Ekaterina S. Mitrofanova

BECOMING AN ADULT IN FRANCE, ESTONIA AND RUSSIA

Ekaterina S. Mitrofanova[2]

BECOMING AN ADULT IN FRANCE, ESTONIA AND RUSSIA[2]

The aim of this study is to compare the sociodemographic events marking the transition to adulthood in France, Estonia and Russia: first leaving parents, completion of education, first partnership, first marriage and first childbirth. We used the first waves of the Generations and Gender Survey for these three countries and an advanced method – Sequence Analysis.

According to the Second Demographic Transition Theory, we expected a convergence in the sequencing, timing and tempo of the occurrence of target events. The results showed the slow convergence of sequences, but not of timing and tempo.

Estonia and Russia are still close in the timing of the occurrence of events, but in tempo Estonia and France are more alike. The ages at which people start families in Estonia and Russia have decreased in younger generations in comparison with older ones, despite our expectation that they would increase. For the youngest generation (1970s), the time between leaving parents and becoming a parent is 5-7 years in France, 4-6 years in Estonia and 2-3 years in Russia. The sociodemographic behaviour of Estonians clearly positions them between Europe and Russia.

Thus, the comparison of France, Estonia and Russia only partially confirms the Second Demographic Transition Theory.

JEL Classification: J12, J13, N3, P46

Keywords: sequence analysis, transition to adulthood, life course, France, Estonia, Russia.

[2] National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute of demography. E-mail: emitrofanova@hse.ru

Introduction

There are many theories on the demographic development the countries. Some theories (for example, the Second Demographic Transition Theory) postulate that, with demographic modernisation, demographic behaviours of people from different regions of the world will converge. For example, people will experience the transition to adulthood in an increasingly similar fashion: it will become "late, protracted and complex" (Billari & Liefbroer 2010). Other scientists believe that different countries will never converge in their demographic behaviours, and the transition to adulthood will always have a specific of a region.

We believe that most countries are experiencing demographic modernisation, whose main result would be a de-standardisation of people's life courses (Bertaux & Kohli 1984; Mayer & Müller 1986). The goal of a secular, non-authoritarian society is to let people realise their intentions (including in the demographic sphere), which will lead to a diversity of biographies.

Nevertheless, there are some very important factors that will shape people's life courses and the transition to adulthood in similar ways across countries. Humanity started to live longer, so we do not have this pressure to live life as quickly and efficiently as possible. Now we have the luxury to postpone important events and even to decline them altogether (e.g. living child-free). Modern jobs require more skills, so we have to study longer and postpone entering the job market. Urbanisation, which parallels demographic modernisation, gives us anonymity, contraception and greater access to education and jobs, all of which lead to the postponement of and even the decline in childbearing. Finally, the main achievement of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) is the separation of matrimonial, sexual and reproductive behaviours; this separation leads to the appearance of partnerships and the postponement of marriages and childbearing.

In total, these factors will delay the transition to adulthood and make it more protracted (as Billari et al. argue); the ultimate question is how the transition to adulthood will look when demographic modernisation ends. The main questions today concern what is going on in these countries right now and how different these countries are from one another today.

We took three countries from one region, Europe, but with different histories of demographic changes, and tested several hypotheses considering the main patterns in the transition to adulthood: sequencing, timing and tempo of the occurrence of events marking the transition. We wanted to test whether the modernisation paths in these three countries are converging (as the Second Demographic Transition Theory predicts) or remain unique.

Theoretical background: transition to adulthood

The conceptualisation of a stage between childhood and adulthood appeared only in the 20th century. Human longevity started to increase intensively, and a new stage began to appear. The transition to adulthood (i.e. late adolescence, early adulthood, young adulthood or emerging adulthood) is the stage of the life course when individuals experience biological, emotional, cognitive and social maturation (Steinberg 2001; Grob 2001).

The first scientific discipline which started to consider life as a course and discovered a transition to adulthood as a new life stage was ***psychology***. Psychologists noticed that childhood today lasts longer than it did before, and that it is not so heterogeneous anymore. They offered a concept of a new life stage between childhood and adulthood. In 1904, Hal invented "adolescence" as a scientific term (Hall 1904). He assumed that the heterochronism of the physical and psychological maturation of young people might become a dilemma for society. Youngsters are in the middle between children and adults, but do not belong to either group; that is why we do not have a clear understanding of their position in the social structure, their roles and their aims. During the 20[th]century, many psychologists offered their own concepts explaining the mechanisms of maturation. Some of them proved that the development of a person depends on biological factors: the genetic programme of a body (Werner 1926; Fröbel & Jarvis 1899), the psychological makeup of a person (Jaensch 1925; Eysenck & Rachman 1967; Lorenz 1963), reactions to physical transformation during maturation (Offer 1984) or the unconscious of an individual (Freud 1936; Freud & Freud 2001). Some psychologists have thought that maturation is a purely psychological phenomenon. The fuel for the transition from childhood to adulthood is aspiration towards independence, individuality (Spranger 1925; Blos 1967) and self-realisation (Buhler 1971). Other psychologists considered the mind a "tabula rasa" (Petryszak 1981), and the development of individuality falls under the influence of society. The aim of a person during the transition to adulthood is to gain the role repertoire (Hofstätter 1959), to form the competencies in new spheres of life (Heitmeyer & Hurrelmann 1988) or to complete developmental-age tasks (Mead 1934; Lazarus 1966; Havighurst 1972).

Some other psychologists were trying to combine several types of factors. Piaget thought the biological ability to theorise, which appears around age 12-15, let people shape the image of their future lives and understand what they want to achieve (Ginsburg & Opper 1969). Gesell suggested that genetics define the tempo, i.e. the sequence and timing of maturation's components, but society lets a person unlock his or her potential (Gesell, Ilg & Ames 1956). Lewin thought that the level of stress and aggression during maturation could be explained by the difference in requirements for a

child and an adult in society: the greater the difference, the greater the stress (Lewin 1935). The successfulness of the formation of identity through the experience of age crises determines how well a person can be socialised (Erikson 1956). A very influential Life Span Development theory (Baltes, Reese & Nesselroade 1998; Smelser & Baltes 2001, pp.8844–8848; Baltes, Staudinger & Lindenberger 2002) postulates that the development of a person continues throughout the life course and is influenced by many cultural, societal and individual factors.

Arnett divided the transition to adulthood into two parts: "emerging adulthood" (18-30 years) and "young adulthood" (30-50 years) (Arnett 2000, 2003, 2007; Tanner & Arnett 2009; Arnett 2012). He conducted surveys which showed that people did not consider certain events in life as markers of the transition. They paid more attention to their own perception themselves as adults. Arnett's ideas are actively discussed by demographers (Liefbroer & Toulemont 2010). We need stronger criteria than just a sense of self as an adult, however. Moreover, events and self-perception are tied together: a person cannot achieve full financial or physical independence without getting a job. Without important events (e.g. a relationship, education, or a job) it is very hard to develop as an individual, to gain a social status and experience. We admit the importance of the psychological feeling of being an adult, but the role of life course events is still very important for society and the person.

We listed several psychological theories to show how complex and ambiguous the phenomenon of transition to adulthood is. Even the science which first started to study maturation cannot fully describe and explain the mechanisms of this process. We can summarise that a lot of psychological, biographical and environmental aspects influence our development; that transition to adulthood is one of the most rapid and important changes in the human life, psyche and body; that it has its own structure and the parts of maturation (physical, psychological, social) can be heterochronous; and that no one knows for certain the criteria or age of the start and end of the transition to adulthood. This phenomenon is still understudied.

Sociologists and demographers started to study the transition to adulthood in the second half of the 20th century. After the youth movements and rebellions in 1968, *sociologists* realised the power of this new social and age group. To understand youngsters better, sociologists needed to investigate this life stage's main process– the achievement of adult social roles and statuses. These ideas were actively explored by Sociology of Life Course Approach. The Life Course Approach also came from psychology and only in 1960s started to be adopted by sociologists and demographers. Its main idea is that human development extends across the whole life course (Elder Jr. 1975; Elder Jr. & Giele 1998). There are several factors shaping the life courses of people:

individual development (human agency), history (location in time), culture (location in place), social relations (linked lives) and timing (age, period and cohort intersection). The development of the life course runs parallel with demographic modernisation: the life courses of people are becoming more diverse, de-institutionalised, de-standardised and individualised (Bertaux & Kohli 1984; Mayer & Müller 1986). There are still some norms and cultural age deadlines in societies that continue to influence people's behaviour (Hagestad & Neugarten 1985), but these norms are becoming internalised, subjective and more flexible (Billari & Liefbroer 2010). Institutional arrangements also influence the behaviour of people, particularly national cultural features and the welfare state (Buchmann 1989; Esping-Andersen 2007). The Life Course concept encompasses the term "transition to adulthood", the topic of interest. This term reflects very well the nature of the process: adolescence is not some fact or event − it is a set of events which has very flexible requirements for the presence of the events, their order, tempo and age of occurrence. There is no specific age range for the transition to adulthood. Researchers operationalise this construct on the basis of the culture and specific social group which they investigate.

Demographers started to study the transition to adulthood because of their own motives: to make conclusions about changes in demographic behaviour, we need to wait until all the members of a cohort leave the age under the risk of event occurrence. The first life-course events usually occur during the first third of life, so we may make some comparisons of real behaviour even when new generations have not reached midlife.

There is greater consensus among demographers on what is included in the transition to adulthood because the list of life-course events is much shorter than the list of psychological phenomena. Nowadays, a lot of researchers agree that the following list of sociodemographic events mark the transition to adulthood: first leaving the parental home, completing education, entering the work force, first cohabitation (or partnership), first marriage and the birth of the first child (Billari & Liefbroer 2010; Billari et al. 2005; Buchmann 1989; Liefbroer 1999).

The theory of the Second Demographic Transition presented the idea that if economic success of some countries can be repeated by other countries, the same can be done with demographic modernisation (van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1995). There are several indicators of demographic modernisation which influence the transition to adulthood; for one, the postponement of marriages and childbearing lead to the postponement of the transition to adulthood (Billari & Liefbroer 2010; Puur et al. 2012). People choose cohabitations instead of marriages and non-marital childbearing instead of marital, so we need to deal with new forms of old behaviours. The patterns of the transition to adulthood change in both quantitative (tempo and timing) and qualitative

(sequencing) vectors. Billari and Liefbroer supposed that we are moving from the old pattern of the transition to adulthood ("***early, contracted and simple***") towards the new one ("***late, protracted and complex***") (Billari & Liefbroer 2010). This is how they described a new pattern: "a relatively early exit from the parental home, followed by time spent living without a partner, entry into a non-marital union, the birth of a first child (at a relatively "late" age) and marriage occurring either late (just before or after entry into parenthood) or not at all". They also assumed a convergence of the patterns of becoming an adult in different countries, but could not find compelling evidence of this for European countries.

The divergence of the transition to adulthood and other aspects of demographic behaviour can be explained by the following: the behaviour of people in different countries depends on the institutional arrangements and cultural traditions, and, because of that, the convergence of behaviours will never be achieved. In 1965, Hajnal proposed the concept now known as the Hajnal line, which runs from Trieste to St. Petersburg (Hajnal 1965). He analysed the matrimonial behaviour and features of family formation in the European countries east and west of his line, and concluded that there are a lot of historical factors which shaped demographic behaviours differently in Western and Eastern Europe. In the 19th century, Western Europe changed matrimonial and reproductive patterns from early and universal to late and selective: previously everyone had to marry and have children, and in response to Malthus' ideas (Petersen 1979) people started to postpone, even eschew altogether, marriage and childbearing. In Eastern Europe, early and universal marriages and childbearing lasted much longer. In Russia, we can still characterise these behaviours as the earliest and the most widespread among European countries. Based on this division, France belongs to Western Europe, most of Russia belongs to Eastern Europe, and Estonia is divided into two halves, one to the right and the other to the left of the Hajnal line.

There are some more theories which seek to identify regional patterns of demographic behaviour. Buchmann argues that there are different rules and norms in different societies which regulate the timing of the occurrence of life-course events. In some countries, individualism has a stronger influence, whereas in others, institutions are more important in shaping biographical strategies (Buchmann 1989). Many system theories from all the aforementioned disciplines posit that all levels matter: macro (state), meso (family and community) and micro (individual) (Bronfenbrenner 2009; Hendry & Kloep 2012, pp.28–31; Carr 2009, pp.134–135). We agree that while countries have political, cultural, religious, institutional and other differences, we can expect that, even if they start to move in one direction, we still will notice many qualitative or quantitative differences. Up to this point, young people around the globe are becoming closer to each other in their views and aspirations because of the Internet, but national borders and norms still cause many

differences. Let us look closer at the institutional arrangements in Europe and their influence of the transition to adulthood.

Reher divided Europe into north and south. The north tends to exhibit relatively weak family ties and early ages of leaving the parental home. The south shows stronger family ties and later ages of leaving the parental home (Reher 1998).

Cavalli and Galland distinguished three broad geographical categories for the transition to adulthood in Europe (Cavalli & Galland 1993): (1) the Mediterranean: a postponement of leaving parents, which coincides with marriage; (2) Northern Europe and France: leaving parents followed by living alone, with partnerships outstripping marriages; (3) the UK: leaving the parental house early because of study and work and postponement of family formation.

Ejrnas and Boje compared family policies of European states and divided countries into five clusters (Ejrnas & Boje 2008): (1) Germany, Austria and Luxembourg: long and well-paid maternity leave, plus part-time work; (2) the UK and the Netherlands: short and poorly-paid maternity leave, part-time work and few kindergartens; (3) Denmark, Sweden, France and Belgium: well-paid maternity leave, plenty of kindergartens; (4) South Europe, Latvia and Estonia: poorly-paid maternity leave and few working mothers and available kindergartens; (5) Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Finland: a long maternity leave (up to 3 years) and a small number of working mothers and available kindergartens (except in Finland). Based on this clusterisation, we can see that people from some countries need to choose between work and childbearing because they cannot successfully combine both in the existing institutional arrangements. People who cannot work for several years and who do not get enough support from an employer or government will depend more on family. It can lead to a postponement of leaving a parental house or a greater dependence on a partner, which can lead to earlier marriages or partnerships.

Esping-Andersen identifies several types of welfare regimes, each of which has its own institutional arrangements determining the relationships among the state, businesses, families and individuals (Esping-Andersen 1990, 2007). The liberal welfare regime (e.g. the UK, the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, etc.) provides limited social benefits, so people construct their lives more independently and face more risks, which is why they may postpone some events marking adulthood. Conservative welfare regimes (e.g. Austria, Germany, France, etc.) provide benefits to families or some types of workers which give people more predictability and protection in some sphere of lives and can motivate them to transition to adulthood at relatively young ages. Social-democratic welfare regimes (e.g. Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands) provide benefits to a wide range of people; this decreases the level of uncertainty and motivates people to gain events

marking adulthood at early ages. The last two regimes have less flexibility: the scripts of life depend a lot on institutions and cannot be modernised as fast as in liberal regimes. There is also a Mediterranean welfare regime (e.g. Italy, Greece and Spain) which is close to conservative regimes, but has tighter family ties and less modernised demographic behaviour. Interestingly, Esping-Andersen agrees that, under certain circumstances, welfare regimes in Europe could converge to the liberal one and become "pan-national" (Esping-Andersen 2002, pp.17–19); this would provide consistent "life-course packages" and would lead to one common pattern of becoming an adult.

All the listed demographic theories somehow distinguish the patterns of the transition to adulthood. These theories show how different policy and real demographic behaviour can be depending on the country. Unfortunately, there are only a few theories considering all three countries; we are investigating the Second Demographic Transition Theory and the Hajnal line concept. Other theories are still very useful to us because they help us understand the trends and specific patterns in the countries much better.

We agree that some patterns (e.g. universal and early marriage, early ages of transitions and a small variety of scenarios) could be called *traditional* or old, whereas others (e.g. new forms of cohabitation and childbearing, postponement of transitions, large variety of scenarios) could be called *modern* or new. As studies have shown, the major Anglophone and Western European countries (i.e. the UK, the US, Australia, France, Germany, etc.) demonstrate rapid movement towards new patterns of the transition to adulthood, whereas southern and post-Soviet European countries demonstrate a very slow transition to new patterns. However, all the countries demonstrate modernisation, albeit at their own speed and under other conditions.

Our position that each country has its own path of development, but some trends are so strong and unavoidable that the convergence is inevitable. Of course, the speeds of change and specific patterns will be different, but modernisation is a common process: life expectancy is increasing, life stages are lasting longer, life-changing events are being postponed, the occurrence of events is becoming less predictable, the sequences are becoming more diverse, the number of tracks and options is growing and new forms of families and parenting are appearing. We cannot deny that all modern countries experience the listed changes. What is different is only the niceties. Thus, in our research, we expect to see similar trends of changes in transition to adulthood in France, Estonia and Russia, but we also expect to see delays in modernisation in Estonia and Russia and some country-specific qualities.

Why these three countries?

While France, Estonia and Russia share a continent and major developments such as industrialisation and the First and Second World Wars, they are still very different: they have different traditions, institutions and sociodemographic behaviours in their respective populations.

France stands among the countries which have been pioneers in many spheres: industrialisation, urbanisation, institutionalisation and modernisation of education, contraception, youth movements, etc. France was one of the first countries to experience demographic modernisation (Blum et al. 2009; Blum, Sebille & Zakharov 2009).

Estonia is a Baltic country neighbouring Russia. Estonia was a European country until the Second World War, after which it became a part of the USSR[3]. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union almost 30 years ago, Estonian demographic behaviour started to exhibit more European patterns (Nugin, Kannike & Raudsepp 2016).

Some evidence from the last several decades shows that Russians are also changing their demographic behaviour more in accordance with the European experience (Blum, Sebille & Zakharov 2009; Zakharov & Ivanova 1996; Mitrofanova & Artamonova 2016; Mitrofanova 2016). However, we still do not know whether this is but an effect of the fall of the iron curtain or means that Russians and Europeans are really not as different as we expected.

These three countries are similar enough to have common patterns in the transition to adulthood, but at the same time, they exhibit some unexpected uniqueness in their development and history. France is a typical European country: a pioneer of social, economic and demographic modernisation. Estonia was part of the USSR for 50 years and has a large Russian-speaking population. Russia is a slowly modernising (in demographic terms) country in comparison with its European neighbours.

We expect that not all of the patterns of transition to adulthood (sequencing, timing and tempo) will show the same dynamics in these three countries. We expect the most modern demographic behaviour from the French ("late, protracted and complex"). We think that modern generations of Estonians will tend to behave more European rather than Soviet or Russian, but will

---

[3] We do not want to contradistinguish Europe and the USSR, but in terms of demographic modernisation they developed very differently: modern behaviour was suppressed by Soviet policy (e.g. tax on childlessness, ban on abortion, law on parasitism, unavailability of contraception, etc.), while Europeans fought for their demographic rights (e.g. protests in 1968) and began enjoying freedoms in the demographic sphere earlier than Soviet people.

be somewhere in the middle between France and Russia. We expect Russia will exhibit the most traditional patterns of socioeconomic behaviour ("early, contracted and simple") in comparison with the two other countries.

Operationalisation of the transition to adulthood

We define a transition to adulthood as a complex process which consists of changes in biological, emotional, cognitive and social components of an individual. As social scientists, we will omit the first three aspects and will focus on the social (i.e. sociodemographic) aspect of the transition to adulthood. In this case, we understand a transition to adulthood as a sequence of status transitions (or life-course events), which open the biography of an individual in different spheres of life: professional career, family building, independent living, etc.

We decided to divide the life-course events marking transition to adulthood into two groups: demographic events and socioeconomic events. Altogether, we will call them sociodemographic events. This separation of events is important for our study, because, on the one hand, it will allow us to compare socioeconomic and demographic events (their timing and tempo), and, on the other hand, we will be able to discover which goes first and which goes last (sequencing).

Demographic events comprise first partnership, first marriage and birth of the first child. We define first partnership as an unregistered union and the first marriage as a registered union. The surveys we used define partnership as a union based on shared-space living arrangements lasting at least three months.

Socioeconomic events comprise completion of education, first job and separation from parents. By "first job", the surveys we used imply a work arrangement lasting at least six months. By "separation from parents" (or "leaving the parental home"), the surveys imply the first time when a respondent left his or her parents for at least three months.

We can also call all the events "starting events", though we know that finishing education is not a starting event in itself. However, in the chain of events marking the transition to adulthood, finishing education plays a starting role, because it allows the start of a career – the means to earn a consistent and livable income and become financially independent. It is very hard to start a career without finishing at least some level of education. Moreover, we will explain in the Data section why we study only the events occurring before age 35, but since almost all the generations in our survey passed the age of 35, we can use the information about their education as a finished event, which will not change over time.

Hypotheses

In this paper, we want to test whether the changes in sociodemographic behaviours in France, Estonia and Russia are occurring according to the SDT (i.e. there is a convergence in behaviours) or are following less predictable patterns as other scientists expect (Buchmann, Reher and Esping-Andersen, *inter alia*).

We formulate the following hypotheses:

H1. The transition to adulthood differs among countries.

H1.1. France will have more modern sociodemographic behaviour than other countries (in terms of the SDT).

H1.2. Russia will have more traditional sociodemographic behaviour than other countries (in terms of the SDT).

H1.3. Estonia will be between France and Russia.

H2. The transition to adulthood differs among generations.

H2.1. The oldest generations in France will strongly differ from the generations in Estonia and Russia.

H2.2. The oldest generations in Estonia and Russia will behave very similarly due to their common status as Soviet republics.

H2.3. The younger generations in Estonia will be more similar to those of France than to those of Russia because of the dissolution of the USSR and the Estonians' pivot to the European behavioural model.

H2.4. The changes across generations will show that all three countries are experiencing the similar path of modernisation, but at different speeds and with some country-specific qualities.

H3. The transition to adulthood differs between sexes.

H3.1. Men in all three countries will show more modernised behaviour than women; men will pay more attention to their careers, and women will pay more attention to demographic events.

H3.2. The difference between men and women will be starker in Russia and less visible in France and Estonia.

Data and analytical approach

All the classic indicators of demographic behaviour have a big problem: censoring of events. The measures of central tendency for young people would be shifted to the younger ages because they would represent only people who already experienced an event, so people who postponed an event, would be seen by such measures only after some unknown count of years.

The set of methods which deals well with censoring is event history – or survival – analysis. Usually, researchers create Cox regressions or Kaplan-Meier survivor functions for each event and compare median ages or quartiles of survivor functions. The main disadvantage of such methods is that we can analyse one or, at most, two events in one model. Moreover, if we include two events in a model, we should remember that both of them need to happen before the interview (Billari, 2001b).

The transition to the study of event chains makes it possible to achieve a new level of understanding of the structure of individuals' lives. An advanced method known as Sequence Analysis (SA) helps demographers and sociologists to achieve this aim (Abbott and Tsay, 2000; Aisenbrey and Fasang, 2007, 2010; Billari, 2001a; Billari and Piccarreta, 2005). SA allows researchers to study the timing (i.e. the age at which events are experienced), the sequencing (i.e. order) and the quantum of events (i.e. observed number of events) (Billari et al., 2006).

We used several descriptive techniques of SA to analyse the biographies of French, Estonians and Russians: chronograms, the durations of statuses and the frequencies of subsequences on tables.

We presume that the interval between ages 15 and 35 is very appropriate for studying the transition to adulthood. The age of 15 is the standard age of the start of reproductive behaviour. The age of 35 was chosen as the "upper boundary" of the transition to adulthood because our investigations for Russia (Mitrofanova, 2016; Mitrofanova and Artamonova, 2016) showed that by the age of 35, most Russians have almost all the first events. We also suppose that Europeans tend to have at least socioeconomic events by this age (Ferrari & Pailhé 2016; Rahnu, Puur & Sakkeus 2016; Blum, Sebille & Zakharov 2009; Blum et al. 2009). We did not want to widen the interval more because, for the Soviet generations, the starting events after age 35 seems to be too marginal.

We used harmonised datasets of the first waves of the French, Estonian and Russian "Generations and Gender Surveys" (GGS) (Perelli-Harris et al. 2009). GGS was conducted in France in 2005, in Estonia in 2004 and 2005 and in Russia in 2004. This is not the first study based on this dataset and made for these countries(Blum et al. 2009; Blum, Sebille & Zakharov 2009;

Rahnu, Puur & Sakkeus 2016), but we will develop it by using sequence analysis, examining wider generational rows and bringing these three countries together. Moreover, we are going to develop this study in further works by focusing more on Estonia and adding new information from other waves in France and Russia.

The number of respondents in the present survey is 8,493 people in the French GGS, 6,797 in the Estonian GGS and 9,433 in the Russian GGS. There is a sex imbalance in all three surveys: the share of women is higher than the share of men. The shares of surveyed women are 63.9% in France, 55.7% in Estonia and 63.1% in Russia. We divided the respondents of 1930-1979 years of birth into five ten-year generations. The gender and generational proportions are represented in Figure 1.

Fig. 1. The shares of respondents by country, sex and generation.

Source: The harmonised datasets of the first waves of the French, Estonian and Russian GGS.

Analysis

Figure 2 demonstrates the shares of people who have first sociodemographic events. Both *socioeconomic* events are very common. All the respondents from all three countries have completed *education* at least at some level. There are more differences in *leaving parents*. Almost every French respondent separated from parents: the shares are close to 100%.

Estonians do not so actively leave parents (only 70-80%), and the dynamic varies a lot depending on the generation and sex. Men and women born in the 1930s and 1940s differed a lot (about 80% of men left home, but only 60-70% of women did), other generations are leaving parents in a more uniform way. More than 80% of respondents born in the 1950s and 1960s separated from their parents, whereas the share among the youngest generation is 66% for men and 78% for women.

Among Russians, almost 100% of the respondents from soviet generations left their parental home, whereas modern generations exhibit a lower share – about 90%.

There is much greater variation in starting **demographic** behaviour. The share of French people who have at least one *partnership* has risen from older to youngest generations, from 22% to 74% for men and from 19% to 79% for women. The share for Estonians has also risen, but to a lesser degree: from 33% to 64% for men and from 25% to 72% for women. The intergenerational change among Russians is the smallest: from 27% to 47% for men and from 25% to 47% for women.

The trend in *marriages* is opposite that of partnerships: the share of people having at least one marriage declines from older generations to the youngest. The decline is from 87% to 35% for men and from 83% to 43% for women in France, from 93% to 33% for men and from 91% to 45% for women in Estonia and from 92% to 62% for men and from 85% to 72% for women in Russia. French and Estonian respondents started from slightly different shares, but the behaviour of the youngest generations is almost the same. The youngest Russian generation differs much more from those of the two other countries than from the older Russian generations.

Regarding *childbearing*, the common trend in all three countries is also a decline. Of course, we need to remember that the youngest respondents are only 25, and they have a lot of time to realise their reproductive and matrimonial intentions, so we cannot say that young people refuse to get married and to have children, because it may be just a postponing of demographic events. However, the shares declined to the following degrees, respectively, for men and women: for French people from 86% to 50% and from 87% to 63%, for Estonians from 89% to 54% and from 91% to 72% and for Russians from 90% to 61% and from 92% to 82%. The shares for men do not differ dramatically, but the shares for women show that childbearing occurs earlier in Russia than in two other countries, and childbearing in Estonia occurs earlier than in France.

Fig. 2. The shares of respondents who have starting events by country, sex and generation.

Source: The harmonised datasets of the first waves of the French, Estonian and Russian GGS.

The median ages of all the events for men and women in each country are provided in Appendix 1. The graphs for France show similar trends for men and women: the young generations are postponing marriages and childbearing beyond age 25, but starting partnerships at earlier ages, i.e., in their early 20s; the age of leaving the parental home stabilised for all the generations at the age of 20; the age of completing education increased from ages 14 and 15 to the age of 20. The difference between French men and women is in the timing of demographic events: for all generations, men are starting all the demographic events 2-3 years later than women. The timing of the occurrence of socioeconomic events is almost the same for both sexes across generations.

In Estonia, the picture is different. We observe a decrease in almost all the median ages of demographic events across generations. If the oldest men started partnerships at the age of 24 and marriages a year later, and had their first children at the age of 26, the youngest men start following the same path two years earlier. The same goes for women: the oldest generations started partnerships and marriages at around 23 and had their first children one year later, whereas youngsters start partnerships at the age 20, start marriages at around 21 and bear children at 22. The ages of socioeconomic events stabilised at around age 18 for leaving parents and age 19 for completing education. We do not observe strong differences in socioeconomic behaviours between sexes, but the difference in demographic behaviour exists: men are obtaining all these events about two years later than women.

In Russia, the situation is similar to that in Estonia: we observe a fall in median ages. The oldest men started partnerships and marriages at around age 24 and had their first child at 26, while the youngest men start unions at 22 and have their first child one year later. It is the same for

women: the oldest generation started unions at 22 and began childbearing at 23, while the youngsters had these events two years earlier. The age of leaving the parental home is around 20 for men and 19 for women. The age of completing education decreased from 22 to 19 for men and from 21 to 19 for women. The sex disparity is observed for almost all the events: men are obtaining demographic events about two years later than women and are leaving the parental home one year later.

Median ages showed that the generation of the 1960s and 1970s in Russia and Estonia did not show any modernised behaviour; in fact, they behaved more traditionally. We can explain it this way: we compared the youngsters with the generations of the 1930s, who had to postpone their sociodemographic events because of the Second World War, so their events were forcibly delayed and were not the results of personal decisions. The very young ages of the youngest generations were also the results of external circumstances: the period of *glasnost* (1986-1991) brought some freedom to people's personal and sexual lives, but did not improve access to contraceptives. Thus, young people started to have sexual intercourse at younger ages and more actively, thus begetting a rise in early childbirths. Very often, couples decided to save a pregnancy and get married (because partnerships were then considered inappropriate). That is why the generations of the 1960s and 1970s could be called transitional, but not modern: their attitudes to life-course events started to change, but they did not have the opportunities to set their timetables of events.

To compare the behaviour of the French, Estonians and Russians, we also used Sequence Analysis, which allows us to depict the trajectories of respondents. In Table 1, we present how events were combined into statuses and which colour palette was used for which group of statuses. Grey was used for censored events (when a respondent is too young to have enough time to obtain all the events which are desired).

Tab. 1. The colour codes for statuses

Socioeconomic events	Demographic events					
	No children (C0)			1st child (C1)		
	Single (S)	1st partner (P)	1st marriage (M)	Single (S)	1st partner (P)	1st marriage (M)
No events (N)	SC0N	PC0N	MC0N	SC1N	PC1N	MC1N
Completing education (E)	SC0E	PC0E	MC0E	SC1E	PC1E	MC1E
Leaving parental home (L)	SC0L	PC0L	MC0L	SC1L	PC1L	MC1L
Education→Leaving (EL)	SC0EL	PC0EL	MC0EL	SC1EL	PC1EL	MC1EL
Leaving→Education (LE)	SC0LE	PC0LE	MC0LE	SC1LE	PC1LE	MC1LE
Education and Leaving simultaneously (E&L)	SC0E&L	PC0E&L	MC0E&L	SC1E&L	PC1E&L	MC1E&L
Censored events						

Figure 3 shows the chronograms for men and women in France, Estonia and Russia. Chronograms show the shares of people (Y-axis) with certain statuses at each point in time (X-axis). We used the ages of our respondents as the time point, so the X-axis represents the period of life from age 15 to age 35. The dates collected are accurate to the month, so the transitions from year to year in the chronograms are very smooth.

For our analysis, we used only events which commence demographic and socioeconomic trajectories. For example, for the first partnership or marriage we only used the dates when unions started and did not use the dates of the dissolution of unions. Thus, the chronograms show the fact of each trajectory's inception, but not the development of each trajectory.

At first glance, Figure 3 shows the colours changing gradually from France to Russia. France has a lot of pink and red colours and less dark green; Estonia has less pink and red and more dark green; Russia has almost no vivid pink and red, but a lot of dark green. Looking back at the colour palette, we see that pink and red represent the partnerships without and with children respectively; the prevailing shade of dark green in Figure 3 means that people have marriage, a child and socioeconomic events, the first of which was leaving parents.

In the chronograms for France, many of the colours are distributed evenly. The green palette takes more space, but not as much as for the other countries. This means that, in France, the behaviour of people is more diverse: they can live in partnerships or in marriages with or without children. In Estonia and Russia, however, people behave more similarly by having, nearly

exclusively, a marriage and at least one child. Partnerships are extremely rare in Russia, even when respondents are young.


Fig. 3. Chronograms by country and sex.

Source: The harmonised datasets of the first waves of the French, Estonian and Russian GGS.

The exact shares of each status at ages 15, 25 and 35 are represented in Appendix 2. We deleted the rows where the shares in all cells were less than 1%. We also prepared Table 2, which is

based on the full table of statuses. This table represents the shares of different events (derived from statuses) at ages 15, 25 and 35.

Demographic behaviour at **age 15** is quite similar across all three countries: almost all the respondents are single and do not have any children. *Socioeconomic* behaviour varies more. A quarter of the French respondents already finished their education; 6% of men and 5% of women separated from their parents. Among Estonians, these shares are much lower: only 6% of men and 7% of women finished education, and 3% of people left their parents. Among Russians, the share of people finishing education before age 15 is less than 1%, but the shares of people who already left their parents are close to the French results: 5% of men and 6% of women.

Age 25 is in a period when young people are actively trying new social roles, looking for a place in society and in the labour market and experimenting in personal life and preparing to start families. The comparison of *demographic* behaviour gives us very interesting, but expected results. The share of *single* people is at least 10% higher for men than for women in every country; and among the countries the highest shares are in France (42% for men and 27% for women), the lowest are in Russia (34% for men and 22.5% for women). If a person registered as single, it does not mean he or she has never had a love relationship – it just means that they never lived together for at least three months and have not got married.

The shares of people who have experienced *cohabitation* differs dramatically among countries: about 22% of French respondents had already had at least one partner by age 25; the same indicator for Estonians is about 15%; for Russians, it is 8%. The situation for *marriages* is opposite: the lowest share is in France, the highest in Russia. The interesting thing is that marriages differ between sexes: there are 15% more women in marriages than men for each country. *Childbearing* looks even more uneven between men and women because the sex difference is already 20% in each country. We can assume that even in France women tend to start a family and give birth to a child at the healthiest reproductive ages. Men seem not to feel such pressure, so they can and do postpone demographic events.

The shares of people who do not have any experience in the *socioeconomic* sphere has fallen below 5%, but the preferences for the first event vary, albeit not greatly: 67% of French people prefer to finish education first, with only 30% leaving parents before completing education; Estonians have the same priorities (57% finishing education first, 36% leaving parents first); Russian men also prefer to finish education first (49% versus 44% of those who left parents first). Only Russian women tend to leave parents first (54% versus 40% of those who finished education first). As Russian women are starting families very early (in comparison with the two other

countries), they may be traditional in other aspects: they may, for instance, leave their parental home when they get married and begin life in the husband's family.

Age 35 is different for different cultures: by this age, most people already have all the starting events, in some countries this is a period when people are still experimenting and achieving some new social roles. Our data show that, in these three countries, almost everyone already separated from their parents and completed their education; more than 90% of people have either a partnership or marriage; 60-70% of respondents have at least one child.

The shares of men with ***demographic*** events are coming closer to what women have, but the difference between countries remains the same: 16% of men and 13% of women in France have at least one *partnership* by age 35; 9% of men and 8% of women in Estonia have the same experience; and only 5% of Russians said that they have lived in an unregistered union. In all the countries, the shares of cohabiting people declined from age 25 to 35, but the distance between countries is still very big: in France, there are twice as many people who have a partnership experience as in Estonia, and thrice more than in Russia.

Marriages are more evenly distributed among countries and sexes at age 35: 56% of men and 60% of women are in marriages in France; 63% of men and 68% of women are in marriages in Estonia; and 64% of men and 68% of women are in marriages in Russia. Estonians and Russians are very close to each other in this regard. France has smaller shares, but only by 8%, and it looks like a postponement, rather than a complete refusal, of marriages. The decline in the share of married women in Russia is explained by the growth of people with censored events.

Childbearing is very close to marriages in its dynamics and shares: 62% of men and 68% of women in France have at least one child by the age of 35; 65% of men and 72% of women in Estonia also have a childbearing experience; among Russians, these shares are 65% for men and 72% for women. Estonians and Russians are comparable again, whereas French respondents fall short by just 3-4%.

The behaviour of our respondents shows that socioeconomic events are the most vital for young people, who achieve these events most actively between ages 15 and 25. For most people, except Russian women, the first event is the completion of education; Russian women prefer to leave their parents first.

The set of demographic events is less important during this first 10-year period. Only women, especially in Russia, tend to start a family as early as possible (and it relates to leaving parents), whereas men are not so burdened by this question during the first half of the transition to

adulthood. That is why the second half of the transition to adulthood is more demographic, especially for men. When some economic stability is achieved, people more intensively get married and give birth to a child. This increase is easily discernible among French men: the share of fathers increased from 26% at age 25 to 62% at age 35.

Tab. 2. The shares of events achieved at ages 15, 25 and 35, by country and sex

Ages	Types of events	Events	France, %		Estonia, %		Russia, %	
			Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Age 15	Demographic events	Single	99.8	99.7	100.0	99.8	99.7	99.6
		1st partner	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.3
		1st marriage	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
		1st child	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
	Socio-economic events	No events	70.2	67.8	90.5	89.8	94.1	93.7
		Completing education was first	23.6	27.4	5.8	6.9	0.5	0.2
		Leaving parents was first	6.0	4.7	3.4	3.2	5.4	6.1
Age 25	Demographic events	Single	41.9	27.3	37.6	23.5	33.8	22.5
		1st partner	21.6	22.6	15.8	14.5	8.1	7.1
		1st marriage	36.5	50.1	46.5	61.8	57.2	69.4
		1st child	25.8	46.2	40.9	62.1	46.2	67.2
	Socio-economic events	No events	2.4	1.5	3.7	4.7	4.8	3.5
		Completing education was first	66.8	66.9	58.6	54.9	48.5	39.9
		Leaving parents was first	29.7	30.4	34.5	37.4	44.4	54.2
Age 35	Demographic events	Single	10.9	9.6	5.3	5.4	6.6	7.7
		1st partner	15.8	12.8	9.1	6.7	5.4	5.3
		1st marriage	55.8	59.4	62.8	67.4	63.9	67.3
		1st child	62.1	67.8	64.8	71.5	64.8	72.1
	Socio-economic events	No events	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.9	0.3	0.3
		Completing education was first	57.3	57.9	44.1	46.2	37.3	33.2
		Leaving parents was first	24.2	22.9	30.3	30.0	37.3	45.5

Figure 4 shows chronograms for each country, sex and generation. The white dashed line on the chronograms shows the ages at which people start to experience censoring: age 25 for Russians, 25-26 for Estonians and 26 for French people. We did not show the censored data (grey colour) on these chronograms, so it would be visible how many people among those older than 25 experienced different events.

The exact shares of each status at the ages of 15, 25 and 35 are represented in Appendix 3 (the rows with shares below 3% were deleted). The accumulated shares of events (as in Table 2) are in Appendix 4.

In Figure 4, we can see when all the behavioural shifts started. Let's start with **socioeconomic** behaviour.

The *lightest blue* indicates the status "***no events***". We can see a distinct trend in this colour among French people: at the age of 15, less than half of the oldest generations had this status, and the other half had some other events, namely the completion of education; among the modern French people, the share of "eventless" increased by more than 80%. Among Estonians, the growth of "eventless" people at age 15 started at a 75% share and reached a 94% share in the youngest generations. As a "competing" event, Estonians also mostly have the completion of education. For Russians, the share of people who have no events at age 15 was 93% for men and 91% for women and reached 94% and 95%, respectively, in the youngest generations. Thus, for French people, we can clearly see the postponement of events, mainly the finishing of education. For Estonians, the changes are not so dramatic, but the postponement is also vivid. For Russians, the situation is very different because people postponed events even in the oldest generations.

Among French people, the share of youngsters who ***finished their education*** before they left their parents decreased in comparison with older people: the drop was 13% for men and 30% for women. This is a very big loss, but we think it indicates a positive change: people started to study longer. Among Estonian men, we observe a 19% increase in this share; among women, we see a decrease by 13%. The phenomenon of different changes can be explained by different requirements of men and women in the labour market and society. Among Russians, we observe an increase for men by 15% and an increase for women by 5%.

All the respondents who ***left their parents*** before finishing education mostly did so before age 25. The share of French men who prefer leaving parents first hovered around 25-30% among generations born in 1930-1969; modern men leave parents more actively: by age 25, the share is already 37%. Only 15% of the oldest generation of French women preferred leaving parents first, whereas among the youngest women this number is three times higher. We can scarcely say that French women are becoming more traditional and leaving their parents to live with their husbands' families. More likely, French women are becoming more economically independent, and they may rent an apartment alone, with a friend or with a boyfriend.

For Estonian respondents, the results fluctuate considerably: the biggest share of people who preferred to leave parents first belongs to the 1940s generation of men (44% at age 25) and to the 1960s generation of women (47% at age 25). For men, the share declined after this point, and for women the share increased from the oldest generations. The dynamics for young Estonian men and women are opposite: men tend to finish education first whereas women tend to leave their parents first.

In Russia, the intergenerational tendencies differ from those of the other countries. In the oldest generations, the share of people who left parents before finishing education was 50% for both sexes. It is a very high share in comparison with France and Estonia; we believe it resulted from the political, social and economic environments of the USSR in the middle of last century. Phenomena composing these environments were the following: (1) continuous urbanisation stimulated young and active people's movement from rural parental homes to study or work in cities; (2) there were abundant opportunities to get a flat from the government; (3) there were several instruments of forced migration, such as military service, compulsory assignment to work after study and work mobilisation for "large-scale development projects" (e.g. the Baikal-Amur Mainline); (4) gender roles still were very traditional in much of society, so women tended to marry at young ages and move from the parental home to the husband's home. All these reasons can lead to a situation in which half of the generation separated from parents in early ages and before other events. Things started to change in the most modern generations: 36% of men born in the 1970s (in comparison with 50% from the oldest generation) left their parents before finishing education; 48% of modern women, in comparison with 53-58% from soviet generations, left their parents first. We think this decline among men may be the result of a declining share of men serving in the army. The whole decline for both sexes may be linked to the fact that it became much harder to obtain one's own flat – people can either buy or rent one, so they need financial recourses which may be unavailable at young ages. However, in comparison with other countries, Russian women separate from their parents very intensively. We can assume that this is because some patterns of traditional marital behaviour are still common among women.

Let's describe now the changes in **demographic** behaviour. The shares of *single people* (all shades of two *blue* palettes) are shrinking for the youngest people. This can be explained by the growth of partnerships (pink and red), because the legitimisation of partnerships permit cohabitation.

The shift from marriages to partnerships began in the generation born in the 1950s in France, in the generations born in the 1950s and 1960s in Estonia and in the generations born in the 1960s and 1970s in Russia. Again, we see a progression starting in France and moving to Estonia and then Russia.

As socioeconomic events, *partnerships* have their peak around age 25. Among the French, the growth in the share of cohabiting people at age 25 was from almost 3% for the oldest generation to 44% for men and 47% for women of the youngest generations, so the actual growth is more than 15 times! For Estonians, the trend is from 6% to 33% for young men and to 39% for young women.

For Russians, the change is from 4% to 16% for men and from 5% to 14% for women. The largest growth is in France, whereas the growth in Russia is very small.

The peak in *marriages* occurs around age 35. At age 25, the share of those who married among French men of the oldest generation was 51%; among those of the youngest generation, it was 11%. At age 35, the numbers are 83% in the oldest generation versus 49% in the 1960s generation[4]. Among French men, the decrease is very dramatic, but among French women it is less pronounced: from 65% at the age of 25 in the oldest generation to 23% in the youngest generation; from 81% at age 35 in the oldest generation to 60% in the 1960s generation. Among Estonians are the same shares for men at age 25: 44% versus 23%; at age 35, they are 88% versus 69%. For women, the shares are 61% versus 36% and 88% versus 76%. For Russian men, the proportions are 53% versus 48% and 87% versus 76%; for women, they are 65% versus 63% and 82% versus 82%. The shares of married people in the oldest generation are almost the same across the three countries, but the shares of married people in the youngest generations differ a lot, especially at age 25. Marriage in France is commonly postponed until the second half of the transition to adulthood, and even there it drops a lot. The biggest changes are observed among French men, whereas Russian women demonstrate almost no changes.

The *unions without children* (*pink* for partnerships and *first green* palette for marriages) are changing their type from generation to generation. If, in older generations, people prefer to register marriage even if they did not have children, modern people prefer partnership as a first and childless union. At this point, only France and Estonia demonstrate this change clearly. In Russia, this transformation has only just begun.

Childbearing increases more slowly than marriages. One of the reasons is the growth of extramarital childbearing (Appendix 5 contains exact shares). The *red* palette represents partnerships with at least one child, and the *second green* palette represent marriages with at least one child. *Childbearing in singlehood* was not popular among the older generations of French people and Russians and loses its attractiveness even more among young people. The shares at age 35 decreased from 4% to 2-3% for men and from 9-10% to 3-4% for women. For Estonians, the share of childbirth in singlehood at age 25 increased from 0-2% to 2-3%, but almost disappeared by age 35. People prefer to have children in unions.

The share of *childbearing in partnerships* decreased considerably among French people. At the age of 25, only 2% of the oldest generations had children in partnerships, whereas for the 1970s

---

[4] We cannot adequately compare the oldest generation with the youngest at the age of 35 because of censoring, so at the age of 35 we just compare the oldest generation with those born in the 1960s.

generation this share grew to 7%. At the age of 35, the share of the oldest generation was 2%, and the share of the 1960s generation was 25%. Among French women, the growth at age 25 is from 1% to 13% and, at age 35, from 2% to 22%. Thus, the shares of French men and women giving a birth to a child in partnership increased 10 times, which coincides with the rise of partnerships and indicates that people perceive partnerships as an alternative to marriages.

For Estonians, the growth was from 1% among the oldest generation at age 25 to 14% for the youngest; from 2% for the oldest generation at age 35 to 16% for the 1960s generation. For women, the change was from 3% to 22% and from 4% to 13%, respectively. For Russian men, the growth was from 1% to 4% and from 3% to 7%; for Russian women, it was from 3% to 9% and from 4% to 6%. The behaviour of Estonians is much closer to that of the French, rather than to the behaviour of Russians. The rise of childbearing in partnerships in Estonia and Russia has the same tempo as the rise of partnerships themselves, which means that people who choose this type of union perceive it as an alternative to marriage.

The opposite trend is visible in marriages: aside from Russian women, all other groups in our study demonstrate a decrease in *births in wedlock*. This decrease also coincides with the decrease in marriages themselves, so the biggest drop we observe is for French men.

Fig. 4. Chronograms by country, sex and generation.

Source: The harmonised datasets of the first waves of the French, Estonian and Russian GGS.

Discussion of results

We tested all the hypotheses. Not all of them were confirmed, however.

H1. The transition to adulthood differs among countries.

H1.1. France showed more modern behaviour than the other countries: more than 70% of youngsters have a first partnership, when only 30-40% have a first marriage. The number of children born outside of marriage is approaching the number of children born within wedlock. All the demographic events are postponed for two years among youngsters in comparison with older generations. Young people are starting families after age 25, but they obtain socioeconomic events before 20. The interval between all socioeconomic and all demographic events is about five years for men and three years for women. The interval between leaving parental home and becoming a parent is seven years for men and five years for women.

H1.2. Russia showed very traditional behaviour in all the generations. Only 50% of youngsters have a first partnership, and 60-70% have a first marriage. The number of children born outside of marriage is much smaller than the number of children born within wedlock. The demographic events are occurring two years earlier in the youngest generation than in the oldest one. Young people are starting families at ages 20-23, but they obtain socioeconomic events at ages 19-20. The interval between all socioeconomic and all demographic events is about three years for men and one year for women. The interval between leaving parental home and becoming a parent is three years for men and two years for women.

27

H1.3. Estonia clearly lies between France and Russia. About 60-70% of youngsters have a first partnership, and only 30-40% have a first marriage. The number of children born outside of marriage hardly compares with the number of children born within wedlock. All the demographic events occurred in the youngest generation about two years earlier than in the oldest generation. Young people are starting families at ages 20-23, but they obtain socioeconomic events at age 18. The interval between all socioeconomic and all demographic events is about five years for men and three years for women. The interval between leaving the parental home and becoming a parent is six years for men and four years for women. Thus, the timing of the onset of events in Estonia is more similar to that of Russia, but the tempo and the sequencing is closer to that of France.

H2. The transition to adulthood differs among generations.

H2.1. The oldest generations in France are more similar to those in Estonia and Russia than we expected: the chronograms look very similar, and the median ages are quite close to each other.

H2.2. The oldest generations in Estonia and Russia behaved very similarly since both countries were Soviet republics.

H2.3. The younger generations in Estonia are more similar to those of France, rather than those of Russia, because of the dissolution of the USSR and the Estonians' pivot to the European model. The chronograms for Estonians born between 1970 and 1979 looked very similar to those for the French: a lot of partnerships and an increasing number of children born out of wedlock. Nevertheless, the median ages of demographic events in Estonia were still much closer to those of Russia than to those of France.

H2.4. The changes across generations showed that all three countries are experiencing similar paths of modernisation, but at different speeds and with some country-based peculiarities. The chronograms clearly showed that the way biographies are changing is very similar across all three countries, but the median ages demonstrated the remained differences in timing of events.

H3. The transition to adulthood differs between sexes.

H3.1. Men in all three countries exhibited more modernised behaviour than women: the difference in median ages in all the countries showed that men are delaying the onset of demographic behaviour by at least two years in comparison with women. Men payed more attention to career when women payed more attention to demographic events: the mean ages confirmed that the sex difference in the occurrence of socioeconomic events is minimal, and the difference in the

occurrence of demographic events showed that women care more about family formation. This is probably due to the strong association between pregnancy at young ages and infant health.

H3.2. The difference between men and women is not strong in Russia and less visible in France and Estonia. We disprove this hypothesis, because the sex difference in all the countries is about two years.

We disproved some of our hypotheses and discovered that the convergence in sequences is apparent in all three countries, whereas the timing and tempo did not show such results. We revealed that Estonia and Russia are still close in the timing of the occurrence of events, but the tempo is uniform in Estonia and France.

We also were surprised by such young median ages of the occurrence of demographic events in Estonia and Russia. We should remember that the youngest respondents were only 25 years old, and not all of them had the full set of first events at the time of the survey. We still can explain the decrease in median ages thus: the generations of the 1960s and 1970s, who socialised mostly in the Soviet era, did not show any behavioural modernisation. They started social changes, the result of which we can see in the following generations, but they did not have the opportunity to realise their intentions: contraceptives were not available in Soviet times; unmarried people could not rent an apartment or a hotel room; people could work only at official and prescribed jobs because of the law on parasitism (1961-1991); they could not choose where to work after finishing their education because of compulsory assignment to work after study (1933-1991); and they were forced to have children at younger ages because of indirect restrictions on sexual activity, social pressure and the tax on childlessness (1941-1991).

The Estonian generations of the 1970s showed a more rapid transition to modernised behaviour, because people finally felt free of the USSR's control and turned sharply to European norms and institutions. The changes in Russia are occurring much more slowly, because Russia is still very far from Europe and is much bigger and more heterogeneous than Estonia. The case of Estonia is very peculiar, and we will continue studying this country. It should be interesting to divide the Estonians by ethnicity and compare the sociodemographic behaviours of ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians in Estonia. We expect that the first group will have more European patterns of behaviour (i.e. more like France), whereas the second group's behaviour will be similar to what we see in Russia.

Conclusion

We tested several hypotheses considering the timing, tempo and sequencing of the events marking the transition to adulthood in France, Estonia and Russia. Our analysis revealed that the Hajnal line theory has more evidence behind it than the Second Demographic Transition Theory. We can see that the changes in these three countries generally go in one direction (towards a "late, protracted and complex" transition to adulthood), but the patterns that most modern generations demonstrate still return us to a Western vs. Eastern European nuptial and reproductive model: marriages and childbearing are occurring in Russia and Estonia at much younger ages and among a bigger share of the population than in France.

We can confirm the assumption of the de-standardisation of people's life courses which many scientists expected (Bertaux & Kohli 1984; Mayer & Müller 1986). In the case of France, Estonia and Russia, the main factor of the increase in the variety of life-course tracks is the appearance of a new type of matrimonial behaviour – partnership.

We will continue our investigation using even younger cohorts from the second and third waves of the Russian GGS. We think that the generation born in the 1980s should demonstrate much more modern demographic behaviour than their predecessors because they were the first youngsters who did not experience Soviet life in their formative years.

Acknowledgements

References

Arnett, JJ 2000, „Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties", American Psychologist, vol. 55, no. 5, pp. 469–480.

Arnett, JJ 2003, „Conceptions of the transition to adulthood among emerging adults in American ethnic groups", New directions for child and adolescent development, vol. 2003, no. 100, pp. 63–76.

Arnett, JJ 2007, „Emerging adulthood: What is it, and what is it good for?", Child development perspectives, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 68–73.

Arnett, JJ 2012, „New Horizons in Research on Emerging and Young Adulthood", in A Booth, SL Brown, NS Landale, WD Manning, & SM McHale (eds), Early Adulthood in a Family Context, Springer, pp. 231–244.

Baltes, PB, Reese, HW & Nesselroade, JR 1998, Life-span developmental psychology: Introduction to research methods, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.

Baltes, PB, Staudinger, U & Lindenberger, U 2002, Lifespan psychology: Theory and application to intellectual functioning, Routledge, New York/London.

Bertaux, D & Kohli, M 1984, „The life story approach: A continental view", Annual review of sociology, pp. 215–237.

Billari, FC, Hagestad, GO, Liefbroer, AC & Spéder, Z 2005, „The Timing of Life: The Organization of the Life Course in Europe", in The timing of life: The organisation of the life course in Europe, European Social Survey, London.

Billari, FC & Liefbroer, AC 2010, „Towards a new pattern of transition to adulthood?", Advances in Life Course Research, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 59–75.

Blos, P 1967, „The second individuation process of adolescence", in The psychoanalytic study of the child, pp. 162–186.

Blum, A, Lefèvre, A, Sebille, P, Badurashvili, I, Régnier-Loilier, A, Stankuniene, V & Sinyavskaya, O 2009, „Introduction: International Comparisons - France, Georgia, Lithuania and Russia", Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 40, no. 3–4, pp. 5–34.

Blum, A, Sebille, P & Zakharov, SV 2009, „A divergent transition to adulthood in France and Russia: a cohort approach", Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 40, no. 3–4, pp. 123–152.

Bronfenbrenner, U 2009, The ecology of human development, Harvard University Press, Harvard.

Buchmann, M 1989, The script of life in modern society: entry into adulthood in a changing world, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Buhler, C 1971, „Basic theoretical concepts of humanistic psychology", American Psychologist, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 378–386.

Carr, DS (ed.) 2009, Encyclopedia of the Life Course and Human Development, Macmillan Reference USA, Detroit, retrieved August 7, 2013.

Cavalli, A & Galland, O (eds) 1993, L'allongement de la jeunesse, Actes Sud, Paris.

Ejrnas, A & Boje, TP 2008, „Family Policy and Welfare Regimes", in Ejrnas, A., Boje, T.P., Lewis, J., and Plumien, A. (Eds.). Report 3: Labour Market and social Policies, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen.

Elder Jr., GH 1975, „Age Differentiation and the Life Course", Annual Review of Sociology, no. 1, pp. 165–190.

Elder Jr., GH & Giele, JZ 1998, Methods of life course research qualitative and quantitative approaches, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Calif.

Erikson, EH 1956, „The problem of ego identity", Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 56–121.

Esping-Andersen, G 1990, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton University Press, NJ.

Esping-Andersen, G 2002, Why We Need a New Welfare State, OUP Oxford, New York.

Esping-Andersen, G (ed.) 2007, Family formation and family dilemmas in contemporary Europe, Fundació´n BBVA, Bilbao, Spain.

Eysenck, HJ & Rachman, S 1967, Neurosen, Ursachen und Heilmethoden, Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin.

Ferrari, G & Pailhé, A 2016, „Transition to adulthood in France: Do descendants of immigrants differ from natives?", Families and Societies. Working Paper Series, no. 50, pp. 1–38.

Freud, A 1936, Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Wein.

Freud, S & Freud, A 2001, Complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Random House.

Fröbel, F & Jarvis, J 1899, Pedagogics of the Kindergarten D. Appleton and Company., New York.

Gesell, A, Ilg, FL & Ames, LB 1956, Youth: The years ten to sixteen, Harper, New York.

Ginsburg, H & Opper, S 1969, Piaget's theory of intellectual development: an introduction, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall.

Grob, A 2001, „Youth to Adulthood across Cultures, Transition from", in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Elsevier, pp. 16678–16682, retrieved January 15, 2016.

Hagestad, GO & Neugarten, BL 1985, „Age and the life course", in RH Binstock & E Shanas (eds), Handbook of aging and the social sciences, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, pp. 35–61.

Hajnal, J 1965, „European marriage patterns in perspective", in Glass DV, Eversley DE, eds. Population in history: essays in historical demography, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, Illinois, pp. 101–143, retrieved November 5, 2017.

Hall, GS 1904, Adolescence: its psychology and its relations to physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion and education, New York : D. Appleton and Company, retrieved March 2, 2017.

Havighurst, RJ 1972, Developmental Tasks and Education 3 edition., Longman Group United Kingdom, New York.

Heitmeyer, W & Hurrelmann, K 1988, „Sozialisations- und handlungstheoretische Ansätze in der Jugendforschung", in Handbuch der Jugendforschung, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 47–70.

Hendry, L & Kloep, M 2012, Adolescence and Adulthood: Transitions and Transformations, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York, NY.

Hofstätter, PR 1959, Einführung in die Sozialpsychologie, Stuttgart.

Jaensch, ER 1925, Die Eidetik und die typologische Forschungsmethode.

van de Kaa, DJ 1987, „Europe"s Second Demographic Transition", Population Bulletin, vol. 42, pp. 3–57.

Lazarus, RS 1966, Psychological Stress and the Coping Process, McGraw-Hill, New York.

Lesthaeghe, R 1995, „The second demographic transition in Western countries: An interpretation", in Gender and family change in industrialized countries, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 17–62.

Lewin, K 1935, A dynamic theory of personality; selected papers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York and London.

Liefbroer, AC 1999, „From Youth to Adulthood: Understanding Changing Patterns of Family Formation From a Life Course Perspective", in Population Issues, Springer, The Netherlands, pp. 53–85.

Liefbroer, AC & Toulemont, L 2010, „Demographic perspectives on transitions to adulthood: an introduction", Advances in Life Course Research, no. 15, pp. 53–58.

Lorenz, K 1963, Das soganannte Böse: Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression, Borotha-Schoeler, Wein.

Mayer, KU & Müller, W 1986, „The state and the structure of the life course", in AB Sørensen, FE Weinert, & LR Sherrod (eds), Human development and the life course: multidisciplinary perspectives, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 218–245.

Mead, GH 1934, Mind, self and society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Mitrofanova, ES 2016, „The Age Parameters of the Starting Demographic Events Across Russian Generations", Russian Education & Society, vol. 58, no. 9–10, pp. 601–622.

Mitrofanova, ES & Artamonova, AV 2016, „The perspectives of family policy in Russia amid increasing cohabitation", European Journal of Government and Economics, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 47–63.

Nugin, R, Kannike, A & Raudsepp, M (eds) 2016, Generations in Estonia: contemporary perspectives on turbulent times, University of Tartu Press, Tartu.

Offer, D 1984, „Das Selbstbild normaler Jugendlicher", in Probleme des Jugendalters, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, pp. 111–130.

Perelli-Harris, B, Kreyenfeld, M, Kubisch, K & Sigle-Rushton, W 2009, „The harmonized histories", Rostock: Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research Working Paper, retrieved May 17, 2017.

Petersen, W 1979, Malthus: Founder of Modern Demography, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey.

Petryszak, NG 1981, „Tabula rasa – its origins and implications", Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, vol. 17(1), pp. 15–27.

Puur, A, Maslauskaite, A, Stankuniene, V & Zakharov, SV 2012, „Transformation of Partnership Formation in Eastern Europe: The Legacy of the Past Demographic Divide", Journal of Comparative Family Studies, vol. 43, no. 3, retrieved December 3, 2013.

Rahnu, L, Puur, A & Sakkeus, L 2016, Partnership dynamics in second half of the 20th century: evidence from Estonia and other GGS countries of Europe, Tallinn University, Tallinn.

Reher, DS 1998, „Family ties in Western Europe: Persistent contrasts", Population and Development Review, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 203–234.

Smelser, NJ & Baltes, PB (eds) 2001, International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences, Elsevier, Amsterdam ; New York.

Spranger, E 1925, Psychologie des Jugendalters, Quelle & Meyer, Leipzig.

Steinberg, L 2001, „Adolescent Development, Theories of", in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Elsevier, pp. 102–105, retrieved January 15, 2016.

Tanner, JL & Arnett, JJ 2009, „The emergence of "emerging adulthood"," in A Furlong (ed), Handbook of Youth and Young Adulthood: New Perspectives and Agendas, Routledge, Oxon, pp. 39–45.

Werner, H 1926, Einfuhrung in die Entwicklungspsychologie, Leipzig.

Zakharov, SV & Ivanova, EI 1996, „Fertility decline and recent changes in Russia: On the threshold of the second demographic transition", in Russia's demographic crisis, pp. 36–83, retrieved September 28, 2017.

Appendixes

Appendix 1.The median ages of the events marking the transition to adulthood (by country, sex and generation).

Women

	1st partnership	1st marriage	1st child	1st leaving parents	completing education

— 1930-39   — 1940-49   — 1950-59   — 1960-69   — 1970-79

Appendix 2. The shares of statuses at ages 15, 25 and 35 by country and sex (the rows in which the shares in each cell are less than 1% were deleted).

Ages	Statuses	France, %		Estonia, %		Russia, %	
		Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Age 15	SC0E	22.7	26.2	5.5	6.3	0.5	0.1
	SC0EL	0.9	1.1	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.0
	SC0L	4.7	2.9	3.3	3.0	5.3	5.9
	SC0LE	1.3	1.6	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
	SC0N	70.0	67.7	90.5	89.7	93.9	93.5
Age 25	M1C0E	0.5	0.3	1.3	2.4	2.7	1.3
	M1C0EL	11.0	9.8	5.0	3.4	4.8	3.2
	M1C0L	1.7	1.3	2.3	1.2	2.6	1.5
	M1C0LE	2.7	2.4	2.4	2.7	5.2	4.4
	M1C1E	0.5	1.1	4.0	8.0	5.2	5.9
	M1C1EL	14.3	27.0	15.2	19.0	14.9	16.3
	M1C1L	1.7	2.6	5.3	5.9	4.5	6.9
	M1C1L&E	0.3	0.4	0.8	1.7	0.6	1.0
	M1C1LE	3.4	5.0	8.6	15.4	14.7	27.6
	M1C1N	0.1	0.1	0.6	1.5	1.1	1.0
	P1C0E	0.8	0.4	1.8	1.2	1.0	0.6
	P1C0EL	9.2	7.5	4.4	1.8	1.8	0.8
	P1C0L	2.2	2.1	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.4
	P1C0LE	4.9	5.7	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.0
	P1C1EL	2.9	3.6	2.4	3.9	1.2	1.1
	P1C1LE	1.0	2.1	1.5	2.5	0.8	2.1
	SC0E	12.4	7.6	13.8	9.1	11.1	6.3
	SC0EL	14.4	6.9	9.3	3.7	4.2	2.2
	SC0L	4.8	2.9	4.2	2.2	4.2	2.2
	SC0LE	6.6	4.8	6.2	3.7	8.4	5.5
	SC0N	2.2	1.2	2.4	2.2	3.0	1.7
	SC1E	0.1	0.4	0.2	1.1	0.6	0.7
	SC1EL	0.7	2.3	0.1	0.5	0.7	1.1
	SC1LE	0.3	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.9	2.1
Age 35	censorings	17.5	18.2	22.7	20.5	24.1	19.7
	M1C0E	0.1	0.0	0.9	1.2	0.5	0.3
	M1C0EL	3.6	3.3	1.8	1.0	2.3	1.5
	M1C0LE	1.1	0.5	1.5	0.9	2.0	1.8
	M1C1E	0.7	0.8	7.3	12.5	4.5	3.8
	M1C1EL	34.8	40.3	24.2	22.9	23.7	21.6
	M1C1L	1.8	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.3
	M1C1L&E	0.7	0.6	1.6	2.0	0.8	1.0
	M1C1LE	12.5	11.5	23.1	24.2	27.7	34.6
	P1C0EL	3.4	1.9	0.8	0.2	0.6	0.4
	P1C0LE	2.4	1.8	1.0	0.3	0.6	0.5
	P1C1E	0.1	0.0	1.0	1.1	0.3	0.3
	P1C1EL	6.3	4.8	3.0	2.3	1.5	1.5
	P1C1LE	2.5	3.4	1.7	1.6	1.7	2.1
	SC0E	2.2	1.2	2.9	2.6	1.6	1.1
	SC0EL	4.4	2.7	1.1	0.2	0.8	0.6
	SC0LE	1.5	1.4	0.7	0.5	1.6	1.3
	SC1E	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.5	0.3	0.5
	SC1EL	1.3	2.6	0.0	0.1	0.8	1.5
	SC1LE	0.6	0.8	0.0	0.2	1.1	2.4

Appendix 3. The shares of statuses at ages 15, 25 and 35 by country, sex and generation (the rows in which the shares in each cell are less than 3% were deleted).

Ages	Statuses	France, %										Estonia, %										Russia, %									
		Men					Women					Men					Women					Men					Women				
		'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79
Age 15	SC0E	37.8	30.2	23.2	15.6	11.6	53.9	34.5	26.8	15.9	9.4	14.9	6.9	2.5	1.4	4.2	19.6	7.7	2.1	1.0	2.9	0.8	0.6	0.1	0.5	0.6	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.1
	SC0EL	2.3	1.2	0.7	0.3	0.4	3.6	1.1	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.0	2.0	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
	SC0L	7.8	5.8	4.3	3.7	2.6	2.6	4.8	2.6	2.7	1.9	6.4	4.1	3.8	2.2	1.2	4.2	4.4	2.3	2.1	2.4	5.8	7.5	4.4	4.7	5.2	8.2	6.3	5.5	5.5	4.1
	SC0LE	2.8	1.7	1.2	0.6	0.7	3.4	2.0	1.4	0.7	1.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	SC0N	48.4	60.7	70.3	79.1	84.7	36.1	57.3	67.5	79.4	87.0	77.4	88.1	93.4	95.8	94.0	73.8	86.9	95.3	96.6	93.8	93.4	91.8	95.0	94.6	93.5	91.4	93.1	93.7	94.1	95.1
Age 25	censorings	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1
	M1C0E	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.3	2.6	1.5	1.5	0.6	0.9	5.9	4.2	1.3	0.8	0.7	3.4	3.1	3.0	2.7	1.6	1.4	1.0	1.4	1.1	1.5
	M1C0EL	17.7	14.3	13.4	8.4	3.2	12.4	12.3	11.9	8.3	5.2	7.2	3.5	7.6	5.0	2.5	4.6	4.7	3.5	2.4	2.1	4.0	3.5	4.3	6.2	5.3	4.0	2.9	3.8	2.8	2.2
	M1C0L	2.7	2.2	2.6	0.9	0.5	0.4	1.4	2.1	1.9	0.3	3.6	4.8	3.0	0.8	0.2	1.2	1.5	1.7	0.8	0.6	5.4	3.7	1.8	1.8	1.6	2.6	2.3	1.1	1.1	0.7
	M1C0LE	3.2	3.8	3.3	1.7	1.9	0.7	2.6	2.5	2.2	3.5	2.8	2.6	4.6	1.6	0.9	2.8	3.1	3.5	2.2	1.9	6.6	6.1	6.2	4.2	3.8	5.5	3.8	5.0	3.6	3.9
	M1C1E	0.2	1.5	0.5	0.2	0.1	3.0	1.6	0.7	0.5	0.2	4.9	3.9	4.9	4.6	2.1	15.9	13.0	6.6	3.8	2.0	6.6	5.7	5.7	4.8	3.8	6.0	6.1	6.7	5.7	4.8
	M1C1EL	18.6	23.8	19.9	7.8	3.2	40.1	42.6	32.3	17.7	7.7	10.5	16.5	17.6	21.4	9.6	17.0	18.5	21.7	22.7	15.0	8.5	12.7	17.6	16.9	15.6	11.5	13.7	15.8	20.8	18.8
	M1C1L	1.8	3.0	2.1	1.2	0.4	3.0	3.3	3.4	2.3	0.9	6.2	8.7	7.2	3.8	1.4	2.7	7.9	8.6	7.7	2.4	4.2	8.0	5.3	4.3	2.0	7.6	8.1	8.4	5.9	4.4
	M1C1LE	5.1	6.0	4.3	1.1	1.1	4.7	5.9	7.1	3.3	4.0	4.4	9.7	13.1	11.1	4.2	5.4	12.8	22.7	24.0	10.5	10.9	13.9	17.1	17.2	12.3	24.4	28.3	27.9	31.1	25.9
	M1C1N	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	1.3	1.5	0.2	0.4	0.0	2.8	3.3	1.4	0.2	0.0	1.8	1.4	1.6	0.5	0.6	1.2	1.7	0.7	0.6	1.1
	P1C0E	0.4	0.3	0.0	1.6	1.5	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.9	0.5	1.1	1.1	2.4	3.5	1.6	0.6	1.1	0.7	2.1	0.8	1.2	0.8	0.6	1.6	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.8	1.1
	P1C0EL	0.4	2.4	5.4	16.6	18.1	0.7	1.4	4.4	13.1	15.3	1.5	1.3	3.4	4.2	10.2	0.2	0.8	1.0	1.1	5.6	0.6	0.2	0.1	1.5	5.3	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.6	1.9
	P1C0L	0.0	1.3	1.5	3.4	3.9	0.0	0.6	1.7	4.3	3.1	1.0	0.6	0.9	1.2	1.2	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.6	2.4	1.0	0.6	0.5	1.3	1.0	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.4
	P1C0LE	0.2	0.8	2.8	7.5	12.1	0.7	0.7	2.8	8.4	14.2	1.3	0.4	1.5	3.6	3.0	0.4	0.6	1.1	1.8	5.4	0.8	0.4	0.6	1.4	4.6	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.9	2.2
	P1C1EL	0.9	1.2	2.1	5.0	4.7	0.6	1.4	2.3	5.7	6.9	0.5	1.1	0.9	3.0	5.8	1.2	0.9	1.9	4.9	9.9	0.2	1.4	0.8	1.5	1.7	0.4	0.4	0.9	1.1	2.5
	P1C1LE	0.5	0.5	0.4	1.2	2.3	0.3	0.6	1.3	2.6	5.1	0.0	0.6	1.1	0.8	4.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	3.5	7.4	0.2	0.4	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.9	4.6
	SC0E	14.7	9.8	10.5	14.1	13.2	12.2	6.4	6.3	6.6	7.9	13.8	12.3	9.3	7.9	24.3	13.8	6.9	5.1	6.8	13.1	12.9	10.6	10.3	10.5	11.9	8.3	6.3	5.7	5.8	5.5
	SC0EL	17.2	12.6	15.3	13.0	14.8	5.7	6.4	7.7	7.6	6.5	11.0	6.9	8.7	9.5	10.3	6.9	3.8	3.3	3.0	1.8	2.0	2.2	3.5	5.0	6.7	2.5	2.5	2.1	2.0	2.1
	SC0L	4.1	4.9	4.3	5.3	5.4	2.0	1.4	3.0	3.6	4.1	11.0	6.3	2.7	2.6	0.9	2.6	3.0	2.4	2.0	1.0	8.7	6.1	3.6	3.0	2.2	3.1	3.9	2.0	1.6	0.6
	SC0LE	7.1	6.3	5.8	5.2	8.9	3.0	3.3	3.6	4.8	8.9	8.7	9.5	4.4	5.2	4.4	4.2	3.9	3.6	2.8	4.1	12.1	7.6	8.2	8.1	7.3	5.8	6.3	6.2	5.0	4.0
	SC0N	1.4	1.7	2.2	2.9	2.2	1.4	1.0	0.8	1.6	1.0	4.6	2.6	1.1	2.8	1.4	3.8	3.4	1.2	1.1	1.9	5.2	4.7	2.8	1.8	1.9	2.9	2.1	2.0	1.1	0.6
	SC1EL	0.9	1.3	0.7	0.1	0.5	6.3	3.0	1.4	1.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.8	1.1	0.7	0.4	1.9	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.9
	SC1LE	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.2	0.6	1.2	1.0	1.1	0.4	3.4	2.3	2.1	1.4	1.1
Age 35	censorings	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	88.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	89.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	97.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	97.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.9	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	100.0
	M1C0EL	5.3	4.0	5.7	2.8	0.4	5.8	4.9	3.8	2.8	0.2	3.1	2.2	2.3	1.8	0.0	1.4	1.1	1.5	0.8	0.1	2.8	2.9	3.1	2.9	0.0	1.9	2.6	1.5	1.5	0.0
	M1C0LE	0.7	1.1	2.5	1.0	0.1	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.4	0.0	3.1	2.2	1.9	1.0	0.0	1.6	0.6	1.1	1.3	0.0	5.4	2.4	2.1	1.6	0.0	2.7	2.2	2.5	1.5	0.0
	M1C1E	1.2	1.2	0.9	0.6	0.0	2.0	1.0	0.6	0.5	0.0	12.1	10.4	9.5	6.5	0.4	31.9	20.5	8.3	4.4	0.3	8.5	7.5	4.8	4.5	0.0	5.9	4.1	4.9	3.6	0.0
	M1C1EL	54.3	48.3	42.3	30.3	3.6	60.5	58.6	48.8	37.0	3.1	30.5	27.9	33.2	33.1	0.7	28.3	27.0	31.2	28.3	0.6	26.0	28.2	34.7	31.6	0.0	23.9	23.3	28.2	30.0	0.0
	M1C1L	3.0	2.6	2.5	1.2	0.0	2.4	2.5	3.0	2.4	0.1	5.4	4.1	0.9	0.4	0.0	1.8	2.4	2.5	2.6	0.0	4.6	4.7	1.4	0.9	0.0	3.7	2.9	2.7	2.1	0.0
	M1C1LE	17.2	19.8	12.8	12.1	1.5	9.2	12.0	15.8	15.7	3.0	28.7	35.3	32.8	23.0	0.4	16.5	29.6	38.5	35.6	0.4	36.6	39.4	38.2	31.8	0.0	41.6	44.5	43.7	41.5	0.0
	P1C0EL	0.7	1.7	4.4	7.9	0.5	0.3	1.7	2.8	3.8	0.0	0.5	0.9	0.9	1.8	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.0	0.8	0.2	0.5	1.3	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.3	0.0
	P1C0LE	0.4	1.6	3.6	4.8	0.9	0.1	1.2	2.2	4.1	0.4	1.3	0.6	1.1	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.8	1.6	0.0	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.9	0.0

P1C1EL	1.2	2.6	6.2	16.7	1.7	1.4	2.0	4.4	11.9	2.0	0.8	1.9	3.0	8.3	0.7	1.2	2.0	1.9	6.1	0.4	0.4	1.4	1.5	3.8	0.0	1.4	1.0	2.0	2.5	0.0
P1C1LE	0.7	0.9	2.6	5.9	1.2	0.3	1.4	3.3	9.4	1.0	0.0	0.9	2.5	4.4	0.5	0.4	0.9	1.8	4.6	0.2	1.6	1.4	2.6	2.7	0.0	1.7	2.9	2.5	3.2	0.0
SC0E	2.7	3.0	3.1	1.9	0.4	1.6	1.2	1.7	1.0	0.3	4.6	2.8	3.6	4.0	0.4	4.2	3.3	1.9	3.5	0.3	1.4	1.8	2.8	2.2	0.0	1.0	2.0	1.1	1.3	0.0
SC0EL	4.4	5.4	5.3	6.0	0.4	2.8	3.7	3.6	3.4	0.1	0.8	1.3	1.3	2.0	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.0	1.2	0.4	0.8	1.6	0.0	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.9	0.0
SC0LE	1.8	1.9	2.2	1.6	0.3	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.5	0.2	1.5	0.9	0.4	1.2	0.0	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.0	1.6	1.4	1.5	3.2	0.0	1.5	2.3	1.5	1.0	0.0
SC1EL	2.1	1.5	1.5	1.2	0.4	8.1	3.2	2.1	1.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.4	1.2	1.3	1.1	0.0	2.7	2.0	1.5	1.4	0.0
SC1LE	0.7	0.5	1.0	0.8	0.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.0	2.4	1.6	1.0	1.3	0.0	4.9	3.6	2.4	1.3	0.0

Appendix 4. The shares of events by ages 15, 25 and 35 by country, sex and generation.

Ages	Types of events	Events	France, %										Estonia, %										Russia, %									
			Men					Women					Men					Men					Women					Men				
			'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79
Age 15	Demographic events	Single	100	100	99.9	99.5	99.9	100	100	99.4	99.5	99.7	100	100	100	100	100	99.9	100	100	99.9	99.2	100	100	99.6	99.9	99.5	99.9	99.8	99.5	99.5	99.5
		1st partner	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.4
		1st marriage	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1
		1st child	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1
	Socio-economic events	No events	48.6	61.0	70.3	79.3	84.8	36.1	57.3	67.8	79.6	87.1	77.4	88.1	93.4	96.0	94.0	73.8	86.9	95.3	96.7	94.2	93.4	92.0	95.1	94.9	94.0	91.5	93.3	94.0	94.3	95.3
		Education was first	40.2	31.3	23.9	16.1	12.0	57.8	35.6	27.8	16.5	9.8	15.6	7.6	2.7	1.8	4.2	21.6	8.2	2.2	1.0	3.1	0.8	0.6	0.1	0.5	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.2
		Leaving was first	10.6	7.5	5.7	4.4	3.2	6.0	6.8	4.3	3.8	3.1	6.7	4.1	3.8	2.2	1.2	4.3	4.5	2.4	2.2	2.7	5.8	7.5	4.8	4.7	5.3	8.4	6.4	5.8	5.7	4.5
Age 25	Demographic events	Single	46.8	37.3	40.0	41.7	45.3	31.9	23.8	25.0	26.8	30.3	50.5	38.5	27.3	30.4	43.8	33.1	23.4	19.3	18.4	24.5	43.3	34.3	31.7	31.7	32.0	29.5	25.8	22.5	19.1	16.6
		1st partner	2.5	6.5	12.6	36.4	43.7	2.8	5.2	13.9	36.2	47.2	5.9	6.1	10.8	18.5	32.7	5.5	4.8	7.4	14.1	39.0	4.2	4.5	4.5	8.2	16.4	5.3	4.9	5.0	6.4	14.4
		1st marriage	50.7	56.2	47.5	21.8	11.0	65.3	70.9	61.1	37.1	22.5	43.6	55.4	61.9	51.2	22.8	61.4	71.8	73.2	67.5	36.1	52.5	61.2	63.8	60.0	47.8	65.2	69.3	72.5	74.5	63.8
		1st child	29.3	38.4	31.4	18.1	13.4	59.9	61.6	51.8	35.6	27.9	28.5	43.9	48.2	48.6	33.5	49.2	62.2	69.4	73.1	55.3	35.2	48.2	53.0	50.9	39.7	60.6	66.0	68.0	72.6	67.6
	Socio-economic events	No events	2.0	1.9	2.3	3.2	2.4	1.7	1.2	1.2	2.2	1.2	6.4	4.8	1.9	4.4	2.3	8.5	7.7	3.6	1.8	2.9	8.5	7.1	5.5	2.7	2.9	4.5	4.9	3.7	2.3	2.3
		Education was first	72.2	67.9	68.7	67.1	59.4	82.1	76.3	67.7	61.6	52.5	52.8	48.7	55.8	59.7	72.0	69.2	55.3	47.2	48.3	56.1	40.0	42.0	47.6	51.9	55.0	38.2	35.7	39.1	42.8	43.1
		Leaving was first	25.2	29.2	27.9	28.5	37.1	15.9	21.2	29.7	34.9	45.1	39.5	43.5	39.5	31.5	21.7	20.3	34.5	45.4	46.6	37.8	50.9	48.8	46.0	44.1	36.2	56.1	58.3	55.6	53.0	48.4
Age 35	Demographic events	Single	13.3	13.4	14.1	12.4	1.5	16.5	12.4	11.0	9.2	0.9	7.7	6.1	5.9	7.9	0.4	6.8	6.8	5.6	7.6	0.4	8.5	7.6	7.8	9.9	0.0	12.8	11.5	8.0	6.9	0.0
		1st partner	3.5	7.3	17.9	38.6	4.6	2.4	6.8	14.5	30.9	3.5	4.6	7.6	10.1	21.8	1.2	5.4	5.5	6.8	14.6	0.9	4.4	4.1	6.4	10.7	0.0	5.2	6.5	6.4	7.9	0.0
		1st marriage	83.2	79.4	68.1	49.0	5.6	81.1	80.8	74.4	59.9	6.5	87.7	86.4	84.1	69.4	1.4	87.8	87.7	87.6	76.4	1.4	87.1	88.2	85.8	75.5	0.0	82.0	82.0	85.6	82.2	0.0
		1st child	82.4	78.6	71.6	71.6	8.5	86.1	83.4	81.6	81.0	9.6	81.3	85.5	86.0	81.2	2.6	87.2	89.7	92.4	89.1	2.2	82.9	89.0	86.7	80.3	0.0	88.9	87.4	90.7	88.8	0.0
	Socio-economic events	No events	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	2.3	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.0	2.0	2.3	0.5	0.2	0.0	1.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.0
		Education was first	72.9	68.3	69.4	68.6	7.7	82.6	76.8	68.3	62.2	5.9	55.6	51.7	57.3	61.9	2.1	74.8	59.8	50.0	48.8	2.0	43.5	45.9	50.8	50.8	0.0	40.5	38.6	41.4	42.9	0.0
		Leaving was first	26.1	30.7	29.1	29.9	4.0	16.8	21.8	30.2	36.2	5.0	40.8	44.6	39.8	32.5	0.9	21.2	35.4	45.6	46.2	0.7	54.7	51.6	48.0	43.6	0.0	57.6	59.6	56.8	51.9	0.0

Appendix 5. The shares of childbirth in and out of wedlock by ages 15, 25 and 35 by country, sex and generation.

Ages	Childbearing	France, %										Estonia, %										Russia, %									
		Men					Women					Men					Women					Men					Women				
		'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79	'30-39	'40-49	'50-59	'60-69	'70-79
Age 15	In singlehood	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1
	In partnership	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	In marriage	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Age 25	In singlehood	1.6	1.6	1.5	0.7	0.9	7.5	5.2	3.1	2.3	1.9	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.6	1.8	1.5	2.3	2.9	2.2	2.4	2.2	2.9	2.9	3.2	1.4	6.6	4.7	4.2	3.2	3.6
	In partnership	1.6	1.7	2.7	6.9	7.4	1.3	2.5	4.4	9.2	12.9	1.0	2.4	3.4	6.0	13.7	3.0	2.1	3.8	10.0	22.0	0.8	2.2	2.5	3.3	3.3	2.8	2.6	3.1	3.8	8.5
	In marriage	26.1	35.1	27.3	10.5	5.1	51.1	53.9	44.3	24.1	13.1	27.2	41.3	44.4	42.1	18.0	44.8	57.8	62.7	60.8	30.8	32.2	43.1	47.6	44.4	35.0	51.3	58.7	60.7	65.6	55.5
Age 35	In singlehood	3.5	2.1	2.7	2.3	.4	9.7	5.0	3.4	2.5	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.0	1.4	1.8	2.9	2.9	0.1	3.4	3.9	2.4	2.9	0.0	9.1	6.4	4.6	3.6	0.0
	In partnership	2.1	3.6	9.4	24.5	3.0	1.8	3.6	8.9	22.1	3.0	1.5	4.8	7.0	15.5	1.2	4.1	4.3	5.7	12.5	0.8	2.6	3.1	4.6	7.1	0.0	3.7	4.9	5.1	6.3	0.0
	In marriage	76.8	72.9	59.6	44.8	5.1	74.5	74.8	69.3	56.4	6.3	79.5	80.1	78.6	65.5	1.4	81.8	83.6	83.8	73.7	1.3	76.9	82.0	79.6	70.3	0.0	76.2	76.2	81.0	78.9	0.0

Ekaterina S. Mitrofanova

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). Institute of demography. Junior research fellow, teacher.

E-mail: emitrofanova@hse.ru