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democracy was bad in principle but successful and stable, and that it was only in the later years of the Peloponnesian War, when the democracy was no longer delivering success, that it was set aside. And the experiences of oligarchy then were so bad that nobody in the fourth century wanted oligarchy.

As for Sparta, the dispensation attributed to Lycurgus can be seen as an attempt, by making certain concessions, to unite all the full citizens, richer and poorer together, in conditions of comparative equality and in opposition to the much larger number of non-citizens. The citizens knew that their supremacy depended on preserving that arrangement; and, in spite of their fear of the helots, for most of the time the *perioikoi* and the helots accepted their inferior position without rebelling against it.

And the polarisation of the Greek world, between Athens and Sparta for much of the fifth century, between Athens-plus-Sparta and Thebes in the middle of the fourth century, between Athens and Macedon after that, meant that local differences were exacerbated by being drawn into a more wide-ranging opposition.

So political instability was an important and pervasive feature of ancient Greece, and is well worth studying as an aspect of Greek political life.

ARISTOCRACY IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS: DEFORMATION AND/OR ADAPTATION

Valerij Goušchin

1. INTRODUCTION

The Old Oligarch and his *Athenaion Politeia* are the first things that come to mind if we discuss the role of the aristocracy in classical Athens. In this pamphlet it is stated that the Athenians have chosen the kind of constitution (i.e. democracy) that ‘lets the worst people be better off than the good’. This could suggest that the aristocracy had lost its meaning at least in the second half of the fifth century B.C. In spite of that, the Athenian constitution could retain its aristocratic style even in the time of democracy. F.J. Frost was sure that until the middle of the fifth century most significant decisions were made by a narrow circle of aristocratic families. The same has been claimed recently by R.W. Wallace, however specifying a chronological milestone. The hereditary aristocracy, he asserts, remained important down to 442, i.e. to the ostracism of Thucydides Melesius.

This is in agreement with W. Eder, who supposed that the priority of the aristocracy in democratic Athens continued until the middle of the fifth century, and an alternative to the old leading families could be provided only by the ‘new politicians’ who emerged in politics relatively late in the fifth century. He stated, however, that the Athenian *demokratia* was designed to fit the existing system of aristocratic leadership.

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Obviously it is still questionable what influence Athenian democracy and democratic institutions exerted upon the aristocracy (or the latter on democracy). I shall discuss this question below, but offer some preliminary considerations at the beginning.

In speaking about democratic Athens I refer to the sixth (as the beginning) and the fifth centuries. I leave aside here the question whether the Athenian democracy was fully developed in this time or reached its developed form at the end of the fifth century (or even in the fourth century). On the other hand, I shall discuss their role in politics, but not, for example, in the religious sphere, where the aristocracy perhaps retained a more or less influential position throughout the fifth century.

As for the aristocrats, they could be conceived in terms of merit, birth and wealth. Though the well-born and the well-to-do could belong to different social strata, I am inclined to think of ‘aristocracy’ as the term synonymous with the ‘upper class’ (or leisure class) that included the members of Attic gene and the wealthy Athenians. This is how Aristotle characterized the ‘notables’ (gnorimoi): ‘among the notables wealth, birth, virtue, education, and the distinctions that are spoken of in the same group as these (tōn de γνωρίμων πλούτος ευγένεια ἁρετή παιδεία καὶ τότη τούτους λεγόμενα κατά τὴν εὐεργετὴν διαφοράν).’

We need to take into account that the aristocracy of ancient Athens differed substantially from the aristocracy of mediaeval Europe that used to enjoy hereditary titles and political privileges. The Athenian upper class was not the closed social stratum or a so-called ‘premier état’ with more or less constant membership. ‘Les époques archaïque et classique’, A. Duplessy, asserts ‘con sa permanence la disparition de certaines lignées et l’émergence de nouveaux groupes, provoquant une recomposition sociale incessante de l’élite.’

7 See, e.g., M.H. Jameson, Religion in the Athenian Democracy in Morris & Raflaub (n. 4, above), 171–96, N. Evans, Civic Rites: Democracy and Religion in Ancient Athens (Berkeley & Los Angeles: U. of California P., 2010). But there could be one important change, in that from the middle of the fifth century new priesthoods were not hereditary in particular gene but were open to all qualified Athenians (S.D. Lambert, ‘A Polis and Its Priests: Athenian Priesthoods Before and After Pericles’ Citizenship Law’, Historia lix 2010, 143–75; cf. the argument of J.H. Blok, ‘Pericles’ Citizenship Law: A New Perspective’, Historia lvi 2009, 141–170, that the purpose of the law was to ensure that all citizens should be truly Athenian and therefore fit to hold priesthoods).
8 The Greeks used for ‘aristocracy’ rather ambiguous terms: αὐτοῖς (or καλοκαίραγοι), ἑσθοῖς, gnorimoi etc. See on this W. Donlan, ‘Social Vocabulary and Its Relationship to Political Propaganda in Fifth-Century Athens’, QUCC xxvii 1978, 95–111, Ober (n. 5, above), 251 ff. Aristot is often used during the archaic period as a designation of the aristocrats (W. Donlan, ‘A Note on Aristos as a Class Term’, Philologus cviii 1969, 268–70).
11 A. Duplessy, ‘La Cité et ses élites. Modes de reconnaissance sociale et mentalité agonistique en Grèce archaïque et classique’, in H. Fornes & C. Stein (eds.), Aristocratic authority, modelling...
13 E.g. W.R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens (Princeton: Princeton P., 1971), 251 ff. A leading man’s authority and prestige were measured by the number of his followers (W. Donlan, ‘The Pre-State Community in Greece’, Sscr xxviii 1989, 137–206 at 139). The Aristocratic Ideal and Selected Papers (Chicago: Bolchazy–Carducci, 1999) 99 n. 22. In using the language of hetairiai I am not supposing that these links were comparable to the hetairiai known from the late fifth century.
16 Thuc. 1.126–13; see also S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, 1 (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1991), 203 ff. Cylon was an Olympic victor and son-in-law of the Megarian tyrant, and in this sense he was most authoritative among his hetairiai and koinotai (Hdt. 5,71,11).
solidarity) were stronger than familial ones: "The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, because a partisan was more ready to dare without asking why."

'Political friendship' (to put it in Connor's terms) and *hetaireiai* gave to politics an informal style. The mechanism of rotation (or election) was not carefully constructed or frequently violated. This type of power relations resulted in the bitter rivalry of aristocratic factions and was fraught with serious political upheavals; and the case of Cylon could be an example of this.

But with the lapse of time some leaders began to seek the *demos*' support in their struggle with their opponents. The common people at this time became more influential, if not in politics yet in society. According to Thucydides the *demos* took an active part in the suppression of Cylon's *coup*. In the times of Solon and Pisistratus, I believe, the common people played an active part politically. Suffice it to recall the long-lasting quarrel between the multitude and the notables before Solon's reforms. And so of some of the aristocrats recognised the masses' ambitions as a new weapon to use against each other. Those who were ready to recognise the mass's ambitions converted themselves into *prostatai tou demou*.

At first the *prostatai* could use the *demos' support primarily for the struggle with their rivals. Over some time they would have had to formulate certain democratic slogans, i.e. to act (whether consciously or not) as democratic reformers. This type of politician (*prostatai* and demagogues) is mentioned particularly in the first part of the *Athenaion Politeia*. Obviously these are first-rank politicians who in their own way promoted the development of democracy in Athens:

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18 Thuc. 3.82.5, transl. B. Jowett.
19 Ober supposes that it was only in the time of Cleisthenes that the lower classes became sufficiently politically aware to be a factor in political struggles (Ober [n. 5, above], 85).
20 'The Athenians, when they saw what had happened, came in a body from the fields (περνώντες ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν) and invested the Acropolis' (Thuc. 1.126.7, transl. B. Jowett).
21 V. G Definition of the *prostatai* in A. P. 13.4 and the Establishment of the Tyranny of 561/60 B.C. CQ 45, 1949, 14–21. The *demos* could make an appeal to the leaders.
22 Ath. Pol. 2.1: οὐκ ἦσαν διά τὸ τε γνώμων καὶ τὸ πάθεις τοῖς γόνοιν.
23 Ober (n. 5, above), 85. But one of the aristocrats (as in the case of Pericles) could 'decide[d] to devote himself to the people, espousing the cause of the poor and the many instead of the few and the rich, contrary to his own nature, which was anything but popular' (Plut. Per. 7.3, transl. B. Perrin). (In common with the other contributors to this book, I cite Plutarch's *Lives* by the chapters and sections of the Teubner and Budé editions; but I quote the translations of B. Perrin from the Loeb edition, which has a different division of the chapters into sections.)
24 According to Ober the democratic leaders were driven by a competitive ethos rather than by theoretical principles (Ober [n. 5, above], 84).
25 On *prostatai* and their democratic programmes see: Goussin (n. 21, above), 14–19.
26 Certainly, we need to be careful here, because of course the *Athenaion Politeia* may be (mis-)understanding these early politicians by using the criteria of the author's own time.
27 This list of *prostatai tou demou* is given by Ath. Pol. 28.2–3. Certainly, from other sources other persons could be added to this list (e.g. Hyperbolus, Androcles, etc.).
28 In Ath. Pol. 28.2 the meaning seems to be that Themistocles was a democratic leader and Aristides was an aristocratic leader, but Ath. Pol. 23.3 puts both on the democratic side.
29 Ober (n. 4, above), 122, 128.
30 Thuc. in his life of Pericles wrote as follows: 'Now there had been from the beginning a sort of seam hidden beneath the surface of affairs, as in a piece of iron, which faintly indicated a divergence between the popular and the aristocratic programme; but the emulous ambition of these two men [Pericles and Cimon] cut a deep gash in the state, and caused one section of it to be called the "Demos", or the *People*, and the other the "Oligoi", or the *Few* (Plut. Per. 11.3, transl. B. Perrin) – but for doubts see A. Andreu, 'The Opposition to Pericles', HJS xxxviii 1978, 1–8 at 2). Connor thinks that political conflicts before the appearance of demagogues were mainly a matter of personal rivalry (Connor [n. 13, above], 110ff.). Those could be those whom Solon envisaged in his law on *suzis* (Ath. Pol. 8.5); see also n. 80, below.
31 On *prostatai* and their *hetaireiai* see Goussin (n. 21, above), 123 n. 58.
32 Hdt. 5.66.1, transl. A.D. Godley. According to the *Athen. Pol.* he was ἠπτάμαινος δὲ τοῖς...
However, the first-rank politicians were not eager to flaunt their friendly interactions. The Athenians indeed could look askance at those who seemed to prefer the company of their social peers to that of ordinary citizens. This explains Aristides' desire to look like a lone (or independent) politician. Pericles, who had friends of the greatest influence, avoided invitations to dinner, friendly and familiar interaction. Some time later Cleon demonstratively broke off with his friends, displaying his loyalty to the demos.

This fact demonstrated, on the one hand, that narrow group loyalty was replaced (or seemed to be replaced) by loyalty to the people. But, on the other hand, it could relate to such a phenomenon as demagogy. The latter is characterized, Connor postulates, by the abandonment of working through friends and by appealing directly to the people. In that case, some features of demagogy appeared before Cleon: one may find it in the behaviour of Aristides and Pericles.

3. BETWEEN STABILITY AND INSTABILITY

At the turn of the sixth and fifth centuries the aristocrats were faced with new challenges, because they were divided into rival groups. The Alcmaeonids and their (and/or Cleisthenes') supporters could be weakened after Cleisthenes' sudden departure from the political scene. It would seem that this created certain advantages for their ill-wishers. Indeed, there could be among them the opponents of Cleisthenes and a reform. Besides, the latter could be still alive the followers of Isagoras (or his followers' descendants) and those whom the sources called as 'the friends of the tyrants', e.g. Hipparchus son of Charmus. There were also those who did not join any of these groups. Each group mentioned above could have been led by one of its members, but the aristocracy did not have a common leader. The situation changed with appearance of Miltiades, who, as A.W. Gomme wrote, 'put himself at the head of the nobles'. But after Miltiades' death his opponents, who put him on trial in

Ober (n. 5, above), 86.
But together with E.S. Gruen I am averse to see in this political parties ('Stesimbrotos against Miltiades and Thesmotheon'), CSCA iii 1970, 91–8 at 91–2.
He was archon in 496/5 B.C. (Develin, Athenian Officials, 684–321 B.C. [Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1989]), 54.
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489 (i.e. the Alcmaeonids), won the leadership in Athens.50 But they lost their championship as soon as the Athenians made use of the law of ostracism. Later, in the 480s–470s, Themistocles and Aristides took priority with varying success. If Themistocles was a democratic leader, Aristides was thought to be a leader of an aristocratic kind.51 But Plutarch writes of him as a single-handed politician who was more inclined to demonstrate his independence.52 If that is right, the aristocracy could have been deprived of a leader in the traditional sense of the word until Cimon’s appearance in politics. Perhaps this is how we might understand a problematic passage in the Athenion Politeia.

We read there as follows:

For it so happened that during these periods the better classes had no leader at all, but the chief person among them (μηδὲ ηγεμόνα ἔχειν τοὺς ἐπισχετέας ὧλλ’ αὐτῶν πρεσβευόντα). Cimon son of Miltiades, was a rather young man who had only lately entered public life; and in addition, that the multitude had suffered seriously in war.53

This text presents many difficulties. It follows the story of Ephialtes’ reform of 462, which did not relate to the time of Cimon’s youth.54 In addition to that, the substantial Athenian losses would seem to us unrealistic, if we move Aristotle’s narration to the 480s (on casualties see pp. 56–8, below). I assume that Cimon’s youth and the substantial military losses of the Athenians should be attributed to different periods.

We may suppose that after Miltiades’ death the aristocracy, if not leaderless, did not have a recognised leader at the head of them. Aristides, as remarked above, may have preferred a different political style emphasising his independence. The situation changed when Cimon obtained leading position. He belonged, to a particularly notable and influential family and therefore surpassed many of the aristocrats. This could give him a dominant position among the aristocrats (ὁ πρεσβευόντας τῶν αὐτῶν πρεσβευόντων).

Over time Cimon turned into a national (and, like his father, panhellenic) leader. His indisputable leadership is reflected in the text of Ath. Pol., where we find a teleological view of it, i.e. Cimon’s priority and leadership as a pre-ordained result. But in the 480s he was still young to enter public life. That is perhaps why, according to Ath. Pol., the aristocrats had a recognised champion but not a hegemon (μηδὲ ηγεμόνα ἔχειν τοὺς ἐπισχετέας).

What was happening in society displeased the aristocracy and demanded an immediate reaction on their part. Their discontent could be especially intensified in a time of war. If we put our trust in Plutarch’s narration, before the battle of Plataea (in 479) a conspiracy was organized by noblemen (ὁ πρεσβευόντας τῶν αὐτῶν πρεσβευόντων) who had been impoverished by the war, and they wanted, Plutarch reports, to over-

throw the democracy (καταλάβων τὸν δῆμον).55 Nevertheless Aristides, who commanded the Athenians at Plataea, put a brake on the investigation.

Among the conspirators Plutarch mentions Agiasias of Acharnae and Aeschines of Lamprae, who managed to escape from the camp.56 The finding of ostraka with the name Agiasias of Agryle or Lamprae (but not of Acharnae), gives some reason to trust Plutarch’s story in spite of the confusion in the details.57 If so, some things seem to me noteworthy, in particular, the negative effects of the war remarked on by Plutarch (see also pp. 56–8, below). In addition, I should like to draw attention to one thing. The conspirators preferred to act secretly from Aristides, though it would be comprehensible that he had enough sympathy with them not to initiate judicial proceedings.

The situation changed after Cimon headed (or organised) the aristocratic faction, which we shall see in the battle of Tanagra c. 457 (see below). In Athens there began a ‘Cimonian’ era. For a long time Cimon continued to be a successful military commander and the most influential politician. Thereby he contributed to the strengthening the position of the aristocracy;58 and that in turn may have enabled the Athenion Politeia (or its sources) to talk about the Areopagus’ domination. According to the Athenion Politeia, in the 470s–460s the state was dominated by the Areopagus.59 Perhaps Cimon’s political influence or his effective collaboration with the Areopagus (though most likely he was not a member) could be an explanation of this notion.

However, Ephialtes’ reform of 462/1 and subsequent events put an end to Cimon’s dominance and to the influence of the aristocracy. Cimon’s sluggish attempt to restore the aristocracy’s previous importance (as he responded to the reform of 462, according to Plutarch) were unsuccessful.60 His subsequent expulsion by the procedure of ostracism put an end to the Cimonian era.

The aristocrats remained leaderless again. Changing political realities stirred up their dissatisfaction and irritations. For the first time, as was said above, that had happened at Plataea in 479. A second attempt was made before the battle of Tanagra in 457. This time the discontent was caused by the long wars, which were thought

52 Plut. Arist. 3.4; see also p. 53; above.
56 Plut. Arist. 13.3.
57 Harvey (n. 55, above), 58–9, Rhodes (n. 12, above), 123, S. Brenne, Ostrakismos and Pronomia in Athens (Tyche Supp. iii 2001), 89–90, discusses the ostraka and considers the identification with Plutarch’s Agiasias possible but ‘sehr hypothetisch’.
58 ‘When he was at home, he mastered and constrained the people in its onsets upon the nobles’ (Plut. Cim. 15.1, transl. B. Perrin).
60 Plut. Cim. 15.3.
to be a symbol of the democracy.61 The attempted coup was unsuccessful or without
effect, though we do not know the details of it.

Soon after that there emerged new negative circumstances. Here we should place what we learn from the *Athenai on Politeia*, that the aristocracy suffered from the wars and numerous military campaigns, which resulted in ravages and their numerical decline. For Aristotle this was above all a stimulus to the development of democracy.62 *Revolutions in the constitutions also take place on account of disproportionate growth; for just as the body is composed of parts, and needs to grow proportionately in order that its symmetry may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled...*63 He gives, in particular, the example of Taras, where a great many notables were defeated and killed by the iapygians after the Persian Wars and constitutional government was changed to a democracy.64 In this context also he mentions Athens, where ‘the notables (gnorimoi) became fewer because at the time of the war against Sparta the army was drawn from a muster-roll’.65

But in this case we are interested not so much in Aristotle’s theoretical assessment as in the problem of the supposed numerical decline of the aristocracy in the 460s–430s. In the *Athenai on Politeia* we find as follows ‘In those days the expeditionary force was raised from a muster-roll, and was commanded by generals with no experience of war but promoted on account of their family reputations, so that it was always happening that the troops on an expedition suffered as many as two or three thousand casualties, making a drain on the numbers of the respectable members both of the people and of the wealthy (τιτρενταθεσθης τοις ἐπετειχισμένοι καὶ τοῖς ὁμοζευτηκόντοις)’.66

P.J. Rhodes points out it is not plausible that the casualties should have occurred only or primarily among the upper classes. He assumes that Aristotle used ἐπετειχισμένοι not in a political but in a moral sense.67 These casualties could be in any case the representatives of three first property classes.68 The inscription ek kata-
logou meant indeed that the men recruited (and hence killed) were Athenians belonging to the first three classes,69 If so we can talk about military losses among the aristocrats in the time of the so-called First Peloponnesian War as well.70 Suffice it
to mention the defeat of the Athenians at Halieis c. 459 and at Tanagra c. 457.71 One may add to the list the Egyptian disaster of 454.

The battle of Tanagra may provide an example of the mass death of the aristocrats. The ostracised Cimon who had refused to join his tribe (Oecneis) appealed to his followers (or heaitroi) to fight strongly against the Lacedaemonians. ‘They took his armour and set it in the midst of their company, supported another ardently in the fight, and fell, to the number of one hundred.’72

Certainly, the casualties will not always have been so sizable. In the battle of Platea, as Herodotus reports, the Greeks lost 159 men with 52 Athenians among them.73 Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the losses of the Athenians could be substantial, at least within the so-called hoplite class. The casualty list of the tribe Ebrethias for a year c.460 contains 176 names (IG I2 1147), and that of Aegeis more than 57 (1147 bis). If the war losses of the other tribes were equal to those of Ebrethias, as G. Smith assumed, the total losses would be 1,760 -- though she granted that most likely that would be an overestimate.74

Whatever the actual numbers, the military losses created a social void in the civil community and in the ranks of the aristocracy, which eventually was filled by those who satisfied the property qualifications. But in this case the aristocracy of the well-born and educated turned increasingly into a proportioned class. Thus the list of those who were prominent after these wars could differ to some extent from what had gone before.75

61 Tanagra: Thuc. 1.107.5, Hornblower (n. 16, above), 170–1; but contra E. Badian, From Platea to Potidaea (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. P., 1993), 213.
63 Arist. Pol. 5.1302a3–6, transl. H. Rackham.
64 Arist. Pol. 5.1303a1–6.
67 Rhodes (n. 46, above), 328. But the gnorimoi whom Aristotle mentions in the Politics were obviously a social category.
68 Dovatur (n. 62, above), 154–5.
69 See in general Christ (n. 66, above).
70 Dovatur (n. 62, above), 156. We may add the sizeable casualties at Drabescus in 465/4 (e.g.:
However, I suspect that during the ongoing wars – even taking into account the fact that they aimed at enrichment\textsuperscript{77} – the regeneration of the propertied class is unlikely to have been fast,\textsuperscript{78} especially if the classes were defined on the basis of wealth obtained from agricultural production. Plutarch mentions economic disasters of the propertied class before the battle of Plataea, and Thucydides in turn reports that the Athenians recovered from the calamities of the Persian Wars only on the eve of the Peloponnesian War.\textsuperscript{79}

4. ADAPTATION: THUCYDIDES MELESIOU AS A CASE-STUDY

Democratic institutions and the successes of those whose who relied on the \textit{demos} had a profound effect on politics. (Let us recall the impressive list of \textit{prostatai tou demos} of the sixth and fifth centuries on pp. 50–1, above). The aristocratic \textit{hetairiai} in this situation moved step-by-step out of the political sphere (perhaps until 411), remaining only informal communities of friends. This means that some groups of aristocrats lost their political influence and/or converted into \textit{apragmomenoi}.\textsuperscript{80}

However, if the representative institutions were playing an increasing role in politics, the ability to work in (and with) the people’s assembly or \textit{heliaia} was becoming increasingly significant, and the aristocracy had to take this into account. That is why we hear of Miltiades’ \textit{psephismata} (whether authentic or not), which were the result of cooperation with the people’s assembly (\textit{ekklestia}).\textsuperscript{81} Readiness to adapt to new conditions was displayed by Cimon.\textsuperscript{82} He also had to acquire the skills of working (in with) the people’s assembly. It is also displayed in his repeated election as \textit{strategos} from 478/7 to 462/1, because he was a skilful and popular military commander.\textsuperscript{83} Another illustration of his impact on the \textit{demos} could be his victory over Ephialtes when the question of assistance to Sparta was discussed.\textsuperscript{84} He won this victory at the meeting(s) of the people’s assembly, and that seemed to control his democratic opponent Ephialtes.

But perhaps the most conspicuous evolution was made by Thucydides Melesiou, who was Cimon’s relative. Information about him we find mainly in Plutarch, which in itself may provoke disbelief. But what Plutarch reports does not contradict historical reality and could well be the case. Thucydides, as Plutarch wrote, ‘being less of a warrior than Cimon, and more of a forensic speaker and statesman (\textit{gραμματικος} δε και \textit{πολιτικος} μελλων), by keeping watch and ward in the city, and by wrestling bouts with Pericles on the bema, soon brought the administration into even poise’.\textsuperscript{85} Besides, he was successful in the lawcourts (\textit{dikasteria}), in particular in the trial of a certain Pyr Lampas. Perhaps this event preceded his rivalry with Pericles.\textsuperscript{86}

And the struggle over Pericles’ building programme was conducted in the assembly, which could affect the nature of the confrontation and add ‘parliamentary’ features to it.\textsuperscript{87} Elsewhere Plutarch mentions ‘Thucydides and his party’ (των θυσαυτων ουκ θυσαυτου).\textsuperscript{88}

\begin{itemize}
  \item 478/7 is his first supposed \textit{strategos}: Develin (n. 48, above), 67–72. See also E. Stein-Hölleskamp, ‘Kimon und die athenische Demokratie’, \textit{Hermes} xxxvii 1995, 145–64 at 157–8.
  \item He mastered and constrained the people in its onsets upon the nobles, as Plutarch narrates, and its efforts to wrest all office and power to itself’ (Plut. \textit{Cim.} 15.1).
  \item Plut. \textit{Cim.} 16.8–10.
  \item Plut. \textit{Per.} 11.1, transl. B. Perrin; see also Rhodes (n. 12, above), 127.
  \item Plut. \textit{Per.} 14.1.
\end{itemize}
But at the beginning the aristocrats were dispersed in the face of their opponents. He would not suffer the party of the "Good and True (καλοίς καθησκευασμένης)" as they called themselves, to be scattered up and down and blended with the populace, as heretofore, the weight of their character being thus obscured by numbers, but by calling them out and assembling them into one body, he made their collective influence, thus become weighty, as it were a counterpoise in the balance. He separated off the kaloi kagathoi to give them greater political weight in the assembly. If this was so, Thucydides' hetaireia had certain similarities with a parliamentary party.

Thucydides managed to restore the influence of the aristocracy in the assembly, but for a short time only. Pericles, as Plutarch narrates, 'secured his rival's banishment, and the dissolution of the faction (κατέληκε δὲ τὴν αὐτοπεποίητην ἐπαρχίαν) which had been arrayed against him'. Thucydides' faction was defeated and he was exiled by the procedure of ostracism. The aristocracy lost its leader once more. It was not easy for a new man, we may agree with Connor, to take over the leadership of the group. I should even say that it would be impossible owing to the lack of equal rights for leadership, as I suggested earlier. Thucydides became the leader because he was Cimon's relative, because he belonged to one of the most distinguished and influential aristocratic families.

Plutarch assumed that after Thucydides' expulsion Pericles converted from the leader who did not hesitate to use demagogic techniques into the wise leader of all the people. But at this time in Athenian politics there appeared new figures such as Cleon.

5. CONCLUSIONS

So what happened to the aristocracy in democratic Athens? During the period under review the aristocracy remained the most politically active layer of the citizen body. Firstly under the domination of competitive values (or the agonistic spirit) the aristocrats were fighting with each other while remaining parts of a whole. But over time there was a split, which had a significant impact on subsequent events. It found its expression in the appearance of prostatai whose efforts supplied the beginning of democracy in Athens. Besides, their type of political behaviour, i.e. direct appeal to the demos, permits us to distinguish them from the other aristocratic leaders whose activity was based primarily on friendship association (hetaireiai). The political actions of prostatai had features of demagoguery. Thus we can assume that such a phenomenon as demagoguery appeared long before Cleon.

Nevertheless the situation of fifth-century Athens was not favourable for the aristocracy. The supposed numerical reduction of the nobility owing to frequent wars and military conflicts (more or less perceptible) could have been an acute problem as well. Despite the likely replacement of the lost men by new members of the property class(es), this situation could be regarded as a serious deformation.

Those who preferred to use the traditional forms of political struggle were frequently faced with problems. On the one hand, this was a result of the inner inequality of the nobility. Not all of its members had the chance to become leaders of aristocratic factions. Often this left the nobility leaderless and so prevented the emergence of new political groupings. Suffice it to mention the efforts made by Thucydides son of Melesias in creating his own group. In the event there emerged a political hybrid, of an aristocratic hetaireia which did not shun demagogic techniques. We should treat this as a sign of adaptation, or adaptation through deformation.