DEFORMATIONS AND CRISES OF ANCIENT CIVIL COMMUNITIES

Ancient History

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CONTENTS

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democracy was bad in principle but successful and stable, and that it was only in the later years of the Peloponnesian War, when the democracy was no longer delivering success, that it was set aside. And the experiences of oligarchy then were so bad that nobody in the fourth century wanted oligarchy.

As for Sparta, the dispensation attributed to Lycurgus can be seen as an attempt, by making certain concessions, to unite all the full citizens, richer and poorer together, in conditions of comparative equality and in opposition to the much larger number of non-citizens. The citizens knew that their supremacy depended on preserving that arrangement; and, in spite of their fear of the helots, for most of the time the *perioikoi* and the helots accepted their inferior position without rebelling against it.

And the polarisation of the Greek world, between Athens and Sparta for much of the fifth century, between Athens-plus-Sparta and Thebes in the middle of the fourth century, between Athens and Macedon after that, meant that local differences were exacerbated by being drawn into a more wide-ranging opposition.

So political instability was an important and pervasive feature of ancient Greece, and is well worth studying as an aspect of Greek political life.

ARISTOCRACY IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS: DEFORMATION AND/OR ADAPTATION

Valerij Gouschin

1. INTRODUCTION

The Old Oligarch and his *Athenaion Politeia* are the first things that come to mind if we discuss the role of the aristocracy in classical Athens. In this pamphlet it is stated that the Athenians have chosen the kind of constitution (i.e. democracy) that 'lets the worst people be better off than the good'.[1] This could suggest that the aristocracy had lost its meaning at least in the second half of the fifth century B.C.

In spite of that, the Athenian constitution could retain its aristocratic style even in the time of democracy. F.J. Frost was sure that until the middle of the fifth century most significant decisions were made by a narrow circle of aristocratic families.[2] The same has been claimed recently by R.W. Wallace, however specifying a chronological milestone. The hereditary aristocracy, he asserts, remained important down to 442, i.e. to the ostracism of Thucydides Melesiou.[3]

This is in agreement with W. Eder, who supposed that the priority of the aristocracy in democratic Athens continued until the middle of the fifth century, and an alternative to the old leading families could be provided only by the 'new politicians' who emerged in politics relatively late in the fifth century.[4] He stated, however, that the Athenian *demokratia* was designed to fit the existing system of aristocratic leadership.[5]

[1] [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.1, transl. E.C. Marchant.

[2] F.J. Frost, 'Tribal Politics and the Civic State', *AJAH* i 1976, 66–75, see also E.D. Frolov, 'Politicheskie lideri afinskoi demokratii' (Political Leaders of the Athenian Democracy), in his *Paradoxi istorii – paradoxi antichnosti* (Paradoxes of History – Paradoxes of Antiquity) (St. Petersburg: U.P., 2004), 164–81 (in Russian).

[3] R.W. Wallace, 'The Practice of Politics in Classical Athens, and the Paradox of Democratic Leadership', in D. Hammer (ed.) *A Companion to Greek Democracy and the Roman Republic* (Chichester: Wiley–Blackwell, 2015), 241.

[4] W. Eder, 'Die Athenische Demokratie im 4 Jh. v.Chr.: Krise oder Vollendung?', in his (ed.), *Die Athenische Demokratie im 4 Jh. v.Chr. Vollendung oder Verfall einer Verfassungsform?* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1995). 11–28; idem, 'Aristocrats and the Coming of Athenian Democracy', in I. Morris & K.A. Raaflaub (edd.), *Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges* (Dubuque: Archaeological Institute of America. Colloquia and Conference Papers ii, 1997), 10–40 at 107.

[5] Eder, 'Aristocrats' (n. 4, above), 106, 122, cf.: J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens. Rhetoric, Ideology and the Power of the People* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1989) 84. The word *demokratia*, as Eder thought, originally pointed not to the people's power, but to the position of a person or group whose power rested on the *demos* (Eder, 113).

Obviously it is still questionable what influence Athenian democracy and democratic institutions exerted upon the aristocracy (or the latter on democracy). I shall discuss this question below, but offer some preliminary considerations at the beginning.

In speaking about democratic Athens I refer to the sixth (as the beginning) and the fifth centuries. I leave aside here the question whether the Athenian democracy was fully developed in this time or reached its developed form at the end of the fifth century (or even in the fourth century).[6] On the other hand, I shall discuss their role in politics, but not, for example, in the religious sphere, where the aristocracy perhaps retained a more or less influential position throughout the fifth century.[7]

As for the aristocrats, they could be conceived in terms of merit, birth and wealth. Though the well-born and the well-to-do could belong to different social strata, I am inclined to think of 'aristocracy' as the term synonymous with the 'upper class' (or leisured class) that included the members of Attic *gene* and the wealthy Athenians.[8] This is how Aristotle characterized the 'notables' (*gnorimoi*): 'among the notables wealth, birth, virtue, education, and the distinctions that are spoken of in the same group as these (τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων πλοῦτος εὐγένεια ἀρετὴ παιδεία καὶ τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφοράν)'.[9]

We need to take into account that the aristocracy of ancient Athens differed substantially from the aristocracy of mediaeval Europe that used to enjoy hereditary titles and political privileges. The Athenian upper class was not a closed social stratum or a so-called 'premier état' with more or less constant membership.[10] 'Les époques archaïque et classique', A. Duploy asserts, 'ont connu en permanence la disparité de certaines lignées et l'émergence de nouveaux groupes, provoquant une recomposition sociale incessante de l'élite'.[11]

6 E.g. Eder, 'Aristocrats' (n. 4, above), 107.

7 See, e.g., M.H. Jameson, *Religion in the Athenian Democracy* in Morris & Raaflaub (n. 4, above), 171–96, N. Evans, *Civic Rites: Democracy and Religion in Ancient Athens* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: U. of California P., 2010). But there could be one important change, in that from the middle of the fifth century new priesthoods were not hereditary in particular *gene* but were open to all qualified Athenians (S.D. Lambert, 'A Polis and Its Priests: Athenian Priesthoods Before and After Pericles' Citizenship Law', *Historia* lix 2010, 143–75; cf. the argument of J.H. Blok, 'Pericles' Citizenship Law: A New Perspective', *Historia* lviii 2009, 141–170, that the purpose of the law was to ensure that all citizens should be truly Athenian and therefore fit to hold priesthoods).

8 The Greeks used for 'aristocracy' rather ambiguous terms: *agathoi* (or *kaloikagathoi*), *esthloi*, *gnorimoi* etc. See on this W. Donlan, 'Social Vocabulary and Its Relationship to Political Propaganda in Fifth-Century Athens', *QUCC*. xxviii 1978, 95–111, Ober (n. 5, above), 251 ff. *Aristoi* is not found during the archaic period as a designation of the aristocrats (W. Donlan, 'A Note on Aristos as a Class Term', *Philologus* cxiii 1969, 268–70).

9 Arist. *Pol.* 4.1291в28 sqq., transl. H. Rackham.

10 E.g. D. Roussel, *Tribu et cité: Études sur les groupes sociaux dans les cités grecques aux époques archaïque et classique* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1976), 71–2.

11 A. Duploy, 'La Cité et ses élites. Modes de reconnaissance sociale et mentalité agonistique en Grèce archaïque et classique', in H. Fernoux & C. Stein (edd.) *Aristocratie antique: modèle et …*

In other words, the individuals and the families covered by word 'aristocracy' were not necessarily the same in the time of Solon and during and after the Persian Wars. Most of those men whose names are known from the century before Solon, as P.J. Rhodes argues, cannot be linked reliably to families which were prominent after Solon.[12]

This could mean that the aristocracy (or ruling class) was not a group of equals. There could be certain dividing lines within the aristocracy, for example, between the well-born and the well-to-do (and the *palaioploutoi* and the *kainoploutoi* within the well-to-do). One may also assume that those who belonged to the oldest families may have had some priority among the well-born owing to their hereditary fame (πατρικὸς δόξα).

2. ARISTOCRACY AND THE COMING OF DEMOCRACY

In Archaic Athens political activity was dominated by the aristocratic families who relied upon their followers (*hetairoi*).[13] According to Aristotle's *Politics* in oligarchies 'the magistrates … are filled from high property-grades or from political clubs (*hetairon*)'.[14] Perhaps the Athenian constitution before Solon which was 'in all respects oligarchic' could be an example of this.[15]

The leaders of *hetaireiai* were the most influential persons from the first-rank nobility, who had an unquestionable and incontestable authority among the others. Cylon, for example, as Thucydides narrates, came from an old and authoritative family (τῶν πάλαι εὐγενής τε καὶ δυνατός).[16] Solon mentions such a leader in one of his verses, when he addresses himself to the young Critias who did not honour his father (Sol. fr. 18.1–2 Diehl = 22a West = 22 Gentili & Prato). Apparently, the young aristocrat Critias was firmly attached to the leader of an aristocratic group (a *hegemon*) rather than to his father: in other words group solidarity proved to be stronger than family ties.[17] I should also recall the words of Thucydides, who noted that in the period of the Peloponnesian War the bonds of friendship (and aristocratic

vembre 2005], 2007), 57–77 at 73. Ober doubts that the old *gene* played as important a role in the early history of Athens as was once believed (Ober [n. 5, above], 252).

12 P.J. Rhodes, 'Oligarchs in Athens', in R. Brock & S. Hodkinson (edd.), *Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2000), 119–36 at 120. He assumes that they died out or withdrew from politics after Solon.

13 E.g. W.R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1971), 25 ff. A leading man's authority and prestige were measured by the number of his followers (W. Donlan, 'The Pre-State Community in Greece', *SO* lxiv 1989, 5–29 at 13 n. 22 = his *The Aristocratic Ideal and Selected Papers* (Chicago: Bolchazy–Carducci, 1999) 299 n. 22. In using the language of *hetaireiai* I am not supposing that these links were comparable to the *hetaireiai* known from the late fifth century.

14 Arist. *Pol.* 5.1305в30–5, transl. H. Rackham.

15 *Ath. Pol.* 1.

16 Thuc. 1.126.3–5; see also S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, i (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1991), 203 ff. Cylon was an Olympic victor and son-in-law of the Megarian tyrant, and in this way he was most authoritative among his *helikiotai* and *hetairoi* (Hdt. 5.71.1).

solidarity) were stronger than the tie of blood, because a partisan was more ready to dare without asking why'.[18]

'Political friendship' (to put it in Connor's terms) and *hetaireiai* gave to politics an informal style. The mechanism of rotation (or election) was not carefully con-structed or frequently violated. This type of power relations resulted in the bitter rivalry of aristocratic factions and was fraught with serious political upheavals; and the case of Cylon could be an example of this.

But with the lapse of time some leaders began to seek the *demos*' support in their struggle with their opponents. The common people at this time became more influential, if not in politics yet in society.[19] According to Thucydides the *demos* took an active part in the suppression of Cylon's *coup*.[20] In the times of Solon and Pisistratus, I believe, the common people played an active part politically.[21] Suffice it to recall the long-lasting quarrel between the multitude and the notables before Solon's reforms.[22] And so some of the aristocrats recognised the masses' ambitions as a new weapon to use against each other.[23] Those who were ready to recognise the mass's ambitions converted themselves into *prostatai tou demou*.

At first the *prostatai* could use the *demos*' support primarily for the struggle with their rivals.[24] Over some time they will have had to formulate certain demo-cratic slogans, i. e. to act (whether consciously or not) as democratic reformers.[25] This type of politician (*prostatai* and demagogues) is mentioned particularly in the first part of the *Athenaion Politeia*.[26] Obviously these are first-rank politicians who in their own way promoted the development of democracy in Athens[27]:

sixth century	fifth century
Solon	Xanthippus
Pisistratus	Themistocles[28]
Cleisthenes	Ephialtes
	Pericles
	Cleon
	Cleophon

On this basis we may accept Eder's idea that the democratic system was invented by the aristocracy.[29] But with some correction: that it was not the whole of the aristocracy who made efforts to create a democratic constitution, but a part only.

If this is right, there took place in Athens a division into democratic and aristo-cratic orientations among the politicians, or, more precisely, a separation of demo-critically-oriented leaders from the aristocracy. And this happened much earlier than we might expect, i. e. in the sixth century, not in the time of Pericles or after the appearance of the demagogues.[30] Besides, this could be described as a serious di-vorce in the ranks of the aristocracy that would exert a considerable impact on subsequent events, even though those who turned into *prostatai* were very few. Certainly, this does not mean that the whole of the aristocracy divided into warring parties. There were, I suspect, a certain number who were not inclined to join to any side (the so-called 'quiet' Athenians or *apragmones*).[31]

The political actions of those aristocrats who were inclined to rely on the *demos* differed significantly from what had gone before. Politicians of that sort needed to make themselves known among the common people in order to become a *prostates*, because *prostatai tou demou* may be a men at the head of their own factions (*het-airelai*), they may include common people in their *hetaireiai*.[32] Cleisthenes, as Herodotus narrates, who was getting the worst of Isagoras, 'took the commons into his party' (τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται).[33] This formulation could be a meta-

18 Thuc. 3.82.5, transl. B. Jowett.
19 Ober supposes that it was only in the time of Cleisthenes that the lower classes became suffi-ciently politically aware to be a factor in political struggles (Ober [n. 5, above], 85).
20 'The Athenians, when they saw what had happened, came in a body from the fields (πανδημεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν) and invested the Acropolis' (Thuc. 1.126.7, transl. B. Jowett).
21 V. Gouschin, 'Pisistratus' Leadership in *A.P.* 13.4 and the Establishment of the Tyranny of 561/60 B.C.', *CQ²* xlix1999, 14–21. The *demos* could make an appeal to the leaders.
22 *Ath. Pol.* 2.1: ἐστασίαζον τοῖς τε γνωρίμους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος πολὺν χρόνον.
23 Ober (n. 5, above), 85. But one of the aristocrats (as in the case of Pericles) could 'decide[d] to devote himself to the people, espousing the cause of the poor and the many instead of the few and the rich, contrary to his own nature, which was anything but popular' (Plut. *Per.* 7.3, transl. B. Perrin. [In common with the other contributors to this book, I cite Plutarch's *Lives* by the chapters and sections of the Teubner and Budé editions; but I quote the translations of B. Perrin from the Loeb edition, which has a different division of the chapters into sections.]
24 According to Ober the democratic leaders were driven by a competitive ethos rather than by theoretical principles (Ober [n. 5, above], 84).
25 On *prostatai* and their democratic programmes see: Gouschin (n. 21, above), 14–19.
26 Certainly, we need to be careful here, because of course the *Athenaion Politeia* may be (mis)-understanding these early politicians by using the criteria of the author's own time.
27 This list of *prostatai tou demou* is given by *Ath. Pol.* 28.2–3. Certainly, from other sources other persons could be added to this list (e.g. Hyperbolus, Androcles, etc.).

28 In *Ath. Pol.* 28. 2 the meaning seems to be that Themistocles was a democratic leader and Aristides was an aristocratic leader, but *Ath. Pol.* 23. 3 puts both on the democratic side.
29 Eder (n. 4, above), 122, 128.
30 Plutarch in his life of Pericles wrote as follows: 'Now there had been from the beginning a sort of seam hidden beneath the surface of affairs, as in a piece of iron, which faintly indicated a divergence between the popular and the aristocratic programme; but the emulous ambition of these two men [Pericles and Cimon] cut a deep gash in the state, and caused one section of it to be called the "Demos", or the *People*, and the other the "Oligoi", or the *Few*' (Plut. *Per.* 11.3, transl. B. Perrin) – but for doubts see A. Andrewes, 'The Opposition to Pericles', *JHS* xcviii 1978, 1–8 at 2). Connor thinks that political conflicts before the appearance of demagogues were mainly a matter of personal rivalry (Connor [n. 13, above], 110ff.).
31 These could be those whom Solon envisaged in his law on *stasis* (*Ath. Pol.* 8.5); see also n. 80, below.
32 On *prostatai* and their *hetaireiai* see Gouschin (n. 21, above), 123 n. 58.
33 Hdt. 5.66.1, transl. A.D. Godley. According to the *Ath. Pol.* he was ἡττώμενος δὲ τοῖς

phor.[34] But nothing prevents us from treating it literally, i.e. from noting the inclusion of the *demos* (or some men from the *demos*) into Cleisthenes' group. In this case it could have provided him with numerical superiority over Isagoras.

The appearance of *prostatai tou demou* gradually weakened the importance of traditional aristocratic associations (*hetaireiai*) and shifted the focus of political activity from informal groups to state institutions. The appeal to the *demos* (or the *demos*' appeal to the leaders) could be taken through the representative institutions such as the people's assembly and the jury-courts. Despite the fact that many of the leaders of the *demos* (if not all) held official positions in the state, their influence as *prostatai* had an informal tone. A similar influence in the people's assembly was to be exercised by Cleon, Hyperbolus, etc.[35] In this way those who sought the *demos*' support gave rise to demagogy as the model of political behaviour. Plutarch supposed that Pericles was prone to demagogy before the ostracism of Thucydides Melesiou.[36] Therefore I suspect that demagogy as political phenomenon could have appeared much earlier.

Nevertheless membership of *hetaireiai* could still be a prerequisite for a successful political career (or for the beginning of one) in the first half of the fifth century. Plutarch, if we can trust him, wrote that Themistocles' career owed much to membership of a *hetaireia*.[37] Unlike him Aristides was alone in his political activity.[38] However, Plutarch narrates that Aristides introduced his decrees through other men so that Themistocles might not oppose him.[39] These 'other men' could be the members of Aristides' grouping or *hetaireia*. If so, Aristides was not alone as Plutarch assumed (or as Aristides wished to appear).[40] The same practice was attributed to Pericles, who did not want people to grow accustomed to speeches by him.[41]

However, the first-rank politicians were not eager to flaunt their friendly interactions. The Athenians indeed could look askance at those who seemed to prefer the company of their social peers to that of ordinary citizens.[42] This explains Aristides' desire to look like a lone (or independent) politician. Pericles, who had friends of the greatest influence, avoided invitations to dinner, friendly and familiar interaction.[43] Some time later Cleon demonstratively broke off with his friends, displaying his loyalty to the *demos*.[44]

This fact demonstrated, on the one hand, that narrow group loyalty was replaced (or seemed to be replaced) by loyalty to the people. But, on the other hand, it could relate to such a phenomenon as demagogy. The latter is characterized, Connor postulates, by the abandonment of working through friends and by appealing directly to the people.[45] In that case, some features of demagogy appeared before Cleon: one may find it in the behaviour of Aristides and Pericles.

3. BETWEEN STABILITY AND INSTABILITY

At the turn of the sixth and fifth centuries the aristocrats were faced with new challenges, because they were divided into rival groups.[46] The Alcmaeonids and their (and/or Cleisthenes') supporters could be weakened after Cleisthenes' sudden departure from the political scene.[47] It would seem that this created certain advantages for their ill-wishers. Indeed, there could be among them the opponents of Cleisthenes and his reforms. Besides, there could be still alive the followers of Isagoras (or his followers' descendants) and those whom the sources called as 'the friends of the tyrants', e.g. Hipparchus son of Charmus.[48] There were also those who did not join any of these groups. Each group mentioned above could have been led by one of its members, but the aristocracy did not have a common leader. The situation changed with appearance of Miltiades, who, as A. W. Gomme wrote, 'put himself at the head of the nobles'.[49] But after Miltiades' death his opponents, who put him on trial in

ἑταιρείαις (*Ath. Pol.* 20.1: see, e.g., Goušchin [n. 21, above], 17 n. 25, and in general Eder [n. 4, above], 135).

34 According to Connor Cleisthenes brought the *demos* over his side by informal means, by promising to treat them as his *hetairoi* (Connor [n. 13, above], 90–1 n. 5).

35 E.g. M. I. Finley, 'Athenian Demagogues', *Past and Present* xxi 1962, 3–24; revised in his *Democracy Ancient and Modern* (London: Hogarth P., ²1985); reprinted in various collections, e.g. P. J. Rhodes (ed.) *Athenian Democracy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U. P., 2004), 163–84. See also J. T. Roberts, 'Athens' So-Called Unofficial Politicians', *Hermes* cx 1982, 354–62.

36 Plut. *Per.* 15.2. See also: R. Sealey, 'The Entry of Pericles into History', *Hermes* lxxxiv 1956, 234–47 at 234 ff. = his *Essays in Greek Politics* (New York: Manyland), 59–74 at 59 ff.; R. K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1989), 39. It is usually thought that Plutarch's distinction between the earlier and the later Pericles was the result of his trying to reconcile the leader of all the Athenians from Thucydides with the partisan politician of other writers: e.g. Gomme, *H. C. T.* i. 65–7.

37 Plut. *Arist.* 2.5. But we need to be careful with Plutarch: there is certainly a tendency in Plutarch's biographies to see Athenian politics in anachronistic terms; much depends on what the source was for his different remarks.

38 Plut. *Arist.* 2.6. But elsewhere he calls Aristides the friend (*hetairos*) of Cleisthenes (Plut. *Arist.* 2.1). See also Connor (n. 13, above), 54.

39 Plut. *Arist.* 3.4.

40 On Aristides' *hetaieria* see Connor (n. 13, above), 27 and n. 42, 55.

41 Plut. *Per.* 7.7.

42 Ober (n. 5, above), 86.

43 Plut. *Per.* 7.5, Connor (n. 13, above), 57, 119–22, 127, K.-W. Welwei, *Die griechische Polis* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1983), 49, Ober (n. 5, above), 86.

44 Plut. *Praec. Ger. Reip.* 806 F., Connor (n. 13, above), 91–2.

45 Connor (n. 13, above), 117–8. Rhodes thinks that some politicians cultivated the reputation of full-time politicians (P. J. Rhodes, 'Political Activity in Classical Athens', *JHS* cvi 1986, 132–44 at 141 = his [ed.], *Athenian Democracy* [n. 35, above], 185–206 at 201).

46 But together with E. S. Gruen I am averse to see in this political parties ('Stesimbrotus on Miltiades and Themistocles', *CSCA* iii 1970, 91–8 at 91–2).

47 E.g. V. Goušchin, 'Athenian Ostracism and Ostraka: Some Historical and Statistical Observations', in L. Mitchell & L. Rubinstein (edd.) *Greek History and Epigraphy: Essays in Honour of P. J. Rhodes* (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2009), 225–50 at 228.

48 He was archon in 496/5 (R. Develin, *Athenian Officials. 684–321 B.C.* [Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1989], 54).

49 A. W. Gomme, 'Athenian Notes', *AJP* lxv 1944, 321–39 at 329 = his *More Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford: Bl;ackwell, 1962), 26; see also Goušchin (n. 47, above), 230–1. In the course of time he became a panhellenic and national leader: Gomme, p. 322 = 20).

489 (i.e. the Alcmaeonids), won the leadership in Athens.[50] But they lost their championship as soon as the Athenians made use of the law of ostracism. Later, in the 480s–470s, Themistocles and Aristides took priority with varying success. If Themistocles was a democratic leader, Aristides was thought to be a leader of an aristocratic kind.[51] But Plutarch writes of him as a single-handed politician who was more inclined to demonstrate his independence.[52] If that is right, the aristocracy could have been deprived of a leader in the traditional sense of the word until Cimon's appearance in politics. Perhaps this is how we might understand a problematic passage in the *Athenaion Politeia*.

We read there as follows:

> For it so happened that during these periods the better classes had no leader at all, but the chief person among them (μηδ' ἡγεμόνα ἔχειν τοὺς ἐπιεικεστέρους ἀλλ' αὐτῶν προεστάναι), Cimon son of Miltiades, was a rather young man who had only lately entered public life; and in addition, that the multitude had suffered seriously in war.[53]

This text presents many difficulties. It follows the story of Ephialtes' reform of 462, which did not relate to the time of Cimon's youth.[54] In addition to that, the substantial Athenian losses would seem to us unrealistic, if we move Aristotle's narration to the 480s (on casualties see pp. 56–8, below). I assume that Cimon's youth and the substantial military losses of the Athenians should be attributed to different periods.

We may suppose that after Miltiades' death the aristocracy, if not leaderless, did not have a recognised leader at the head of them. Aristides, as remarked above, may have preferred a different political style emphasising his independence. The situation changed when Cimon obtained leading position. He belonged, to a particularly notable and influential family and therefore surpassed many of the aristocrats. This could give him a dominant position among the aristocrats (αὐτῶν προεστάναι).

Over time Cimon turned into a national (and, like his father, panhellenic) leader. His indisputable leadership is reflected in the text of *Ath. Pol.*, where we find a teleological view of it, i.e. Cimon's priority and leadership as a pre-ordained result. But in the 480s he was still young to enter public life. That is perhaps why, according to *Ath. Pol.*, the aristocrats had a recognised champion but not a *hegemon* (μηδ' ἡγεμόνα ἔχειν τοὺς ἐπιεικεστέρους).

What was happening in society displeased the aristocracy and demanded an immediate reaction on their part. Their discontent could be especially intensified in a time of war. If we put our trust in Plutarch's narration, before the battle of Plataea (in 479) a conspiracy was organized by noblemen (ἄνδρες ἐξ οἴκων ἐπιφανῶν) who had been impoverished by the war, and they wanted, Plutarch reports, to over-throw the democracy (καταλύσειν τὸν δῆμον).[55] Nevertheless Aristides, who commanded the Athenians at Plataea, put a brake on the investigation.

Among the conspirators Plutarch mentions Agasias of Acharnae and Aeschines of Lamptrae, who managed to escape from the camp.[56] The finding of *ostraka* with the name Agasias of Agryle or Lamptrae (but not of Acharnae), gives some reason to trust Plutarch's story in spite of the confusion in the details.[57] If so, some things seem to me noteworthy, in particular, the negative effects of the war remarked on by Plutarch (see also pp. 56–8, below). In addition, I should like to draw attention to one thing. The conspirators preferred to act secretly from Aristides, though it would be comprehensible that he had enough sympathy with them not to initiate judicial proceedings.

The situation changed after Cimon headed (or organised) the aristocratic faction, which we shall see in the battle of Tanagra c. 457 (see below). In Athens there began a 'Cimonian' era. For a long time Cimon continued to be a successful military commander and the most influential politician. Thereby he contributed to the strengthening the position of the aristocracy;[58] and that in turn may have enabled the *Athenaion Politeia* (or its sources) to talk about the Areopagus' domination. According to the *Athenaion Politeia*, in the 470s–460s the state was dominated by the Areopagus.[59] Perhaps Cimon's political influence or his effective collaboration with the Areopagus (though most likely he was not a member) could be an explanation of this notion.

However, Ephialtes' reform of 462/1 and subsequent events put an end to Cimon's dominance and to the influence of the aristocracy. Cimon's sluggish attempt to restore the aristocracy's previous importance (as he responded to the reform of 462, according to Plutarch) were unsuccessful.[60] His subsequent expulsion by the procedure of ostracism put an end to the Cimonian era.

The aristocrats remained leaderless again. Changing political realities stirred up their dissatisfaction and irritations. For the first time, as was said above, that had happened at Plataea in 479. A second attempt was made before the battle of Tanagra c. 457. This time the discontent was caused by the long walls, which were thought

50 E. Badian, 'Archons and *Strategoi*', *Antichthon*, v 1971, 1–34 at 11–14, P. Karavites, 'Realities and Appearances, 490–480 B.C.', *Historia* xxvi 1977, 129–47 at 135.

51 E.g. Plut. *Arist.* 2.1, V. Rosivach, 'State Pay as War Relief in Peloponnesian-War Athens', *G&R*[2] lviii 2011, 176–83 at 178 n.10.

52 Plut. *Arist.* 3.4; see also p. 53, above.

53 *Ath. Pol.* 26.1, transl. H. Rackham.

54 See e.g. P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1981), 325–6.

55 On the Plataean conspiracy see also Plut. *Arist.* 13, F. D. Harvey, 'The Conspiracy of Agasias and Aeschines (Plutarch, *Aristeides* 13)', *Klio* lxvi 1984, 58–9, Rhodes (n. 12, above), 123, J. Marincola, 'The Fairest Victor: Plutarch, Aristides and the Persian Wars', *Histos* vi 2012, 104–5 n. 32 (with bibliography). That conspirators were interested in overthrowing the democracy raises many doubts: perhaps they wanted to come to terms with Persia (Rhodes [n. 12, above].123).

56 Plut. *Arist.* 13.3.

57 Harvey (n. 55, above), 58–9, Rhodes (n. 12, above), 123, S. Brenne, *Ostrakismos und Prominenz in Athens* (*Tyche* Supp. iii 2001), 89–90, discusses the *ostraka* and considers the identification with Plutarch's Agasias possible but 'sehr hypothetisch'.

58 'When he was at home, he mastered and constrained the people in its onsets upon the nobles' (Plut. *Cim.* 15.1, transl. B. Perrin)

59 E.g. *Ath.Pol.* 23.1, 25.2, with Rhodes (n. 54, above), *ad loc.*, see also Rhodes (n. 12, above), 123–4, idem. *A History of the Classical Greek World. 478–323 B.C.* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, [2]2010), 40–6.

60 Plut. *Cim.* 15.3.

to be a symbol of the democracy.[61] The attempted *coup* was unsuccessful or without effect, though we do not know the details of it.

Soon after that there emerged new negative circumstances. Here we should place what we learn from the *Athenaion Politeia*, that the aristocracy suffered from the wars and numerous military campaigns, which resulted in ravage and their numerical decline. For Aristotle this was above all a stimulus to the development of democracy.[62] 'Revolutions in the constitutions also take place on account of disproportionate growth; for just as the body is composed of parts, and needs to grow proportionately in order that its symmetry may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled ...'[63] He gives, in particular, the example of Taras, where a great many notables were defeated and killed by the Iapygians after the Persian Wars and constitutional government was changed to a democracy.[64] In this context also he mentions Athens, where 'the notables (*gnorimoi*) became fewer because at the time of the war against Sparta the army was drawn from a muster-roll'.[65]

But in this case we are interested not so much in Aristotle's theoretical assessment as in the problem of the supposed numerical decline of the aristocracy in the 460s–430s. In the *Athenaion Politeia* we find as follows 'In those days the expeditionary force was raised from a muster-roll, and was commanded by generals with no experience of war but promoted on account of their family reputations, so that it was always happening that the troops on an expedition suffered as many as two or three thousand casualties, making a drain on the numbers of the respectable members both of the people and of the wealthy (ὥστε ἀναλίσκεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων)'.[66]

P. J. Rhodes points out it is not plausible that the casualties should have occurred only or principally among the upper classes. He assumes that Aristotle used ἐπιεικεῖς not in a political but in a moral sense.[67] These casualties could be in any case the representatives of three first property classes.[68] The conscription *ek katalogou* meant indeed that the men recruited (and hence killed) were Athenians belonging to the first three classes.[69] If so we can talk about military losses among the aristocrats in the time of the so-called First Peloponnesian War as well.[70] Suffice it to mention the defeat of the Athenians at Halieis *c.* 459 and at Tanagra *c.* 457.[71] One may add to the list the Egyptian disaster of 454.

The battle of Tanagra may provide an example of the mass death of the aristocrats. The ostracised Cimon who had refused to join his tribe (Oeneis) appealed to his followers (or *hetairoi*) to fight strongly against the Lacedemonians. 'They took his armour and set it in the midst of their company, supported one another ardently in the fight, and fell, to the number of one hundred.'[72]

Certainly, the casualties will not always have been so sizeable. In the battle of Plataea, as Herodotus reports, the Greeks lost 159 men with 52 Athenians among them.[73] Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the losses of the Athenians could be substantial, at least within the so-called hoplite class. The casualty list of the tribe Erechtheis for a year *c.*460 contains 176 names (*IG* i³ 1147), and that perhaps of Aegeis more than 57 (1147 bis). If the war losses of the other tribes were equal to those of Erechtheis, as G. Smith assumed, the total losses would be 1,760[74] – though she granted that most likely that would be an overestimate.[75]

Whatever the actual numbers, the military losses created a social void in the civil community and in the ranks of the aristocracy, which eventually was filled by those who satisfied the property qualifications. But in this case the aristocracy of the well-born diluted by the well-to-do turned increasingly into a propertied class. Thus the list of those who were prominent after these wars could differ to some extent from what had gone before[76].

61 Tanagra: Thuc. 1.107.5, Hornblower (n. 16, above), 170–1; but *contra* E. Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 1993), 213.

62 E.g. A. Dovatur, 'Aristotel o sotsialnih prichinah izmenenia afinskogo gosudarstvennogo stroja v 60–30 godah V v. do n. e. (Aristotle on the reasons for the changes of the Athenian Constitution in 60s–30s of the fifth century B.C.)', in *Drevnij Vostok i antichnij mir* (Ancient Orient and Ancient World) (Moscow: U.P., 1980), 152–8 (in Russian).

63 Arist. *Pol.* 5.1302B33–6, transl. H. Rackham.

64 Arist. *Pol.* 5.1303A1–6.

65 Arist. *Pol.* 5.1303A8–10, transl. H. Rackham. Aristotle remarks on losses in land battles (ἐν Ἀθήναις ἀτυχούντων πεζῇ οἱ γνώριμοι ἐλάττους ἐγένοντο).

66 *Ath. Pol.* 26.1, transl. H. Rackham: see, e.g., M. Christ, 'Conscription of Hoplites in Classical Athens', *CQ*² li 2001, 398–422 at 399.

67 Rhodes (n. 46, above), 328. But the *gnorimoi* whom Aristotle mentions in the *Politics* were obviously a social category,

68 Dovatur (n. 62, above), 154–5.

69 See in general Christ (n. 66, above).

70 Dovatur (n. 62, above), 156. We may add the sizeable casualties at Drabescus in 465/4 (e.g.:

71 Thuc. 1.105.1 (Halieis), 108.1 (Tanagra), cf. Dovatur (n. 62, above), 156.

72 Plut. *Cim.* 17.7, transl. B. Perrin. Cimon's *hetaireia* consisted of men from different tribes. Cimon himself belonged to Oeneis (VI), Euthippos of Anaphlystus (whom Plutarch mentions) to Antiochis (X). His *hetairoi* perhaps were Macartatus and Melanopus, whose funerary stele Pausanias mentions (Paus. 1.29.6. See also: N.T. Arrington, 'Inscribing Defeat: The Commemorative Dynamics of the Athenian Casualty Lists', *Cl. Ant.* xxx 2011, 179–212 at 206–207). If the latter was related to the Melanopus who was famous in the fourth century, he could belong to Cecropis (IX) (e.g.: Develin, [n.48, above], 247, 282, cf.: J.K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families. 600–300 B.C.* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1971), 388. In the fourth century a Macartatus of Prospalta from the tribe Acamantis (V) is known (Davies, 364).

73 Hdt. 9.70. But according to Plutarch in his life of Aristides the Greek losses at Plataea were 1,360 men, with the 52 Athenians, all from the Aiantid tribe, among them (Plut. *Arist.* 19.5–6, for Athens citing Cleidemus: *FGrH* 324 F 22). The 1,360 'looks like a mere compilation from the incomplete items in Herodotus; Plutarch's source has apparently added another 600 for the other half of the centre and rounded off the total' (C. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece* [Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1963], 340–1). But these figures are regularly considered too low (e.g. Hignett, *loc. cit.*). On military losses in general see, e.g., A. J. Holladay, 'Hoplites and Heresies', *JHS* cii 1982, 94–103 = his *Athens in the Fifth Century and Other Studies in Greek History* (Chicago: Ares, 2002), 169–81; P. Krentz, 'Casualties in Hoplite Battles', *GRBS* xxvi 1985, 13–20.

74 G. Smith, 'Athenian Casualty Lists', *CP* xviii 1919, 351–64 at 360–1.

75 Smith (n. 74, above), 363.

76 In the same way perhaps as with the century before and that after Solon (see pp. 48–9 and n. 12, above).

Paus. 1.29.4, cf. D. W. Bradeen, 'The Athenian Casualty List of 464 B.C.', *Hesperia* xxxvi 1967, 321–8).

However, I suspect that during the ongoing wars – even taking into account the fact that they aimed at enrichment[77] – the regeneration of the propertied class is unlikely to have been fast,[78] especially if the classes were defined on the basis of wealth obtained from agricultural production. Plutarch mentions economic disasters of the propertied class before the battle of Plataea, and Thucydides in turn reports that the Athenians recovered from the calamities of the Persian Wars only on the eve of the Peloponnesian War.[79]

4. ADAPTATION: THUCYDIDES MELESIOU AS A CASE-STUDY

Democratic institutions and the successes of those whose who relied on the *demos* had a ;profound effect on politics. (Let us recall the impressive list of *prostatai tou demou* of the sixth and fifth centuries on pp. 50–1, above). The aristocratic *hetaireiai* in this situation moved step-by-step out of the political sphere (perhaps until 411), remaining only informal communities of friends. This means that some groups of aristocrats lost their political influence and/or converted into *apragmones*.[80]

However, if the representative institutions were playing an increasing role in politics, the ability to work in (and with) the people's assembly or *heliaia* was becoming increasingly significant, and the aristocracy had to take this into account. That is why we hear of Miltiades' *psephismata* (whether authentic or not), which were the result of cooperation with the people's assembly (*ekklesia*).[81] Readiness to adapt to new conditions was displayed by Cimon.[82] He also had to acquire the skills

of working in (and with) the people's assembly. It is also displayed in his repeated election as *strategos* from 478/7 to 462/1, because he was a skilful and popular military commander.[83] Another illustration of his impact on the *demos* could be his victory over Ephialtes when the question of assistance to Sparta was discussed.[84] He won this victory at the meeting(s) of the people's assembly, and that seemed to control his democratic opponent Ephialtes.

But perhaps the most conspicuous evolution was made by Thucydides Melesiou, who was Cimon's relative. Information about him we find mainly in Plutarch, which in itself may provoke disbelief. But what Plutarch reports does not contradict historical reality and could well be the case. Thucydides, as Plutarch wrote, 'being less of a warrior than Cimon, and more of a forensic speaker and statesman (ἀγωνιστὸς δὲ καὶ πολιτικὸς μᾶλλον), by keeping watch and ward in the city, and by wrestling bouts with Pericles on the bema, soon brought the administration into even poise'.[85] Besides, he was successful in the lawcourts (*dikasteria*), in particular in the trial of a certain Pyrilampes. Perhaps this event preceded his rivalry with Pericles.[86]

And the struggle over Pericles' building programme was conducted in the assembly, which could affect the nature of the confrontation and add 'parliamentary' features to it.[87] Elsewhere Plutarch mentions 'Thucydides and his party' (τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Θουκυδίδην ῥητόρων).[88]

77 On enrichment as the aim of wars see M. Trundle, 'Coinage and the Transformation of Greek Warfare', in G. G. Fagon and M. Trundle (edd.), *New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 227–52 at 233 and n. 24.

78 It is possible that the *zeugitai*'s obtaining in 457/6 the right to be appointyed archons (*Ath. Pol.* 26.2) was a result not only of democratisation, but also of a numerical reduction of the *pentakosiomedimnoi* and *hippeis*. Thus, extending the archonship to *zeugitai*, I think, will have made many more eligible. H. van Wees inclined to think that *zeugitai* were members of the Athenian leisured class, therefore extending the archonship to *zeugitai* did not greatly increase the number eligible (e.g.: H. van Wees, 'The Myth of the Middle-Class Army: Military and Social Status in Athens', in T. Bekker-Nielsen & L. Hannestad [edd.], *War as a Cultural and Social Force* (Copenhagen; 2001), 45–71, *contra* M. Valdés Guia & J. Galiego, 'Athenian *Zeugitai* and the Solonian Census Classes: New Reflections and Perspectives', *Historia* lix 2010, 257–81).

79 Thuc. 2.16.1.

80 W. Donlan, *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece* (Lawrence: Coronado Press, 1980), 122 = his *The Aristocratic Ideal and Selected Papers* (n. 13, above), 122. On *apragmones* and *apragmosyne* see, e.g., L. B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1986).

81 Dem. 19.303.

82 We find a conspicuous story in the life of Cimon: 'When the Medes made their invasion, and Themistocles was trying to persuade the people to give up their city, abandon their country, make a stand with their fleet off Salamis, and fight the issue at sea, most men were terrified at the boldness of the scheme; Cimon was first to act, and with a gay mien led a procession of his companions through the Cerameicus up to the Acropolis, to dedicate to the goddess there the horse's bridle which he carried in his hands, signifying thus that what the city needed then was not knightly prowess but sea-fighters' (Plut. *Cim.* 5.2, transl. B. Perrin). Cimon refused to rely on his aristocratic status, if we are to trust this story.

83 478/7 is his first supposed *strategia*: Develin (n. 48, above), 67–72. See also E. Stein-Hölkeskamp, 'Kimon und die athenische Demokratie', *Hermes* cxxvii 1999, 145–64 at 157–8. 'He mastered and constrained the people in its onsets upon the nobles, as Plutarch narrates, and in its efforts to wrest all office and power to itself' (Plut. *Cim.* 15.1).

84 Plut. *Cim.* 16.8–10.

85 Plut. *Per.* 11.1, transl. B. Perrin; see also Rhodes (n. 12, above), 127.

86 E.g.: Pl. *Lach.* 158a, Anon. *Vit. Thuc.* 6. See also: P. Cartledge, 'Fowl Play: A Curious Lawsuit in Classical Athens', in P. Cartledge, P. Millett & S. Todd (edd.) *Nomos. Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1990), 41–61 at 45, E. Carawan, 'The Trials of Thucydides "the Demagogue" in the Anonymous "Life" of Thucydides the Historian', *Historia* xlv 1996, 405–22 at 411–6, D. Nails, *The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Others* (Indianapolis; Hackett, 2002), 257–9. R. Meiggs supposed that Pyrilampes was among those who made the Peace of Callias (R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* [Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1972], 146, cf. Develin [n. 48, above], 80, 107).

87 Plut. *Per.* 12.1, 14.1–2. See also J. S. Boersma, *Athenian Building Policy from 561/0 to 405/4* (Groningen; Scripta Archaeologica Groningana 4, 1970), 65–81 at 80–1, A. Powell, 'Athens' Pretty Face: Anti-Feminine Rhetoric and Fifth-Century Controversy over the Parthenon', in A. Powell (ed.), *Ancient Greece* (London: Routledge, 1995), 245–70 at 249. I leave aside here the question of the reason for this rivalry. Not all scholars tend to see in it a conflict of the opponents or supporters of the democracy: e.g.: F. J. Frost, 'Pericles, Thucydides, son of Melesias, and Athenian Politics Before the War', *Historia* xiii 1964, 385–99 = his *Politics and the Athenians* (Toronto: Kent, 2005), 278–97; K.-J. Hölkeskamp,'Parteiungen und politische Willensbildung im demokratischen Athen: Pericles und Thukydides, Sohn des Melesias' *HZ* cclxvii 1998, 1–27. E. Carawan calls Thucydides a demagogue because he was named *prostates tou demou* in the anonymous *Life of Thucydides* (Anon. *Vit.Thuc.* 7) (Carawan [n. 86, above]). But I am inclined to see in Thucydides Melesiou Cimon's political heir (cf., e.g., H. T. Wade-Gery, 'Thucydides the Son of Melesias: A Study of Periklean Policy' *JHS* lii 1932, 205–27 at 205 = his *Essays in Greek History* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1958], 239–70 at 239).

88 Plut. *Per.* 14.1.

But at the beginning the aristocrats were dispersed in the face of their opponents. 'He would not suffer the party of the "Good and True (καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς)", as they called themselves, to be scattered up and down and blended with the populace, as heretofore, the weight of their character being thus obscured by numbers, but by culling them out and assembling them into one body, he made their collective influence, thus become weighty, as it were a counterpoise in the balance.'[89] He separated off the *kaloi kagathoi* to give them greater political weight in the assembly. If this was so, Thucydides' *hetaireia* had certain similarities with a parliamentary party.[90]

Thucydides managed to restore the influence of the aristocracy in the assembly, but for a short time only. Pericles, as Plutarch narrates, 'secured his rival's banishment, and the dissolution of the faction (κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν ἀντιτεταγμένην ἑταιρείαν) which had been arrayed against him'.[91] Thucydides' faction was defeated and he was exiled by the procedure of ostracism.[92] The aristocracy lost its leader once more. It was not easy for a new man, we may agree with Connor, to take over the leadership of the group.[93] I should even say that it would be impossible owing to the lack of equal rights for leadership, as I suggested earlier. Thucydides became the leader because he was Cimon's relative, because he belonged to one of the most distinguished and influential aristocratic families.

Plutarch assumed that after Thucydides' expulsion Pericles converted from the leader who did not hesitate to use demagogic techniques into the wise leader of all the people.[94] But at this time in Athenian politics there appeared new figures such as Cleon.

5. CONCLUSIONS

So what happened to the aristocracy in democratic Athens? During the period under review the aristocracy remained the most politically active layer of the citizen body. Firstly under the domination of competitive values (or the agonistic spirit) the aristocrats were fighting with each other while remaining parts of a whole. But over time there was a split, which had a significant impact on subsequent events. It found its expression in the appearance of *prostatai* whose efforts supplied the beginning of democracy in Athens. Besides, their type of political behaviour, i.e. direct appeal to the *demos*, permits us to distinguish them from the other aristocratic leaders whose activity was based primarily on friendship association (*hetaireiai*). The political actions of *prostatai* had features of demagogy. Thus we can assume that such a phenomenon as demagogy appeared long before Cleon.

Nevertheless the situation of fifth-century Athens was not favourable for the aristocracy. The supposed numerical reduction of the nobility owing to frequent wars and military conflicts (more or less perceptible) could have been an acute problem as well. Despite the likely replacement of the lost men by new members of propertied class(es), this situation could be regarded as a serious deformation.

Those who preferred to use the traditional forms of political struggle were frequently faced with problems. On the one hand, this was a result of the inner inequality of the nobility. Not all of its members had the chance to be leaders of aristocratic factions. Often this left the nobility leaderless and so prevented the emergence of new political groupings. Suffice it to mention the efforts made by Thucydides son of Melesias in creating his own group. In the event there emerged a political hybrid, of an aristocratic *hetaireia* which did not shun demagogic techniques. We should treat this as a sign of adaptation, or adaptation through deformation.

89 Plut. *Per.* 11.2, transl. B. Perrin. Cf. Thuc. 6.13.1 (Alcibiades).
90 E.g. Ober (n. 5, above), 89. But for doubts about the resemblance of Thucydides' *hetaireia* to a political party see M. H. Hansen, 'Political Parties in Democratic Athens?', *GRBS* liv 2014, 379–403 at 381 ff.
91 Plut. *Per.* 14.3.
92 See, e.g., Wade-Gery (n. 87, above), 206 ff. = 240 ff. Pericles, in Wade-Gery's expression, began his fifteen years' principate (p. 205).
93 Connor (n. 13, above), 63 n. 55.
94 Plut. *Per.* 15.1–2. See also Sealey, (n. 36, above), 234 ff. = 59 ff., Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation* (n. 36, above), 39.