6 Defeating the authoritarian majority

An uneasy agenda

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In the present climate, a relatively narrow aspect of the transition to democracy appears to have assumed overwhelming importance – the threat to the formation of a stable democracy posed by that "authoritarian syndrome" which is such an integral part of the culture of societies in transition.

By "transition to democracy" I mean the transition by a society from an authoritarian regime of whatever kind[1] to a liberal democracy, that is to a political system based on institutionalized and public competition among the political elites for the votes of the electorate with the object of achieving power and influence. Joseph Schumpeter described liberal democracy as a "competition for leadership" or "free competition for a free vote".[2]

The authoritarian syndrome is present to a greater or lesser extent in the cultures of virtually all countries embarking on the path to democracy, and makes this path quite thorny. At the same time, in the theory of democratic transition, the issue of political culture as a whole and authoritarianism in particular is confined to the periphery of research interests, at least when compared with economic and socio-structural issues.

This state of affairs appears rather odd. In the theories of social systems and behavioral theories,[3] political culture is traditionally assigned a substantial, independent role. This is also true of the theories of totalitarianism and democracy: as far as totalitarianism is concerned, ever since Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* (1941) and Theodor Adorno's *Authoritarian Personality* (1950), and in terms of democracy at least since Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's *Civic Culture* (1963).

Transitology provides a different picture. There is a series of research works on transition in which cultural issues are completely ignored.[4] There are works in which political culture is treated largely as a function of economic factors and social structure.[5] Indeed, this appears to be the dominant approach. At times we encounter a less simplistic and more appropriate version, according to which political culture, although powerfully influenced by economic and social processes, is nevertheless capable of determining the specific characteristics of the emerging political institutions[6] and of facilitating the collapse of unsustainable political structures.[7]

However, there is little popular support for the view of political culture as an independent factor of transition, capable of playing a decisive role in the course

of democratization. The most prominent advocate of this position is Robert Dahl,[8] but even he pays less attention to culture in his analysis of the emerging polyarchy than to social structure, political institutions and economic processes; and in what he does say about it, he is extremely circumspect.

In my opinion, it is sensible to look at culture, the economy, technology, the social structure, and politics as a system of relatively independent but inter-related and mutually-influencing factors in the transition towards democracy. It would be hardly correct to assert a priori a leading role of this or that factor in transition. I think that the specificity of transition crucially depends on the spe-cificity of interconnections of the factors. So the constructing of theoretical and empirical models of these interconnections is a complicated and necessary task for research studies of transition.

At any given moment, culture acts to restrict the range of potential decisions and actions of individuals, groups and society as a whole. In this case, in refer-ring to culture, I mean the multiplicity of personal cultures existing in a given society, each of which represents a multitude of subjective thoughts, values, positions and stereotypes.[9]

Unlike the normal idea of culture (or collective culture) as representing a set of ideas considered by tradition or law as normative in a given society and being the subject of regular appeals, personal culture is the immediate regulator of behaviour. To adopt a Freudian analogy, one might say that the role of collective culture is similar to that of the super ego, while the role of personal culture is similar to that of the ego.[10]

For understandable reasons, the sum of the personal cultures existing within a society differs from the collective culture in its greater heterogeneity and "vola-tility" of content (i.e. its capacity for relatively rapid alterations within the hier-archy of values and meanings).[11] Cultural volatility is particularly apparent in transitional societies. I would point out that phenomena often observed within them such as increased *ressentiment*[12] or, on the other hand, outbursts of "nation-wide adoption" of new values and rejection of the past, belong to the sphere of personal cultures.

Permit me to make a few explanatory remarks regarding "authoritarian syn-drome". Over the 60 years since the publication of Theodor Adorno's book referred to above, the concept of authoritarian syndrome has undergone substan-tive change. From an almost exclusively psychological interpretation, political science has moved on to a culture-based assessment, including not merely the typical psychological features of authoritarian personality but also values, ideo-logical preferences and also forms of everyday and political behaviour. Along with the concept of right-wing authoritarianism, the concept of its left-wing "sibling" has appeared.[13]

Numerous empirical research works on the authoritarian syndrome provide reasons to suppose that it belongs among phenomena of which the basic com-ponents vary little from one cultural context to the next.[14] Without going into all the aspects of authoritarian syndrome here, I shall confine myself to its typical attitude towards authorities. Taken as a whole, this attitude is common – albeit

to a varying degree – among the cultures of the overwhelming majority of countries with authoritarian regimes: China, the USSR, the dictatorships which arose in the former European colonies, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Spain under Franco and the contemporary left-wing dictatorships in Latin America.

To simplify the situation to the utmost, an authoritarian attitude to power can be linked to a willingness to accept the holders of power as father figures or "elder brothers", as those possessing unconditional authority and "more equal" than the rest. And this is the most modest way of putting it. At its more extreme, it can become the view that the holders of power are superior beings, leaders of the nation, of the world proletariat or of humanity as a whole, or even God's representatives on earth.[15]

Clearly, in the case of an authoritarian attitude to power it is difficult to regard the government as just a team of civil servants hired by a population, let alone retain that "healthy contempt and dislike of power" which is so important to liberal culture.[16] It follows that the stronger this attitude, the less compatible it is with the concepts of the separation of powers, checks and balances, transparency of power, the institutionalization of conflicts, political competition and, of course, political involvement. All these concepts are likely to be regarded as pointless and therefore unnecessary, or as devaluing what is true.

More typical of authoritarian culture are ideas of the natural concentration of power in the hands of a single person; of the salutariness of the unity of society and government, the leaders and the people; of the inadmissibility of public conflict[17]; of the need for each to take care of their own: the leaders to concentrate on governing and the ordinary people to putting in an honest day's work.

When describing the authoritarian syndrome in terms of values and ideas, one should not forget that they are only the tip of the cultural iceberg. Its "below the surface" part represents stereotypes of behavior – subjects difficult to verbalize but very important for understanding the mechanisms of influence of culture on the formation of political institutions.

The threat of "authoritarian syndrome" to a democratic transition may take different forms and will depend first on how strong and how widespread its hold on society and, second, on the nature of the democratic transition. The first is obvious, but the second requires some explanation.

Democratization (the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule) represents a progression towards a significantly more complicated social system, and therefore involves a culture clash between the more innovative-progressive and the more conservative sectors of society. This conflict is bound to involve the elites. The models of exclusively "bottom-up" or exclusively "top-down" democracy do not match reality. The talk is always of the interaction between the elite and the rest of society. But the demands of the cultural situation among the elite and society as a whole that are necessary for the success of democratization vary enormously depending on the type of transition and its specific conditions.

Most "culturally inoffensive" is the transition which Fareed Zakaria calls an "unintended political effect"[18] of economic liberalization. Such a liberalization starts with pragmatic political slogans, which can be far from the ideals of liberal

democracy. But it introduces liberal economic practices and provokes its inter-
action with culture, social structure and political institutions. Gradually, this
interaction may lead (or not lead) to changes in social culture favouring
democracy.

In this version, the incidence of authoritarian syndrome at the outset of eco-
nomic liberalization poses no political threat to future democratization. The
institutions of political democracy do not appear immediately but after several
decades, in the course of which society becomes accustomed to the new con-
ditions as authoritarian values, ideas and stereotypes gradually lose (if they lose)
their dominant position in the social culture.

Similarly, the elite do not need to possess a system of consistent liberal values
and ideas from the very start: liberal innovations in economics do not need to be
accepted as values (it is sufficient that they are included in the spectrum of
actions that are culturally acceptable). Thus elites can "allow themselves the
luxury" of the gradual liberalization of their own consciousness. It is this very
cultural inoffensiveness which is, in my opinion, one of the main reasons for the
success – more often than not – of this particular form of democratization.

A very different situation arises in cases where democratization begins
without an economic "overture", i.e. with the immediate construction of political
institutions. In the best-case scenario, this involves a social culture which at the
onset of the transition to democracy is, as a rule, relatively undeveloped in terms
of liberal values and ideas and, at worst, demonstrates a deep-seated and extreme
authoritarian syndrome. In the latter case, a successful start to democratization
requires at least a modest decline in authoritarianism.

In a case such as this the demands on the reformist elite are extremely high if
democracy is to succeed: the elite need to be immersed in liberal values, be able to
reach agreement with its ideological opponents, resist the likely wave of social
ressentiment, be aware of the factors which trigger such ressentiment and be able
to alleviate it. In a word, the elite need the sort of wisdom, knowledge and experi-
ence it is almost impossible to come by. It is hardly surprising that the likelihood
of failure of the democratic forces in such a situation is extremely high.

The destruction of nascent democratic institutions may occur in a number of
ways. It may happen gradually through the gradual infiltration of authoritarian
practices into the material of everyday operations of formally democratic institu-
tions. I refer to the growing use of a variety of restrictions on political competi-
tion, media freedom and independence of the judiciary, the spread of
authoritarian-style relationships within political institutions and between
members of the public and the authorities, the displacement or departure from
the structures of power of people who do not fit this style and the growth of pop-
ularity of politicians using authoritarian slogans. As a result, democratic institu-
tions are transformed into institutions of authoritarian power. A little later, the
changes which have occurred are consolidated in law and other regulations. In
point of fact, this is what happened in the Russia of the 2000s.[19]

Sometimes the dismantling of democratic institutions may occur relatively
rapidly – as a result of a coup with active or passive popular support or as a

result of the democratic empowerment of those who espouse as their political objective opposition to the "pseudo-democratic chaos".

However, regardless of the speed of the retreat from democracy, a necessary condition of its success is an occurrence of what, since Max Scheler's times, political science has referred to as *ressentiment* (resentment, disappointment and disenchantment) and which, in the political practice of Spain at the late 1970s, and thereafter in Latin America, began to be referred to as "el desencanto".[20]

In societies in the process of a transition to democracy, *ressentiment* is evident primarily in the triggering of "authoritarian syndrome" (i.e. authoritarian syndrome becomes stronger than at the onset of the democratization process and some or all of its characteristics become dominant features within the national culture). In other words, we are talking about a splash of rejection of democracy at numerous levels – cognitive, emotional, and behavioural – and in terms of values.

Ressentiment is to a greater or lesser degree a virtually universal feature of the transition to democracy. Increased ressentiment has been seen in the overwhelming majority of countries caught up in the "third wave" of democratization, including those in which the initial steps in the transition to democracy encountered a rush of public enthusiasm (the USSR, Spain, Portugal, etc.).

The reasons for the triggering of authoritarian syndrome can be many and varied – disillusionment and disappointment with ineffective government, rising social inequality, corruption, a deterioration in status or material conditions and the collapse of the normal fabric of everyday life, along with the need to adapt to new, unfamiliar and more challenging conditions. The process by which all these circumstances trigger the authoritarian syndrome is a growing dissatisfaction with the situation. Taking into account the mechanisms initiating such dissatisfaction, most of these circumstances can be classed as frustrators, i.e. obstacles to the achievement of aims engendering a wish to get around or overcome these obstacles.

In societies where what Inglehart refers to as "modern culture" is relatively undeveloped – and this applies to most of the countries that have embarked on the transition to democracy since the beginning of the twentieth century – economic growth can play an extremely frustrating role.

The frustrating effect of economic growth in such societies is caused by two factors. One of them is the rise in social envy against a background of increased inequality caused by positive movement in the economy. This phenomenon is evident not only in societies in transition but also in societies with stable modern and even post-modern cultures. The other factor is specific to societies which are only just beginning the process of modernization. This is a tendency to have chimerical aspirations,[21] which are the result of a lack of development of a type of behaviour which I call "achievement behaviour", and above all – one of key components of such behaviour – realistic goal setting.[22]

The tendency towards chimerical aspirations is demonstrated by the fact that during periods of economic growth, given growth in the level of performance ("I have", for example, gives the level of income), the level of aspiration ("I want")

increases at a much faster rate than the level of expectation ("I can"). The
growing gap between aspirations and expectations[23] causes frustration and, as a
result, aggressiveness and, sometimes, social unrest. Incidentally, where an eco-
nomic downturn occurs in these communities, the level of aspiration declines
sharply, the gap between that and the level of expectation is reduced and frustra-
tion abates. In this respect, these communities differ from those with developed
modern and even post-modern cultures where frustrations are reduced in times
of economic growth and increase during economic downturns.[24]

As discussed, waves of *ressentiment* are common to the overwhelming major-
ity of societies in transition, but their strength varies considerably from one
country to the next. Apart from anything else, these differences are linked to the
presence or absence within the national culture of elements working against
ressentiment.

Such elements include identification with the community of successful demo-
cracies. The influence of this factor is easily traceable in the Eastern European and
Baltic states. The feeling of belonging to the democratic West was manifest there
to varying degrees throughout the whole period of totalitarian rule, and at the time
of the collapse of the Soviet empire, it was among the dominant elements of the
culture. The feeling of identifying with the West and the efforts to institutionalize
this were, for Eastern Bloc countries, one of the main motivators of democrat-
ization. It is likely that the desire to unite with the West was for them as important
a factor of democratization as the longing for national independence. The latter is
understood in two ways – as a way out of the Soviet (Russian) sphere of influence,
and as a restoration of the institutions of democracy destroyed by the Soviet Union.
As the process of transition developed and problems arose associated with the
same, their Western orientation significantly reduced the level of *ressentiment* and
prevented the possibility of an authoritarian backlash.

In Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, the orientation towards the West also played
– and continues to play – a role in blocking authoritarian syndrome. According
to most sociological surveys, "Westernism" is closely associated in the Russian
public consciousness with democratic values, while Slavophilism, Eurasianism
and other forms of Russian opposition to the West have positive correlation with
the elements of authoritarian syndrome.

However, the incidence of Westernism in Russia is much lower than in
Eastern Europe and of a rather different quality – a large proportion of those ori-
ented towards the West regard Russia as less a part and more a partner of the
West. The relative weakness of Westernism in Russian culture can be explained
by the fact that here it has traditionally come up against "velikoderzhavnost'"
("Great power-ness") – the vision of Russia not as one among a community of
equals but more as an independent player on the global stage that incites fear and
therefore respect[25] and is in a position to impose its will on others.

"Great power-ness" has been an ever-present component of the Russian iden-
tity at least since the eighteenth century.[26] The nineteenth century saw the estab-
lishment within Russian culture of a rather close link between "Great
power-ness" and anti-Westernism. What is more, with time anti-Westernism

became increasingly closely identified as a supplementary element of "Great power-ness". It reached its zenith during the Soviet period and the attempt by Mikhail Gorbachev to free "Great power-ness" of anti-Westernism ended, as we know, in failure.

Modern Russian culture retains the interdependence between "Great power-ness" and anti-Westernism. Thus today, as in earlier times, pro-Western movements and "Great power-ness" play a zero sum game against each other within Russian culture; the more widespread "Great power-ness" the less popular Westernism becomes, and vice versa. It is no coincidence that the growth in "Great power" sentiment evident in Russia in pre-crisis years (until 2008)[27] brought with it increased anti-Westernism; and in the post-crisis period, when the pathos of "Great power" became somewhat weaker, the attitude toward the West became a little bit better. According to data from the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Sciences, between 1995 and 2007 the number of Russians who reacted positively to the mention of the US fell from 77 to 37 per cent and the proportion of those who reacted with animosity to such a mention grew from 9 to 40 per cent. Western Europe's image also suffered a blow: between 2002 and 2007 the average number of negative features of Western Europe referred to by respondents grew significantly – from 37 to 45 per cent. Top of these negative features were: "oppression" – a rise from 19 to 34 per cent; "threat" – from 43 to 57 per cent; "weakness" – from 12 to 25 per cent; "moral decay" – from 33 to 45 per cent and "crisis" – from 14 to 24 per cent[28]. The economic crisis 2008–10 has weakened the confidence of Russians in the "Great power-ness" future of the country. According to VCIOM public opinion polls, the percentage of those who believe that in 15–20 years Russia will become a great power has declined in this period from 50 to 36 per cent.[29] At the same time, the number of Russians with a "somewhat positive" attitude to the European Union and NATO increased respectively from 48 to 55 per cent and from 12 to 22 per cent[30].

The presence within the culture of elements capable of counterbalancing *ressentiment* significantly eases – for the reformist elite – the process of democratic transition.

Where there are no such elements or where they are weak, the democratic elite needs to think about creating ways of counterbalancing this – in particular, of developing systems to transform an authoritarian culture into a democratic one. Even Montesquieu and Tocqueville wrote about the particular role the deliberate creation of values and behavioural stereotypes plays in the development and workings of democracy – though not, of course, in quite those words.[31] Many years later, in 1944, one of the twentieth century's most brilliant psychologists, Kurt Lewin, wrote of the need to apply systematic efforts towards the transformation of the culture created in Nazi Germany.[32]

I suggest that any series of measures aimed at the cultural "reprogramming" of a society in transition should at the very least include the following:

• the deliberate destruction of the myths, values, ideas and stereotypes of authoritarian culture and the promotion of liberal culture using electronic

media, the internet, and secondary and higher education institutions (giving society an "injection" of liberal values);
- large scale education for democratic management of all levels of government (Kurt Lewin considered it a primary tool in the efforts towards movement from a totalitarian to a democratic culture);[33]
- state support for the development of civil society structures and other democratic practices within public life;
- a national policy aimed at increasing (or at least not allowing a decrease in) the social status of groups within society having most influence on cultural transformation (teachers, lecturers, artists, scientists and journalists) and the widest possible involvement by representatives of these groups in working with the government.

Of course, the listed measures do not guarantee the absence of *ressentiment*. They can, however, reduce its force.

A failure to appreciate the importance and even the rejection of the idea of cultural reprogramming is typical of many liberal reformers.[34] Ideologically, this is linked to the negative attitude typical of liberals towards any form of state encroachment upon an area of individual choice.

A reminder of culture as a function of economic and socio-structural variables serves as the pragmatic basis for this position. One of the common manifestations of this view today is the claim that the development of the middle class represents the best possible guarantee of the irreversibility of the conversion to democracy. Numerous references to the fact that the middle class may possess different value systems and that, depending on the value system, it is capable of being an effective support either for a democratic or for a totalitarian regime[35] are, as a rule, ignored.

Whatever the explanation for this underestimation of democratization's cultural factor, it normally goes punished. For that reason, I fully agree with Kurt Lewin when he asserts that:

the democratic leader who wants to transform the atmosphere of a group into the democratic one has to be in power and has to use his power for active re-education and that the democratic principle of tolerance for others has one significant limitation: no less necessary is "a democratic intolerance to intolerable.[36]

In any discussion of the substantial aspects of the reconstruction of a culture along democratic lines, we should bear in mind that its subject matter is not authoritarian culture in its pure form, but a transition-type culture, i.e. a culture which is far from being consistent, which contains elements of authoritarian syndrome in at times bizarre combinations with elements which are very alien to it.

Among the dangerous illusions most frequently encountered in the culture of societies in transition is the combination of forms of extreme individualism with equally extreme paternalist expectations of the role of the state. In everyday

language, this strange hybrid of individualist and collectivist principles can be expressed as follows: I have the right to do as I please, I owe society and the state nothing – but society and the state are bound to guarantee my well-being.

Such "individualist paternalism" is incompatible either with mature authoritarian or with mature democratic culture. However, it is easy to find in societies with a decaying or, conversely, growing left-wing authoritarian regime, as well as in societies that have liberated themselves from the left-wing authoritarian regime but have not yet completed the transition to democracy. It was widespread in the USSR prior to the downfall of the Communist regime and predominates in post-Soviet Russia today.[37] It is also typical of the former Soviet republics to a greater or lesser degree, as well as of the former Eastern Bloc and modern Venezuela.

The more ingrained "individualist paternalism" is within a society in the process of democratization, the starker the choice facing that society: a rejection of simplistic ideas of the rights of the individual and the social role of the state, the creation of an effective market economy, and a stable democratic political system, or the return to an authoritarian regime, possibly even more corrupt and significantly less effective than the regime which existed prior to the attempt to democratize.

The answer to the question of how many failed attempts at democratization a country is able to endure before it falls apart largely depends on the state of its culture.

Notes

1 In the most general of terms, it is possible to divide such regimes into "traditional" authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (see, for example: Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 12).

2 See: Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, George Allen & Unwin, 1944, p. 271.

3 See for example: Talcott Parsons, *O sotsialnykh sistemakh* (*About social systems*), pub. Akademicheskiy proekt, 2002; Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, The Free Press, 1968; David McClelland, *Human Motivation*, CUP, 1987; Harry Triandis, *Culture and Social Behavior*, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 1994; Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values*, Sage Publications, 1984; Shalom H. Schwartz, and W. Bilsky, "Toward A Universal Psychological Structure of Human Values" in: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1987, Vol. 53, No 3, pp. 550–562, and others.

4 See, for example: Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts" in: *World Politics*, 1997, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 155–183 and Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, CUP, 1991.

5 See Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy" in: *American Political Science Review*, 1959, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 69–105; Mancur Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force" in: *Journal of Economic History*, 1963, Vol. 23, No 4, pp. 529–552; Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad*, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2003, and others.

6 See Ronald Inglehart and W.E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values" in: *American Political Science Review*, 2000, Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 19–51; Ronald Inglehart, "How Solid Is Mass Support for Democracy: And How Can We Measure It?" in: *Political Science and Politics*, 2003, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 51–57.

7 See: Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

8 See: Robert Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, Yale University Press, 1991, p. 262.

9 On the concept of personal culture, see Ronald Fischer, "Congruence and Functions of Personal and Cultural Values: Do My Values Reflect My Culture's Values?" in: *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 2006, Vol. 32, Issue 11, pp. 1419–1431; Jaan Valsiner, "Personal culture and conduct of value" in: *Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology*, 2007, Vol. 1, No 2, pp. 59–65; Yuri Rozhdestvensky, *Vedenie v kulturovedenie* (*Cultural Studies: Introduction*), Dobrosvet, 2000.

10 Some examples to clarify the difference between what I call collective culture and personal culture: the content of the Gospel is certainly a part of collective culture of any Christian country, whereas understanding of the content of the Gospel by citizens of this country are components of a set of its personal cultures; an article of the Constitution (e.g. about the freedom of speech) is a part of collective culture of the country, whereas understanding of freedom of speech by citizens of this country belong to its set of personal cultures. Collective culture can exist at a societal level, as well as at a group level.

11 For the construction of a theoretical model of the volatility of personal culture we are able to adopt the concept – popular in identity theory – of salience. Sheldon Stryker and Peter Burke define identity salience "as the probability that an identity will be invoked across a variety of situations, or alternatively across persons in a given situation" (Sheldon Stryker and Peter Burke, "The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory" in: *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 2000, Vol. 63, No. 4, p. 286). According to Richard Serpe and Sheldon Stryker, changes in the salience of identities occur when people are unable to find or to use the opportunity to act in a way consistent with their highly salient identities (Richard Serpe and Sheldon Stryker, "The Construction of Self and Reconstruction of Social Relationships" in: Edward Lawer and Barry Markovsky (eds), *Advances in Group Processes: A Research Annual*, JAI Press, 1987, pp. 41–66 – cited in: Sheldon Stryker and Peter Burke, *The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory*, pp. 286–287).

12 Max Scheler called *ressentiment* "the self-poisoning of the mind" and understood it as a "lasting mental attitude, caused by the systematic repression of certain emotions and affects. … The emotions and affects primarily concerned are revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to detract, and spite" (Max Scheler, *Ressentiment*, trans. William H. Holdheim, Noonday, 1973, pp. 45–46). According to Max Scheler, "ressentiment is therefore chiefly confined to those who … fruitlessly resent the sting of authority" (ibid., p. 48).

13 Friedrich von Hayek, George Orwell and Hans Eysenck have to be mentioned among the first researchers who described the phenomenon of left-wing authoritarianism (see, for example: Friedrich von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, University of Chicago Press, 1944; George Orwell, *Notes on Nationalism*, 1945, http://orwell.ru/library/essays/nationalism/english/e_nat (accessed 16 March 2012); and Hans Eysenck, *The Psychology of Politics*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954).

14 This can perhaps be explained by cultural invariance of the psychological mechanism triggering authoritarian syndrome (internally motivated or inducing an external renunciation of individual liberty and personal responsibility for the benefit of traditional or pseudo-traditional relationships of a paternalist nature), and of the organizational conditions to satisfy the requirement for a renunciation of liberty.

15 By way of illustration readers should judge for themselves the peculiarities of the attitude to Lenin among those peasants, who, in the winter of 1924, carried placards reading "Lenin's tomb is the cradle of humanity" past the newly-built mausoleum.

16 See: Friedrich Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, Routledge, 2005, p. 152.

17 I am reminded here of the colourful expression of General L. Dubelt cited by Alexander Herzen in *Byloe i dumy* (*My Past and Thoughts*), who characterized the authoritarian regimes of the nineteenth century whose pomp, and conviction of their own legitimacy, set them apart from many of the authoritarian regimes of more recent times: "We are not France, where the government is at loggerheads with the parties, where they pull it into the mud; we have *paternal* rule, everything is done as privately as possible" (*Buloe i dumy*, Volume one, Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoy lituratury, 1962, pp. 382–383).

18 See: Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom*, p. 84.

19 For more detail on the transformation of Russia's political system during this period, see, for example: Mark Urnov and Valeriya Kasamara, *Sovremennaya Rossiya: Vyzovy i otvety* (*Modern Russia: Challenges and Responses*), FAP "Ekspertiza", 2005, pp. 25–44; and Mark Urnov, "Transformatsiya politicheshkogo rezhima v Rossii: soderzhanie i vozmozhnye posledstviya (The transformation of the political regime in Russia: the content and the possible consequences)" in: Yuri Krasin (ed.) *Demoktratiya i federalizm v Rossii* (*Democracy and Federalism in Russia*), ROSSPEN, 2007, pp. 87–103.

20 See: Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 283–4.

21 This term (*les aspirations chimériques*) was introduced by the Belgian psychologist Francine Robaye in 1957 (Francine Robaye, *Niveaux d'aspiration et d'expectation*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1957, p. 187).

22 On the structure of achievement behavior see Mark Urnov *Emotsii v politcheskom povedenie* (*Emotion in Political Behavior*), Aspect Press, 2008. On the realistic goal setting see Garry Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth-Century England*, Gregg Revivals, 1993, p. 27; Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts*, American Psychological Association, 1997, p. 227; Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, Harper & Row, 1970, p. 31. On the connection between the realistic goal setting and the level of maturity of achievement motivation, see John W. Atkinson, "Motivational Determinants of Risk-taking Behavior" in: *Psychological Review*, 1957, Vol. 64, No. 6, Part 1, pp. 359–372.

23 Based on strictly theoretical arguments, I would point out that we are talking of the gap between the level of aspiration and the level of expectation and not between the level of aspiration and the level of performance. The thing is that giving the growth of mismatch between "what I want" and "what I have" as the reason for the growth in public aggressiveness is typical of most of political psychology's models of this phenomenon (see, for example: James Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution" in: *American Sociological Review*, 1962, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 5–19; Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton University Press, 1970; Morton Deutsch, "Field Theory in Social Psychology" in: Gardner Lindzey and Elliott Aronson (eds), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, Addison-Wesley, 1968, pp. 412–487). However, such an explanation of aggressiveness implicitly assumes too primitive a behavioral model of *homo politicus*. In particular, it is postulated that *homo politicus* resorts to aggressiveness in any situation where there is a significant difference between what he wants and what he has, irrespective of whether obstacles exist in the way of the realization of his desires. Furthermore, this explanation contradicts the understanding of frustration adopted in psychology and leads to the confusion of the concepts of frustration and relative deprivation. The view of the dynamic of aggressiveness as a function of the disconnection between "what I have" and "what I can" is free of such flaws (for more detail, see Mark Urnov's *Emotsii v politcheskom povedenie* (*Emotion in Political Behavior*).

24 The mounting frustration within society in conditions of economic growth and its dissipation during the period of the economic crisis in Russia is described in Mark Urnov's *Emotsii v politcheskom povedenie* (*Emotion in Political Behavior*). Examples of other countries at relatively early stages of modernization where increased frustration and social tension were evident against economic growth are: Greece in the 1950s

and 1960s, Spain in the 1960s, Brazil in the late 1960s/early 1970s, Taiwan and South Korea in the 1960s–1980s, Iran and China in the 1980s (Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 70–72), and Egypt, Tunisia and Libya in 2011.

25 In my 2004 research study "Sindrom radikal'nogo avtoritarizma v rossiyskom massovom soznanii (Syndrome of radical authoritarianism in Russian mass consciousness)", about 60 per cent of Russians questioned agreed with the statement that "Russia should incite fear as only then will it be respected" (Mark Urnov and Valeriya Kasamara, *Sovremennaya Rossiya: Vyzovy i otvety* (*Modern Russia: Challenges and Responses*), p. 54).

26 During the twentieth century there were two relatively short periods in Russia (each of about ten years) when "Great power-ness" was unpopular: between 1917 until the mid-1920s, and from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. These two periods of "atypical" sentiment had different causes and their influence on political practice was very different, but in both cases they were replaced with powerful tides of "Great power-ness" and nationalism.

27 An implicit sign of the strength of such feelings was the virtual absence within the consciousness, either of the Russian public or of the elite, of any healthy feeling of self-irony in relation to the general concern for the country's greatness. As a result, the everyday incidences of "Great power-related" pathos became rather comic, for example, the appearance on shop counters of "Imperial" smoked sausage.

28 See: *Rossiyskaya identichnost' v sotsiologicheskom izmerenii* (*Russian identity in the sociological dimension*), Moscow, 2007.

29 http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=269&uid=13805 (accessed 16 March 2012).

30 http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=268&uid=13711 (accessed 16 March 2012).

31 The former said that "It is in a republican government that the whole power of education is required" (Charles-Louis Montesquieu, Baron of Secondat, *O dukhe zakonov* (*The Spirit of the Laws*), Mysl', 1999, p. 39). The latter wrote that "The first duty which is at this time imposed upon those who direct our affairs is to educate the democracy; to warm its faith, if that be possible; to purify its morals; to direct its energies; to substitute a knowledge of business for its inexperience and an acquaintance with its true interests for its blind propensities …" If this does not happen then democracy – as it was in France at the time of the Revolution – will turn out to be "under the power of wild instincts" (Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Henry Reeve, 1838 (republished 2003), pp. 16–17).

32 See: Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts*, p. 46.

33 See: ibid., p. 37.

34 In this they differ from totalitarian reformers. The latter place a high price on the role of culture in shoring up the political regime and as soon as they seized power, they begin to carry out some or other form of "cultural revolution".

35 For more detail, see Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man. The Social Basis of Politics*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 127–179.

36 Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts*, pp. 38, 36.

37 I refer again to my research of 2004. In it, given the choice between "The state is obliged to guarantee for everybody proper work and an adequate standard of living" and "The state should take care only of the well-being of those who are genuinely unable to work (senior citizens, children and the disabled)", 68 per cent of respondents opted for the former, 28 per cent the latter and 4 per cent were undecided. I would point out that the view of the state as a defender and protector is not incompatible with deep-seated mistrust of it. In the same research study 72 per cent of Russian respondents agreed with the statement that "most officials in Russia are thieves" and just as many (75 per cent) stated that "key sectors such as the electricity, the coal and oil industries and the railways should be state-owned" (Mark Urnov and Valeriya Kasamara, *Sovremennaya Rossiya: Vyzovy i otvety* (*Modern Russia: Challenges and Responses*), pp. 56, 62).