WITH PREFACES BY

CYRUS R. VANCE AND GEORGIY A. ARBATOV

MUTUAL SECURITY

A NEW APPROACH TO SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

EDITED BY

RICHARD SMOKE AND ANDREI KORTUNOV

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the Center for Foreign Policy Development
at Brown University
and
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The End of the Consensus That Never Was: The Future of Soviet-American Relations as Viewed by the Soviet Public

ANDREI MELVIL AND ALEKSANDR NIKITIN

Introduction

What impact are perestroika and glasnost beginning to have on Soviet public attitudes about foreign policy, and especially about policy toward the United States? What spectrum of opinion is forming among the Soviet people on key questions of international politics, security, and Soviet-American relations?

These questions are of great importance for several reasons. One is that the development of an entire spectrum of views, rather than adherence to a single viewpoint, serves as an indicator of the progress of reform and transformation in Soviet society. Another, obviously, is that as Soviet society becomes more democratized, public opinion will come to play an increasing role in influencing the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. For decades, opinion polls on foreign policy issues were not conducted in the USSR. It was assumed that there was silent, virtually unanimous consent for the government's foreign and national security policies. There was no open, systematic consideration of alternative views, in spite of it being generally known that some differences in viewpoint existed in fact.

This paper summarizes some of the earliest research done within the USSR on newly emerging public attitudes about foreign policy, especially toward the United States. To some extent this research employed, as a model, some prior research

carried out in the United States by the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University and the Public Agenda Foundation in New York City. Specialists at Brown University were consulted during early stages of the Soviet research project.[1]

The Soviet project, like the American one, was carried out in two stages. A first stage was required to create a basic framework of concepts and to identify potential new tendencies. The Soviet research project studied, at this stage, the opinions of foreign policy specialists. The second stage then employed the concepts that had been developed to ask questions of the public. Due to the limits on space and the desirability of giving emphasis to the opinion of the public, this chapter will summarize the first stage of research only briefly.[2]

The first stage: research on specialists' opinion

In the spring of 1988, an extensive questionnaire of approximately 170 questions was developed, exploring different possible viewpoints on the nature and dynamics of Soviet-American relations, international security, trends in world development, and the foreign policy goals and interests of the USSR. The questionnaire was then answered by 120 Soviet specialists in international relations, including academic specialists, diplomats, journalists, and representatives of various social organizations. In choosing our respondents, we emphasized two criteria: their professional competence, and their diversity of policy viewpoints.[3]

The results of this initial stage of research allowed us to draw some important conclusions. First, the results demonstrated that there has been a *major erosion of the entire set of traditional viewpoints associated with the old thinking*. There were many and clear disagreements with traditional ideological formulas. These disagreements included a refusal by the majority to agree that "the opposition of socialism and capitalism is a fundamental contradiction of the epoch," which was the very prism of all thinking for decades.[4] Almost 80% disagreed that the main goal of Soviet foreign policy should be premised on the "class struggle" and aimed at the spreading of socialism worldwide. Instead, 77% said the chief goal should be the prevention of nuclear war. More than 90% said that questions of human rights is *not* "a zone beyond criticism," including criticism from other countries.

Similarly, we found among these specialists a general *departure from the ideologized perception of Soviet-American relations* and of international relations in general. Asked whether Soviet-American relations would always be defined chiefly by political and ideological rivalry, 43% said no, and only 34% said yes. A full 50% predict a reduction, at least, in the salience of ideological differences. Asked about Soviet aid to the Third World, only 24% supported directing it by ideological criteria, and 35% supported giving it to those most in need. A larger

number, 38%, supported a reduction in aid in order to turn all resources toward the domestic progress of perestroika.

Another notable result was *an erosion of "superpower" psychology.* Forty-three percent foresee Soviet-American relations occupying a less prominent place in future world politics (35% do not); and 59% said the USSR and U.S. should not have any special rights among nations.

These specialists tend to *de-emphasize military aspects of security.* Only 17% said that the most effective means for achieving Soviet security are military-technical, while 52% saw political means as most effective. Forty-two percent advocated the attainment of Soviet security on the basis of agreements with the United States, suggesting that the emphasis on mutual security in Soviet "new thinking" is being widely accepted by specialists. Fifty percent of the respondents saw parity as a more secure and preferable state of the nuclear balance, but nearly as many said that "the USSR has no need for as many [nuclear] weapons as the U.S." Defensively oriented conventional postures were endorsed by 30%, even as a strategy for the Soviet Union to carry out unilaterally. A deliberate attack on the USSR by the United States was assessed as either "unlikely" or "very unlikely" by 82%. However 43% agreed that in general terms an "American threat" does exist and two-thirds of this group sees it as including a military threat. We assess these numbers as relatively low, when it is recalled that for decades the existence of a serious "American threat" was part of the core of Soviet political culture and thinking. In spite of President Gorbachev's proposal that nuclear weapons be abolished by the year 2000, only 10% of the respondents thought this possible.

Analysis of the specialists' responses

To create the framework for our next stage — research on public opinion — we analyzed the results of the first stage in a particular fashion. All the responses to all the questions were statistically analyzed to identify "clusters" of viewpoints. That is, we sought to identify a limited number of alternative, main tendencies. This form of statistical research is called "cluster analysis."

This analysis yielded six major clusters. We gave names to these six alternative viewpoints, and might briefly describe them as follows:[5]

1. *An "ideological" scenario.* This is the traditional Soviet ideological viewpoint. Class and ideological factors and conflict are, and will continue to be, the defining features of Soviet-American relations. The rivalry between the two sides is rooted in profound contradictions between their social systems, and can only end with the victory of one side. However, most proponents of this view expect the victory to be political and ideological, not military, and they foresee a preservation of approximate military parity between the two

sides. The main reason for the arms race is the constant American effort to achieve military superiority, and the important role of the military-industrial complex in American society. Soviet and American rivalry for the allegiance of Third World countries will continue sharply.[6]

2. *A "superpower" scenario.* This viewpoint focuses not on ideology but on the state interests of the USSR, and also of the United States. These two nations are superpowers unlike any other on Earth, and will de facto have special rights and powers, even well into the future. Since the foreign policy of the USSR should be guided not by ideology but by "realpolitik," the USSR should limit its aid to socialist and developing countries and focus its resources on consolidating its national strength. Then it should engage in economic and scientific-technical competition in global markets, for its own national advantage. Tension in Soviet-American relations can be reduced by reaching practical agreements of benefit to both, and by at least partial de-ideologization of relations. The growth of the USSR's national power will guarantee Soviet security in the event that security agreements with the United States prove unsuccessful.
3. *A "competitive coexistence" scenario.* This viewpoint focuses on the imperative of preventing a global nuclear war, and advances this as the most important goal for Soviet foreign policy. To this end, the USSR should focus on reaching agreements with the United States to reduce the nuclear threat. The security of the USSR will be guaranteed in the form of mutual security with the United States, strictly verified by national means. Reductions in military forces will be achieved step by step, maintaining at least approximate parity at each step (although it probably is unrealistic to expect nuclear weapons to be entirely abolished even by 2010.) An ideologically based competition in the non-military spheres of Soviet-American relations will continue, although with some moderation as a by-product of the military reductions.[7]
4. *A scenario of "general normalization."* This viewpoint suggests a sweeping change in Soviet-American relations, developing over time. Tensions will reduce greatly. Both sides will understand that the balance between elements of competition and elements of cooperation is shifting steadily toward cooperation. Ideological competition will cease to be important in Soviet-American relations, and the two sides will work to resolve, step by step, all problems between them. Progress, achieved in stages, in military affairs (arms reductions) will assist in improving relations in economic, political and other spheres; and vice-versa. Friction between them in the Third World will

diminish greatly, and by 2010 the two sides can achieve radical reductions (though perhaps not the complete abolition) of nuclear weapons.[8]

5. *A scenario of complete restructuring of international relations.* In this viewpoint, entirely new principles of international relations and international security will be developed. A global transformation will occur, in which not only the USSR and the U.S. but all nations will cease relating among each other in terms of threat, and instead will jointly address common global problems. Both Soviet and American interests will be subordinated to those of the world community; political and ideological conflict will yield to the recognition of global interdependence. Mutual security between East and West will merely be part of, and partially a result of, the development of common security for all the world's nations.[9]

6. *A scenario of the USSR focusing on domestic problems.* This scenario gives unconditional priority to the interests of domestic development. The USSR would reduce its aid to the socialist and developing countries, reduce or end all foreign commitments, cease to act abroad on ideological motives, focus all resources on domestic needs, and adopt the slogan that socialism is best advanced by force of example. The American threat will continue, but the USSR will retain and improve its defensive potential sufficiently to guarantee its security unilaterally and to continue its own development peacefully. Relations with the United States will become relatively unimportant. Nuclear weapons will remain, but the USSR will not require parity with the United States and can retain merely a reasonable sufficiency of nuclear forces.[10]

It should be emphasized that in our research project, none of these possibilities was considered "correct" or "incorrect." Determining their correctness was not our research goal. Rather our goal was to identify broad alternatives, each of which would be regarded as "correct" by its own adherents. Evidently there is no homogeneity, but rather great diversity, in the views of these 120 specialists in international affairs.[11]

Several areas should be mentioned where there was agreement among a majority of them, whatever their other disagreements. A majority agreed that common and parallel interests will increasingly arise between the USSR and the U.S., such as resolving such common problems as problems of ecology, energy and terrorism. A majority agreed that the Soviet understanding of what socialism means should be brought up to date to incorporate common interests and values of all of humanity. A majority agreed that an exact correlation of Soviet and American military capabilities is not and will not be decisive for their security; in other words exact parity is not necessary for the military balance. A majority believe that arms reductions will remain the single most important area for Soviet-American

cooperation. A majority are convinced that the progressive success of perestroika in the USSR will evoke a largely positive response in the United States and hence an improvement in Soviet-American relations. A majority believe that further developing economic, scientific-technical and cultural ties with the U.S. are important, independent of the ups and downs of their political relations.

The second stage: research on public opinion

In the second stage of our research, we employed these six "future scenarios" to improve our questionnaire. Some questions were removed; some new ones added; some were reworded. Having identified some major, basic tendencies, we were able to identify issues and problems more clearly, and ask questions that would get more nearly to the heart of peoples' attitudes. We also were able to simplify the questionnaire, in the sense of removing some technical ideas and jargon that, as we discovered, do not reveal important, underlying issues. Some simplification of the questionnaire was necessary before employing it with the general public.

We then took our improved questionnaire to the Soviet public. Specifically, we asked many hundreds of Soviet citizens to answer the questions it poses. Rather than relying on responses being mailed back, we took the questionnaire to citizens in their homes. The research was conducted in two cities in the European portion of the Russian Republic. In what follows, we shall refer to "Soviet public opinion," while noting now that the sample was not drawn from all parts of the USSR.[12]

Before reporting the results let us offer one preliminary observation, which we believe is significant not only regarding research on Soviet public opinion but also public opinion research in other countries. In the course of our work we discovered that it made a great difference whether questions were worded using the phrases of official rhetoric, or using other phrases and terms. When we worded questions using the phrases of official rhetoric, large majorities would respond by agreeing with that rhetoric. When we asked the *identical questions* using other language, we often received different responses.

The interpretation of this result is clear. When people hear the phrases they have already heard many times from the government, it is natural that they respond with agreement. Clearly, they are not actually thinking through the meaning of the question in their own minds, or not entirely. On the other hand, when they are asked a question that does not use official phrases, they have no choice but to think about the question itself. They must think through its meaning in their own minds. Of course, in some cases it is not possible to ask a question without using the standard terms for it, or words that resemble the official phrases sufficiently that nearly anyone will be reminded of the official phrase. In what follows we present our

results, insofar as possible, reflecting people's conclusions when they seemed to be considering questions in their own minds and not repeating official slogans.

The decline of ideology

Various evidence suggests a decline in the importance of ideological considerations in Soviet public opinion. For example an overwhelming majority of the citizens (77%) disagreed with the statement that the main goal of Soviet foreign policy should be the spread of socialism throughout the world. Only 14% of the public supported this statement. We also put the question more concretely by asking which should receive priority in Soviet aid to foreign countries — support for socialism abroad or support for the general interests of humanity (such as ecological interests or humanitarian concerns like hunger). Only 9% of the public agreed that support for socialism should always receive priority, while 71% supported giving priority to the interests of humanity. In a different version of the question, 46% said the USSR should help, insofar as possible, all needy countries while only 12% said that help should be restricted to needy countries that are pro-socialist and anti-capitalist.

The decline of ideological motives was also revealed in other ways. A 57% majority rejected the idea that any cooperation between the socialist and capitalist camps can only be temporary and limited; only 24% agreed. Asked whether the intensity of the ideological conflict between the two camps will increase, continue the same, or decline, only 7% predict an increase, 20% responded that it will remain the same, and an absolute majority of 55% think that it will decline.

For many years, official Soviet rhetoric declared that questions of human rights in the USSR are strictly an internal matter, and not something that may be an object of criticism or discussion from abroad. Yet our survey found that today this view is shared by only about one-third of the population. The other two-thirds support the position that human rights questions cannot be "off limits" to foreign criticism, because human rights are universal concepts that transcend national frontiers.

We asked this question: "At present there are a number of rules affecting the import into the USSR of books, videos, and other forms of information. Assuming that pornography and propaganda for war and racism are excluded, do you think all the other restrictions should be left in place as they are now, or strengthened, or reduced, or abolished?" Only 8% responded that the general restrictions should strengthened and only 19% that they should be left in place as they are now; 25% answered that they should be reduced and 36% said they should be removed completely.

Other data were also consistent with our conclusion that the importance of ideology as a criterion or motive in Soviet foreign relations has declined significantly among the Soviet public.

The nuclear threat

We asked a number of questions regarding perceptions about the danger of nuclear war. Perhaps the most dramatic response concerned the possibility of victory. We asked the question "If a nuclear war occurs, who will be the winner?" and received these responses from the public:

U.S.	2%
USSR	5%
neither	87%

In other words, nearly nine citizens out of ten regard a nuclear war as unwinnable.

The Soviet public evidently feels secure from surprise attack. Seventy percent responded that the United States cannot launch a surprise nuclear attack upon the USSR, and only 16% said that it can. The public also sees no need for Soviet nuclear superiority. Only 8% advocated it, compared to an overwhelming 74% who called for parity between the two sides' nuclear arms. However the public feels that that parity need not be exact. Asked to agree or disagree that "the U.S. and USSR have so many nuclear weapons that an exact parity is not that important," 71% agreed and only 17% disagreed.[13]

The citizens also place much more faith, at this point, in the power of international agreements to improve Soviet security than in further unilateral efforts. Observe these results:

Question: What is most important for the security of the USSR?

1) Strengthening its own defense	10%
2) Bilateral agreements	17%
3) Multilateral international agreements	64%

We interpret the emphasis on multilateral agreements here as reflecting a belief that international treaties mean more if they are made in the context of international law and with the participation of the international community as a whole.

All this does not mean that the Soviet people have become simple-minded optimists. More than one-quarter of the respondents fear that a process of arms reductions will work asymmetrically: it will eventually make the USSR more vulnerable than it makes the United States. Concerns are also aroused when citizens are asked whether the USSR should scrap all its offensive weapons and maintain only a defensive arsenal. In spite of the fact that this idea has been part of official doctrine for several years, it enjoys the support of only about half the citizens we surveyed. (By contrast, it was supported by more than 90% of the specialists we had surveyed.)[14]

We also asked about nuclear weapons themselves. There is no doubt that the Soviet people regard them as an absolute evil, and a grave danger to the whole of mankind. Even the most casual observer of Soviet public opinion observes that much. At the same time, our research found strong evidence that Soviet citizens are accepting the idea that under present circumstances, they may be a necessary evil — to ward off the far greater evil of nuclear war. Not surprisingly, we found that 59% of the citizens agree that the existence of the Soviet nuclear arsenal is instrumental in maintaining peace. Very surprisingly, we found that 30% of them believe that the existence of the Western nuclear arsenal also is instrumental in maintaining peace. There is only one reasonable interpretation for this result. The 30% have come to accept the idea of a balance of mutual deterrence. They have accepted the idea that the two nuclear arsenals balance each other and make it irrational for anyone to consider using the weapons.

Soviet public opinion also holds a complicated attitude about the abolition of nuclear weapons. (Incidentally the same complication is found also in Western public opinion.) On the one hand, nearly all citizens desire a nuclear-free world. Our research found that 91% believe that nuclear weapons should not exist. But when specifically asked about whether it is possible to abolish the weapons, only about 60% say yes. About one-third say it is not possible (the remainder being unsure). Even among those who think that it is possible, a mere 16% believe that it can be done by the year 2000, which is an official proposal of the Soviet government.[15]

The American threat

We asked citizens how they saw the threat from the United States. The fact that the Soviet public feels relatively secure from any direct, surprise American attack has already been shown. Nearly half of the public (46%) still believes that, in general, there is an American threat; but almost as many (41%) now believe there is not.

More revealing than this is the fact that two-thirds of those who do believe in an American threat cannot say what the threat is:

Question: If you believe there is an American threat, in what spheres of life does it manifest itself?

1) economics	4%
2) science & technology	2%
3) military	23%
4) ideology	3%
5) culture	0%-1%
6) cannot say	67%

There are several remarkable things about these responses. Of course, one remarkable thing is how few believe there is an ideological threat, or an economic or technological threat. The number of people saying that the threat is military is more remarkable for how low it is than for how high it is. But the most remarkable thing of all is how many people cannot specify what they think the threat is, *even after they are offered five possible answers.*

We believe that the correct interpretation of this result is that "the American threat" has become psychological. In their emotions, people feel some kind of vague threat, but in their minds they cannot actually find anything specific. The threat no longer exists in the realm of external reality, but it continues to have an internal, psychological existence. To some considerable extent, people still feel an "image of an enemy." But it is only an image; it is intangible.

Responses to questions about the American people and the American government are consistent with this interpretation. Soviet citizens agree almost unanimously (95%) that the American people want to reduce the danger of nuclear war. This is not surprising because for decades, official rhetoric has drawn a firm distinction between the "good" American people and the "bad" American government. But the answer to the next question is more surprising:

Question: The American government, as well as the Soviet government, wants to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

Agree:	60%
Disagree:	20%

The other 20% were unsure. In other words, among the Soviet people willing to make a judgment, a three-to-one ratio believes that the United States government does want to diminish the danger of war. This is not the judgment of a people who actually fear a military enemy.

Soviet-American relations in the future

Responses to a number of our questions all point to a conclusion that the Soviet people both desire and anticipate a continuing improvement in Soviet-American relations. More than 80% of the respondents favored the further development of trade, other economic contacts, and scientific and cultural relations with the United States, "regardless of the political situation between the two countries." More than 80% also agree that progress in Soviet-American relations cannot be limited to one specific area (such as the military) but must incorporate all areas — arms reductions, and also economics, science, technology, economics, culture, etc. Perhaps more significant, nearly 90% percent believe that "common problems facing the U.S. and USSR will force both sides to cooperate."

Taken together, these data probably signal the arrival of a new mass perception of priorities in Soviet-American relations. Contrary to the recent past, when the main emphasis in at least the Soviet official position was on progress in arms reductions, the Soviet people today support simultaneous cooperation between the USSR and the U.S. in all directions.

A majority of Soviet citizens apparently are also willing to give up the special privileges of being a "superpower" along with the United States. While more than 50% believe that relations between the USSR and the U.S. will continue to shape international politics, 68% endorse the idea that the two countries should have only the same rights and privileges in the international arena as any other countries.

The scenarios of Soviet-American relations and characteristic individual types

Naturally we researched the responses of the citizens surveyed to the six future scenarios for Soviet-American relations. As we anticipated, a simple breakdown of peoples' preferences is not very meaningful with a sample of this kind. Partly this is because, as mentioned earlier, one individual may want to endorse more than one scenario. A more subtle and more important reason is that the scenarios require discussion before they can be used very meaningfully. To respond intelligently, people must understand some complicated things. They must understand the practical implications of each scenario; they must understand what the USSR would gain and what it would have to give up in each case; and they must understand that certain combinations of policies are possible and other combinations are impossible. Understanding all this, without discussions, is too much to ask of ordinary people, particularly people who are not used to public opinion surveys on great issues of policy, and not used to public debate of policy alternatives.[16]

Therefore we approached the public response to the six scenarios in a different way. Naturally we recorded their preferences. We also compared their preferences with their responses to other questions. We also made cross comparisons among their other answers, such as their opinions about security and their opinions about Soviet-American relations. In addition, we held some discussions with groups of citizens. We also evaluated our results in the light of other research that we and others have done.

Our most significant conclusion, after the completion of all these things, proved to be the illumination of several characteristic "types" of individuals. Specifically, we were able to identify five types of people or five typical "mentalities." Of course only a few individuals fit each type perfectly. But we found that people of each type tend, on the whole, to give similar answers to certain questions. Indeed once their attitude on some questions was identified, we could predict with a fair degree

of confidence how they would answer other questions. We also believe that these five types can be found throughout many parts of the USSR. We will conclude this chapter by discussing these five types of "political consciousness" with respect to Soviet foreign affairs.

The traditional ideological type

In a political culture that traditionally has been highly ideological, it is not surprising to find a well-defined type of ideological mentality. While ideological perspectives are found among others also, in this type they are paramount. Ideology acts as a lens through which all issues of politics, economy and culture are perceived.

What are the attributes of this type? Perhaps most important, this mentality relies heavily on stereotypes. Ideas like "American imperialism," "world socialism," "parity," "the American threat" and other, easily recognized newspaper clichés produce an immediate and nearly automatic response. Like a conditioned reflex, they lead to a predictable reaction.

More of this type (62%) believe that an American threat exists than does the general population. Two-thirds of this type believe that the ideological conflict between socialism and capitalism is the main reason for the arms race. Nearly a third of them do not believe that having normal relations with the United States would have any value for the USSR. Among this type we find the highest percentage of people who believe that the main goal for Soviet foreign policy should be the promotion of socialism around the world, and also the greatest support for directing Soviet foreign aid by ideological criteria.

The ideological mentality may generate curious contradictions, because it is dependent upon a blind acceptance of official rhetoric and newspaper clichés. Currently one such cliché is that common problems will force the USSR and the U.S. to cooperate. Accepting this cliché like any other, the ideological type endorses this idea (even more than other types), apparently not noticing that it contradicts viewing the United States as an enemy. Then, having pledged their support for the cliché, they make another 180-degree turn and support – much more than people generally – the idea that any cooperation with the capitalist states must be temporary, unstable and limited. Here is a second example: the ideological type accepts the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" in weapons because it is part of today's official rhetoric. But it turns out that these people define, in their own minds, "reasonable sufficiency" as meaning that the USSR must have exactly as many weapons as the United States does and not one rocket less. (Of course the concept actually means that the USSR should have only those weapons it needs for its own security, and never mind how many the Americans have.)

The ideological mentality is also a very skeptical mentality. This type has less confidence than people generally in arms reductions, or in the positive impact of perestroika on Soviet-American relations. We suspect there may be an overall constellation of skepticism – doubt about the future of Soviet-American relations, doubt about the impact on it of perestroika, and for that matter doubt about perestroika itself.

About one-third of the citizens we surveyed supported, at least partially, the "ideological" scenario for the future of Soviet-American relations. But a majority rejected it.

Let us mention that we believe this type should actually be called the *traditional ideological* type, because it is our observation that, in their own way, many supporters of glasnost, perestroika and the new political thinking are just as ideological. The only difference is that the contents of their slogans has switched.

The isolationists

In the current domestic situation of the USSR, when many problems are being exposed that were neglected for a long time, it is natural for there to be a new focus of attention on internal development. The extreme or "pure" form of that focus is our scenario called "the USSR focusing on domestic problems." More than one-fifth of the citizens surveyed supported this scenario. We will call them isolationists.

What is the underlying attitudes of this type? Is it isolationism in the traditional geopolitical sense? Is it a form of nationalism? How does this type see the problem of security?

One major feature of this mentality is a desire to remove the USSR from any network of interdependence with the rest of the world. In comparison with people generally, this type believes the least in global interdependence, in the interests of humanity as a whole, or that common Soviet-American problems compel cooperation.

This is a defensive mentality. Most supporters of this scenario believe in unilateral means to achieve Soviet security. They prefer a build-up of military strength and technology over political negotiation as a path to security. More than people generally, they see the threat to the USSR as military, and they tend to mistrust arms reductions and reliance on only defensive weapons. In a sense they are oriented toward what is concrete: they focus on the military threat, not an ideological one, and they believe in military power, not negotiations. This type will insist on military parity with the West at any cost.

Analysis of their responses shows that this type does not adopt its position from feelings of simple weakness as a result of a disastrous situation at home. The stance is not despair before the multitude of domestic problems, but a desire for isolation

in a position of strength. In essence, they believe that the numerous internal problems can be solved only behind strong walls. It would not be much exaggeration to call this a Fortress Russia mentality.

Not surprisingly, this type emphasizes the sovereignty of the state. A much higher percentage of this group than of the whole public believes that Soviet human rights questions are a strictly internal matter, which other countries should not meddle in, and believe that information and publications from the West should continue to be restricted. But the psychological stance is not so much fear of ideological subversion, as it is the desire for strong walls for the fortress in every sense.

At a time of nationalist upheavals within the USSR, it would be logical to ask whether this type identifies with the Soviet Union or with its own Republic or ethnic group. At this stage we cannot answer this definitively because our research was conducted in the Russian Republic. However our study of responses to dozens of questions, and the cross comparison of these responses, convinces us that this mentality is focusing on the wall – both existing and desired – between the USSR and the rest of the world. This group wishes to be safe behind the wall of the state. For a multinational state like the USSR, this is a significant observation.

The anti-nuclear type

This type responds strongly to the scenario that we call "Competitive Coexistence." These are worried people who feel keenly the threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust that could destroy human civilization.

It is this group, much more than others, who see Western as well as Soviet nuclear weapons as preserving the peace – in other words, who accept the idea of a mutual deterrent balance. However exact parity is not necessary since both sides already have far too many weapons.

For this type, preserving mutual deterrence is merely a first step. In this view the urgent next step is to reduce nuclear arms by means of negotiations with the West. This type is more optimistic than people generally about the feasibility of these negotiations, and also more optimistic about the possibility of abolishing nuclear weapons completely, perhaps even by the year 2000. For this group the prevention of nuclear war should be, of course, the chief goal of Soviet foreign policy.

For Soviets it follows logically (although it might seem strange to Westerners) that this type also believes, more than the public generally, that "peace is impossible so long as American imperialism exists." The reason why these people support this idea is not because they ideologically reject the West's social system (as the traditional ideological type does), but because they are fearful of another great nation – *any* other great nation – that possesses huge quantities of nuclear weapons.

There is also a paradox in this mentality, which agrees that rivalry between the USSR and the West will continue, even following great reductions in nuclear arms. This type does *not* believe this from a desire to take revenge in other areas, for having been forced – under the threat of worldwide disaster – to make great compromises on nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, these people would like to see more comprehensive cooperation with the West in all fields, if they thought it was possible. But this is a pessimistic mentality. They do not think it is possible. They see the elements of conflict in Soviet-American relations as too strong. The reason they believe that great nuclear reductions can be achieved is that they see the threat of global catastrophe as being the one thing so powerful that it can force the two sides to make compromises and reach agreements. No other factor is strong enough to do so, so agreements in other areas will not be successfully reached.[17]

The conciliatory type

Approximately three-fifths of the citizens gave their support to the scenario of "general normalization" of relations with the United States.[18] We will give the name "conciliatory" to this type. However this does not mean that these people want the USSR to make one-sided concessions to the West; it means that they believe both sides should be conciliatory toward each other. What are the attributes of this mentality?

First, it is an "America-centered" mentality, or to be exact, one that sees Soviet-American relations as the centerpiece of world politics, compared to which all other matters are subordinate. These people, more than the population generally, believe that Soviet-American relations will never become secondary (surpassed, for instance, by North-South problems, or Soviet-European relations or Soviet-Japanese relations.) From this viewpoint it follows that security depends on nuclear parity between the two sides, and follows also that American as well as Soviet weapons help prevent war by balancing each other. It also follows consistently that bilateral negotiations and agreements are more important than multilateral ones, and that the superpower arsenals are the decisive question for world peace. This viewpoint does not assign great importance to regional conflicts elsewhere on Earth, to terrorism, or to other possible threats to security and peace.

This mentality is a Western-oriented one and is "liberal." It rejects the idea that there might be any danger to the Soviet Union from "creeping Westernism." People holding this viewpoint desire an open Soviet society with no barriers to information or publications from the West, and they hope for cooperation with the West in economics, culture, and all spheres of life.

In our assessment, these foreign policy attitudes are a reaction against the Cold War – in a sense a simple reaction. This viewpoint does not conceive any brand new ideas. It takes the old categories and reverses them: minuses are switched into

plusses and plusses are switched into minuses. It is important to observe this when comparing this type with the next one. The next one also favors good relations with the West, but in a different way.

The global type

In citizens' responses to our "future scenarios," the fifth scenario of a complete restructuring of international relations was the most popular of all. A full 79% of the people surveyed gave their partial or complete support to this scenario, with 40% giving it complete support.[19] These people endorse a future in which security and peace is achieved by creating an entirely new kind of global system.

When people who give the greatest emphasis to this scenario are asked about Soviet-American relations, their typical response is to perceive the question in a global context. They feel that questions of bilateral relations should be resolved according to the interests of the whole of humanity. They reject the idea of "superpower" privileges or that East-West relations are the central international issue. They say that Soviet-American relations are already starting to be of secondary importance on the world scene. People holding this viewpoint reject the idea that the U.S.-Soviet balance in nuclear weapons can be a foundation for peace. They desire multilateral, not bilateral, treaties.

This type also rejects the significance of ideology and of ideological conflict — at any rate the traditional ideological conflict between socialism and capitalism.[20] Naturally their perception of any American threat is minimal. Those holding this viewpoint also have a much more negative view of nuclear weapons than most people. They usually do not accept that even Soviet nuclear weapons help preserve the peace, and they strongly desire complete world-wide nuclear disarmament and a nuclear-free world.

We must add a note of caution in interpreting these results. Many of these themes are part of the "new thinking" and the new official rhetoric. In the last several years these ideas have received great publicity in newspapers and elsewhere. It is not easy to tell how many of the citizens we surveyed may merely be expressing their agreement with the official slogans (as many Soviet citizens have always expressed agreement with the official slogans, whatever they may be at any one time.) The importance of this possibility is demonstrated by an analysis of the responses of this type to other questions. Many who endorse the global slogans also do *not* give much support to concrete policies for coping with global issues, for instance the possibility of directing Soviet foreign aid to all needy countries. Also, many who endorse the global viewpoint also respond positively to the idea that the USSR should concentrate all resources on solving its internal problems, *rather than* pursuing international goals.[21]

We will not analyze these results further here. Rather we wish to emphasize, in conclusion, the tremendous diversity in Soviet public opinion that our results reveal. These five viewpoints all differ greatly. They lead to very different policy conclusions. Yet not one of them can be dismissed as bizarre or unimportant. Each one is supported by large numbers of people.

At the present time, the Soviet Union is passing through a period of both profound and extremely rapid change. The debate, and sometimes the clash, of ideas is more intense than at any time since the period around 1917. As glasnost and democratization advance, debate about foreign policy and national security will no longer be excluded. Thus it will become more and more important to understand the true opinions of the public.

Notes

1. The research in the United States is reported in this book in the chapter by Mark Lindeman, and is referred to there as the "Futures" study. That research is described in greater detail in a book to be published shortly in the United States.
2. A more complete report of the first stage of our research may be obtained by contacting the authors at the Soviet Peace Committee, Moscow.
3. Two hundred questionnaires were distributed, and 120 completed ones were returned. The sample, then, is a self-selected one in a sense. For example, individuals who place no value on this kind of research presumably did not return the questionnaire. The list of respondents did not include a significant number of military officers. The respondents were 80% male and had a median time employed in professions involving international affairs of fifteen years. The breakdown of their ages was as follows: 20-29, 8%; 30-39, 49%; 40-49, 20%; 50-59, 13%; 60 or older, 10%. While this group is relatively young, it must be recalled that it is this group that will be moving into positions of responsibility and influence over the next decade or so.

   The limitations of the sample are less important than they may appear, because in this first stage we were not primarily interested in the exact distribution of responses. Rather we were mainly interested in identifying chief tendencies and in discovering whether various answers tended to cluster together. Certain other basic conclusions, discussed next, can also be validly drawn from such a sample.

   We acknowledge with thanks the great assistance in this work of colleagues at the Institute for Sociological Research of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and especially the assistance of V. Marinov.
4. A majority of 74% disagreed with the statement that "collaboration between capitalism and socialism can only be temporary and limited." Only 20% agreed that "as long as American imperialism exists, a lasting peace is impossible." Fully 64% disagreed.
5. These six viewpoints, or scenarios, played approximately the same role in our public opinion research that the four "Futures" played in the project conducted by the Center for Foreign

Policy Development at Brown University and the Public Agenda Foundation of New York. There are important similarities but also important differences between the four American scenarios and the six Soviet ones. Naturally we do not mean to imply that the viewpoint of every individual would be exactly captured by any one of these six scenarios. The six represent merely broad viewpoints; many nuances are possible within each one.

6. This scenario corresponds approximately to the Future in the American research project called "The U.S. Gains the Upper Hand" – in reverse, of course.
7. This scenario corresponds exactly with the Future developed in the American research project called "Eliminate the Nuclear Threat; Compete Otherwise."
8. This scenario corresponds fairly closely with the Future developed in the American research project called "Cooperative Problem Solving."
9. This scenario might be seen as an application, to the global level, of the spirit of perestroika within the USSR. It visualizes a thorough global restructuring or "perestroika for the world."
10. This scenario corresponds closely with the Future developed in the American research project called "Defend Only North America."
11. The significance of the relative popularity of these six alternatives among the respondents should not be exaggerated. The cluster analysis technique makes it difficult to determine this accurately. Some individuals may not agree with any of the six; some may agree with portions of more than one. Nonetheless, for the record, our analysis indicates this breakdown among the respondents:

#1. Ideological	13%
#2. Superpower	14%
#3. Competitive Coexistence	35%
#4. Complex Normalization	28%
#5. Restructuring	50%
#6. Soviet domestic focus	20%

The total adds up to much more than 100% because, as noted, some people support more than one alternative. Due to limitations of space, we will not discuss here a further complication: these "future scenarios" can be understood both as what one expects (prediction) and as what one wishes (preference).

12. A systematic survey of public opinion, on issues of foreign policy, had scarcely ever been conducted before in the USSR; and to our knowledge, had *never* before been conducted employing a large number of detailed questions. Hence this research was necessarily carried out on a somewhat experimental basis. It was not feasible, and was not to be expected, that early, ground-breaking research could, at the very first blow so to speak, meet the highest standards of statistical sampling techniques. For example the limitation to the Russian Republic, and to its European portion, means that the results do not necessarily reflect accurately opinion throughout all the republics of the USSR. It should also be kept in mind that this research was conducted in 1988, and much has changed since, both in the USSR and in the world.

    The report offered here of our public opinion research is necessarily simplified, for reasons of space. Also this book is not primarily about public opinion, and a more elaborate and complete presentation of our work would not be appropriate here. A more complete report of the second, public opinion, stage of our research may be obtained by contacting the authors at the Soviet Peace Committee, Moscow.
13. This was one of the questions where the divergence was striking when the question was reformulated using official phrases for exact parity.

14. Here is an example of a response to official rhetoric that is the opposite of the one discussed earlier. When the official rhetoric is contrary to the traditional attitudes of centuries, there is a tendency for citizens to respond with traditional attitudes.
15. It would not be correct to say that the public attitude contains a logical contradiction or inconsistency. It is not illogical to wish that a nuclear-free world were possible, while believing that, realistically, it is not.
16. This research was conducted in 1988, only about three years from the very beginning of glasnost.
17. Discussions in depth with people holding this viewpoint revealed that the majority of those who hold it feel that it is self-contradictory and unstable. In a sense it is illogical that the two sides would make extremely important agreements in one area and not be able to reach agreements at all in other areas. Many people of the third type saw their viewpoint as actually being a limited or truncated version of the next, fourth viewpoint. But they held to their view nonetheless because they regard it as the realistic one. They pointed out that something like this is, in fact, what the two sides have achieved so far — major agreements in military areas and very little else.
18. Observe that here, as before, the total percentage of supporters of all scenarios will come to much more than 100% because some individuals endorse more than one scenario. Whether they do so, while appreciating possible conflicts among the scenarios they are endorsing remains an open question.
19. As noted in the previous footnote, in this method the total number of supporters can come to much more than 100%.
20. However such people may find themselves in an "ideological" conflict with those who do not share their views; and in a sense this fifth type could be seen as itself a new ideology.
21. Such data are reasons for caution, but not for dismissing entirely the support that these people give to the global viewpoint. For example, some may not have understood the practical contradictions implicit in these questions and would answer differently if they had. And some may have meant, by their responses, to say that the USSR should *temporarily* focus on internal problems until they are solved, and then turn to global needs and global restructuring.

The Contributors

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The American side of these Working Groups employed the device of having both a "chair" and a "convenor." The chair was a senior person who oversaw the work. The convenor was a member of the staff of the Center for Foreign Policy Development.

Chronology of Major Meetings

Joint Project on Mutual Security of the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University and the Institute for the USA and Canada of the Soviet Academy of Sciences:

July 1987	Initial discussions and formal agreement to create the project. Moscow.
Jan. 1988	Planning meeting held by directors of the two institutes. Providence.
July 1988	*Opening Conference* in Moscow, hosted by the Institute for the USA and Canada. All working groups held their first meetings.
Sept. 1988	Nuclear and Conventional Arms Reductions Working Group meeting. Providence.
Oct. 1988	Persian Gulf Working Group meeting. Washington, D.C.
Nov. 1988	North Pacific Working Group meeting. Washington, D.C. Planning meeting held by the directors of the two institutes. Moscow.
Dec. 1988	Principles and Criteria Working Group meeting. Providence. Future Scenarios Working Group meeting. Providence. Planning meeting held by the directors of the two institutes. Providence. Directors of the Center for Foreign Policy Development briefed the "transition team" working for incoming President Bush on the project. Washington, D.C.
Feb. 1989	Future Scenarios Working Group meeting. Providence.
Mar. 1989	European Working Group meeting. Moscow.
May 1989	Persian Gulf Working Group meeting. Washington, D.C. European Working Group meeting. Providence. Nuclear and Conventional Arms Reductions Working Group meeting. Providence.

Aug. 1989	Persian Gulf Working Group meeting. Washington, D.C.
Nov. 1989	*Closing Conference* in Providence (first two days) and in Washington, D.C. (next three days), hosted by the Center for Foreign Policy Development. All Working Groups held meetings, and briefings were conducted in Washington, D.C. for the policy community, including Administration officials.

Several of the Working Groups plan to continue in independent existence, despite the end of the formal project. This list does not include the many meetings at which people from only one side were present, and does not include numerous meetings held by individual members of the Working Groups while they were traveling in the other country.

The Center for Foreign Policy Development

The Center for Foreign Policy Development is a non-profit organization established in January 1981 to engage in research on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and on related nuclear weapons issues. The Center is affiliated with Brown University, one of the leading private (that is, not governmentally-supported) universities in the United States. The Center's mandate is to bring together scholars, practitioners and the public in a search for policy choices that can lead to consensus on the best ways to reduce the risk of nuclear war while defending basic American values and interests.

The Center engages in a variety of research projects on U.S.-Soviet relations and nuclear issues. In addition, it publishes research reports, briefing papers and a newsletter, and sponsors conferences, lectures and courses. The Director of the Center is Mark Garrison; its Research Director is Richard Smoke; its Associate Director is Alan Sherr. The professional staff of the Center includes ten full-time researchers, plus an additional half-dozen who conduct research at the Center on a part-time basis, and an equal number of junior research assistants. This does not count administrative and support staff. In addition, the Center often secures the participation in its projects of senior specialists from other organizations.

Major projects of the Center prior to the Mutual Security Project included these:

1983-85: *Voter Options on Nuclear Arms Policy.* This joint project with the Public Agenda Foundation of New York City researched the spectrum of American perceptions and opinion, primarily regarding nuclear weapons issues, and developed four basic options reflecting that spectrum.

1985-88: *The Public, the Soviets and Nuclear Arms.* Also conducted jointly with the Public Agenda Foundation, this project developed basic options for U.S. policy toward the USSR. The project was overseen by a nonpartisan National Council of

one hundred leading Americans. Using research on public values as the starting point, researchers tested and refined options through discussions with experts, community leaders, and representative groups drawn from the public. The final options were then presented in campaigns in selected cities using specially prepared video and print materials, and communicated to political leaders through a series of briefings. An article entitled "America's 'New Thinking'," published in the Fall 1988 issue of *Foreign Affairs* presents some of the results of this project; and a book is forthcoming.

Current projects of the Center for Foreign Policy Development include these:

- The Center is examining ways to conduct further research on *East-West mutual security*. One project being launched is described by P. Terrence Hopmann in this volume.
- A project on *Soviet Foreign Economic Policy and International Security* is exploring relationships between U.S. security interests and Soviet economic policy. Joint commercial ventures have been chosen as a case study to examine Soviet policy and U.S. options. The project includes five parts. First, researchers are publishing a series of briefing papers on topics such as financing of joint ventures in the USSR and Soviet laws governing such ventures. Second, books are being published to expand the base of theoretical and practical research on the relationship between perestroika and U.S. interests. Third, researchers are collaborating with scholars of the Moscow Institute of Economy and Management, under the Moscow City Council, on the practical prospects for joint ventures. Fourth, an extensive data base on joint ventures and related issues is being developed and will be made available to researchers in the U.S. and abroad. Fifth, a "mini-course" on Soviet political economy is being offered to U.S. policymakers and business people.
- A project entitled *The U.S. and the USSR: Choices for the 21st Century* is developing curricular materials for use at the secondary, college, and adult education levels. Preliminary research has shown that the "options" approach, developed in the projects described above with the Public Agenda Foundation, can be a powerful tool for educating people about the complexity of East-West relations and nuclear weapons issues.

The Institute for the USA and Canada

The Institute for the USA and Canada is a non-profit, non-governmental research institute, one of more than two hundred research institutes within the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The Institute is the Academy's institute for scholarly and scientific study of the society, politics, economy and other affairs of the United States and Canada. Increasingly often in the West, as well as in the Soviet Union, the Institute is referred to as ISKAN, which are the initials of its formal name in Russian.

The Institute for the USA and Canada was founded in 1968. Its Director is Academician Georgiy A. Arbatov. "Academician" is the highest scholarly and scientific rank possible in the USSR. Academician Arbatov is also a People's Deputy in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Deputy Directors of the Institute are Andrei Kokoshin, Viktor Kremenyuk, Sergei Plekhanov, and Anatoliy Porokhovsky.

The Institute conducts social science research on contemporary and historical politics of the United States, its social structure and economy, American law, and American domestic affairs. It makes a particular study of the policies, both domestic and foreign, of the U.S. government, with a special focus on American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. The Institute's research staff are sometimes called "Americanologists," just as Western specialists on the Soviet Union are called "Sovietologists."

The Institute also draws upon its research to prepare analyses, upon request, of American foreign policy and U.S.-Soviet relations for departments of the Soviet government, for organs of the Party, and for other public bodies. Numerous research projects are under way at all times. The Institute publishes its own monthly magazine entitled "U.S.A.- Economy, Politics, Ideology," which is also translated into several foreign languages including English.

The Institute for the USA and Canada includes seventeen departments and a total professional staff of about 300 scholars. This does not include clerical and support staff. The main departments are as follows (each title except the last referring to the United States): Internal Political and Social Problems, General Economic Problems, Agriculture, Management, General Problems of Foreign Policy, Regional Problems of Foreign Policy, European Problems, Military-Political Problems; and Canada.

The Institute maintains numerous contacts with scholars and foreign policy specialists throughout the United States and Canada; and also with other specialists around the world who study the United States or Soviet-American relations. The Institute has always sought ways to improve understanding and communications between the United States and the Soviet Union.