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TRAJECTORIES OF REGIME TRANSFORMATION AND TYPES OF STATENESS IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES[4]

It is commonplace that a sovereign state is a prerequisite to democracy. But not all states are alike, each having different resources, capacities, priorities, properties, and so forth. What kinds of states and what particular features are conducive to democracy or autocracy? How do different types of stateness and their dynamics relate to different trajectories of regime transformation in post-communist countries?

In light of the significant debate in comparative politics regarding the importance of structural and procedural (actor-oriented) factors in democratization and democratic consolidation, we address the effect of stateness on regime transformations in a broad framework, allowing us to specify the role of structural conditions and the decisions of key political actors in post-communist regime change.

The focus of this research is empirical, implementing a combination of qualitative comparative and multivariate statistical methods in order to study a sample of post-communist countries from the two past decades.

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Key words: stateness, regime transformations, post-communist countries, democratization, dynamics modeling.

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Introduction

Why do some post-communist nations become democratic, while others do not? What is necessary for successful democratization? Are some specific preconditions, be they economic, social, or cultural, indispensable for democracy or do the crucial factors relate more to particular decisions and actions of political actors who seek or resist democratization?

It is commonplace that a sovereign state is a prerequisite to democracy. But not all states are alike, each having different resources, capacities, priorities, properties, and so forth. What kinds of states and what particular features are conducive to democracy or autocracy? How do different types of stateness and their dynamics relate to different trajectories of regime transformation in post-communist countries?

We address these two major sets of research questions in this paper. Our approach is empirical, as we apply a combination of qualitative comparative and multivariate statistical methods to study a sample of post-communist countries in order to answer some of the abovementioned questions. For this purpose, we use an original dataset created specifically for this research project.

We start this paper by evaluating the existing theoretical and empirical literature, which serves as the basis for formulating our hypotheses. Next we discuss the data, methods, and empirical results of our research. In conclusion we analyze and discuss our results, verify our hypotheses, and suggest areas for further research.

Literature and hypotheses

In the literature on democracy and democratization, one can single out two major alternative explanatory models. One focuses on the more objective *structural* preconditions for democracy, while another focuses on subjective *procedural*, actor-related factors, meaning the specific policies and decisions of major political actors involved in transitions.

Proponents of the first approach vary significantly in their arguments, but do share one basic feature: Democracy emerges more or less organically from a set of particular favorable preconditions, among which one can find the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society with a dominant figure of a ‘bourgeois’ (Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). Many authors underline a relatively high level of socio-economic development, with the primary focus being on GDP per capita (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Epstein et al. 2006). Another widespread

argument stresses national identity and a sovereign state as prerequisite for democracy (Rustow 1970; Fukuyama 2004; Tilly 2007). Other scholars speak of the necessity of civic political culture or nonmaterial values (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart and Weltzel 2005; Fish 2009). Among other factors a *non-rentier* economy (Huntington 1991; Ross 2001; Treisman 2010), absence of irreconcilable social, ethnic, and religious cleavages (Chirot 2009) are listed.

One can point out an interesting line of argument dealing with particular religious traditions – i.e. arguments in favor of Protestantism and against Islam; ambiguities about Orthodoxy, Confucianism and Buddhism; and a near silence about Judaism (Fish 2002; Diamond 2010). Some authors also emphasize international influences, including a country's proximity to established democracies, its colonial heritage, the quality of its institutions, and even climate and national IQ (Vanhanen 2009).

An alternative, policy-oriented approach is based on the assumption that democracy can be crafted through appropriate decisions (Linz and Stepan 1978; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Di Palma 1991; Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996; Colomer 2000, etc.). Major themes within this approach include the role of interactions ("games") between actors before and during the different stages of transition from authoritarianism, the configuration of major players, types of "exit" from authoritarianism or communism, attitudes towards the political opposition, use of violence for resolving political and other conflicts, whether old elites are replaced or preserved, rotation of power, institutional design for new democracies, and institutional constraints on the executive.

Of course, one should not exaggerate the polarity of these two explanatory models because objective structures are reproduced through subjective actions and policies, while political decisions have their own specific historical, socio-economic, and cultural grounds. However, recent empirical *large-N* studies (Teorell and Hadenius 2007; Teorell 2010) tend to support an "anti-structural", "actor-oriented", "no-preconditions-approach" to democratization processes since the mid-1970s. We check and disaggregate this general conclusion using a specific sample of post-communist countries. Thus, our first hypothesis is:

> *H1: <u>Actors do matter</u>. Structural factors, either favorable or unfavorable for democracy, do not predetermine the trajectories and outcomes of post-communist transformations and the policy choices of key political actors are crucial for defining these trajectories and their outcomes.*

As for the problem of democratization and various aspects of stateness, a basic consensus exists in the literature.[5] As Linz and Stepan (1996: 17) claim, "Without a state, no modern democracy is possible." Yes, modern states do emerge in violent and undemocratic ways, but, at certain stages of development, some were able to develop and maintain democratic institutions and practices (Weber 1976; Tilly 1992; Van Creveld 1992). Democracy does require a state, but what kind of a state and with which properties?

Without disputing this consensus, we wish to stress that modern states are very different entities *per se*. Most of them are member-states of the United Nations, but they differ profoundly in the level of their actual sovereignty, available resources and capacities, stages of development, the international and domestic challenges they face, the priorities they define for themselves, and so forth. (see, for example, Melville, Polunin, Ilyin et al. 2010). Facing these complexities, one may be tempted to reduce them to a set of epithets – "strong" and "weak" states, "failed" and "rogue" states, etc. In this paper, we develop a different analytical approach. We start with differentiating two conceptually different dimensions of the modern state: *statehood* (external and internal recognition of sovereignty) and *stateness* (the level and quality of the state's basic functions).

In the existing literature, stateness, as specific quality of a state, is widely perceived as one of the criteria used to evaluate levels of democracy (see, for example, Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2010). We assume that states with different political regimes may perform their functions in different ways (Schmitter 2005 makes a similar point), and we add to this assumption a dynamic aspect in which we take into account how different types of stateness change during periods of post-communist transformations.

Our arguments are drawn on the existing literature dealing with modern states, state-building, and nation-formation, particularly focusing on transitional contexts, democratization and stateness, and state capacity (Nettle 1968; Tilly 1975, Evans 1992; Spruyt 1994; Evans 1997; Fukuyama 2004; Schmitter 2005; Roeder 2007; Fritz 2007; Back and Hadenius 2008; Fortin 2010; Moller and Skaaning 2011; etc.).

We do acknowledge some confusion existing in the literature dealing with the conceptualization of stateness and state capacity, particularly within the context of democratization. For example, Fukuyama defines multiple dimensions of stateness, including functions, capabilities, and grounds for legitimacy of government. He suggests a list of functions of the state that defines the strength of institutions and the changing scope of state functions over time, including defense, law and order, property rights, protection of the poor, macroeconomic

[5] With maybe some marginal disagreements regarding sequencing: Should state-building and effective institutions come first, followed by democratization, or should both tracks occur simultaneously, thereby supporting each other?

management, public health, education, financial regulation, redistributive pensions, environmental protection, unemployment insurance, asset redistribution, and fostering markets and cluster initiatives (Fukuyama 2004). We attempt to restructure these functions for operational purposes.

Bäck and Hadenius (2008) consider stateness as the capacity of state organs to maintain sovereignty. This is better described within a notion of statehood in our particular conceptual framework. Hendrix (2010) proposes to define state capacity in terms of military capacity, bureaucratic or administrative capacity, and the quality and coherence of political institutions. Fortin (2010) suggests five measures of state capacity, consisting of corruption, contract intensive money, infrastructure reform, protection of property rights, and tax revenue. Charron and Lapuente (2010) simply equate state capacity with the quality of government.

Taking into account both our research questions and the debates in the literature over the functions of the modern state and how these correspond with patterns of democratization, we assume that there are different types of stateness, each with its own dynamics. Accordingly, our second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: Stateness does matter. The trajectories and outcomes of post-communist transformations correspond to different types of stateness and their dynamics.

Both hypotheses are tested empirically using an original dataset and a combination of quantitative (multivariate statistical) and qualitative comparative (cross-national) methods.

Data and methods

Dataset

Our dataset consists of variables from statistical sources, widely used cross-national indices, and expert evaluations specially collected for this study, which are necessary for capturing some attributes of the countries under study. Indeed, data gathered from expert judgments require special attention in order to avoid pitfalls, such as differences in measurement criteria, dubious validity and reliability, and so forth. However, expert opinion is an essential part of data used by social scientists in empirical analysis. Our research is not an exception to this rule.

Our dataset includes the following variables, grouped by category:

(1) *Economic*: GDP per capita, growth in GDP per capita.

(2) *Social and demographic*: Life expectancy, infant mortality rate, Gini Index, etc.

(3) *Structural variables, measured by widely recognized indices and rankings*: World Bank Governance Indicators, Cingranelli – Richards (CIRI) project data.

(4) *Expert evaluations of regime change*: Pressure on political elites "from below" at the starting point of a transition, use of violence during the transition period, openness to international influence, parliamentary arrangements vs. presidentialism, success of the opposition in attaining power at the start of the transformation process, etc.

(5) *Characteristics of political regime*: Polity IV, Freedom House, etc.

(6) *Expert evaluations concerning various aspects of stateness*: Instances of aggression undertaken or suffered by the country, fractionalization of society, propensity to civil war, consensus on founding political rules and their dynamics, adaptation to the requirements of international audits on national political institutions, presence of antigovernment paramilitary groups, privatization of the state ("state capture"), likelihood of secessionism, scope of terrorist threats, border disputes, involvement in military and political blocks, etc.

These variables are organized as a panel describing 28 post-communist countries[6] (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) from 1989 to 2008[7]. Several expert judgments are provided only for certain decades, meaning that they are invariable within a given decade.

The empirical part of our research is organized as follows. Firstly, we constructed a unified index of democracy (PCADI). Secondly, we ran regressions to study the effects of structural and procedural variables on democracy in the final year analyzed. We then focused on identifying those variables that are strongly related to changes in the unified index of democracy after controlling for several characteristics of each country studied. Our unified index of democracy also allowed us to identify distinct types of trajectories for regime transformation. After this, we proceeded to include characteristics of stateness into our analysis, whereby we proposed and tested an empirical model and a typology of stateness. Finally, we explored the relationship between stateness and types of trajectories for regime transformation.

[6] We are fully aware of the problematic nature arising from the concept of "post-communist countries", which embraces those states that have undergone profound transformations over the past two and a half decades and have developed extremely different characteristics. At the moment they demonstrate more differences than similarities. However, we are interested in understanding why and how they have developed these different features after their exit from communism more than two decades ago.

[7] Montenegro was excluded from the dataset due to an absence of relevant data for most of the analyzed period.

Transformation trajectories: PCADI, principal component, and cluster analysis

Testing our hypotheses requires the operationalization of trajectories for regime transformation in order to make them suitable for comparing a wide range of processes in post-communist countries that occurred during the past two and a half decades. This also helps us accomplish other research tasks. A trajectory can traditionally be described as a sequence of numerous decisions and actions leading to certain observable institutional results. If we were to use a qualitative approach to accomplish this task, then we would end up with a collection of individual stories on the transitions of almost three-dozen post-communist countries. Instead, we have assumed that a trajectory of regime transformation can be presented as a sequence of values of a unified index of democracy taken on an annual basis from 1989 to 2008.

There is a long tradition of measuring democracy in a cross-national and cross-temporal basis. In this paper we use the Polity IV and Freedom House indices – the two most accepted measures in academic research. In order to level out discrepancies between the two indices and get rid of any random noise inherent therein, we construct a unified index from the Polity IV and Freedom House indices (for similar attempts see Teorell and Hadenius 2007; Bäck and Hadenius 2008). However, we forego the arithmetic mean and prefer extracting the first principal component. Principal component analysis is preferred as a reduction technique because of its flexibility. It allows one to verify whether the information in raw indicators is sufficiently homogenous for constructing an index. It also helps to ascribe a reasonable weight to each raw indicator. Principal component analysis of the two indices produces our *Principal Component Analysis Democracy Index* (PCADI), which is linearly related to the corresponding arithmetic mean. Despite this linear relationship, we lean towards PCADI because of the abovementioned methodological advantages of the principal component method. We have checked the correlation of PCADI with four other democracy indices (Polity IV, Freedom House index, Unified Democracy Score, and The Economist Intelligence Unit Index), and found a high level of consistency in TSCS data. The results are shown in Table 1.1. We interpret these results as evidence suggesting the validity of PCADI.

We use cluster analysis to identify types of trajectories of regime transformation (hierarchical cluster analysis with squared Euclidean distance and Ward's method as an agglomeration procedure). The choice of Ward's method is stipulated by its optimal properties revealed in computer simulations (Gore 2000; Scheibler and Schneider 1985). When using cluster analysis, countries are viewed as points in a 20-dimensional vector space using PCADI

for a particular year in the 20-year timespan from 1989 to 2008). Thus, points in close proximity correspond to countries with a similar regime-change trajectory.

Stateness: Empirical model

Based on the abovementioned literature, we propose an empirical model of stateness, implying a modern social state's ability to fulfill its basic functions, with a set of available and appropriate indicators:

External security

(a) Aggression on the territory of the country (expert evaluation);

(b) Territorial claims (expert evaluation);

(c) Border disputes (expert evaluation).

Domestic order

(a) Terrorist threats (expert evaluation);

(b) Civil war (expert evaluation);

(c) Antigovernment paramilitary groups (expert evaluation);

(d) Disappearances of citizens (CIRI);

(e) Extrajudicial killings (CIRI).

Legitimacy

(a) Changes in founding constitutional rules (expert evaluation);

(b) Public consensus on founding constitutional rules (expert evaluation);

(c) Political prisoners (CIRI).

Administrative capacity

(a) Extent of "privatization" of state functions by organized or informal interest groups (expert evaluation);

(b) Government effectiveness (WB);

(c) Control of corruption (WB);

(d) Regulatory quality (WB).

Conditions for development

(a) Health expenditures (% of GDP);

(b) Research and development expenditures (% of GDP);

(c) Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP).

These are not ideal indicators, perhaps. However, our choice is motivated by their accessibility and conceptual coherence of the suggested model.

The five basic functions of a modern state are treated as five dimensions of stateness, each described by a different group of relevant indicators. Measuring such a five-dimensional concept requires a vector index of stateness in lieu of a unique scalar. The vector consists of five components, each measuring a particular aspect or dimension of the concept we are studying. Each component of the vector is produced by principal component analysis and is the first principal component extracted from the corresponding set of indicators. The timespan of the analysis covers the 1990s and 2000s, using the decade as a unit of time because expert judgments have been coded only for decades. If annual data for some attributes were available, then their values were averaged over the decade. Naturally, we extracted principal components from a joint set of variables measured for both decades, thus making the resulting indices comparable over time.

In order to include stateness in further analysis and explore its relationship to trajectories of regime transformation, we propose a typology of stateness based on vector indices. We use cluster analysis to classify countries according to five sub-indices of stateness. We employ the same approach used to identify regime-change trajectories.

Identifying factors of regime change trajectories

Having constructed the PCADI and the typology of stateness, we use regression and comparative analysis to reveal factors affecting regime change. As regression analysis of observational cross-sectional data makes causal inference spurious, we combine it with time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) and multilevel models.

Finally, because gaps arise in our dataset, we cannot include all the 29 post-communist countries in the regression analysis, although we do address their development with qualitative methods. The majority of regression results correspond to 23 countries, excluding Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mongolia, and Turkmenistan.

Analysis

Cross-sectional analysis

PCADI was used as a dependent variable in cross-sectional regression models with several structural variables (infant mortality rate, life expectancy, GDP per capita, growth in GDP per capita, Gini Index) on the right-hand side. As cross-sectional regression analysis is

especially prone to problems with endogeneity, we lagged right-hand-side variables to mitigate endogeneity. The dependent variable represents PCADI in 2008, while predictors are averaged over 1989 – 1993.

Because of the small-N sample, we do not rely on asymptotic distributions of t-statistics and use a bootstrap with 10,000 replications to calculate standard errors. The results for 23 countries are given in Table 1.2 where models 1 through 5 are bivariate and model 6 is a multiple regression. The coefficient for growth in GDP per capita is positive, but not statistically significant. Thus, economic growth at the beginning of the transformation period is not a good predictor of regime outcomes in the 23 post-communist countries we consider in the regression analysis. This may indicate that the social support of democratic reforms was due to many characteristics of social development reflecting the well-being of citizens (for instance, the Gini Index). Sure enough, GDP per capita dynamics are not the most straightforward indicator of this. Though the coefficient is not statistically significant, its sign deserves a few words of discussion. The positive sign suggests that a better recovery from economic crises is associated with more successful democratization.

Coefficients for the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, life expectancy, infant mortality and the Gini Index are statistically significant with signs consistent with the initial expectations. Put differently, positive coefficients for logged GDP per capita and life expectancy corroborate the idea that highly developed nations have a higher propensity for ensuring democratic consolidation. A similar interpretation is given to the negative coefficient for infant mortality, inasmuch as more developed countries have lower infant mortality rates due to a better fulfillment of key social functions.

One might also hypothesize that the sign of the coefficient for the Gini Index may be not robust for changes in model specification because of the complex relationship between inequality, as measured by the Gini Index, and democracy. More inequality may mean both poverty amidst the broad social strata and a differentiated social structure with considerable differences in income. Though the first situation hampers democratic consolidation, the second one should encourage it. Our further research supports this claim.

Our main focus here is on R^2 statistics, which suggest that the infant mortality rate at the start of democratization is the best variable for explaining cross-nation differences in the regime-change outcomes of the 23 post-communist countries. A bit less informative in this sense is the logarithm of GDP per capita. These structural characteristics statistically explain 56% and 48%, respectively, of cross-nation variation in the level of democracy in 2008.

We abandon the bivariate regression setting in Model 6, which contains all explanatory variables from Models 1 through 5. This model accounts for 62% of the variation in PCADI in

2008. Naturally, all coefficients are statistically insignificant because of the multicollinearity reinforced by a small sample size. Especially collinear are logged GDP per capita and infant mortality rate, with a product-moment correlation coefficient of -0.81.

It is theoretically meaningful to discover the share of PCADI variance that may be explained by all these structural factors when redundant information is excluded. To understand this, we orthogonalized the space of right-hand-side variables through principal components, and regressed PCADI from 2008 on them. Standard errors, again, were computed with the bootstrap. Table 1.3 summarizes these results.

We see from Model 8 that the first two principal components, which account for about 83% of total variance, have statistically significant coefficients, although the second principal component's significance is not robust (compare Models 7 and 8, where differences in standard errors lead to different conclusions about statistical significance when $\alpha = 0.05$). Because a substantive interpretation of coefficients from a regression on principal components is problematic, we focus on the R^2 statistic, which is equal to 0.57. Hence, the structural factors we include in the regression allow us to account for no more than 57% of the cross-national variation in PCADI after redundant information has been removed.

Now, is it indispensable that the remaining variation in PCADI is caused by procedural factors? A stochastic approach to the empirical data suggests that the attribute we analyze has an inherent randomness reflecting its dynamic nature. Thus, we need procedural variables to be included in the model explicitly.

Table 1.4 reports these results. Model 9 includes only two procedural variables, one representing privatization of the state and the other being a dummy variable for a country's foreign policy orientation. This dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if a country has a pro-Russian orientation, and 0 in other cases. This model reveals that coefficients for both procedural variables are negative. Hence, countries with higher levels of state 'privatization' are on average less democratic in 2008. As for countries that were building allied foreign relations with Russia during the period of 1989 to 1993, these are on average 4.58 points less democratic than the rest. Taking into account the range of PCADI (from 0 to 10), we claim this effect to be significant both statistically and substantively. Additionally, this model is especially insightful because it accounts for 86% of the dependent variable's variance, while containing only one continuous variable and one dummy variable on the right-hand side. This model with two procedural explanatory variables explains more variance than Model 6 with five structural explanatory variables. This finding emphasizes the role of procedural factors in explaining the results of regime transformations.

However, Models 10 through 12 show that the statistical significance for the state 'privatization' coefficient is quite unstable. Nevertheless, the sign remains the same. We argue

that the changes in statistical significance are due to the variable's collinearity with logged GDP per capita (R = -0.6953) and infant mortality (R = -0.6367).

Our analysis indicates the effectiveness of combining structural and procedural variables when explaining the results of regime transformation in post-communist countries. This is especially explicit in Model 11, which combines both types of variables and accounts for 93% of the cross-national variance in PCADI.

TSCS data: Fixed effects models

Although the regression models described above reveal a rather congruent picture of statistically and substantively significant factors for regime transformation, all of them are potentially subject to such flaws as unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of explanatory variables. The use of lagged right-hand-side variables, averaged over the period from 1989 to 1993, cannot level these out completely.

We employ fixed-effects models to mitigate these problems. The model contains a separate constant for each country and allows for a correlation between country constant and error term – a kind of endogeneity. This is a nice property of the model, as this correlation is rather plausible. We also admit that the effect of different explanatory variables is heterogeneous for distinct subsamples of countries. To account for this, we use dummy variables for pertinent regression slopes.

The findings are presented in Table 1.5. Models 13 through 15 are estimated with OLS applied after the so called 'within transformation'. The only difference in these models concerns the set of explanatory variables analyzed. More specifically, Model 14 adds GDP growth rate to Model 13. The logic behind this model augmentation is that GDP growth rate reflects the effectiveness of the state in coping with economic turbulence. Model 15 includes the logarithm of GDP per capita as well. This variable is correlated with life expectancy (R = 0.7214), but its substantive meaning is different.

Model 16 is a fixed-effects model with panel-corrected standard errors, as is conventional after the publication of Beck and Katz (1995) seminal paper. Estimation assumes first-order serial correlation, which is common for all countries.

All these fixed-effects models are highly consistent in their findings. Positive coefficients for life expectancy suggest that the conditions of living, which reflect a wide range of social and economic characteristics of states, have an impact on progress in democratic consolidation. Countries with higher life expectancy on average are more democratic.

We also find a complex link between democracy and the Gini Index. Model 5, with cross-section data, had a negative coefficient for the Gini Index, while in Models 13 through 17 it is positive, suggesting that countries with higher inequality are, *ceteris paribus*, more democratic. But the interaction term for the Gini Index and the dummy variable for state 'privatization' in the 1990s (1 if 'privatization' measure is equal to either 3 or 4 out of 4 possible values) has a negative coefficient. Such an approach allows us to get a deeper understanding of the mechanism that links democracy and inequality. We reveal the deleterious effect of inequality in cases where it is due to a deep gap between the poverty of large segments of the population and the wealth of the political and/or business elite. This situation characterizes 'privatized' states. The opposite is also true: In 'non-privatized' states, income inequality is to a large degree due to a complex social structure and, consequently, is related to better requisites of democracy. The results of regression analysis corroborate such a differentiated view of the effect of inequality. Thus, the Gini Index is positively related to democracy in 'non-privatized' countries, but the relation disappears, all else being equal, when looking at 'privatized' countries.

Multilevel modeling

We verify the FE-models findings with multilevel regression models. They are based on estimating the vector of regime transformation for each state. It is a linear OLS approximation of the regime-transformation trajectory and conveys information about its general direction and speed. As different vectors are different lines, corresponding constant terms and slopes vary. High positive slopes indicate a fast consolidation of democracy, whereas a small positive or negative slope suggests no clear transformation vector, and a big negative slope reflects consolidation of autocracy. The constant term is less informative, being equal to the starting value of PCADI predicted by the model. We seek to find variables that explain the differences in slopes and constants across countries.

Though the multilevel approach resembles FE-models, it is different both theoretically and technically. Particularly, it helps to model dynamics explicitly as a change in time.

Table 1.6 displays results for multilevel regressions. Models 17 and 18 are reported as baselines because they provide the basis for assessing increases in explained variance when additional right-hand-side variables are included. We concentrate on Model 20, because it is the fullest one and gives parameter estimates that are robust to changes in specification.

Firstly, the coefficient of the variable for time is positive and indicates that the majority of post-communist states were moving towards a consolidated democracy. But this trajectory does not concern those countries whose foreign policies were oriented towards Russia. Vectors

of regime transformation for these countries have slopes of -0.08 (0.13 less 0.21). Hence, post-communist countries form statistically discernible groups characterized by different types of transformation direction.

Secondly, Model 20 vindicates the differentiated effect of inequality. While the coefficient for the Gini Index is positive, its interaction with state 'privatization' in the 1990s is negative. Both coefficients are statistically significant.

Then, logged GDP per capita is positively related to the dynamics of regime transformation. Finally, the dummy variable for presidential systems with an opposition that did not attain power at the beginning of the transformation is also both negative and statistically significant at $\alpha = 0.1$. Thus, such countries are less democratic on average.

Empirical analysis consistently suggests that structural factors have less explanative power than procedural ones when modeling differences in the trajectories and results of post-communist transformation.

Discussion

Clusters of post-communist transformations

Cluster analysis allows us to allocate different types of regime-transformation trajectories in post-communist countries into six distinct groups (see Appendix 2), which we interpret as follows:

1) "*Towards democratic consolidation"* (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Estonia);

2) "*On the road to democracy"* (Albania, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine);

3) "*Breakthrough to democracy"* (Serbia and Croatia);

4) "*Problematic trajectories"* (Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia);

5) "*On the road to autocracy"* (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan);

6) "*Consolidated autocracies"* (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).

The first cluster consists of post-communist countries that have, compared with the other clusters, achieved significant, although somewhat varying, results in the consolidation of democratic regimes. With the exception of Mongolia, which is largely a specific anomaly, most of these countries had favorable structural preconditions for democracy. However, their steady upward regime-transformation trajectories to a large extent resulted from strategic decisions in favor of democracy taken by key political actors. Pro-Western politicians steered their countries

out of a communist past while returning them to where they had once belonged – the European family of civilized and democratic nations (Mongolia is an exception, once again).

As a rule, a typical transformation in these instances was initiated amid growing public discontent with the old regime, which itself began to neglect its social and economic obligations. This discontent was accompanied either by a split in the ruling communist party and an emergence of a reformist wing that was at least temporarily capable of controlling changes or by the resurgence of an opposition that could not be ignored by hardliners, who were themselves rapidly losing popular support. The political programs of opposition groups frequently combined democratic elements with nationalist ones. The transitions to democracy in countries of this cluster were undertaken via round tables or "velvet revolutions". Transformation processes were accompanied by virtually no violence both before and after the collapse or controlled dismantlement of the old regimes. A partial exception to this scheme is represented by Romania. Institutional design patterns in this cluster were determined by the formation of strong parliaments, as well as by the emergence of oppositions that derived their legitimacy from a pre-communist past. It is worth mentioning that, with some exceptions, such as Mongolia, one of the sources of this new legitimacy was an experience with statehood prior to communism.

The second cluster consists of post-communist countries with transformation trajectories that are more irregular or "bumpy" compared to the first cluster. These countries ventured into transformations under dissimilar structural conditions and experienced different political crises of a varying scope and intensity, including those resulting from both political and non-political (ethnic, regional, etc.) cleavages. The more serious problems these countries faced dealt with the rise of nationalist oppositions, ethnic and other conflicts, and even territorial losses.

This cluster provides strong evidences that democratic-institution building is often inconsistent and followed by delays and setbacks when there is either a significant presence of deap cleavages that have the potential to result in large scale conflicts or a simultaneous need to carry out various reforms. However, under these unfavorable conditions, not a single political actor can expect to dominate for a substantial period of time, even if he or she can enjoy the situational advantage of readjusting the "rules of the game" for his or her own benefit. Paradoxically, this gives the countries of the second cluster a chance to pursue democratic-focused trajectories, however imperfect they may be. It should be noted that one of the sources and manifestations of defects with this trajectory comes from conflicts over the choice of institutional design, including that of a presidential republic.

The third cluster consists of Serbia and Croatia. The post-communist transformations in these countries suffered from the disastrous effects of widespread violence during civil wars and of involvement in conflicts with neighboring countries during Yugoslavia's lingering and painful

disintegration. These countries fell prey to the rise of nationalism, which led to nearly a decade of large-scale violence. However, those new political leaders that came to power under direct pressure from the West and that were not related to the previous regimes of, say, Milosevic and Tudjman, managed to bring these two former Yugoslav republics out of international isolation and carry out comprehensive reforms that allowed for the rapid implementation of a democratic project. The selection of a parliamentary design facilitated this further.

The fourth cluster offers examples of transformations starting under the considerably different structural conditions of Russia, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. However, the hybrid regimes established in these countries resulted from the constant inability or unwillingness on the part of key political actors to seek compromises in order to avoid conflicts. Instead, they easily yielded to the temptation of using different degrees of violence to resolve conflicts with numerous political opponents. After having ascended to power, the once-promising democrats frequently demonstrated a reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of the opposition and to allow for fair political competition. Moreover, all these countries opted for strong presidential systems. This unsurprisingly led to an extremely high price of losing power – intertwined with huge stakes of property – to political rivals who had long lists of grievances caused by former democrats who turned into "strong men". The fact that these countries are stuck in transition and bump repeatedly into the same unsolved problems can be explained by the specific actions of key politicians, rather than by simply having the wrong initial structural conditions.

The fifth cluster is made of countries with substantially different starting conditions, including quite favorable ones, such as in Belarus and Kazakhstan. By contrast, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan were departing from communism under conditions of large-scale conflicts, such as the civil war in Tajikistan. Moreover, oppositions in these countries were weak or largely undemocratic, such as the national-democratic opposition in Tajikistan, which made an alliance with Islamists. Whatever the differences might have been, the countries in this cluster showed that the autocrats coming to power did not stop short of using all means possible in order to guarantee self-preservation in politics.

The sixth cluster consists of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. These countries demonstrate how easily Soviet-era authoritarianism can be replaced with a post-Soviet authoritarianism that is based on neo-patrimonial practices. This replacement was caused by both an absence of mass demand for change and the metamorphosis of first secretaries of local communist parties into presidents for life with virtually no opposition from either the nomenklatura or the streets. Surprisingly, the case of Tajikistan has set a different pattern. This is probably more evidence in favor of the argument of political strategies and tactics over that of initial structural conditions. It should be noted that hopes for the trouble-free rule of autocrats in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

clash with the growing Islamist challenge, which is still kept under control by means of security. However, the more it is suppressed now, the greater challenge it will pose in the future.

This brief interpretation of six clusters cannot put an end to the debate over the primacy of structural and procedural (actor-oriented) factors in post-communist transformations. Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions can be made.

First, the composition of clusters can be attributed to specific "proportions" of certain structural and procedural factors. Each cluster has its own specific set of factors and patterns of interactions leading to an observable result.

Second, it can be argued based on the analysis of anomalies that there are no automatic effects of favorable or unfavorable structural factors outside the context of actions undertaken by political actors. To put it differently, due to certain political strategies, democracy can take root in spite of poverty, cleavages, etc. However, the opposite situation is also possible.

Third, the following procedural factors leading to positive outcomes can be identified: (a) existence of pressure on the "old regime" (more specifically, pressure "from below", for example, in the form of mass demonstrations; it is preferable that this pressure holds out after the collapse of the "old regime" in order to discipline reformers); (b) actions of the "old regime" (no non-reflexive attempts to save the situation at all costs; instead, willingness to negotiate and to allow round tables with those who challenges their authority); (c) the origin of reformers and how they came to power (distribution of power resources at the initial stage of transformation; a split in the ruling party and the emergence of reformers from the ranks of the ruling party who are ready to carry on a dialogue with those who challenge the "old regime"; the rate at which the opposition with no relation to the "old regime" comes to power and, in general, rotation of politicians in the executive and legislative branches); (d) the specifics of the opposition (organized with an integral political program) and its program (the key factor here is the dominance of democratic principles over nationalist or religious objectives, otherwise a democratic project is doomed); (e) institutional design (a definite choice of parliamentary arrangements and strong consecutive limits of presidential power is conducive to the consolidation of democracy); (f) the presence of an external reference point taking a democratic shape and various forms of assistance form democratic states.

Stateness as a factor of post-communist transformations: Types and dynamics

Empirically observed differences in the capability of post-communist countries to provide external security, domestic order, legitimacy, administrative capacity, and conditions for

development allows us to group them into *three types of stateness*, which, for lack of more precise terminology, are, for the time being, referred to as (a) *"full"* and (b) *"thin"* and (c) *"average"*.

The *"full" (or "plump")* type of stateness is characteristic of those post-communist countries that, in the course of transformation processes, succeeded both in meeting obligations ascribed to a modern social state and in expanding the volume of these obligations. These achievements have been partially due to favorable socio-economic conditions but above all have resulted from the policy choices made by key political actors. The idea of "fullness" of stateness has nothing to do with "state power", "international influence", and so forth. Instead, it is understood as the ability of a state to execute its functions towards both an individual citizen and society in general.

The group of post-communist countries aspiring to "full stateness" consists of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, etc. These countries aim towards (a) ensuring international security with the help of international institutions (with NATO, above all); (b) ensuring internal order, understood in terms of *Rechsstaat* in the absence of grave threats; (c) maintaining necessary social conditions for the legitimacy of the state and political regime; (d) ensuring the quality of institutions and administration; and (e) creating a complex environment for the development of human capital, innovations, and entrepreneurship. Yet, there is some dissimilarity in this group. We can see a stable subgroup of countries with relatively flat dynamics of stateness, consisting of Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Poland. This contrasts with a subgroup of countries with an intense expansion of stateness in different directions over the past two decades, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania. Croatia is aiming to join this subgroup. Indeed, Croatia is an example of a dramatic breakthrough to a high degree of stateness taking place almost simultaneously with a breakthrough to democracy.

It is necessary to reiterate that the countries aspiring to "full stateness", as we conceptualize it, are moving in a democratic direction. However, there is an anomaly within this group that has to do with an absence of favorable structural conditions represented by Moldova. This country has a very weak and one-sided ("thin") stateness, but has, nevertheless, demonstrated a potential for democratic development.

The second type of stateness stands in contrast to the first one. We call it *"thin"*. This type of stateness is characteristic of post-communist countries that initially had relatively limited socio-economic and other resources for develop and maintain all the necessary functions of modern stateness. However, the decisive factor here has had to do with political decisions and actions, rather than initial conditions. Some of the countries in this group managed to ensure

internal order by employing all possible means, including force and violence. The peculiar condition of stateness for others in this group has resulted from the involvement of external actors. Internal evolution can also be seen as a factor of "thin" stateness here. These countries have different types and levels of legitimacy and capacity to provide conditions for the complex development of human capital, innovations, and entrepreneurship. In most cases we see unbalanced expansion and, figuratively speaking, fluctuating stateness, especially when unfavorable conditions of territorial disputes, poor quality of institutions, and limited resources for development are involved. This is typical of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, for example.

The third type of stateness – *"average"* – is characteristic of Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Mongolia. These are very different countries facing various internal and external challenges and following dissimilar transformation trajectories. The elites in these countries choose utterly different political strategies (a comparison of Belarus and Mongolia is particularly eye-opening, to say the least). Yet they are all brought together into one group by having an "average" level of stateness, understood as the extent and specifics of performing basic functions required from a modern social state.

The analytical tools we use allows us to distinguish between five types of stateness dynamics (see Appendix 4):

1) *Uniform expansion of "plump" stateness* (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland);

2) *Explosive expansion of "average" stateness* (Croatia);

3) *Sharp reduction of "average" stateness* (Kyrgyzstan);

4) *Minimal dynamics of "average" stateness* (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Russia, and Ukraine);

5) *Extremely uneven (one-sided) expansion of "thin" stateness* (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova).

A *Uniform expansion of "full" stateness* is typical of successful countries that departed from communism in a relatively smooth way and have been able to build socially oriented states to ensure that their citizens are enjoying external security, internal order, legitimate government, government's efficient administrative capacity, and a potential for further development.

An *Explosive expansion of "average" stateness* is distinctive of Croatia. This country provides an example of dramatic expansion of stateness in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, due to a combination of internal change and external pressure[8].

[8] We believe that this group should also include Serbia, but this country was left out of the analysis due to statistical limitations.

A *Sharp reduction of "average" stateness* is distinctive of Kyrgyzstan. This is the only country studied in which internal conflicts lead to the overall reduction of stateness' scope, accompanied by a general weakening of all state functions.

A *Minimal dynamics of "average" stateness* is characteristic of countries with substantially different initial structural conditions, political strategies employed by key political actors, and outcomes of development in the past two decades. However, in terms of performing basic governmental functions, their dynamics of stateness demonstrate similarities.

An *Extremely uneven (one-sided) expansion of "thin" stateness* is typical of countries with substantial differences compared to those of the previous type. However, they all share the same levels of "thin" stateness and patterns of uneven expansion due primarily to a reactionary approach to various crises and threats.

Turning back to one of our research questions and to a corresponding hypothesis on the relationship between the types and dynamics of stateness and trajectories of regime transformation, we believe that the essential elements of this relationship are obvious and significant, although we are not yet able to give them a detailed theoretical justification at this stage of research.

First, as shown by our empirical analysis, democracy corresponds to "full" stateness and has little in common with the categories of "strength", "power", and "influence". A high degree of external sovereignty is desirable, but, strictly speaking, not necessary for democracy. Trajectories of democratization, as a rule, correspond to the expansion of stateness. Yet several anomalies exist here, including Mongolia and, above all, Moldova. These countries were indicated as anomalies when we analyzed factors of regime change.

Second, it is evident that, in general, a "thin" type of stateness is not typical of a democracy or a democratic trajectory of regime change, with Moldova serving as an exception. One of the explanations here is that it is easier for autocrats to rule under conditions of socio-economic deficits and poor institutional quality (see Gandhi 2008; Charron 2010; Frantz, Ezrow 2011). An alternative explanation suggests that autocrats are different and that they rule under varying structural and political conditions, meaning that they do not choose the same policies, even under similar conditions. Countries with a "thin" type of stateness demonstrate uneven (one-sided) dynamics, primarily in the areas of external security and domestic order.

Conclusions and desiderata

The qualitative and quantitative analysis undertaken in this paper supports both of our hypotheses. Peculiarities of the trajectories of post-communist transformations, aggregated into six distinct clusters and analyzed above, support the argument that structural factors, be they favorable or unfavorable for democracy, do not predetermine the processes and outcomes of transitions, which in fact depend on the strategic and tactical choices of leading political actors. Structural conditions, however, as our first cluster demonstrates, become indispensible on the path leading towards democratic consolidation[9].

The analysis carried out in this paper also corroborates our proposition about the relationship existing between transformation trajectories and the types and dynamics of stateness of post-communist. "Plump" – in the sense of the volume of the social functions performed by a modern state – and more-or-less evenly expanding stateness corresponds to transformation trajectories leading towards democratization, while "thin" stateness with a one-sided dynamic, if one exists at all, is typical for transformations leading in non-democratic directions. Democracies do seek to better provide basic social functions for citizens and society, while non-democracies have different priorities.

In our further research we are planning to verify our findings using a larger sample of countries, including not only the classics of the 3rd wave of democratization and the post-communist examples of the 4th wave, but also the Arabic countries of the 5th wave as well. Analysis of such a *large-N* sample may help us to check our preliminary conclusions and provide new ones.

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[9] Mongolia still remains an exception in this cluster.

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Appendix 1. Tables with regression analysis results

Table 1.2. Product-moment correlation (R) and Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (ρ) between PCADI and other democracy measures

Democracy measures	R	P
Polity IV	0.9705 *(540)*	0.9688 *(540)*
Gastil's index	0.9705 *(540)*	0.9785 *(540)*
UDS	0.9448 *(290)*	0.9430 *(290)*
The Economist index	0.9640 *(54)*	0.9467 *(54)*

Note: number of observations in parentheses.

Table 1.2. OLS-regressions with structural factors

Explanatory variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP per capita logged	2.80**					0.90
	(0.56)					(1.30)
GDP per capita growth rate		0.11				-0.11
		(0.13)				(0.11)
Life expectancy			0.85**			-0.09
			(0.20)			(0.37)
Infant mortality				-0.08**		-0.07
				(0.02)		(0.04)
Gini Index					-0.39**	-0.15
					(0.09)	(0.18)
Constant	-14.03**	7.91**	-52.23**	9.99**	17.77**	12.12
	(4.48)	(1.33)	(14.23)	(0.73)	(2.33)	(27.56)
N	23	23	23	23	23	23
R^2	0.48	0.03	0.38	0.56	0.24	0.61

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01. Bootstrapped (10,000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is PCADI ranging from 0 through 10. Explanatory variables are averaged over 1989 – 1993.

Table 1.3. OLS-regressions on principal components

Explanatory variables	(7)	(8)
1st principal component	1.30**	1.30**
	(0.33)	(0.27)
2nd principal component	-0.88	-0.88*
	(0.50)	(0.43)
3rd principal component	-0.02	
	(0.80)	
4th principal component	-0.73	
	(1.19)	
5th principal component	-1.44	
	(1.34)	
Constant	6.94**	6.94**
	(0.55)	(0.47)
N	23	23
R^2	0.61	0.57

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01. Bootstrapped (10,000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is PCADI ranging from 0 through 10. Explanatory variables are principal components extracted from GDP per capita logged, GDP per capita growth rate, life expectancy, infant mortality and Gini Index averaged over 1989 – 1993.

Table 1.4. OLS-regressions on structural and procedural factors

Explanatory variables	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Orientation on Russia	-4.58***	-3.57**	-4.46***	-4.59***
	(1.18)	(1.33)	(1.03)	(1.24)
Privatization of the state in 1990's	-1.06***	-0.72**	-0.42	-1.03***
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.28)
Infant mortality		-0.04		
		(0.03)		
GDP per capita logged			1.31**	
			(0.48)	
Gini Index				-0.01
				(0.10)
Constant	10.91***	11.12***	-0.55	11.20***
	(0.42)	(0.40)	(4.11)	(2.47)
N	19	19	19	19
R^2	0.86	0.91	0.93	0.86

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01. Bootstrapped (10,000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is PCADI ranging from 0 through 10. Infant mortality, GDP per capita logged and Gini Index are averaged over 1989 – 1993. Orientation on Russia is an expert evaluation and concerns 1989 – 1993. Privatization of the state in 1990s is expert evaluation as well and concerns 1990 – 1999.

Table 1.5. Fixed effects models

Explanatory variables	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Life expectancy	0.34*	0.32*	0.36*	0.26**
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.07)
Gini index	0.36**	0.34**	0.34**	0.33**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Gini index*	-0.25**	-0.24**	-0.26**	-0.26**
*Privatization of the state in 1990's	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
GDP per capita growth rate		-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
GDP per capita logged			-0.37	0.09
			(0.64)	(0.38)
N	345	324	324	324
R^2				0.70
R^2_{within}	0.43	0.39	0.39	
$R^2_{between}$	0.66	0.66	0.64	

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Dependent variable is PCADI ranging from 0 through 10.

Table 1.6. Multilevel regression models

Explanatory variables	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Years since 1989		0.13**	0.15**	0.13**
		(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
GDP per capita growth rate			-0.01	-0.01*
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Gini index			0.17**	0.19**
			(0.03)	(0.03)
Orientation on Russia			0.72	0.69
			(1.57)	(1.48)
Vacillations in foreign policy orientation			0.10	0.37
			(1.20)	(1.16)
(Years since 1989) * (Orientation on Russia)			-0.22**	-0.21*
			(0.09)	(0.09)
(Years since 1989) * (Vacillations in foreign policy orientation)			-0.05	-0.03
			(0.08)	(0.08)
Presidentialism with no opposition in power			-1.92	-1.64
			(0.99)	(0.90)
Gini index* *Privatization of the state in 1990s			-0.12**	-0.11**
			(0.03)	(0.02)
GDP per capita logged				0.58*
				(0.27)
Constant	6.20**	5.01**	2.29**	-2.74
	(0.54)	(0.42)	(0.85)	(2.53)
Var (const)	6.604**	3.755**	4.066**	3.762**
	(1.987)	(1.189)	(1.326)	(1.226)
Var (time)		0.024**	0.023**	0.023**
		(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Cov (time, const)		0.013	-0.223*	-0.229*
		(0.068)	(0.087)	(0.086)
Var (resid)	2.675**	1.280**	0.816**	0.816**
	(0.181)	(0.089)	(0.063)	(0.063)
N	460	460	389	389

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix 2. Clusters of regime-transformation trajectories in post-communist countries



Fig. 2.1. Regime-transformation trajectories of cluster 1 ("Towards democratic consolidation")



Fig. 2.2. Regime-transformation trajectories of cluster 2 ("On the road to democracy")



Fig. 2.3. Regime-transformation trajectories of cluster 3 ("Breakthrough to democracy")



Fig. 2.4. Regime-transformation trajectories of cluster 4 ("Problematic trajectories")



Fig. 2.5. Regime-transformation trajectories of cluster 5 ("On the road to democracy")



Fig. 2.6. Regime-transformation trajectories of cluster 5 ("Consolidated autocracies")

Appendix 3. Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for vector index of stateness and its indicators

	Factor loadings				
	External security	Domestic order	Legitimacy	Administrative capacity	Conditions for development
Indicators:					
Aggression on the territory of the country	– 0.78				
Territorial claims	– 0.82				
Border disputes	– 0.91				
Terrorist threats		– 0.79			
Civil war		– 0.90			
Antigovernment paramilitary groups		– 0.94			
Disappearances of citizens		0.87			
Extrajudicial killings		0.89			
Changes in founding constitutional rules			– 0.82		
Public consensus on founding constitutional rules			0.78		
Political prisoners			0.77		
Extent of "privatization" of state functions by organized or informal interest groups				– 0.91	
Government effectiveness (WB)				0,96	
Control of corruption (WB)				0.96	
Regulatory quality (WB)				0.95	
Health expenditures (% of GDP)					0.88
Research and development expenditures (% of GDP)					0.81
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)					0.78
Model fit:					
% of variance explained	70.02%	76.80%	62.51%	89.34%	68.25%

Note: Factor loadings are correlation coefficients between sub-index and correspondent indicators.

Appendix 4. Selected radar-charts of stateness dynamics in post-communist countries

1. Uniform expansion of "plump" stateness



Fig. 4.1.1. Uniform expansion of "plump" stateness (Slovak Republic).



Fig. 4.1.2. Uniform expansion of "plump" stateness (Slovenia).



Fig. 4.1.3. Uniform expansion of "plump" stateness (Poland).



Fig. 4.1.4. Uniform expansion of "plump" stateness (Hungary).

2. Explosive expansion of "average" stateness



Fig. 4.2.1. Explosive expansion of "average" stateness (Croatia).

3. Sharp reduction of "average" stateness



Fig. 4.3.1. Sharp reduction of "average" stateness (Kyrgyz Republic)

4. Minimal dynamics of "average" stateness



Fig. 4.4.1. Minimal dynamics of "average" stateness (Russia).



Fig. 4.4.2. Minimal dynamics of "average" stateness (Belarus).



Fig. 4.4.3. Minimal dynamics of "average" stateness (Kazakhstan).



Fig. 4.4.4. Minimal dynamics of "average" stateness (Mongolia).

5. Extremely uneven (one-sided) expansion of "thin" stateness



Fig. 4.5.1. Extremely uneven (one-sided) expansion of "thin" stateness (Azerbaijan).



Fig. 4.5.2. Extremely uneven (one-sided) expansion of "thin" stateness (Georgia).

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