

MODERN AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORRUPTION

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the link between the modern authoritarianism and corruption. Even though corruption plays an important role in Communist regimes, post-colonial dictatorships and authoritarian monarchies, coercion - which is a traditional tool used by authoritarian rulers - remains the basis of these regimes. However, a new type of non-democratic regimes, which we call neoauthoritarian, has emerged since the last quarter of the XX century. The new regimes are based on a dynamic interplay between coercion and corruption. That interplay allows authoritarian rulers to bring to the forefront either coercion or corruption, depending on the current political situation in the country and the political, economic and social issues on the political agenda. In this type of regimes, ruling political-economic groups capture the state and the public authority in the country and use all their instruments and resources to achieve their private goals. This paper presents empirical results showing that the Communist regimes, dictatorships and authoritarian monarchies exist in 33 modern non-democratic states, while neoauthoritarian regimes can be found in 19 states. I show that high levels of corruption are typical of all of these regimes, especially in dictatorships and neoauthoritarian ones. I explain a relatively lower level of corruption in the authoritarian monarchies using Olson's theory of stationary bandit. In particular, I speculate that the ruling monarchs fight corruption among bureaucrats since they perceive it as stealing their own property that damages the sources of their administrative rent and their revenues. At the same time, the high-level political corruption persists. Finally, I show that dictatorships are on average more fragile than economically elastic neoauthoritarian regimes, although it might be challenging to differentiate between them. All authoritarian and neoauthoritarian regimes, except a few monarchies, are non-stable regimes, allowing me to hypothesize their coming transformations or collapse.

Key words: authoritarianism, corruption, coercion, neoauthoritarian regime, fragile state

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The drive mechanisms of the political regimes

The basis of the modern state functioning is presented by the set of such three driving mechanisms of the political, economic, information and other social processes like the competition, the coercion, unfortunately, the political and economic corruption. It is supposed that the type of the ruling political regime defines, and along with approaches and classifications, known in political science [1,2,3], therefore can be defined also by what kind of mechanism from the mentioned triad acts as the dominating.

In the democratic political regime the dominating driving mechanism of all the political, economic, information and other social processes lies in the competition which is generally defined as “rivalry, competition of people, groups, organizations in order to achieve similar purposes, the best results in a certain public field” [4]. Naturally we mean the fair, transparent and professional competition in a legislative legal framework.

The standard rules of the competition are regulated and defined in each concrete field by the public authority which is urged to use the compulsory power authority for ensuring compliance with such rules by all subjects of the competition. This power and compulsory authority is based on a monopoly of the state on legal and public coercion including the power. Besides it is used as the main mechanism to tackle those problems of state administration which don't provide competitive regulation (national defense and safety, protection of a law and order, legal procedure and other) [5, p.11]. In such context the coercion limited by standard legal norms is compatible with the competition and, moreover, amplifies with the competition while administrating the state. The state monopoly for such civilized coercion is similar to natural monopoly in economy — without this monopoly it is impossible to provide effective production of a certain type of production or the certain services having limited resources. On the other hand, first of all in political and information spheres it is the competition that is urged to protect citizens from the illegal imperious coercion, to counteract usurpation of the public power and emergence of total monopoly in this field. About such monopoly

L. Mises wrote "the monopolist, regardless of being the individual or the group of individuals, individually controls the circumstances providing a human survival...; possesses the power to starve to death all who doesn't obey his orders" [6, p.262].

The modern world practice shows that one of the most significant factors distorting appreciably an ideal picture of the competition as the main mechanism of functioning of the democratic state is presented by corruption which promotes creation of "unnatural" monopolies in various spheres of public life. Corruption which is completely ineradicable and always conceals in "dark corners" of any administrative system including systems of the public authority even in the ruling democratic regime, is capable to start extending intensively as a cancer swelling by the weakening competition which serves as a basis of counteraction to corruption by means of external political and civil control of the public power activity [7].

The relationship of the competition, coercion and corruption as driving mechanisms of political, economic, information and other social processes at democratic regime can be presented as a scheme (figure 1).

DEMOCRATIC REGIME




Figure 1

In a historical retrospective the coercion up to direct physical abuse was dominating in the classical autocracies (tyrannies in Ancient Greece, a despotism the ancient eastern states, dictatorships in Ancient Rome, absolute monarchies in

the Middle Ages and later historical periods). In the modern history the tough power coercion, including mass physical extermination, was the dominating mechanism in the totalitarian regimes [8]. Thus along with coercion, the corruption played the essential role in functioning of historical autocracies in various forms from the direct bribery to favoritism as well as in the totalitarian regimes as specific forms of material and social privileges [9]. On the one hand such regimes sought to fight against corruption among the attendant officials, and on another hand — in order to ensure support and strengthening of the power, the governors created the conditions generating the new corrupt officials and stimulating the corruption burst out.

Nowadays some types of autocracy remain naturally with noticeable changes. Namely the monarchies in which the monarchs and monarchic dynasties possess the real, but not symbolical compulsory authority. An autocracy in such modes to the republican form of governance as presidential or mixed (semi-presidential) republic concerning the style of governance can be designated as the post-colonial dictatorships. Such dictatorships which mainly enjoy personalistic character have dispersion of authoritarian characteristics, according to Lenz-Stepan [10] multidimensional classification from the sultan forms of governance to military- bureaucratic ones and which have transformed to these or those collective forms of governance in certain cases.

Such form of governance as the soviet republic [11] among the totalitarian regimes only the communist regime ruling in Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained nowadays. It gained the character of inherited dynastic rule "in pure form". Also some authoritarian communist regime remained, which appeared as a result of transformations of the initial totalitarian regimes into the "softer" authoritative forms which according to Lenz - Stepan classification are designated as the post-totalitarian regimes.

The ruling regimes which use the compulsory and power methods to regulate the main social relations, can be designated as authoritarian ones [12, pp.243-248]. These modes are formed, mainly, as a result of the state (dynastic,

intra elite, military) coups or "creeping" concentration of the power in hands of leaders or independent elite groups which carry out the power either in the form of collective rule (for example, in the form of the power of a certain party, a military junta, a political and economic group), or in the form of autocracy of a charismatic leader. In the authoritarian regimes the dominating mechanism of their functioning, first of all, is the power coercion directed on extermination of any political competition, but at the same time along with coercion the essential role in the state administration is played also by different types of corruption.

The relationship of coercion, corruption and the competition as driving mechanisms of political, economic, information and other social processes at authoritarian regime are presented as a scheme (figure 2).

AUTHORITARIAN REGIME




Figure 2

In the last quarter of the XX century in seven various regions of the world the tendency of the political landscape change gained its development as a result of the dictatorial and communist regimes crash. This tendency was apprehended as a global tendency of democratization. However the political practice didn't confirm straightforwardness of this tendency which due to S. Huntington became widely known as "the third wave" of democracy and generated even the new direction of the academic researches named "transitology" [13]. In reality, the failed

authoritarian regimes were replaced by not only the democratic regimes, but also by another ones, though they differ from pure authoritative, but also they are not democratic.

The attempts to define such regimes within the theory of "democratic transits", introducing into scientific turn of speech the "democracies with adjectives", various "transitional", "hybrid", "imitating" and other "pseudo-democracies", were fruitless. As A. Melvil emphasizes, "democracies with adjectives" need to be conceptualized in other non-democratic conceptual frame: "This implies that in focus of the analysis there have to be not these or those "adjectives" and "democracies", but the a subject (predicate) which, strictly speaking, isn't democracy at all. So an important problem of a political comparativistics becomes the typologization of modern non-democracies, i.e. the autocratic modes of new type" [14].


As the analysis of mechanisms of such regimes functioning shows, their characteristic distinctive feature is the fact that in such regimes coercion and corruption are in close interconnection and supplement each other in suppression, first of all, of the political and information competition, as well as of the economic one. It depends on the fact that if ruling regime isn't hereditary monarchy, so according to F. Fukuyama, "because of the actual opinion that in the modern world the only legitimate source of the power is democracy ... even the most stubborn dictators consider themselves obliged to receive at least a piece of democratic legitimacy, having arranged the elections" [15, pp.56-57]. So the need to imitate the elections causes the creation of simulacrum of the democratic institutes and orders and to use along with coercion the political corruption for the regime guaranteed demanded results of the actions called "elections" and deduction of the privatized public power.

On the other hand, the such a regime represents the regime of "the dominating power" in which according to T. Karozers, "the large-scale corruption and "friendly capitalism" (crony capitalism)" [13] usually becomes the result of long deduction of the power by one political group. L. Geveling defined this

regime as a kleptocracy — "the power of thieves" which "represents the form of the power organization based on corruption and the appropriate social-political group of members allowing serious violations of public norms use their power (usually state and political) authority for fast self-enrichment and strengthening of the key positions in society" [16, p.10].

The functioning of such regime which can be defined as authoritative-kleptocratical or neoauthoritarian, is based on dynamic interconnection of coercion and corruption depending on the internal political situation and the current political, economic and social tasks solved by the regime, the dominating mechanism is presented by either coercion, or corruption acts. Thus the primary use of these mechanisms by the neoauthoritarian essentially depends on concrete realization in the certain state of such various types of neoauthoritarian regime as corporate or personalistic one (the regime of a personal authority).

The relationship of coercion, corruption and the competition as driving mechanisms of political, economic, information and other social processes at neoauthoritarian regime can be presented in the scheme (figure 3).



In the neoauthoritarian regime corruption as the driving mechanism of its activity gains comprehensive character and can be defined as "the state capture" which represents the top in hierarchical system of forms of the political and economic corruption which is schematically represented in figure 4.




Figure 4

The state capture represents such form of corruption in which the public power is privatized by the ruling political economic groups including the absolute rulers and their environment can also act, and all imperious and compulsory powers and types of an administrative resource of the public power go for capture of natural resources and the earth, the main streams of financial means, the state and private property and property, the most profitable economic agents, both in state, and in the private sector, and also the most influential means of mass distribution of information for their use for material enrichment of members of ruling groups and their leaders. Thus in the seized state political and economic corruption gains system character and becomes the key mechanism of functioning of such state, forcing out the fair and transparent competition and promoting formation of the monopolies subordinated to ruling groups in political, economic, information and other spheres of activity of society and the state.

The politicians who came to power in order to privatize it and to capture the state always begin their activity with abuses of the legislative resource and the regulatory resource in the sphere of human resources of the public power. By the way it doesn't depend on how was an initial entry into system of the public power.

The initial introduction in the public power system can be caused by process which starting point is the state buying (capture). During such process the representatives of the economic agents who are buying up the state and, first of all, the financial and industrial groups and corporations of oligarchical type start being integrated directly into system of the public power, occupying the public both political and administrative positions. Thus there is a direct penetration of business into the power, their merge into some kind of Siamese twins, the political and business elites are combined, and thus the ruling political and economic groups are formed. An example of such a process may be the involvement of big businessmen in structures of the legislative and the executive power of Nigeria which began in the first half of the 60th years of the XX century after declaration of country's independence and this process proceeded at least till the beginning of the Fourth republic at the close of the century [16].

Coming to power for the purpose of the state-capture can result also from revolutions and power actions, such as, in case of coming to the power of the lieutenant Y. Jammeh in 1994 in Gambia after a military coup [17] as well as the ethnic groups in 1991 in Ethiopia after overthrow of the government Mengista Hayle Mariam [18]. And even as a result of rather free and competitive elections with the subsequent "creeping" concentration of the power in hands of the winners, as in cases with elections of presidents: in Belarusian A. Lukashenko in 1994, in Venezuela U. Chavez in 1998 and in the Russian Federation V. Putin in 2000.

The solution of labor questions aiming at the state-capture begins with that the representatives of forces which came one way or another to power, the appointees supporting these forces of the financial and industrial groups and the corporations (including as a payment for such support) and other personnel which swore on loyalty is appointed not only to the highest political positions of the state,

that is quite legitimate and is politically proved, if coming to power took place as a result of free and fair elections, but also despite the principle of a political neutrality of the government, the legal system, the law-enforcement system and the armed forces to all administratively significant positions in these structures. It is done in order to take all the system of the public power under the total control. Similar way there are the appointments in governing bodies like the state ones and those that are under control of the state corporations, companies and banks with the purpose to take financial streams under control, and mass media with the aim to take the information space of the country under control.

At the same time, by means of the legislative resource abuses, the flywheel of political corruption starts twisting with acceleration. The legislation "is improved" for the purpose to restrict the political competition, opportunities for legal activity of opposition (up to its full elimination) and the formation of conditions for the domination of the ruling forces and groups in the field of politics and, first of all, in the following electoral cycles.

Thus the constantly growing political corruption starts corroding from within the system of the public power, dooming her to degradation and self-destruction, but also creates the nutritious soil for distribution of all types of economic corruption in the state and bureaucratic environment in order to occupy of the state by the ruling political and economic groups. It occurs so because political actor who seized and holding power by means of political corruption loses immunity to all the types of corruption, to corruption as it is.

In the process and at the end of the public power privatization which is carried out during one or two electoral cycles, and creation of a "stable" political system, the ruling political and economic groups almost uncontrolledly abuse, first of all, the legislative and regulatory resources in order to redistribute the natural resources and the land, the financial means, the state property for mercenary ends, and also in order to capture the most profitable private corporations, the companies and banks using power and status resources. And thus while abusing the information and communication resources there is a systematic information

manipulation of mass consciousness and an agitation and propaganda mesmerizing in order to mobilize the society to support the ruling regime.

In the state the ruling regime is the authoritarian one, its base of the political and economic groups activity becomes the abuses of all types of the administrative resource of the public power, political and economic corruption in combination with authority coercion.

Analysis of modern neoauthoritarian and authoritarian regimes

One uses the method of the comparative and institutional analysis for the empirical analysis of the ruling authoritarian and neoauthoritarian political regimes, the basic data is presented by the quantitative assessments of institutional characteristics of the sovereign states in the modern world received as result of the political researches [19] .

The results of the research received by the non-governmental organization the Freedom House in framework of "Freedom in the World" program in 2014 show, that according to the expert assessments 70 states of 193 sovereign UN member states aren't electoral democracies [20]. According to the methodology used by the Freedom House, the electoral democracy is characterized by the competitive multi-party system and universal voting rights, the regular free and fair elections by secret ballot, the openness of election campaign where all parties have access to funds of mass information. The compliance to criterion "electoral democracy" serves as minimum necessary condition for correlation between the political regime in the state with the regimes realizing the modern representative democracy. The discrepancy to this criterion serves the sufficient basis for definition of such regime to be non-democratic.

It is important to note that fact that according to the World bank in 2013 in the states with the ruling non-democratic regimes there are 3018 million people or 42,4% of all population of the planet [21].

First of all, it is necessary to allocate the 16 states from the mentioned 70 non-democratic states, which have armed conflicts on their territory proceeded or suspended within last three-five years, including the participation of foreign armed

forces, where there were military coups or changes of the ruling regimes using coercion structures. It doesn't mean that on the territory of other states there are no frozen or localized conflicts, for example, as in case of the Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

It is offered to include the following states in group of the states with the unstable regimes: Afghanistan, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Burkina Faso, Haiti, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Yemen, Kot-d'ivoir, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, the Syrian Arab Republic, Somalia, Thailand, the Central African Republic, Southern Sudan.* For these states the classification analysis of ruling political regimes is considered to be inexpedient at least until they reach rather steady stabilization of the internal political situation in them.

Another 54 non-democratic states can be divided into two groups: the first one contains 34 states with ruling authoritarian regimes and the second — the 19 states with ruling neoauthoritarian regimes and also one can allocate a unique phenomenon which represents Singapore.

The first group of the states with authoritarian regimes represents set of three subgroups.

The first subgroup which may to be called the "communistic rudiments", consists of the four states with ruling authoritarian communist regime and Democratic People's Republic of Korea where the last totalitarian communist regime remained. The list of such communistic states ranged on the values of a rated index of corruption perception (CPI),** was determined by the non-governmental organization Transparency International in 2014 [25] (see table 1).

* Hereinafter, the analysis of the status and nature of the ruling regimes used information [22, 23, 24].

** The values of a rated index CPI vary between 0 (the lowest level of corruption) to 1 (most corrupt).

Table 1

№	The country	CPI	Type of political regime
1	Republic of Cuba	0,54	personalistic T. and R. Castro since 1959.
2	People's Republic of China (PRC)	0,64	corporate Communist party of China since 1949.
3	Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)	0,69	corporate Communist party of Vietnam since 1976.
4	Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR)	0,75	corporate National and revolutionary party of Laos since 1975
5	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)	0,92	personalistic dynastic Kim's family since 1948

It follows that according to Transparency International in 2014 three states with ruling communist regime are in a corruption above average zone which is defined by values $CPI > 0,5$, and another two are in a zone of high corruption which is defined by $CPI \geq 0,7$.

The lower level of corruption in Cuba, in the People's Republic of China and SRV is the result of the fact, that the leaders of these states use campaign against corruption as the tool for control and keeping in obedience the middle and lower levels of the ruling party nomenclature. It allows to reduce a little local, business and household corruption, but practically doesn't influence the political and economic corruption on higher levels.

It should be stressed that in the People's Republic of China the publicly advertised application of the death penalty for such types of corruption crimes as plunder of the state property (Art. 384 of CC People's Republic of China) and bribery (Art. 385, 388 of CC People's Republic of China) [26] plays a big role. Thus in the People's Republic of China the campaign against corruption is actively used as the tool for elimination of disagreeable challengers for the top posts in

party and state hierarchy. As example we can mention the destiny of the "perspective" party functionary Bo Silai, who was sentenced to life imprisonment on a charge of getting bribes and abuse of official status, as well as his colleague the former minister of security Chzhau Yunkan and even more than thirty condemned party functionaries holding high posts in the Communist Party of China [27, 28].

It is also necessary to note that Democratic People's Republic of Korea with CPI=0,92 together with Somalia with the same value of this index became in 2014 the most corrupted states in the world.

The second subgroup consists of 18 states with rigid authoritarian regimes which actively use power coercion in the political sphere and therefore can be defined as modern dictatorships. The list of such dictatorships ranged on the values of CPI in 2014 is presented in table 2.

Table 2

№ п/п	Country	CPI	Type of dictatorship
1	Rwanda	0,51	personalistic the president P. Kagame since 2000
2	Gabon	0,63	personalistic dynastic president O. Bongo 1967-2009gg. president A. Bongo (son) since 2009.
3	Algeria	0,64	personalistic the president A. Bouteflika since 1999.
4	Djibouti	0,66	personalistic dynastic president H. Aptidon 1977-1999 the president I. Guelleh (nephew) since 1999
5	Togo	0,71	personalistic dynastic president Mr. Eyadema 1967-2005gg. the president F. Gnassingbe (son) since 2005.
6	Cameroon	0,73	personalistic the president P. Biya since 1982.
7	Uganda	0,74	personalistic the president Y. Museveni since 1986.
8	Guinea	0,75	corporate military junta since 1984.

9	Republic of Congo	0,77	personalistic the president D. Sassou-Ngessa since 1979
10	Democratic republic of Congo	0,78	Personalistic dynastic president L.-D. Kabila 1997-2001gg. the president Zh. Kabila (son) since 2001.
11	Chad	0,78	personalistic the president I. Déby since 1990.
12	Zimbabwe	0,79	personalistic the president R. Mugabe since 1980.
13	Cambodia	0,79	personalistic the prime minister Hun Sen since 1985.
14	Myanmar	0,79	corporate military junta since 1988.
15	Angola	0,81	corporate The labor party (MPLA) since 1976.
16	Eritrea	0,82	personalistic the president I. Afework since 1993.
17	Sudan	0,89	personalistic the president Omar al-Bashir c 1993г.
18	Equatorial Guinea	-	personalistic the president T. Mbasogo since 1979.

As it follows from table 2, according to Transparency International in 2014 the 13 modern dictatorships are in a zone of high corruption and only 4 — in a zone of corruption above average. The index of corruption perception for Equatorial Guinea wasn't defined by Transparency International. According to data in 2013, the rated value of an index of corruption control, which defines the World Bank [29], for this state makes 0,82 that corresponds with a zone of high corruption.

Thus, it is possible to state that the authoritarian dictatorships are characterized by high extent of corruption. The only noticeable deviation is made by the "youngest" of the modern dictatorships — Rwanda which president P. Kagame relies on power coercion up to physical elimination of challengers in the political sphere, but he is focused on development of the competition and decrease of corruption in the economic sphere [30].

The third subgroup consists of 11 monarchies in which the monarchic dynasties possess real imperious and compulsory authority and predominate in

administration of the states. The list of such authoritative monarchy ranged on the values of the CPI index in 2014 is presented in table 3.

Table 3

№	Country	CPI	Type of the monarchy
1	United Arab Emirates	0,3	absolute the federal
2	Qatar	0,31	absolute
3	Malaysia	0,48	constitutional federal
4	Bahrain	0,51	constitutional
5	Jordan	0,51	constitutional
6	Saudi Arabia	0,51	absolute the theocratic
7	Oman	0,55	absolute
8	Kuwait	0,56	constitutional
9	Swaziland	0,57	constitutional
10	Marroko	0,61	constitutional
11	Brunei-Darussalam	-	absolute the theocratic

This subgroup doesn't include the two more constitutional monarchies with ruling authoritarian regimes — Thailand where in May 2014 there was a revolution and the martial law [31], and Cambodia included in the second subgroup, where in 1993 the constitutional monarchy was restored, but so far the power in the state actually belongs to the prime minister Hun Sen.

As it follows table 3, according to Transparency International in 2014 the 7 modern authoritative monarchy are in a corruption zone above average, but it is close to the lower boundary of this zone to values $0,5 < \text{CPI} < 0,6$. Marocco with $\text{CPI}=0,61$, Malaysia about $\text{CPI}=0,48$ and Qatar with $\text{CPI}=0,31$ are in a corruption zone below average, and The United Arab Emirates (UAE) with $\text{CPI}=0,3$ — in a

zone of low corruption ($CPI \leq 0,3$). The index of corruption perception for a sultanate Brunei-Darussalam wasn't defined by Transparency International. According to data in 2013, the rated value of an index of corruption control, which defines the World Bank [29], makes 0,36 for this state that corresponds with a corruption zone below average.

The uniqueness of the Singapore's phenomenon is the defining role in the history of this small state, the island city-state with the population of 5,399 million people (2013) [32], was played by one person aspired to turn the poor corrupted state deprived of natural resources in the state which is economically developed with a high standard of living, as well as to eliminate corruption.

This person is Li Kuan Yu who headed the state in 1959-1990 as the prime minister, then became the senior minister in the government of his successor Guo Chuok Tanga, reserving the control over government, and in 2004 he delegated the power to his son Li Syen Lungu who held the minister-mentor's position (founded special for him) in the government till 2011. But even leaving the government after parliamentary elections in 2011, Li Kuan Yu remained to his the death in March 2015 the national leader, indisputable authority and unconditional central figure of the political regime created by him and ruled by him more than fifty years.

"The soft dictator" Li Kuang Yu created a unique authoritarian political regime where the political and civil rights are essentially limited, but the development of competitive market economy is intensively stimulated, the compliance of the "rule of law" principle is rigidly provided and the effective system of corruption elimination was created where nobody is untouchable, whatever high positions one holds. This key principle of campaign against corruption of Li Kuan Yu was formulated in the most known of attributed to him quotes: ""Having started fighting against corruption, first of all put three friends in jail. You know, for what, and they know, for what" [33].

Such regime allowed Li Chuen Yu to make "economic miracle" and to solve a problem of transition of Singapore from "the third world — in the first" [34]. In researches of the World Economic Forum Singapore since 2006 steadily takes a

place in the top-five states with the best indicators of global competitiveness [35]. In researches of Transparency International since 1998 it steadily takes a place in top-ten states with the lowest levels of corruption [36], and according to the World bank since 2007 enters the top-five states with the highest GDP per capita (PPP) [21].

However, after Li Kuan Yu`s death there is a question whether it will or not and if so, in what direction the authoritarian regime of a personal authority will be transformed, and what is more important, whether the successors will keep the reached results of the only successful example of "authoritative modernization". Thus it should be noted that according to the results of researches of Freedom House, since 1999 Singapore treats category of "partially free states" and there is the tendency to slow softening and democratization of the ruling regime due to gradual expansion of civil liberties and political rights of his citizens [37].

The list from 19 states with ruling neoauthoritarian regimes ranged on the values of the CPI index in 2014 is presented in table 4.

Table 4

№	Country	CPI	Type of neoauthoritarian regime
1	Sri Lanka	0,62	corporate family clans
2	Armenia	0,63	corporate political and economic groups
3	Ethiopia	0,67	corporate ethnic groups
4	Mozambique	0,69	corporate ethnic groups
5	Belarus	0,69	personalistic the president A. Lukashenko since 1994.
6	Mauritania	0,7	corporate military groups
7	Azerbaijan	0,71	personalistic dynastic president Mr. Aliyev 1993-2003gg. the president I. Aliyev (son) since 2003.
8	Gambia	0,71	personalistic the president Ya. Jammeh since 1994.
9	Kazakhstan	0,71	personalistic

			the president N. Nazarbayev since 1991.
10	Nicaragua	0,72	corporate personified the president D. Ortega since 2006.
11	Kyrgyzstan	0,73	corporate patrimonial clans
12	Nigeria	0,73	Corporate confessional communities
13	Russian Federation	0,73	corporate personified the president V. Putin since 2000. president D. Medvedev (political successor) 2008-2012
14	Islamic Republic of Iran	0,73	theocratic
15	Tajikistan	0,77	personalistic the president E. Rahmon since 1994.
16	Burundi	0,8	corporate ethnic groups
17	Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	0,81	corporate personified president U. Chavez 1999-2013 the president N. Maduro (the political successor) since 2013.
18	Uzbekistan	0,82	personalistic the president I. Karimov since 1990.
19	Turkmenistan	0,83	personalistic president S. Niyazov 1990-2006gg. the president Mr. Berdimuhamedov (the political successor) since 2007.

As it follows from table 4, according to Transparency International in 2014 14 of the 19 states with ruling neoauthoritarian regimes, i.e. more than 74% of the states of this group, are in a zone of high corruption and only 5 are in a zone of corruption higher than average, but closer to its upper bound to $CPI \geq 0,6$. It shows the high corruption of the states with neoauthoritarian regimes and that corruption really serves as the key mechanism of functioning of such regimes.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis of the data provided in table 1-4 corresponds with charts of change of the average levels of corruption over the last ten years in groups of the states with different types authoritarian and neoauthoritarian regimes (figure 5).




Figure 5

The vast majority of the states with the ruling authoritarian and neoauthoritarian regimes is substantially struck with corruption. According to Transparency International in 2014 77% of such states had the high level of corruption with $CPI > 0,7$ or the level of corruption is significantly higher than an average value $CPI > 0,6$. The deviations from such order represent, except Singapore, rather less corrupted authoritative monarchies.

This fact concerning authoritative monarchy has an explanation, proceeding from the theory of "the stationary bandit" by M. Olson [38, pp.33-39]. The behavior of the governor ("the stationary bandit") M. Olson describes as follows: "The stationary bandit who is constantly controlling the territory will take care that the victims had an interest in continuation of production and implementation of favorable trade. The more their income, the more he will be able to take away. <...> As the victims of the stationary bandit are for him a source of tax payments,

he establishes a ban on murder and causing injuries to the citizens. And because burglarizing of his citizens and the activities for protection against reduce the total income, the bandit forbids everyone to steal, except himself".

The modern authoritative monarchs and their dynasties are confirmed that they will hold the power beyond all bounds long, they are the main recipients of profit from national, mainly raw economy, and in this context they represent governors like "stationary bandit". They perceive corruption among the officials serving them as "stealing from their pocket", destroying sources of the administrative rent causing damage to their income and interests. Therefore, in authoritative monarchy the governor fights against business and household corruption on the lower levels of the power. Thus corruption on higher levels remains at the high, but the general level of corruption decreases a little.

The high level of corruption is a feature both for neoauthoritarian regimes and for modern dictatorships. It is caused by fact, that borders between such modes are rather relative and diffused. Recently the tendency concerning modern dictatorships is their some "mitigation", the decrease of violence applied by the power [39] and respectively the drift towards neoauthoritarian regimes. At the same time some neoauthoritarian regimes trying to hold the power by all means on the contrary "become tougher", expanding application of power coercion in the political sphere, and thus they drift towards dictatorships.

Thus the states with ruling dictatorships are on average more fragile, than the states with more economically "elastic" neoauthoritarian regimes and in general the states with other authoritarian regimes. It can be illustrated by the charts of change of the average levels of failure presented (figure 6) for groups of the states with different types of authoritarian regimes and neoauthoritarian regimes. To assess the levels of failure one uses the values of the Fragile States Index (FSI) defined by the results of the joint researches since 2005 made by the non-governmental organization the American Fund for Peace and the American magazine Foreign Policy [40]. This index changes by the range from 0 to 120 (the highest level of failure).




Figure 6

It should be noted that practically all states with ruling authoritarian and not authoritarian regimes except for such monarchy as the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and also Kuwait (but only according to 2014) belong to unstable states with $FSI \geq 60$ according to the definition from Fund for Peace. Such situation can be explained that using the rigid coercion increases instability of the ruling regime and makes the state more fragile and insolvent to solve the faced problems. Therefore, in the long term one can expect either essential transformations, or crashes of the similar regimes.

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