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Найдено 9 публикаций
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Препринт
Mitrofanova E. Working Papers. SSRN, 2017
В исследовании проанализированы последовательности наступления ключевых социодемографических событий жизни, маркирующих взросление: первого партнерства, первого брака, рождения первого ребенка, покидания родительского дома, завершения получения образования, первого трудоустройства. Выявлено, что по доли респондентов, имеющих разные стартовые события, Эстония и Франция более похожи, чем Эстония и Россия, тогда как по возрасту наступления событий Эстония и Россия похожи гораздо больше, чем Эстония и Франция. Последовательность наступления событий свидетельствует о том, что все три страны, не смотря на разные скорости и другие паттерны, проходят путь от "ранней, ускоренной и простой" модели взросления к "поздней, растянутой и сложной". 
Добавлено: 3 декабря 2017
Препринт
Myalo A. Working Papers. SSRN, 2019
Добавлено: 4 сентября 2019
Препринт
Susin I., Chernov G. V., Cheparuhin S. Working Papers. SSRN, 2020
Добавлено: 13 октября 2020
Препринт
Levando D. V. Working Papers. SSRN, 2017
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This paper suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a noncooperative game theory. Definition of a suggested finite game includes a family of nested simultaneous non-cooperative finite games with intra- and inter-coalition externalities. In this family, games differ by the size of maximum coalition, partitions and by coalition structure formation rules.  A result of every game consists of partition of players into coalitions and a payoff profile for every player. Every game in the family has an equilibrium in mixed strategies with possibly more than one coalition. The results of the game differ from those conventionally discussed in cooperative game theory, e.g. the Shapley value, strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium, core, kernel, nucleolus.  We discuss the following applications of the new game: cooperation as an allocation in one coalition, Bayesian games, stochastic games and construction of a non-cooperative criterion of coalition structure stability for studying focal points.
Добавлено: 3 мая 2017
Препринт
Levando D. V., Sakharov M. Working Papers. SSRN, 2018
We develop a theory of market instability caused by strategic trade with complete information and without outside shocks. We focus on general equilibrium duopoly as a strategic market game with infinite strategies, and a pricing mechanism. First order conditions of the game are the 1-st kind integral equations of Fredholm, which have many solutions. A solution is a probability distribution and can be approximated only. We suggest a modification of Tikhonov regularization for their numerical approximation. Impossibility to construct a unique and exact solution imposes a restriction on existence of converging common beliefs of players about actions of each other, on existence of rational expectations, and on price discovery property of the market, although the market is informationally efficient. Approximated price has unremovable instabilities, `natural instabilities', specific to parameters of a chosen approximation. Our result is also related to existence of sun-spot equilibrium, and noise trade.
Добавлено: 23 января 2018
Препринт
Novak A., Khvostova I., Larin A. V. Working Papers. SSRN, 2019
Добавлено: 10 декабря 2019
Препринт
Shadrina E. V., Dmitry V. Kashin, Dmitri V. Vinogradov. Working Papers. SSRN, 2020
Добавлено: 4 февраля 2020
Препринт
Myalo A. Working Papers. SSRN, 2019
Добавлено: 4 сентября 2019