Emancipative Values and Democracy: Response to Hadenius and Teorell

Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart

This article demonstrates that Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell's attempt to disprove a causal effect of emancipative mass orientations on democracy is flawed in each of its three lines of reasoning. First, contrary to Hadenius and Teorell's claim that measures of "effective democracy" end up in meaningless confusion of democracy and minor aspects of its quality, we illustrate that additional qualifications of democracy illuminate meaningful differences in the effective practice of democracy. Second, Hadenius and Teorell's finding that emancipative orientations have no significant effect on subsequent measures of democracy from Freedom House is highly unstable: using only a slightly later measure of the dependent variable, the effect turns out to be highly significant. Third, we illustrate that these authors' analytical strategy is irrelevant to the study of democratization because the temporal specification they use misses almost all cases of democratization. We present a more conclusive model of democratization, analyzing how much a country moved toward or away from democracy as the dependent variable. The model shows that emancipative orientations had a strong effect on democratization during the most massive wave of democratization ever—stronger than any indicator of economic development. Finally, we illustrate a reason why this is so: emancipative orientations motivate

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emancipative social movements that aim at the attainment, sustenance, and extension of democratic freedoms.

Introduction

In a study designed to test the predictive power of cultural and economic theories of democratization, Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell (2005) criticize recent work by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2003) and Welzel, Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (2003). They criticize particularly these authors' finding that emancipative mass orientations show a significant impact on democracy (more recently, see Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel and Inglehart, 2005; Welzel, 2006). Hadenius and Teorell try to disprove this claim on three grounds. First, they argue that the dependent variable used by Inglehart and Welzel—effective democracy—is conceptually flawed, so the strong effect on democracy attributed to emancipative orientations is meaningless. Second, they argue that Inglehart and Welzel's strategy to rule out reverse causality by introducing the number of previous years under democracy is mistaken, for this control predictor cannot be considered as the lagged version of the dependent variable, effective democracy. Third, Hadenius and Teorell show that early 1990s measures of emancipative orientations have no significant effect on the 1999 democracy ratings from Freedom House controlling for the ratings in 1995. They infer from this result that Inglehart and Welzel's interpretation of the causal relation between emancipative orientations and democratic institutions is wrong. In sum, they maintain that emancipative mass orientations are "endogenous" to democratic institutions, having no causal effect of their own on democracy. With this conclusion they confirm what Dankwart Rustow (1970), Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson (1994), and Robert Jackman and Ross Miller (1998) have postulated earlier: widespread pro-democratic attitudes are a consequence rather than a precondition of democratic institutions.

Our response addresses this critique point by point, showing that it is untenable in each aspect. To do this, we proceed in five steps. First, we provide evidence demonstrating that effective democracy is a more meaningful and close-to-reality measure of democracy than the scores from Freedom House alone. Second, we maintain that including previous years under democracy as a control predictor in regressions, which explain effective democracy, is an appropriate procedure to consider reverse causation. For those who argue that democracy affects mass orientations rather than the other way round attribute to democracy a "habituation effect" (Rustow, 1970), which is supposed to unfold with the *endurance* of democracy. Third, we demonstrate that the effect of emancipative orientations on subsequent democracy scores from Freedom House *does* hold against controls of lagged measures of these scores, and that per capita GDP and other indicators of economic development do not eliminate the effect of emancipative orientations. Fourth, we provide a more conclusive model of democratization addressing directly the changes in levels of democracy that occurred during the most massive wave of democratization ever, showing that emancipative orientations helped minimize decreases as well as maximize increases in the level of democracy, depending on the initial level of democracy. Fifth and finally, we illustrate one reason why this effect exists: emancipative orientations motivate emancipative social movements that aim at the attainment, sustenance, and extension of democratic freedoms.

Is Effective Democracy a Meaningful Concept?

Hadenius and Teorell claim that our measure of effective democracy is meaningless because it confuses two conceptually different things: democratic government and effective government. This statement seems to rest on the assumption that combining different things always produces meaningless confusion. If this were true, water would be meaningless because it is a conceptual confusion of hydrogen and oxygen.

We agree that democratic governance and effective governance are conceptually distinct. But this is precisely the reason why we look at how they interact. There would be little point in combining democracy and effectiveness if they were exactly the same. Logically, if one is interested in the effective practice of democracy, one must combine information about democratic governance and effective governance.

Hadenius and Teorell argue that what matters is whether democracy is institutionalized in the first place; whether it is effective is a secondary question. Here we disagree. Since democracy is designed to empower people, what matters is how much it *actually* empowers people. This is not only a question of whether democracy is institutionalized; it is *also* a matter of uncorrupt practices in the power holders' handling of democratic freedoms, as the recent literature on "deficient democracies" emphasizes (Ottaway, 2003).

Hadenius and Teorell's argumentation is ambiguous. On one hand, they question that it makes sense to differentiate between effective democracy and democracy as such. On the other hand, they insist that the democracy scores from Freedom House are meaningful *because* they indicate effective practices of democratic freedoms, not only whether democratic freedoms are formally enacted.[1] This is an unproven assumption based solely on the self-declared intentions of Freedom House. To be sure, Freedom House is not only looking for the mere legalization of democratic freedoms, but also recognizes how much these freedoms are subject to obvious violations. But there is no evidence that Freedom House is sensitive to more subtle ways to circumvent formal procedures, rights, and freedoms other than open violations. As Richard Rose (2001) and Wayne Sandholtz and Rein Taagepera (2005) argue, the ancient disease of corruption is one of these sublime ways, and probably one of the most efficient ones.

By definition, corruption means the abuse of state power for private benefit, involving clientelism, nepotism, patronage, and other forms of favoritism, all of which disable the due formal procedures on which democracy depends (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2005). To the extent to which corrupt government embezzles taxpayers' money, it expropriates the public, disabling democratic controls over state power. Corrupt government helps to suspend people's democratic freedoms and, in extreme cases, comes close to disenfranchise the electorate, even if democratic freedoms remain formally untouched. Each degree of corrupt government is a step to disempower the people. Since the empowerment of people is at the heart of democracy, absence of corrupt government is of direct relevance to how much democracy can take effect. This justifies a qualification of the effectiveness of given democratic freedoms by using indicators of corrupt government or its absence.

There is no evidence that Freedom House is as sensitive to the eminence of cor-rupt government as other organizations that specifically address this issue (such as Transparency International or the World Bank). For these reasons, we use the World Bank's "control of corruption" scores as our measure of effective (or uncor-rupt) government. Control of corruption is one of the six indicators the World Bank provides under the concept of "good governance." Corruption is measured by the World Bank in the broadest possible sense, or what they call "grand corruption." This broad measure of corruption focuses on state involvement in corrupt practices. It combines expert and population judgments from a wide range of sources using an elaborated "unobserved components method" that provides maximum data quality (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2005).

Absence of corruption is an appropriate qualifier, indicating to what extent demo-cratic freedoms can take effect. But how should one combine measures of uncorrupt government with measures of democratic freedoms to yield a meaningful index of *effective* democratic freedoms? Precisely because democratic freedoms and uncor-rupt government are different things, one should not mix them up by calculating an average or another additive combination. Any additive combination is flawed because it allows favorable scores in uncorrupt government to compensate deficien-cies in democratic freedoms. Hence, a combined measure should not average the two components but should instead specify how they interact. Since interaction is modeled by multiplication, we multiply measures of democratic freedoms taken from Freedom House with measures of uncorrupt government taken from the World Bank. Doing so, we use uncorrupt government as a qualifier to determine how much particular democratic freedoms can take effect. The equation below depicts this rationale:[2]

Effective Democracy	=	Democracy score	*	Effectiveness score
Weighted percentages		Percentages		Weights from 0 to 1.0
Democracy score:		a measure of democratic freedoms using the added Freedom House scores for civil liberties and political rights (polarity reversed, maximum set equal to 100).		
Effectiveness score:		a measure of uncorrupt government using the World Bank's scores for "control of corruption" (normalized scale to yield fractions from 0 to 1.0).		

The index of effective democracy downweights democratic freedoms to the extent that the practice of these freedoms is offset by corrupt government practices. Be-cause we use uncorrupt government as a weighting factor that ranges from 0 (for the most corrupt country) to 1.0 (for the least corrupt country), high scores in uncorrupt government cannot compensate for low scores in democratic freedoms. As a factor in multiplication, even a maximum score of uncorrupt government (1.0) cannot do more than maintain the given extent of democratic freedoms. Uncorrupt government can only deflate but not inflate democratic freedoms.

A society can score low in effective democracy for two different reasons: either it has few democratic freedoms, in which case the score for effective democracy

will be low anyway, irrespective of how incorruptly the society is governed; or the respective society has many democratic freedoms but corrupt government renders them largely ineffective. In both cases, the effective democracy score will be low. This property of our index is fully intentional. Whether citizens cannot practice democratic freedoms because these freedoms are not instituted in the first place, or whether they cannot practice them because corrupt government renders these freedoms ineffective, is irrelevant to the fact that citizens are in both cases hindered to practice freedoms.

In the perspective of effective democracy, the crucial question is whether certain institutional practices hinder people to make use of democratic freedoms. The exact source of the hindrance—absence of democratic freedoms or corruption of these freedoms—is less relevant in this perspective than the hindrance itself.

Effective democracy is a more demanding concept than democracy without this qualification. For a society must have *both* a wide range of democratic freedoms *and* largely uncorrupt government practices to achieve a high score in effective democracy. Only one of these two components must be absent to yield a low score in effective democracy, but both of them must be present to yield a high score in effective democracy. These properties differentiate the concept of effective democracy from democracy by itself, so there would be no point in talking about effective democracy if it were exactly the same as democracy.

Hadenius and Teorell misunderstand the implications of effective democracy. They speculate, for example, that Singapore would score high in effective democracy because our index construction allows Singapore's largely uncorrupt government to compensate for its lack of democratic freedoms. To demonstrate that this assumption is false, Figure 1 depicts a selection of cases, illustrating the differences between democracy as such (labeled formal democracy) and effective democracy. Singapore reaches the thirty-third percentile in formal democracy as compared to the tenth percentile for China. This finding reflects that civil and political freedoms in Singapore are not as rigidly restricted as they are in China. Therefore, Singapore is rated by Freedom House as "partly free" and China as "not free." On the other hand, Singapore is rated only *partly* free, not entirely free, because it imposes considerable restrictions on electoral competition. Still, because of largely uncorrupt government practices, the limited extent of democratic freedoms is converted almost undiminished into the extent of effective democratic freedoms. Nevertheless, Singapore's extent of effective democratic freedoms remains limited because deficiencies in democratic freedoms cannot be compensated, even if prevailing government practices were entirely uncorrupt.

Bolivia is another interesting case discussed by Hadenius and Teorell. Compared to Singapore, Bolivia has much wider democratic freedoms. Yet, largely corrupt government practices dramatically deflate the effectiveness of these freedoms. The reality behind this observation is reflected in all six indicators of "good governance" provided by the World Bank. According to these data, political violence, patronage, and corruption have until recently been so pervasive in Bolivia that the citizens have in practice been largely deprived from their constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. In cases like this, corrupt institutional practices undermine existing civil and political freedoms in their function to give people effective control over state power. The core function of democratic freedoms, people empowerment, is rendered ineffec-

tive under corrupt government. No question that Bolivia has institutionalized much wider democratic freedoms than Singapore. But the Singaporeans can use their fewer freedoms more effectively than the Bolivians can use their wider freedoms. As a consequence, the extent of *effective* democratic freedoms in Bolivia is even narrower than in Singapore. These differences in effective democracy may seem surprising if one is used to focus on democracy as such. But they are more indicative of the citizens "real" freedoms than standard indices of democracy.

Figure 1
Contrasting Cases of Formal Democracy and Effective Democracy

Hadenius and Teorell see the differences in the institutionalization of democratic freedoms as primary and differences in how much these freedoms are set into effect as secondary, while downplaying the latter as a minor question of the quality of democracy. Conversely, we think that the question of how much democratic freedoms are set into effect is as important as the question of how much these freedoms are institutionalized. In fact, differences in the effectiveness of democracy become more important as more countries adopt democracy. Our interest in democracy focuses on how much democracy gives people practicable entitlements, not theoretical ones. This perspective reflects what democracy after all is for: people empowerment. In this perspective, it is imperative to focus on how far given institutional practices provide people "real" power. The concept of effective democracy is designed to do exactly this.

To close this point, we conclude that—empirically—effective democracy makes a significant difference to democracy itself, and that—theoretically—this difference makes sense.

The Question of Causality

Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann (2003) argue that emancipative mass orientations have a causal effect on democratic institutions because the impulse of these orientations is to place emphasis on human well-being, freedom, and equality—which are core norms inherent in the idea of democracy. Whenever these orientations become more widespread, more people will support the idea of civil and political freedoms, even if the concept of democracy is unknown to them (in which case it can be invented anew). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) measure emancipative orientations by a syndrome of various components obtained by a factor analysis of five mass-level attitudes, which include the following (factor loadings on the underlying dimension in parentheses):

- an emphasis on human freedom reflected in liberty aspirations (.88);
- an affinity to civic action reflected in self-reported participation in such activities as signing petitions (.87);
- tolerance of nonconformity reflected in an acceptance of homosexuality (.81);
- a basic sense of being at peace with oneself reflected in life satisfaction (.83);
- an esteem of people in general reflected in generalized interpersonal trust (.61).[3]

This syndrome integrates individualistic attitudes and humanistic attitudes into an overarching emancipative orientation. This orientation is rooted in a general "belief in human potentialities" (Lasswell, 1951). It places emphasis on ordinary people's decision-making freedom and their equality in this freedom. Because of this emphasis, emancipative mass orientations are supposed to provide a powerful social force that motivates emancipative social movements aiming at the attainment, sustenance, or extension of democratic freedoms.

To test whether emancipative orientations have a causal effect on effective democracy, Inglehart and Welzel conduct regression analyses in which emancipative orientations are used as a predictor of effective democracy measured at a time *after* emancipative orientations are measured. Moreover, they take into account that emancipative orientations might themselves be a consequence of preceding democracy. To achieve this, they include as an additional predictor the number of years a country had spent under democracy up to the point in time when emancipative orientations are measured. For this procedure isolates those parts of emancipative orientations that are uninfluenced by preceding democracy, removing reverse causality if there is any.

Hadenius and Teorell criticize this procedure, arguing that in Granger-causal tests of reverse causality it is standard to use a lagged measure of the dependent variable. Since the previous time under democracy is not exactly a lagged measure of the dependent variable (i.e., effective democracy) Hadenius and Teorell claim that Inglehart and Welzel do not perform a test of reverse causality. This is a purely technical argument against which we hold that, for theoretical reasons, it is perfectly appropriate to use the time under democracy as a control predictor to test reverse causality. Why is this so?

Authors claiming that pro-democratic mass orientations are a consequence rather than a precondition of democratic institutions (Rustow, 1970; Muller and Seligson,

1994; Jackman and Miller, 1998) invoke "institutional learning" or "habituation." Solid pro-democratic orientations, they reason, can only emerge on the basis of positive experiences with democracy. People have to be socialized into working democratic practices, so they can learn to appreciate them. Rustow called this "habituation." Obviously, habituation can only take place when democratic institutions already exist and endure. This rationale places emphasis on the length of time democracy persists: the longer democratic institutions are in place, the likelier they become an unquestioned part of a society's collective identity.

This reasoning is only partly convincing. Taken to the extreme, it forecloses the possibility that an esteem of political self-expression, freedom, and equality can emerge even if people have no first-hand experience with democracy. Foreclosing this possibility is at odds with the fact that the whole idea of democracy had been invented under authoritarian government (Markoff, 1996). It is also at odds with the fact that many of the transitions to democracy during the past 30 years had been achieved through mass resistance against authoritarian regimes and driven by the aspiration for civil and political freedoms (Foweraker and Landman, 1997; Tilly, 2004; Schock, 2004; Karatnycky and Ackerman, 2005). A solid demand for democratic freedoms does not only occur under already existing democratic institutions; it often also occurs under tyranny. It is one of the most powerful forces in undermining and overthrowing tyranny.

Still, if there is a grain of truth in the habituation argument, controlling the effect of emancipative orientations for the number of years a society had already spent under democracy is a perfect means to come to terms with the aspect of endurance implied by the habituation argument. As the analyses in Table 1 shows, the number of years a country had spent under democracy does not diminish the significance of the pro-democratic effect of emancipative orientations (see Model 1-5). The effect is not an artifact of these orientations being produced by the endurance of democratic institutions.

Does economic development render the effect of emancipative orientations insignificant, as Hadenius and Teorell suggest? The answer is no. Regardless of whether we include per capita GDP, logged per capita GDP, the Human Development Index, or the Resource Distribution index introduced by Tatu Vanhanen (1997), and used extensively by Carles Boix (2003), none of these predictors makes the pro-democratic effect of emancipative orientations insignificant (see Models 1-4, 1-8 to 1-10). Moreover, economic development indicators show in all regressions a weaker and less significant pro-democratic effect than emancipative orientations, disconfirming Hadenius and Teorell's conclusion that economic prerequisites outperform cultural prerequisites in explaining democracy.

Lagged Dependent Variable Tests

Hadenius and Teorell insist that a decisive test of reverse causality requires the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable among the predictors. If we follow this dictum and include a lagged measure of effective democracy among the predictors, the pro-democratic effect of emancipative orientations remains highly significant (see Model 1-11). It is the *only* significant effect beside the lagged level of effective democracy itself. This is noteworthy because the earliest available measure of effec-

Table 1
Explaining Levels of Effective Democracy in 2002-2004 (OLS-Regressions)

	M 1-1	M 1-2	M 1-3	M 1-4	M 1-5	M 1-6	M 1-7	M 1-8	M 1-9	M 1-10	M 1-11
Emancipative orientations 1995[a]	.89*** (16.5)			.52*** (5.1)	.72*** (8.1)		.50*** (5.1)	.54*** (5.3)	.52*** (5.1)	.48*** (4.4)	.19*** (3.5)
Per capita GDP 1995[b]		.88*** (15.6)		.44*** (4.7)		.71*** (7.3)	.42*** (3.8)				-.03 n.s. (-.43)
Years under democracy up to 1995[c]			.80*** (10.8)		.22** (2.5)	.19* (2.0)	.04 (.38)	.19** (2.2)	.25** (3.0)	.10 n.s. (1.1)	
Logged p.c. GDP 1995[d]								.26** (3.1)			
Human development 1995[e]									.22** (3.0)		
Resource distribution 1993[f]										.38*** (3.4)	
Lagged dependent var. 1996[g]											.84*** (13.8)
Adj. R²	.80	.78	.63	.84	.81	.77	.84	.83	.84	.84	.96
N	71	71	70	71	70	70	70	70	68	70	70

Note: Entries are standardized beta-coefficients with T-values in parentheses.
Variable descriptions <http://worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html>:
a) See #49 on website indicated above. Data are from the earliest available survey of WVS II-IV, mean year of measurement 1995. b) See #05 on website indicated above. c) See #23 on website indicated above. d) Logged version of b). e) See #06 on website indicated above. f) See #08 on website indicated above. g) See #21 on website indicated above.
Significance levels: n.s. $p > .10$; * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

tive democracy dates from 1996 and is temporally closer to the dependent variable (which is measured from 2002 to 2004) than our measure of emancipative orientations. Because the lagged dependent variable has by definition a far better chance to affect later manifestations of itself than do other previously measured factors, it is remarkable that the effect of emancipative orientations remains significant.

Hadenius and Teorell's claims are untenable with respect to effective democracy. The next question is whether their claims hold with regard to their preferred indicator of democracy: the civil and political freedom ratings from Freedom House. To be sure, we do not consider the Freedom House ratings as valid in measuring people's real freedoms as our index of effective democracy. Still, we take the challenge of Hadenius and Teorell who operate on the grounds of this variable to refute our claim that emancipative orientations have a causal effect on subsequent democracy. To do this, they show that emancipative orientations measured around 1992 have no significant effect on 1999 Freedom House ratings that controlling for the ratings in 1995.

This result is highly unstable. As Figure 2 illustrates, the significance of the effect of emancipative orientations on subsequently measured Freedom House ratings is sensitive to the exact temporal choice of the dependent variable.[4] The T-value of the effect is highly significant for any temporal specification of the dependent variable after 2000. For example, if one uses the most recent ratings from 2004 as the dependent variable (or the ratings from 2001, 2002, or 2003 or an average of all of them)

Figure 2
T-Values of the Partial Effect of Emancipative Orientations

instead of the 1999 ratings from Freedom House, emancipative orientations around 1992 *do* show a highly significant and positive effect on subsequent democracy, controlling for the ratings in 1995.[5] This effect hardly exists because emancipative orientations around 1992 are endogenous to democracy in 2004.

The models in Table 2 use the Freedom House ratings from 2002 to 2004 as the dependent variable, controlling the effect of emancipative orientations for the lagged dependent variable measured in 1995 (as Hadenius and Teorell do). Model 2-6 shows that the effect of emancipative orientations remains significant under this control. Consequently, Hadenius and Teorell's strategy to demonstrate the insignificance of the effect of emancipative orientations does not work if one uses a temporally wider measure of the dependent variable, which is more reliable as it reduces measurement error of specific years. Further controls operated by Hadenius and Teorell to demonstrate the insignificance of emancipative orientations fail as well. Following their procedure to include the interaction between emancipative orientations and the lagged Freedom House ratings does not make the main effect of emancipative orientations insignificant (Model 2-9). Even per capita GDP does not render emancipative orientations insignificant (see Models 2-7 to 2-9). Against emancipative orientations, per capita GDP shows a weaker, less significant (and sometimes even negative) effect on democracy. The effect of emancipative orientations, by contrast, remains highly significant and positive in all model specifications. This result is insensitive to whether we include only the sample from World Values Surveys II-III (as Hadenius and Teorell do) or whether we include the full sample from World Values Surveys II-IV, in which case the number of included nations increases from 61 to 74 (see Models 2-8 and 2-9). Therefore, Hadenius and Teorell's finding that emancipative orientations have no significant effect on subsequent Freedom House ratings, controlling for the ratings in 1995, is unstable at best.

A Conclusive Model of Democratization

Hadenius and Teorell's conclusions are untenable, even if we remain within the limits of their own analytical design. The crucial point is that the entire design is mistaken. The major flaw lies in an uninformed choice of the timing of the dependent and lagged dependent variables when timing is crucial to analyze democratization. Hadenius and Teorell operate with measures of democracy from 1995 and 1999. As Figure 3 demonstrates, this specification would be perfect if it were intended to miss as many cases of democratization as possible. The overwhelming majority of democratization cases clustered in the years between 1988 and 1995, and constitute the most massive wave of democratization ever (Doorenspleet, 2000; Kurzman, 1998). But Hadenius and Teorell's model only captures cases of democratization between 1995 and 1999, a period in which hardly any such case was observed. In other words, Hadenius and Teorell's model is irrelevant to democratization.

If one wants to explain democratization, one must focus on periods in which most cases of democratization cluster. Why these cases cluster in distinctive waves is a separate story that needs an explanation of its own. But it is obvious that changes in the international system play a decisive role (Huntington, 1991). Transitions to democracy in U.S.-allied countries such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan

Table 2
Explaining Levels of Formal Democracy in 2002-2004 (measured by added Freedom House ratings): OLS-Regressions

	M 2-1	M 2-2	M 2-3	M 2-4	M 2-5	M 2-6	M 2-7	M 2-8	M 2-9
Emancipative orientations 1992 or 95[a]	.72*** (8.0)			.63*** (3.5)		.22* (2.4)	.38*** (2.9)	.35*** (3.2)	.84*** (3.4)
Per capita GDP 1995[b]			.65*** (6.6)	.11 n.s. (.59)	.06 n.s. (.56)		-.22* (-1.7)	-.20* (-1.8)	-.10 n.s. (-.79)
Lagged dependent variable 1995[c]		.86*** (12.8)			.82*** (8.3)	.70*** (7.6)	.75*** (7.9)	.77*** (9.5)	1.01*** (6.4)
Interaction[d] between a) and c)									-.86** (-2.1)
Adj. R^2	.50	.73	.41	.50	.73	.75	.76	.79	.79
N	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	73	73

Note: Entries are standardized beta-coefficients with T-values in parentheses.

Variable descriptions <http://worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html>:

a) See #49 on above indicated website. Data are from the earliest available survey of WVS II-III if N=61 (in which case mean year of measurement is 1992) or from WVS II-IV if N=73 (in which case mean year of measurement is 1995). b) See #05 on website indicated above. c) See #18 on website indicated above. d) Product of a) and c).

Significance levels: n.s. $p > .10$; * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

only happened after the United States gave up its support of right-wing authoritarian regimes after the Washington Consensus in the mid-1980s. Likewise, transitions to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe only happened after the Soviet Union nullified its military guarantee of communist regimes in 1988. The prominence of these international events makes it evident that inner-societal conditions, from which pressures to democratize might emanate, become virulent only within the limits of favorable international conditions. Accordingly, if one is interested in the democratizing effects of inner-societal conditions, one should analyze them within the limits of favorable international conditions. This is done by focusing on international waves of democratization.

Why cases of democratization cluster in wave-like international trends is explained by international events such as the Washington Consensus or the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. These events explain why many countries democratize within the same period of time. But even during a pronounced international trend of democratization, there is huge variation in how close countries move toward complete democracy. And there are always some countries behaving against the trend in that they remain nondemocratic or move away from democracy. Variation in how much

Figure 3
Changes Toward and Away from Democracy over Time

countries move toward or away from democracy cannot be explained by a certain trend when this trend itself is a constant for the involved countries. Instead, variation in how much countries move toward or away from democracy within the same trend of time, can only depend on different inner-societal conditions. Here our analysis steps in: we analyze how differences in inner-societal-conditions, such as emancipative orientations, affect changes toward or away from democracy within the same time trend.

To analyze changes toward or away from democracy, we calculate a change score, subtracting the level of democracy before a major transition wave from the level of democracy that has been sustained after this wave.[6] This yields a measure that is meaningful in both its sign and magnitude. A negative sign indicates a decrease in the level of democracy and a positive sign an increase, while the magnitude indicates the extent of the respective decrease or increase. The next question is how much inner-societal factors, such as emancipative orientations, influenced changes in the level of democracy.

If emancipative orientations influence changes in the level of democracy, they must be present when these levels actually do change. Thus, we should use measures of emancipative orientations from amid a major wave of democratic changes. The measure of emancipative orientations taken from the earliest available surveys of the second and third rounds of the World Values Survey dates on average in 1992 (for some 40 countries it dates from 1989 to 1991). As Figure 3 illustrates, this measure dates amid the most massive democratization wave ever, that is the period from 1989 until 1995.

When economists explain changes in per capita GDP, they include the start-level of per capita GDP among their predictors. This models the fact that high growth rates are achieved more easily at lower levels of per capita GDP (a basic precondition for catch-up growth). The same logic applies to the analysis of change in levels of democracy. The direction in which a society can change its level of democracy (to the better or worse) and how much it can do so, depend on its initial level of democracy. The initial level of democracy determines the potential for change. And since other factors can influence changes in democracy only within the limits of the given change potential, this change potential must be controlled for. This is achieved by including it as a control predictor, which is also a means to control reverse causality. Including the start-level of democracy among the predictors reduces the effect of emancipative orientations to precisely that part that is itself unaffected by prior democracy. So we isolate the effect from reverse causation.

As Model 3-3 in Table 3 demonstrates, emancipative orientations show a significantly positive effect on democratic change controlling for the start level of democracy. Figure 4 shows this effect. It shows that societies experienced larger losses in democracy than their start-level of democracy suggests, if emancipative orientations have been less widespread than these societies' start-level of democracy suggests. Likewise, the more the radius of emancipative values in a society exceeds the radius suggested by the start-level of democracy, the more do the gains in democracy exceed the amount suggested by the start-level of democracy. In other words, holding prior democracy constant, emancipative orientations have an independent effect on democratic change.

As the split sample test in Models 3-6a and 3-6b demonstrates, this effect is pro-democratic in a double sense. Among societies whose start-level of democracy

was already relatively high (Model 3-6a), emancipative orientations show a highly significant positive effect on democratic change. As these societies had more to lose than to win, a positive effect in their case means a *loss-minimizing* effect. Emancipative orientations therefore have a *democratic consolidation* effect among societies that are already relatively democratic. Conversely, among societies whose start-level of democracy was still relatively low (Model 3-6b), emancipative orientations show a highly significant positive effect on democratic change, too. These societies had more to win than to lose, so a positive effect in their case means a *gain-maximizing* effect. In other words, emancipative orientations unfold a *democratizing* effect among societies that are not yet democratic. In sum, emancipative orientations have both democratic consolidation effects and democratizing effects. In combination of these two effects, emancipative orientations operate *generally* in favor of democracy. They constitute an evolutionary force of regime selection and confer a selective advantage to democracy.

   Again, per capita GDP cannot explain away the effect of emancipative orientations (see Model 3-3). Indicators of economic development have no significant effect on democratic change controlling for emancipative orientations (we have checked that the same holds for the alternative indicators of economic development shown in Table 1). This result turns the conclusion of Hadenius and Teorell into its exact contrary: cultural prerequisites are more important for democratization than are economic ones (within the limits of favorable external conditions and within the limits of a society's given potential for democratic change).

   This is not to say that economic development is irrelevant. Its major importance lies in its tendency to give rise to emancipative orientations, for which Inglehart and Welzel (2005) provide ample evidence. By itself, economic development has little effect on democratization—and it should not, according to classical accounts of modernization theory.

Democratization as an Emancipative Achievement

   Hadenius and Teorell invoke modernization theory to provide a theoretical justification of their claim that mass orientations do not affect democratization. Ironically, the whole point of modernization theory is that economic development is favorable to democratization *because* it shapes mass preferences in favor of democracy. Early modernization theorists like Seymour Lipset (1959: 84-85) have been aware that such modernization factors as per capita GDP affect democracy mostly because they shape people's prevailing orientations in ways that question uncontrolled authority and make freedom of expression, political self-determination, and pluralism a natural preference. And as Dahl (1973: 124) and Samuel Huntington (1991: 69) recognize, these orientations can emerge even if people have no first-hand experience with democracy, so a preference for political freedom and equality does not need democratic institutions to be in place before-hand. Otherwise, democracy could have never occurred in the first place. Pro-democratic orientations can and do emerge naturally on the ground of modernization processes that make people existentially more secure, cognitively more competent, and socially more independent. This can also happen in authoritarian regimes, if they modernize, as was the case in Spain, South Korea, Taiwan, or Chile, to name just a few examples. This was also

Table 3

Explaining Degrees of Change in Levels of Formal Democracy: OLS-Regressions

	M 3-1	M 3-2	M 3-3	M 3-4	M 3-5	M 3-6a Split A: above midpoint of start-level of democracy[f]	M 3-6b Split B. below midpoint of start-level of democracy[f]
Emancipative orientations 1992[b]		-.38** (-3.1)	.55*** (5.7)	.46*** (3.4)	.89*** (5.0)	.79*** (3.9)	.58*** (4.2)
Per capita GDP 1995[c]				.15[n.s.] (1.1)			
Start-level of democracy 1984-88[d]	-.79*** (-9.9)		-1.2*** (-12.0)	-1.3*** (-11.4)	-.77*** (-3.5)	-.80*** (-3.9)	-.45*** (-3.2)
Interaction[e] between b) and d)					-.76* (-2.3)		
Adj. R²	.62	.13	.75	.75	.76	.35	.45
N	61	61	61	61	61	31	30

*Note*: Entries are standardized beta-coefficients with T-values in parentheses.
Variable descriptions <http://worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html>:
a) Dependent variable: Inversed and to 100 percent standardized, added Freedom House ratings for civil and political freedoms from 2000-04 minus the same ratings from 1984-88 (yielding a -100 to +100 change scale). b) See #49 on above indicated website. Data are from the earliest available survey of WVS II-III (mean year of measurement is 1992). c) See #05 on above indicated website. d) See #18, inversed and to 100 percent standardized, added ratings for civil and political freedoms from Freedom House for 1984-88 e) Product of b) and d). f) Midpoint (median) at 50th percentile of d).
Significance levels: n.s.: p > .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

Figure 4
The Partial Effect of Emancipative Orientations on Democratic Change

the case in the more modern communist societies such as the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, or what is now Slovenia. Despite the inefficiencies of communism, these societies reached relatively high levels of income, education, and social complexity, with the consequence of relatively widespread emancipative orientations. These orientations became virulent as soon as the Brezhnev Doctrine was nullified. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) demonstrate, the democratic relevance of modernization lies in its tendency to yield emancipative orientations. Controlling for these orientations, the democratizing effect of modernization is seriously diminished.

It is an important insight of action-centered approaches (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1992) that democratization is not a mechanical process. There is no developmental automatism bringing democracy about. Instead, democratization is achieved through collective actions. Because such actions are driven by specific motivations, an explanation of democratization not taking the role of motivations into account is insufficient (Huntington, 1991: 69). Emancipative orientations are important in this motivational perspective because they give social movements and civil society agents a major motivation to struggle for democratic freedoms.

A recent turn in democratization research has brought the masses back into democratization studies (Markoff, 1996; Foweraker and Landman, 1997; Schock,

2004). These studies argue that democratization is not only a matter of elite-level agreements on whether and how to democratize a society. Instead, it is claimed that mass pressures exerted by social movements and civic associations are decisive for a society's chances to attain and sustain democracy. This has been demonstrated in a multicountry study by Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman (2005), which show that whether nondemocracies convert into democracies, whether they convert into incomplete or complete democracies, and whether they remain democracies, all depends on the mass basis of pro-democratic social movements and actions. Theoretically one would assume that the pro-democratic mass actions studied by these authors and the emancipative mass orientations analyzed in this article are inherently linked: emancipative mass orientations should provide a major social force in motivating pro-democratic mass actions.

Unfortunately, standardized data on observed mass activity are not available in the same differentiation as data on mass orientations, so the link cannot be analyzed with advanced statistical means. At least a classificatory analysis is possible. Using Karatnycky and Ackerman's classification of pro-democratic mass activities into "weak or absent," "moderate," and "strong," the box plot in Figure 5 indicates that there is indeed a significant linkage. Among the five societies in the World Values Survey in which pro-democratic mass actions are classified as "weak or absent" (Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, Macedonia, Uganda, Zimbabwe), on average only a sixth of the public favors emancipative ideals. For the 13 societies in our sample in which pro-democratic actions are categorized as "moderate," this is true for roughly a quarter of the public.[7] And among the 22 societies in our sample in which pro-democratic actions are classified as "strong," a third of the public on average favors emancipative ideals.[8] As it seems, emancipative mass orientations tend to motivate the social movements and civic actions that finally attain, sustain, and extend democracy.

Conclusion

In contradiction to the analyses by Hadenius and Teorell, we found both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence supporting the claim that emancipative mass orientations have a strongly positive effect on democratic institutions. This effect is independent from the influence of prior democracy on emancipative orientations. Thus, emancipative orientations can and do emerge in nondemocracies, largely in response to socioeconomic modernization. In such cases, emancipative mass orientations become a social force of democratization that nurtures pro-democratic social movements. Yet these orientations also help to foster and improve democracy in countries that are already democratic. Emancipative orientations nurture pro-democratic social movements under any circumstances. If this is not to attain democracy, it is to sustain and extend it.

We conclude that democracy should be understood as an essentially emancipative achievement because the civic actions and coalitions that attain, sustain, and extend democratic freedoms are largely motivated by emancipative mass orientations. This is logical, since democracy is designed to empower people, making it a natural target of the orientations emphasizing people empowerment—which is what emancipative orientations do.

Figure 5
Emancipative Mass Orientations and Civic Mass Actions

Notes

1. If one uses the civil and political freedom ratings from Freedom House as a measure of democracy, one implicitly adopts a liberal notion of democracy ("liberal democracy"). This is justifiable on historical grounds because civil and political liberties are the beginning of modern democracy and have so far been a core demand in practically every democracy movement in history.
2. For a detailed description of variables, see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) under <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/ humandevelopment.html> (see "Variables" #21).
3. Emancipative orientations constitute a broad syndrome of attitudes. Scores of other attitudes, including an emphasis on gender equality, intrinsic work motivations, and support of autonomy as a goal in education are closely related to it, implying that variation in emancipative orientations can be measured in various different ways, all of which indicating the same underlying dimension. For reasons of comparability, we use the measure introduced by Inglehart and Welzel (2005). For a detailed description of variable construction, see the website <http://www.worldvaluessurvey. org /publications/humandevelopment.html> under "Variables" (#49).
4. To be more precise, we talk about the "partial" effect of emancipative orientations under control of the 1995 Freedom House ratings.
5. A reason why emancipative orientations show an effect on democracy levels only after 2000 is that until that point, these levels have still been in motion in a number of countries. Only after 2000 is there a more consolidated picture.

6.   The technique of time-pooled, cross-sectional analyses is no alternative to this approach when change in the dependent variable is largely discontinuous, occurring in short and distinctive waves between prolonged periods of constancy. Time-pooled, cross-sectional analyses multiply the number of country-based observations by yearly measures of the same variables in the same countries. For many questions in political economy, this inflation of units of observation might be appropriate, but not for analyzing democratic changes. The eruptive character of these changes divides time into short relevant periods and long irrelevant periods, a distinction that is not accounted for in a time-pooled, cross-sectional database. Such a database gives each unit of time exactly equal weight, which would be appropriate if democratic changes occurred continuously, moving on bit by bit from one year to the next. Democratization is entirely different from such cumulative processes. It is a highly discontinuous process that occurs suddenly, showing major incisive changes, before and after which lie sometimes decades of constancy.

7.   These societies include Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, Mexico, Moldova, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, Taiwan, Tanzania, and Turkey.

8.   These societies include Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.

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