by Russian-language newspapers. The following research aimed at revealing the main arguments expressed by representatives of different political forces can be regarded as the attempt to present the diverse fields of language policy in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union disintegration.

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Appendix 1. Research Programme

Topic of the research: Contemporary Debates on Language Policy Regarding Ethnic Minorities in Latvia and Ukraine: The Discourse of Russian-Language Press.

The current relevance of the topic is demonstrated in continuous and ongoing debates over language situation in Latvia and Ukraine. After the Soviet Union disintegration the issue of language policy had become a crucial point of political discussions in both countries. The controversial Soviet legacy resulted in a pressing problem of granting Russian the status of the second state language, non-citizens and their inability to participate in political life of independent Latvia which remains insoluble to present day. Language tensions after the USSR disintegration is one of the dominant topics in contemporary debates and are largely represented by print media which appear to be the key source of information and one of the actors taking part in current agenda-setting. Thus, **the method of discourse analysis** is the most relevant and fruitful methodological approach to the studies of language policy in Latvia and Ukraine. It a key instrument in analyzing the strategies of representation of language policy by Russian-language newspapers.

The hypothesis: language policy related to ethnic minorities in contemporary Latvia and Ukraine is constructed as a social problem in the discourses of Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers published in the Russian language.

The subject of my research is the processes of constructing the social problem of language policy in the discourse of Russian-language newspapers in both countries.

The object of the following research is the discourse of language policy in relation to ethnic minorities in Latvia and Ukraine after the Soviet Union disintegration. Several daily Russian-language newspapers were chosen for the empirical analysis: Latvian *Chas*, *Telegraph*, *Vesti segodnya*, *Business and Baltia* and *Edinstvo*, Ukrainian *Delovaya Ukraina*, *Den*, *Pravda Ukraini* and *Fakti and Kommentarii*). **The aim of the research:** to display the strategies of representation of language policy toward ethnic minorities in the discourses represented by Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers.

Research question is whether the problem of language policy regarding ethnic minorities is a socially constructed problem in the discourses of Russian-language press in contemporary Latvia and Ukraine?

Research objectives:

To describe the historical and institutional context of contemporary debates on language policy in Latvia and Ukraine (the impact of the Soviet national policy, the analysis of laws, international conventions, the Ukrainian and Latvian Constitutions);

To elaborate a descriptive model of contemporary language policy toward

ethnic minorities in Latvian and Ukrainian print media;

To describe the mechanisms of constructing of language policy in Latvia and Ukraine as a social problem;

If the initial hypothesis is proved, a clear necessity to describe the discursive strategies of constructing language policy as a social problem arises;

To describe what styles of claims-making approval/disapproval are used by Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers published in the Russian language;

To mark out the main social and political actors (organisations, individuals, politicians etc.) that participate in the discourse formation, production and reproduction;

To find out commonalities and distinct features of the discourses of language policy related toward ethnic minorities.

Questions for empirical analysis:

Is the issue of language policy toward ethnic minorities is constructed as a social problem in the discourses of Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers?

What are the major actors that participate in the production of language policy (ies) in Latvia and Ukraine?

Whose interests (which social and political groups, organisations or individuals) are represented in the selected publications?

In what sociopolitical context emerge the problems of language policy in relation to ethnic minorities since 1991?

How do political, social and cultural boundaries between the “core-building” ethnic groups and ethnic minorities are constructed in different Latvian and Ukrainian newspapers?

What ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ publics can be designated in the public space of Latvia and Ukraine?

Appendix 2.

Important Political Events Connected with Language Policy in Latvia and Ukraine and the Selected Russian-Language Newspapers

Table 1. Russian-Language Newspapers in Latvia

Month, year	Latvia/Event	Newspaper/Type	Circulation (copies)
August 1991	Restoration of Latvia' independence	Edinstvo/daily	20 000 (1991)
June 1994	Approval of the law on citizenship	SM-Segodnya/daily	75 000
July 1999	Debates over the language law	Telegraf/daily	12 000
September 2003	Referendum on accession to the European Union	Chas/daily	16-22 000
February 2004	Protests against minority education reforms	Vesti Segodnya/daily	23 900
May 2005	Ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities	Chas/daily	16-22 000
February 2012	Referendum of the status of the Russian language	Telegraf/daily	12 000

Table 2. Russian-Language Newspapers in Ukraine

Month, year	Ukraine/Event	Newspaper/Type	Circulation (copies)
December 1991	Establishment of Ukraine' independence	Pravda Ukraini/3 times a week in eth 1990s	42 000 (2007)
December 1997	Ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities	Delovaya Ukraina/Tuesdays and Saturdays	14 000 (1997)
June 2003	Approval of the law «On the Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages»	Den/daily (in 3 languages – Russian, Ukrainian and English)	60 000
November 2004- January 2005	The Orange Revolution	Den/daily (in 3 languages – Russian, Ukrainian and English)	60 000
August 2012	Viktor Yanukovich signed the law "On the principles of the state language policy"	Fakti I Kommentarii/daily	1, 1 mln.

Appendix 3.

Example of Coding

Панорама Латвии, Рига; 10.07.1999; 158 (2022);
Наталья МИХАЙЛОВА. ОПЯТЬ НАШ ЯЗЫК...

Итак, в минувший четверг Сейм принял откровенно **"драконовский" Закон о госязыке [metaphor]**, который в момент *пригвоздил русский язык [category]* к *позорному столбу [metaphor]*. Даже бесстрастное обычно новостное агентство BNS на сей раз окрестило этот закон **"противоречивым" [characteristic of the law]**. Мы беседуем с депутатом фракции "За права человека в единой Латвии" Юрием Соколовским **[Latvian politicians, expert interview]**.

- Закон принят в самом **жестком, крайнем варианте**. Достаточно назвать лишь несколько прошедших поправок, чтобы в этом убедиться.

Например, запрещено употреблять **русский язык** на предприятиях, где большая часть принадлежит государству. Причем многие уверены, что доля госкапитала должна быть обязательно 5. Это не так. Если, условно говоря, в акционерном обществе у государства 2, а у всех остальных акционеров (их может быть сколько угодно) - по 1, то в этом случае у государства - большая часть капитала.

Далее. Запрещено употреблять **негосударственный язык [category]** в частной сфере, если это противоречит "защите общественных интересов" **[reference to law]**, а также если при этом страдает "общественная безопасность, здоровье, мораль общества, права потребителя, безопасность на рабочем месте и т.д." **[reference to law]**,

- Что значит "мораль общества"? Кто это определяет?

- Вот именно это и вызывает, мягко говоря, недоумение. Как и то, что означает в данном случае "общественная безопасность". О том, чтобы растолковать данные термины, никто не позаботился. Наверное, это должен будет сделать **Кабинет министров [claim-makers]**.

Также запрещено работать на частном предприятии, осуществляющем "публичные функции", если вы не владеете **государственным языком [category]** "на должном уровне". Этот туманный "должный уровень" тоже будет определять Кабинет министров.

Немаловажно и то, что заявления во ВСЕ органы государственной власти и самоуправлений теперь можно будет подавать только на **госязыке**. Или приложить нотариально заверенный перевод к вашему прошению. Причем перевод не может обеспечить ваш сосед, а вы потом - его заверить. Надо будет обратиться к специальному нотариальному переводчику ("zverinЭtais talks").

Естественно, это дополнительные расходы. Правда, не относится это к обращениям в **полицию, лечебные учреждения, службы спасения**

и другие институции [institutions]. Но только в случаях вызова "скорой", при несчастных случаях или сообщении о преступлении.

Далее. Все публичные мероприятия проводятся только на **госязыке**.

- Это относится и к **митингам русских организаций [forms of protest, "weak" publics]**?

- Нет, здесь действует другой закон: "О митингах и пикетах..." **[reference to the law]**. Но, например, кинофестиваль "Балтийская жемчужина" надо будет проводить на **латышском языке**. Вот еще "*перл*" - все фильмы, транслируемые по телевидению, должны осуществляться только с переводом на **латышский язык**. Причем в переводе необходимо соблюдать "нормы литературного языка". Та же проблема - кто будет определять эти нормы? **[rhetorical question]**

Не забыли и топонимический аспект - названия мест теперь должны звучать в строгом соответствии с правилами латышской грамматики. Так что польским названиям некоторых местечек в Латгалии придет конец. Кстати, то же относится к именам собственным в паспортах **"иностранцев" [category]**.

Следующий момент - получение образования гарантируется только на государственном языке **[reference to the law]**. Вся документация, а также печати и бланки организаций и предприятий должны быть только на **госязыке**. Запрещены вывески, реклама, афиши, сообщения и другая информация в публичных местах.

- Что значит "публичное место"? Например, помещение РОЛ или редакция русской газеты - публичное место? Туда ведь может прийти любой желающий...

- И это никак не расшифровывается. А как известно, все неясности в законе **чиновники [claim-makers]** всегда трактуют в свою пользу...

Что ж, спасибо за разъяснения. Но и это еще не все, уважаемые читатели, а только основные поправки, призванные указать свое место **русским ["weak" publics, appeals to Russian speakers]**. Ну а мы-то с вами хороши - как мы могли допустить такое? **[rhetorical question, appeals to Russian speakers]** Шаг за шагом, капля по капле **русский язык [category] выдавливался [metaphor]** отовсюду **[the rhetoric of entitlement]**. А мы становимся все "лояльнее", интеллигентность не позволяет нашим учителям участвовать в **пикетах [forms of protests]**, а идут туда только пенсионеры. Вы думаете, им это надо? **[rhetorical question]** Они и так без **госязыка** доживут свои годы - старики о нас с вами заботятся. Вы смеетесь над ними?

И еще. **Русская община Латвии [claim-makers]** в понедельник, 12 июля, в 18.00, приглашает на встречу с депутатами левой фракции **[forms of participation of "weak" publics]**. Она состоится на Эспланаде и посвящена принятому **Закону о языке [category]**. А "Панорама Латвии" приглашает принять участие в "прямой линии" в воскресенье, 11 июля, с



13.00 до 14.00, по тел.: 465969 и 465587. Вы можете высказать свои соображения относительно нового закона: утверждать ли президенту его или нет? И почему?



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