Transcendentalism as the Special Type of Philosophizing and Transcendental Paradigm of Philosophy

«Only the revival of Kant's transcendentalism can be an [possible] outlet for contemporary philosophy»

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Abstract. In the paper we have attempted to consider Kant's transcendental philosophy as a special type of philosophizing and the new transcendental paradigm, which differs from both the ‘object’ metaphysics of Antiquity and ‘subject’ metaphysics of the Modern Age (transcendent — transcendental — immanent metaphysics). For this purpose we shall introduce the methodological terms ‘transcendental shift’ and ‘transcendental perspective’. The basis for such representation of transcendentalism is the cognitive and semantic reading of the Critique and theory of ‘two aspects’. While in classical metaphysics cognition is interpreted as a relation between empirical subject and object, in transcendental metaphysics (perspective) ‘possible experience’ (Erfahrung) shall be understood as a relation between ‘consciousness generally’ (transcendental subject) and ‘thing-in-general’ (transcendental object). In this, Kant's transcendentalism, in contrast to classical contemplative metaphysics, acts as an ‘experimental’ metaphysics and the transcendentality is defined as the intermediate between the immanent and transcendent ontological area (as a “instrumental” component of our cognition).

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In the second half of the XXth century the second ‘discovery’ of Kant, associated with conceptual change in the understanding of transcendentalism — the transition from the traditional ontological theory of “two worlds” to the theory of “two aspects” based on the epistemic, or the cognitive and semantic, reading of Critique, arises. In this regard, R.Hanna writes that the development of contemporary philosophy (in the face of two major traditions: analytic and continental) is largely predetermined by Kant’s transcendentalism, and the XXth century may be named as the post-Kantian century; M.Foucault echoes him and says that Kant “stands at the beginning of a new method of philosophizing”. The Russian philosopher A. Ogurtsov emphasizes in his book devoted to the contemporary philosophy of science philosophy of science (2011) that only the revival of transcendentalism (as the "removal" of the alternative of naturalism/realism («Back to things!») and constructivism («Nothing is given. All is our construction!») can be the outlet for the contemporary philosophy/philosophy of science of science (see epigraph). This allows us to consider Kant's transcendentalism not just as one of the particular philosophical theory, but as the basis of a new — transcendental — paradigm (resp. type) of philosophy (philosophizing).

[Anticipating our subsequent exposition, let us say a few words about the methodology of our approach. It presents itself as meta-research of Kantian transcendentalism, the intention of which is aimed at not so much the detailed textual reproduction of Kant's thoughts themselves (concepts) "within," as much as on the reflexive influence of main passages of Kantian thoughts so as to identify and learn how to apply them, that is, we will follow the letter, but the spirit of Kantian thoughts. At the same time we will try not to consider Kant's transcendentalism from the point of view of some other philosophy, for example Hegel or Husserl, which treated transcendentalism as the precursor to their philosophy, that is, “built” Kantian transcendentalism in their own concept, but rather try to identify the main intentions of transcendentalism, cleansed of its particulars. By this, we claim to analyze the position of meta-transcendentalism].

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As the starting point for our interpretation of the transcendentalism we take the classical paradigm of epistemology, for which the main question is the relation of a subject to an object what

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4 See his inaugural lecture «L’Ordre du discours», 1970.

can be represented in binary scheme S(subject) — O(object). On this scale, we also mark the result of our knowledge or the interaction between the subject (S) and the object (O) in the process of cognition – the experience (or experienced knowledge; Ger. ‘Erfahrung’), which is located in the middle of the scale. In this case the binary scheme turns into a ternary one: S — Erfahrung — O.

According to key [KrV, B 25] of Critique, where transcendental philosophy (TrPh) is defined as “…knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori”, the transition to transcendentalism is based on transcendental 'shift' from studies of the [empirical] objects (things) to the right side of the scale in the direction to the subject, but rather into the intermediate between subject and object area of experienced knowledge, — which is the area of the transcendentality (as a specific ontological area). In other words, the transcendental shift from things (empirical perspective) to [a priori] conditions of their possibility (transcendental perspective) is a specific feature which expressed the main and common sense of Kant's transcendentalism. If empiricism (naturalism) is aimed at studying the things so transcendentalism is aimed at determining and researching the conditions of the possibility of their existence (antique metaphysics; ontological transcendentalism) or cognition (Kant; epistemological transcendentalism).

The comparison of the transcendental with the empirical, which we define in the presented scheme as the distinction between empirical and transcendental perspectives is crucial for the understanding of the transcendentality. If the empirical perspective believes the knowledge we receive to be the result of affection of our sensibility, the transcendental perspective believes the knowledge to be the result of our faculty of cognition (sensible vs. non-sensible / intelligible / transcendental cause/causality; problem of double affection). Transcendentalism does not negate the empirical approach, but sort of "builds" it into a more general position, based on the foundation of our knowledge with the necessity of a priori components present.

6 Kant equates Erfahrung and Empirische Erkenntnis [KrV, B147–8].
7 Cf.: "...but with our mode (manner) of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori".
8 Also see Kant’s notes from Prolegomena: «The word ‘transcendental’, which with me means a reference of our cognition, i.e., not to things, but only to the cognitive faculty...».
9 I introduce the concept “transcendental shift” for the characteristics of Kant's transcendentalism in my article “Kant’s transcendentalism as the transcendental paradigm of philosophizing” (see: Katreshko S.L., Transcendentalizm Kanta kak transcendental’naja paradigma filosofstvovanija. In: Kantovskiy sbornik [The Kantovsky sbornik], 2014, №2 (48), s.11–25 (http://journals.kantiana.ru/kant_collection/1775/5059; in Russian).
10 It may be noted that (Kant's) transcendentalism conceptually corresponds to (Aristotle's) metaphysics as knowledge of the first principles (causes) of things. In this sense, antique metaphysics (Plato, Aristotle, Neoplatonists, and others) can be defined as ontological transcendentalism unlike rising to Kant epistemological transcendentalism.
11 We note that we introduce the understanding of the transcendental perspective, which differs somewhat as the concept of “transcendental perspective” in the works (Palmquist, 1987; Allison, 2004), although it corresponds with them. For us, the transcendental perspective is the transcendental shift towards study of the “mode of our cognition” (B25), the definition of the naive-realistic or empirical state point of view (perspectives) on cognition of the impact of the object (thing) on the subject (mind).
12 For us, the transcendental perspective is the transcendental shift towards study of the “mode of our cognition” (B25), the definition of the naive-realistic or empirical state point of view (perspectives) on cognition of the impact of the object (thing) on the subject (mind).
However, the aforesaid Kant's *transcendental shift* is not defined quite and refers to the interval of the possible transcendental arrangement on the right side of the scale between *objective* experience and the *subjective* content of our consciousness. That's why it's possible to fix three main interpretations of Kant's transcendentalism.

Historically first, but not according to the spirit of Kant's transcendentalism, is the *phenomenalist* interpretation\(^ {13} \), which could be called the theory of "two objects" or "two worlds". Here, the transcendental (resp. a priori) corresponds with the sphere of the mental, and, accordingly, the things-in-themselves and things-as-they-appear-to-us belong to two different worlds — the physical (objective) and the mental (subjective). Thereby, transcendentalism approaches the phenomenalism of Berkeley.

\[ \text{Thing (Object)} \quad \{ \text{Mode of our cognition} \} \quad \text{Consciousness (Subject)} \]

\[ \text{Transcendental shift} \]

Even Kant himself indicates the error of a similar interpretation, with which the second edition of his *Critique* is complimented by the new section (title 'The Refutation of Idealism'), with the goal of refuting such phenomenalist reading of his transcendentalism.

The theory of two-aspect interpretation of transcendentalism is more suitable to the spirit of transcendentalism, in which Kant's thing-in-itself and thing-as-it-appears-to-us are not considered two different ontological entities ('objects'), but as «two sides,» or a "two-fold point of consideration/two modes of representation" of one and the same real-life object [KrV, BXVIIln]\(^ {14} \). Accordingly, the Kantian things-as-they-appear-to-us already to do not relate to the area of the mental (subjective). In such interpretation the transcendental shift does not displace the intention of the study to the right limit to the analysis of the [empirical] subject, i.e. it does not immerse us in the study of the content of consciousness, but stops at the middle area of the transcendentality, which Kant calls "the mode (faculty) of cognition", or the area of *Erfahrung* on our epistemic scale\(^ {15} \).

The second interpretation examines transcendentalism as a sort of idealism (resp. metaphysics of Platonistic type\(^ {16} \)): the transcendental shift is directed to the upper right, to the Platonic world of the Forms. The "condition of possibility" is thought of as belonging to another – intelligible – world\(^ {17} \). This interpretation was developed in classic German idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), which can rightfully be called transcendental idealism, whereas Kant's transcendentalism characterizes as the synthesis of empirical realism and formal idealism. The basis for such an interpretation is the definition of TP from the A–edition, dating back to Wolff's transcendental ontology (cosmology)\(^ {18} \).

\[ \{ \text{A priori Forms as conditions of the possibility of Experience} \} \quad \text{(A–edition)} \]

\[ \text{The intelligible world} \]

\[ \text{Thing (Object)} \quad \text{—} \quad \text{—} \quad \text{Consciousness (Subject)} \]

The first and second interpretations of transcendentalism are based on the defining opposition of "transcendental vs. empirical", but doesn't take into account more subtle differentiation between the a priori and transcendental of "late" Kant, who does not equate *transcendental* to a priori, but

\(^{13}\) See Göttingen review by Ch. Garve (1742–1798) and J.G. Feder (1740–1821) and so on.

\(^{14}\) Cf. “The *Critique*... teaches that the object should be taken in a twofold meaning, namely as appearance or as thing in itself” [KrV, BXXVII].

\(^{15}\) Although, it's not necessary that this interpretation identifies exactly with the theory of the two aspects.

\(^{16}\) We distinguish between the theory of Plato himself and Platonism, in which the ontological status is attributed to Forms.


\(^{18}\) However, such is the antique transcendentalism of Plato, Aristotle, Plotin and so on.
understands transcendental as the possibility of a priori\textsuperscript{19}. In this regard we should pay attention to Kant’s remark in [KrV, B80–1], which states that “not all a priori knowledge should be [included]” in the area of the transcendental, but only the knowledge of its (1) possibility and (2) use in the experience, i.e. objective significance of a priori. Although Kant understands the possibility of a priori, inter alia, as its epigenesis [KrV: B91, 118–9, 127–8, 167; Kant’s ‘subjective deduction’ [A XVI – XVII], the essence of transcendental is associated with (2), i.e. with “objective validity” (Ger. objektiv Gültigkeit) to apply a priori in our [empirical] cognition (Kant’s ‘objective deduction’). Therefore, if a priori can be correlated with the non-platonic subjective realm of consciousness (Cartesian “innate ideas”; 1-st interpretation) or Platonic objectively existing Forms from the realm of the intelligible (2-nd interpretation), the transcendental (as ‘transcendentalism’) correlates with the area of Erfahrung as trans-subjective principles (‘tools’ of cognition) which constitute our “mode of cognition”.

\begin{center}
The intelligible world (transcendent) \\
\hspace{1cm} | (a priori – 2) \\
\hspace{1cm} | \\
Thing (O) — (empirical) — Erfahrung — (a priori – 1) — Consciousness (s) \\
(transcendental)
\end{center}

Thus Kant’s characteristic of transcendentalism as the research of our “mode of cognition” should be understood not subjective and psychologically, in terms of analysis of our faculties of cognition and/or solution of the problem of (epi)genesis of a priori\textsuperscript{20} and not objectively idealistic, but cognitive and semantically [reading of Kant’s Critique] as a solution of the problem of objectivity of a priori representations, i.e. the possibility of their use in experience. Kant tells about the semantic orientation of transcendentalism in a letter to M. Herz (21.02.1772), in which he explicates the idea of his Critique as a response to the following semantic question for the first time: “What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object?” Thus the Kant’s position or transcendentalism in the narrow sense is connected with the solution of “the main transcendental question” about the objectivity (“objective validity”) of a priori representations, which are located in the middle of the epistemic scale\textsuperscript{21}, while the metaphysics developed by Kant's appears as metaphysics of possible experience (see about possible experience below).

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzcd}
\text{Thing (Object)} & \text{‘Mode of our cognition'} & \text{Consciousness (Subject)} \\
\text{Transcendental shift} \\
\end{tikzcd}
\end{center}

Such (the third) interpretation which places its basic definition of TP from the B–edition. In this way, transcendentalism is primarily viewed not as ontology, but as epistemology, as the study and analysis of the epistemic conditions of possibility human cognition: the transcendental method (neo-Kantianism), the transcendental arguments (analytic philosophy) and so on.

\{General note\} We started our interpretation with the exposition of the transcendental shift, based on the definition B–edition, and now we are going to the exposition of the second of its stages — the metaphysical

\textsuperscript{19} Agreeing with N. Hinske, the transcendental on the third stage of Kant’s evolution (= B–edition of Critique) is understood exactly such (Hinske, N Kants Begriff des Transzendentalen und die Problematik seiner Begriffsgeschichte/ In: Kant–Studien, 1973. V.64. S.56 – 62).

\textsuperscript{20} See Kant’s Refl. 4900/4901: 1) “I concern myself not with the evolution of concepts, like Tetens (all actions by means of which concepts are produced), nor with their analysis, like Lambert, but solely with their objective validity” (Ref. 4900); 2) “Tetens investigates the concept of pure reason merely subjectively (human nature), I investigate them objectively. The former analysis is empirical, the latter transcendental” (Ref. 4901) [AA 18:23].

\textsuperscript{21} On one hand, this corresponds with the theory of “two aspects,” in which the Kantian things-in-themselves and things-as-they-appear-to-us are viewed not as two different ontological essences, but as “dual methods”: the sensual and the rational [methods] consideration of the same subject [KrV, BXXVII]. On the other hand, the given position of the transcendental between the objective and subjective allows one to speak of its special ontological status.
shift, based on the definition A–edition. This logically justified, but historically we had to change the order of expositions and start from definition A–edition. In this case, the scheme of presentation would be such:

\[
\text{[empirical] Thing (O)} \quad \text{[possible] Thing} \quad \text{[possible] Experience/Erfahrung (Thing—in—general)}
\]

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However, the described first phase of the transcendental shift does not yet characterize the specifics of Kant’s transcendentalism, but sets a range of à la transcendental concepts. This “withdrawal” of subject and object in favor of some primary in respect to the subject and object of the given occurs, for example, in Empiriocriticism, Marxism, Popper’s three-worlds-theory and other non-classical philosophical systems. Thus, Kant stands at the origins of the transcendental paradigm of philosophizing, the transition to which is connected with overcoming both objective (Antiquity) and subjective (Modern Era) points of view and moving the intention of research to the middle between object and subject area which Kant associates with experience/Erfahrung.

It worth noting that the concept of the mature Plato is the first ancestor of this type of philosophizing, where Forms are postulated as a necessary component of cognition without which a person “will have nothing on which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning” [Plato, Parmenides, 135c]. Husserl further develops this intention, as Kant’s transcendental shift can be interpreted as a return to some pre-reflective state of mind in the act of cognition, in which neither the subject nor the object opposing it differ yet, and although the intention of our [intentional according to Husserl] consciousness is directed on an object, but the phenomenal given experience, which is the inception of our knowledge, is the primary given for it. Accordingly, subject and object presumed by the classical paradigm as primary appear as secondary entities in transcendental paradigm of philosophizing.

If the thing appears to be the main object of the study of the ancient paradigm of philosophy, i.e. the metaphysics of a thing/object is developing (transcendent metaphysics; meta–physics), and the consciousness/cogito appears to be the object of the classical paradigm of Modern Era (respectively, the metaphysics of a ‘subject’ [immanent metaphysics; meta–psychology] is developing), then the middle area of ‘Erfahrung’ is the object of the transcendental type of philosophizing (or transcendental metaphysics), which appears in the Kant’s transcendentalism:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Thing} & \quad \text{—} \quad \text{Erfahrung} & \quad \text{—} \quad \text{Consciousness} \\
\text{metaphysics of a ‘object’} & \quad \text{—} \quad \text{metaphysics of experience} & \quad \text{—} \quad \text{metaphysics of a ‘subject’} \\
\text{Ancient paradigm} & \quad \text{—} \quad \text{Transcendental paradigm} & \quad \text{—} \quad \text{Classical paradigm} \\
\{ \text{transcendental paradigm of philosophy} \}
\end{align*}
\]

(Note on transcendental ontology) A feature of this type of philosophizing puts forth that that which correlates with its ontology (the realm of the transcendental or the realm of experience) is neither subjective nor objective. The metaphor of a telescope conveys the nature of transcendental ontology well (G. Frege). Suppose that we observe a star with the aid of a telescope; the star itself will have an objective (real) status (which corresponds to the Kantian thing-in-itself). Our existing mental image of it will already be subjective. Let us ask the question: what status will the star have on the lens of the telescope (that can correlate with the Kantian Kantian things-as-they-appear-to-us), which is basically as if between the objective (real) star itself and its subjective (mental) image of our consciousness? Our answer will be that this “image (telescope)” will have a specific

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22 Accordingly, the Kantian shift could be called the transcendental-phenomenological, and Kantian Erfahrung can be correlated with Husserl’s “intentional reality”.

intermediate ontological status — a transcendental status (cf. with Husserl's intentional reality).

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We now proceed to further analysis of Kant's transcendental shift, to the analysis of his second — metaphysical — phase, with which the specifics of Kant's own transcendentalism should be linked. This specifics are largely predetermined, on one hand, by Kant to build his “experimental” metaphysics (by analogy with the experimental science of Modern Era) “new method of thought” [KrV, B XVIII], or transcendental method (Cohen, Natorp). And on the other hand, that by which Kant inherits and develops passages, dating back from the ontology of Wolf, which is directed at the analysis of the possible, and not actual, object. What important here is the definition from the A—edition, where Kant defines the object TrPh in the quality of study of “objects in general”\(^{24}\).

Like any metaphysical method, the transcendental method is in the universalization of the empirically given by its liberation from particular conditions. Actually beginning from Antiquity (Plato, Aristotle, etc) any field of science (meta—physics) deals with the kind of “overcoming of empirical”, but the specific of "scientific" transcendental metaphysics comparing with the previous "school" metaphysics, is largely (though not completely) predetermined by the fact that the object of its generalizations is not a thing or consciousness, but experience. Transcendentalism acts as metaphysics of experience, or (more precisely) metaphysics of possible experience.

However, the determining thing for the 'new method of thought' of the Kantian transcendentalism that distinguishes it from traditional metaphysics is that this is not only the subject which changes, but also the style of philosophizing and foremost, the way of introducing metaphysical abstractions. Traditional metaphysics, being traced back to Aristotle, is a doctrine about essence, which is positioned as something meta-physical, i.e. as fundamentally unobservable underlying-ness in the base ('sub–stance') of the sensuously given. For Kantian “experimental” metaphysics the methodological differentiation of ‘real — possible’ is the essential. The transcendentality, unlike the empirical-actual-ness, acts as possible. Kant, accordingly, is building new metaphysics — the metaphysics of possible experience which acts as the transcendental generalization of empirical experience and in the result of which the structure of "transcendental O — transcendental S", encompassing the empirical relation O — S, is formed:

\[
\text{transcendental O} \rightarrow \{ \text{empirical O }\rightarrow \text{empirical S}\} \rightarrow \text{transcendental S}
\]

Transcendental-metaphysical, unlike essential-metaphysical, acts as a “horizontal” functional generalization of given empirical pattern. It is based on the transition of the transcendental perspective if an object of empirical perception acts as an appearance (phenomenon) or empirically given in the appearance of the thing, which by the thing of transcendental perspective act as an abstract thing-in-general, which Kant identifies with the transcendental object [KrV, A250].

On this subject Kant writes: “The transcendental use [of a conception]… is this, that it is referred to things in general and to itself [= thing-in-itself], but the empirical use, when merely to phenomena [= empirical things, or things-as-it-appears-to-us]” [KrV, B298]\(^{25}\).

As a result of such transcendental generalization the empirical subject and object are converted to, respectively, the consciousness generally [Prol, §20] or a/the transcendental subject (transcendental unity of apperception; TUA) and the object-in-general or the transcendental thing/object (TO), the relation between which predefines the possible experience\(^{26}\). Or, considering the primacy of experience, the possible experience is conceptualized by Kant as the “interaction” of transcendental object and subject. In this case TUA and TO are introduced by Kant in a correlative manner: «the transcendental unity of apperception that all the manifold, given in

\(^{24}\) See: “I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general” [KrV, A11-12]. Cf. with "object in general" in Wolff's transcendental ontology.

\(^{25}\) Cf. with objects in general from TrPh— definition in the A—edition [KrV, A11-12].

\(^{26}\) In English version of this text grammatically with the word “object-in-general” (resp. “consciousness generally”); see below) had to be used the definite article «the», but object-in-general are non-real and abstract objects (our mind’s abstraction), or ens rationis (Kant even calls transcendental object (as ‘something as such’) “= nothing”) and so on (philosophical) sense here is more suitable indefinite article "a".
intuition is united into a conception of the [transcendental] object» [KrV, B140]27:

\[
\text{empirical Subject} \rightarrow \text{ExperiencE/Erfahrung} \leftarrow \text{empirical Object}
\]

\[
\{ \text{possible ExperiencE/Erfahrung} \}
\]

\[
\text{Transcendental Subject} \leftarrow \text{Emp.Ob} \rightarrow \text{Emp.Sub} \rightarrow \text{Transcendental Object}
\]

(\text{consciousness generally})

(Note on Kantian doctrine of “transcendental object”) The development of the doctrine of the “transcendental object,” which conceptually may identify with “object in general” is interesting. In fact, the pre–category of the “transcendental object” is the first transcendental condition of our recognition of things and lays in the basis of other categories. Unfortunately, Kant doesn’t develop and “blocks” this doctrine in B–edition.

However, Kant’s “subjective” and “objective” things-in-themselves, which act as kind of left and right limits of the epistemic scale, should be distinguished from transcendental subject and object. The thing-in-itself and noumenal ‘I’ are not transcendental, but transcendent. According to Kant, their function is negative and is to specify all the cognitive scale the same way as a numerical scale is given through marks ”plus” and ”minus” of infinity (+∞ and −∞), i.e. to mark the limits of our possible cognition. At the same time they are inaccessible for cognition. Transcendental subject and object as the constitutive elements of the possible experience on the scale are between empirical-phenomenal (immanent) and transcendent. Considering this (distinction ‘transcendent vs. transcendental’), the Kantian transcendental shift may be represented as follows:

\[
\{ \text{transcendental} \{ \text{transcendent} \{ \text{empirical} \} \text{transcendental} \} \text{transcendent} \}
\]

\[
\text{noumenal ‘I’} \leftarrow \{ \text{TUA} \leftarrow (\text{emp. S} \leftarrow \text{emp. O}) \leftarrow \text{TO} \} \rightarrow \text{thing-in-itself}
\]

(empirical experience)

\[
\{ \text{area of the transcendental-ness} \}
\]

(possible experience)

Conclusion. A schematically whole shift has two phases: its own displacement and the transcendental generalization and may be represented as follows:

\[
[\text{empirical}] \text{Thing} \leftarrow [\text{possible}] \text{Erfahrung} \leftarrow [\text{empirical}] \text{Consciousness}
\]

\[
\text{(the area of the transcendental-ness)}
\]

\[
\text{transcendental thing/object} \rightarrow \text{transcendental subject}
\]

\[
\text{(thing in general)}
\]

\[
\text{(consciousness generally)}
\]

Appendix-1 (see pp.3–4 above)

On possible understanding of Kant’s transcendentalism

There are two similar, but different definitions of transcendental philosophy (TP) in the 1st [A11–12] and 2nd [B25] editions of Kant’s Critique.

The transcendental shift from things (empirical perspective) to [a priori] conditions of their possibility (transcendental perspective) is a specific feature which expressed the main and common sense of Kant’s transcendentalism in both definitions. If naturalism is aimed at studying the things so transcendentalism is aimed at determining and researching the conditions of the possibility of their existence (ontological transcendentalism) or cognition (epistemological transcendentalism). However, the aforesaid Kant’s transcendental shift is not defined quite and that’s why it’s possible to fix three main interpretations.

27 Cf. with characteristics [KrV, A 250–1]. Let us note that the Kantian transcendental object stands as objective function of our representation of the world and lies (together with categories) as a base of the transcendental ontology, the essence of which can be expressed by the thesis: “We know not [physical] objects, but we know phenomena objectively [‘thing-ly’].” (E. Cassirer).
The first ‘psychological/phenomenalist’ interpretation (so-called Göttingen review) brings Kant's transcendentalism close to Berkley's phenomenalism, which considers the transcendental shift as to the furthest right in the field of consciousness. The interpretation of ‘two worlds’: things-in-themselves belong to the objective reality, and things as they appear to us belong to the subjective reality.

The second ‘metaphysical’ interpretation examines transcendentalism as a sort of idealism: the transcendental shift is directed to the upper right (Platonic world of the Forms). The “condition of possibility” is thought of as belonging to intelligible world. This interpretation was developed in classic German idealism, which can rightfully be called transcendental idealism, whereas Kant's transcendentalism characterizes as the synthesis of empirical realism and formal idealism. The basis for such an interpretation is the definition of TP from A–edition, dating back to Wolff's transcendental ontology (cosmology).

The third ‘epistemic’ interpretation places its basic definition of TP from B–edition as “knowledge [of] the mode of cognition”[B 25] with the goal of justifying the necessary basis we need to have to recognize things of a priori conditions, and the epistemic conditions of their possible cognition. In this way, transcendentalism is primarily viewed as epistemology: transcendental method (neo-Kantianism), or transcendental argument (analytic philosophy). Instead of the “two worlds”, the “two aspects” interpretation is suggested.

The 1st and 2nd interpretations of transcendentalism are based on the defining opposition of “transcendental vs. empirical”, but doesn’t take into account the Kantian more subtle differentiation ‘a priori vs. transcendental”. In this regard we should pay attention to Kant's ‘remark’ [KrV, B80–1], which states that “not all a priori knowledge should be [included]” in the area of the transcendental, but only the knowledge of its (1) possibility and (2) use in the experience, i.e. objective significance of a priori. Although Kant understands the possibility of a priori, inter alia, as its epigenesis ('subjective deduction' [AXVI–II]), the essence of transcendental is associated with (2), i.e. with “objective validity” to apply a priori in empirical cognition ('objective deduction'). Therefore, if a priori can be correlated with the subjective realm of consciousness or Platonic objectively existing Forms, the transcendental (as ‘transcendentality’) correlates with the area of Erfahrung: this is trans-subjective principles (as ‘tools’ of cognition) which constitute our “mode of cognition”.

At the present time the basis of opposition is the difference between the 2nd and 3rd interpretation, which correlate higher with ontological and epistemological transcendentalism. I think, that Kant's own transcendentalism is primarily connected with epistemic, or even cognitive and semantically reading of Kant's Critique (see his letter to M. Herz (21.02.1772): “What is the ground of the [semantic] relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object?”), which must form the basis [of development] of the contemporary transcendentalism.