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ФОРМИРОВАНИЕ РОССИЙСКОЙ МЕДИАСИСТЕМЫ В КОНТЕКСТЕ ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИИ

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In the last century, Russia's identity has been characterized by numerous contradictions and tensions being simultaneously a centre of empire and geopolitical periphery, a world-wide known culture and quite strong economy based on supply of natural resources, a multi-cultural and multi-linguistic society with a dominance of the Russian background. In the nation state building process Russian media have played different roles, among which the following ones are of great importance: provision of communication infrastructure for a large territory and development of the national identity through instrumental use of media. In the recent decades, economic interests of the media industry through national advertising have become new agents to support all-national television channels as a backbone of Russian media system. The transformation of the Russian media has shown an interesting case of interplay between nationally determined post-Socialist transition and influences of media globalization.

Key words: *Russian media; media system; media market; globalization; post-Soviet Russia.*

На формирование российской идентичности в XX в. оказали влияние противоречия различного характера. Так, Россия одновременно являлась центром империи и геополитической периферией, страной с богатым культурным наследием и экономикой, основанной на потреблении природных ресурсов, территорией, на которой обитали представители большого числа культурных и языковых групп, и при этом преобладали представители российской нации. Говоря о роли российских медиа в становлении российского государства, следует отметить два важных момента: обеспечение протяженной территории страны коммуникационной инфраструктурой и развитие российской идентичности. В последние десятилетия, основой российской медиасистемы стали общенациональные телевизионные сети, развитие которых стимулируется интересами общенациональных рекламодателей. Процесс трансформации российских медиа продемонстрировал интересную взаимосвязь между национальной спецификой и влиянием медиаглобализации в пост-социалистическом переходе.

Ключевые слова: *российские медиа; медиасистема; медиарынок; глобализация; постсоветская Россия.*

Russian Media: Interplay of Centralization and Decentralization

Many scholars argue that contemporary Russia is being characterized by the conflict between centralization and decentralization of political, economic, and cultural actors. Centripetal and centrifugal vectors are present in many areas of social and corporate life, making the Russian situation extremely difficult to comprehend. Researchers have pointed out the state of flux, chaos, and "mosaic" as important characteristics of modern Russia (Petrov, 2000; Nechayev, 2000). For example N. Pokrovsky (Pokrovsky, 2001) stressed:

"In Russia we are witnessing a specific symbiosis of proactive global trends with traditional, semi-feudal stratifications. [The] new economic system encompasses

very dissimilar and even impertinent "fragments" like technologically advanced post-industrialism and quasi-markets, revived archaic natural exchange of goods, criminal economics, forced labor, industrialization, post-industrialization and de-industrialization. Moreover, the new system is not a transitional multi-faceted way of life, but [a] new stable social and economic structure".

Russia as a post-Soviet country inherited many institutions from the past that have turned out to be rather stable and paradoxically in some practices even rooted in traditions of the Russian Empire (Vartanova, 2012). On the other hand, it has also developed new structures and routines that often coexist with the old structures while being in nature contradicting them. The co-existence between the old and the new has become very interesting particularly in the Russian media, which inherited a media and communications traditions of the Soviet state represented by relatively developed though completely divided segment of economy. These traditions in fact have a mixed nature originating from different periods: the press from Imperial Russia, broadcasting from the Soviet Union, and the Internet from the post-Soviet period (Rantanen, 2002). The penetration of the different media at early post-Soviet period was uneven and reflected ideological priorities of the Soviet media policy. Press, TV, and radio achieved the largest possible audiences, while the number of fixed telephone lines needed for Internet access was a limited and the lines were of poor quality. Although satellite communications were numerous and comparatively advanced, they were not in public use and were controlled by the military.

With the start of the social transformations a new challenge emerged from the global environment characterized by a rapid progress of digital communication technologies and expansion of media and advertising business searching for new markets. This all resulted in a unique situation of "post-Soviet Russian transformation within an exterior framework of globalisation" (Segbers, 1999). Despite its former economic isolation, post-Communist Russia has experienced globalization in ways similar to other countries, but this has now resulted in increasing nationalism, in terms of both the content and the reception of programs (Rantanen, 2002). As a result, its media and communications system has been reorganized

and remodelled in a way that cannot be observed except with tools that can explore the emerging combinations of the old and the new, penetrated at different levels by processes that go beyond the analysis of the local to the global. As Rantanen and Vartanova pointed to, a detailed analysis of the different levels within the Russian media and communications system might help to understand the complexity of systematic transformations on four different levels: (1) global-national; (2) national-regional; (3) regional-local; and (4) various other combinations such as global-regional, global-local, and national-local It should be noted that territorial/regional diversity, unevenness of economic development, political diversity, multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism might be easily observed in various combinations on all levels (Rantanen, Vartanova, 2004).

Figure 1

Media Influences of Different Vectors of the Russian Federalism[1]

In this framework, the Russian media provide a fascinating case to illustrate the interplay between the global, the national (which for Russia is mostly equal to the federal), and the local (which might be seen as both subfederal, regional and communal). Media as agents of social change contribute to contradictory processes of both federalization/centralization and regionalization/decentralization, which enhance each other as well as con-

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[1] *Source:* Rantanen, T., Vartanova, E. (2004). P. 147−162.

tradict. This is illustrated by the Figure 1 which shows that Russian media is in a great degree described by tensions inside the nation state itself.

At the same time, Russian media channel global influences through content, economic activity and organizational principles of rapidly developing media industry. The role of advertising market that has brought huge investments into media industry since 1991, is difficult to overestimate (see table 1). New formats and professional standards of a global nature might be easily found in regional and local media while federal (or all national media) often guide nationally determined traditions and values. Consequently, Russian media have become simultaneously, as part of a changing reality, both dynamic and vulnerable, thus reflecting the complexity of problems of the Russian post-Soviet transformation.

Table 1

Structure and Dynamics of the Russian Advertising Market[2]

Segment	2007	2009	2010	2011	Growth in 2011 in %
	Bln $				
TV	4,35	2,75	3,82	4,51	18
Terrestrial	4,32	2,71	3,76	4,44	18
Cable and satellite	0,02	0,03	0,05	0,07	36
Radio	0,57	0,26	0,35	0,40	15
Print media	1,99	1,01	1,31	1,39	6
Newspapers	0,44	0,20	0,28	0,30	7
Magazines	0,90	0,48	0,63	0,68	8
Advertising publications	0,65	0,32	0,39	0,40	3
Outdoor advertising	1,55	0,72	1,02	1,18	15
Internet	0,48	0,46	0,92	1,44	56
Media advertising	0,21	0,18	0,36	0,52	45
Contextual advertising	0,26	0,27	0,56	0,91	63
Other media	0,09	0,06	0,10	0,14	32
Indoor advertising	0,07	0,05	0,08	0,11	35
Movie theatres	0,01	0,01	0,02	0,03	25
Total ATL segment	9,05	5,28	7,53	9,08	21
BTL segment	2,31	1,24	1,90	2,43	23
Total	11,3	6,56	9,43	11,4	44

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[2] Source: *AKAR, 2012.* URL: www.akarussia.ru

In the process of conceptualizing the Russian media model there exists an obvious need to provide up-to-date definitions of the local and the regional as well as the relationship between the local and other levels, including the different levels of the regional and the national (federal). In the long run, by analyzing these levels, it would be easier to understand not only the relationship between the global and the national/local but also to see how centripetal media can contest the power of centrifugal media.

Decreasing Press

The Soviet media system was rather specific and implemented many features which today look rather old-fashioned. First of all, the Soviet Union was a print media country with strong traditions of daily reading newspapers and books. The number of newspapers was high and the newspaper system itself was balanced in terms of geographic representation; in 1990, before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there existed a strong sector of 43 all-national dailies and more than 4,500 regional and local newspapers with a total distribution of 37,848,556,000. The distinguishing feature of the Soviet press was its pyramid hierarchy, which subordinated all levels of daily newspapers to the central (national) newspapers published in Moscow (Richter, 1995; Zassoursky, 1997). After two decades, by the 2010s, Russian newspaper sector looked even more balanced and was comprised of three more or less equal parts with national newspapers accounted for about one third of circulation, one third – for regional and one third for local newspapers. Although the structure of the newspaper industry has changed, the main trend, e.g. the reduction in circulation, looked quite negative. This might be explained by the demographic situation (declining population), decrease in interest of Russian to newspapers as a part of their media menu, and the rise of TV and new media as sources of news and entertainment (Vartanova, Smirnov, 2010). This lack of readers' interest to the print newspapers also

explains why the amount of advertising in print media decrease while the same indicator for television remains stable and for new media even grows (see table 2).

Number of titles of Russian newspapers[3]

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Total dailies	494	552	545	533	582
Total paid-for dailies	491	521	510	495	541
National paid-for dailies	23	25	25	25	24
Regional and local paid-for dailies	468	496	485	470	517
Morning paid-for dailies	470	497	486	473	520
Evening and afternoon paid-for dailies	21	24	24	22	21
Total free dailies	3	31	35	38	41
Regional and local free dailies	3	31	35	38	41
Total non-dailies	25,984	26,542	26,610	27,510	28,011
Total paid-for non-dailies	25,686	26,112	26,100	26,930	27,391
National paid-for non-dailies	7,056	7,145	7,080	7,120	6,980
Regional and local paid-for non-dailies	18,630	18,967	19,020	19,810	20,411
Total free non-dailies	298	430	510	580	620
Regional and local free non-dailies	298	430	510	580	620

The magazine segment of the Russian media market has stably developed compared to the newspaper one. In 2000s, its annual growth exceeded 13% and only India's and China's magazine sectors developed

[3] Source: Federal Agency for Print and Mass Communications

faster. However, the national market of Russian magazines in early 2010s was characterized by a strong segment of glossy magazines (900 million copies by late 2000s), and 600 millions of which were printed abroad. Circulations and popularity of glossy fashion and life style magazines increased while quality political weeklies demonstrated economic losses and decreasing influence at the national level. Another trend has been the reinforcement of the capital magazine market. In Moscow, magazine periodicals clearly outperformed those in the regions — about 60% of the circulation was comprised by the central editions. However, as was the case with newspapers, out of the total number of magazines, only 12,000 are really being published in the country. One of the major problems of this segment is the imperfect system of distribution, especially when it comes to subscription. The main consumers of magazines are citizens of metropolitan areas (Vartanova, Smirnov, 2010).

Among the main reasons to explain the decline of print media the economic ones should be mentioned the first. Scholars have pointed to many depressing processes in the Russian print media industry — the crisis of the national distribution system, increase in prices of newsprint and printing, and emergence of the state paternalism — informal interferences of the state in the media economics which distorted principles of market and fair competition (Vartanova, 2009; Ivanitsky, 2011). As a result, by 2000s, the print media became an element of the urban life style, because their distribution systems could survive only in transport communications of megapolicies and their business models could attract advertising of cities' shopping centers.

Nevertheless, it would be unfair to explain all the changes in the newspaper system only by the shift of the Russian media economy to the market-based relations. Among the reasons one should mention are processes of liberation of regional political systems from pressures of the federal elites accompanied by the constructions of regional identities and de-politicization of print media content.

Political regionalization of the Russian press markets. In the struggle against the post-Soviet leadership in the 1990s, President Yeltsin formu-

lated a well-known strategy — "Grab as much sovereignty as you can" — in his effort to gain the support of Russian regional elites which have gained more legal independence and have been actively pursuing this strategy. For the print media this has resulted in new centrifugal trends that have changed the Russian print media. The circulation of national newspapers has decreased dramatically in the regions. In 1990s the market share of all Moscow dailies in Rostov was only 10% of that of the main regional daily; in Vladivostok the distribution of the national daily *Izvestiya* was more than thirty times less than that of the local daily. Resnayanskya points to the researchers of the VTsIOM and other sociological surveys which "reveals that the public prefers the more accessible regional and local media" (Resnyanskaya, 2009). In 1998, the number of national dailies per 1,000 Russians in central Russia was less than 60, and in Siberia and the Far East it was only 1 per 1,000 (Grabel'nikov, 2002).

Change in regional identities. The formation of regional identities, especially in areas with multinational and multilingual populations and non-Russian minorities, became a vital issue in cultural policies for involving the media, especially newspapers, in the construction of the post-Soviet society. Support was also given to new public movements and to the restoration of local traditions, especially in economically and culturally independent regional centres like Niznhiy Novgorod, Samara, Irkutsk, and Stavropol' as well as in the ethnic republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Chyvashiya. The legitimization of regional independence became an important issue for the regional press to win over public opinion during election campaigns (Pietilainen, 2000). Regional elites inspired the creation of a regional identity, and local and regional newspapers were enthusiastic in advocating the concept of a *malaya rodina* (little motherland) to remind their readers of their locality.

De-politicization of content. Newspapers in Russian regions experienced the same trends as the central dailies — going from political engagement in the early days of *perestroika* to disillusionment with politics

and therefore interest to human interest stories. The regional and local press had to find new ways to survive economically and to attract readers. They experimented with previously unknown tabloid formats, attempting to build a close relationship with their readers. Scholars have described this process negatively as "boulevardisation", emphasizing that regional newspapers were becoming more sensational and scandalous, less professional, and of poorer quality than national newspapers. Unlike the national political dailies, regional and local newspapers began to concentrate on everyday issues such as gardening, housekeeping, and legal and business advice, using humor, photos, and big headlines. Many editors-in-chief of local newspapers have suggested that the everyday usefulness of their newspapers' content and advertising — in short, their relevance to the practical life of readers — has contributed to their success (Vartanova, Smirnov, 2010).

Stable Broadcasting

As for the broadcasting, television is the largest and still highly developing segment of the modern Russian media system accompanied by the positive dynamics of the radio market. There are three main types of terrestrial broadcasters: centralized national channels, networked national channels, and regional channels. In major 200 Russian cities there are 10—12 publicly accessible TV channels. Cable television and satellite television are rapidly developing. Market experts believe that the total number of channels broadcast in Russia stay close to 1500. Television has become the most important source of information and entertainment for most Russians. About 40% of Russians watch the central channels broadcast from Moscow every day. For many families, an important factor in the choice of this or that medium is money: they do not have to pay for television (Vartanova, Smirnov, 2010).

However, the core of the Russian TV market is composed of a few channels, available to more than 50% of population. Practically all Rus-

sians receive three state-controlled channels: *Perviy Kanal* is available to 98,8%, *Rossiya 1* – to 98%, and *NTV* – to 96% of the whole population (Televidenie v Rossii. Sostoyanie, tendencii i perspektivy razvitiya, 2012).

The role of TV in the everyday life of Russians is difficult to overestimate. One of the crucial indicators is definitely the time audience spent for daily watching TV. In 2011, Russians watched TV 220 min. per day (3 hours 40 min.), which was 8 min. less than in 2009 – the peak year for the duration of TV watching (ibid). Although daily TV watching is slightly decreasing in all age groups, especially among young people of 15–24 years old and men 40–54 years old, TV remains the leader in the media system in terms of time spending. This is rather similar to the general trends in many developed countries, and the decreasing interest of young Russians who growingly watch TV programs and video online is another consequence of the digital revolution in Russia.

The federal government maintains strong (formal or informal) relations with the nationally distributed state and private TV channels. Many post-Socialist countries experienced similar pressures from their central governments, which used to utilize the state broadcasters to promote their own political philosophy and values though they were restructured as public service broadcasters (Sparks, Reading, 1998). In Russia, after the introduction of President Yeltsin's policy of political and economic regionalization, the federal government has increasingly used TV to promote Russian integrity and challenge the influence of local authorities. This process was even strengthened since 2000s with the optimization of the state-owned broadcaster VGTRK and changes in ownership of *Perviy Kanal* (Televidenie v Rossii. Sostoyanie, tendencii i perspektivy razvitiya, 2010 and 2011).

National television channels have played a particularly important centrifugal role in present-day politics and construction of modern Russian identity. As for the structure of the media system, this role led to the subsequent "redistribution of power": the central (federal) channels took upon themselves the function of covering national politics and that of

mass entertainment. This was actually supported by the growth of the national advertising market which used TV as a major advertising channel to reach mass audiences (Vartanova, Smirnov, 2010). It has been proved by recent developments of the regional TV that demonstrated its degrading role because of the decrease in number of regional news and current affair programs replaced by the entertainment and advertising provided by Moscow-based networks. In addition, one should take into account the new effects produced by online media which supply simultaneously global, national and local, communal content thus making a new impact upon centrifugal influences of the federal broadcasters on national and local audiences.

However, the centrifugal role of Russian federal TV broadcasting in 2010s has been challenged, and the potential of the federal channels in forming the national agenda has not been fully realized. In an attempt to satisfy advertisers' needs, Russian TV has shifted its programming policies to emphasize entertainment, with elements of infotainment, tabloid style, and to promote journalism "on demand". This, in turn, shifted audiences' attention either to regional print media or to the Internet both outperforming the national television in more adequate and unbiased coverage of politics (especially of Parliamentary Elections in December, 2011) and their information proximity to audiences.

The internal contradictions of the nature of Russian television broadcasting resulted from its instrumental involvement into politics, on the one hand, and obvious profit-oriented motives of its operation stimulated by the development of Russian advertising industry, on the other. Because of its technical characteristics and penetration level, Russian television still retains its unique ability to maintain the unified information space of Russia. This has put TV into difficult and vulnerable position in the media system with a complexity of pressures on it from different Russian elites, but also made it extremely influential in political/public communication. Some scholars argued that since 1993 major federal channels mobilized voters more efficiently than any political party, and the Russian mediacritic Elena Rykovtseva even pro-

posed the term "airwaves (or broadcasting) party", thus proving the particular role of TV in the public communication in the Russian society.

The new digital technologies are actively being developed by non-terrestrial pay-television operators. Each region in the country has its own cable TV companies; the Association of Russia's cable television alone includes more than 100 regional companies. All in all, there was more than 55 million subscribers. The regions most highly developed in this respect are Moscow and St-Petersburg. At the same time, not more than 20% of Russia's population has access to digital cable supplying "Triple Play", Internet, television and telephone. The leading players in the national cable and IP-television system are *NKS/Nacional'nye Kabel'nye Seti*, *MTS*, and *Akado*. Direct satellite broadcasting (Direct TV) is carried out by two powerful companies, *NTV-Plus* and *Nacional'naya Sputnikovaya Kompaniya (Trikolor TV)*. *NTV-Plus* has broadcast via the *Bonum-1*'satellite since 1998, and the number of its subscribers is 550 thousand. In 2006, the company extended broadcasting into Siberia. It was the first company to try experimental high-definition broadcasting (HDTV). *Nacional'naya Sputnikovaya Kompaniya* emerged on the Russian market in December 2005. The *Trikolor TV* package is distributed in the European part of Russia via the *Eutelsat W4* satellite. By 2012, it had 12 million subscribers.

Rising Internet

The fastest growing segment of the media system in Russia is the Internet. The number of its users in 2011 experienced 5,4% growth and stood close to 70 million Russians. Russia is also a Europe's leader in broadband penetration growth, which in 2011 was close to 20% increase annually. Most Russian users search for the news, this trend indicating the triumph of the Internet over the traditional media. Russians also are active in social networks combining information search and personal

communication, they also read and actively write blogs, frequently visit video- and photohosting services. In terms of the size of the Internet audience, the absolute leaders are Moscow (6,5 million), St-Petersburg (2,7 million) and big cities (with population more than 1 million). On the other hand, still about 6% of the population has not even heard about the Internet, and about the half do not have an opportunity to use it regularly (Internet v Rossii. Sostoyanie, tendencii i perspektivy razvitiya, 2012).

Compared with its growth rate in other countries, initial development of Internet in Russia was slow. However, from 1993 to 1997 the number of Russian Internet users doubled each year. The statistics show that the number of Russian Internet users is now close to 70 million (about 50% of the population). The progress of the Internet initially occurred in big cities, especially Moscow, but in recent years it has also expanded to the regions. The residents of Moscow and St-Petersburg now represent less than 20% of Russian users. The share of female users is close to 40%. However, the majority of users are still educated and/or high-income urban men between 20−35 years old, including state officials, politicians, businessmen, journalists, and students (ibid).

The Russian media form the core of the Runet, the Russian language content sector of the Internet. There are websites for traditional newspapers as well as for TV and radio companies that offer an online version of their offline content. About 70% of Russian online media represent the Internet versions of paper publications (termed "clones" and "hybrids" by Russian scholars), and the rest are Internet-only papers ("originals"). The most popular original online sources are *kp.ru* (this Internet version of *Komsomolskaya Pravda* is among top-10 European sites in terms of unique visitors), *rian.ru*, *lenta.ru*, *rbc.ru*. Those which have no equivalent in the traditional media or news agencies and successfully compete with them, offer constantly updated news and reviews of other information sources. In contrast to many national newspapers, Internet news services have been promoting more diverse and balanced reporting trying to

represent extended (compared to traditional media) or alternative news agenda. However, in recent years it was the Internet media which represent a variety of politically engaged news sites. Yet, the Runet contains almost infinite content resources in Russian and the languages of other ethnic groups.

Distances and technical backwardness hamper the all-Russian use of the Internet. These problems arise mostly from the low level of the national telecommunications infrastructure and the crisis in the economy. Only a small number of Russian Internet users have access from home, due to low telephone penetration (no more than 180 lines per 1,000 inhabitants) and the poor quality of telephone lines (ISDN lines are extremely rare even in big cities, and fiberoptics are almost inaccessible). Low living standards also make rapid progress of the Internet unrealistic.

The development of the Internet in Russia can be divided into three main periods. The first one covers the years 1991−1993, when main users were academic institutions. In the second period, 1993−1996, the Internet spread mainly in Moscow and St-Petersburg among state officials, businessmen, and journalists in large media companies. And in the current period (since 1996), the most rapid growth has taken place in large academic centers (Novosibirsk, Samara, Ekaterinburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk) outside Moscow and St-Petersburg. Although the progress of the Internet in the regions is obvious, its unevenness still characterizes the present situation. Of all Russian Internet users, almost one-third are residents of the Central and Northern regions and one-third are in Siberia and the Far East, whereas the southern areas have a much lower share − 8,8% (Perfiliev, 2001).

Following the recent creation of seven federal super-regions, several big Internet hubs have been formed around regional administrative centres. And since May 2000, Russia has been divided into seven federal regions *(okrug),* headed by plenipotentiaries appointed by the president to control the execution of federal laws in the territory of the Russian Federation. In many regions of the Northern Caucasus, the only users

are regional universities (funded by the Soros Foundation). Information and technological wealth directly correlate with the level of economic development of the region and the de-monopolization of the regional telecommunications market. In the competitive telecommunications markets with three or more access providers (Novosibirsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Ekaterinburg and Samara), Internet use is much higher, due to the improving quality of communication and the decreasing costs of access.

Firstly, the Internet and the mobile telephones have expanded the access of Russian people to information, but the problem of "digital divide"/ "digital inequality" is still quite urgent due the large territory of Russia. In the 2000s, the inequality of the regions in terms of digital access has been going down, and the social, age and gender balance among Russian mobile and Internet users has been improving. Today, the proportion of women among Runet users is slightly more above 50%, though a typical user is an educated male city dweller having a high level of income, aged between 25 and 35, an official, a politician, a businessman, a journalist or a student. Another trend in the development of the Internet is the predominance of individual users over corporate ones. However, the ratio between the internet connections from homes and from offices is still 35:65.

Secondly, it is obvious that for modern Russians the Internet is an essential part of the media system. The increase in their purchasing power undoubtedly contributed to the development of the new media: pay digital TV (cable and satellite), the Internet and the mobile telephones as vehicles for distributing news, weather forecasts, and advertising. According to the FAMPK data, in recent years the proportion of Russians who have no contact with the media has gone down, and the proportion of the audience using the Internet as a mass medium has gone up. In 2007, the number of Russians who use only the audiovisual media (TV and radio) dropped: it was no more than 55%. At the same time, the proportion of the audience in contact with the other major older sectors (TV, radio and the print media) dropped too: in 2007 it was about 10%

of Russians, which was 10% lower than in 2006. Meanwhile, a growth in the media audience in general could be observed: from 2006 to 2007 it totalled 32%, so more than 35% of Russians use the print media, TV, radio and the Internet every day (Pechat` v Rossii. Sostoyanie, tendencii i perspektivy razvitiya, 2008).

Thirdly, the Internet is becoming increasingly popular as an advertising vehicle, which strengthens its position in the Russian media system. Over recent years, the Russian Internet advertising market has developed dynamically and progressively. According to the Association of Russian Communication Agencies, this segment of the advertising market displays the highest growth dynamic, twice as high as the traditional media. In spite of the relatively small total volume of advertising on the Internet, the growth rate was very high since mid 2000s. For the first time in the modern Russian media history, the volume of Internet advertising exceeded the volume of print media (see table 2 above).

Finally, the process of technological convergence is proving beneficial first and foremost to large concerns, which succeed by establishing multimedia newsrooms and by repeatedly using their own resources for content. The instances are relatively few but the tendency can be observed in the establishment of print media by *RBK* for recycling their online content and in the purchasing by the *Prof-media* concern, which specialises in the traditional media, of the leading enterprise of *Rambler*'s internet sector. Online media projects are gradually becoming full-fledged media market participants, and this dynamically growing sector of the information and communication industry attracts the attention of all players in varying degrees. The pioneering companies in this field were *RBK-Informacionnye Sistemy*, *Yandex* and *Rambler-Media*. In time, new departments specializing in the global computer net emerged within other media empires too. As the media and communication channels are closely interwoven today, large media companies tend to occupy other new market niches. The *Gazprom-Media (NTV-Plus), Akado,* and *Tricolor TV* companies are developing cable and satellite television in order to realize interactive and multimedia projects. In other words, the global

process of "new media" market expansion has become a reality for Russian media companies too.

The development of the modern media system and journalism is closely related to the development of the Russian mass media into an individual industry steadily increasing its attractiveness to both Russian advertisers and foreign investors. Today the most evident process encouraged by the introduction of the market philosophy and economy into the media system and journalists' professional activities is the transformation of their economic and typological foundations. In the modern Russian media industry, there exist some drastically new business models which were impossible under a state-controlled economy. The Soviet mass media and journalism played the role of an ideological, pedagogic and educational institution, but they did not care much about audience demands. In fact, this was not necessary, as all the money they received was allocated from the state budget. Audience demand, especially when monitored by analysis, is a vitally important mechanism for adjusting media activity to the market.

The fundamental change that triggered the transformation of the media system in post-Soviet Russia was the intensive growth of the advertising industry. As a result, the basic law of the media economy came into play, the law of constructing an audience for advertisers. In accordance with it, the media form their content with the aim of attracting precisely the audience whose custom is most advantageous to the advertisers, who are the main source of financing media enterprises (Picard, 1989). It has to be admitted that under the market conditions the performance of any social functions by the media often becomes a secondary concern, commercial interests being regarded as more important.

Disproportionate Globalization?

In response to transition, Russian mass media embarked on a course of globalization, thereby becoming a vivid example of transformations

occurring around the world. Initially, media researchers tended to view globalization as a unidirectional process within which context media products and media technologies were imported into less developed countries from mature economies, first and foremost from the USA and the former colonial powers, such as Great Britain, France and Germany. This attitude gave rise to the conception of media imperialism, which totally disregarded the role of national factors in the process of globalization. Further research, however, raised the issues of return information flows from less developed regions as well as the strategies for acquisition and assimilation of national mass media and the resistance they put up in response to globalization (Featherstone, 1995). Thus, researchers saw modern development through the prism of the national globalization conception suggesting that globalization involves close interaction with national media systems and that the process is uneven and influenced not only by current tendencies but also by the cultural traditions of the country itself. This is what modern Russia illustrates perfectly well (Vartanova, 2005).

Importing the theory. In constructing a new market-based media model, Russian mass media were guided by Western theories of free and responsible mass media, open society and self-sufficient media market, which guarantees, by definition, political and cultural pluralism. In fact, "Western media" did not turn out to be an integrated whole but a number of individual systems shaped in response to the particular social and economic conditions, national traditions and cultural peculiarities. The "Anglo-Saxon model," as the British researcher C. Sparks put it, "is an imaginary construction that combines the features of two different systems: American commercial press and British public broadcasting" (Sparks, Reading, 1998).

This dichotomy is indicative enough of the structural heterogeneity of "Western media", though in reality the media systems are much more diverse.

The media models of Northern Europe or Italy may prove to be more beneficial for Russia than those of the USA or Great Britain.

From the experience of the Nordic media systems, known for significant governmental influence on the media industry, it is clear that the party that makes an order is not always guided by selfish motives. When the Nordic countries' governments subsidize political parties' newspapers or oblige commercial television channels to support the public broadcaster through a system of payments, they actually strive to encourage media pluralism and diversity. The Italian media model characterized by a high degree of political involvement suggests that the experience of Russian mass media is not unique and that there are ways to establish a viable media system. Thus, international experience may have a constructive impact on Russian media. However, it is a matter of creative adaptation of global conceptions to the Russian media context.

Importing the media content. The issue of dependence of the media systems on transnational media content producers has been discussed by politicians, researchers and journalists since the mid-1950s. In those days such discussions were labeled as information imperialism, and for many authors they were associated with the uneven information flow from the USA and Western European countries into the rest of the world. A really apt metaphor, "a one-way street", was proposed by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis in their work (Nordenstreng, Varis, 1974). In Russia, however, one could observe *disproportionate globalization:* in early 1990s Latin American television serials poured in making the adherents of the Americanization theory stand back unable to resist new arguments. The explanation, however, was trivial enough: as Russian media economy was undeveloped in those days, only this type of content was available to relatively poor television channels. Through commercials created by foreign advertising agencies, soap operas and serials altogether new formats were introduced to Russian television programs.

In the late 1990s, the globalization format in Russia changed. While the direct import of television products continued, adaptation and borrowing strategies started to develop intensively. Like else-

where, globalization in Russia manifested itself in the inclusion of non-national elements into the national context. Dubbing films, producing their own commercials based on global schemes and adapting Western entertainment programs (*Pole Chudes*, *Kak Stat' Millionerom*, *Fabrika Zvyozd*) do not mean the development of the traditional Russian culture. As a matter of fact, the national contextualization of globalization, known as glocalization (Rantanen, 1999), is a proof of similarity of the processes ongoing in Russian and foreign media.

In the 2000s, the mainstream of import of content from the global market has been transformed into purchasing TV formats, that have been lately produced for the local market with Russian stars and production capacities, and the acquisition of licenses to publish global magazine brands. The way to glocalization of content has become the most widely spread.

The arrival of global media companies. Although the influx of global media capital to the Russian market is limited in scale, it is becoming increasingly evident. In Russia there are no "key players" of the global media market yet, but active involvement of foreign media businesses, which started in 2000, is indicative of the growing interest. In the Russian media economy, foreign companies are still in the background but their presence is already tangible.

The German concern *Burda* has successfully operated at the magazine market for many years. Some American companies have a share in Moscow FM radio stations and newspapers (*Vedomosti*). Scandinavian countries form a significant "cluster" in the Russian media market, namely in the market for business editions of St-Petersburg (*Bonnier*, a Swedish media concern in *Delovoi Peterburg*), for UHF television (the Swedish *Modern Times Group* in *DTV-Viasat*), for glossy magazines and English-language newspapers in the Russian capitals (the Finnish *Sanoma-WSOY* in the *Independent-media* publishing house) and for the political print press in the capitals (the Norwegian concern *Orkla* in *Profmedia*).

The forecast to be done with regard to these relatively few examples of foreign media businesses' participation is as follows: as the Russian economy is increasingly incorporated into the global market, mass media are likely to become a more attractive area, particularly in response to the fast growth of the advertising market in Russia.

Economic crisis of 2009—2010 has obviously affected economical activity of foreign media business in Russia, especially in the context of crisis at Russian advertising market. However, the drop in investments in quality media (for instance, the *Russkiy Newsweek* closed by Axel Springer) has not led to the overall decrease of investment in entertainment or specialized media. The position of *Burda*, *Sanoma*, *Axel Springer* at the Russian media market is still quite strong, while foreign newcomers at lifestyle segments are developing regardless of crisis.

Emergence of a new professional culture. An essential dimension of globalization that played an important part in the transformation of the Russian media system was penetration of Western journalistic professional standards into the everyday activities of Russian mass media. When Russian readers open *Kommersant* or *Vedomosti*, their eyes are struck by the leads and the "inverted pyramid"-structured materials. The layout, the illustrations and the headlines make the leading Russian newspapers look more like British and American editions than the daily newspapers of the Soviet times.

An important tendency in the development of the new professional culture manifested itself in a shift toward the information standards of British and American journalism, the classical principle of dividing the texts into "news" and "opinions". The aspiration to be objective, unbiased significantly affects Russian journalists' language and style and drives genre transformation. As a consequence, in print and electronic mass media the number of opinion-based materials gradually decreases.

Adaptation of media brands. Robert Robertson, one of the founders of the cultural globalization theory, always draws our attention to the fact that globalization is closely related to localization. From his viewpoint,

along with the strategic role of the global, in particular societies and cultures it is the local that becomes the focus of attention. This is clearly manifested in economic relations. Those companies which produce and market their products on a global scale invariably place an emphasis on the local. Firstly, they adapt their product to local conditions; secondly, they tend to use the local culture to promote the product, which contributes to better sales. What the *Coca-cola* or *Sony* concerns refer to as *global localization* is in fact incorporation into the local culture (Robertson, 1992).

The experience of the Russian magazine market, first and foremost in the sector of glossy magazines for women and men, interior magazines and weekly news editions, aptly illustrates global localization. Notably, it is the magazine market that proved to adapt the global most successfully. Making use of its resources as a powerful magazine concern, the German publishing house *Burda* created a series of magazines adapted to the Russian market, a fact that became the first sign of global localization. Localization in the magazine market has taken various forms. Many foreign editions started in the mid-1990s with simply copying content by translating texts into Russian. In time, however, they came to attract Russian advertising, inclusion of Russian materials made the content more animated, and some editions even "localized" their titles (for example, *Good Housekeeping* turned into *Domashniy Ochag* and *Maison Francaise* into *Mezonin*).

Creative localization proved to be a factor which made global magazine brands successful. The magazines *Cosmopolitan* and *Russkiy Newsweek* are indeed indicative of this.

The former, by reducing the traditional format and subsequently the price in 2004, gained in sales and popularity, which gave a lead to other local *Cosmo* editions.

Another prime example of creative localization in the Russian media market is musical radio formats. Along with the emergence of Russian pop music, chanson and Russian rock stations, adaptation of the globally used radio formats also began in Russia. Because of the specific structure

of Russian society, with its variability of educational and living standards and tangible geodemographic differences, some "pure" musical formats required softening and diffusion. For this reason, many Moscow FM-stations have chosen to move away from mechanical adaptation of the foreign market findings toward a more elaborate adjustment of world experience to specifically Russian conditions.

Conclusion

For most media researchers, it is clear that the modern mass media, their economic foundations, their structures and institutions, have all been shaped by market influence. In many studies, it is emphasized that the mission of the media and journalism in democratic countries to provide unbiased information and a broad and fair reflection of existing views and ideas goes hand in hand with the commercial need to make profit. (McQuail, 2005; Croteau, Hoynes, 2001). This situation results in inevitable internal contradictions in the media systems of market economies. In other studies, these contradictions are labeled as contradictions between the commercial media and social interests, between culture and commerce, or between a prosperous business and a weak democracy (Croteau, Hoynes, 2001; Media Between Culture and Commerce, 2007; McChesney, 1999). Whatever the definition, in each case the idea is that there are inseparable ties between the market as an economic structure of society, and the media system existing within its context. Many researchers stress that because of these close ties the market influences the character of the media, in effect imposing its own values and thus leading to commercialization, which, in turn, results in such characteristics as sensationalism, the tabloid style, emphasis on entertainment (Sparks, 1992; Esser, 1999). Certainly under market influence media systems tend to be more and more homogeneous (Hallin, Mancini, 2004).

In spite of all its peculiarities, the development of the media system in post-Soviet Russia has changed profoundly over recent decades market

influence. The consequences have been similar to those in foreign media: a restructuring of the media system, quantitative growth, increased diversity in media channels and media content, regionalization of the media markets, and the introduction of ICT into the media infrastructure and into the media system itself. Not in summary but in clarification: the deeper the market penetrates into the economic activity of the media and into the practices of professional journalists, the further the Russian media model becomes transformed.

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HYBRIDIZATION OF THE MEDIA SYSTEM IN RUSSIA: TECHNOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

ГИБРИДИЗАЦИЯ МЕДИАСИСТЕМЫ В РОССИИ: ТЕХНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ И ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ АСПЕКТЫ

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Communication patterns of our society have undergone crucial changes due to the development of the digital public sphere and the emergence of "hybrid media systems" (Chadwick, 2011). The formation of such media systems influences the established media-politics relationship, which is especially relevant to democracies in transition such as Russia. This paper examines the transformation of the mass

media system in Russia with its implications to the online public sphere and the democratic state of the Russian web. Special attention is given to the role of the Russian new media in fostering civic engagement along with the political mobilization after the parliamentary elections of 2011. The authors argue the two-side understanding of hybridization of media systems: the one based on technological media convergence and that of political nature, including the configuration of online vs. offline media parallelism, substantial agenda flows, and the level of solidity of the national public sphere. Concluding from the analysis of the evolution of the Russian media system in 2000s, the authors outline the perspectives of the Russian hybrid media system and its democratic potential.

Key words: *Russian media; hybrid media system; new media; political mobilization; democracy; participation divide; political hybridization.*

Массовая коммуникация в информационном обществе претерпела серьезные изменения в связи с развитием цифровой публичной сферы и появлением «гибридных медиасистем» (Chadwick, 2011). Формирование такой системы средств массовой информации в стране влияет на установленные медиа-политические отношения, что особенно актуально для демократий переходного периода, таких как Россия. В статье анализируются трансформация системы СМИ в России и последствия этой трансформации для публичной сферы и демократического потенциала Рунета. Особое внимание уделяется роли новых медиа в развитии гражданского общества, а также в политической мобилизации после парламентских выборов 2011 г. Авторы предлагают двустороннее понимание гибридизации медиасистемы: с одной стороны, гибридизация основана на технологической конвергенции средств массовой информации; с другой стороны, она имеет политический характер, который отражается в том числе в структурном параллелизме между онлайн- и оффлайн-СМИ, в переходах повестки дня из Интернета в оффлайн-медиа и в

качественных характеристиках национальной публичной сферы. По итогам анализа траектории развития СМИ России в 2000-х гг. авторы намечают перспективы развития русской гибридной медиасистемы и оценивают ее демократический потенциал.

Ключевые слова: *российские СМИ; гибридная медиасистема; новые медиа; политическая мобилизация; демократия; цифровой разрыв; политическая гибридизация.*

In 1990s and early 2000s, development of the Internet drew in expectations of new milieus of public discussion that would lead to democratization via bigger citizen involvement and horizontalization of communication, especially in transitive democracies (Rohozinski, 1999; Kuchins, 2007). By far, there was limited evidence of the political role of online mediated milieus beyond their purely organizational role (for positive findings of causal relations between communication online and political mobilization, see Shah et al., 2005), and there were even doubts in their organizational potential (Gladwell, 2010; Raupp, 2011). During the Arab spring, as Sarah Oates of the University of Maryland argued on the New Media conference in St-Petersburg in 2011, it wasn't the Internet itself but the shutting down of the Internet access that made young users of social networks come out on the streets to physically reproduce online communication networks. But we argue that, in case of Russia, the new hybrid structure of the media system has produced the impact of a different nature.

Under "hybrid media system" we, following Chadwick (2011), understand the media system, which "is built upon interactions among old and new media and their associated technologies, genres, norms, behaviors, and organizations". In political terms, Chadwick appears to be suggesting a political understanding of hybridization of media systems, which needs to be distinguished from media convergence, or tech-based hybridization, the latter meaning growth of online media segment and

structural transformations of the media sphere in terms of author-audience relations, competition and/or use of user-generated content, or individualization of media consumption. Based on Chadwick's reflection, we argue that, in political terms, a national media system may be called politically hybrid when extensive tech-based hybridization (in the forms of convergent media practices) is supplemented by a nationally- (or supranationally-) bound political hybridization – that is, by a specific configuration of horizontal flows of information and agendas across online and offline media segments, with specific thresholds for agenda spillovers and uniquely shaped (re)distribution of political influence between the "old" and "new" segments of media market.

In theory, it is the high level of *structural parallelism* in between online and offline media that ensures flows of agenda topics between online and offline audiences; put simply, media outlets available both online and offline ensure similarity of agendas, thus reproducing existing social cleavages and political polarization. But in reality there can be high boundaries for agenda spill-overs both between online (like social networks) and offline (like national TV) media, or even within a media company due to adaptation of content to channel (Bennett, 2003), as well as boundaries that cut across online/offline diversification either reproducing existing polarization or creating new borderlines within audience communities. So the outline of politically hybrid media systems may be more complicated than just the one based upon online/offline opposition bringing in the need for deeper reflection upon democratic quality of a given media system, as its hybridization is shaped by general paths of media system development (Hallin, Mancini, 2004; 2012), socio-political context (Adam, Pfetsch, 2011), media-political interaction (Puyu, Bodrunova, 2013), the level of technologic media convergence, and realities of the renewed media market (Litvinenko, 2011).

By 2010, one could tell that the hybridized media system had fully formed in Russia, the last three to four years being marked by growth of the Internet penetration already producing qualitative shifts in news consumption; but the patterns of hybridization didn't repeat those of

West European countries and provoked somewhat mixed feelings among scholars about the democratic efficacy of online media. As Oates suggests, "the Russian case provides evidence for the notion that national media norms tend to overwhelm international models about the democratizing potential of the Internet" (Oates, 2008).

At the beginning of the 2000s the Internet growth in Russia was rather slow-paced due to the infrastructural and socio-economic factors, but since 2007 the digital communication has been spreading explosively, having an increase of 23,5% from 2007 to 2011: as of September 2011, more than 50,8 million of Russians used the Internet regularly, which is the highest figure in Europe in terms of country population being online ("Russia Internet Usage and Marketing Report" from Internet World Statistics in 2012).

We will start our analysis from the description of the current state of the hybrid media system in Russia and its historical development in correlation with the political context as far as the formation of the hybrid media system is tightly related with the state regulation of the media.

Some political scientists (Bogaards, 2009; Toepfl, 2011) also name the Russian political regime "hybrid" or "semi-democratic", pointing out that the government in Russia has strong control over politics, the economy and lesser — over the "critical aspects of media and society" (Etling et al., 2010). As the authors of the study of public sphere in the Russian blogosphere mention, different types of control over the media system co-exist in Russia: the main federal TV channels are either state-owned or under state control via affiliated holders or state-controlled enterprises. However there exist independent outlets in the print, radio and online sector. They also describe the current media ownership model as a "hybrid" one, where "the Kremlin actively controls the far reaching national television news, while allowing television entertainment to flourish, and permitting marginalized independent media" (ibid).

The German scholar Florian Toepfl distinguishes four spheres of the modern Russian hybrid media system according to the relationship of the media outlets with the government. It is significant that his division

of the spheres has a strong correlation with technical platforms of media (TV, print, Internet): official mass media (mainly federal TV), mainstream mass media (mainly tabloid press), liberal-oppositional mass media, and social media (Toepfl, 2011). In Toepfl's interpretation, federal TV channels such as *Perviy Kanal*, *Rossiya* and *NTV* belong to the first sphere. They are mainly tuned to provide the point of view of the ruling elites. The second sphere consists of the media owned by individuals or big corporations, "whose profits are heavily dependent on the benevolence of the power center" and who therefore can't afford to be too critical towards the government. The third sphere of liberal-oppositional media includes ardent opponents of the regime who represent liberal-democratic values but have very limited circulation (ibid). Under the "sphere of social media" Toepfl understands widely the Internet-based publications that are built upon user-generated content. This last category is not under strong state control as the Russian government has not yet technically filtered the Web (Etling et al., 2010).

From the beginning the hybrid media system was characterized by low level of structural parallelism between traditional and online media. For instance, the index of quotations of the Russian internet resources ("IAS Medialogia") shows that among the 10 most quoted Internet resources there are only two media outlets that also have an offline version (in May 2011 that were the portal of the TV news program *Vesti* and the site of the business newspaper *Vedomosti*). The others are usually Internet start-ups of the early 2000s, which do not have an offline version, such as *gazeta.ru*, *lenta.ru*, etc. The phenomenon of low parallelism in the hybrid media system makes Russia differ from the hybridization model we can observe in the Western democracies and can be regarded as typical for transitional democracies where traditional media don't enjoy high credibility, or also for democracies where there exist a wide range of actors that don't have access to traditional media (Litvinenko, 2011).

Role and significance of each of the four components of the Russian media system described above have been transforming over time, according to the socio-economic development of the country and with

the growth of Internet penetration. The mayor shift in relations between these components is connected with the decrease of the TV-consumption: Strukov (2012) claims that Russia has already reached the "post-broadcast phase". Sara Oates's research shows the decline of interest towards TV as a source of information, especially among the younger audience (Oates, 2012). Some sociologists warn that the fading role of the federal TV, which for many years has been the only medium that connected the whole country together, threatens to destroy the fragile common public sphere that country used to have (Gabowitsch, 2012). On the other hand, the fourth sphere (that of the social media) gains more and more importance: the first two places in the media preferences of the Russians aged from 12 to 34 are taken by the Russian search engine *yandex.ru* and by *Facebook* and *Vkontakte* social networks, followed by the federal TV channel *Perviy Kanal* (Oates, 2008). In 2010, the Internet analytics company ComScore ranked Russia as the country with the 'most engaged social networking audience worldwide', according to the time Russians spend in social networking sites (in 2010 it was 9,8 hours per visitor a month) (Russia Has Most Engaged Social Networking Audience Worldwide, 2010).

Social media has shown an extreme growth during the last three years, the leaders being local: *Vkontakte* with over 110 million Russian-language accounts, *Odnoklassniki*, and, recently, *Facebook*, with over 9 million by September 2012 (Socialbakers, 2012b), this "*Facebook* millions" being "generally of the wealthier, travelling, cosmopolitan variety, having foreign friends and tending to live in Moscow and St-Petersburg" (Joffe, 2010). Generally speaking, the Internet in Russia is influenced by the distortions of the offline media system and can be better understood via the notion of national media models rather than via the normative Western ideas of the universal democratic impact of the web (Schmidt, Teubener, 2006; Oates, 2008; Alexanyan, Alto, 2009; Gorny, 2009).

According to the categorization made by G. Bovt by 2002, the Russian new media went through three phases of development (Bovt, 2002): before 1999 when first experiments were initiated by several big players,

to 1999-2000 when most Russian online-only media, existing till today like *gazeta.ru, smi.ru, utro.ru, lenta.ru*, etc., appeared in between State Duma and presidential election campaigns, and to the booming Internet media investment by new players who had no clear political preferences or goals for their Internet projects in the times of Putin's first presidential term, and were business-oriented, trying to deploy strategies of multi-channel delivery and precise targeting, especially on business news market. By 2006, the aggregate revenue, generated by online media segment, reached European levels of circa 2% and was growing rapidly; this fourth period ended with 2008 "heirs' elections", Russian−Georgian armed conflict and the outburst of economic recession. Based on our study conducted in 2012, that consisted of the online-survey on the media use patterns of the participants of the rallies in 2011-2012 (424 full responses) and 11 in-depth interviews, we can point out one more important phase in the Russian new media history, that started with the Medvedev's presidency in 2008 and is distinguished by growing civic activity both online and offline that, after a wave of disappointment triggered by Putin and Medvedev's "castling" in September 2011, culminated in protests after the parliamentary elections in December 2011.

This current phase of new media development, along with the high penetration of the Internet in Russia, is characterized by even tighter state control of TV channels and high polarization of the digital public sphere, with the formation of the new cluster of alternative online media outlets targeting the group of urban liberal intellectuals, such as *slon.ru*, *openspace.ru*, *snob.ru*, etc. In this phase we can also observe rapid evolution of the grassroots activism in Russia, slowly starting since 2008, with its rapid growth in 2010 (for example, car owners lobbied the change of law on VIP cars, people self-organized in fighting forest fires, struggled against the Gazprom tower in St-Petersburg and against of building the highway through the Khimky forest, etc.) and the culmination in winter 2011-2012.

Although it seems almost impossible to prove the causality between the changing patterns of the media use and the civic activism within the

framework of the media effects theory (as far as there exists a complex interdependency between different social, economic and political factors), some scholars show correlations between the use of social networks and political mobilization in Russia. Thus, Panchenko shows that it was mostly the Russian *Facebook* that apparently mobilized the biggest number of rally participants (Panchenko, 2012).

The protest movement in Russian urban areas (predominantly in Moscow and St-Petersburg), on the one hand, proved wrong the arguments that were popular among scholars in 2008-2009 about the lack of democratization potential in the Russian Web (Fossato, Lloyd, Verkhovsky, 2008), but, on the other hand, it also showed the gravity of the digital and participation divide (Marr, Zillien, 2010) in the country. For example, the total amount of Russian *Facebook* users, that played a major role in communication upon the protest issues, is only about 9 million users (liberal journalists from Moscow are used to talking about "the *Facebook* million" while describing their core audience), which is a rather small figure in comparison with the Russian population of 142 million.

The "participation divide" is obviously interdependent with the structure of the hybrid media system we described above. Its components are often isolated from each other, so that, for instance, the liberal public counter-sphere on the Internet is rather "closed up" within its own information world. The spill-overs between the elements of the system are not granted and they become less possible in cases of social crises as it was in December 2011. Thus, Russian federal TV channels, with the exception of *Ren-TV* (which, though, doesn't have access to all the Russian households), did not cover the protests that started on December 5, until the rally on Bolotnaya Square on December 10, which was then interpreted as a threat of an "Orange revolution" in Russia. As a result, most of the Russian population didn't really know what was going on in Moscow, St-Petersburg and other big cities (Litvinenko, 2012).

We may conclude that the type of the hybrid media system that has been shaped in Russia in the recent 12 years, which is characterized by a low level of parallelism between online and offline media and the com-

plexity of spill-overs between its components, apparently has the potential of deepening the fragmentation of society and weakening of the ties between different social milieus. More empirical studies therefore are needed to examine the specific features of functioning of such types of media systems in democracies in transition.

We could suggest the indicators that may, given that there's further research on them, predict the "spill-over effect", which may be defined as "online protest communication turning into offline street protest". Beside political and mediacratic trends, one needs to look at:

- the speed of decline in mainstream TV consumption;
- levels of the Internet penetration both on the whole, horizontally (in regional dimensions) and vertically (for the age-conditioned digital divide), well before any other signs of street protest activity;
- reshape of media diets in terms of online/offline consumption, in the aspect of political relevance of news sources and relevance of sources of political information;
- configuration of structural online/offline parallelism in the media system;
- appearance of alternative-agenda media whose agenda reminds of 'alternative' or single-issue parties;
- topical flows and the amount of shared agenda between mainstream and alternative-agenda media.

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BUSINESS COMMUNICATION: INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

БИЗНЕС-КОММУНИКАЦИИ: ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ПОДХОД

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The article deals with the issue relating to the analysis of the influence of profound institutional, cultural and communication matrices on the Russian business communication functioning. It also reveals the connection between institutional matrices defining the life of a society as whole, communication matrices regulating social communication and matrices setting frameworks of professional activity in business communication.

Key words: *institutional matrices; cultural matrices; communication matrices; business communication.*

В статье рассматриваются вопросы, связанные с анализом влияния глубинных институциональных, культурных и коммуникационных матриц на функционирование российских бизнес-коммуникаций. Выявлена связь между институциональными матрицами, определяющими жизнь общества в целом, коммуникационными матрицами, регулирующими социальную коммуникацию, и матрицами, задающими рамки профессиональной деятельности в сфере бизнес-коммуникаций.

The works of the Russian researchers including I. A. Arenkov, J. A. Bichun, V. A. Grigoryeva, M. A. Gorenburgov, S. A. Yeremina, E. K. Zavyalova, S. D. Gurieva, S. A. Guryanov, A. B. Zverintsev, A. N. Krilov, I. V. Loktionova, I. V. Lopatinskaya, O. V. Nikitenko, T. M. Orlova, V. E. Reva, A. A. Romanov, V. A. Spivaka, V. V. Tomilov, N. A. Tchizhov as well the works of some foreign specialists such as R. Brandel, W. D. Haywood, J. M. Lahiff, J. M. Penrose, M. Rafael show that communication is a necessary and very important condition of the human cooperative economic activity. Communication is present at all stages of the replenishment cycle: production, distribution, exchange of goods and their consumption. It goes without saying that nowadays business communication is turning into the strategic resource of modern business development that provides business efficiency and qualitative growth in the constantly changing environment. Moreover, it is stated that the establishment of an effective system of communication in all sectors of the economy is becoming one of the most important factors in the development of market relations.

At present theoretical and methodological aspects of business communication are mainly being studied in the special part of management (communication management).

However, it is obvious that unilateral consideration of business communication from the point of view of economic, psychological or philological science largely impoverishes the understanding of this vital resource of the efficient economy and does not allow us to reveal all the opportunities for its practical application.

A significant breakthrough in the research of business communication is possible only if we manage to go beyond the traditional paradigms and try to consider business communication from the standpoint of the institutional approach. According to this approach, business communication is a social institution that influences people and coordinates their

activities by way of specific tough matrices, which have taken shape for centuries and as such are extremely difficult to transform.

Like any other social institution business communication results from the social needs for an objective process of specialization of labor, and more generally, it appears in differentiation between human sensorial-objective activities and social relations. Needs and conditions of their satisfaction form corresponding interests and goals that act as direct determinants of social institutions foundation and development genesis. Therefore, social institutions have a special feature i.e. they stem from the cooperative purposeful activity of a group of people and their goal accomplishment. Institutionalization of the activity requires a certain standardization of these goals, shaping them into specific forms and creating conditions for their reproduction.

This means that business communication in general is not just a set of organizations and groups that make voluntary commitments and stick to them. Business communication is a strict system of rules, norms and social expectations, in accordance with which these duties are to be performed. These rules, norms, expectations are objictified in the form of a certain status of people who ensure the operation of business communication system, as well as in the form of roles whose performance is assigned to (and sometimes imposed on) the people associated with the institution[1].

In this sense, business communication just like any other social institution acts as an element of a social entity of whose behavior other elements have specific expectations, i.e. the performance of specific functions. But just as behavior of an individual can be deviant (diverging) in the positive or negative sense, so operation of a social institution can either coincide with a social order and expectations of other social institutions or can be different. Evasion of performing the expected functions

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[1] The concept of "role" (usually with the attribute "social") is traditionally attached to an individual and is used to denote a set of rules determining the behavior of individuals who act in the existing social system based on their status or position, and the behavior itself that implements these rules. However, in my opinion, rich heuristic potential of this concept gives the opportunity to use it also in order to represent a specific aspect of social institutions functioning.

(or incoordinate deviations) causes various sanctions against the social institution (namely − against the individuals representing it).

However, it is time we moved forward in our understanding of the problem under analysis keeping in mind that business communication is a social institution.

Institutional and cultural matrices

Famous researchers Karl Polanyi (Polanyi, 2002) and Douglas North (North, 1997) suggested that the institutions system[2] of each specific society makes up a distinctive institutional matrix that defines a range of possible directions for its further development. Polanyi thought that institutional matrix directs economic relations between people and determines the place of the economy in the society. It sets the social sources of rights and liabilities, which authorize the movement of individuals and goods at the beginning of the economic process, inside it and at the end. As North sees it, institutional matrix of the society acts as a basic structure of ownership rights and the political system. North believed that economic and political institutions in the institutional matrix are interrelated, i.e. political rules form economic ones, and visa versa. Both Polanyi and North suppose that each society has a specific and unique institutional matrix.

Developing these ideas S. Kirdina formulated an idea that "an institutional matrix is a distinctive genotype of a society that takes shape during the formation of governments and retains its main features during their development" (Kirdina, 2012).

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[2] The most extensive accurate definition is given by J. March and J. Olsen: "An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances" (March, Olsen, 2006). − Non-institutional relations are all the relations and social life phenomena that are not described by this definition.

According to S. Kirdina, people know two basic matrices that predetermine their way of life and social activity to a large extent: X-matrix and Y-matrix. Each of these two matrices rests upon its specific economic, political and ideological institutions. The conception of Kirdina is shown in table 1:

Table 1

Institutional matrices

X - matrix	Y - matrix
Economic institutions	
Supreme relative ownership	Private ownership
Redistribution (accumulation – concordance – distribution)	Exchange (buying - selling)
Cooperation	Competition
Service labour	Wage labor
Cost reduction (X-efficiency)	Profit increase (Y-efficiency)
Political institutions	
Administrative division	Federative structure
Vertical hierarchical authority with Center on top	Self-government and subsidiarity
Appointment	Election
General assembly and unanimity	Multi-party system and democratic majority
Appeals to higher levels of hierarchical authority	Law suits
Ideological institutions	
Collectivism	Individualism
Egalitarianism	Stratification
Order	Freedom

Ideal types of X- and Y-matrices make it possible to distinguish between phenomenological objects possessing or not possessing corresponding qualities. In other words, it becomes possible to judge institutions of what types of matrices prevail in a specific society.

For example, X-matrix prevails in Russia, most Asian and Latin American countries. Y-matrix is dominant in the USA and Europe, the institutions of another matrix being complementary. Complementary institutions are those that function simultaneously with basic institutions to perform similar functions, i.e. X-matrix institutions function in Y-matrix dominant societies and vice versa. Complementary institutions are less spread as their activities depend on basic institutions that reflect the institutional matrix nature.

It is reasonable to suggest that economic and political institutions are not only interrelated within an institutional matrix, as the authors of this theory believed, but also closely linked to the culture of the society. The study of the phenomenon of culture, opportunities and restrictions which carry cultural constants is sporadic in Russian business practices. But the world experience shows the need for such research.

There are many definitions and interpretations of the term "culture" and it is not necessary to enumerate them all[3]. E. Schein analyzed a great number of definitions of this term in his book "Organizational Culture and Leadership". In my opinion, it was he who gave the most general interpretation which quite accurately captures the essence of this social institution. Schein defines culture of a group as "a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way you perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems" (Shein, 2002).

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[3] I would like to remind that the term "culture" is presumably derived from the Latin word "culture" which originally meant the cultivation of land or tending. The original concept of culture existed in ancient civilizations of China (the notion of "ren") and India (the notion of "dharma") and meant a direct human impact on nature. It also denoted human upbringing and education.

From the point of view of the institutional approach, culture is understood as a set of social communities and systems amenable to structuring on different layers. Scheuss' multistage model illustrates this concept (figure 1) and distinguishes the following cultural layers (Scheuss, 1985):

- national culture (within the same country);
- branch culture (in the same industry);
- organizational culture (within an enterprise).

Scheuss' multi-stage model

On this basis, culture can be understood as an inner core of a technology, a complex of standards, criteria and procedures that determine directions and algorithms of a socially approved behavior and effective functioning. In other words, culture is a combination of knowledge, values, norms which provide human adaptation to the environment or transformation of this environment according to their needs, goals and ideas. The existing cultures reflect the reality ethnic and social groups used to live in and effectively adapt to.

It is clear that culture is always associated with a specific social or geographical area, i.e. with specific cultural imperatives operating within these limits. Put it differently, it refers to a certain real or virtual territory

where the population recognizes the authority of a particular cultural system. It has always been so and it seemed it will always be.

Obviously, as the environment changes within the culture there appear new knowledge, values and norms more effective in the new environment than those which an individual used to be based upon. A gradual change of the external environment means smooth cultural alterations, though cultural conflict exists as long as culture itself. However, at a time when the external environment is changing rapidly and yesterday's culture, understood as the basis for internal technology becomes ineffective, there appears what experts call the "culture shock": the inability to give up the old culture, regarded as a value despite a sufficiently clear understanding of its inadequacy. That causes detestation towards the new culture that cannot be mastered through the old one.

If we take into consideration the fact that every social group or nation has their own "culture custodians", i.e. individuals or institutions preserving traditions and culture, protecting them against intrusion, we may presume that the conflict between the new culture and the old one is serious. Social and cultural institutions invest heavily in preserving culture, transforming it into a museum, and keeping traditional behavior features intact at least in everyday life (traditional dances, folk songs, etc.)

It goes without saying that Russia and the rest of the world have changed greatly over the last years. There are thousands of books about it. The main conclusion is that more and more people get an opportunity of keeping their personal identity as our life is getting rid of all former local restrictions and the world is becoming more open for us. A person can self-actualize in a wider range of areas. Among the features of the new reality already described in different sources there are some more that are worth mentioning:

1. It is no longer necessary for the modern human to be closely connected to other people in order to survive, exist and move forward. That means the disappearance of the solidarity problem;

2. Direct dependence between the relative level of well-being and the effort made to achieve this prosperity ceases. In other words,

a robust social policy blurs out the difference between those who work hard and those who do their work anyhow;

3. A feeling that natural resources are deteriorating strains the sub-conscious of a modern man, forcing him to treat all others as potential enemies.

All these circumstances have altered modern reality metric, al-most wiping out the previous culture that was formed in totally different conditions. The sense of ineffectiveness of the previous culture makes modern man search for new life principles.

The loss of old values is stressful as such, and it is enough to increase aggressiveness and intolerance. Besides, while searching new life principles, one may come to the conclusion that culture based on aggressiveness and intolerance is much more effective than solidarity culture.

Another problem is that people are embedded in more and more all-embracing and high-speed communication network, having less and less opportunity to personally influence the amount of the information circulating in it or the performance rate, not to mention the desire to control them. On the contrary, our life is more and more determined by global communication, people are making less impact on informational situation.

It is clear, that under these conditions not only an individual but also culture as a whole – as a social institution – start looking for methods of self-renewal or adaptation to changeable circumstances.

The Russian culture in its present state, for example, is representing a mixture of three different cultures.

One of them proclaims the principle of harmony, integrity and inter-relatedness of all living things in this world as the basic attitude of man towards the outside world; the principle of recognition of sovereignty of every smallest particle in the universe and respect to the rights of this particle, the principle of natural growth and increment, the rejection of revolutions and violent transformations. This is a **cosmocentric culture.**

Different peoples at all stages of historic development are found to have cosmocentric culture. In particular, the work of K. Myalo "Bro-

ken Thread" (Myalo, 1998) argues that the Russian village was an independent civilization that relied on the idea of perfect balance in the universe, which had been forming itself naturally for thousands of years. It is the cosmocentric culture that puts into practice the life orientation called by E. Fromm (Fromm, 2000) the orientation towards "being". In western cultures this orientation was reflected in the works of medieval European thinkers. The authors of the new time are V. Vernadsky (Vernadsky, 1981), A. Schweitzer (Schweitzer, 1993), Yu. Lotman (Lotman, 1992).

The second distinct type of the culture of relations in Russia is called **sociocentric culture**. The peculiarity of this relationship system is determined by the idea that the center of the universe is a kind of human community, where this individual includes himself. A fundamental feature of sociocentric culture is the dissolution of the individual in a kind of "we" or a community serving as the supreme authority and a higher power in relation to this individual. It should be emphasized that this is a voluntary and often subconscious adoption by the individual of clichés, schemes and patterns of thinking and behavior accepted in the community, which are considered as the only possible.

This culture allows a person to realize himself and others only as members of a tribe, social or religious community, not as independent human beings. On the one hand, it prevents an individual from becoming free and creative, or governing his own life; on the other hand, it provides a membership in an integral system and a certain undeniable place in it. Belonging to the "we" relieves the individual from the responsibility to find their own solutions, from agonizing doubts, from a painful burden of freedom. At the same time involvement in the "we" gives people a sense of pride and superiority.

Another important feature of sociocentric culture is a constant presence in the mind of an individual of a clear and distinct idea about some others, which can be called "they" and who are enemies. As a matter of fact, the sense of "we" arises as a contraposition of "they". This is the main difference between sociocentric and cosmocentric cultures. While

keeping a person dissolved in the community, this culture isolates one community from others and the natural world. The more powerful, scaring, threatening the monster "they" is, the stronger is the need to dissolve in the concept "we".

The division of people into in-s and out-s is always accompanied by the idea of violence. This idea appears in different forms. The most primitive variant is the striving to exterminate the out-s, the different, not the in-s. This cruel but naïve view on violence is opposed to another one, which is not less cruel but is less naïve, it is based on the understanding of the inanity of straightforward elimination of "the different". It hinges on the idea not to demolish the enemy, but to make him indistinguishable from the in-s, i.e. to prevail not physically, but morally. This reminds us of O'Brien from G. Orwell's "Nineteen Eighty-four": a sophisticated intellectual craving for power over the close (Orwell, 1992).

The division into "we" and "they" may be based on different principles. Religious, class and national criteria were the most "popular" in the XX century.

Marginal, lumpen people and those, who had passed through jails and prison camps, also influenced the relationship culture very much. The result of all this is a phenomenon called "Soviet People" described by A. D. Sakharov as: "The ideology of a Soviet Philistine (I mean the worst but, unfortunately, rather typical representatives of workpeople, peasants and intellectuals) comprises several plain ideas:

1. The Cult of the State, combining in different proportions worship of power, naïve confidence that people in the West live worse than we do, gratitude to "benefactor"-state and hypocrisy and fear at the same time;

2. Selfish desire to secure the wellbeing for themselves and their families by "living like others do": by means of string-pulling, theft condoned by bosses and ever-present hypocrisy;

3. The Idea of National Superiority. As a result some Russians (and not only Russians) express it in historical riots and bashings. How often we hear: we spend money on these black (yellow) monkeys, feed the

spongers. Or: the Jews are to blame for all this (or Russians, Georgians, skibbies – inhabitants of Central Asia)" (Sakharov, 1990).

The third component of Russian culture which manifests itself in all our relationships can be called **egocentric culture.** Its most important features are striving for self-esteem, satisfaction from consumption and creation, power over others. It is connected with the notion that every person is the architect of his own happiness and happiness consists in possession. "You must always go ahead and try your happiness". This is the first commandment of people who adhere to egocentric culture. All other people involved in the same business as this individual are considered as competitors.

While being guided by his ego, striving to reach personal advantages, the bearer of this culture should remember that people around him think only of themselves as well. Thus, to attain his goals the individual has to consider and use interests of others. The process can take quite decent forms, according to D. Carnegie, the advocate of this form of relations (Carnegie, 2009). It can acquire manipulative character (the essence of relationships is the same: one good turn deserves another). Egocentric culture may result in the loss of individuality.

Meanwhile, it is the egocentric culture that inspires individualization, whose aim is widening the freedom of thought, emotions and action. At the same time it causes feelings of loneliness and anxiety, loss of identification with other people. The progressing separation from others may result in isolation. If there is no connection with "we", the freedom may turn into a burden, source of doubt. Then there arises an irresistible desire to get rid of such a freedom: to go underfoot or to find any other way to get in touch with people and the world to escape from indecision even at the cost of freedom. However, there is another way out. As E. Fromm (Fromm, 2011) believes, if a person is able to develop internal power and creative initiative, he can build up fundamentally new relationships and solidarity with all people. In a nutshell, egocentric culture has two ways of self development: predatory and humanistic.

Egocentric culture is sometimes referred to as Western culture which was imported (even implanted) into Russia. In fact, it is a natural consequence of human adaptation to certain conditions of existence, and it is as natural for Russia as for other countries.

It should be emphasized that the abovementioned culture types are the ideal models never found in their pure forms. They form three vectors of space where real cultures manifest themselves. These cultures represent peculiar "concretions", "clouds" with relatively solid "core" and thinned "circumference". It means that one type will prevail to a greater or lesser extent. In this sense one can speak about Euro-American, Asian, Russian and many other real and potential cultures. At the same time, in practice each of these "thickenings" inclines to one of the above mentioned ideal types.

Particularly, if we analyze the Western culture, which has always strongly influenced the minds and hearts of many educated Russians, it will be hard to avoid noticing a controversial synthesis of cosmocentric and egocentric cultures in it, with the latter being more powerful. The synthesis resulted in three main elements, on which Western culture is based. They are respect for property, human rights and legal institutions.

There are of course various subtypes and variations in the Western culture. Erich Fromm, for instance, singles out the so-called ethnic culture that proclaims the idea of superiority of one nation over others and one person (belonging to the given nation) over other people (Fromm, 2000).

According to pagan culture the main values are pride, power, fame, wealth and other things typical of supremacy. And the means to achieve these goals are conquest, pillage, destruction, victory.

Another type of Western culture is called technocracy. It rests on the idea that it is possible to achieve some grandiose technological utopia by turning nature and society into a machine, controlled from one centre. One has every reason to believe that technocratic culture with its cult of power, gross interference in natural processes, is one of the derivative forms of existence and the manifestation of some more fundamental complexes

connected with the general idea of the world. We have called these forms sociocentric and egocentric cultures. The idea is exemplified by the fact that technocratic civilization is dynamically developing both in the West, where egocentric culture prevails, and in the East (Japan, Korea, and already China, India), where sociocentric culture predominates.

At the crossroads

One has every reason to believe that culture, in the form it was described above, is beginning to collapse. Those values, norms and knowledge which have determined the life philosophy and life matrix of our ancestors and even parents, do not work any longer. They are replaced by the new moral tools which will be based on egocentric culture. The Russian pursuit of team spirit, social justice, and profit balance has been many times highlighted by the research both in our country and abroad. Nowadays this tendency is vanishing. In fact, it is a violent individualism which is an obvious reaction to the forcible collectivism that prevails in the country. This pendulum called "collectivism-individualism" has sharply swung in the direction of the individualism.

However, representatives of other cultures do not lose ground either. They do their best to counter the formation and development of the culture, centered around the idea of human individual sovereignty. Moreover, there is an absolutely incredible impulse to what can be described as collectivization of mind. And if in the Soviet times collectivization was compulsory, it is voluntary now, which poses a question whether the Soviet collectivization was as compulsory as it was presented. People tend to join the most exotic groups under the slogan "Let's create civil society in Russia"[4]. It has been already mentioned that this great and powerful

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[4] I want to make myself clear. I have nothing against civil society or a human right to join interest groups. I simply believe that the fact of existence of such groups have nothing to do with the civil society, whose main idea is the idea of an independent and responsible citizen.

"we" of a totalitarian empire has now been replaced by "we" – based on religion, nationalism, democracy and anticommunism. Each of these facets of "we", with their own truth and intolerance, continues to manipulate the absolute categories and universal ideologies as before. Only the sacred key words have changed. Now they are "morals", "traditions" and "human rights".

Another important conclusion is that culture is becoming divided into three layers. The lower layer is represented by the traditional provincial culture, i.e. by the culture of a city, where an individual lives. It can also be the culture of a social group or any other subculture. The middle layer is represented by the so-called countrywide culture that embraces a mixture of values and notions and is to be surely recognized by a citizen of the given country. A specific character of this type of culture and its difference from the so-called national culture can be easily observed in Russia, which is a home for many tribes and ethnic groups. The third layer, which is coming into existence and becoming more and more powerful, is the so-called global culture. It is the culture of regulation and information, the culture of "Snickers" and "Tampax", fast food, unisex clothes, powerful cars, etc. that can either terrify some people or arouse enthusiasm of other people.

Under these conditions one should adapt not to one but to three cultures at the same time.

As far as business communication is concerned, globalization of business processes leads to formation of a certain cross-national business culture, and its rules and principles are shared by almost all businesspeople worldwide. On the other hand, national and cultural cross-national differentiation is growing, i.e. ethnic groups and nations try to maintain their cultural values, protect them from being vanished by erosive popular cultures (Pezoldt, Fedosova, 2006).

All these characteristics of the modern world economy put on the agenda a question of the influence of national cultures of different countries on the international business. This influence can be external, i.e. cooperation with clients, suppliers etc., and internal, meaning coordi-

nation with workers of multinational companies. According to Geert Hofstede, the Dutch scientist, "national culture determines society's mentality", while "organizational culture determines workers' ideas" (Hofstede, 2000).

Communication matrices

Modern science has proved that any communication act is mediated by some compulsory norms and rules, determining behavioral expectations. These norms and rules must be understood and accepted by at least two interlocutors. Each person taking part in communication tries intuitively to follow certain norms and rules which, as they assume, can help make communication efficient and successful. These "regulators" can be designated as principles, postulates, norms, rules, discourses, conventions, codes, formats.

Leaving aside the interpretation of these notions (Dzyaloshinsky, 2011), we can say that the most appropriate term for all possible "regulators" is "matrix". The word was used in the cult feature film by brothers Andy and Larry Wachowski to denote an interactive computer program. The program simulates reality for billions of people linked up to it against their will by the insurgent machines, which take energy from people to exist.

Of course, this term appeared long before the film "Matrix" and has its certain meaning. It comes from the Latin word "matrix" (uterus) and is used in metal-working to indicate instruments with a reach-through hole or hollow, used in stamping, pressing. The term is also used in printing art to describe a metal plate with extruded image of a letter or a symbol that serves as a form for letter casting.

The meaning "form" which, in other words, sets certain parameters for something enables us to use the term in a wider sense. In particular, in order to designate the systems of knowledge, values and norms which reflect specificity of communication between different communicators

in different situations and reconcile these systems with the general social situation it would be more appropriate to use the term "communication matrix", expressed by discourses, conventions and codes.

Relying on S. Kirdina's idea about two ideal X- and Y- matrices we can arrange all different communication matrices into three groups: vertical, horizontal and hybrid.

Vertical matrix:
- The relations between communicators are hierarchical (parents – children; bosses – subordinates, the state – subjects);
- The state prevails in most communicational processes;
- Access to information is hindered by many special standard acts;
- There is no freedom of speech.

Horizontal matrix:
- Subjects have partnership relations;
- There is efficient feedback;
- The right to free access to information, expression of opinion and choice of communication channel is secured legally and exercised.

Hybrid matrix:
- It arranges communicating subjects in classes, with horizontal relations inside the group and vertical relations between different groups;
- Partial access to various databases is provided. Nevertheless, special permission is needed to access most information sources.

Nowadays these three communication matrices coexist in Russia with hybrid matrix being the basic one, and vertical and horizontal matrices playing a complementary role.

From a practical point of view, each of these matrices determines relations between communication initiator and its recipient. There are several alternative business communication paradigms differing in all components including the ethical one. They are all located in some particular "space" formed by three vectors. These are fundamental social

and professional attitudes that determine the overall nature of the relationship of the communication initiator to the recipient.

The first of these attitudes puts an initiator above a recipient, and thus determines his right to consider a recipient as a subject of control (brought up or trained subject), and him- or herself — as a medium or translator of management programs of different types and levels. The general meaning of this kind of communication is **"influence".**

This interpretation has been justified by many theorists and researchers who suggested a complex of complicated, well-composed and, in some way, perfect management influence theories that rest upon the idea of active role of the initiator and passive role (despite numerous reserves) of the recipient, viewed as an object of influence.

The second attitude puts the initiator next to the recipient and directs him towards **information sharing**. In this case the initiator's main responsibility is to provide the recipient with different sorts of information, data and materials and help him express his opinion.

The third fundamental attitude prescribes that the initiator of communication sees himself a participant, together with the recipient, interested in the joint search for solutions to serious life problems. In this sense the initiator acts as a "**dialogue moderator**". It means that the initiator can and must create an environment for an equitable dialogue between different participants of the communication process. This function is essential in the society which is torn apart by conflicts, split into encampments and unable to find reconciliation on squares and tribunes. This is the function that is able to turn the conflict destroying the unity into the conflict, identifying the problem, and thus to bring it closer to solution not at the level of street brawls, but by means of a reasonable and pragmatic public dialogue[5].

All aforesaid explains why business communication development perspectives are determined not inside business, but at points of interaction between business communication and other social institutions.

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[5] For details about dialogue technique in business communication see the following works: Resnyanskaya, 2001; Grusha, 2001; Prokhorov, 2002.

Analyzing the dynamics of these interactions back in the mid-1990s I wrote about the three possible variants of development of Russia.

One of them can be described as "Westernization project", the second as "modernization project", and the third as "fundamentalist (or in other terms archaic) project".

The Westernization project is bound up with conviction of the inevitability of universal world community formation. It is based on the principles of democracy and liberalism, scientific and cultural progress and worldwide dissemination of industrial or postindustrial economy models.

Modernization project supporters believe that in Russia the Western "world order project" will encounter insoluble difficulties and is to be replaced by the process of modernization that is similar in form but alternative in essence. Modernization is a specific adaptation form of traditional communities to the globalizing civilization challenges. The essence of modernization lies in the aspiration to preserve cultural backgrounds and to combine them with modern western civilization elements. For instance, adoption of some market parameters of economic life organization is combined with sincere confidence in the unique character of the Russian culture which is built on the principle of non-market relations. Unwillingness to agree to political unification of the planet is combined with the urge towards economic unification.

And finally, the **"fundamentalist project"** focuses on fundamental and arrogant rejection of the Western world values and rests upon the "returning to roots", "appealing to the foundations of national wisdom" and "national culture protection" ideas (see e.g. Dzyaloshinsky, 1996; Dzyaloshinsky, 2001).

The scenarios of Russia development which have appeared recently prove this prediction one way or another (Dorozhnaya karta grazhdanskogo obschestva, 2009; Chto budet s Rossiei? Politicheskie scenarii 2008-2009. Analiticheskii doklad, 2008; Ikhlov, 2011; Rossiya XXI veka: obraz zhelaemogo zavtra, 2010; Obretenie buduschego: strategiya 2012, 2011).

As stated in one of the latest papers by Modern Development Institute "Russia made an unprecedented breakthrough from posttotalitarianism to the values of freedom, right, democracy and market at the end of the twentieth century. This process has not been finished, but it is quite radical and unprecedented for our history. The country came out of the formational shift almost bloodlessly and as quickly as possible. Now there are fewer hopes for renovation than in the past, because of the weariness, resource deterioration and loss of confidence in the future of the country. But the historical chance still remains and the society must take advantage of it. The question is the survival of Russia as a leading country, at least within the current geostrategic parameters" (Rossiya XXI veka: obraz zhelaemogo zavtra, 2010).

The authors suggested a list of criteria that, in their opinion, underlie the process of modernization:

- Quality of life comparable with standards of the most advanced countries in all significant parameters;
- Competitive economy ensuring high living standards, realizing the advantages of all natural and human resources, participating in the international division of labor as one of industrial leaders and showing sustainable potential for innovations and response to competitor's challenges;
- Fair social system, providing the maintaining and reproduction of human capital, equal initial opportunities for all citizens and a reliable protection of socially vulnerable population strata;
- Advanced and dynamic science; natural culture achievements that are to be preserved and multiplied;
- Efficient state responsible to its citizens and a fair social order that provides personal liberties and security of interest for every citizen as well as respect for major rights and freedoms and the supremacy of law;
- Inland rule of law and order and international security that is achieved due to the involvement in comprehensive systems of international security; constructive cooperation with all neigh-

boring and leading countries; modern and efficient armed forces that are able to prevent and stop any hostile actions;

- Healthy environment, preservation and reproduction of the country's natural potential (Rossiya XXI veka: obraz zhelaemogo zavtra, 2010).

If this scenario succeeds, there will be conditions and prerequisites for the dialogue both between business and other social institutions, on the one hand, and in business itself, on the other one.

Nevertheless, there is ground for skepticism. From the institutional matrices theory point of view, the forecast of modern transformation process in Russia looks like this: "First of all, it will result in renovation and consolidation of dominating position of basic redistribution economy institutions, unitary-centralized political structures and communitarian ideology. Secondly, new effective niches for embedding and operating of complementary for our country market economy institutions, federative organization and subsidiary ideology will be found. Thirdly, we may expect more public consensus on problems of structure and prospects of the country development that will be expressed in terms of "legal field" expansion, i.e. free legal articulation and maintaining civilized forms of social life reflecting the "life and idea" of our society.

It is obvious that in this situation business communications will follow traditional hybrid matrices typical of modern Russia.

However, history is done through people. It is clear that it is impossible to escape some obligatory stages of development. It is impossible to make a transition from an agrarian or agrarian-industrial society to information or post-information society at once. But it is possible to "compress" some stages and to avoid some errors which were done by the first explorers. It is possible to incorporate quite consciously those Y-matrix public institutes which, continuing to remain complementary, will still change technologies of the organization management and people's behavior essentially.

It is no wonder that an interest in large doctrinal projects in the Russian society has been revived. By this we do not mean the so-called national (or, rather, branch) projects "Health", "Education", "Housing",

"Agriculture". We mean the project called "Innovative Russia" by Alexander Neklessy and Peter Schedrovitsky, as well as "Megaproject" devised by several scientists, and ICD development mentioned above, etc.

We do not need to analyze the essential features of all these projects here. What is important is that history testifies that such megaprojects are sometimes successful, for example:

- Reforms by Alexander II (at the beginning — the decayed feudalism, at the end — almost the capitalism; growth of almost all indicators; the ideological message is the advantages of liberalization);

Restoration of Japan after the defeat in the II World War (a large-scale reindustrialization, conversion of what was left, replication of the new; the ideological message is that it is necessary to rise even after the defeat);

Modern Chinese industrialization — from Dan Sjaopin to the present time (the ideological message — the maximum use of external experience and resources for the development of local economy);

The European Union: the largest economy, the leader of political and technological innovations, is created on the basis of reconsideration of the errors made during the world to mitigate decolonization consequences.

Nevertheless, there is one prerequisite for such fundamental reforms. It is national approval of these reforms by the elites and the population. Such a big country like Russia needs efficient means of communication to achieve national consent. This must be a coordinated movement of all subjects of social dialogue towards one another. Only business structures that have come to realize that there will be no development either for businesses or for the country without the dialogue may be the initiators of this movement.

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MEDIA RHETORICS – PARTICULAR RHETORICS OF LANGUAGE OF MASS MEDIA

МЕДИАРИТОРИКА – ЧАСТНАЯ РИТОРИКА ЯЗЫКА СМИ

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Mass media are the most influential sphere of the existing modern culture. They form their own picture of the world or a world media picture in the consciousness of the audience. Its basic features are separation, fragmentariness and step-type behavior. The estimation of this fragmentariness is possible within the framework of the rhetorical methodological approach. Traditional central concepts of classical rhetoric — ethos, logos and pathos — can become the basis of a descriptive model of a modern world media picture.

Key words: *world media picture; rhetorical modality of a media discourse; culture of a ready word; protheism of the language person of the journalist.*

Медиадискурс, как прозаический тип речи, и СМИ, как наиболее влиятельная сфера бытования современной культуры, — «благодарный» материал для риторического осмысления. Традиционные центральные понятия классической риторики, переосмысленные в контексте риторического ренессанса XX века

и неориторических теорий, могут стать основой для формирования частной риторики языка СМИ — медиариторики. В статье предлагаются медиариторические понятия, с помощью которых возможно построение риторической модели современного медиадискурса и той медиакартины мира, которая им формируется. Здесь же рассматриваются перспективные направления исследований в области этой новой филологической дисциплины.

Ключевые слова: *медиариторика; медиакартина мира; культура интерпретации готового слова; риторическая модальность; риторическая позиция.*

The comprehension of rhetoric stretches today far outside limits of the theory of eloquence. From the middle of the XX century, which became an era of the rhetorical Renaissance, the understanding of this science broadens to the philosophy of verbal and speech culture (Okeanskiy, 2005). Such an approach to the rhetoric allows us to speak about its own methodological system. "The methodological difference of rhetoric from other philological sciences consists of orientation to the value aspect in the description of the subject and the submission of this description to the applied tasks. <...> Elimination of the value aspect of research of the speech and the text leads to the loss of the specifics of rhetoric against a background of descriptive philological disciplines" (Rhetorics).

Rhetorical Renaissance of the XX century

The crucial role in rhetoric revival in the XX century was played by *the theory of mass communications* and *the logical theory of the argument*. They enriched and expanded the categorial device and tools of classical rhetoric. The theory of mass communications representing an extensive set of research tools of linguistic, semiotic and social and psychological character, promoted the development of deeper understanding of the

main participants of the communicative act (the sender defining characteristics – the recipient of the message, the sender – the addressee), and also the parameters of the message.

H. Perelman's theory of the argument became a theoretical basis of "new rhetoric" (or "neorhethoric"). This theory in many respects created the subject matter and a system of research analysis of *the French structuralism*. Thanks to efforts of this school rhetoric started to arrive at the proscenium of intellectual life of France and Europe as a whole, in the middle of the 1960s (R. Bart, Tsv. Todorov, Z. Zhenett, A.-I. Greymas, K. Bremon, etc.).

The Belgian "group μ"'s (Z. Dubois, F. Menge, F. Pir, F. Edelin, Zh.-M. Klinkenberg, A. Trinon, etc.) work "The general rhetoric" (the 1970s) became a key stage in the revival of rhetoric. They emphasized the *rhetorical*, instead of *poetic* (by R. Yakobson) function of language and described it as *transcendental* (that is initially inherent in the language, causing all other functions of language) in relation to other language functions. Such an approach practically gave researchers a chance to study manifestations of the rhetorical in any type of verbal communication, both in semiotics area (which can be included in rhetorical) and in nonverbal communicative systems. The second important result of "group μ"'s activity is that they defined both the ultimate goal and the main object of rhetoric as a product of ethos. Thus, "group μ", after Haim Perelman, revived the axiological component to the rhetorical analysis.

Today rhetoric became a driving force of language policy in many countries (first of all in the USA, Japan, Germany). The American rhetoric, for instance, is called a perfect instrument of public consciousness manipulation. It is essentially important in the culture of *mass information* and *mass communication*, in the world of mass media, and, naturally, occupies there the top of "the pyramid of knowledge" which to some extent brings it together with rhetoric in Ancient Greece. During the antique era the rhetorical class was the highest (after grammar and poetics) and *prepared the citizen for conscious political activity*. That is to say rheto-

ric was taken as the top of *education*, or of *paydaia*. Werner Yeger wrote about it: "Education is means used by the human community to preserve its kind corporally and spiritually..." (Yeger, 2001).

Today rhetoric is thought to be a certain *coherent* beam of philological subjects (stylistics, cognitive science, pragmatics, psycholinguistics, lingvoethics, lingvoculturology, theories of speech acts). Actually, the subjects which it once generated. At the same time rhetoric acts as a certain *outlook* since it has a very important axiological component. Rhetoric drives speech behavior to a verbally conscious purpose, and its rules (norms) — to an *ideal*. That is modern rhetoric is, as we say today, *multilinguistic* or even the *polyhumanitarian*: it unites not only linguistic subjects and methods, but also all-humanitarian subjects (philosophy, sociology, political science, etc.). We even prefer to consider *rhetoric as a coherent science* since it does not only use the polyhumanitarian approach, but also forms on its basis the rhetorical understanding of the research object which is the language in its mental discursive movement.

Rhetorical comprehension of a media discourse. Media rhetorical categories

Mass media, media discourse are the most "grateful" material for rhetorical comprehension. First of all, because it is a prosaic type of speech and prosaic texts serving that is the object of research of traditional rhetoric (Rozhdestvenskiy, 1996; Volkov, 1996). Secondly, because mass media are the most influential sphere of the modern culture. For this reason it is possible to speak about rhetorical, or more exactly even neorhetorical comprehension of a media discourse and *the media picture of the world* presented in it, and also about the creation of private rhetoric of the mass media language, media rhetoric.

The categorial scientific device of private rhetoric of a media discourse, or *media rhetoric*, by means of which the media discourse can be described, has to rely, on the one hand, on traditional rhetorical concepts

and on the other hand it is enriched by research of various schools of the XX century neorhetoric we spoke above.

Mass information and mass communication are considered by modern literature as one of *speech innervoices* that is "a certain material of speech processed by certain tools" (Rozhdestvenskiy, 1996). Yu. V. Rozhdestvensky singled out three main types of differentiation of mass communication texts and information: 1) on a cumulative *image of a ritor*; 2) on territorial and occupational characteristics and 3) on specific and genre features (Rozhdestvenskiy, 1996). It is obvious that today from these three dominants only *the first* more or less remains unchanged. Washing out borders of genres, the change of the system of genres brings the text characteristics out of the category of dominants of the modern media space rhetorical analysis. It is possible to partly recognize territorial occupational characteristics essential when it comes only to narrowly professional and narrowly territorial (regional) publications: the duplicating, diffusion of central and large local (regional, republican) publications form certain "monochromaticism" of a media picture of the world presented in them.

In our opinion, traditional central concepts of classical rhetoric — *ethos, logos and pathos* — can become the basis of a descriptive model of a modern media discourse and a media picture of the world.

"It (in classical rhetoric. — *I. A.*) is accepted to call ethos the conditions which the recipient of speech offers to the speaker. <...> It is accepted to call pathos an intention, a plan of the speaker which has the purpose of developing in front of the recipient a defined subject interesting for him. <...> It is accepted to call logos the verbal means used by the speaker during the realization of the plan of speech" (Rozhdestvenskiy, 1997).

Three main categories of classical rhetoric connected directly with each other and kind of penetrating into each other, are structured in a media discourse and cement the neorhetorical model of a media picture of the world and receive their own terminological designation in the media rhetoric.

Pathos of the media discourse is embodied in general perlocutive idea of its texts which we named *a rhetorical modality*.

Logos is embodied in the main strategies of discursive activity of mass media which come to *various types of interpretation* (especially at the level of national topics) and accumulate in themselves all signs *the era culture of the real world of interpretation*.

The quintessence of *ethos* in a media discourse can be considered *a rhetorical position* of a journalist, and also the publications or the channels through which media texts are broadcast. Speech activity of a journalist, as an individual, and, according to Yu. V. Rozhdestvensky's terminology, "a cumulative image of a ritor", is *proteistic* today.

Interpretative system of the media discourse

Once again we will emphasize that all three categories are not isolated from each other and exist in close interaction. It reveals vividly at the level of language, the main "device" and the main tool of activity of mass media. The language of modern mass media (at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries) can be considered *a two-dimensional interpretation*. On the one hand, it fits in the new concept of the main question of philosophy when in the center of attention there is not the problem of correlation of *being* and *consciousness*, but the problem of *reality* and *text* as its possible interpretation. On the other hand, the mass media language fits into the system of units of verbal communication which nowadays form as cultural information and include cultural sems, a cultural background, cultural concepts and connotations. Moreover, whatever component dominates in this or that text of mass media, we can only talk about the addressees' interpretation of mass media of meanings and figuratively motivated associations which are generated by them. Cultural and language competence of modern informants of the Russian literary language and the Russian culture allows journalists to conduct and make "precedent" operations of various intellectual and mental complexity

and of various ethic and psychological background. The abundance of texts-interpretatives in a media discourse reflects the fact that we appear to be creators and at the same time users of the *culture of interpretation of the ready word*. The culture of the ready word is the rhetorical type of culture in which the word is the live bearer of cultural tradition and all important meanings and contents of this tradition. But the modern era shows us also its interpretation of the ready word culture which consists first of all in a travestying of these meanings and traditions. And this travesty is an outcome of a certain rhetorical aim: free use of the word is a traditional rhetorical understanding of the problem of the word in general: "from its the very beginnings in Greece the rhetorical theory and practice understands the word as if it was *entirely in the power of its user*" (Mikhaylov, 1997). Only today the author-journalist, the author-scripter dominates not only and not so much over the word, as over the word of others, over a cultural background, so he does not create but interprets.

The *journalist-scripter* (R. Bart's term), appears to be the bearer of this activity, i.e. such a type of a language personality that does not exist out of (before and after) this speech act, who creates the text only *here and now*. And though the question of possible existence of a certain average type of a language personality of a journalist is questionable, discussion of this subject seems promising and quite reasonable. The existence in comparative rhetoric of the concept of *a national rhetorical ideal* (Mikhalskaya, 1996) itself allows us such an approach. Especially so because each language personality is formed on the basis of appropriation by a specific person of all language wealth created by predecessors. Moreover, a personality in general, and a language personality in particular, is defined by time and place: existing in historical time and space, it has the appropriate mentality – it defines not only specific conceptions, but also the ways of thinking and feeling that dominate in its environment, the ways of understanding the world and of estimating people. In this sense it is possible to speak about the person of the era of Antiquity, of the era of the Middle Ages, of the era of Renaissance, etc.

The antinomy of a journalistic creativity, which results from the fight of social and personal bases in the language personality of a journalist, and also from the need to unite individual and collective, forms a mental and behavioral dominant of linguo-rhetorical activity of the modern journalist. This dominant can be designated as *a proteism of a rhetorical position of the journalist*. Of course, it is not that proteism which in its time was offered for understanding of the phenomenon of A. S. Pushkin's works: an organic penetration into the culture of any nation, confluence with it without loss of his own national identity is one of the amazing traits of Pushkin's poetic mind, of Pushkin's language picture of the world. But this Pushkin's "crunching" of cultures always remained within Culture. The proteism in works of modern journalists is in many respects predetermined by specifics of a subject of their language: the media space is an original single-stage interpretation not only of a cultural background, but also of the processes taking place out of the sphere of culture, we will call them after P. M. Bitsilli (Bitsilli, 1996) civilizational. That is the modern journalist forms in consciousness or subconsciousness of the audience first of all *a picture of a modern information Civilization*.

This interpretative level (the most obvious, the most open) in the language of modern mass media brings us directly to a more difficult interpretative system which is schematically expressed by the dichotomy *reality~text*. And the greatest interest in it for us is represented by interpretative models of the major national and cultural stereotypes. A cultural tradition is a powerful mechanism which makes a much stronger impact on our perception, than the scientific description. Both culture concepts and its toposes undergo interpretation. It is first of all connected to those differences which exist between the notions of *a concept* and *a topos,* which are predetermined by specific differences of linguistics and rhetoric. *The concept* (the notion of cognitive science) is a reflection of *speech-thought-cognitive* activity. *The topos* of culture is a reflection of an *estimative and comparative knowledge, an ethic and moral paradigm of the people* and at the same time it is *a basic national communication component* (Hazagerov, 2008). The scientific literature that describes and systematizes concepts of

the Russian culture is extensive. Toposes in this sense were less "lucky". A. M. Panchenko in his time wrote about it in the book "The Russian culture on the eve of Peter's Reforms" (Panchenko, 2008).

Interpretation of the domestic system of toposes in media discourse is treated by the main strategies of modern mass media's activity. In the second half of the XX century domestic mass media appeared to be completely in the power of those strategies that had been already created in the West. Among them it is necessary to recognize as the main things: 1) the strategy of "cultural shock", 2) the manipulation strategy, 3) the strategy of a secularizm and, last but not least, 4) the hedonism strategy. In our opinion, we should recognize the hedonism strategy as the dominating strategy leading all others. An entertaining function was always inherent in the press. But preferences of audience could not be fully reflected in mass media until the 1990s: "the reading public was accustomed to a few mentions of the daily, personal, domestic" (Fomicheva, 1976). Today we observe a different situation: the entertainment factor very often outweighs the informational value factor when members of the public choose this or that edition, moreover, an informational cause in itself is sometimes not serious, entertaining (regardless of positive or negative content of this information). But there is also an opposite tendency: shocking (tragic) information is perceived as entertaining. This tendency in many respects is caused by the double idea of a leisurely character of modern mass media: on the one hand, they take free (leisure) time of the reader, on the other hand, they actually make as such the leisure of the reader, they are his filling.

Sources of hedonism lie in *the European subjectivity* which is today euphemistically called *anthropocentrism*. In modern Russian mass media this subjectivity is embodied and realized in the following mental linguo-rhetorical operations:

- in the communicative aim of a transaction (a possible change of communicative roles of the writer and the reader);
- in transformation of *a topos of self-appraisal* (a conversion into Anglo-Saxon model of the world image in which the center is "I": "I – centrism", "yachnost");

- in pretativization of *quality of life* as a sociocultural "fragment" of a new Russian mentality;
- in reshuffle of *"the external"* and *"the internal"* as the terms of the topos of *Integrity* (the term "external" as a topological symbol of non-priority, of periferism, is brought forward to the center of being and forces out to the periphery the term "internal", i.e. value significant);
- in conversion of the hypertopos Being (ontologically unstable term "virtuality" replaces antonymous, i.e. the ontologically rigid term "reality", growing fast with meanings of the second and creating thereby *mythoenergy of virtuality*), and so on.

So in the entertaining and hedonistic sphere of mass media we do not face a simple interpretation of these or those national cultural stereotypes, but the change, "conversion" of the whole blocks of ontologically and axiologically important components (or maybe even of dominants) of the traditional outlook of Russians inherent in the Russian language (as the views of Germans – in German, and of Chinese – in Chinese).

Rhetorical modality as a media discourse constant

The existence of the strategic paradigm of activity of mass media, predetermined by the initial aim of belief and influence, shows us the basic impossibility of an objective modality of texts of media discourse. In texts of mass media there is always a certain communicative and target component, a certain rhetorical sense which we named *a rhetorical modality* of media text. Most often persuasion appears to be this component, open or hidden, i.e. manipulative. The rhetorical modality of media texts can be expressed both explicitly, and implicitly because the rhetorical sense exists not only outside the text (in the intension of the journalist-rhetorician), but also in the text itself: both in its ideological sphere, and in its formal organization. Regardless of interpretation of this rhetorical content by the reader the *constant will be the rhetorical modality of the media text*.

And here again we should address the category of *rhetorical position of the journalist*. The concept of *an author's position* (L. G. Kayda) was developed for journalism. But the media text is a wider phenomenon than a publicistic text. The social journalism is a sphere of a direct influence, direct persuasion. As a rule, the publicistic text is built by a ritor on the basis of his own beliefs. It is typical of a media discourse that journalists (both individuals, and corporative media communities) act as *intermediaries* between the reality itself and the mass audience. By means of their views and world outlook they form a world picture in the consciousness of the mass audience. Not all *events* (the phenomena appurtenant to the world) become *facts* (that is to say opinions about the world) in mass media. There are the journalists who recast *events into facts*, that is the language persons provided with cultural and social authority to "filter" the events. And in this respect journalists act as ritors, as professionals of rhetorical activity, that is "of the art of use of language <...> *to convince or have an impact on others* (our italics. − I. A.)" (Scott, 1980).

All media discourse participates in the formation of such a picture of the world. And in this sense we can also speak about *a rhetorical hypermodality* of media discourse in general. But this hyper modality is not the mechanical sum of rhetorical modalities of separately taken media texts. It is above the "fight", it is exactly that "beacon" of media discourse on which its texts are focused. And this beacon is a media picture of the world.

In our opinion, all texts of a media discourse have a rhetorical modality: both of reasoning, and informing types. For the informing type of speech, and consequently for texts of informational genres, the rhetorical modality will be telling at a stage of the choice of an event, worthy to be "melted" into a fact. (Such an informational genre as interview is not an exception: even the choice of the interviewee is predetermined *by a rhetorical modality of importance, significance or relevance* of this "hero" for formation of a certain picture of the world in the consciousness of the mass audience, that is of the mass addressee). The "de re modality" as, however, the "de dicto modality", is subordinated here to

a wider and at the same time to a more specific modality – the rhetorical proper. It forces *the event* to move to the category of *the fact* and, thus, to become *an argument of interpretation* of the objective world within media discourse, that is to become a fragment of the media picture of the world.

In reasoning type of speech, that is in analytical genres, whose share considerably decreased today, the rhetorical modality predetermines the choice of argumentative methods, or tactics, that allow the sender to reach the planned perlocutive effect [natural proofs, arguments to ethos, arguments to pathos, arguments to authority (to trust and to mistrust), the quasiargumentation, methods of linguistic demagogy, argumentum comoediarum (not true, but the plausible image of the past) and others] (Mikhalskaya, 1996; Panchenko, 2008; Hazagerov, 2002).

Thus, the genre belonging of texts of media discourse does not influence the existence or lack of rhetorical modality. A genre can be "a non-core credit" in its result and formation. *The rhetorical modality appears to be an objective category of discourse of the mass media, generating factual and structural components of this discourse.*

The structure, as modern philosophers argue, is the main concept of humanitarian knowledge of the XX and XXI centuries, it is a way of the organization of any humanitarian material. The media rhetoric is a peculiar "opened structure", i.e. not closed, not predetermined, open. Therefore, *the media rhetoric* faces not only one task: the media rhetoric can develop in details the typology of rhetorical positions of the reader in modern media discursive activity; in media rhetorical aspect we face the phenomenon of corporative mass media and corporative language policy of various mass media to reveal that media corporations have their own rhetorical position in the era of aspiration for depersonalization of the journalist and of obscuring his name behind the name of an edition or a channel; within media rhetoric it is necessary to develop a typology of a rhetorical modality in media texts of various media cultures. The development of a dictionary of national toposes seems promising to us, an intensive polysemantic interpretation of which in modern media

discourse leads to the deformation of a traditional value paradigm in the consciousness of the mass audience.

The media rhetoric is the new theoretical and study subject demanded by time of a peculiar diffusion of culture. Blurring the borders (state, cultural, social, ethnic, etc.) happens at the expense of rapid and extensive development of communication technologies. Modern communications, information technologies squeeze space and time, overcoming immensity of the world around us. Its cultural and civilizational variety joins a single worldwide context more and more actively. The activity of modern mass media becomes more and more transnational and supranational. And the coherent beam of *media rhetoric* can highlight culture-specific components of national images of the world in the language activity of mass media that actively transform and intertwine in language of modern mass media and thus participate in the formation of *a modern media picture of the world*.

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MAPPING MASS COMMUNICATION THEORIES IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

ТЕОРИИ МАССОВОЙ КОММУНИКАЦИИ В СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РОССИИ

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The author of this article suggests separating two main ways of classifying mass communication theories — according to the sphere of social / private life and the element of mass communication process as the object of scientific consideration. Moreover, it provides a possibility to indicate the universal way to classify theories.

Key words: *mass communication theories in Russia; media and journalism theory; classification of theories.*

Автор статьи предлагает выделить два основных способа для классификации теорий массовой коммуникаций — по взаимодействию со сферой общественной / частной жизни или по объекту рассмотрения звена массово-коммуникационного процесса. Также в статье рассматривается возможность универсального способа классификации теорий.

Ключевые слова: *теории массовой коммуникации в России; теория медиа и журналистики; классификация теорий.*

Today is no classification of main theoretic divisions of mass communication research in Russia. On the one hand, we can see a terminological mess in the objects of theoritizing: what we consider communication, media communication, mass communication, media, ICT, means of mass communication, mass media, journalism, journalistic or media text. There is no terminological apparatus in this sphere. Researchers give different definitions to one and the same phenomena and subject matters. Besides, they sometimes use one definition when describing polar opposite things. On the other hand, researchers sometimes do not know what to call theories, concepts, approaches, traditions of analysis, schools and research works, principles, scientific divisions, paradigms, methodologies, methods, etc.

There is an obvious sceptical attitude towards the possibility to define a theory for such practice-oriented spheres as journalism and mass media. If journalism and mass media are professions and not research fields, then can we speak about the science of journalism and mass media? How can it be called then?

We would like to single out several conceptual points, which state the necessity to create the theory of media, not theory of journalism:

- Mass media have become a separate sector of industry, which is closely connected with consumer capitalism, consumer market and serving free time. The formation of mass media industry is closely connected with the formation of contemporary media systems, which are functioning pretty consistently in response to the complex requests of the advertisers to the access both mass and segmented audiences;
- Industrial production of content, which is represented in the process of medium unification, as well as in the standardization of journalistic texts (in such genres as news, report, interview, expert comment). The role of industrial requirements for the selection of news (gate-keeping concept);
- TV stands in the centre of many media systems. Now it is wider than journalistic texts. Besides, TV has turned into a technolog-

ically-dependent branch and the development of the Internet as a part of the media system has strengthened the technological dependence of the industry on ICT;

- The editorial office lays in the basis of mass media system. However, the editorial office is not a purely journalistic group, but an organization uniting various specialists, focused on the mechanical producing of a production mass;
- In developed market democracies a special division is being formed. It is called media politics. It is moulded by a variety of public forces and is focused on performing of special goals at the society.

Thus, a number of processes taking place in the media industry make media scholars formulate a new theory and new conceptions, which would allow us to describe, systemize and distinguish logical links in the existing empiric material, as well as to model and to forecast the processes of the development awaiting the mass media.

A number of researchers point out the impossibility of creating a unique classification system for the existing theoretical mass communication studies. Thus, Bakulev thinks that "it is difficult to present the most significant mass communication theories, and to suggest a way of classifying them and a type of correlation between them, as the spectrum of media functions is very wide, as well as the range of possible perspectives" (Bakulev, 2010). Bakulev agrees with Denis McQuail's opinion that many existing theories are incompatible, unaccomplished and inadequate. M. Nazarov also highlights the fact that the main divisions of media studies are marked by "a variety of conceptual approaches" (Nazarov, 2003). Besides, "these approaches are not isolated and sometimes cross over with each other" (ibid). I. Kiria describes "many borderline disciplines and research divisions, which are connected with linguistics, psychology, political economy, politics and philosophy as well, that can also be referred to divisions within media studies (Kiria, 2004). A. Chernyh pays attention to the "theoretical syncretism" in this research field, where "the old tested approaches and the ones co-exist supplementing each other" (Chernykh, 2007). I. Fomichyova states that

"any communication should be characterized in a multidimensional way using different criteria. This to a full extent is regarded to the mass media which we are especially interested in" (Fomicheva, 2007). N. Bogomolova takes into account the fact that theoretical studies of mass media "as a rule are identified with the dominating in this or that age theoretic orientation" (Bogomolova, 2008). L. Zemlyanova highlights the width of "multiprofile studies of the capabilities and consequences of the influence of new information technologies on society, culture, and journalism destiny" (Zemlyanova, 2004).

However, many researchers – G. Bakulev, M. Nazarov, I. Kiria, A. Chernykh, J. Dzyaloshinsky, E. Vartanova, I. Fomicheva and others – in their course books and monographs present their own classification of media and mass communication theories. This is reflected first of all on the way the works are structured. It is important to understand that in most cases suggested classifications are made with regard to foreign researchers and their classification techniques, but Russian scientific context and the authors' view leave a special "Russian" trace, so it would be inappropriate to talk about complete borrowing.

Other research works are held within the framework of certain divisions and media theories. In such papers other divisions in media theory are not always mentioned (E. Prokhorov, S. Korkonosenko, S. Gurevich, G. Lazutina, L. Resnyanskaya, I. Zassoursky).

Means of classifying media and mass communication studies № 1

Sociological theories of the first and middle level (the theory of public spheres, institutional theory, theory of social systems, theory of fields) represent the basis for the existence of a relatively universal classification system of media theories. All existing theories connected with media are based on the perception of media within the frames of these theories.

Most researchers are united by the perception of mass media as a social institute, social system, as a sphere, which coexists along with other

spheres of public life: social sphere, politics, economy, culture and the sphere of private life. As a result, it seems rational to distinguish the following groups of media theories: social, political, economic, cultural and anthropological.

<div align="right">*Table 1*</div>

**Method of combining media studies
according to the type of classification № 1**

Summand 1	Summand 2	Sum	Russian researchers
Mass media	Spheres of public life		
	Political sphere	Political theory of mass media/ studying media from political perspective	L. Resnyanskaya M. Shkondin A. Kachkaeva I. Zassoursky
	Economic sphere	Economic theory of mass media / studying media from economic perspective	E. Vartanova M. Makeenko S. Smirnov S. Gurevich V. Ivanitsky G. Schepilova
	Social sphere	Social theory of mass media/ studying media from social perspective	E. Prokhorov I. Fomicheva Y. Zassoursky L. Svitich G. Lazutina S. Korkonosenko
	Spiritual sphere	Cultural theory of mass media/ studying media from cultural perspective	M. Kniazeva A. Novikova
	Sphere of private life	Anthropological theory of media / studying media from anthropological perspective	T. Frolova D. Dunas O. Smirnova E. Pronin E. Pronina

Let us analyze the correlation between the stated classification method with other means of classification. E. Vartanova thinks that it is important to examine mass media through the prism of the effects they produce or do not produce on the society or on individual level (Vartanova, 2010). It is connected with the fact that journalism is supposed to satisfy individual, group and social demands for information at the same time. E. Vartanova suggests four main groups of public needs and media effect on society. Thus, the theoretical studies of journalism should be realized in accordance with these four categories.

Table 2

**Four groups of needs / effects
according to the classification of E. Vartanova[6]**

Name of the group of needs / effects	Short description
Political	Society needs information provision for the normal functioning of the political sphere. The mass media serve the political process both from the position of the politicians and of the electorate.
Economic	Satisfying the pragmatic interest of the consumers. The media serve market economy, based on the consumer behaviour.
Cultural	Russian language "lives" in the mass media
Value-oriented	The media mould collective values and national identity

Except the above mentioned categories of the dichotomy "needs-effects" E. Vartanova also distinguishes the effect of media influence on the contemporary human being, which allows us to call him/her "a media human being, as the process of decision making for people and their very being is to a significant extent defined by the media" (Vartanova, 2009).

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[6] Source: Vartanova, E. (2010). P. 15–19.

The researcher Chernykh thinks that it is possible to distinguish three dominating approaches to communicativism and general sociological theory of mass communication on a contemporary stage — staring from 1990s and up to present.

<div align="right">*Table 3*</div>

Three theoretical approaches to communication science in the general sociological theory of mass communication according to A. Chernykh[7]

Name of the approach	Short description
Socio-organizational approach	Society is stable and highly structured. Special attention is paid to institutes and structures. The research works, devoted to the mass media, have predominantly descriptive character
Political economy approach	Obsession with the economic explanation of mass communication phenomena. Studying media as a production process and as a product
Theory of practices	Theoretical consensus, which is focused on practices of people's being opposed to the institutes and structures. Practice as a core idea of anthropological research

A. Chernykh thinks that research works of the theory of practices, which is referred to the beginning of the 1980s, have occupied a dominating place in the world. The first two approaches were on top of their popularity in the 1990s and are still being used, comprise the mainstream of the sociological theory of the mass media of the 1960–1970s.

The means of media theories classification suggested by Dzyaloshynsky is also referential to the two previous ones.

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[7] Source: Chernykh, A. (2007). P. 43–45.

Table 4

Three main complexes of research, which comprise the mass media research environment in Russia, according to J. Dzyaloshinsky[8]

Name of the research complexes	Short description
Socio-oriented research	The media is a social machine, realizing a number of functions
Media-centric research	Organizational aspects of the media enterprise activity
Anthropo-centric research	Problems of journalistic creative work and audience behaviour

Classification of media theories according to their interaction with the four spheres of public life and one private sphere seems to be an obvious and fairly general way of analyzing the mass media. A comparative analysis of various research classifications proves that. However, most researchers are far from being conscious about the link to a certain public / private sphere when they study the media. E. Vartanova distinguishes this "link" most precisely (refer to table 2). Her classification of the four main groups of "needs-effects" is the most compatible one with the concept of the four spheres.

The aspiration to a multi-aspect analysis of the media is not that obvious among the majority of researchers. As a rule, representatives of the research sphere are inclined towards a particular tradition or school of analysis. Thus, they prolong a certain theoretical paradigm and consequently the theories and concepts formed within its framework. Besides, the adherence to this or that theoretical paradigm is also connected with tradition.

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[8] Source: Dzyaloshinsky, J. (2010).

Russian tradition of media research

Throughout centuries Russian media have had a solid status of a special institute — a political one. Peter the Great who created the first Russian newspaper *Vedomosti* formulated its main goals: it should inform readers about foreign and home developments. Peter was himself engaged in this process of informing. He selected texts for publication, edited them and also monitored the layout. Thus, he demonstrated and implemented the formula of active political participation in the activities of the mass media.

The media and politics still go hand in hand. It is not surprising that a significant number of research works in Russia are devoted to the studying of relations between the political institute and the media institute.

The social theory of the media can be regarded as a type of the political world outlook. The social or normative media theory was initially created on the practices of public media and despite the lack of such media in Russia it is highly popular. The attribution of certain social commitments to the media is adaptable to the political and economic conditions. Normativeness has become not only a principle, but a theory outside the frames of which media analysis seems to be impossible for some researchers. When the book of Peterson, Siebert and Shramm "Four Theories of the Press" was translated into Russian, the representatives of the research field decided that theory of media equals media model. Further attempts of media studies were reduced to the examination of media models, systems and media structures, but not to theory studies. Should we mention that a theory is a complex of conceptions and concepts, which are developed within the framework of a certain scientific paradigm. They describe the reality and help to explain it. Thus, the media theory in Russia is a complex of media conceptions and media concepts, that were developed and that are being developed within the frames of the Russian scientific paradigm. These conceptions and concepts describe and explain the mechanisms of the process of media func-

tioning – from the sender of the message to the impact on the audience, whereas media model is a means of describing the practical functioning of the media in the political and economic concept. That is why the names of media models mostly refer to the forms of political organization (authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility), rather than to the media.

There is no doubt that D. McQuail's social theory without the presence of an analogue of the BBC and U. Habermass "public sphere" under the conditions of a poorly developed civic society and pluralism of views in Russia has its own authentic features, which are not always recognized by the West.

The second significant layer of research is devoted to the studying of media as an industry, the functioning of the media based on economic laws. They have switched from describing ideal business models of media enterprises to interpreting media economy as informal. All the attempts to call media owners "managers" and the editorial office a media enterprise, however, have been successful. Although the obvious link between the authorities and the business prevented the researchers from studying the pure mass media economy, the first Russian school of media economy managed to adapt Western conceptions to the realities of the Russian society and to develop its own methodological and concept apparatus.

For the representatives of the social theory of mass media the answer to the question "What do mass media represent?" is "social institute", while for media economists it is "industry". We can state that the basis of the scientific paradigm of contemporary media research in Russia lies in two axioms – media as a social institute and media as an industry.

Table 4

Structure of media theories in Russia

Characteristics of theories depending on the dominating scientific paradigm	Media theories	Conceptions	Concepts
Alternative theories	Anthropological theory	They are developed within the framework of the theories. Each theory has its own. They may cross over.	
	Cultural mass media theory		
Topical theory	Economic mass media theory		
Theories of mainstream	Social mass media theory		
	Political mass media theory		
Dominating scientific paradigm: The mass media are both a social institute and an industry			

The mainstream theory and topical theory are widely represented. Meanwhile, the gap in the sphere of alternative scientific theories and the lack of alternative dominating scientific paradigm is surprising. The issues of socio-political and economic wellbeing, which have occupied the minds of media researchers, have totally excluded cultural and anthropological aspects of mass media research. While the latter paradigms are if not dominating, but widely represented among other paradigms of Western researchers. From these facts we may conclude, that it is not serious to analyze the media from other point of view rather than political, economic or social institute. The works of many researchers are far from understanding the media as a controversial symbolic structure, which influences a human being not only forming his or her political views and inciting to consume, but also influencing

the intellectual and spiritual life of people in an integral and profound way.

It would be a mistake to say that the cultural and anthropological aspects are not represented in the practices of Russian researchers. The interdisciplinary approach is one of the consciously promoted scientific methods. Elements of non-economic and non-political conceptions are presented even in strictly economic or political works. However, these conceptions, which are developed within the frames of a different alternative scientific angle, lack integrity.

Anyway, Western academic experience proves that cultural and anthropological media researches may be self-sufficient scientific paradigm, based on self-sufficient scientific paradigms. Analyzing mass media only as a subject of political and economic influence would be a demonstration of conservatism and scientific narrow-mindedness. We have to realize that cultural and anthropological approaches can hardly be widely and thoroughly represented bearing in mind the existing traditional character of Russian scientific schools of media studies. Apparently, they should be instigated. Otherwise there is a possibility to lag behind the Western scientific paradigms.

Means of classifying media and mass communication research № 2 and universal way of classification

General understanding of mass communication as a process containing several links lies in the basis of the second means of classification of media theories. Lasswell specified these links most vividly and clearly. Later many mass communication researchers, D. McQuail in particular, structured their course books focusing their attention on each of the links separately. The links of the first researcher are not always compatible with the objects of study of the second researcher. However, we can obviously trace some kind of "symmetry" between the two.

Table 5

**Links in the chain of communication process
according to G. Lasswell and objects
of study according to D. McQuail[9]**

Link in the chain of mass communication process according to G. Lasswell	Object of study according to D. McQuail
–	Structure of mass communication
Who says?	Organization of mass communication production
What?	Studying content
In which channel?	–
To whom?	Studying the audience
With what effect?	Effects of mass communication

A number of researchers considers important to combine both the first and the second means of theory classification. They make attempts to analyze different stages in mass communication, bearing in mind the possibility of interaction with the four spheres of public life.

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[9] Source: Lasswell, H. (1948); McQuail, D. (2010).

Table 6

**Four components of the mass media as subjects
of study according to I. Kiria[10]**

Name of the component	Short description
Analysis of mass media materials	Analysis of media texts (radio, TV, movies, advertisements, etc.) using different methods A) Linguistic analysis B) Strategic analysis C) Discourse analysis
Analysis of the media	A) Analysis of the means of delivering information B) Analysis of particularities of the message depending on the means of delivering
Structural analysis of the mass media	Summarizing analysis of media system in all its aspects and social representations. The connection of the mass media with other spheres of public life A) Economic analysis B) Political analysis C) System of the mass media (classification analysis) D) Legal analysis
Analysis of the processes of receiving information	Influence of the media on the audience A) Socio-technical analysis (appropriation of technical objects by the society) B) Analysis of the means of usage of information or the storage medium C) Analysis of meaning distortion

[10] Source: Kiria, I. (2004).

The suggested classification according to the subject of mass media study corresponds with the whole chain of elements in media functioning — from the sender to the influence on the receiver of information. Should we consider structural analysis, which I. Kiria distinguishes along with the subjects of the communication chain, using different foundations for the differentiation of the classifying system? Structural analysis is a complex analysis of the media as a system and not only a detailed analysis of elements realizing the communication process by means of the media. When considering media as a system, the researcher inevitably works within the frames of a certain theory, most likely political or economic one. And this would be his reference to the analysis according to spheres of public life and not according to the links in the communication chain. The attempt to correlate the stages of mass communication process with the economic and political realities is obvious.

Is it possible to create a full-scale scheme of media analysis, combining two means of theory classification — using both spheres of public life and links of the communication process. Let us try to present one.

Table 7

Universal analysis of the media, taking into account both means of classification of media and mass communication studies

Mass media theory based on the principle of belonging to a sphere of public / private life	Links of mass communication				
	Source (sender of the message)	Content of the message (content-analysis, discourse analysis)	Channel of message delivery	Audience of the message and ways to study it	Effect of the message
Political theory of mass media	Structure of mass media ownership – political leader, parties, oligarch	Politically evaluative content	Consideration of different channels, but first of all to the federal TV channels as dominating means of forming political agenda	Mass audience as electorate. Data from sociological surveys: opinion polls, measuring media consumption, focus groups and other quantitive research works	Unlimited influence of the media
Social theory of media	Journalist and his/her social commitments	Social problematics of the media, social values in media materials	New media, blogosphere and other media	Active, protest audience. Audience as citizens, Data from sociological surveys: opinion polls, measuring media consumption, focus groups and other quantitive research works	Interpreting media messages; Protest activity

Mass media theory based on the principle of belonging to a sphere of public / private life	Links of mass communication				
	Source (sender of the message)	Content of the message (content-analysis, discourse analysis)	Channel of message delivery	Audience of the message and ways to study it	Effect of the message
Economic theory of mass media	Structure of mass media ownership – media outlet as an enterprise, top-management of the media outlet; journalist as a wage worker	Media materials stimulating consumption (advertisements), business press as a type of journalism	Advertising and business publications	Heterogeneous. Audience as consumers. Data from sociological surveys: opinion polls, measuring media consumption, focus groups and other quantitive research works	Limited influence of the media;

Mass media theory based on the principle of belonging to a sphere of public / private life	Links of mass communication				
	Source (sender of the message)	Content of the message (content-analysis, discourse analysis)	Channel of message delivery	Audience of the message and ways to study it	Effect of the message
Cultural theory of mass media	Social, historic and cultural determination of society, in which the journalist is immersed; journalist's mentality, as well as media managers strategies in the promotion of global media product	Global content and the system of values in the local culture: content of the mass media as a myth; interpretation of the meanings of a special reality	TV and other media	Mass. Audience as a nation. Data from sociological surveys: opinion polls, measuring media consumption, focus groups and other quantitive research works	Unlimited influence of the media
Anthropological theory of mass media	Journalist's personality	Representation of the human being in the media	TV, the Internet and other mass media	"Hyperindividualistic". Audience as a complex of persons. Ethnographic studies of the audience. The focus is placed not on a household/ family, but on individuals.	Critical interterpretation of media messages

The suggested scheme allows us to indicate the coordinates of any researcher in the sphere of media. The first type of classification is an interdisciplinary one and inclines toward a rapprochement with such disciplines as political sciences, sociology, economics, cultural studies and anthropology. The second approach is an inner disciplinary one and concentrates on the subject of study, characteristic only for the media. Combining the two means schematically (refer to the table 6) we can convince ourselves that the nature and the structure of media theories is complex. Not all researchers unanimously draw a demarcation line between theory of journalism and theory of the mass media. This is obvious as a number of researchers still consider the concepts "journalism" and "mass media" to be synonyms. Besides, some think that the mass media are included in journalism.

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RUSSIAN MEDIA STUDIES: REGIONAL PARADIGM

РОССИЙСКИЕ МЕДИАИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ: РЕГИОНАЛЬНАЯ ПАРАДИГМА

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The state of media researches at the Russian regional universities is analyzed in the article. The article presents the analysis of self-presentations and problems of mass media researches of some higher education institutions having taken part in the poll. Additional data were taken from the appropriate universities' sites. The quantitative statistical analysis is accompanied by a qualitative research in which the problem of scientific investigation of the universities in the sphere of mass media studying is analyzed. The article describes serious distinctions between self-presentation of the scientific mass media researches and real researches in their purposes, tasks, used methodology. The article proves the necessity of universal terminology, the common qualifier of scientific researches in mass media studies. The approximate model of such a qualifier which was supported by National Association of Mass Media Researchers (NAMMI) is offered. It is taken now as a basis for the creation of Map of Russian Media Studies of the author of the article and with NAMMI's support.

Key words: *media studies; typology and classification; Russian regional universities; National Association of Mass Media Researchers; Map of Russian Media Studies.*

В статье анализируется состояние медиаисследований в российских региональных университетах. Анализируются самопрезентации направлений, проблем исследований ряда вузов, принявших участие в опросе. Дополнительные данные были взяты из соответствующих разделов сайтов университетов. Количественный статистический анализ сопровождается качественным исследованием, в ходе которого анализируется реальная проблематика научных поисков университетов в сфере изучения масс-медиа. Показываются серьезные различия между самопрезентацией научных направлений и реальными исследовательскими практиками по целям, задачам, используемым методикам. Делается вывод о необходимости выработки профессиональным сообществом универсального терминологического аппарата, единого классификатора научных исследований в области масс-медиа. Предлагается примерная модель такого классификатора, которая была поддержана Национальной ассоциацией исследователей масс медиа (НАММИ) и взята за основу в процессе создающегося сейчас под руководством автора статьи и при поддержке НАММИ «Атласа российских медиаисследований».

Ключевые слова: *медиаисследования; типология и классификация, региональные российские университеты; НАММИ; Атлас российских медиаисследований.*

One of the main tasks of National Association of Mass Media Researchers is to create a full inventory of research works and data provided by specialists in the sphere of mass communications. A serious barrier in implementing new approaches and solving up-to-date problems of this sphere is the lack of cooperation and data sharing between researchers in different regions, universities and cities of Russia. One of the possible explanations of this situation is that the Mass Communications Studies is only at the early stage of its development. The process of transformation of mass communication in the real world is far ahead of Mass Communications Studies development, that

is why it is very important for the professional research community to work out a common thesaurus, classifications and definitions which reflect the real situation. It is important to take into consideration the existing practices and valuable experience of practitioners working in different regions of our country and facing different stages of media development instead of implementing standardized recommendations from one "think tank". It goes without saying that we should undergo the unification process and work out some general norms and rules approved and accepted by the professional community. We believe that National Association of Mass Media Researchers should perform the role of the abovementioned "think tank".In order to become accepted by the professional community the recommendations worked out by National Association of Mass Media Researchers should be based on hands-on material and existing practices of media studies of the whole country.

The Board of National Association of Mass Media Researchers supported these ideas and introduced the project *Map of Russian Media Studies* at one of its first meetings (Interv'yu s Alexandrom Chernovym o proekte NAMMI "Atlas rossiiskikh mediaissledovanii", 2012).

The article discusses the process of shaping the pilot study within this project. The suggested structure of the study is as follows:

- the universities with journalism as a major which carry out the research in the sphere of mass media are listed;
- the list includes only regional universities, while the universities of Moscow and St-Petersburg are excluded;
- only the academic research is taken into account in the study, while monitoring, analytical and information centers which conduct media measurements are excluded;
- all these restrictions are purely technical and can be explained by the narrow-focused approach chosen for the study; in case the project is a success and is to be continued, Moscow and St-Petersburg universities as well as research centers will be also included into the list.

The form and research methods include: a questionnaire for representatives of universities, the members of Educational and Methodological Council on Journalism at Moscow State University; sample analysis

of websites of higher education institutions; analysis of official data on journalism development; analysis of reference data published lately.

The main problem complicating the research in this sphere is the lack of complete and trustworthy statistics. Thus, for example, it turned out that a simple question: how many universities suggest journalism as a major, was not easy to answer. The directory "Journalism Education in Russia" includes 94 higher education institutions, but only 83 Departments of Journalism are included into its appendix (Zhurnalistskoe obrazovanie v Rossii. Spravochnik, 2007), whereas 120 higher education institutions are mentioned in various research works and articles. Moreover, 110 Universities applied to the Ministry of Education and Science to provide them with state-funded places for journalism as a major in 2012.

We have chosen to rely in our research on the database provided by Russian Accreditation Agency as the most trustworthy source. Russian Accreditation Agency is the governmental body within the Ministry of Education and Science, and it is authorized to control the quality of education and its correspondence to state standards. The Agency also informs university applicants whether the university has the state accreditation in a given major.

The electronic directory "All Higher Education Institutions of Russia" contains such information as the graduation degree (specialist, bachelor, master) and the state accreditation of the universities where journalism is a major course. It is important to keep in mind that a curriculum can be accredited only after the first enrollment of students completes the education and graduates and that the process of accreditation takes the whole academic year, that is why the information in the database is constantly changing. For example, according to this database by June, 1 there were 149 Universities with Journalism as a major whereas by June, 10 this number increased to 169. It means that not the number of Universities with Journalism as a major but the number of accredited curriculums increased. Accordingly, the ratio of Journalism Departments in regional universities and universities of Moscow and St- Petersburg is changing. These data are not provided, therefore we can rely only on our own conclusions and observations. For example, according to the data provided by the directory by June, 1, 2012, we can see

that 15 out of the abovementioned 149 universities are situated in St-Petersburg, and 25 are in Moscow. Thus, the rest 109 are in regional universities.

Accredited higher education institutios with Journalism as a major

This ratio reflects the general state of affairs in the sphere of training a new generation of journalists.

At the first, pilot stage, the research was focused on the regional segment. A short questionnaire (Atlas rossiiskikh mediaissledovanii, 2012) was developed. It contained the following questions:

- Full name, title, institution, contact information (mailing address, phone number, e-mail);
- Full name of the department or chair at your institution, where research projects are being conducted;
- A few most important achievements of your institution in studying media and communications;
- A few influential scholars in the sphere of media and communications belonging to your institution;
- Full name, phone number, e-mail of a contact person from your institution who can provide further information on research projects conducted at your institution;
- If for some reason you do not know who is a contact person at your institution, please, provide contact information of the department, where research projects are being conducted

At the regular session of Educational and Methodological Council on Journalism at Moscow State University in February, 2012 50 representatives of Russian universities were asked to answer these questions. Unfortunately neither these nor any other questionnaire data can reflect the real state of affairs. Nevertheless, the analysis of these data allows to see the most significant research tendencies. The results were summed up and included into a database by NAMMI's Executive Director, Dr. Irina Zhilavskaya. However, many respondents failed to provide the detailed information. thus we had to browse the sites of the universities participating in various projects and to study the lists of published works and the titles of theses defended on journalism. 84 directions of research works and academic interests were mentioned by the respondents. The questionnaire revealed the spheres of interests and general lines of research activities common for all universities. As different researchers use different terminology to define the lines of research, we suggest the general taxonomy based on the subject and the sphere of research.

The 16 main lines of research mentioned by the representatives of the Universities are:

1. Language of mass media — 5 universities (6,96%);
2. Genres of mass media — 3 universities (3,57%);
3. Media texts — 1 university (1,2%);
4. Discourse Studies — 1 university (1,2%);
5. Regional mass media (as a part of the topic of the university research) — 31 universities (36,9%);
6. Economic approach to mass media (media management, media marketing) — 4 universities (4,7%);
7. Sociology of mass media — 7 universities (8,3%);
8. Multimedia journalism and problems of media convergence types — 5 universities (6,96%);
9. Internet as a media platform (transformations in media channeling): technologies, classifications, social and economic influence — 4 universities (4,7%);
10. Philosophy of mass media and philosophy of journalism — 1 university (1,2%);

11. Media images in social communication — 3 universities (1,2%);
12. Media education in Russia: from media literacy to proficiency — 7 universities (8,3%);
13. Journalism, advertizing, PR: ways of their interaction and cross-influence — 4 universities (4,7%);
14. Journalism and literature (fiction, non-fiction, journalism and media criticism) — 4 universities (4,7%);
15. Legislation in mass media — 2 universities (2,3%);
16. International journalism — 2 universities (2,3%);

You can see these results in the pie chart (figure 2):

The directions of research in regional Universities

Some conclusions:

1. Many research spheres in journalism have philology at their core. The vast majority of Journalism Departments cooperate with Philology Departments in their research work. Such topics as *Language of Mass Media* (6,96%)*, Genres of Mass Media* (3,57%)*, Media Texts* (1,2%)*, Discourse Studies* (1,2%) are studied in most universities, for example, Samara State University, Stavropol State University, Mari State University, Perm State National Research University, Smolensk, Vyatka, Novgorod, Altai, Belgorod, Orel, Cherepovets and some other universities.

2. Many universities try to develop methods and methodology of media education. South Ural State University, Tyumen State University, Belgorod State University, Perm State Institute Of Art And Culture, Orenburg State Teacher's Institute claim *Media Education in Russia: From Media Literacy to Proficiency* (8,3%) as their priority.

3. The analysis reflects close attention to *The Problems of Multimedia Journalism and the Problems of Media Convergence Types* (6,96%). This is a priority research area in the Far East Federal University, Vyatka State University, Altai State University, South Ural University, etc.

4. A crucial though not widespread research area is *Sociology of Mass Media* (8,3%). It is a priority research area in Saratov State University, South Ural State University, Samara State University, Togliatti State University, Cherepovets State University, Novgorod University, Smolensk State University, etc.

5. The level of interest to such research area as *Economic Approach to Mass Media (Media Management, Media Marketing)* (4,7%) is rather low. Altay State University, Stavropol State University and some other universities mention that they are interested in this area but the analysis shows that it seems to be only a declaration of intent.

6. The same level of interest is observed in the research area *Internet as a Media Platform (Transformations in Media Channeling): Technologies, Classifications, Social and Economic Influence* (4,7%). Only Vyatka State University, Stavropol State University, Voronezh University and Altai University mention that they are interested in this area.

The largest segment *Regional Media Studies* (37%) presents the most challenging task for analysis, as it is the most diffuse one. Browsing webpages of the universities which state that it is their prior research area, and analyzing the lists of published research works of university scholars and research teams, one can notice that one of the main problems is the lack of precision in definitions, as the declared works differ in their field and subject matter. It is possible to distinguish two approaches to *Regional Media Studies*: a) regional media in the context of national media, and b) studies of the specific character of regional media, regional media functioning, regional identity, peculiarities of regional media markets, different types of regional media, etc.

The research spheres in these two approaches differ greatly, and one can clearly discern between research objectives of the two abovementioned approaches. On the one hand, one can see such projects as "Peculiarities of Development of Regional Mass Media in the Far East" (the Far East Federal University), "History of Television of the Volga Region Republics", "History of Journalism in Chuvashia" (Chuvash State University), "History of Regional Journalism in Perm Region" (Perm State University), "History of Smolensk Region Journalism", "The Directory "Journalism in Tambov" and similar projects in Arkhangelsk, Chuvashia, Voronezh, etc. A number of textbooks and manuals on the history of journalism in different regions have been published. On the other hand, there are such projects as "Ethnic, National and Cross-ethnic Aspects of Mass Media (Russian-Komi and Finno-Ugric-Russian Cross-ethnic Cultural Contexts)" (Syktyvkar State University), "National Mass Media and the Press of the Volga Region Republics/ of North Caucasus/ of Siberia/ of the Far East", etc.

The desire to diversify a large segment of research, which the scholars and participants of the projects define as *Regional Media Studies* showed at least ten directions of research. Thus, within this segment (taken as 100%) the following directions can be distinguished:

1. Taxonomy of Russian regional media – 2 universities (6,5%);
2. The description and classifications of regional media – 11 universities (35,5%);

3. Peculiarities of regional media history – 6 universities (19,3%);
4. Ethnic and national peculiarities of regional media – 4 universities (12,9%);
5. Cultural influence on regional media – 7 universities (22,6%);
6. Social and economic influence on regional media – 2 universities (6,4%);
7. Regional media and the sociology of its audience – 6 universities (19,3%);
8. Peculiarities of mass communication types in the regions (TV, press, publishing, radio, etc.) – 4 universities (12,9%);
9. Local mass media (university TV) – 1 university (3,2%);
10. Regional media education: milieu, methods and techniques – 3 universities (9,6%).

The chart reflects these results (figure 3):

Figure 3

Directions of Regional Media Studies

- Taxonomy of Russian regional media
- The description and classifications of regional media
- Peculiarities of regional media history
- Ethnic and national peculiarities of regional media
- Cultural influence on regional media
- Social and economic influence on regional media
- Regional media and the sociology of its audience
- Peculiarities of mass communication types in the regions (TV, the press, publishing, radio etc.)
- Local mass media (university TV)
- Regional media education: milieu, methods and techniques

The analysis of the most considerable segment of studies in the regions highlighted the following problems:

- need for uniformity in terms and definitions;
- need for the general norms for the degree of research activity assessment;
- need for the transparency, which can be achieved through effective communication in the Russian professional community.

The first pilot stage of the project not only revealed these problems but also pinpointed the ways to solve them. At the next stage the following two tasks will be crucial: 1) to create the taxonomy of the existed research which should be approved by the professional community, and 2) to work out the criteria of research activity assessment accepted by the majority of media researchers.

Regarding the first task, it would be sensible to use the classification suggested by National Association of Mass Media Researchers as the basis, and to add Regional Media Studies into it. It will include the following directions:

1. Mass Media as a Social Institution;
2. Mass Media Management;
3. Mass Media Audience;
4. Mass Media Influence;
5. Professional Journalism in the Age of Digital Media;
6. Mass Media Texts;
7. Regional Media Studies

As for the second task concerning the research activity assessment, the matrix format can be suggested. In the down column the directions of research are stated while in the horizontal row the achievements of the researcher and results of the work (from field research to monographs) are reflected.

Results and intensity / Direction of research	Published monograph	Collection of articles	Published articles	Articles published in Russian peer-reviewed journals	Articles published in the journals included into Citation Index	Field research	Presentation at a conference	Implementation of the results
Mass Media as a Social Institution (theory of communication and journalism, media imagery in social communications, media and law, mass media and media communication history)								
Mass Media Management (media economy, media management, media marketing)								

Mass Media Audience (transformation (including historical), classification, the level of media information literacy, media behavior, media activity, media education)		
Mass Media Influence (media psychology, media sociology, media measurement)		
Professional Journalism in the Age of Digital Media (multimedia and convergence in the current media practice, innovation in training).		

Mass Media Texts (media criticism, mass media discourse and media texts, journalism and literature (fiction and nonfiction, including political essays), etc.			
Regional Media Studies (objective processes of media regionalization, including the impact of globalization)			

In the conclusion we can suggest the following:

1. Research within the project *Map of Russian Media Studies* should be continued;
2. It is important to define research tools and to coordinate research activities in the country;
3. It is necessary to inform the professional community about the project and promote its ideas and objectives.

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Part 2.

RUSSIAN MEDIA: ANALYSING THE CURRENT TRENDS

RUSSIAN SUPREME COURT'S VISION OF MEDIA FREEDOM[11]

СВОБОДА СМИ ГЛАЗАМИ ВЕРХОВНОГО СУДА РФ

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    The article explains and illustrates what can be called the most important milestone in Russian media law since 20 years: the adoption by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of the Resolution "On the Judicial Practice Related to the Statute of the Russian Federation 'On the Mass Media'". The author argues that it brings Russia closer to a modern and coherent legal framework for the media sector. The adoption of this Resolution is a unique, long-awaited and important event in the regulation of Russian mass media. The Resolution instructs how to interpret and apply the Statute on the Mass Media of 1991 to digital and Internet based services in today's market. With its Resolution the Supreme Court fills in the gaps in the overall legal framework applicable to mass media and shows how Russian Media Law may be adapted to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

    Key words: *media law; censorship; privileges of journalists; access to information; freedom of the media.*

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[11] This chapter is based on the abridged version of the author's article "Russia's Modern Approach to Media Law" (Richter, 2011). The author was one of the five external experts appointed to the working group of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which elaborated the text of this resolution.

В статье объясняется и иллюстрируется, пожалуй, наиболее важное событие в российском праве СМИ за последние 20 лет: принятие пленумом Верховного суда РФ Постановления «О практике применения судами Закона Российской Федерации «О средствах массовой информации». Автор утверждает, что оно делает правовые рамки СМИ в России более современными и разумными. Постановление инструктирует судей в отношении применения Закона «О СМИ» 1991 г. к цифровым и Интернет-услугам, существующим на медиа-рынке. Своим Постановлением Верховный суд заполняет прорехи, существовавшие в системе правового регулирования СМИ, показывая, как Закон «О СМИ» приспособить к практике Европейского суда по правам человека.

Ключевые слова: *право СМИ; цензура; права журналистов; доступ к информации; свобода массовой информации.*

Introduction to the procedure for the adoption of resolutions by the Supreme Court

In June 2010, Russia's highest court adopted for the first time in its history a coherent interpretation of relevant case law in relation to the mass media, editors and journalists.

To recall some of the background, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Article 126)[12] the supreme judicial body for civil, criminal, administrative and other cases under the jurisdiction of common courts is the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (hereinafter "the Supreme Court"), which among other duties shall "provide explanations on the issues of court practice". According to the Statute "On

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[12] The Constitution was adopted by popular vote on 12 December 1993. See URL: http://constitution.ru/ for the official translations of the Constitution into English, German and French.

the Judicial System of the RSFSR"[13], which is still in force, explanations introduced by the Plenary Meeting of the Supreme Court are binding for both the courts of law and other state bodies, as well as for state officials who apply the law.

The Resolution "On Judicial Practice Related to the Statute of the Russian Federation "On the Mass Media" (hereinafter − the Resolution) was unanimously adopted at the Plenary Meeting on 15 June 2010 by all 78 judges of the Supreme Court, who were present[14].

Foundations of the Media Regulation

The Resolution sets out the important political and legal principle that the "freedom to express opinions and views and the freedom of mass information are the foundations for developing a modern society and a democratic state", thus underlining the place and role of the free media in the system of institutions and values of the Russian Federation. Courts should take this principle into consideration in all cases in which this freedom is challenged in the name of values that are not exactly the foundations for developing democracy in the Russian Federation, such as public morals or the reputation of citizens and companies.

Limitations on the freedom of mass information, as the Resolution reminds, are admissible exclusively if imposed by a federal statute of Rus-

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[13] RSFSR stands for *Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic*.

[14] Resolution of the Plenary of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation "On the Judicial Practice Related to the Statute of the Russian Federation 'On the Mass Media'" No. 16. The author was one of the five external experts appointed to the working group of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which elaborated the text of this resolution. See the Russian text at URL: http://www.rg.ru/2010/06/18/smi-vs-dok.html. An official English translation is available on the website of the Supreme Court at URL: http://www.vsrf.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=6786 and URL: http://www.vsrf.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=6787. An unofficial (but more reliable) translation was published in Richter, 2011, see URL: http://www.obs.coe.int/oea_publ/iris/iris_plus/2011-1.html.

sia and cannot be introduced by any other legal act. The Supreme Court refers here to the provisions of Article 55 paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which stipulates that the rights and freedoms of a person and citizen may be limited only by a federal statute to the extent necessary to protect the foundations of the constitutional system, morals, health, rights and legal interests of other persons, and to defend the country and the security of the state. Therefore, if judges are adjudicating on the question whether or not media professionals may be exposed to liability charges, the judges are instructed to verify possible limitations on the right to freedom of information of the media professionals are indeed covered by a federal statute (and not solely, for example, by regional statutes, decrees of the President or governmental resolutions).

The Resolution enumerates international mechanisms that regulate freedom of expression and freedom of mass information and are binding for the Russian Federation. In this regard the Resolution steps out of routine by referring the Russian courts not only to the relevant provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights but also to the rarely recalled Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the CIS Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Censorship

An important place in the Resolution is taken by the Supreme Court's commentary on the provisions in the Statute of the Russian Federation "On the Mass Media"[15] (hereafter — Statute on the Mass Media) that refer to the ban on censorship (point 14[16]). Although in general the Resolution's statement is trivial the text provides some curious nuances.

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[15] Statute of the Russian Federation "On the Mass Media" No. 2124-1 of 27 December 1991 as of 8 December 2003 (in English): URL: http://merlin. obs.coe.int/redirect.php?id=12475

[16] Point numbers in brackets hereinafter refer to the points of the Resolution.

The courts are reminded that according to Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Statute on the Mass Media censorship is the demand made by officials, state bodies, or local self-government bodies, organizations or public associations that the editorial office of a mass medium or its representatives (in particular the editor-in-chief or his/her deputy) obtain from them prior approval for the publication of messages and materials (except for cases when the official is an author or interviewee), as well as for the suppression of the dissemination of messages and materials[17] or separable parts thereof.

The Supreme Court notes that officials have indeed the right to demand that their prior approval be given, when the subject matter to be disseminated consists of their own materials or interviews given to journalists. By contrast, the law does not foresee a corresponding obligation of the journalist to obtain prior approval for disseminating this type of information. Therefore, the Supreme Court's message is that while such a demand is not an act of censorship, a journalist's refusal to provide the transcript for an advance agreement on it is not punishable. This is important for court cases on the content of media materials disseminated on the basis of interviews because the Supreme Court's reading of the provision allows the editorial offices to edit interviews independently (under the condition that they do not violate copyright law). This rule is even more evident if a journalist makes his own story based on the interview without "distortion of its meaning and the words of the interviewee" (point 14).

According to the Supreme Court, it is a different question under what conditions the founders of the mass medium (whose status resembles in many ways that of owners of the media outlet) may lawfully demand that its editorial office or its editor ask for their prior approval on messages and materials that they intend to disseminate. The answer depends on whether or not the editorial charter or a separate agreement between the

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[17] The law does not define what it understands by "messages" and "materials". It appears, however, that messages are meant to be texts or speeches while materials can be visual and therefore refer to videos, photos, etc.

founder and the editorial office (that under certain circumstances replaces the editorial charter) foresees this possibility. The Supreme Court concludes that, in the absence of such a provision, any interference by the founder with the professional independence of the editorial office and the rights of a journalist is illegal.

The Resolution explains that despite a general ban on censorship stipulated by Article 29 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Articles 56 and 87 of the Constitution allow for a possibility of limiting freedom of mass information as a temporary measure in case of a state of emergency or the martial law (although these articles do not specify that censorship is indeed such a measure). In these cases censorship can be imposed and enforced following the procedure established by the Federal Constitutional Statutes[18] "On the State of Emergency" and "On the Martial Law".

Regulation of online media

The Supreme Court made a bold (though in a way short-lived) step and tailored the norms of the Statute on the Mass Media, which was adopted in 1991 and hence before the phenomenon of the Internet had come to Russia, to the social relations that characterise the virtual world and that require a legal framework. Neither has the text of the Statute on the Mass Media been amended to take into account these new relations, nor was a special statute addressing Internet-related legal issues ever adopted. As a result the legal framework for interactive and online services was quite unclear and allowed for different interpretations of the potentially applicable norms. The Supreme Court proved its courage in applying the logic of the Statute on the Mass Media to the relations between the providers and users of online services.

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[18] Federal Constitutional Statutes have a higher status than Federal Statutes, they are adopted following a more complex procedure and may not be vetoed by the President.

A logical construction based on Article 24 paragraph 2 of the Statute on the Mass Media led the Supreme Court to important legal conclusions. The main one was that websites were not subject to mandatory registration as they would be if they were to be considered mass media outlets. Thus the Resolution (point 6) confirmed the legal tradition that has emerged in Russia in the absence of clear rules, namely that the registration of websites can be done on a voluntary basis only (Richter, 2010). In 2011 Article 24 of the Statute on the Mass Media was abolished, and a new notion of the media was introduced into the law. One of the types of the mass media is now a "network publication", or in fact an online media.

If the registration takes place, continues the Resolution, then the authors of online services acquire the status of journalists with all the rights and privileges foreseen by the Statute on the Mass Media. Many websites seek such registration, because they want to receive accreditation with state bodies for their reporters. Now registration will become easier because point 6 of the Resolution stipulates as follows:

"According to Article 1 of the Statute of the Russian Federation On the Mass Media, freedom of mass information includes the right of any person to found a mass media outlet in any form that is not prohibited by the law. Starting Internet websites and using them to periodically disseminate mass information is not banned by the law. Considering this and based on the comprehensive list of grounds to refuse state registration of a mass media outlet set out in part 1 of Article 13 of the mentioned Statute, the registration authority has no right to refuse the registration of an Internet website as a mass media outlet should its founder express the wish to obtain such a registration".

In other words, registration is not necessary but if requested it should always be provided.

On the other hand, if a website is registered as a mass media its staff bears the same responsibilities as journalists. The site itself is subject to the system of warnings from Roskomnadzor[19] or a public prosecutor in

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[19] Roskomnadzor is a Russian abbreviation for the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technologies and Mass Media under the Ministry of Communications and Mass Communications.

cases of abuse of the freedom of mass information. Such warnings may eventually lead to the site being forced to close down as a media outlet, although in such a case it would probably be able to continue to operate as a regular website. These consequences deter many website operators who therefore refrain from requesting registration. The Resolution acknowledges that those who violate the law when disseminating information through Internet websites not registered as mass media outlets shall be subject to penal, administrative, civil, and other liability under the legislation of the Russian Federation. However, they may not be subjected to the specific provisions foreseen by the legislation on the mass media among which are stricter penalties for dissemination in the mass media of extremist calls.

The Resolution provided a vital clarification on the issue whether there was a need to obtain a broadcasting licence to disseminate audio-visual programming online. The Supreme Court recalled that a broadcasting licence was necessary if technical means for over-the-air, wire, or cable television and radio broadcasting are used to distribute the mass media output (Article 31 of the Statute on the Mass Media). It then considered that such technical devices were not used for disseminating mass information through websites. As a consequence, the Supreme Court concluded, a person who disseminated mass information online did not need to acquire a broadcasting licence. This explanation removed the threat for online broadcasters that performing online commercial or non-profit activities without a licence might lead to administrative liability, which would have been the case had a licence been deemed obligatory by law. Alas the relief did not last for long. In 2011 amendments adopted to Article 31 of the Statute on the Mass Media eliminated the condition to use over-the-air, wire, or cable means for broadcasting to be considered as such and thus made it clear that a licence is necessary to be obtained in dissemination programmes online, if the broadcasts are based on a schedule.

Further on the Resolution reiterated that the provisions of Article 24 paragraph 2 of the Statute on the Mass Media referred to the applicabil-

ity of the rules established for radio and television, but only where such rules were established by the Statute on the Mass Media. As the latter refrains from the regulation of advertising, the rules established by the Federal Statute "On Advertising" in relation to commercials in television and radio broadcasting did not apply to the Internet. This had been open to question with regard to the norms relating to the amount and time of advertising and bans or restrictions on advertising of certain types of goods and services (such as tobacco, alcohol or medical services). At the same time the Resolution mentioned that general rules on dissemination of advertisements in the mass media established by the Statute on Advertising should be applied to those websites registered as mass media outlets. Because there were no such general rules (with a minor exception for advertising to raise funds for shared construction of real estate), the Supreme Court probably referred to such basic principles of advertising as fairness and credibility of information. A year later, in 2012, the parliament amended the Statute on Advertising to include a ban on advertising of alcohol products in Internet. That move made a strong blow on the financial sustainability of online news media.

An issue dealt with in the Resolution that enjoyed intense attention by the media is the liability of the "editorial offices" of registered Internet sites for statements made by readers/viewers on the website's fora and chat pages. If this section of the website is not pre-moderated, the editorial office of such an outlet can become liable only if it receives a complaint from Roskomnadzor or a public prosecutor that the content of a communication presents an abuse of the freedom of the mass media (Article 4 of the Statute on the Mass Media) and subsequently fails to amend (or delete) the communication and the communication has been judged to be illegal by a court. Here the Resolution draws a parallel between such fora and live broadcasts that do not make broadcasters liable in accordance with Article 57 ("Absolution from Responsibility") of the Statute on the Mass Media.

At the stage of editing the draft resolution representatives of Roskomnadzor strongly objected to this reasoning. Their position was based on

the argument that registration as a mass media outlet assigns the editorial office of an Internet site certain responsibilities. Among such responsibilities, the basic one is editing the information disseminated by the media outlet. The way in which this duty is performed directly relates to potential liability for violations of the Statute on the Mass Media, and in particular for dissemination of extremist speech. Roskomnadzor was worried about a possible hike in extremist materials, as well as materials that propagate pornography and the cult of violence and cruelty under the disguise of comments on the websites registered as mass media.

Soon after the adoption of the Resolution, on 6 July 2010, the head of Roskomnadzor issued Order No. 420 which approved "Rules for addressing requests concerning the prohibition of abuse of the freedom of mass media by material sent to the mass media and disseminated through information telecommunication networks, Internet included". The Rules have been drafted in accordance with the Statute on the Mass Media, Regulations on Roskomnadzor, and the Resolution.

According to the Rules, if comments that appear on websites registered as mass media seem to abuse the freedom of mass media a Roskomnadzor official makes a screenshot of the questionable material and prepares a report, to which it adds a copy of the screenshot. Immediately thereafter Roskomnadzor sends to the mass media outlet a request suggesting to remove or to edit the material. The request is signed by the head of a Roskomnadzor department and is registered and formulated following standard internal rules.

The request is to be sent to the editorial office of the online media via e-mail to the Internet address announced on their website (with a marker of notification of delivery), as well as via fax. The fact and time of the dispatch of the request must be documented. Compliance with the action suggested is checked one working day after the dispatch. In case the demand to remove the questionable material is not met or the performed editing does not result in the removal of the elements of abuse of the freedom of mass media, an official warning to the edito-

rial office is issued. The Rules have already been used on a number of occasions.

One may doubt the legality of some of the provisions of the Rules. To begin with, the 24-hour deadline is set neither in the Statute on the Mass Media, nor in the Resolution. The absence of any time reference in the law made it impossible for the Resolution to find a requirement for the mass media outlet to act "immediately" or "as soon as possible". Moreover, there is no obligation for a mass media outlet to indicate its e-mail address on its website, to check its e-mails every day, or to have a facsimile device. In response to this criticism raised by this author in an interview to the *Deutsche Welle* radio, the broadcaster received an inquiry from an assistant to the head of Roskomnadzor as to the time limits that exist in Germany for reacting to official complaints. In reply the station provided Roskomnadzor with a memo published on the website of both *Deutsche Welle* and Roskomnadzor[20]. It indicated in particular that the normal practice in Germany for website operators was to have a grace period of a week in controversial situations when consulting lawyers might be necessary to come to a conclusion.

The Resolution abstains from giving guidelines on situations in which the editorial office of an online media are addressed not by public bodies and officials but by individuals who believe that their rights and legal interests were violated in comments disseminated via Internet forums and chats. Will the media outlet that ignores such a complaint be still exempt from responsibility? The discussion in the editorial group showed that the majority believed that the persons defamed should make use of their right to a refutation of the defamatory statements in the same fora and chats. As a research shows the case law on civil lawsuits in relation to defamatory comments in the forums became very controversial and requires additional explanations from the top courts (Richter, 2013).

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[20] See the websites of Deutsche Welle (URL: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5915106,00.html) and Roskomnadzor (URL: http://rsoc.ru/press/publications/news12554.htm).

Guarantees for access to information

The Resolution clarifies some issues concerning the access of journalists to information that is of public interest. The Supreme Court reiterates that information inquiry by the editorial office of a mass medium (Article 39 of the Statute on the Mass Media) is a legal means to seek information on the activities of state bodies, bodies of local self-government, state and municipal organizations (commercial and non-commercial), public associations, and their officials (point 15). The novelty of the explanation is that it explicitly puts both commercial and non-commercial public organisations under the obligation to provide information, while earlier the former were typically excluded for reasons of commercial secrecy.

One important instruction to the courts in relation to information requests is based on Article 38 of the Statute on the Mass Media, which stipulates that providing data requested by the editorial office of a mass media outlet is a form of satisfying citizens' rights to promptly receive information from the mass media on activities of public bodies and their representatives. Taking into consideration "that after a long period of time the requested information may lose its currency", the Resolution instructs the courts "to examine and adjudicate such cases as quickly as possible" (point 15).

In the context of access to information the Resolution deals with the issue of accreditation of journalists (point 21). It discusses Article 48 of the Statute on the Mass Media, which is the only article in Russian law that concerns accreditation. The Resolution contains several conclusions:

1. Accreditation provides journalists with additional possibilities of seeking and obtaining information in comparison with those who are not accredited;
2. Rules concerning accreditation by state bodies, bodies of local self-government, state and municipal organizations may not impose limitations on the rights and freedoms of accredited journalists other than those foreseen in the federal statutes (for example,

the suspension of an accreditation would not be a permissible measure as it is not stipulated by a federal statute);

3. There are no grounds to refuse accreditation or to cancel it other than those listed in Article 48 (these are: violation of the rules of accreditation and/or a court decision holding that the accredited journalist defamed the accrediting organisation).

Thus the Supreme Court in fact says that a public body may not legally deny accreditation to a mass medium previously not accredited at that body, and it instructs the courts to assist journalists who sue against such a denial.

Protection of journalists' privileges

Like elsewhere in the world Russian journalists, editors and media outlets enjoy certain privileges that under particular circumstances protect them from the need to check the truthfulness of the information that they disseminate and from related accusations of violating the law. They are all listed in Article 57 of the Statute on the Mass Media, and each of them is discussed in the Resolution.

According to Articles 57 and 35 of the Statute on the Mass Media, the editorial office, editor-in-chief and journalists of a mass medium are exempt from liability for disseminating information that is part of so-called "obligatory reports", that is statements that an editorial office is obliged to publish by law or pursuant to a court order. The Resolution (point 22) adds to the very few narrowly defined cases when the law speaks of an obligation to disseminate specific information (e.g. under the martial law) the case of broadcasting or publishing (free of charge) material for election or referendum campaigning according to the rules of the relevant legislation. Such an obligation exists, for example, for state but also private broadcasters that agree to provide airtime for campaigning and therefore must comply with the conditions set in the Federal Statute "On Basic Guaranties of the Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in a Referendum

of Citizens of the Russian Federation". The Resolution also includes in the list of exemptions the obligations imposed on the national state-run broadcaster by the Federal Statute "On Guarantees of Equality of Parliamentary Parties as to the Coverage of their Activities by the State-Run General TV and Radio Channels". By doing so the Supreme Court makes a bold step towards protecting the media from liability for the contents of the campaigning messages that they disseminate. Such dissemination typically occurs without real possibility for the editors to amend the content as any attempt of interference could be considered a violation of the electoral rights of candidates. From now on all liability for pre-election statements lies with the politicians who make these statements.

The Supreme Court gives a crucial explanation with regard to the exemption from liability for information contained in interviews with representatives of state and local self-government bodies, state and municipal organisations, institutions, enterprises, bodies of public associations, and the official representatives of their press services. The Resolution (point 23) instructs judges that the contents of such interviews shall have a legal nature equal to that of an official response of such organisations to an information request by the mass media outlet (and in the case of disseminating the latter the media are also exempt from liability). Thus the media are now free from having to verify information provided by a variety of interviewed persons − from politicians and officials to press spokesmen. Earlier the practice of holding journalists liable for the content of interviews was quite common.

Further on the Resolution discusses a privilege related to official speeches and statements made by public officials as well as by delegates to the meetings of public associations such as political parties. There was a certain legal ambiguity as to which speeches can be considered "official". The Supreme Court held that they include, for example, speeches by an official at a scheduled meeting, held in the presence of journalists, in specially allocated premises of a building of the corresponding body, organisation or public association and in accordance with the approved agenda (point 23).

Because the media are exempt from liability only if they reproduce the words of the officials "literally", the Supreme Court explains that the Statute on the Mass Media does not necessarily require verbatim reproduction as the courts believed was the case. The Resolution states that literal reproduction is "a form of quotation that does not change the meaning of the statements, reports, materials and their fragments while and where the author's words are quoted without distortion". At the same time, the Supreme Court notes that it is important to consider that every so often exact fragments of statements, reports or materials, when quoted out of context, can appear to have a different meaning to the original meaning of the statement, report or material. Thus the Resolution's interpretation of literal reproduction becomes very favourable for responsible media outlets.

Article 57 of the Statute on the Mass Media also makes media outlets immune from liability for literal reproduction of materials taken from other mass media "which can be ascertained and called to account for a breach of the legislation of the Russian Federation on mass media". When considering the norm, the Supreme Court recalls that the "other mass media" do not need to be necessarily outlets registered in Russia. According to the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 402 of the Civil Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, a foreign outlet can be held liable in Russia, if the defendant organisation, its administrative body, branch or representative office are on the Russian territory or if the defendant citizen resides in Russia or if the defendant has property on Russian territory, or (even more importantly) – in defamation cases – if the plaintiff resides in Russia.

Public interest

The Supreme Court notes that there are three norms in the federal law related to mass media activities that refer to "the public interest":

1. Article 49 paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 5 of the Statute on the Mass Media stipulates a ban on the dissemination of information

concerning the private life of citizens in the mass media without their prior consent or the prior consent of their legal representatives unless disseminating the information is necessary for the protection of public interests;

2. Article 50 paragraph 1 sub-paragraph 2 of the same statute allows for dissemination of reports and materials produced with the assistance of hidden audio- and video recording, film recording and photography if this is necessary for the protection of public interests and provided that measures against possible identification of outsiders have been taken;

3. Article 152 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation specifies that the divulging and further use of the image of a citizen is allowed only with the consent of the citizen. His consent is not needed, however, if the use of the image is in state, social or other public interests.

Because the notion of public interest is not legally defined, courts are in a difficult position when adjudicating on conflicts based on different interpretations of public interest. Providing such a definition turned out to be a difficult task, especially because the laws of other European countries rarely provide examples. Therefore the Supreme Court relies for its definition on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

The Resolution notes that "public interest shall be understood not as any interest expressed by the audience but as, for example, the need of the public to reveal and expose a threat to the democratic state governed by the rule of law and to civil society, to public safety, or to the environment". The Supreme Court does not limit the notion to clear-cut examples but goes further by instructing the courts to "make a distinction between reporting facts (even controversial ones) capable of contributing in a positive way to a debate in society, concerning, for example, officials and public figures in the exercise of their functions, and reporting details of the private life of an individual who does not exercise any public functions. While in the former case the mass media exercises its public duty by contributing to imparting information on matters of public interest, it does not do so in the latter case" (point 25).

With this reasoning the Russian Supreme Court clearly follows the arguments of the European Court of Human Rights in its famous judgments concerning the cases of *Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom* and *von Hannover v. Germany*. If the media disclose aspects of private life with the aim to uncover corruption or other offences of politicians and officials such an endeavour establishes circumstances that grant the editorial office immunity from lawsuits aimed at protection of private and family life. This needs to be distinguished from cases when the disclosure of private information is done for the sake of sensation or seeks to cater to lowbrow interests of the audience. In these cases the law shall not grant protection.

This position of the Supreme Court is extremely important for the sake of political discussion in the Russian media because it allows journalists to widely use the rights provided to them by the Statute on the Mass Media and the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.

Protection of confidential sources

The Supreme Court discusses another important issue for political journalism: the conditions for disclosure of confidential sources of information. The Resolution reminds the courts that they shall be guided by Article 41 of the Statute on the Mass Media, which stipulates that the editorial office is obliged to keep the source of information secret and has no right to name the person who has provided the information with the proviso that his name not be divulged. The Resolution states that the personal data of the person making the proviso is "secret information, which is specially protected by the federal statute" (point 26). An exception applies, if the demand for disclosure is made by a court of law in connection with a case pending before that court.

By providing this explanation the Supreme Court confirms that there is no contradiction between Article 41 of the Statute on the Mass Media quoted above and Article 56 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Rus-

sian Federation adopted after the Statute on the Mass Media. Article 56 provides a list of persons who may not be called to testify in court as witnesses (attorneys, clergymen, etc.). The list does not mention journalists or editorial workers, which does not exclude in principle that there may be other groups enjoying relief from the duty to witness in court. This is confirmed by the Constitution (Article 51 paragraph 2) which declares: "A federal statute may envisage other cases of absolution from the obligation to testify". The importance of the explanation of the Supreme Court lies in reminding prosecutors and investigation bodies that are more accustomed to work with the Criminal Procedure Code than the Statute on the Mass Media which norm to apply — and that is the norm of the Statute on the Mass Media on confidentiality of sources.

And even though a court of law may still demand such a disclosure at any stage of the case deliberations, the Supreme Court makes an important clarification for the freedom of the media in this regard. The Resolution stipulates that such a demand is allowed only after "all other means to learn about relevant circumstances, which are important for the just examination and adjudication of the case, are exhausted and the public interest in disclosure of the source of information overrides the public interest in keeping it a secret" (point 26). Here again the Supreme Court follows the case law of the European Court of Human Rights[21]. It is clear that the Resolution obliges the courts from now on to provide reasons for why the public interest in disclosure would outweigh the necessity to keep the source secret.

Conclusion

The Resolution is unique and a long-awaited and important event in the legal regulation of Russian mass media. By analysing its text one remarks the extraordinary character of its essential content.

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[21] E.g. judgment on the case of *Goodwin v. the United Kingdom* (Application no. 17488/90).

In our view the significance of the Resolution is not only to set uniform rules for court practice. Adopted at a critical stage in national journalism, it pushes the editorial offices to provide an honest service aimed at truthfully and critically informing the public on issues of common interest, and most of all, on political developments in Russia. At the same time, journalism as mass entertainment for the sake of ratings and maximum profits now gets less protection in courts.

The Resolution allows Russian media to engage in socially responsible journalism without being threatened by illegal pressure in the courtroom, extreme demands by state bodies and excessive bureaucratic procedures. By adopting it the Supreme Court in fact instructs the judges to stand guard of a professionally honest quality journalism in Russia.

Unfortunately more recent amendments to the Statute on the Mass Media and the pieces of legislation attempt to reverse this positive trend set by the Supreme Court. By Constitution the Supreme Court cannot change the law, but it can and it does continue to interpret it in the best possible way for democracy and freedom of the media in Russia.

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ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONVERGENCE IN RUSSIAN DAILY PRESS

ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ ЭФФЕКТЫ КОНВЕРГЕНЦИИ В РОССИЙСКОЙ ЕЖЕДНЕВНОЙ ПРЕССЕ

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The "industrialization" of convergence, the tendency to build multimedia and social elements into the mass media business model most vividly manifest themselves in daily newspapers: high periodicity requires, firstly, a highly developed culture of financial management and, secondly, well-functioning managerial processes.

The goal of this paper is to understand the share of convergence projects (websites, in particular) in the total financial results for the Russian daily press. In addition, the authors focused on the methods for monetization of the projects implemented on the convergence basis.

In terms of the development of convergence projects, there is an obvious gap between the daily press of the two capitals (Moscow and St-Petersburg) and their counterparts in the Russian regions. The financial results for convergence projects of the national daily newspapers exceed those of the regional ones by an order of magnitude and even more.

In general, for Russian dailies convergence is not a significant source of revenues, which do not exceed 10% of the gross revenues made by the newspaper as an enterprise (the print version plus the website). Exceptions are rare. Moreover, half the media outlets under our consideration declare zero or negative cash flow from convergence projects.

Key words: *convergence; daily newspaper; economics of daily press; investments; profit.*

Статья представляет собой обобщение и анализ данных первого этапа исследования влияния конвергенции на экономику, финансы и менеджмент ежедневных газет в России. Полученные результаты показывают, что в настоящее время еще рано говорить о существенном вкладе конвергентных, прежде всего онлайновых продуктов и услуг в выручку и прибыль газетной прессы. В российских ежедневных газетах, за минимальными исключениями, доход от конвергентных операций не превышает 10% совокупной выручки издания. При этом половина рассмотренных газет вообще не получает прибыли или даже фиксирует убытки от конвергентных проектов и продуктов.

Конвергенция пока не позволяет и в ближайшей перспективе не позволит генерировать выручку, достаточную для того, чтобы газеты могли создавать интернет-редакции как самостоятельный бизнес или отказываться от бумажной версии. При этом очевидна существенная разница в уровне экономической отдачи от конвергенции между двумя кластерами изданий — представителями двух столиц (Москвы и Санкт-Петербурга) и региональных газет.

Ключевые слова: *конвергенция; ежедневная газета; экономика ежедневной прессы; инвестиции; прибыль.*

Introduction

Convergence process has come to be one of the most significant factors in mass media transformation worldwide (Gillmor, 2004; Feldman, 1996; Flew, 2005; Kung, Picard, Towse, 2008; Internet-SMI. Teoriya i praktika, 2010). In this research the convergence is understood as a production of digital media product through the integration of multimedia and social elements (text, photography, graphics, audios, videos, hypertext, blogs, social media, and the like) and distribution of these products across a wide number of digital channels.

Convergence effects may take various forms: they influence content, change audience characteristics and shape perception of a mass media brand. Nevertheless, if we see mass media as a business, the major effects of convergence deal with its economic and managerial consequences, i.e. changes in the business model and media management elements (Allan, 2006; Deuze, 2007).

"Industrialization" of convergence, a tendency to integrate multimedia and social elements into media business models can be clearly identified in daily newspapers: their high periodicity requires, first, impeccable financial management and, second, well-functioning managerial processes.

The relatively successful development of multimedia projects in the national press of the Russian Federation brings up two issues for researchers to consider: that of economic and managerial consequences of convergence as a whole and that of spreading convergence models throughout the country, among regional press outlets (Vartanova, 2010; Vartanova, Smirnov, 2010).

In order to study these issues, the authors have conducted a number of in-depth interviews with representatives of the national and regional daily press, which enabled them to get a notion of the business component of convergence projects both in large metropolitan newspapers and local (republican and regional) ones.

The interviews were aimed at finding out the share of convergence projects (websites, in particular) in the total financial results for the Russian daily press. Revenues, profit/losses, expenses as well as investment volume were con-

sidered. Along with these, the authors examined convergence-based project monetization strategies and managerial decisions pertaining to the projects.

The research results indicate that convergence in Russian daily newspapers is at an early stage of development, a fact supported by a relatively low monetization level of relevant projects (in terms of income and profit). However, considering daily newspaper managers' plans for developing digital platforms, there are reasons to believe that in time the contribution of convergence to newspapers' income and profit will grow.

Moreover, we have to admit that in terms of convergence project development there is a large gap between the metropolitan cities (Moscow and St-Petersburg) and the regions. Taking into account the obvious disparity in investment activity of national and regional newspapers (gross investments), we tend to believe that in the near future the gap will not be reduced, to say nothing of being overcome.

Background

According to Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communications (FAPMK), the newspaper industry of the Russian Federation includes 40 thousand registered newspaper titles. Among them are "classical" (social and political) general interest newspapers that account for not more than 5 thousand, including regional and urban ones. Admittedly, there are no data available on the number of newspapers of the above-mentioned 40,000 which come out on a regular basis. According to the FAMPK specialized report, they hardly amount to 60% (not more than 24 thousand).

What is more, most of these 24 thousand titles are low quality media products, whose target audience is unclear and distribution geography is rather limited. According to FAMPK, in the second half of 2010 the subscription catalogue of the joint stock company "Rospechat" (one of the largest Russian Press Distribution Agencies) included 366 newspapers: 233 national and 143 regional ones. The Russian Press catalogue of "Pochta Rossii", which is also engaged in distribution, published at

the same time by Intraregional Subscription Agency (MAP), lists 2030 newspapers in the country's regions, among others 466 national ones.

Along with it, the circulation auditing system in Russia is far from being developed: there is no information available on the volumes of print media products. The only more or less reliable source of information on the popularity of newspaper is audience measurements.

Thus, despite the undoubtedly large number of newspapers in the Russian Federation, the monitoring of their condition is not sufficiently clear and sound: in order to detect current tendencies, additional researches into the industry are needed.

Table 1 below contains the data on the audiences of the largest national daily newspapers in Russia. Two of these (*Sovetskiy Sport* and *Sport Ekspress*) are sporting dailies, another two (*Kommersant* and *Vedomosti*) are business newspapers, while the largest one (*Iz Ruk v Ruki*) is pure classified.

Table 1

Top daily newspapers in terms of one issue audience (AIR, Russia)[22]

№	Title of edition	2010	
		in thousand people	in %
1	*Iz Ruk v Ruki*	3 813,0	6,6
2	*Komsomolskaya Pravda*	2 886,5	5,0
3	*Rossiyskaya Gazeta*	1 393,4	2,4
4	*Moskovskiy Komsomolets*	1 150,6	2,0
5	*Sovetskiy Sport*	572,6	1,0
6	*Sport-Ekspress*	567,2	1,0
7	*Izvestiya*	369,8	0,6
8	*Kommersant*	258,6	0,4
9	*Vedomosti*	155,3	0,3

[22] Source: TNS Rossiya, NRS, May-October, 2009 May-October, 2010. URL: http://www.tns-global.ru/rus data/ratings/press/index.wbp?press.action=search&press.regionId=68CDA84F-6158-4F7C-A36A-7DAF207B88E1&press.regionId=C27FFFD9-CC9B-4AD1-B826-00B2CDE2B4AB&press.regionId=C9838420-042B-4B9E-B7A8-F228DB27C8E1&press.periodId=A849006B-07C1-42DB-BA2E-E55025CEC789&press.smiId=FFE6B659-63E1-46F3-96E1-53EBD1D16CCE

Table 2 contains the data on the audiences of the largest weekly and monthly newspapers.

**Top weekly and monthly newspapers
in terms of one issue audience (AIR, Russia)[23]**

№	Title of edition	2010	
		in thousand people	in %
1	*Argumenty i Fakty*	7392,4	12,8
2	*Teleprogramma*	6654,5	11,5
3	*Komsomolskaya Pravda* (weekly*)*	5529,3	9,6
4	*777*	5146,3	8,9
5	*Orakul*	2781,1	4,8
6	*Zhizn*	2425,5	4,2
7	*Moya Sem'ya*	2154,4	3,7
8	*MK-Region*	2050,8	3,5
9	*Ekspress-Gazeta*	1741,1	3,0
10	*Sovetskiy Sport — Futbol*	1726,5	3,0

As it follows from tables 1 and 2, in terms of audience volume Russian weekly newspapers significantly outperform daily ones. However, from the viewpoint of shaping the public agenda, dailies appear to be a much more powerful instrument. They are also more com-

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[23] Source: TNS Rossiya, NRS, May-October, 2009 / May-October, 2010. URL: http://www.tns-global.ru/rus/ data/ratings/press/index.wbp?press.action=search&press. regionId=68CDA84F-6158-4F7C-A36A-7DAF207B88E1&press. regionId=C27FFFD9-CC9B-4AD1-B826-00B2CDE2B4AB&press. regionId=C9838420-042B-4B9E-B7A8-F228DB27C8E1&press. periodId=A849006B-07C1-42DB-BA2E-E55025CEC789&press. smiId=81D642D7-33B9-4BFA-BEF8-8986ACC07021

plex from the viewpoint of business processes and work organization.

Notably, daily newspapers also exhibit a much better dynamic of advertising revenues than weeklies (see table 3).

Table 3

National titles' advertising revenues in 2009-2010, in million roubles[24] (VAT included)[25]

Type of edition	2009	2010	Dynamic, %
Daily newspapers	4 606	5 240	14%
Weekly newspapers	2 172	2 392	10%
Monthly magazines	10 790	11 153	3%
Weekly magazines	5 485	6 265	14%
Advertising editions	5 583	4 968	-11%
National print media (TOTAL)	**28 635**	**30 018**	**5%**

Nevertheless, in the context of the national media system as a whole, the newspaper industry does not look very impressive, a fact that might be accounted for by the crisis of the traditional mass media.

In 2010, newspaper circulation sales in Russia declined, although advertising revenues grew by 13% (see table 4). In this point, newspapers significantly outperform magazines (7%) but clearly lag behind them in terms of gross advertising revenues (9,7 billion roubles and 21,6 billion roubles respectively).

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[24] During the period considered $1= about 30 roubles.

[25] Source: Video International Analytical Centre (data obtained from TNS Rossiya Media Intelligence). URL: http://www.sostav.ru/columns/adpress/2011/0005/

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Table 4

Advertising market volume in 2010, in billion roubles (VAT included)[26]

Segment	2008	2009	2010	Gain in 2010, in %
Television	138,9	113,7	130,7	15
Radio	15,0	10,6	11,8	11
Print media	75,3	42,0	44,8	7
Among them: newspapers	*13,1*	*8,6*	*9,7*	*13*
magazines	*35,1*	*20,2*	*21,6*	*7*
advertising editions	*27,1*	*13,2*	*13,5*	*2*
Outdoor advertising	45,8	27,3	32,2	18
Internet	17,6	19,1	26,65	40
Other media	3,2	2,6	3,7	44
TOTAL	**296**	**215**	**250**	**16**

Newspapers, however, do not look altogether bad only in comparison with the other segments of print media industry. Table 4 shows that neither the volume of gross advertising revenues nor their dynamic are indicative of good prospects for development: newspapers are considerably inferior to both television, the most economically significant mass media segment, and the Internet, the most dynamical one.

Taking into account a decline in circulation sales characteristic of the Russian newspaper market and a significant contribution of advertising to Russian print media revenues (about 42%), newspaper publishers in Russia are beginning to seriously consider the possibility of modernizing present-day newspapers' business model.

Although business processes in daily newspapers could be optimized along various dimensions (reducing production expenses, improving distribution systems, changing the system of motivating and rewarding the

[26] Source: Association of Advertising Agencies of Russia. URL: http://www.akarussia.ru/knowledge/market_size/id457

staff, and the like), the only possible strategic decisions are those based on convergence: integration of various forms of digital multimedia content on a universal platform / platforms and its distribution through different channels. This means that monetization of convergent products / services underlies the future business model of daily newspapers.

Methodology

The key task of this research was to isolate the economic and managerial effects of convergence and determine its role in business models of various daily newspapers of the Russian Federation, which implied:

- studying the economy of newspapers' print versions, their profitability/unprofitability and revenue sources;
- studying the "capital" part of convergence, i.e. determining the contribution of investments into convergence projects in the total investment volume;
- studying the "income-generating" part of convergence (monetization), i.e. the ways of obtaining the financial flow from convergence, and determining the share of the flow in the total revenues;
- studying the "costs" part of convergence, i.e. examining the items of expenditures on such projects and their volume;
- determining the overall economic outcome, i.e. the ability of the mass media to generate a positive cash flow and operating profit from convergence projects;
- studying the conceptual and strategic contribution of convergence to newspapers' business activity, its influence on mass media development strategy and the ultimate goal in convergence projects.

To do the research, we conducted a number of in-depth interviews with representatives of large Russian daily newspapers; in the course of the interviews all kinds of questions were asked: financial, economic and strategically oriented.

The results of the interviews were submitted to quantitative and qualitative analysis. On the basis of the information obtained, clusterization was made enabling us to isolate the groups of Russian daily newspapers typologically similar from the viewpoint of their convergence component.

In the course of the research, 6 daily titles printed not less than 3 times a week were studied: 2 in Moscow, 1 in St-Petersburg, 1 in Kazan (Tatarstan), 1 in Astrakhan and 1 in Smolensk. Thus, we controlled the sample in terms of:

- city size (Moscow's population amounts to more than 11,5 million people, it is the largest city of the Russian Federation, the population of St-Petersburg is over 4,5 million, that of Kazan is more than 1,1 million, more than 0,5 million people live in Astrakhan and more than 0,3 million people in Smolensk). This indicates that we considered the specificity of mass media functioning in cities of virtually any significant size;
- city status (Moscow is the capital of Russia, St-Petersburg is the second, after Moscow, metropolitan city, the "second capital" of Russia, Kazan is a large regional centre, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan, a developed industrial and agricultural region, Astrakhan is a centre of a peripheral area and Smolensk is a centre of an oblast which is relatively close to Moscow);
- newspaper type in a particular city (*Komsomolskaya Pravda* is a large national mass interest daily, *Kommersant* is a large national quality newspaper with strong business and financial content, *Delovoi Peterburg* is the largest business newspaper in St-Petersburg, *Respublika Tatarstan* is the largest regional daily newspaper of Tatarstan, a republic formed as a national community, *Volga* is the largest daily newspaper of the Astrakhan area and *Rabochiy Put'* is the largest daily newspaper of Smolensk, also distributed in the region).

Since the sample included as few as 6 newspapers, the authors of the article are far from claiming that the results obtained are statistically

significant. However, given a high level of parameter controllability (see above) and a qualitative result analysis, we believe that the results appear to be generally valid for Russian daily newspapers of the types we have described.

Research results

The processing of research results showed that the prevailing economic model for most print versions of Russian daily newspapers is the advertising based one: five of the six newspapers under consideration get more than half the revenues from advertising. The *Volga* newspaper was the only one to note that advertising (including commissioned materials) accounted for 50% of the financial flow. The advertising share of the total revenues — 70—80% — is especially high in the business and financial papers: *Kommersant* and *Delovoi Peterburg*.

Despite the advance of the Internet and decreased interest in the traditional mass media, advertising revenues are still capable of providing Russian print dailies with a sufficiently high profits (four out of six newspapers in our sample reported having operating profits). This applies first and foremost to daily newspapers in large cities (up to 30%). Along with it, most managers we interviewed claimed that over the past five years the dynamic of economic indicators had either met their expectations or even exceeded them, which is indicative of sufficient stability and predictability of the economic condition of the daily print media in Russia.

As was mentioned above, the results of the research into convergence projects realization in daily newspapers were submitted to a cluster analysis. As the key criteria of clusterization we selected:
- a position of convergence in dailies' strategies;
- a contribution of revenues from convergence projects to newspaper's total revenues.

In addition, we took into account a newspaper's gross revenues of print edition and gross revenues from convergence projects.

It should be noted that the share of revenues from convergence projects appears to be essential because it is in fact indicative of the monetization level, of the convergence project's ability to generate a cash flow tangible for the mass media. In this respect, considerations of profitability (revenues minus expenses) seem to be of less importance because they sometimes mirror somewhat up-to-the minute, incidental state of affairs having little to do with the strategic direction of development. In other words, if a convergence project generates a considerable share of a media enterprise's revenues, this project's efficiency is worth developing, even if the enterprise is being unprofitable; if, however, convergence accounts for a tiny share of revenues, the enterprise's profitability does not make this part of the business strategically important.

The cluster analysis enabled us to isolate two groups of daily Russian newspapers, which include the media outlets similar to one another along the above-mentioned criteria.

Group 1. Metropolitan daily newspapers

This group includes *Komsomolskaya Pravda, Kommersant* and *Delovoi Peterburg.* Large newspapers of Moscow and St-Petersburg are drastically different from provincial ones not only in terms of the size of the business but also in terms of greater economic effects of convergence.

In these three newspapers contribution of convergence revenues to the total revenues exceeds 5%. In the case of *Kommersant,* the share of revenues from its online project is more than 20% of the revenues generated by the print version and the website combined.

Along with it, top managers of the three newspapers have come to regard convergence as an economic tool, a way of making more money, while marketing and image considerations remain in the background.

As Andrei Dyatlov, deputy editor-in-chief of the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* newspaper, put it, "The advertising market is rapidly transform-

ing. It is leaving newspapers for electronic media. Why should we watch it leave? We will found our own electronic medium".

Some of these newspapers tend to develop the electronic version on the basis of original materials avoiding complete duplication of the print version. This tendency most vividly manifests itself in *Delovoi Peterburg*. "We did not want the print and electronic versions to coincide. We removed the newspaper's archives from the Net and left only the company's profiles there, and the rest is original materials supplied by our journalists. In fact, originality was what we sought." – said Oleg Tretyakov, former editor-in-chief of *Delovoi Peterburg*. The number of journalists writing exclusively for the electronic version is not very small – there are seven of them (the staff of the print version includes about 50 journalists).

However, this is not the most widespread model of online newsrooms: it is more common for the print version's journalists to develop the materials written for the print version and supply this content to the website. Only several editors work just for the website. This fact, economize on staff costs.

"The journalistic staff working for our four platforms – the newspaper, the site, radio and television – is the same. It means that after a journalist has conducted an interview he posts the audio recording on to the site, along with the material. If the recording is of good quality, we immediately play it on radio. When a journalist goes on a business trip, he brings back photographic, audio and video materials. And thus, instead of forming four teams of journalists for four platforms, we have formed four platforms for one journalist. People can learn the same news from television, radio and the site." – says Andrei Dyatlov.

It is notable that the revenue level of both print and electronic versions of newspapers in Group 1 is higher than that of newspapers in Group 2 (in absolute figures). The print newspaper *Kommersant* generates about 20% of the revenues (excluding publishing and selling specific business information about legal entities' bankruptcies) of the eponymous publishing house as a whole, whose turnover is slightly lower than

100 million dollars. Notably, the online business accounts for 10% of the publishing house's revenues.

According to the data provided by *Delovoi Peterburg,* its website's revenues can amount to 5 million roubles a month that is 60 million rubles a year (about 2 million dollars). This high figure is irregular but quite attainable.

As will be shown below, for the newspapers in Group 2 such figures are so far unattainable.

In addition, convergence development in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and *Kommersant* led to an increase in the spectrum of content delivery channels. Gradually, the online platforms of both newspapers displayed branded linear radio and TV channels with content of their own production which were later distributed in traditional ways: newspapers founded their own terrestrial radio stations, created television channels and started to distribute them in pay television packages. For the newspapers in Group 2, such practices requiring considerable financial investments and organizational efforts are inaccessible.

Group 2. Provincial daily newspapers

Irrespective of living standards and geographical position of the region they belong to, the provincial Russian daily newspapers (there are three of them in our sample: *Respublika Tatarstan* in Kazan, *Volga* in Astrakhan and *Rabochiy Put'* in Smolensk) have much in common.

To begin with, the newspapers in this group are characterized by a small contribution of convergence to the overall turnover of the edition as an enterprise. In all three newspapers it is below 5% (in reality – next to zero).

"Very little money comes from the site. Actually, it comes from advertising organized by the person in charge of the site. No wonder it's just like pocket change," comments Alexander Shlyakhov, chief manager and editor of the *Volga* newspaper. "There are few advertisements on the

site, but a positive tendency is evident," says editor-in-chief of the *Respublika Tatarstan* newspaper Alexander Latyshev.

At present, managers of these newspapers tend to regard convergence not as an economic tool (a component of the business model) but as an element of marketing or image formation. This is a forced position accounted for by the low level of revenues from convergence products, which fail to affect the overall financial situation in the media outlet.

The level of convergence development in these daily newspapers is rather low: even in relatively large regional media outlets only one or two people are engaged in it (and this is part-time work), which invariably influences the quality of the content represented in the convergent form. "Our staff schedule does not allow for a website newsroom, so we have to tear people away from the print version. For the site to be more or less full-fledged, we need at least 5 staff members. In reality, only two people attend to it, one of whom simultaneously handles newspaper subscription. One more employee is in charge of renewing the website. And there is no one else. The situation is very bleak indeed." – comments Alexander Latyshev from *Respublika Tatarstan*. This state of affairs excludes the possibility of creating radio and television platforms for the newspaper content and also makes it impossible to fill the site with content different from that of the print version. With the newspapers in Group 2 the websites' core represents posted texts from the print version, with very few original materials.

In part, this situation is accounted for by a significantly smaller turnover of provincial newspapers (in comparison with national media outlets) and, subsequently, a lack of investment into convergence projects development. For instance, the turnover of *Respublika Tatarstan* is 68 million rubles (about 2 million dollars), that of *Volga* – 25 million rubles (about 1 million dollars). These figures are 10-fold lower than those of national newspapers. However, a strategic underestimation of convergence possibilities is also evident. "The founders are not much interested in the website", we heard some members of staff say: "We are the ini-

tiators because we do realize that the future belongs to the fusion of the print and electronic versions. We mustn't lag behind. If we do, we'll never catch up." It is not surprising, therefore, that under such circumstances convergence development is confined to some texts and very few audio and video files posted on to the website.

There is no need to labour the point that there are some features common to the newspapers of both groups. For instance, all the newspapers under consideration get the most of their convergence revenues by selling advertising, not content. The model of making money on selling content or other services is still underdeveloped.

Most newspapers in both isolated clusters are planning to develop convergence projects in the near future and enlarge investment; they also tend to rely on increased convergence revenues.

On the other hand, profitability level and, accordingly, the contribution of convergence profit to the overall profit of a newspaper as an enterprise vary considerably from title to title. Half the newspapers under consideration, which include large national editions, report that the online projects are unprofitable, to say nothing of the recently launched radio and television projects. Some daily newspapers indicate that the profit share is below 5%. However, there are editions which report high profitability of their convergence (online) projects and, accordingly, their comparatively high contribution to the newspaper's gross profit. This fact is accounted for by low expenses on the online platform. As Alexander Latyshev from *Respublika Tatarstan* put it: "Money is actually spent only on salaries and hosting".

The newspapers' investment activity with regard to convergence also varies considerably. Depending on the stage of the convergence project development – the start, the relaunch or activity maintenance – both the general level and the share of investment can be rather high (for instance, in 2011 the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* newspaper's investment into the website alone – excluding the radio and television projects – exceeded the investment into the print version 8-fold) or drop almost to zero (as in the case of *Delovoi Peterburg*)

Conclusions

The spread between the daily newspapers of the two capitals (Moscow and St-Petersburg) and their counterparts in the Russian regions in relation to the degree of convergence projects development is obvious. The differences manifest themselves, in the first place, in the scale of financial activity: revenues, expenses, investments and profit are 10-fold higher with national newspapers than with regional ones. The financial indicators of convergence projects in the capitals and in the regions correlate in about the same proportion. Even the regions with high GRP (Gross Regional Product) and living standards (Tatarstan, for example) are not an exception: the financial effects of daily press' activity and the convergence projects they develop are very small in comparison with national newspapers. Accordingly, the level of convergence projects realization varies considerably: in regional mass media the quality of multimedia content is lower, the website construction is less efficient, there is less original video and audio content available on their digital platforms. While, inside publishing houses, national dailies are developing television and radio, regional press does not even dream of such projects.

In Russian daily newspapers the level of investment into convergence projects varies considerably depending on the stage of their realization: it can be high at their start and relatively low at the stage of maintenance. In some cases (see *Komsomolskaya Pravda*) it may exceed the level of investment into the print product development.

For the most part, revenue from convergence is not very high: it does not exceed 10% of the gross revenues from the newspaper as an enterprise (the print version plus the website). Exceptions are rare (see *Kommersant*, the share of revenues from its online project is more than 20% of the revenues generated by the print version and the website together). Notably, in national newspapers convergence projects' contribution to the newspaper's revenues is significantly higher than in regional ones. It is also important that most newspapers under consideration rely on tangible growth of convergence revenues in the near future.

Along with it, half the media outlets under consideration declare a zero or negative cash flow (excluding investments) from convergence projects. This is true even of some large national newspapers' online projects (excluding radio and television, so far unprofitable by definition). However, some daily media outlets report online platforms' high profitability – up to 50%. The underlying cause is comparatively low operational expenses.

Expenses minimization is daily newspapers' major goal in convergence projects realization. Normally, this is achieved through the intensified work of the print version's employees (a separate newsroom is either not formed at all or it is comparatively small and staffed with editors and technicians). Thus, the most widespread model of convergence project management involves the journalists working for the print version in producing texts and even multimedia content for the website (see *Komsomolskaya Pravda*).

It is notable that most Russian daily newspapers are willing to develop convergence projects in the near future and increase investments into these projects.

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THE REGIONAL DIMENSION
OF RUSSIAN BROADCASTING

РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫЕ АСПЕКТЫ
РОССИЙСКОГО ТЕЛЕВЕЩАНИЯ

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The author examines the role of television in the construction areas and other imagined communities, new typological approaches to the television channels definitions. The article analyzes the existing and possible classification of media coverage areas. This material may be of interest to journalists, researchers of the federal, regional and local television stations.

Key words*: broadcasting; territory; broadcaster; region; typology.*

Автор рассматривает роль телевидения в конструировании регионов и иных воображаемых сообществ, предлагает новые типологические подходы к определению телеканалов. Статья анализирует существующие и возможные классификации медиа по охвату территории. Материал может быть интересен журналистам; исследователям федерального, регионального и местного телевещания.

Ключевые слова: *телевидение; территория; вещатель; регион; типология.*

The analysis of the Russian modern TV is complicated by the lack of clear and reasonable criteria of local and regional television. It is considered a priori that television which is not national (federal) is regional (local). The Law "On Amendments to Clauses 14, 33, 36 of the Federal Law "On Advertising" gives the definition of federal channel: it is "an organization which realizes on-air broadcasting on the territory of more than five subjects of the Russian Federation". Current Russian laws, however, do not give such clear definitions of local or regional television. At the same time, conceptions of regional and local TV are often used as synonymous ones without concretization. This mixture of different types of broadcasting is caused by historical reasons, non-transparency of Russian business and anachronistic administrative division of the country. It is important to examine what principles were fundamental for the Soviet period of television technology distribution and what principles of dimensional organization of broadcasting are used nowadays. This article is devoted to the territorial dimensions of television coverage and to analysis of the role of open-air broadcasting in the construction of regions.

Economic geography of television. The background

When examining the differences between Soviet and post-Soviet television it is typical to point out the abolition of the censorship and the appearance of the commercial channels with TV series and advertising. These differences may not be the most essential. The principles of location and the regulation of broadcasting have changed dramatically. Instead of the primitive dichotomy "Central Television − local studio" with duplication of the functions, formats and style of the Central Television in local programs, today there is a great variety of broadcasters.

This variety is created by international (transboundary) television companies and world services (*Euronews* and *Russia Today*), by almost twenty federal channels, by national broadcasting companies (*Tatarstan −*

Noviy Vek, Moya Udmurtia, Sakha), by nation-wide channels (*Perviy Kanal* and *Rossiya*), and also by regional channels (provincial, krai and okrug-wide) like *Yuzhniy Region Don*, *Yenisei-Region* and others. But the most significant change of the dimensional characteristics of television is connected with the penetration of modern TV in small audience groups at the level of municipal unit, city area and even a block.

In the Soviet period an oblast (krai) had a minimal or last status of television center. And even not all the administrative oblast centers had a broadcasting committee. As a rule, cities with population less than a million were not supposed to have a TV studio as well as evening paper, metro, opera house and some other creature comforts. In those small towns where TV center was built, the authorities could be punished for spontaneous activity, given that the Soviet view of television presupposed millions of viewers. Only processes of regionalization in 1990s spread TV to the compact audience groups. Corporative, university and school broadcasting centers appeared. There are no enormous differences in picture quality between home video and professional report any more. Technological innovations (continuous miniaturization and reduction in price of television equipment) brought down the coverage for local broadcasters to the level of village (aul or ulus).

However, only Canadian philosopher Marshall McLuhan called television world a "global village". In Russia TV is, and always has been, a city media, which is weakly presented at the countryside. "According to the government statistics near 1,5 million of people who live in about 10 thousand settlements are not covered with broadcasting at all, and 3,7 million have access to only one television program" (Televidenie v Rossii. Sostoyanie, tendencii i perspectivy razvitiya. Otraslevoi doklad, 2010). Broadcasting covers the country's territory not with a solid wave but as well as road network and circulation system with capillaries of television transmitters concentrated in the big cities. That is why geographical features, the character of settlements, communicative connectivity of territories exert a great influence on media landscape.

In the scientific literature devoted to television a question of appropriateness and reasonability of spreading of television technologies in one or another region depending on their human capital has not still been raised. Oddly enough, the question of economic reasonability of broadcasting in remote areas has not been put by public authorities as well. However, the installation of digital exciters and digital receiving systems by the Russian TV and radio networks (RTRS) in the outlying districts allows this statement of a question. Every new technological breakthrough sharpens the question of the price of penetration and payback. Should multiplexes be installed in those regions where even analog television does not differ in variety and quality of content?

Historical prerequisites of the placement of the first regional TV studios

Spread of broadcasting in regions began only in the first half of 1950s. At the beginning, the enthusiasm of radio (and other electronic technologies) fans played a crucial role. The amateur TV studios appeared spontaneously in different cities. They mostly appeared in radio clubs, universities and institutes of technology. The authorities did not interfere with their work but were of little help either. In 1951 the broadcasting station constructed by amateurs appeared in Kharkov. While the television center was in process of construction local community was making home-made TV sets. Delegations from Odessa and Riga, Omsk and Vladivostok came to Kharkov in order to get to know technological devices and adopt the experience from the first broadcasters. In 1951 on initiative of the professor A. A. Vorobiyov, the director of Tomsk polytechnic institute who had familiarized himself with equipment of Kharkov's experimental television center, the decision to build an amateur TV-center in the polytechnic institute was made. At that time it was clear from the executive orders that the government was not going to build a television center in Tomsk in next five years. In half a year Tomsk polytechnics have created

transmitting television equipment (Televidenie v Sibiri: monographiya, 2011).

Television as well as other electronic communications is a technology which is not created by a single genius but absorbs discoveries of many engineers, research teams and design departments. Territories which have created the best conditions for a new communication technology achieve performance by way of growth of human capital. Like the Internet and mobile telephony now make users think fast, television, half a century ago, made audience clever. Television brings people closer to the cultural achievements of civilization and opens new perspectives in education and self-cultivation. At least it did so at the dawn of television's presence in social life.

On September 15, 1955, The Council of Ministers of the USSR accepted a resolution № 1689 "On Measures for Further Development of Broadcasting in the USSR". The phase of rapid development and spread of technical facilities of television broadcasting in regions had started. The resolution obliged Government of the RSFSR and Councils of Ministers of the union republics to build television centers and relay stations, to make and assemble microwave-link equipment for relay stations in 1956−1958. At the same time, the government did not state the principles of television centers location. It put into operation those centers which were built at the expense of executive committee and enterprise forming a company towns budget. And then the government would suddenly remember to amend the site location plan of television centers. In 1965 the Resolution of CPSU "On State and Measures of Improvement of Local TV Studios in the RSFSR", which provided requirements only for strengthening of material and technical basis and ideological orientation of broadcasting, was adopted. Leadership of a party declared putting into operation dozens of satellite communication receiving stations "Orbita" in Siberian regions, the Far East, Central Asia and the Far North. It was expensive equipment which would never be installed at the expense of local budget. However, the Communist party stopped closing its eyes to the unauthorized activity which local television studios had

been showing since 1950s. The party wanted television to demonstrate the advantages of the Soviet way of life. Otherwise there was no need to construct all the satellite system.

Struggling with "amateur activities" of local TV studios, leaders of Central Television even promoted closure of some autonomous broadcast centers. For example, of all television studios which appeared in Altayskiy Kray at the end of 1950s only one in Barnaul was still operating by 1970. The same thing happened in Tyumenskaya Oblast — only the regional television center was left there. Closure of the TV studios in Biysk, Rubtsovsk, Nizhnevartovsk, Khanty-Mansiysk and other Siberian cities ought to be authorized somehow. As an excuse an economical version was suggested which stated unprofitability of small studios and difficulty of their regular technical modernization. Researcher of the TV E. Bagirov writes about this version: "General enthusiasm for television in the early 1960s provoked spontaneous construction of television centers on the initiative of local community without regard to the state resources for their regular modernization" (Bagirov, 1985).

However, there was another reason which was not named explicitly but local television journalists understood it correctly. A number of local TV studios still missing their role of the Central Television as information and journalistic branch were keeping on making all-embracing reports, thus bringing themselves to the useless competition with the all-Union programs. On principles of political monocentric Central Television was formed and it became the main supplier of information for the Soviet people. And local TV studios, on the complementary principle, were to make "News from the Fields" on a regional scale. As Central Television's power was rising, local studios were brought down to the level of the correspondent's offices. It may be said that in the geographical location of television centers Soviet government was seeking for simplification of situation, as "plurality should not be posited without necessity". It can explain, for example, the fact that Vilnius had a republic committee on television, while neither Riga nor Tallinn had one.

New principles of geographical location of television companies

After the August Putsch of 1991 the "parade of sovereignties" began, and instead of general television system, which had been being created for decades, fifteen independent state television and radio complexes appeared in half a year. It took a lot of time and strength to create uniform information space which was destroyed almost in a blink. At the beginning of 1990s idea of independent private television was maturing among many of journalists and businessmen. This period was the most favourable for creation of media business due to many reasons. State television was extremely depressed, it was splitting into separate production units. Professional personnel of state television companies were seeking for more creative and well-paid work.

State authority was unconcerned with television. The licensing system for broadcasting was working on default. There was no such term as "pirate movie" in public conscience. There had not been rivalry on the market because there had not been a market itself yet. In this very period the principles of geographical location of broadcasters changed dramatically. If in 1950s government solved the problem of TV tower's construction from the state considerations, then at the beginning of commercialization of the regional television area only ambitions of the local founders and initial capital initiated the start of new telecasting station broadcasting.

It became clear very soon that it is easy to start broadcasting in one or another human settlement but it is not so easy to keep an audience and to compete with other broadcasters. To understand the logic of state and private broadcasters' formation in the provinces it is necessary to examine the triad of key concepts "Center — Regions — Outlying districts". Between the center and regions the same relations of subordination are being formed as between a region and its outskirts.

Metropolis takes tax payments, competitive production and best specialists from regions and gives in return budgetary subsidies, foreign goods and culture samples (including television programs of central

channels). As a matter of fact, this is colonial policy but today it disguises itself in economic and cultural forms. The further from capital the less possibilities of TV programs reception, variety of channels and quality of television production remain. Oblast and krai centers act towards raions and oblast towns in the same manner as the capital acts toward the provinces.

There are more than 12 thousand of municipal units in Russia today. Our analysis of the registry licenses for broadcasting, kept by Roskomnadzor[27] gave us 3753 licensees in television. Not all of them produce something for broadcast and go on air because of economic reasons. According to A. V. Malinin, the Deputy Minister of Communications and Mass Media, "the number of cities where federal channels have interest from the economic point of view in spreading their programmes with all-Russian and local advertising is not more than 120"[28]. In consideration of the fact that Russia has only 11 megalopolises with population of more than a million inhabitants, it is clear that among 120 "cities profitable for TV" not all are equally profitable. It is obvious from the national sampling of TNS Gallup Media: there are 29 big Russian cities which are the most interesting from the point of development of local television and advertising market.

Does it mean that television is being located in the area of regions-markets and obeys the market laws of profit? The answer is both yes and no. Spread of programs at the territory of oblasts' raions has little interest for local commercial television companies because they have to pay operators of RTRS (Russian Television and Broadcasting Network) for signal propagation. The coverage of outlying regions does not promise the same advertising revenues as those which can be made from broadcast of TV programs in the administrative center of the oblast. The question of costs and profit is not prior for the Oblast Administration while the issue of political influence among the electorate is quite pressing. That is why

[27] The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications and Mass Communications. URL: http://rsoc.ru/mass-communications/reestr/

[28] National Association of Broadcasters. URL: http://www.nat.ru/

oblast television channels (telenets) mostly have state legal status. Thus, non-state broadcasters which make business from TV are concentrated in the provincial centers. State broadcasters which make a political and social project from television try to cover all the territory of the federal subject.

There is its own specifics in the commercial way of broadcasters' location which is connected with the fact that the principal business of our country is associated with hydrocarbon raw materials. Let us suppose that Khanty-Mansiysk has a population of 75 thousand people. According to this number this city is not supposed to have seven institutes of higher education, two theatres, two state museums, two newspapers and a television company which NAT (National Association of Broadcasters) praised as the best of the year for three times. As far back as 2007 television channel *Yugra* started broadcasting in the digital standard DVB-T in MPEG4. *Yugra* is the only regional television radio company which produces live-action films and TV series based on their own studio *Yugra-film*.

It reminds, by the way, of Manaus, Brazilian town, where the world's largest opera house was built in 1896, in the days of the rubber boom and world-famous tenors were being invited there. *Yugra* is the only television company which covers the administrative center of the oblast with broadcasting, although it does not have high ratings in Tyumen. *Yugra* shows how television can work without paying attention to the administrative boundaries. The very fact of the existence of such a unique television company maintains understanding of the region as a corporation. But still the situation of one television company going beyond the boundaries of the autonomous district is unique and even ridiculous in some way. Usually city television companies are closed on their city audience from which they collect advertising contacts for financing of broadcasting.

System approach to the location of local broadcasters as a side-effect of government regional policy

Government bodies have their own logic of broadcasters' location which coincides neither with market logic nor with corporate. And this logic is not easy for understanding. Why, for example, Kudymkar, the administrative center of Perm Krai, has GTRK "Komi-Permyatskaya", though population of this town is only 31 thousand people? And why does not the big industrial Siberian city like Novokuznetsk with the population of 563 thousand have any state television radio company? Neither has Tolyatti which population is 703 thousand people. And Tura (an urban-type settlement in Evenkiysky District of Krasnoyarsk Krai) with 5 thousand of inhabitants has GTRK "Heglen". Only high social tasks can explain such audience imbalance in state broadcasting.

However, regional authorities think only on a local scale and do not want to take extra responsibility for interregional projects. "Thinking within limits and borders obstructs project activity at the macro-regional level for the simple reason that any idea of cooperation between regions or between their parts is usually being rejected due to "natural" escape from excessive complications" (Glazychev, Schedrovitsky, 2004). Some attempts have been made to build horizontal relations at the level of "Siberian Accord" but governors of 15 krais and oblasts went no further than making declarations. Position "it is better to have little and not much of a good but yours" impedes the creation of interregional programs (TV channels). Siberia had an experience of co-production and information exchange within the framework of programs *Gubernskie Novosti* (GTRK "Novosibirsk", GTRK "Tomsk", GTRK "Altai") and "News of Siberia" (a regional network NTSC), but it was short-lived.

The basic problem of digital divide, which is connected with disproportions in the location of television forces, consists in the lack of regional policy. There is Ministry of Regional Development, there are many policy documents and declarations but there is no policy itself, no policy as a state participation in affairs of regions. "Russia has no distinct

regional policy. Today the course on income equality of the Federation units is set. This course leads (sooner or later) to the reduction of donor regions and this is happening now. I think that another strategy should be adopted — the rate based on the regions of growth, around which outpacing economic growth is starting, and which will draw neighboring territories into their own orbit of development" (Khloponin, 2004).

It is exactly the absence of the distinct and coherent regional policy that has led to the situation when municipal TV companies, which only began to appear as a type of broadcaster, have to scale down their operation here and there. Let us say, in Krasnoyarsk region five municipal TV stations were asking for entering into the television holding "Yenisei-Region", because they were not able to live on advertising revenues. The new edition of the Law "On Principles of Local Self-Government" and the relevant amendments to the Budget Code have frozen the partial municipalization process of territorial administration. Now, not only grants and subsidies from the regional funds, but also federal subsidies for exercising on state powers can enter the municipality not directly but only through the subject of the federation. We do not get a lesson from history although it had been already stated in the XIX century that "The bigger territory tending to one center, the more desert is all other area culturally and spiritually. The only salvation for the border regions from the devastating action of centralization is to establish regional councils and to hand over disposal of local finances to them" (Potanin, 1995).

Management failures in the attempt
to link the communicative space regions by district TV

It would not be fair to refer all the failures in creating of new regional broadcasters only to the rigid chain of command and self-interested "regional barons". The failure in establishing district television is due to a more complicated set of managerial, professional, and financial reasons. When establishing the seven federal districts by the Presidential Decree № 849 in

2000, the most adventurous media managers decided that they had received carte blanche to create inter-regional broadcasters. The motto of these projects was "the formation of the uniform information space in the regions".

In 2001, with the support of the Minister of Press Michael Lesin and RTR chairman Oleg Dobrodeev Siberian entrepreneur Jacob London created television station "TV-Siberia" with the financial support of tycoon Oleg Deripaska. However, TV company went on air with the news programs only in the fall of 2002, and six months later difficulties with licensing and financing of the project began. In the summer of 2003 most employees, who had been enticed by high salaries from Kuzbass and Altai television companies, were withdrawn from the staff without service benefits.

Despite the fact that Ural has a similar television company – "Yermak" – which exists for seven years already, the experiment in creating inter-regional television in the federal districts cannot be called successful. Firstly, the founders of "Yermak" and "Siberia" have not solved the problem of signal delivery over large areas (Siberian Federal District occupies 5114,8 sq. km., Ural Federal District – 1788,9 sq. km.). To such coverage a huge transmitter-receiver system, the broadcast license and costs (for which no one, as it turned out, was ready) would be required. Programs of "TV-Siberia" could be seen only in Novosibirsk.

Secondly, such a huge territory, divided into several time zones, has different climatic and, what is more important, different economic conditions. Evenk reindeer-breeder in Taimyr, a worker of the agricultural holding in the south of Omsk Region and, say, a teacher from Irkutsk actually have little in common. They are not interested in the news of distant areas which live different lives. None of them considers Novosibirsk a capital of the region and newsreel reports from this city are unlikely to have a national news status which would justify their distribution.

Jacob London's project could have been successful only if the professional team of television journalists, assembled from all Siberia, had started to make high-quality programs for regional TV stations in the mode-production studio. In 1950–1960s local studios used to exchange their best programs regularly, but then this practice faded. From 1992 to 1996, the ANO

"Internews" was releasing a program *Local Time*, the purpose of which was to share news items of various genres (primarily without information occasion) among dozens of local TV companies – program participants.

If "TV-Siberia" had become a ground for the creative experiments and exchange of journalistic experience, if it had formed the horizontal relations between regional broadcasters, the project would have succeeded. But the first Jacob London's problem was, apparently, to draw 10 million dollars allocated by O. Deripaska for formation of district TV. Another reason for the regional TV project's failure was non-transparency of the issues of property and funding sources. And in a year and a half of the project Oleg Deripaska failed to understand when and in what form he would receive dividends from the investment in the district television. Naturally, the businessman lost interest in such kind of investment soon.

TV development trends in regions during the digital television transition

It is obvious that a full digital transition guarantees drastic changes to regional television and it has already started to make an impact. "There is an actual risk that in the "Digital Age" local companies could become marginal. Today all strategically minded managers are already pondering how to save these companies, and what they could produce in future. It is important to realize that this issue concerns not only the TV business. In fact, regional media develops civil society and, in Russia, is an essential part of it. Therefore, keeping and development of the media is of common cause" (Shvydkoy, 2010).

As a matter of fact, the conception of the TV broadcasting development in Russia for 2008–2015, which was already approved in 2007, includes the digital transition, however, it does not consider regional channels at all. Alexey Malinin, Deputy Minister of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation, admitted only at the end of 2010 that the Ministry was "yet to carry out a large amount of work in

terms of analysis of the regional market". But we are talking only about the third multiplex, which will include those who did not get into the first and the second set of programs. It may be assumed that there are several methods regional broadcasters can use to "minimize the damage from the digital transition". First of all, a regional channel which managed to enter a multiplex could share its space in the broadcasting schedule with those companies which would otherwise not be present in an obligatory TV package. These companies, however, have to be reclassified as production companies (that is production-studios) rather than television broadcasters in order to use this broadcasting space.

Since all local companies are in a severe competition to get a sponsor, it will be psychologically difficult to enter the broadcasting space as "junior partners". There is another way for the whole television community to enter a multiplex. A new company has to be created by the integration of current broadcasters. If an appropriate legislation were developed, local companies would be able to create a public broadcasting system. Besides, a big company, even of a commercial kind, with its own programming and 15 hour air-time could provide competition to the federal channels and network television companies at least in terms of information broadcasting. The possibility of creating a merger of broadcasters should involve ambitions of media managers who are not eager, as well as regional governors, to merge with anyone at all.

If the integration of broadcasting systems does not succeed either on the base of the most powerful local company or on the basis of a new TV company being an association of all existing provincial broadcasters and production companies, then regional TV companies will have only one choice: to move to non-air space — cable networks and the Internet. In fact, even now, some companies, tired of "fighting with the windmills", agreed with cable TV providers on including their production in a paid TV package. There is no doubt that non-air space has its own growing competition, but the level of tension there could be hardly compared to the cruelty prevailing in the regional air divided between television networks and federal channels.

Nowadays, therefore, since the Soviet times, the country inherited inefficient spatial organization of public broadcasting in the regions, linked to the outdated administrative-territorial division of the republics, regions and districts. VGTRK (RTR) has to maintain redundant structure of broadcasting in sparsely populated districts, even though this broadcasting takes up the airtime only for two to three hours per day. This outmoded system opposes to the emergence of horizontal relations between producers and distributors of programs and to establishing of regional networks and channels.

The emergence of private broadcasters in the 1990s and the transition to the commercial broadcasting economy have not eliminated disparities in regional development. They just prepared the ground for aggressive Moscow capital. Federal channels together with television networks squeezed local broadcasters out of the airtime and turned them into "VCR". Lack of regional content in the TV even in the form of local "windows-spots" contributes to the loss of the regional identity for residents of the province.

National Television Syndicate (NTS) plays an important role in supporting the broadcasters, who refused the networking and switched to their own programming. But NTS started providing TV packages to local television stations only in 2005, when television networks had already been firmly entrenched in the regional space, therefore, nowadays it is difficult to recover lost ground in the air.

Russian regions need cross-border television, which would support the communication connection between currently decaying and degrading peripheral territories. TV should be viewed as a public service and human capital investments. The reformative problem of education and young potential development should be posed for regional broadcasters. We need a federal program to support municipal television stations. These companies, in association with the local cable networks, may become this very "e-government", which for a long time has been discussed by the officials in the government and in the President's administration.

The reconfiguration of TV functions is also a problem for the scientific community of faculties and departments of journalism. We must create a

typology of television broadcasters to include spatial measurements of coverage and bind different TV legal forms to some areas. Following the new classifications we should develop broadcasting concepts and strategic development scenarios of those new companies that have not yet found a place in the regional information space. As man said in the past, to help mass media find their own face. Therefore we have to join in the real media-economy with the research and influence the media landscape of the regions.

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Table 1

Typology of local and regional broadcasting[29] by organizational-legal form and reach

Coverage of the territory / administrative-territorial units	ORGANIZATIONAL-LEGAL FORM AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE TV COMPANIES		
	State-owned companies* (federal, state, district, regional)	**Non-state (private)** companies** (Inc., Ltd., etc.)	**Public–private partnership** — Mixed forms of company-branches, subsidiary companies
The federal districts (8)	Ural district broadcaster "Yermak"	—	—
Republics (21)	GTRK "Bashkortostan" and another 20 similar TV-companies	Small business "Ethir" (Kazan), Ltd "TV 12 Region" (the Republic of Mari El)	Ltd "AIST" (Irkutsk and Transbaikal region)
Territories and regions (55)	Regional state TV channel "Yenisei-Region", state unitary enterprise Regional Television Network (OTS) in Novosibirsk	OTV-3 (Omsk), TV "Yuzhny Region Don", JSC "Oblastnoe TV" Ekaterinburg, TV-21 of Murmansk and other channels	STS-Kuzbass (Kemerovo), Samara GubernskoeTV, etc.
Autonomous regions / districts (5)	GTRK Jewish Autonomous Region "Bira" (Birobidzhan), Aga Buryat GTRK (village Aginskoye), etc.	Ltd. Salekhard Video Channel, Inc. TRC SurgutInterNovosti, etc.	Autonomous facility of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District "District broadcasting company "Yugra", etc.
Municipal formations / cities, towns (12000)	"New TV" (Novokuznetsk), TRC STV (Strezhevoy), TRC Nazarovo, etc.	JSC "TV-2" (Tomsk), Ltd "TV Channel Four" Ekaterinburg, etc.	ANO "Novgorod regional TV" ANO "Volga television broadcasting company", etc.

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[29] The total number of TV companies, having a valid license, is estimated at 3753

* The total number of public television stations in the Russian regions is estimated at 512 (13,6%)

** The total number of non-state TV stations in the Russian regions is estimated to be 3114 (83%)

RUSSIAN MEDIA AND THE INTERNET

РОССИЙСКИЕ МЕДИА И ИНТЕРНЕТ

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The Internet that changed the shape of media at a global, national and regional level influenced the Russian media as well. Despite the economic crisis the Russian media advertising indexes showed positive dynamics and Internet advertising market since 2010 demonstrates the faster growing in comparison with advertising in the "old" media. Russia gains the first place in Europe in the number of Internet users (68,0 million as for June, 30 2012) and is rated as intermediately penetrated country (Internet World Stats. Usage and Population Statistics, 2012). The Internet has become the third resource for obtaining news after television and print media for the whole population (18+0), and the second − for the younger generation in the age group of 18−24 (Osobennosti potrebleniya informacii: stolici vs drugie goroda Rossii, 2012). Two Russian media websites − www.kp.ru and www.ria.ru got into European top 10 in this category by the number of unique visitors. These data drive media researchers to move further for comprehensive understanding of online media sites and their affects on traditional media practices, experiments with new media platforms forcing them to newsroom convergent solutions, new platform integrations, interaction with audiences, and alternative agenda setting.

The paper covers historical perspective of Russian Internet media, and describes its three periods of development; it distinguishes two media groups and several sub-groups, their basic and extra features as part of media system, and figures out local and global trends that sooner or later affect development of Russian media industry and determine a next stage in online media development.

Key words: *Internet; Runet; online media; hypertext; multimedia; interactivity; user generated content.*

Интернет, изменивший конфигурацию СМИ на глобальном, национальном и региональном уровнях, оказал серьезное влияние и на российские средства массовой информации. Несмотря на экономический кризис российские рекламные индексы продемонстрировали положительную динамику, а рынок интернет-рекламы, начиная с 2010 г. развивался более высокими темпами роста по сравнению с рекламой в «старых» СМИ. Сегодня Россия занимает первое место в Европе по числу интернет-пользователей (68,0 млн. на 30 июня 2012 года) и оценивается экспертами как страна с умеренным индексом проникновения Интернета (Internet World Stats. Usage and Population Statistics, 2012). Интернет стал для населения (18+) третьим источником новостей после телевидения и печатных средств массовой информации и вторым — для молодого поколения в возрастной группе 18–24 (Osobennosti potrebleniya informacii: stolici vs drugie goroda Rossii, 2012). Помимо этого, два российских медийных сайта www.kp.ru и www.ria.ru попали в первую десятку европейских сайтов в этой категории по количеству уникальных посетителей.

Эти данные заставляют медиа исследователей продолжать свои дальнейшие изыскания над выяснением природы интернет-СМИ, их взаимодействием с традиционными практиками средств массовой информации, изучать эксперименты редакций на новых медиа-платформах, конвергентные решения создания текстов и новые форматы взаимодействия с аудиторией, приводящие к созданию альтернативных повесток дня.

В статье автор описывает российские интернет-СМИ в исторической перспективе, выделяет три периода их развития, предлагает вариант их деления на две медиа-группы и несколько подгрупп, рассматривает их основные и дополнительные функциональные характеристики как части системы средств массовой информации, выделяет их локальные и глобальные свойства, которые рано или поздно повлияют на развитие российской медиа индустрии и определят дальнейший этап развития онлайн-СМИ.

Ключевые слова: *Интернет; Рунет; интернет-СМИ; гипертекст; мультимедиа; интерактивность; контент, созданный потребителями.*

Online media in Russia: periods of development

In 2011 the amendment to the main Federal Media Law legalized the definition of online media that briefly sounds as "a website in the Internet registered as mass medium in accordance with this law" (Zakon "O sredstvah massovoi informacii", 2011). According to the law the registration as media is ex gratia and not mandatory. Those websites which are not registered legally do not belong to media. Debates on what is mass media in the Internet (Internet-SMI: Teoriya i praktika, 2010) have finished.

The short historical account of media in Runet (the Russian Internet segment) could be described in terms of three periods.

The first started in March, 1995 when *Uchitelskaya Gazeta* jumped online (Gorny, 2007). As opposed to other emerged media sites being just presentations of their "parent" publications from the very beginning it exported the full package of information from a print edition to a digital platform. In 1996 *National News Service* conducted online transmission of the presidential election. Although it was available only for 5,000 users and mostly from abroad this event was the next step to demonstrate

media consumers and media producers broad opportunities of a new channel. By 1998 several other newspapers have made timid experiments in digital environment mostly by computer enthusiasts.

The second period (1999—2004) was marked by appearance of several content outlets capable to compete with traditional media. Among them there were *gazeta.ru, lenta.ru, strana.ru* and other media content projects that positioned themselves as online media which did not have equivalents in offline and spread information only via the Internet. The audience gradually got used to them as a full-scale information source. Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky and other media moguls were general investors, and Fund for Efficient Politics was the main developer.

During this period the *RosBusinessConsulting (RBC)* success story turned around. RBC opened its server in 1995 and during the financial crisis this Internet agency which was not well known to the digital natives and much less to the general public started online publishing the most demanded information about currency rate changes. From this very moment *www.rbc.ru* became the most visited site specialized in finance. The chosen information strategy led to the fact that the amount of visitors nearly equals the circulation of a daily newspaper.

The financial crisis pushed out *gazeta.ru:* at the end of February 1999 it published a beta-version and since March 1999 started production on a regular basis. *gazeta.ru* was the first medium which called itself an online newspaper. Within several months ratings of *gazeta.ru* reached leading positions in Runet that signaled an appearance of the formation of an extra online media sector alongside traditional media — print, TV, radio.

Low-cost production turned out to be attractive for investors and within 1999 a number of media outlets were opened. Some of them appeared to be successful; others survived for a short time but then were closed down because of their unprofitability (Internet dlya zhurnalistov, 2001).

The next five year period (2005—2010) was marked by an open discussion about the crisis in traditional media, and especially in print ones. The concern was provoked by positive dynamics of online readership which was significantly larger than the increase in sales of traditional

newspapers. According to *World Newspaper Association* within the five-year period of time beginning from 1999 the number of Internet users increased by 350%, while the sales from print circulation grew by only by 4,75%. Along with the fall of circulation figures and the losses of advertisers, which were marked in all countries, it proved the presence of a serious crisis in the print and newspapers market (Internet-SMI: Teoriya i praktika, 2010).

Offline journalists all over the world were concerned about the new conditions of media consumption mostly by young audiences, active usage of portable digital devices; growing popularity of individual communication as well as participation in blogosphere, social networking, usage of social containers); and of classified ads that step by step moved from print media to the Internet (Sredstva massovoi informacii Rossii, 2011).

Taking into account these challenges many media sites reconstructed their online departments and newsrooms, which made an opportunity to gain more independence and the right to pack content according to online rules.

During its short history online media proved their substantiality as a part of Russian media system. They possess the whole package of classical media features along with original features which has a special social niche different from the old media audiences not that numerous but younger, richer, and more educated. Additionally they develop to be more flexible in periodicity; boundless in content distribution; reach smaller segmented groups; focus attention on information zones which are characterized by both universal and special topics (Internet-SMI: Teoriya i praktika, 2010).

By the end of this development period online media started off full exercise special digital essentials like hypertext, multimedia opportunities; interactivity, social networking and information exchange with the audiences. Here is the list of top media sites that by 2010 explored digital potential to the full extent*: RIA Novosti (www.rian.ru), Kommersant (www.kommersant.ru), Vedomosti (www.vedomosti.ru), Komsomolskaya Pravda (www.kp.ru), Ekho Moskvy (www.echo.msk.ru), lenta.ru (www.lenta.ru).*

Online media: two groups

Due to the fact that Runet media sector is too young it is early to talk about a clear typological structure. However, we can distinguish several online media groups using a number of clear measures.

The structure of Internet media could be determined in connection with offline in two different groups. One emerged as a result of traditional media change-over to a new digital platform, the other − as initially digital and focusing only on the Internet as a distribution system for information. In another terminology: incumbents, or established organizations, and insurgents, as new firms (Kung, Picard, Towse, 2008).

Newspapers were pioneers to move online. We mentioned *Uchitelskaya Gazeta* − the first traditional newspaper which jumped to Internet without any pressure. Later followers were *Izvestiya, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Argumenty i Fakty,* and all other national newspapers. Nowadays you cannot find any of them without a digital version.

From another originally Internet group that emerged initially on the basis of web-technologies and functioned only in the Internet environment we can name *gazeta.ru, lenta.ru* and other online outlets.

Experts divide the first group in three clusters (Sredstva massovoi informacii Rossii, 2011):

1. "Clones" or equivalent copies of traditional media. These media are still the majority in online catalogues especially in local and niche sector. The number of titles is close to the officially registered media, as no respectable print media outlet, radio station or TV channel could go now without a site in the net (Sredstva massovoi informacii Rossii, 2011).

2. "Hybrids" or modified online versions of traditional media. They emerged on the basis of their offline prototypes, but instead of duplication the content they create extra packages of information in order to reach wider audiences. New sections, hypertext links, multimedia solutions, interactive options − with the help of such various transmission schemes compared to parental media, these editions save the same typological frames and the same brand. This group is bounded mostly with

mainstream media, national papers *(Izvestiya, Rossiyskaya Gazeta,* etc.*)* and broadcasting channels *(VGTRK, NTV, Radio Mayak, etc.*).

3. Online outlets independent from offline with their own system of sections, news update dynamics (some publications passed to a continuous 24x7 content update), substantial multimedia and interactive solutions. These sites represent the third model of traditional media web-versions which is bound to the offline "parent", however uses all the possibilities of the online environment (*Argumenty i Fakty, Ekho Moskvy* are good examples).

The second group includes media projects that emerged in the Internet and do not have offline prototypes. Trying to find their profile they build their own business strategies and unlike the first group take leading positions in Runet online ratings. Some of them openly state their commercial interests and promise to reach their payback point. In this group experts distinguish two clusters: information portals —multifunctional Internet services, which imply a variety of topics, genres and services along with the never ending flow of information; and sites of digital newspapers or magazines with a larger number of analytical articles than the news stories *(slon.ru)*.

Extra measures for media sorting

At the end of 2010 a new group of media that launches its projects both online and offline appeared. This media type includes such projects as the radio station *BFM* and site *BFM.ru*, the magazine *Snob* and its site *snob.ru,* etc. The emerging new type of both online and offline media is a signal to put a question about new measures for media classification sorting.

The popularity of such publications is also influenced by the fact that old media are not capable any more of satisfying the needs of new audiences for "24x7" information. The Internet practically destroys the established understanding of periodicity of the editions. The rhythm of

updates is unique in every editorial office; however, there are no technical limits for the frequency of updating. In an ideal situation the new information block should appear on the screen while the event is evolving, online.

The geographical reach of a publication has also been reassessed. In the Internet the notions of time and distance do not work, information becomes transboundary. The majority of sites including media are open for people from all over the world. The charge for content, technical problems with Internet access and the language of communication are the main barriers to information. In fact, online media with the Russian language potentially reach not only Russian citizens but also Russian speaking people from all over the world. In some cases the amount of visits from abroad could reach even 30–40% of daily visits *(www.kp.ru, www.rian.ru)*. The globalization of audience dictates the character of the content, rhythm of updating, and time when different users in different time zones become active.

The character of information dissemination via the global computer network allows content producers to reassess the parameters of national and local press crucial to old media. In the Internet national media co-exist with local information. However, the character of consuming shifts towards external audience – users from other regions. We may say that the Internet capabilities compensate two vectors – the centripetal and the inclination towards regionalization.

Internet publications treat differently the exclusiveness of the information product. For example, the equivalent copies ("clones") use the same texts and selections of related articles as their offline parental editions. In an organizational perspective that means that media organizations do not need special staff working online and gathering and presenting of information is organized by using offline media principles – traditional content solutions, frequency of refreshing information, etc.

The particularity of the information model for "clones" lies in the fact that they publish information simultaneously with parental editions or with a slight delay. Moreover this kind of sequence (first print, then

online) is crucial for managerial decisions and is based on the fear to lose steady readers. But gradually media managers come to understanding that this strategy is not efficient: according to sociological surveys Internet audience does not match with the audience of old media. In Runet more and more sites publish their online content on a separate schedule with permanent updating. The goal of editorial managers in this case is to attract new consumers and not to lose the old ones who for some reason do not buy print editions any more or do not switch on either TV or radio (Televidenie glazami telezritelei, 2012).

Modified versions of traditional media ("hybrids") have their own approaches. They don't copy their parent editions precisely, but publish online versions following their own structural rules and time schedule.

How do they integrate? Firstly, the materials are adapted for screen reading. Site creators understand that long texts are hard to perceive, that the main page should contain previews and leads to the stories, that headlines should be informative and include key words which help information search. Secondly, unlimitedness of space should be taken into account and articles could be supplied with extra related topics; information is updated online; hypertext links are included to enlarge the information field. Thirdly, clear and simple navigation system with original sections and stories. Fourthly, editorial office as separate department with own financing and organization scheme, adapted to online publishing.

Online media content balances between general and specialized, focused interest. Media that form online top-lists are mostly of general interest profile and could belong to both groups – online versions of "old" media and original online media (*gazeta.ru, lenta.ru,* etc.). However, we can find specialized and niche editions in the net as well. They are focused on audiences with special interests (finances, car industry, sports, religion, gender topics, etc.).

Digital technologies allow publishers to be more flexible in publication structure and composition. That is why online version of traditional media with a settled content scheme may transform and include extra

sections devoted to current events or topics of segment audience interest represent social groups, people sharing the same interests, etc.

Publications which are initially specialized show another trend. To attract a larger audience segments they expand covered topics. For example, *RosBusinessConsulting* includes in its information menu of general interest news and typologically became both financial and general interest online edition.

One of online media particularities is new possibilities for communication with audience. Almost all of them use the function of social networking, interactive discussions and forums for regular communication with readers. Shapes are different: informing and promotion in networks, chats based on focused interests, discussions concerning a given topic or a certain article, ratings, votes. Some media create their own virtual clubs, readers' communities for communication not only with the editorial office, but also with each other. Finding a steady reader is the most grounded answer to the challenges of the competition with "old" media.

Modernization features of online media

Media sector of Runet is one of the most rapidly developing information fields. The characteristics of the new channel such as openness, non-limited access to information and accessibility for all population layers, interactivity and enhanced speed of information distribution, hypertext (the possibility to expand information in-depth) as well as multimedia are sure to contribute. The geographic position of the country, the spread of its territory and the remoteness of some regions also influence these development prospects.

But there is a number digital divide factors restraining developments which include the lack of broadband access to the Internet, the undeveloped system of electronic payments, poor equipment and low technical culture of society as well as rather high prices for Internet services. The

development of the sector is also limited because of the lack of legal base in the field, the lack of respect to copyrighting, and poor personal data protection mechanisms.

However, despite the objective difficulties the dynamics of Internet usage in Russia is growing positively and contributes to consumers' demand for online information. This fact encourages renovation processes in Russian digital media. Editorial offices especially in business and general interest sectors regularly consider their sites to be not only an additional channel of information but as independent projects separated from its digital version of the parent edition and giving users new possibilities of information consumption.

Below we specify modernization features that appeared in leading online media such as *RIA Novosti, Vedomosti, Kommersant*, and others (Internet-SMI: Teoriya i praktika, 2010).

The emergence of constantly updated online newsfeed becomes a required component for media sites' structure. In online newsrooms deadlines are designed with regard to demands of the users who want to get information 24 hours 7 days per week. This formula is the main principle to online newsroom managers and is used not only to breaking news coverage.

Online content is regularly constructed for various different electronic devices — mobile and smart phones, tablets and other mobile gadgets *(www.vedomosti.ru, www.kommersant.ru, www.ria.ru,* etc.*)*.

Online content is packed for multimedia platforms which is probably one of the most serious novelties in Russian media. This fact proves that Russian professionals as their foreign counterparts think about new information strategies for attracting audiences with new practices for the consumption of information (*www.ria.ru, www.kp.ru*, etc.).

Content managers pay more attention to interactivity of their sites for both levels: content production and content consumption as well. The new channel allows to personalize the content with regard to the needs of the user who chooses stories according to his or her interests and has the possibility to work with the content by means of comments, ques-

tions, creating their own content (posting video, photos, etc.). Exploiting of user generated content is one of the main online media achievements which in some cases are considered as equal to that created by journalists. Such forms of co-working with audiences are materialized by means of different related services such as social networking, emails, online interviews, blogs, forums, voting and so on. Surveys and ratings are used for defining social position and preferences of all the site users. Forums are used for discussion of different issues; blogs make possible communication between different representatives of the audience. Recently *Facebook* and *Twitter* services have been also included in the list of editorial communication tools. We can find successful examples in *RIA Novosti* site *www.youreporter.ru* which in 2010 was awarded one of the main National prizes of Runet.

New conditions for media to work online oblige editorial offices to operate carefully with audiences, study their tastes, information preferences, behavior patterns. Russian experts advise media companies to distinguish precisely their audience niche, understand their demographic parameters, social profile, life style and habits, and special features of their media behavior. Several companies, national ones and units of global, work in the Russian Federation in the field of custom market Internet research and offer their services, among them there are *TNS Global (www.tns.global.ru), GFK-Rus' (www.gfk.ru), FOM (www.fom.ru), Levada Center (www.levada.ru),* etc.

There are also several global trends that would sooner or later affect Russian media industry and will distinguish the next stage in online media development.

The first one concerned content monetization. Several units all over the world announced charging users for digital content. However, according to some experts content monetization faces serious difficulties connected with reluctance of young users to pay for the content. Teenagers consume increasingly more media products, but they are not ready to pay for them, the report of *Morgan Stanley Research Europe* (Sredstva massovoi informacii Rossii, 2011) says.

The second one could probably arise in the local Russian press as it happened in Britain where batch of sites were launched all over the country to serve needs of hyper local communities. The authors of the project state that this idea is focused on the local inhabitants — ordinary people, who would be able to create their profiles, publish news and use websites as photo and video stocks, form groups for discussion, exchange comments and files, send emails to each other. It is assumed that these sites will be open also to business communities and advertisers as well as to ordinary people (Internet-SMI: Teoriya i praktika, 2010). If it happens in Runet such kind of sites may become serious competitors to local newspapers.

Another trend demonstrates that Internet original media become very attractive for professional journalists. All start-ups that appeared during financial crisis of 2008–2009 become interesting to advertisers and create serious competitive conditions for traditional media. For example, in 2009 a new online media project *slon.ru (www.slon.ru)* announced in the statement that it intended to compete with print media in the field of comments and analytical articles that had always been a prerogative of the quality press. Editorial article which described in its mission a comparison between online and print media stated: "Almost all our journalists, designers and photo editors are former employees of print media. For most of them the work in *slon.ru* is their first online experience. This is a voluntary decision of the project. We hope to transfer some methods which are more characteristic for the print editions. We would also like to demonstrate to our colleagues from the print media that the borderline between the things they do and online journalism has faded".

The next challenge is the influence of news business mainstream by information created by citizen journalists. Their emergence is connected with the users' desire not only to receive news, but also to write, comment, form communities, discuss actual topics and form their own agenda following their own interests. The possibility to participate in content production — this is the main effect of the revolutionary phenomenon, which appeared due to transparency, interactive possibilities and democratic potential of the Internet as communication and information plat-

form, where anybody could publish posts, comments etc. This phenomenon is widely used by the steady Internet users − for example, active bloggers from the popular *LiveJournal*.

Publications from blogosphere influence media mainstream but user generated content (UGC) is totally different from regular media content because do not represent results of professional journalistic work − to generate a verified information. The penetration of citizen journalism into media content is more and more vivid during breaking news, crisis situations, and when the access to information for some reasons is limited. The well known examples in Russian media are connected with the bomb attacks in Moscow underground, accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, the so-called color revolutions in the post-Soviet countries and other events and stories when peoples' voices participated in agenda setting.

Although professional media in Russia use bloggers' postings and encourage bloggers to contribute as authors and participants of communication, the quality of their posts is criticized by the journalism community. One of the main arguments in favor of the traditional media is the verified data and for that reason the trust of the audience is higher. That is why bloggers who are struggling for the attention of the audience try to improve results of their work, and create their own media projects which pose high standards to the quality of texts *(www.chascor.ru)*.

The competition between professional journalists and bloggers shifts to the media business sphere. There are cases when active content production in social networks was blocked in order to prevent competition with traditional media. We can name examples in the sphere of sports media where the distribution of photo and video created by users during sport events could be a serious competitor to professional journalism information. On the other hand, collaboration with bloggers and payments for their content has become a common managerial practice of media organizations.

However, the most significant trend of the recent years is the growth of the online advertising market and the afflux of advertisers into the Internet environment. Since 2010 it demonstrated the faster growing in comparison

to "old" media and increased (+56%) compared to TV (+18%), and print (+6%) (Rossiiskaya periodicheskaya pechat': sostoyanie, tendencii i perspektivy razvitiya, 2012). However, the online advertising market of Runet has serious problems connected with the fact that advertisers measure the efficiency of the sites using only quantitative indicators of the traffic. This fact creates favorable conditions for traffic purchase which still is not condemned by all media players. Those media which are able to buy traffic do that.

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MEDIA AND RELIGION IN RUSSIA

СМИ И РЕЛИГИЯ В РОССИИ

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The author puts the relations and interactions of two social sub-systems — media and religion — into the context of the contemporary Russian public sphere. Based on several case studies and the analysis of a value dialogue in society, the paper underlines the role of mass media in mediatization of religions, shows dysfunctions and "system errors" in the process. The author suggests that religions are to become active and transparent actors in public debates with their moral monitoring of public sphere and mass media in order to achieve a minimal constructive value consensus in a poly-normative society.

Key words: *media; religion; value dialogue; dysfunctions; consensus.*

Статья рассматривает вопросы взаимоотношений и взаимодействия двух социальных подсистем — СМИ и религии — в контексте современной российской публичной сферы. Основываясь на нескольких исследованиях и анализе особенностей ценностного диалога в обществе, автор подчеркивает особую роль средств массовой информации в медиатизация религии, показывает дисфункции и «системные ошибки» в этом процессе. Нормативная модель, которой придерживается автор, предполагает актив-

ное участие религиозных объединений в общественном диалоге как субъектов ценностного мониторинга средств массовой информации и публичной сферы для достижения аксиологического консенсуса в поликонфессиональном обществе.

Ключевые слова: *СМИ; религия; ценностный диалог; дисфункции; консенсус.*

It seems evident that we can not understand religion as a social subsystem without media context. The process of *mediatization* with its conditions, reasons, effects must be taken into consideration in order to comprehend the role of religion in society. Religions are actualized not only in the modes of practice and worship, but they also have manifestations in the public sphere of a certain society, and they have become a subject of research with a long history (Religion and Media, 2001; Meyer, Moors, 2006; Encyclopedia of Religion, Communication and Media, 2006; Taylor, 2007).

Moreover, in some religions communication ontologically belongs to the very sacrum of the faith (as the Holy Trinity mystery in Christianity, based on "*communio*" between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) or the constituent fundamental process of transmitting religious origins and fundamentals to believers (Prophet Mohammed in Islam).

Looking at media-religion relations from the opposite point of view, we have to raise another question: can we understand media without religious context?

From a secular perspective the answer is positive: yes, we do not need any invocation of transcendental being to explain the nature of media. Yes, there are sacred objects in all religions (e.g., the Holy of Holies, Sacraments, Mecca's Kaa'ba, Buddha's statue, etc.), most religions have Holy Scriptures, some religions have holy persons. Since objects are praised by believers, they are to be respected by non-believers as well, especially journalists. But, nevertheless, they are not necessary for the understanding of media.

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Does it mean that we can precisely describe media as a social sub-system not taking into consideration religion as another influent sub-system? The answer is rather negative in retrospective of so-called "cartoon scandals", persecutions of Christians in some countries and other events, which had implicitly or even explicitly "religious factor" in background. "The increasing presence of religion in public life has provoked an ambivalent response from contemporary scholars trying to understand what the nature of religion is, what its proper role should be, and what its efflorescence means for our understanding of the nature of politics and society", – point out Charles Hirschkind and Brian Larkin (Hirschkind, Larkin, 2008).

When religion appears outside the private sphere, it sometimes becomes an effective tool of social mobilization and solidarity (like in the USSR during World War II) and sometimes – an instrument for manipulation with mass consciousness (like wrongly and aggressively interpreted "jihad", which caused some terrorists attacks).

"We live in a world where media, the political, and the religious cannot be seen as distinct phenomena but, rather, as mutually constitutive" (ibid).

Religion is continuously in need of comprehension not only by theologians, but also from the outside in the rich and complex context of its external relations – by experts in social philosophy, sociology, psychology, anthropology, cultural studies, and – journalism studies and communications.

In order to avoid dysfunctions and conflicts in practice it is highly recommended to study media-religion relations by journalists (Hoover, 2006).

Religions in Russia

Russia is a multi-confessional country, and it must be taken into consideration from the very beginning. After many decades of atheistic persecutions all religions were in a very difficult position before so-called perestroika started.

Last two decades were the time of a rapid development of religions in Russia.

What is the Russian religious landscape now? What does it look like?

Russian Constitution is considered by experts to be liberal and democratic (The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993). It provides equal rights: "The state shall guarantee the equality of rights and liberties regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property or employment status, residence, attitude to religion, convictions, membership of public associations or any other circumstance. Any restrictions of the rights of citizens on social, racial, national, linguistic or religious grounds shall be forbidden" (ibid, Article 19); and also the freedom of religion: "Everyone shall be guaranteed the right to freedom of conscience, to freedom of religious worship, including the right to profess, individually or jointly with others, any religion, or to profess no religion, to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious or other beliefs, and to act in conformity with them" (ibid, Article 28).

The Government generally respects this right in practice; however, in some cases authorities impose restrictions on certain groups.

In practice, only a minority of citizens actively participates in any religion. Many of those who identified themselves as members of a religious group participate in religious life rarely, or do not participate at all. There is not a single set of reliable statistics that breaks down the population by denomination, and the statistics below are compiled from government, polling, and religious group sources.

Recent Levada-Center public opinion poll conducted in November, 2012 confirmed that 74% of the respondents called themselves Orthodox believers, while 7% said they were Muslims. Less than 1% professed other religions (Catholics, Protestants, Jews and others). The center polled 1,600 people in 130 towns and cities in 45 regions (Number of Orthodox Church Members Shrinking in Russia, Islam on the Rise − Poll, 2012).

The share of Orthodox believers in the country has dropped by 6%, from 80% in 2009, while the share of Muslims has grown by 3% to 7% in the same period. 61% of the respondents said they had never opened the Bible. Of those who did, 24% read the Gospel, 16% read the Old Testament and 11% read the New Testament.

Expert poll dedicated to spirituality in Russian society indicates that unquestionable surge of interest to religion and the surge of faith have its place. But in many cases it is a serious problem to obtain valid and authentic information about religious life.

Religions and media

And now, having in mind the religious map of Russia, let us focus on media-religion relations.

Religions and mass media are among most influential social institutions in Russia. Such a role for media — "Fourth Power" — is traditional for at least last century, while religions as influent agents appeared on the Russian public scene in last two decades.

The relations between religions and mass media — their tensions, conflicts, mutual understanding, and "modus vivendi" — make a significant factor for social stability and modernization of post-Soviet Russia in the perspective of the civil society. That is why they are becoming more attractive for research — from phenomenological description to structural and functional analysis.

Lack of experience of two freedoms — of media and religion — in Russia and the principle difference between secular and religions' understanding of the limits of communications' freedom give us an interesting material for analysis.

Table 1 shows mutual correlations of freedom and religion with public opinion, institutional media, and state/local authorities.

Table 1

	Freedom	**Religion**
Public opinion	Lack of experience Civic society crisis Demand of "strong order"	Country of "non-believers" Spiritual hunger Lack of information in public sphere and interactivity
Institutional media	No will to fight for freedom Political and economical dependence Law and ethical problems	Interest – sensational but not essential Marginal place of religion in "hierarchy of attention" No experts/no formation, poor coverage as a consequence
State/Local authorities	Law implementation Lack of responsibility	Formal and informal preferences "De iure" and "de facto" Cases of suppression

The Interreligious Council of Russia drew leaders of Russia's largest denominations as well as international religious leaders together to work for "interreligious peace".

Media facing religions

There are three main ways of mediatization of religions:
1. Media allow, enable and contribute to self-presentation of religions, observe their activity in public interest keeping religious formats (broadcasting services, funerals, weddings, etc.);
2. Media cover religious life using media formats (news reports, feature stories, etc.) and having critical approach towards some social activity or religious institutions;
3. Media use religion for their own aims, selectively importing well-known religious symbols into entertainment, keeping out sacral

meanings and secularizing the essence of religion. This process is out of the control of religious authorities and therefore causes many complains and conflicts.

The first way of mediatization is more or less understandable and depends more or less on media institutions' good will and the audience's demands. In most cases it keeps religious format "untouched", and the media are used more as a channel of transmission rather than active subject of interaction.

The second and the third ways presume a more active role of journalists covering religion. The process is becoming more important, and at the same time more problematic. Conflict and scandals are rooted in misunderstanding or even in bad reporting on religious issues.

Pointing out some neglecting and ignorance of our colleagues, expected to serve the public interest, *Detroit Free Press* columnist David Crumm in his article "Why Write About Religion?" says: "Because faith has shaped our world — for good or ill — and we cannot fully understand the world around us without understanding faith" (Crumm, 2006).

The lack of knowledge and experience in religious life among journalists gives much more space for myths and stereotypes in the public opinion. There is an evident temptation for journalists to feed the audience not with what is happening in reality but with what fits into people expectations, based on myths and stereotypes. The explanations of such a style of journalism may be different — from understandable desire to become more popular and to get a higher position in rating to political manipulation laziness and low professionalism of journalists without any particular aims.

The current state of mass media in terms of correctness and validity of information is a permanent source of concern for many religious organizations in Russia.

How wide this "stereotyped-oriented" journalism in the coverage of religion is spread?

The research of such kind has been being conducted at the Faculty of Journalism, Lomonosov Moscow State University since 2007. Some pre-

liminary results give a possibility to put up several hypotheses for proving them with methods of qualitative and also quantitative analysis.

One of the possible answers could be given, thanks to new Internet-based technologies and also new research design for mechanisms of seeking, rewriting, and spreading of information, which we called *"trace-study"* (Khroul, 2009).

The research conducted in the field of Russian media clarifies functioning of mass information spreading mechanisms — *"media flows"*.

A *"trace-study"* as a research design could be applied for easily fixed in on from the moment of their birth or creation *"comets"* of media reality which *"trajectory"* researchers could follow and search due to the modern "optics" of high quality — computer indexed news data bases and searching systems (such as world well-known *Google, Yahoo* and Russian leaders *Yandex, Integrum,* etc.).

For the *"trace-study"* of religion coverage we chose a media flow about *"seven new mortal sins declared by Vatican"*. Most of news on this subject was published in Russian media during one week — from 10 to 16 March, 2008.

We analyzed 233 texts about *"seven new mortal sins"*, published in Russian media (news agencies, newspapers, weeklies, radio, TV and Internet). We analyzed texts using several categories — time, region, type of media, genre of the text, reliability, and correctness of links and sources, grade of distortion of the original publication, etc.

The main conclusions are the following:

- Authentic sense and reliability seem to be secondary criteria for spreading the information on religious topics through mass media. The primary one is the sensational character of the news, its correspondence with mass myths and stereotypes. Even after appearing in Russian mass media the authentic and truthful information stressing the fact that Vatican did not announce any "new seven mortal sins" during the next several days this topic was developed as "snow-ball", misinforming the audience;
- Quite often mass media invite as experts in diverse problems people who are not competent ones. In the searched story just in

3 cases Catholic priests were the experts, in 5 other texts experts were priests of Russian Orthodox Church. In most cases journalists did not apply for the comment at all;

- Very often journalists do not have critical attitude to the religious news from abroad. They do not intend to check the information with the help of independent information sources. Just reading the initial article in *L'Osservatore Romano* could be enough to understand the aberrations and mistakes made in *La Reppublica*, that "created" this "sensation", transmitted later on by *BBC, Reuters* and *The Times*;
- Having the Internet as a powerful tool for obtaining information and checking it, Russian journalists instead of it use it for further immediate spreading of unproved facts and opinions.

Uncritical media become the space for birth, growth, and support of myth and stereotypes regarding religious life – very delicate and sensitive sphere. Such practices have already caused and may cause many problems in future.

The results of the "trace-study" makes us concern about the role of a journalist in the dialogue between religions and society. Among three main roles of journalists – peacemaker, mediator, and provocateur – the last one, with "sharpening" the picture and making it more "scandalous" becomes the leading one. Our research results show exactly the crisis of professionalism and responsibility.

The results of the research confirm some empirically fixed facts and trends of dysfunction and corruption in the religious life coverage in Russia almost ten years ago (Religiya v informacionnom pole rossiiskikh SMI, 2002):

- biased approach among journalists, tolerated by their colleagues;
- lack of education in religious issues and therefore lack of understanding of what is really going on;
- urgent need of specialized media focused on religious life;
- secular media dependence on political and influential Russian Orthodox Church elites;

- and, therefore, religious minorities are underexposed in the public sphere.

In order to describe this very sensitive aspect, we made a survey on Catholic minority (1% of Russian population) as an example illustrating general situation with the religious minorities' media coverage in Russia.

We conducted the survey of news agencies materials about religious life. The main conclusion is that media appear to be the instrument of marginalization of *"strangers"* (e.g., they describe Catholics just as Western phenomenon).

Media texts represent Catholic Church as the Church of foreigners. Journalists systematically use words adopted from foreign languages, despite masses are held in Russian, the majority of Catholics are ethnic Russians using Russian in everyday life; Russian is used in Catholic publications and documents. This creates stereotype that Catholics in Russia are foreigners who do not want to integrate into local culture.

Media strengthen opposition of *"our faith"* and *"faith of outsiders"*. Ethnical and geographical determinism takes place, myths and stereotypes of mass consciousness dominate in agencies.

There exists a dependence on the state policy in religious sphere. It is not strongly articulated, but could be seen in signs of attention to the religious organizations (to the so-called *"traditional"* religions – Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism).

Russian media formed the image of the *"Church-stranger"* in mind of ordinary audience and in the perception of decision-making officials.

The analysis of the Russian media system, focused on religious life coverage, qualitative analysis of the religious content of the press, quantitative analysis of representation of religious topics in Russian news agencies; *"trace-study"* of religious news in Russian information space give us a strong argument to suppose that mass media play rather a negative role for both religion organizations and for audience.

Covering religion, journalists in Russia with widely developed *"copy-pasting"* practice, without checking the facts in independent sources, are still far from these principles.

Such behavior has impact on the audience: Catholicism is still seen as "invasive religion". Let us take a look at *religare.ru* visitors' voting results, published on April 12, 2004:

"Do you think Mel Gibson's film *"Passion of the Christ"*
will cause spread of Catholicism in Russia?"

Yes	49,7 %
No	39,8 %
Difficult to answer	10,4 %

Reproaching journalists for the spread of myths and stereotypes, we have to be objective and look at religions in Russia themselves: are they transparent and active enough? Are they ready to supply journalists with sufficient information that is to be transmitted to audience? There is a set of problems which seems to be a significant context for religious life coverage.

Not only mass media but also religions themselves have to contribute to agenda setting and to the elaboration of mediatization mechanisms in this very sensitive sphere.

Apart from difficulties of translation from an old-fashioned "dogmatic" language to the modern Russian, and also problems with understanding of internal functionality of Churches and other religious organizations, there are some expectations from the Russian society that religions do not fulfill. And this causes a lack of confidence to religions.

In the case of minorities it sometimes looks even like *"self-silencing"*. For example, during the last years previously open and outspoken position of the Russian Catholic community towards both external world and domestic issues has changed into *"no comments"* style and *"conspiracy"* mentality without any explanations. Most of Catholic media (newspapers, radio, TV, web portals) were closed and not a single one was opened.

If someone (e.g., a journalist, a scholar, a politician) would like to obtain some very basic official information regarding Catholic Church in Russia (e.g., number of parishes, believers, priests, bishops, structures, institutions) he/she would fail — at the moment there is no open sources.

Openness and transparency in terms of values presumes also moral voices of different religious organizations. But in fact religious *"ethos"* actually is visible and heard in the Russian public sphere just from time to time.

Religions facing media

1. Religions traditionally use media in religious formats: for spreading religious texts, transmitting events, ceremonies, etc. In the Russian context, for example, public TV transmits Christmas and Easter Orthodox celebrations;
2. Religions use media formats in religious media of their own (papers, radio, TV, Internet-based media). They are developing rapidly in Russia in order to ensure the influence of religion on the audience and to compete secular media in order to minimize its "negative" impact. The problem of "translation" from religious language to secular makes this usage difficult for religion;
3. Religions use media formats in secular media, demanding more space in the press, more time in public radio and TV, insisting the positive religious life coverage to be a must for secular media;
4. Religions use media's activity for PR purposes — for promoting some big events which need support of media (Patriarch visits, Youth days, social and charitable service of Russian Orthodox Church, educational initiatives, property restitution);
5. Religions observe media in moral discourses (sermons, letters, official documents, etc.), giving evaluation from the normative point of view, deriving from the "creed" of each particular faith. Religious media criticism recognizes competition between Reli-

gion and Media, and is focused mostly on ethical issues, on moral impact of media to the audience. "Ad hoc" protests against some films, TV shows (*Dom, Za Steklom,* erotic movies) and concerts of controversial pop-stars (Madonna, Satanists groups) appear in Russia as well (Khroul, 2012).

The last point is becoming more visible during the last years: religious initiatives on moral control towards media are a part of hot public debate.

Public Council on Morality for TV was proposed by the Club of Orthodox Journalists in November 2007, with support from Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia. "The major portion of society, politicians, pedagogues, artists, and journalists agree that no one is happy with destructive immorality and thoughtless entertainment portrayed on TV, for it only brings harm". – Alexy II noted.

VTsIOM's (All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion) data from December 2008 show that 58% of respondents agree that *Russian media need state censorship.* However, 26% of them are not sure that this is necessary. One-fourth (24%) object to censorship (8% strongly object). One-fifth, or 18% of respondents, found it difficult to answer (VTsIOM, 2008).

The following sections present the sides of the current debate on the subject, including supporters and opponents of social control.

One of the most respected men in Russian Orthodox Church, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin (Head of the Synodal Church and Society Department), believes that "the Council must not forbid anything, but should formulate a reason which will be brought to the viewers' notice as to why something should be prohibited".

Another position belongs to the Orthodox public circles. "The Council will not be involved in any kind of censorship. The moral Council should give its judgment on TV administration's actions instead of censoring." – said Alexander Schipkov, chairman of the Orthodox Journalists Club and councilor to the Chairman of the Council of Federation. "Society has lost control over TV channels. As a result, the norms of

public morality have been violated and have led to the defilement of children." – the Orthodox Journalists Club's chairman stressed.

In addition to the general complaints about immorality on TV, religious organizations always have the right permanently to monitor TV programs or movies from their point of view. But religious leaders and journalists have failed to react against the most controversial cases, placing their hopes instead in the establishment of the new council.

The Head of the Ministry for Culture of the Russian Federation, Alexander Avdeev, described Russian TV products as "low-grade", "immoral", and "harmful". While saying this, minister Avdeev recognized that additional regulation from the Parliament and government is needed for television and mass media.

Vladimir Pozner, a famous Russian TV journalist, warned about the danger of "black" or "behind the curtain" regulation.

The main point of voices "contra" is a "phobia" of the renewal or rebirth of strong ideological control over media endured in the USSR. The contra voices who have invested into "immoral" business on TV very often claim that any attempt to regulate media is an offensive step against freedom of speech. They hide their interest and profit behind the slogan, *"Glasnost must be defended"*. At the same time, the Glasnost Defense Foundation's president, Alexei Simonov, is in favor of the new Council for Morality on TV.

The evolution of the civic attention to Russian television means that its participants are moving from the opportunity of participation in the agenda-setting process, or at least influencing this agenda setting and the media contents, to the necessity of control. Systematic ignoring of citizens as active subjects in the information process, the imitation of their participation in TV activity (as crowd scenes at talk-shows), and arrogant reluctance to work with audience has led to a situation where the most active citizens and public institutions that have expressed desire for social control cannot participate in it.

There is a set of problems in regards to the Public Council for Morality on TV project which seem significant to us as we consider the possibility for this project to be realized.

The *first* significant problem is *the absence of a value consensus in Russian society.*

In a multi-normative society with coexisting different values and normative models caused by poly-confessional and poly-ethnical social structure, and with other factors of diversity, the activity of any council for morality would be successful only if there is a critical level of agreement about what is "good" and what is "bad".

Moreover, reaching the "zone of accordance", a minimum of "axiological unity" seems to be moving away more and more at present.

The modern world offers a great variety and variability of ethical norms and ideas about what is moral and what is not, linked to important world view categories of a person — the attitude to death, the idea of a family, the understanding of social justice, etc. Relativist occasional ethics in pluralist conditions destroyed the fragile social unity in the Soviet Union very quickly (if we assume that this unity actually existed).

Under conditions of increasing diversity, the elaboration of a joint and united idea of *good* and *evil* becomes more and more problematic. For instance, a television program, in which polygamy is represented in a positive way could be acceptable for some Muslims but would provoke protests among Orthodox believers. A TV show supporting family status for homosexual couples would become a reason for indignation from traditional religions followers, but fits well within the frames of liberal world-views of modern youth. Public discussion about euthanasia has already divided several European countries. A list of examples could be continued. It is hard to imagine them as subjects for discussion at the meeting of the Public Council for Morality on TV, and it is even more difficult to think about the possibility of elaborating one united judgment from its members. It would be more feasible in mono-confessional, mono-ethnic, and theocratic countries.

That is why it is not surprising that two "trial" sittings of the Council were held in an atmosphere of intense discussions, and that the opinions of participants were divided. This is quite understandable in the context described above.

The main obstacle in assessing the initiative is the problem of the fundamental possibility of the value consensus, an issue rarely mentioned in Russian mass media. It is the main obstacle but not the only barrier.

The *second* significant problem for the Public Council for Morality on TV is the absence of a system for moral monitoring in mass media and public sphere from value-defined, axiological, homogeneous social institutions and groups. The highest level for aggregate judgments in the moral sphere will not be the society of the whole country, but a morally united, monolithically homogeneous community, in which members are in consensus about *good* and *bad*. Shared opinions about morals unify such communities. That is why they could be named "crystallization centers" of the society, if we use ethical indicators; they could also be also called the "magnets" or "leading lights". Religious organizations and other institutions which evidently express a moral "credo" should be put in this group.

They should be the main participants in social dialogue in the moral sphere, accumulating and articulating value judgments rooted in fundamental normative models (one of Torah, the Bible, Koran, the book of Mormon, the oath of Hippocrates, etc.) as worked out in different situations of modern practice and activity. Total weight of these voices in polyphonic choir would be admittedly louder than voices of particular followers of some exotic ethical system.

Political parties, trade unions, clubs and other organizations, in which the uniting factor is directed outwards (as in the struggle for power, assertion of professional interests, getting income, love for football or sauna, etc.) are not and fundamentally cannot be morally homogeneous social institutions. As maximum, it is possible to discover their conventional professional ethics. The idea of *good* and *evil,* apart from official activity, is sidelined from the discussion to the private autonomous sphere of members' lives.

The problem is that there is no system of "moral monitoring" of events and phenomena of social life in the media and public sphere by active and value-defined communities. The light of "moral leading

lights" is not seen, they are poorly visible, poorly evident at the horizon of public consciousness. In this context the moral navigation of citizens is hardly probable. Being confused in the conditions of value diversity, quite often Russians are not able to make sensible choices; they are liable to normative pressure of different forces.

Even the most powerful voice in sources, opportunities and theoretically the most united community in modern Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church, is not heard regularly and systematically. The Church gives estimations in "ad hoc" manner, when a scandalous and extremely immoral thing happens. This is evident through the controversy around "The Last Temptation of Christ" movie release and with the concert of pop-singer Madonna crucifying herself on a cross, etc.

In ordinary life there is no regular producing and distribution of morally evaluated judgments of TV production and wider address to diverse socially significant problems and situations made by the Church. Moreover, as the press officer of the Russian Orthodox Church, priest Vladimir Viglyansky said, the Moscow Patriarchate does not plan to establish the structures for regular moral estimation of cinema and TV production like those created by the Roman Catholic Church (RPC MP poka ne planiruet sozdavat' sobstvenniy sovet po etike v SMI, zayavil svyaschennik Vladimir Viglyansky, 2008). Meanwhile, at the Catholic Bishops Conference in the USA and in several other Catholic countries, there are special institutions engaged in constant monitoring of cultural life (in the first order, monitoring the movie and television industries) and publishing lists of the main events and news of this or that sphere, with reviews every week. From time to time Muslim leaders also publish texts of normative and value contents, *fetva* actualizing dogma in the social sphere. The purpose of such activity in the field of TV consumption is to support believers in making decisions about what is worth seeing and what is not. These cases might be found in other religions.

It is important that even within the same institution estimations should come with moral authority of society, not from some impersonal subject representing the institution in general. Otherwise, there would be

a risk of harsh assessments of people behavior and consciousness. Moral authorities should give guidelines, but not rule people.

The *third* significant problem for the Public Council for Morality on TV activity is *the absence of a well-articulated dialogue of value systems*. If the moral monitoring of current events and facts takes place, if the "leading light" works in a proper way, it would be possible to speak about the articulated dialogue of value systems within the frames of constructing a normative model. In particular, communication about moral norms and their implementation for communicating facts and events in the society, to our mind, is a fundamental and necessary condition for the formation of a balanced broadcasting policy.

Naturally, this communication of value systems in the public sphere might be problematic, difficult, and disputed, but it would contribute to agenda setting and to the elaboration of media controls in the sphere of moral values.

Moral dialogue in the society is seen more naturally as a polyphony of voices mutually respecting axiological homogeneous social institutions, than as a dissonant choir of the Public Council members' voices composed of the leaders of the society, all singing in different tones. The case of the Public Council for Morality on TV shows that the position of unique "moral tuning fork" in poly-normative society is vulnerable and hard to implement.

Recent controversies

Two recent hot debates – on the so-called *Pussy Riot* punk rock band "prayer" on February 21, 2012, and doomsday on December 21, 2012 – show the complexity and diversity of the relations between media and religion in Russia. Both cases were widely mediatized and had social implications provoked and covered by mass media.

Masked *Pussy Riot* punk group singers staged what they called "an anti-Putin punk prayer" at the Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow

on February 21, 2012. Three *Pussy Riot* members were detained and tried for disorderly conduct. They claimed innocence and insisted that their action was political rather than anti-religious, but court found them guilty and sentenced them to two years in a penal colony on August 17, 2012. On October 10, the Moscow City Court suspended sentence for one singer and upheld for two others.

According to Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, *Pussy Riot* case has somewhat radicalized views in Russia. "I think opinions have somewhat radicalized. It is true because action always provokes counter-action. If someone tries to trample on the foundations of religion, this always provokes a very strong reaction from believers, and it is not because they are fundamentalists or radicals, but because such is human nature." — he said (Medvedev Doesn't Believe in Threat of Religious Fundamentalism to Russia, 2012).

Pussy Riot case impact to Russian society would be impossible without the use of media — from YouTube (first video publication place) to the most influential TV channels — widely used both for advocacy of the singers and for their condemnation.

The involvement of the media, which reproduce and distribute various kinds of rumors, legends, myths, provoking the audience into the strange and irrational behavior, has been explicitly showed by another case dealing with the impact of mass media and also ignorance of their accountability.

Characteristic plot could be seen recently in the context of rumors about the upcoming end-date, doomsday according to the Mayan calendar on December 21, 2012. The most influential (according to the circulation) regional newspaper *Omutninskie Vesti* (Omutninsk, Kirov region) published an article about the prophecy of a Buddhist monk from Tibet. The essence of the prophecy was the following: on December 21, 2012 the darkness "will last about three to four days accompanied by flashes of space, illusory flashes of light" resulting in a "loss up to 10% of the world population". *Omutninskie Vesti,* with a reference to the Tibetan monk, advised people to buy much food, to leave the city and meditate in order to survive.

The social consequences of this publication described Maria Eismont in *Vedmosti* newspaper, published on November, 29: "Omutninsk people for the past week have been actively preparing for the end of the world, hundreds of people were buying matches, candles, salt, oil lamps, and canned food" (Eismont, 2012). The editor received hundreds of phone calls from parents with complains that babies were crying and saying: "Mom, I do not want to die!" Many retired people panicked and asked journalists what they had to do.

Colleagues from *Omutninskie Vesti* said they published the story "by accident", simply because there was a blank space on the last page with anecdotes and crossword puzzles, and they had to put something there. Journalists took the news as a joke and expected the same reaction from the audience.

Social responsibility of journalism presumes that media are not disseminating information that might provoke such inadequate reaction from the audience. Obviously distorted, mythological picture of the world painted by mass media reveals the crisis of the journalists' responsibility, and a serious ethical problem arises again, which leads to dysfunctions in the whole media system in Russia.

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INFORMATION AND ATTITUDE
AS PRODUCTS OF JOURNALISM AND PR

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ И ОТНОШЕНИЕ
КАК ПРОДУКТЫ ТРУДА ЖУРНАЛИСТИКИ И PR

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The article reviews the issue of demarcation between two kinds of journalism and public relations as two types of mass and information activity. The author offers to use journalist's and PR specialist's professional societies representations about products of labor and the most important professional activity tasks as a dividing line.

Key words*: journalism; public relations; product of labor; professional consciousness; mass information.*

В статье рассматривается проблема демаркации журналистики и связей с общественностью как видов массово-информационной деятельности. Автор предлагает использовать в качестве разделителя представления профессиональных сообществ журналистов и PR-специалистов о продукте труда и сверхзадачах трудовой деятельности.

Ключевые слова: *журналистика; связи с общественностью; продукт труда; профессиональное сознание; массовая информация.*

Journalism and public relations have always been regarded as different kinds of activity, and the issue of separating them has never arisen before. It has been common to think that the major professional task of a journalist is to inform the target audience in an unbiased way (adjusting the message to the cultural code of the audience, if needed), while the task of a PR specialist is to strive for the publicity that would be profitable for an organization or a certain customer. However, the development of information and communication technologies along with the social development processes has led to the problem of separating journalism from public relations. On one hand, there are many cases when a journalist does not only inform the audience about some topical and socially significant issues, but also contributes to the promotion of some goods, services, political or commercial ideas. On the other hand, PR specialists are now regarded as "residential journalists", who work for organizations that do not belong to mass media (Agee, Cameron, 2004).

Why search for criteria of separating journalism from PR?

The present problem of demarcation between journalism and public relations is not just a topic for an abstract academic discussion; it is an issue of the further development of journalism that has been actively "crossbreeding" with public relations. This phenomenon of professional "merge" has been described by V. Ivanitsky, S. Korkonosenko, A. Korochensky, B. Lozovsky, V. Khorol'sky and others. However, there are no separate researches of the issue. Perhaps, for many academicians the difference is evident on an intuitional level, and they prefer to take it for granted. Although it is quite likely that the level of knowledge of the issue gets directly influenced by the formed stereotypes and autostereotypes of the two professional communities (journalists and PR specialists), as many of their members do not wish to study the differences and similarities in their professional activities.

At the same time, it is no secret that both journalists and PR specialists often perform the tasks that have not been associated with their

profession before. For example, journalists not only publish sponsored materials or do promotion of their own works or of their customers, hiding behind their professional task to provide unbiased information to the society; it is caused by the enhanced competition at the media market. In their turn, PR specialists often combine propaganda and advertising tasks with providing the audience with unbiased information on these or those events or social phenomena. Moreover, PR specialists more and more frequently turn to alternative communication channels, including Internet blogs, social networks, direct contacts, etc., in addition to the existing mass media; modern technologies provide the opportunity to create one's own mass media that would be either eliminated after the end of the project or used further for any other purposes.

Under current conditions it is becoming more and more difficult to use the traditional ways of demarcation. For example, it would be possible to rely on the differences in functions of the profession. However, these functions have not been studied thoroughly enough, and they have not been a subject to a commonly accepted classification. For this reason, comparing the functions imposed on journalism and the PR functions, one can find a lot of similarities and contradictions. For example, both journalism and PR are included into the processes of social management, social integration, and both of them perform epistemological, axiological and some other functions.

Another problematic difference is the professional ethics, to which Russian theorists and practitioners usually appeal as to the last argument that would separate the a priori "good" journalism from a priori "bad" public relations. Even a brief comparison of professional ethics' codes of journalists and PR specialists shows that both professional groups outline objectivity, truthfulness, honesty and public interest as their ideals. However, the professional code of PR specialists is more imperative. For instance, it contains the requirement to control one's behaviour even in their free time in order not to spoil the image of the professional community. No one expects the same from journalists. At the same time everyone understands that the representatives of both groups often run coun-

ter to the professional ethics' guidelines, and the belonging of journalists to a certain professional community can never guarantee their socially responsible behaviour or the aspiration to take care of public interests. Moreover, studying the work of the modern mass media, one cannot help noticing that the "unbiased" journalists can easily change their attitude towards the covered issue depending on who the customer is, or who of the advertisers did or did not sign a contract with the editorial board. In the latter case they start publishing the "honest and open" negative information about the advertiser till a part of the advertising budget is finally invested.

The present article does not set a goal to eliminate the demarcation problem of journalism and PR, however, in our opinion, it has the capacity to mark some trends for further reflection or discussion on the topic.

Searching for differences through comparison of professional consciousness

Reflecting on the demarcation problem within the framework of the thesis research on social philosophy, we turned to theoretical study of professional consciousness of three professional groups which take active part in mass communication activity: journalists, advertising specialists, and PR specialists. The comparison helped finding the features that can separate one professional community and its consciousness from the others.

The research was based on the concept that a profession is not only a kind of activity or a set of certain inherited and acquired features of a personality; it is also a social community that possesses its own group consciousness. And these are the certain group regulations, systems of values and ideas passed on to the new community members that form the individual consciousness in order to perform the professional work in the most efficient way. At the same time, a professional community, just like any other group, is in the state of permanent development. In the begin-

ning it is a free group with weak connection between its members, the only common feature of which is performing the same operations and solving the same problems (for example, journalists' community from the moment of its emergence till the end of the XIX century). Later, as the interconnection between the members develop and the behaviour norms begin to crystallize, the group conceptualizes its working experience, selects its leaders (the most expert representatives of the community), and the group consciousness finds its shape.

It is important to notice that professional consciousness has traditionally been an object of study in connection with the national consciousness (for example, professional consciousness of Russian and American workers in the studies by A. G. Zdravomyslov and V. A. Yadov). However, to our mind, it is possible to research it separately from the consciousness of a certain nation, concentrating on the "core" that concerns the professional activity only. The first theoretical explanation of this is connected to the fact that any person can be a bearer of several forms of consciousness; therefore, representatives of the same profession can have various political or religious commitments, opinions, etc. But even in this case all of them have something in common. The second empirical explanation was found in the Russian-American research carried out by L. G. Svitich and A. A. Shiryaeva at the beginning of 1990s at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Expecting to see some principal differences between Russian and American journalists (as the previous Russian researches of professional groups had been aimed at finding the peculiarity and the uniqueness of a Soviet person), the researchers were surprised to discover that "there are some certain features of the profession which do not depend on the social structure, national traditions or the lifestyle of the country" (Svitich, Shiryaeva, 2006).

The idea of a "core" of the professional consciousness, which is the same for the representatives of the same profession in any social medium became the basis for another classification of value system of a professional group. To do it, the sociological conception of values, according to which the behaviour and thinking of an individual is strictly regulated

by a system of group traditions, and also some works on social psychology and theory of identity (Le Bon, G. Shpet, E. Erikson, A. Giddens, I. Kon and others) were studied. Besides, the materials on theory and practice of management that review the so-called "organization culture" were considered. As a result, the following groups of value conceptions were outlined (Zorin, 2012):

1. Conception of the object and product of work as of the main professional and moral attitude, as it is the aspect where the principal match of interests of any professional group or community is manifested;

2. Conception of the place of the group within the social structure, which conditions the responsibility degree of the professional group to the society and the responsibility of the society to the group;

3. Conception of the tasks that correspond to the definition of "values and targets" expressing the mission of the group;

4. Conception of the future and the past of the group, which allows, firstly, to explain the logic and legitimacy of a series of other values, and secondly, to create the image of the desired future that can be achieved with the group's activity;

5. Conception of the socially approved and socially disapproved behaviour. It is the result of the previous experience and reflection on the existing practice, and it is the intermediary that explains how the professional activity is to be performed and what are the things to be avoided.

Tasks and product of labour
as the demarcating features of journalism and PR

The present work carefully analyses the conceptions of the object and product of work, as they are the ones that helped finding the significant difference between journalism and public relations, along with the conception of the tasks of their activity.

The conception of the object of activity and the product of work are closely bound to the certain needs of the society the activity or the products are supposed to satisfy. For this reason, "the character and the content of any work activity are conditioned, first of all, by its object. Objectless activity is simply meaningless" (Avraamov, 1991).

The attitude towards the product of the professional activity is the main professional and moral kind of attitude, as it reveals the principal match of interests of the professional group and the society (Lazutina, 1999). And if a certain social need for the labour product disappears for any reason, the professional activity that was aimed at satisfying the need, becomes meaningless and, as a result, it can disappear too.

Under the conception of the activity tasks we understand the value targets connected to the general explanation of what the work activity is for. Studying some certain work collectives, researchers of the organization culture frequently point out the mission, the purpose of the organization, the function of it, for the sake of what the work collective exists, what strategic targets it is striving to achieve. At the same time, the term of mission correlates well with what V. A. Yadov defined as "terminal values and value targets" (Yadov, 1979), which take up the highest position in the hierarchy and compose the "life ideal", the moral image of the future.

Information as the product of journalists' work

The main product of a journalist's activity has always been public information, such as author's publication, or articles (today the term "information products" is frequently used). Moreover, information is the only means journalists have at their disposal when performing their social role (Prokhorov, 2003). The distinctive features of journalists' work are the following:

Firstly, journalists' work is connected to the present moment of reality (D. S. Avraamov, G. V. Lazutina, E. P. Prokhorov, A. A. Tertychny

and others). M. M. Bakhtin wrote that a journalist has to be a modern man, which means that he must live in the context of issues that are to be solved at the present moment.

Secondly, the information provided by journalists is documentary: "unlike a writer, a journalist does not create a new fiction reality" (Avraamov, 1991). However, it is worth noting that this circumstance did not prevent the occurrence of such stereotypical image of a journalist and a writer as of "literary artists". The understanding of journalism as a "nearly literary" activity existed in our country till 1990s, when the "reboot" of the profession began, when it began to manifest itself as something more pragmatic, rational, informational (Fateeva, 2008; Svitich, Shiriaeva, 2006).

Thirdly, the information provided by journalists is always connected not only to the creator of the information, but to its addressees, the audience. For this reason, the real journalistic information is "those parts of the "texts" which "are conveyed" to the audience, forms its consciousness behaviour" (Prokhorov, 2003).

The specifics of the journalists' product determines the character of the professional and moral relations, for which, according to D. S. Avraamov, J. M. Dzyaloshinsky, G. V. Lazutina and others, the relations between the journalist and the audience are the key ones. D. S. Avraamov highlights the principal difference of these relations from those that are formed in other professions, like, for example, between a doctor and a patient, a teacher and a student. A journalist takes part in direct relations when communicating with the sources of information, editors and colleagues, but the main kind of relations for a journalist are the relations with the audience (Avraamov, 1991), which remains the anonymous receiver of the messages. But the role of "journalist-audience" relations in the working process is still a disputable issue. Firstly, the sender of the mass communication messages does not have a direct contact with the receiver due to the peculiarities of this kind of communication, which also requires some kind of special technology to transmit the message (Jirák, Köplová, 2003). Organizing contact not with

separate representatives of the audience, but at least with a representative group requires significant efforts and resources. Secondly, the conducted research proved that journalists see their position in the above mentioned relations in a different way. Sociologists V. Viver and G. Willheut in their work "American Journalist" (1986), which summarized the results of the first large-scale sociological research of American journalists (Trampota, 2006), revealed that journalists take different positions when communicating to their audience. The data was confirmed by the research carried out in 1992. On one hand, journalist can perceive him or herself as an interpreter who analyses and interprets the issues, checks the statements made by the authorities, discusses the current policy. On the other hand, journalists cannot perceive themselves as "information transmitters" who only pass on the information as fast as possible, and to as many people as possible. And thirdly, a journalist can take the position of the "opposition" to the political and business authorities (McQuail, 1999). Naturally, all these factors influence the relations with the audience.

At the same time, we cannot help mentioning one contradiction. Traditionally, information, or a series of texts that is perceived as public information flow (Lazutina, 2004) have been considered the main product of journalists' work (Prokhorov, 2003). However, it was noted that journalism is included into the "mechanisms of social self-regulation" (Lazutina, 2004). One of the key issues has always been the force of intentional or unintentional influence journalists make on the society. It has been noted that journalists do not only transmit the information; they state some certain values and regulations, organize ideological programmes and control their implementation (Avraamov, 1991); for this reason journalism, while not having status of an authority, is included into the authority relations (Lazutina, 2004) and often depends on them. So, it turns out that the product of journalists' work is information, but at the same time the so-called "by-products" – various media effects that can be caused by the journalists' work – are to be considered. To our mind, this fact leads to the confusion in differentiation between journalism and PR, as sometimes causing such media effects is the aim of specialists in PR.

Aims of journalistic activity. We can name two main aims of journalistic activity (however, in general more aims can certainly be singled out). The main aim of journalism is *timely informing people on the topical and socially significant issues.* It can be also called "reality monitoring". The objectiveness of informing in this case is very important.

At the same time, the aim of journalism which is also mentioned within the frameworks of some certain models is *participation in forming public opinion*, which is participation in *social management.* The task can be performed in various ways; therefore, it is evaluated differently, too. A journalist can be a "democracy watchdog", an "enlightener", or a moderator of public discussion, etc.

Attitude as a product of PR specialists' work

If traditionally one considers information to be the product of the journalists' and advertising specialists' work, then the product of PR activity is *the attitude of a certain group of people towards some things or phenomena.* However, many people would not agree with it right away, as the only "tangible" result of PR specialists' work for them is press releases, organized publications, events, etc. But we arrive at the conclusion that the real product is more evanescent, as we analyse the definition of public relations, which emphasizes that this activity is connected to the communication, management and administration at the same time.

A. N. Chumikov and M. P. Bocharov write that "PR operates the perception of the target groups by means of conscious production (interpretation) of messages and placing them in specially organized communication channels" (Chumikov, Bocharov, 2009). After J. Grunig and T. Hunt, it is "operation of communication between an organization and its social surroundings" (Agee, Cameron, Ault, 2004). As S. Cutlip, A. Center and G. Broom write, it is a "kind of management activity that is responsible for determination, establishment and maintenance of mutually profitable relationships between an organization and those

multiple groups, on which the success or failure of the company depend" (ibid). The definition suggested by S. Cutlip is regarded as an acceptable standard of PR definition by the PR structures themselves (Kitchen, 2004). Philippe A. Boiry (Boiry, 2001), the leading expert in this profession in Western Europe, also wrote about these "interactions" as the "main variable" of public relations. M. A. Shishkina describes a complex of Russian and foreign terms that postulate PR as a series of practices used for regulating the relations of a subject with the society (Shishkina, 1999). But, this way or another, all these works are related to the creation of an *attitude* towards these or those things and phenomena, and not to the preparation of press releases or the organization of events.

For a PR specialist information is not a product, it is a tool. Modern researches do not even provide limitations to PR specialists, such as certain types of information, or certain information transmission channels. Messages can be transmitted by means of texts, public speeches, visual images, musical compositions and many other things (Chumikov, Bocharov, 2009), for example, various special events, including the ones organized specially for journalists. For PR specialists it is important not only to create and transmit messages, but also to carry out a thorough study of their audience before the communication act (or campaign) and after it.

It is necessary to pay attention to two important peculiarities connected to the object of a PR specialist's work. The first one is the following: the character and the quality of the created attitude is determined not by the PR specialist, but by a person that applies to the professionals in order to establish or maintain communication with the social groups, which are important for this person. For this reason the targets of the "product" creation can be different. As a rule, authors studying public relations write about reaching mutual understanding and establishing fruitful relations between an organization and its audience by means of two-way communication, or about reaching harmony and mutual understanding (Chumikov, 2000). However, as practice

shows, public attitude towards an object can also change for implausible reasons.

The second peculiarity can be formulated the following way: if the author of a journalistic work (individual or a collective, such as mass media bodies) is always known to the message addressees, and it is easy to find out the customer of an advertising campaign (even if the addressee does not know the copywriter or the advertising agency), then in the system of public relations the connection between the product and the addressee is less evident. The real creators of PR campaigns are very seldom shown to the public. At the same time, unlike advertising, even the subjects of public relation campaigns can keep in the shadow, especially if the purpose is to damage someone's reputation or to create negative attitude to some things or phenomena.

The tasks of public relations organization are very diverse, and hard to classify. However, they can be summarized as *participation in social management,* as "changing the nature and the quality of the relations, we automatically influence the social dynamics, and, therefore, the group functioning" (Boiry, 2001). At the same time, it is wrong to consider public relations a kind of manipulation, simply because the profession itself appears after one understands that it is inefficient to deceive the society. For this reason, participating in social management, a PR specialist performs not only the communication management functions, but also epistemological (constructing the public discourse, cognitive activity), sociological functions and many others (Shishkina, 1999).

Comparison of tasks and products

So, comparing products and aims of the journalists' and PR specialists' work, one can find both similarities and significant differences (see table 1).

Table 1

Product, tasks and type of information
for journalists and PR specialists

Profession	Product	Task	Type of information
Journalist	1. Information (main) 2. Media effects (secondary)	1. Timely provision of information («reality monitoring») *2. Participation in social management*	1. Connected to the present moment of reality 2. Documentary 3. Connected both to the creator (author) and to the addressee of the information
PR specialist	Attitude of social groups towards things and phenomena	*1. Participation in social management*	Information is a tool for solving various communicative tasks, it can be of different types

The tasks of the activities have much in common: both journalists and PR specialists participate in social management. But at the same time, journalism performs an aim of timely informing about what is happening in the world (the "reality monitoring"), which is not typical for advertising or PR. And, maybe the fact that the modern society can in a growing number of cases carry out this "monitoring" without press assistance makes the competition of journalism and PR in the society management more challenging, and gives us one more reason to speak of their "crossbreeding".

At the same time, the main product of journalists' work still remains information, which is documentary and up-to-date. For PR specialists information is just a tool, and the product of their work is the *attitude of a certain group of people towards things or phenomena*. The character of this attitude is determined not by the specialist, but by the employer or the customer, the subject of PR. And if a journalist or mass media sometimes are aimed at the production of information, but also at the production

of a certain media effect, they are usually known by the audience. This is important when the transmitted information damages the reputation of some people or groups (for example, when the guilty party in this or that problematic situation is revealed). As for a PR specialist and PR subject, they are often anonymous, especially if the aim of their activity is damaging one's reputation, discrediting, etc.

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BINARIZM OF STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AS A FACTOR IN WINNING RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 2012

БИНАРИЗМ СТРУКТУРНЫХ ЭЛЕМЕНТОВ КОММУНИКАЦИОННОЙ СТРАТЕГИИ КАК ФАКТОР ПОБЕДЫ НА ВЫБОРАХ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИИ-2012

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The article analyzes the nature of communications technology of the campaign headquarters of Russia presidential candidate Vladimir Putin. For the research and analysis the author has used the method of schematic modeling, the main theory of a binary opposition as a feature of the human mind. There is a description of its nature and structural elements. This article reconstructed the management scheme and communication stream and flows, provided analysis and general characteristics of Communication Management of the campaign of Russia presidential candidate Vladimir Putin.

Key words: *political communication; campaign; political technologists; media; binary.*

В статье анализируется коммуникационная сущность технологии предвыборного штаба кандидата в президенты России

В. В. Путина. При анализе системы коммуникаций политической технологии используются: метод схематического моделирования, главное положение теории бинарности — структура бинарных оппозиций является одной из характеристик человеческого разума, дается описание ее сущности и структурных элементов. В статье реконструирована схема управления коммуникационным потоком, дается ее анализ и общая характеристика коммуникационного менеджмента предвыборного штаба кандидата в президенты России В. В. Путина.

Ключевые слова: *политическая коммуникация; предвыборная кампания; политическая технологи; СМИ; бинарность.*

General information

The Russian presidential election campaign of 2012 is widely discussed by experts in different fields and in mass media as well. In this article the attention is paid to the results the author obtained using the technology of "Binary Communication" described in his monograph "Glasnost as political technology" (Ushanov, 2012).

Binary communication: essence and structural elements

The meaning of "Glasnost" is emphasized in many research works and memoirs devoted to "Perestroika" (especially estimated in a critical way (Boldin, 1995; Burbulis, 2001; Geller, 1997; Kara-Murza, 2003)).

The research of social and political processes characterizing the modern society obviously makes us appeal to mass media as they are the most active form of their expression. The functional characteristics of mass media are not limited as the means of communication serving relations in society. Attention is attracted to techniques of involving communication into deep structures of political life and as a result of it not

only the intensive political process and development of mass media can be changed but also the quality of their mutual influence. But still mass media cannot change the political and social situation; they operate as means of a more complicated process.

Taking "Glasnost" as a phenomenon we systemized and put the following trends into table chronologically: from 1986 till 1990 – distinguished power over the communication process in the USSR which is characterized by mutual influence of mass media and the complex of art of communication such as literature and cinematograph aiming to introduce new themes and knowledge about the country and the world and also new approaches to estimation and interpretation can be observed. According to our point of view, the real things are being converted into objects of compassion and, therefore, they are penetrating into social consciousness only when they obtain an esthetic form, when the matters of real life turn into art emotional images system. In our opinion, the changing of the whole system of knowledge and perception of the Soviet society across the world was the goal of "Glasnost", but it could be obtained using not only the possibilities of mass media but also the complex of art communications. They turn out to be involved in one process; it makes us consider "Glasnost" in two ways: in the narrow and broad senses which are regarded as the General and the Particular.

In the narrow sense Glasnost is supposed to be information policy being initiated by Communist Party Central Committee to support society changes, to fight the opposition side within Party Politburo. According to the Soviet tradition, mass media were utilized as means to achieve some goals. During the social changes period, communist-reformists were doing it the same way, at that time some mass media companies were extracted from the Soviet common Glasnost only by such boundaries, therefore there are many non-understandable things in this case, that is why within a very short period of time alien to socialism ideology of liberalism became so entrenched in social consciousness and was able to change not only political orientations, but make citizens be involved into political process as its performers. That is the reason to investigate

Glasnost in a broad sense as communication front, which deals with the society aiming to change society political consciousness. Such kind of attitude to Glasnost explains the Communist Party information policy failures. Controlling of information front turned to be impossible anyway (it became clear at the end of 1990), since it cannot be regarded as administrative body, it had no division to bring together or to rule; furthermore, information dispersal depends on customers' interests.

We can suggest the following communication chain of the information agenda's creation during the period of perestroika, it happened to be the penetration of liberal dogmas into social consciousness within communication frames as below:

1. Literature journals by publishing unknown before or forbidden documents, memoirs made the society be aware of the new details of well-known events, which consequently led to the re-estimation of these events;

2. Mass media using published materials raised topical questions of real life. Exactly at that period of time the method of considering historical facts as the main argument in political discussion was widely used;

3. The literature developing the same themes became focused on mass media information agenda. At that time books that had been published before were re-issued, and forbidden works or samizdat books became legally admissible. In the long run, new ones written in the tradition of popular literature were published. Cinematograph became involved in this process a little bit later due to its production complications to follow literature and mass media. However, films demonstrated the key problems to larger audiences etching them in the public mind. According to our point of view, the role of cinematograph is very important, as it creates communication binary amplifying ideas, matters, events reflected in mass media, in esthetics images.

We suppose that the core of communication binary is in dual aspects of information mainstream: documental-relational part sug-

gested by mass media and art-emotional aspect belonging to cultural objects. This phenomenon was not obviously foreseen by M. S. Gorbachev' supporters while launching the Glasnost policy. They made use of many years' experience of using Soviet-communist regime's mass media and didn't expect the forthcoming problems. However, for the Communist Party of the USSR it turned out to be the so-called binary gas: harmless elements joining together brought about a fatal explosion.

Binary communication: 2012, a new version

The Russian presidential campaign of 2012 is still being actively discussed by experts in various fields, including mass communications. In this article we would like to scrutinize the results using the method described above.

Post factum it is possible to outline the model, which consists of a set of interrelated and interdependent *tasks* stated by the election headquarters of V. V. Putin in order to achieve the main goal — winning in the first round:

1. Creation of information and emotional background for the coming victory;
2. Creation and implementation to the mass consciousness dystopia of a possible collapse of Russia in case of Putin's defeat;
3. Neutralization of the Communist Party and its leader Zyuganov, who presented the potential risks for Putin's strategy mentioned above;
4. Neutralization of the liberal-democratic protest movement.

In our opinion, it is possible to designate the applied technology as «model of the closed communication cycle». It can be illustrated by the following figure:

Figure 1

Now we can start analyzing the structural elements of the technology.

Element 1 (the election promotional items and advertising). It played the role of a trigger mechanism, which did not only solve the problem of traditional advertising such as suggesting the competitive advantages of the candidate, broadcast and air slogans, etc., but also introduced V. V. Putin's main subject of the information agenda − the election of the president.

Element 2 (information space). The prevalence of positive news made the audience estimate the work of the Russian Government and its Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as successful. Unlike the logic of this element functioning in the previous campaign (it became an integral part of the candidate's campaign), in our opinion, this time it was not limited to broadcasting an image of "man of action", which is not up to the "election tinsel" and played the role of a signal repeater − "Why Putin must

be chosen for president?", — it led to the next step, the third element of technology. At this stage, unified messages coming from political advertising were scattered, refracted through interests and preferences of the society.

Element 3 (information-analytical, journalistic field of mass media). We consider it a key element for the implementation of the tasks outlined above —namely № 2, 3, 4. Propagation was a primary communication tool for the implementation of the abovementioned problems, because it was highly efficient in the conditions of total information superiority over the contenders.

Element 4 (television movies). This element solved the problem of aestheticization of propaganda, translating ideas and opinions to an emotionally-imaging sphere, creating a collective feeling of empathy for the audience... TV is the traditional channel of work with voters for the election headquarters of Vladimir Putin, but in 2012 it was filled with the new content: information, analytical and journalistic part was complemented by feature and art. The format of an article does not allow us provide a detailed review of different means of artistic communication in the pre-election period. The television series directed by Sergei Snezhkin *Belaya Gvardiya (The White Guard)*, shown on March 3, 2012 is a perfect illustration of it. It is worth mentioning that liberal mass media criticized the author's film as an opportunistic snap and a tactical binding to "the current political moment" — the election.

However, various critics argued that screenwriters took liberties with the works of Mikhail Bulgakov. Compared with the previous film adaptation *(Dni Turbinykh (Days of the Turbins)* (1976), directed by V. Basov), they increased the number of scenes of strong emotional stress and pressure (or even rebooted and overloaded them) to the audience. The horrors of the civil war (disturbance, distemper) became the main content of the film. Here we can see relation to the first and third elements of the technology described above. The general idea of a red threat passed through all the maintenance campaign that was developed by the team of V. V. Putin.

Element 5 (special campaign events). It was most clearly manifested in meetings and flash mobs in support of Vladimir Putin. In our opinion, these special events solved a number of problems which were:

- Creating informational background of support (and short time before the election) V. V. Putin for mass media;
- Creating emotional background for participation, empathy and, ultimately, an opportunity to share the triumph of the winner;
- Neutralizing the protest of the liberal-democratic movement.

It is important to outline that this element has been organically fastened in a communication complex which was managed by V. V. Putin's campaign headquarters, so the themes of meetings were incorporated from the third element of the described technology operated, and projected it again on the first element — pre-election advertizing. It is necessary to mention that in the last piece of the pre-election campaign the quantity of advertizing output in favor of V. V. Putin increased, and thematically was connected with a communication stream which was started within the limits of the described technology.

In conclusion, we think that the strategic technology described above — the "model of a closed loop communication" — based on the concept of the main messages of the election headquarters of B. N. Yeltsin's presidential election in Russia in 1996 results of a "If not our candidate, it will get worse". The scale of the instrumental use of the media in the election campaign of the current government's candidate in 2012 was similar and comparable to the practice of 1996. The principal difference between these campaigns lays on a bigger score of communication management from Putin's team (as reflected in the scheme, in which we described functions of spin doctors), as well as an active participation of artistic communication in the campaign information.

In favor of the thesis about qualitative management of communications during the pre-election period of headquarters of V. Putin testifies the fact that the film-making period of the film *Belaya Gvardiya* began early in 2009. If we take into consideration that contours of the political situation of 2012 were shaped after the first blow of the economic crisis

on the economy and society, it is possible to assume that work on the elaboration of the described technology began three years prior to the election.

The principle of an active interaction of documentary, rational and emotional levels of artistic and socio-political communication creates the "model of closed-loop communication" with the publicity as a political technology. The difference is in scale: in 2012, they had the task of using the tool of artistic communication during a short election campaign. It is significant that television was selected as the main tool to broadcast to an audience. There was a more fundamental problem in the adjustment period − the introduction of alien principles of liberal ideology in the Soviet society. Therefore, the form and content of artistic communication in the public communication is broader than the fifth element of our model.

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Part 3.

JOURNALISM STUDIES IN RUSSIA AND ABROAD

PARADOXES OF JOURNALISTIC PROFESSION: CASE OF RUSSIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BRICS COUNTRIES

ПАРАДОКСЫ ЖУРНАЛИСТСКОЙ ПРОФЕССИИ: РОССИЯ В КОНТЕКСТЕ СТРАН БРИКС

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Our empirical studies suggest four paradoxes characterizing Russian media and journalism. The first paradox is the profession itself. On the one hand, journalism is a life-threatening job for truth-seekers. On the other hand, journalism is a fashionable occupation as seen in the growth of journalism schools and number of applicants. The second paradox is the media market. On the one hand, ranked 10^h in the world by economic indicators, it has grown into a mass industry. On the other hand, the majority of regional and local newspapers depend on governmental resources.

The third paradox is a marriage of liberalism and authoritarianism. On the one hand, media reveal the same logic of commercialization and concentration as in the West moving to homogenization. On the other hand, market liberalism of the Russian media successfully co-exists with the authoritarian approach of the government. The fourth paradox is between deterioration in the quality of democracy with a decline of media freedom, on the one hand, and the satisfaction of the majority of journalists in their profession, on the other. Two thirds of journalists in Russia are satisfied with their work conditions in spite of their autonomy being reduced.

This paradoxical situation is reflected in Russian media system, offering an intriguing case with elements of both a Western libertarian system and an Eastern communitarian system, referred to as "Eurasian". Rather than studying it alone and in relation to two main directions of West/Europe and East/Asia, a new approach is provided by the emerging geopolitical entity known as "BRICS" — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Although these countries are different in many respects, they share crucial features in the globalizing world, making them a vanguard group in international arena. The BRICS context is used as an attempt to open new intellectual avenues.

Key words*: Russian media system; journalism; comparative studies; BRICS countries.*

Наши эмпирические исследования отмечают четыре парадокса, характеризующие российские медиа и журналистику. Первый парадокс — это сама профессия. С одной стороны, журналистика — эта опасная работа, если заниматься расследованиями. С другой стороны, журналистика — это модно; открылось много новых факультетов по всей стране, выросло количество желающих учиться профессии. Второй парадокс — это медиарынок. С одной стороны, он 10-й в мире по экономическим показателям, вырос в массовую индустрию. С другой стороны, большинство местных газет зависят от административного ресурса. Третий парадокс — это союз либерализма и авторитариз-

ма. С одной стороны, медиа обнаруживают ту же самую логику коммерциализации и концентрации, как и на Западе, двигаясь к гомогенизации. С другой стороны, рыночный либерализм медиа в России успешно уживается с авторитарным подходом власти. Четвертый парадокс находим между ухудшением качества демократии и свободой слова с одной стороны, и удовлетворенностью большинства журналистов в профессии с другой.

Эти парадоксы российской медиасистемы ставят в тупик, совмещая как элементы западной системы либертарианизма, так и восточной системы коммунитарианизма, говорят о «евро-азиатской» модели. Наш новый подход предлагает уйти от традиционной дихотомии, известной как: Запад/Европа и Восток/Азия. Он предлагает взять БРИКС-контекст, пытаясь открыть новые пути исследования. БРИКС стал новой геополитической структурой, включая Бразилию, Россию, Индию, Китай и Южную Африку. Все эти страны, хотя очень разные во многих отношениях, разделяют ключевые черты в глобализирующемся мире и выступают авангардной группой на международной арене.

Ключевые слова: *российская медиасистема; журналистика; сравнительные исследования; страны БРИКС.*

Russia's media system: Paradoxical and hybrid

Our empirical studies carried out in Russia during the last decade suggest four paradoxes characterizing Russian media in general and journalism in particular. The first paradox is the media market. On the one hand, this is ranked 10th in the world by economic indicators (Pankin, 2010), operating at the intersection of state and business interests. Media have grown into a mass industry of entertainment, information, and advertising. The rapid development of the media is triggered by societal changes, particularly the increase in consumption when income began to grow and interests shifted from politics to private life. On the other

hand, the Russian government acknowledges the non-market character of media – the overwhelming majority of the regional and local newspapers exist owing to various subsidies and administrative resources (Rossiiskaya periodicheskaya pechat': sostoyanie, tendencii i perspektivy razvitiya. 2009, 2010).

The second paradox is a marriage of liberalism and authoritarianism in the Russian media system. On the one hand, the media reveal the same logic of commercialization, concentration, convergence as in the West (European Media Governance: National and Regional Dimensions, 2008) moving to homogenization of media systems and the triumph of the liberal model, as classified by Hallin and Mancini (Hallin, Mancini, 2004). The analysis of its structure and trends represented in terms of media economy and technology (Vartanova, Smirnov, 2010) implicitly suggests a perspective of its gradual convergence with Western models whereby "Russia is no longer such a special case" (Nordenstreng, 2010a). On the other hand, the so-called market liberalism of the Russian media successfully co-exists with the authoritarian approach of the government: "instrumentalization of media" (Zassoursky, 2004) as well as "market authoritarianism" (Shevtsova, 2005). The trend of the last decade is for a proportional decrease in the commercial capital share and an increase in the state capital and mixed (state and commercial) capital shares. The dependence of the media on the state increases in two ways: through state ownership and through regular subsides – both buying the loyalty of the media.

The third paradox is the profession itself. On the one hand, journalism became a dangerous job: journalists with the watchdog role faced a high risk in their professional careers and lives. When we calculated the number of journalists killed since 1992, the most dangerous topics to cover were war, politics, corruption, business and human rights (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2011). The sad statistics of the violence against the professional rights of journalists since the early 1990s included over 300 journalists killed (Deaths of Journalists in Russia, 2011). On the other hand, journalism is a fashionable occupation as seen in the growth of

journalism schools and number of applicants, many from wealthy families. This popularity is not surprising when journalism shines as PR and show business, where big money moves and personal career advancement is achieved, especially in large cities (Pasti, 2010). The study of professional roles of the regional journalists revealed little interest in investigative journalism among young journalists, only a few supported criticizing the government (Pasti and Pietiläinen).

The fourth paradox is between the deterioration in the quality of democracy with a decline of media freedom, on the one hand, and the satisfaction of the majority of journalists in their profession, on the other. During the last decade political research addressed signs of degeneration of democratization (Brown, 2001; McFaul, 2007), although there were opinions that Russia developed as "a normal country" (Schleifer, 2005). Recent studies argue for the crisis of Russian democracy and its authoritarian character (Sakwa, 2011; White, 2011). In the World Audit Democracy (World Audit, 2011) for 13 years Russia's democracy rank (political rights and civil liberties) went down from place 106 to 136. Its corruption rank is 127, which is twice worse than China's (61) and what Russia had 10 years back (76). In comparison with the post-communist countries of Europe and Asia, even with remaining communist states (China, Cuba, Vietnam), Russia showed the lowest criteria of democracy. Its present press freedom rank (the degree to which the country permits free flow of information) is 130, which identifies it as the country without press freedom.

The survey of Russian journalists in 2008 showed that the main constraints in the work of journalists were the local authorities and the editorial bosses, that is, the political control and editorial censorship (Pasti, Chernysh, Svitich, 2012). The number of journalists who identified themselves as independent reporters decreased from two thirds in 1992 to one fifth in 2008. Nevertheless, the number of journalists satisfied with their jobs increased in 2008 (72%) in comparison to 1992 (62%). The young generation especially, which entered the media in the 2000s, was happy with the present opportunities for earnings, career and self-expression, as it is seen in table 1:

Table 1

Job Satisfaction by Generation (in percent, fully or mostly satisfied)

Reasons for satisfaction	Soviet 1991 or earlier	Transitional 1992-1999	Post-Soviet 2000 or later	All Journalists
Opportunity to decide what to write	70.7	62.7	61.2	64.7
Opportunity to help people	65.3	63.5	64.9	64.2
Media's political line	60.9	61.4	58.3	60.1
Job security, social security	43.4	52.1	59.7	51.6
Opportunity for better qualifications	50.2	48.7	55.1	51.1
Opportunity to influence society	46.5	46.9	53.8	48.9
Opportunities for second job	44.8	48.0	52.8	48.4
Opportunities to grow in the post	39.8	40.9	45.5	42.1
Income	42.7	40.0	34.4	38.8
Opportunity for other career via journalism	38.6	35.8	39.0	37.7
Political independence of the profession	34.0	32.4	44.9	37.1
Extra privileges	30.5	35.9	43.9	36.7

The public opinion surveys testify that the majority of Russians today give priority to the basic values of survival – order and security – whereas democratic values remain in the background (Polovina rossiyan razocharovanny rynochnymi reformami, 2010). Like all Russians, journalists as a professional group are also a part of the political culture which today represents a mixture of authoritarian and democratic creed. Therefore, adherence to democracy in the media becomes an important test in the studying Russian journalism and media system.

These paradoxes in the transformation of the media system and journalism witness that Russia remains a special case and puzzle for research, although solid work has been done and conceptual frameworks have been suggested: "Authoritarian-Corporate model" (Zassoursky, 1998), "Eurasian model" (De Smaele, 1999), "Neo-Authoritarian model" (Becker, 2004), "Neo-Soviet model" (Oates, 2009), "Transitional model" (Jakubowicz, 2008), the latter for all post-communist countries; "Statist Commercialized model" (Vartanova, 2012). But the search for relevant conceptualizations and the place of Russia in the global media landscape continues and needs more theoretical and empirical research (De Smaele, 2008).

As shown by a state-of-the-art review (Nordenstreng, 2010b), the concept of media system itself remains unclear and hazy: "A lot of homework remains to be done..." Our new project "Media Systems in Flux: The Challenge of the BRICS countries", 2012—2016, is an exercise towards doing that homework. It aims at increasing the understanding of Russian media system with its paradoxes and contradictions. This contributes to de-westernization media studies (Curran and Park, 2000; Internationalizing Media Studies, 2009) with major attention to cultural traditions and the plurality of socio-political contexts. BRICS as a new framework offers a challenging landscape for comparative studies of media and journalists in their own systems. Comparative perspective with non-Western cultures, which are in transition like Russia and with legacy of authoritarianism like China provides a context for deeper understanding. This framework has not been much applied in international media scholarship and not at all in comparative research of journalists with both similarities and differences between these countries in transition (see e.g. Global Journalism Research: Theories, Methods, Findings, Future, 2008). But today the global importance of the BRICS group rises as a political club with its own regular summit meetings, and also as an economic power with huge investment opportunities and its potential to create a new world order (Ortmann, 2011).

China as point for comparison

Sparks (Sparks, 2010) ranges Russia and China to the fourth media model *authoritarian corporatist* in addition to three models of Western journalism established by Hallin and Mancini (Hallin, Mancini, 2004). However, he argues that China is very different. That constitutes the opposite case is the persistence of Communist Party in power, as distinct from Eastern Europe and Russia where communist regimes collapsed. At the same time Sparks notes that a closer examination reveals some surprising similarities, among which: institutional continuity: old mediums adapted well to market; personal continuity: new elites are direct successors of the old elites; character of privatization: accompanied by large–scale theft of state property and political favoritism; economic order is market oriented but characterized by endemic corruption and political intervention. "Journalistic professionalism remains a dead letter in most of the media" (Sparks, 2010).

What specifics Sparks finds out in China case and what distinguishes China from other countries is no change in the political structure in China. The Communist Party is able to recruit the young and talented, and still is ideologically hegemonic particularly over middle class. China provides a conclusive refutation of the frequently repeated assertion that the middle class is the natural bearer of democracy (ibid). The second distinction of China by Sparks is that the state broadcasters successfully adapted to a world in which their main income is from advertising, rather than governmental subsidy, press titles are much more market oriented. The third is a high degree of personal continuity in the media that means high importance of connections, family privileges and power of personal networks. The fourth is non-transparency of ownership of the Chinese media, "matter of some mystery, but the most reliable source gives the party as the real proprietor"; "combination of continuing political control with strong market orientation" (ibid). The fifth is corruption in the media and political intervention of the party committees.

However, look at Russia and find out the similar specifics what Sparks attributes to China with the exception of communist system. Instead of Com-

munist party, the state in Putin's ruling became to play the central role and (in) directly control the media and market. Like in China, in Russia it is unclear who really owns media. Non-transparency of media market is a consequence of the lack of transparency of Russian economy; "no governmental agency today possesses exhaustive statistical data on the condition and dynamic of the national media market as a whole" (Vartanova, Smirnov, 2010).

Corruption in the media and among journalists became a private matter. In the economically hard 1990s journalists began to excuse their venal practices by claiming a need to survive because of low salaries and lack of social guarantees. During the 2000s, when Russia's economy and its media changed for the better, journalistic salaries rose drastically. However, corruption practices remained. As our survey in 2008 shows, every second journalist produced a news piece in return for extra payments during the past 12 months. Yet having a second job as a means of survival during the 1990s became a privilege and opportunity for advancement in the 2000s. Journalists became well-to-do people with influential contacts in government and big business. Family privileges and personal networks work better than formal institutions and the law in the media market and society as a whole. Professionalism is knowledge of networks and contacts (Blom, 2002), "not *what* you know, but *who* you know!" It rises from such phenomenon as clientelism and nepotism.

Russian journalists represent the middle class, at least in terms of income and education. Although media have lost political independence, the number of journalists satisfied with their jobs has increased. Among the major predictors of their satisfaction were their freedom in newsroom, on the one hand, and editorial line of their mediums, on the other. The majority were satisfied with how their medium informed the public. This shows that contemporary journalists have found a happy consensus between their decision-making in the work and the current editorial politics — an evidence of their adaptation to the changed conditions in the media and the patronage of the authorities. The *etatization* of the media gives obvious guarantees against market uncertainty; at the same time it does not impede *commercialization* of the media — two main trends

of development of media system in Russia. Journalism finds itself in the privileged position being together with the state and market. As our earlier research shows, journalists perform three basic roles: PR worker, entertainer and organizer which differ but not fundamentally from the Soviet journalism roles of propagandist and organizer (Pasti, 2007).

To broaden a list of similarities between China and Russia we could add: 1) the prevalence of domestic owners in the media market and fixed limitations for foreign capital, as distinct from post-communist Europe; 2) tame commercial media not conflicting with the government; 3) a gap of generations over values and skill to work with new technology; 4) striving of young journalists to get job in the state office; 5) growth of independent media in the internet and protesting movements. As the reflection of the resemblance in their developments, researchers to understand China's media system and Russian media system use the same definitions: "instrumentalization" of media (Zhao, 2012; Vartanova, 2012); "Statist commercialization" (Shen, 2012), "Statist commercialized model" (Vartanova, 2012). Comparative study of journalistic roles carried out in 18 countries (Worlds of Journalism, 2011) finds few watchdog journalists in Russia (8%) and China (1%), whereas the majority of journalists in these countries are opportunist facilitators (41% in Russia and 56% in China) and populist disseminators (39% in Russia and 19% in China).

Independent media and social protest

When focusing on Russia, research, as a rule, is satisfied with the mainstream media — today privileged with government and business contracts. However, in our view, such an approach is no longer enough to understand Russian media system because it overlooks new agents such as independent media which emerge outside of the mainstream and act as rebels to the existing political and media systems. Thus, some of the independent media made it impossible to rig municipal elections of 2011 in their localities by acting as watchdogs and even organized open debates between the opposition and the ruling party "United Russia" — an unprecedented political event not only for the periphery, but also the prosperous megacities. As a

result, in several regions the opponents to the ruling party won the municipal elections and formed their new governments. That is, these protesting media acts can be interpreted as a significant part of counter-hegemonic culture within the Russian media system. In some regions the independent reporters established their own new unions of journalists in parallel to the Union of Journalists which exists since the Soviet times. Their regional situations are somewhat similar to some post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where journalists' associations are several and "divided along ideological lines" (Zielonka, Mancini, 2011).

Independent media in Russia usually refer to such famous brands as *Kommersant, Vedomosti, Novaya Gazeta* and *Ekho Moskvy*. All these are located in Moscow with an insignificant audience in provincial Russia and serve, whether intentionally or not, as the "liberal icons" of the current political system. But today the regions, especially economically depressed areas, are awakening owing to civic activity and social protests. In the alliance with the independent media they shake up the social-political situation.

In Russia the experts talk about a new political situation because of rising protest movements in two capitals Moscow and St-Petersburg and other big cities. In China, the rule of the Communist Party is challenged by widespread discontent amongst workers and peasants, often spilling over into savage anti-authority riots (Sparks, 2010). In China every year 450 riots are suppressed. In Moscow, opposition regularly organizes meetings on the 31st of every month to protest the state' refusal to allow free assembly of protesters guaranteed by Article 31 of the Russian Constitution. In Russia social networks (*Vkontakte, Facebook*) had played the important role in rise of "snow revolution" in winter 2011-2012 by forcing to change agenda of independent Internet media. "No media defined agenda setting, but their audience dictated to media a new agenda. Many internet media, among which: *OpenSpace, slon.ru, Bol'shoi Gorod, Afisha* and also online versions of leading newspapers of *Kommersant, Vedomosti, gazeta.ru* began to cover and analyze political protests (Kobrin, 2012). In China macro blogs work as platforms for free discussions and critical assessments of the government. Their influence increase, es-

pecially among young people and students because they are politically independent and pose real problems. They emerged at the beginning of the 2000s as grassroots journalism and unite both professionals and non-professionals, working as journalists but without journalism education.

Cultural contexts

In Geert Hofstede's cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2001; Geert Hofstede Website, 2012) Russia and China reveal both similarities and differences, as seen in figure 1 below. Both have the highest scores in dimension *Power Distance* (PDI): Russia with 93 and China with 80 that testifies a great importance of status in their cultures and polarized top-down relations – premise to accept authoritarian order. Both have a lower score of dimension *Individualism* (IDV): 39 for Russia and 20 for China that reveals them as highly collectivist cultures where relationship is crucial by prevailing over tasks and company.

Figure 1

Russia and China[30] Russia in comparison with the below

But Russia and China are different in other dimensions. In *Masculinity* (MAS): Russia has low score 36, whereas China has high score 66. This characterizes Russia as a feminine society with the dominant values

[30] Source: URL: http://geert-hofstede.com/russia.html

of quality of life and caring for others, whereas China performs as a masculine society driven by values of competition, achievement and success. In *Uncertainty Avoidance* (UAI): Russia has highest score 95, whereas China has a low score 30. The highest scoring of UAI shows Russia as the most complex bureaucracies in the world, bureaucratic system serves as a defense from ambiguous situations and unpredictable future. Russians prefer to have context and background information. On the contrary, Chinese people are comfortable with ambiguity, they are adaptable and entrepreneurial. Truth may be relative, adherence to laws and rules may be flexible to suit the actual situation and pragmatism is a fact of life. In the dimension *Long Term Orientation* (LTO) China has the highest score 118 and Russia has none at all. Here the main distinction is the extent to which society shows a pragmatic future-oriented perspective (China) and a short-term point of view (Russia).

BRICS as a new framework for studying the media systems

BRICS is an acronym for five countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. It emerged in 2001 as BRIC from the analyst Jim O'Neill who introduced it in a company report (O'Neill, 2001), which asserted that these four countries' economies would develop at a rapid rate, so that by 2050 they would have become the largest and most influential economies within the international system, alongside the US – hence breaking the US's hegemonic role within the world economy. Later, many analysts have extended this prediction of economic strength to a growth in political influence for the BRIC, and indeed a consequent alteration in the geopolitical and normative balance of the international system (Snetkov, Aris, 2011).

The inclusion of South Africa into the BRIC group in 2010, according to the analysts' opinion, would motivate other developing countries to begin also to seek membership in BRICS (Marat, 2010). In 2012 Indonesia began efforts to join BRICS (Indonesia Considers Joining BRICS,

2012). The admission of such a strong regional player as Indonesia with the world's fourth largest population, can help expand BRICS influence to Southeast Asia and the Islamic world.

BRICS accounts for 30% of the world's landmass and 42% of the world's population. In 2010, the GDP of its member states made up 18% of the world's GDP and their trade accounted for 15% of global trade turnover. Figure 2 below shows GDP growth forecast for BRIC in international comparison:

Figure 2

Output and Employmeot – Recent Trends

GDP Growth Forecast 2011

	%
Brazil	4.3%
China	8.9%
India	8.6%
Russia	4.3%
Argentina	5.1%
Poland	4.0%
Ukraine	3.9%
South Korea	3.9%
USA	3.1%
Germany	2.6%
Great Britain	1.8%
Euro area	1.5%
Japan	1.5%

Source: The Economist, http://www.economist.com/markets/indicators/

Russia in BRICS

Initiator

Russia was an initiator of the establishment of BRIC; in particular President Putin offered four countries to begin practical collaboration (Lavrov, 2012). The foreign ministers of the four BRIC countries met in

New York City in September 2006, beginning a series of high-level meetings. A full-scale diplomatic meeting was held in Ekaterinburg, Russia, on May 16, 2008 (Cooperation within BRIC, 2009). In 2010, Medvedev stated that "Russia would like the cooperation between the BRIC countries to become a major factor of multilateral diplomacy and to make a substantial contribution to promoting the nascent multipolarity and development of collective leadership by the world's leading countries" (Snetkov, Aris, 2011). Although some analysts have questioned the validity of the inclusion of Russia within the BRIC grouping, in particular because it is argued that the strength and capacity for growth of the Russian economy is not comparable to those of China, India and Brazil. However, whether or not Russia can objectively be characterized as a "rising power", the narrative surrounding BRIC continues to hold prevalence within the international system.

Since 2009, the BRICS group has established annual BRICS summits, each hosted by a different member country. The first summit was in June 2009 in Ekaterinburg, Russia; the second summit was in April 2010 in Brasília, Brazil; the third summit was in April 2011 in Sanya, China and the forth summit in March 2012 in New Delhi, India. In 2011 there was formed the BRICS Forum, an independent international organization encouraging commercial, political and cultural cooperation between the BRICS nations.

The most equal within BRICS

Although Russia has more dollar billionaires than almost any other nation, the inequality in Russia is growing more slowly than any of the BRIC countries and incomes are more evenly distributed than in the United States (Moscow Blog: The Most Equitable Bric, 2010). Currently Sweden is the most equitable nation on earth with a gini coefficient (measuring inequality) of 23 and Namibia is the least, with a coefficient of 70. In Russia, the rich certainly got a lot richer over the last 10 years, with the well-connected business elite becoming some of the richest people on earth. However, the decade-long economic boom that started af-

ter Vladimir Putin became president in 2000 meant that the poor moved toward middle class status even faster. Russia's GDP increased 7,5-fold over the last decade, from around $200 billion to $1,5 trillion; at the same time, average wages increased 14-fold over the same period, from $50 to around $700 a month. Russia's gini coefficient rose from 39,9 in 2001 to 42,3 in 2008 – lower than the United States in both relative and absolute terms, and a lower value than any of the other BRIC countries.

A burgeoning middle class has been established almost overnight. When Putin launched his long-term reform plan, he called for moving 60% of the population into the middle class by 2020. According to a new report by leading investment bank "Troika Dialog", Russia is already there: "Troika" claims the middle class (defined in Russia as income/capita of more than $6,000 a year) already makes up 68% of the population (Business New Europe, 2010), as seen in figure 3:

Figure 3

Size of the BRIC middle class

Note: Based on per capita PPP income of $6,000.

Source: National statistics services

In the study of social media usage in the BRIC countries (Mishra, 2008) the BRIC group was compared with the USA and the world in Geert Hofstede's framework with five dimensions: Power Distance (PDI), Individualism (IDV), Masculinity (MAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI), and Long Term Orientation (LTO). The analysis revealed differences of the BRIC group from the USA, as seen in figure 4[31] below. In particular, the Power Distance scores for all the BRIC countries are much higher than both the USA and the world average scores. The Individuality scores for the BRIC countries are generally lower than the USA and the world average scores (with India being the minor exception). The Masculinity scores for the BRIC countries are in the same range as the USA and the world average scores. The Uncertainty Avoidance scores for Brazil and Russia are much higher than the USA and world average scores while the scores for India and China are much lower. The Long Term Orientation scores for the BRIC countries (and especially China) are much higher than the USA and the world average scores.

Figure 4

BRIC Geert Hofstede Scores

These findings show that the cultural context of the BRICS group is collectivist, paternalist and status-oriented as distinct from the US cultural context representing Western cultures which are highly individualistic and organized around the principles of consultation and reciprocation based on more or less normative rules. These deep differences between the BRICS context and the Western context have profound significance for the media systems and journalisms and need research. They suggest thinking about how to apply Western made conceptions and theories in non-Western contexts.

Discussion

The question of a media system is a pivotal issue in studies of media and communication in rapidly changing national economies and cultures faced with globalization. *Comparing Media Systems* by Hallin and Mancini (Hallin, Mancini, 2004) has become for scholars and students alike one the most quoted books in the field, at least in Europe. Its popularity has led to their new extended volume *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World* (2012). Parallel to this is the perspective opened up by *Normative Theories of the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies* (Christians, Glasser, McQuail et al., 2009) which has precipitated the move of the canonical *Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert, Peterson, Schramm, 1956) from a pervasive framework-building status to the field's history of ideas. A broader context for all this is provided by the tide of internationalization and de-westernization of the field (Downing, 1996; Curran, Park, 2000; Internationalizing Media Studies, 2009) and recently demonstrated by Thomas Hanitzsch (Hanitzsch, 2007) a multinational network the *Worlds of Journalism (WJS)* pulling together journalism researchers for the systematic analysis of journalism cultures from a wide array of cultural contexts.

An important contribution to comparative media studies was made by the late Swedish scholar Jan Ekecrantz (Ekecrantz, 2007) in an ar-

ticle based on a conference at the Moscow State University. He discussed the evolution of media/society models from the traditional quadrant of politics-economics-technology-culture to a post-modernist culture-audience version and proposed an "integrated institutional model" which would accommodate the changing sociopolitical situations (ibid). And he did this in the context of post-communist Russia, including "the neo-authoritarian state and the clash of media civilizations" (ibid).

In the same spirit, Nordenstreng (2010a) points out that the old way of viewing Russia as something special is no longer valid. Also, an overview of the media in contemporary Russia (Nordenstreng, Pietiläinen, 2010) shows that, despite setbacks in the movement from autocracy to democracy, the overall picture is not totally gloomy. A collection of contributions from earlier Academy research projects on media in Russia (Russian Media and Changing Values, 2010) presents quite a varied landscape. Indeed, the Russian media system is in flux — as is the whole country highlighted by the title *Russia in Flux* of Research Programme 2004—2007 funded by the Academy of Finland.

The same flux metaphor is also applicable to the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and indeed to China — a perspective highlighted by Colin Sparks (Sparks, 2010). Actually Ekecrantz (Ekecrantz, 2007) was also led from examining Russia to considering China, as were Nordenstreng and Paasilinna in the anthology from the Academy project on Russian media in 1990s (Nordenstreng, Paasilinna, 2001).

Sparks' important essay raises critical questions about the theoretical basis of comparing media systems. Like the concept of a media system, the question of comparison — at a time of global integration also makes nation-states increasingly problematic although by no means obsolete — has also become a vital topic in media and communication studies, as demonstrated by the *Handbook of Comparative Communication Research*, which includes an overview by Sonia Livingstone (Livingstone, 2011). Highlighting the same trend is *Comparative Media Systems: European and Global Perspectives* (Comparative Media Systems: European and Global Perspectives, 2010).

The comparative perspective of the global media landscape is no doubt high on the scholarly agenda, but most scholars approach it from a particular national or regional angle. The angle of our new project *Media Systems in Flux: The Challenge of the BRICS Countries* was originally Russia – with China as a point of comparison. What this project proposes is to widen the angle to three other countries, India, Brazil and South Africa, opening up perspectives on the consolidation of democracy in large developing countries on different continents. This selection of countries follows a new coalition in global politics, which started a few years ago between Brazil, Russia, India and China – known as "BRIC" – and in 2010 was extended to also include South Africa, making it "BRICS".

Media system is a concept used in media studies since the 1980s and by now it has become a standard framework in describing and assessing the overall media landscape in a country or region. It typically refers to the legal and economic structures of the media as well as to surrounding political and philosophical doctrines. The current Russian media system offers an intriguing case with elements of both a Western libertarian system and an Eastern communitarian system, often referred to as "Eurasian". Rather than studying it alone and in relation to two main directions of West/Europe and East/Asia, a new approach for its analysis is provided by the emerging geopolitical entity known as "BRICS" – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. These countries are large by their geographical and population size and their economies are rapidly growing. Although they are different in many respects, they share crucial features in the globalizing world, making them a vanguard group of the developing world. Moreover, there are opinions about BRICS's potential and investment opportunities to create a new world order.

We see importance of the BRICS framework owing to: 1) growing political influence of the BRICS group in the world; 2) becoming framework in many areas of research; 3) ours the first attempt in international media studies; 4) a route to go away from Western transitology.

The Russian media system itself is full of contradictions and paradoxes which cannot be fruitfully analyzed just in terms of the conventional

dimensions. The BRICS context is used as an attempt to open new intellectual avenues. But to understand Russian media system in the context of BRICS we also take the USA as a reference point. It is interesting to explore the potential of Liberal model based on pure Anglo-Saxon culture with a strong national tradition as compared to the BRICS countries which represent hybrid or mixed culture. For example, Russia composes of 11 time zones; has several traditional religions: Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist; includes over 100 nationalities; only in the Republic of Dagestan there are 15 official languages. Russia has several political regimes: liberal democratic, authoritarian, feudal, quasi-shariah.

BRICS countries present a challenge to democracy in general and the role of media and journalism in democracy in particular. Their spectrum is ranging from Western democracy (India) through authoritarian regimes (Russia) to communist rule (China). They show different political solutions and there is no uniform development suggested by Western transitology. This article based on the new research project in the making raises questions rather than offers definite answers.

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THE DIGITAL DEVICES IN JOURNALISTS'
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY IN RUSSIA

ЦИФРОВЫЕ УСТРОЙСТВА В ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНОЙ
ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ РОССИЙСКИХ ЖУРНАЛИСТОВ

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The article presents the first results of the research "The Digital Devices in Journalists' Professional Activity in Russia". The research is set to define which digital means of collecting, processing, creating and storing information are currently used by Russian journalists in newsrooms of the traditional and new media. Special attention is given to the influence of such factors as age groups, gender, and journalistic specialization. The aim of the research is to determine the key factors affecting the growing digital gap between the different generations of journalists and the peculiarities of the digital divide in the Russian context.

Key words: *Russian journalism; journalist's profession; technological transformations; digital divide.*

Статья представляет результаты первого этапа исследования, определяющего, какое место занимают цифровые устройства в поиске, сборе и подготовке информации в профессиональной деятельности современных российских журналистов. Особое внимание уделяется таким категориям возраст, пол и специа-

лизация в журналистике. Основной целью исследования стало определение ключевых факторов, влияющих на цифровой разрыв между разными группами журналистов и особенностями цифрового неравенства в российском контексте.

Ключевые слова: *российская журналистика; профессия журналиста; технологические трансформации; цифровое неравенство.*

The rapid development of information and communications technologies has brought about significant changes in all the spheres of today's society. Researchers believe that "the quantitative transformations in the information field have preconditioned the emerging of a fundamentally new social form and namely the information society" (Webster, 2004).

The appearance and development of cable and satellite television, personal computers, the Internet and mobile communications have led to unprecedentedly far-reaching and rapid distribution of the journalist content.

However, above mentioned changes are not limited to the media functioning and distributing information. Since the 1990s, the integration of computers and other digital means into the work of not only the media on the whole, but also separate journalists, has led to major transformations both in the media system and the nature of journalists' and other media employees' jobs. The given period may be regarded as a time of the dramatic technological modernization of journalism. We hear more and more about a universal journalist whose ability to employ information technologies is turning into one of the key skills. In times of the informational revolution new technologies are becoming an integral part of journalism.

Journalists themselves agree that their profession has transformed, its borders expanded as a result of such objective factors as the surge in speed of distributing information, the unprecedented growth in information volumes, the development of new data carriers, the availability of information to the mainstream audience, etc.

To estimate the significance of the above mentioned changes, we can recall the communication tools available to journalists just a couple decades ago: their range was limited to telephone, postal service and fax. Mobile communications first appeared in Russia in the early 1990s, and obtained wide circulation only by the end of the previous century. To get to the information source, a journalist had to use his own feet or company vehicles. Nowadays it is only in the old films that we can see a reporter rushing to the nearest phone trying to outrun his competitors and be the first to break the sensational news. This situation can make today's journalists equipped with mobiles and tablet PCs with access to the Internet laugh.

Surely, one's "feet" can still be viewed as an irreplaceable means of making an exclusive report or an interview, as one still has to rush to the site in many cases. Nevertheless, the current level of information speed makes it impossible for a journalist to get to each and every news peg, besides, there is no necessity therein.

A poll conducted among journalists working for the federal and regional media in Russia was aimed at defining the way in which new technologies enter their job (Kikhtan, 2004). Summing up the poll findings, we can say Russian journalists regard the Internet and other digital means as first and foremost the bridge connecting the post-Soviet space to the international community. A new way of thinking, new structure of the profession and new professional skills, access to the global information resources irrespective of whether the newsroom is based in the capital or a regional centre, new means of communication expanding its borders and other factors were named as the advantages of new technologies.

Not only does the modern journalist act fast, he/she also possesses the complete and detailed information. It is a qualified journalist that looks deeply into each subject. "The fullness of information brings about comprehensive ideas which in their turn provide efficient ways to resolve problems" (Frolova, 2009). Thus, the digital means have not only expanded the range of journalist's tools, they have also provided the funda-

mentally new opportunities for information search and the unlimited variety of information sources; new choices for professional and interactive communication as well as the more efficient means for self-development and self-realization.

It is only recently that the phenomenon of the social distance (or the digital divide) has become the subject of research. Such researchers as Norbert Wiener, Herbert Marshall McLuhan, Wilbur Schramm, Herbert Schiller and others focused on the processes affecting the transformation of the society: the social structure changes, the cultural and industrial dynamics or, on the contrary, the psychological transformations of the personality due to the intensification of information exchange, etc.

According to the concept of an information society, an industrial society passes through the following phases of development: material production (early industrial society), service industry (post-industrial society) and information technologies (information society). What distinguishes an information society is that information technologies take on a determining role in all areas of life. Among theorists who contributed most to understanding of the problems of an information society and information inequality are Ioney Masudu, Elvin Toffler, Manuel Castells, Frank Webster. This phenomenon was subjected to serious analysis by Manuel Castells in the trilogy "The Information Age".

The most important thesis behind the concept of the information society is that not only the volume, but also the nature of information changed the mode of life of the contemporary society, above all because economic growth today is based on theoretical knowledge which relies upon information within the broadest interpretation of the term (Webster, 2004). This is the understanding of information which served as a basis for the concept of an information society.

However, a long while passed before investigators understood that the information society does not only bring new advantages and achievements.

When accessing their foreign counterparts' approach to the above mentioned problems, Russian scientists pointed out at its typical "technocratic" and "psychometric" features (Zemlyanova, 1995). To a great extent, the theorists' efforts were aimed at explaining the information society realia, its general characteristics, at detecting the key factors affecting the human. Besides, the researchers concentrated on the influence of digital technologies on the development of the media as such and their system (Vartanova, Smirnova, 2009; Vartanova, Smirnova, 2010).

As for the effect of the digital technologies on inner transformations of journalism, we believe the researchers have not been paying significant attention to this aspect. For the last decades journalism studies in Russia have focused a lot on creative, deontological, legal, and economic dimensions of the profession. However, recently the nature of journalism as a profession has been substantially influenced by the technological development. That is why special attention should be paid to the impact that ICT and their consequences have made on the professional journalistic culture in Russia.

1990s were crucial for the Russian mass media that have been changed both qualitatively and structurally. The transformations have reshaped the profession dramatically. That is why researchers in the 1990s paid special attention to the new professional standards and values of journalists, and also to the factors defining the development of mass media, changes in patterns of ownership, the legal status, the status of mass media and journalists, their social and professional values, and especially to the problems of their freedom and independence. Consequently, in the 2000s the Russian journalism has attained its current state. This served as the background and the content for the formation of the modern professional identity by the Russian journalist that was seriously affected by the technological transformation in media and profession.

Let us now take a closer look at the first results of the research "The Digital Devices in Journalists' Professional Activity in Russia".

The first stage of the research included polling 86 MSU students. It was aimed at defining how frequently and how intensely they used digital devices depending on the following factors:

- gender;
- age;
- type of media the respondent is employed with;
- the conditions of working with the media.

The following respondents' characteristics were defined in course of the research:

Age. The polling was voluntary, and therefore various age groups took part in it. The most active participants (accounting for the largest part of the respondents) were aged 21−25 (Figure 1).

Respondents' Characteristics: Age

31-40; 4,70% 0,00%
26-30; 12,80%
Low 20; 16,30%
21-25; 66,20%

Gender content. The diagram shows that female students made up about 90% of the respondents. This fact reflects the general situation at the Faculty of Journalism: through the last 10−15 years the share of male students has been fluctuating between 20 and 10%. Such feminization trends are typical of the modern Russian journalism on the whole (Figure 2).

Figure 2

Respondents' Characteristics: Gender

Types of Media the respondents are employed with. A significant part of about 30% work for the print media, about 15% for television and radio, 8% work for the Internet media. A separate group of respondents cooperating with several media was singled out and made up about 20%. Quite a large part of respondents referred to the so-called "miscellaneous" group, including press relation services, advertising agencies, photo agencies, publishing houses, etc. (Figure 3).

Figure 3

Respondents' Characteristics:
Types of media the respondents are employed with

One of the conditions the respondents had to meet to take part in the poll was their permanent or temporary *employment with some kind of media*. It should be mentioned that the students of the Faculty of Journalism, Lomonosov Moscow State University, normally combine their studies with a job in the media. The situation is typical for Russia in general. Most of them do freelance, but about 33% of the respondents still have a permanent job in the media (Figure 4).

Respondents' Characteristics:
permanent or temporary employment with some kind of media

Permanent; 33%

Freelance; 67%

Further on, let us present some of the research findings. It was highlighted in the poll framework that only the professional and not the personal use of digital devices would be taken into consideration.

Analysis Category "*Employing Technical Means of Communication at Work*".

94% (that is the vast majority) of the respondents mentioned they used the Internet (including e-mail and other services) for communication.

About 80% said they used mobile services.

Only about half of the respondents claimed they used wire telephones.

It should be mentioned that there was hardly any difference in answers to this question provided by male and female respondents.

As for the "age" sub-category, despite the fact that the age gap was quite narrow, the answers varied greatly: only a small percent of the respondents under 25 said they used wire telephone services.

In the *Types of Media* sub-category, the difference was even more obvious. For example, wire telephone services are used by almost 90% of the respondents employed with the press and only 3% of those working for the Internet media.

The results in the category "*Using Digital Devices at Work*" were as follows:

Mobile services are used by the vast majority of respondents (about 90%), both males and females.

As for the *desktop PC* position, this kind of PC is used by only about a half of all the respondents (about 40% males and 60% females), whereas *portable computers* (including laptops, iPads and so on) are used by more than 80% of the participants, with females being significantly more active users than males (86 and 67% respectively).

Among other digital devices, the most frequently used ones were digital cameras (43% of the respondents, with almost the equal share of males and females), and digital dictaphone recorders (used by slightly more than one third of the respondents, with males being twice as active as females).

Among the least frequently used gadgets named during the poll, one can mention the hidden camera and the e-book device. The use of hidden camera was not commented upon. The poll participants who had mentioned the e-book explained that they viewed it as a very efficient tool in cases when their job involved analyzing great amounts of information and regular addressing to the same sources. The use of e-book allows one to return to the necessary data without addressing the Internet every time.

The results in the sub-category "Age" were not too impressive. However, it was determined, for example, that the oldest age group within the given poll stage (31−40 years old) used desktop PCs and portable PCs with approximately the same intensity.

Another analysis category, *"The Frequency of Using Digital Devices at Work"* revealed the following:

Most of the respondents (more than 70%) constantly used digital devices at work and simply could not do without them; about 16% used them very often. Thus, the vast majority of respondents, about 90%, demonstrated the maximum level of activity in employing digital devices for professional needs. Only about 10% said they used them seldom, an insignificant part of respondents were undecided. The option "never" was not chosen by anyone.

Finally, the last analysis category was *"The Use of Digital Devices at Different Stages of Work"*. The analysis showed that most respondents (77%) use digital means when searching for information. At all the other stages, their use is not as active. For example, only 57% of participants said they employed digital devices when writing/preparing the media materials.

However, in this case, male respondents demonstrated a higher level of activity, with almost 80%. The least active use of digital devices was in the aspect of communication with both information sources and colleagues: slightly above 50%, with almost the same percentage of males and females.

Thus, the key research findings have shown that the Internet remains the most important means of communication for journalists, being used by the vast majority of respondents. Mobile services are used less actively. The wire telephone is obviously losing its ground. The intensity of its use depends on the type of media a journalist is employed with. It fluctuates between 90% and 3% of respondents working for the print and Internet Media correspondingly. Similar trends can be singled out in the use of desktop PCs: not more than a half of respondents use it at work.

The results in general confirmed the fact that wire devices are stepping back under the pressure of mobile ones. The respondents mentioned that popularity of wire telephones and computers is fading out, they are not even installed at some offices or flats. Digital devices provide the background for journalists' mobility. They allow them to become in-

dependent from a particular workplace and at the same time to create a full-scale workplace and transmit information from wherever they are to wherever they need. Today's journalist has to be available any time, be connected to *Twitter* or *Facebook*.

Digital devices have become a tool journalists employ every day, most of them simply cannot cope without them.

Personal digital devices are the element a journalist cannot do without at any work stage. They allow to conduct constant news monitoring reducing the time limits spent on the information search, collection and processing, to communicate with the editorial office. However, their use is most intense when searching for information. The respondents mentioned that one of the key advantages of the personal digital devices was the opportunity to optimize information processing. Besides, it should be mentioned that the respondents sometimes viewed digital devices as an image attribute of the modern journalist and described them as a tool of success and professional growth.

Male and female journalists employ digital devices equally actively in spite of the types of media, employment conditions and so on.

Therefore, the results confirm the suggestion that young Moscow journalists have become quite advanced in their use of personal digital devices. On the one hand, this increases the efficiency of their working activity. But on the other hand, the signs of the digital addiction of journalists have been demonstrated as well.

They often become totally helpless without their digital tools and lose traditional communication skills. Some of them realize it and even suffer of it. When commenting the use of digital devices, the respondents pointed out at their drawbacks as well. In particular, they mentioned the minuses of such digital addiction:

"A laptop or a mobile got broken, and the newspaper was outrun by the competitors", "A journalist shouldn't rely solely on technologies as they are not a 100% substitute for the flexible human mind" and so on.

On the whole, the research confirmed that digital devices have become an irreplaceable tool for a journalist. However, too much expo-

sure or addiction to the digital devices can cause great damage to one's professional achievements. In times of the tough competition with civil journalism, with amateur users intensely employing digital tools, only the combination of professional skills and experience of a journalist and their resorting to modern technologies can bring true success and efficient results.

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JOURNALIST AND JOURNALIST'S CULTURE IN RUSSIA

ЖУРНАЛИСТ И ЖУРНАЛИСТСКАЯ КУЛЬТУРА В РОССИИ

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This article scrutinizes the figure of media professional in Russia, deals with sociological portrait of a journalist taken in historical prospective. Following the existing research practice, some comparisons have been made between journalists acting in different periods of modern Russian history (from 1920s to 2000s), between Russian and foreign media professionals. Russian professional journalistic culture is analyzed in the international context.

In this article a brief description of sociological study tools and methods is given, a journalist is seen as a subject of study in Russia. On the base of concrete sociological research projects the main frames, problems and significant conditions of journalist's work in Russia are presented.

Key words: *media professional; journalist; journalistic culture; sociological approach; institutional roles; ethical ideologies.*

В статье представлена фигура профессионального журналиста в России, создан социологический портрет российского журналиста в исторической перспективе. На основании проводимых

исследований в области изучения профессиональных журналист-ских практик, результатов ряда российских и международных исследовательских проектов, а также материалов исследований журналистов в СССР произведены сравнения различных периодов журналистских практик в стране, представлены сравнения от-ечественной и ряда зарубежных журналистских культур.

В материале дан обзор социологических методик исследования журналистов, обсуждены значимые проблемы и ограничения про-фессиональной деятельности журналистов в современной России.

Ключевые слова: *медиапрофессионал; журналист; журна-листская культура; социологический подход; институциональ-ные роли; профессиональная этика.*

First of all, it is necessary to give a general description of a journalist in order to understand the main things about the professional. There are diverse interpretations of this term — both theoretical and practical. But full and sufficient definition could be found if a journalist is defined as a judicial category: "The journalist shall be understood to mean a person who edits, creates, collects or prepares messages and materials for the editor's office of a mass medium and is connected with it with labor and other contractual relations or engaged in such an activity, being autho-rized by it" (Zakon "O SMI", 1991).

This definition points to the main directions of further discussion about professional journalist's culture, since it mentions different types of professional activity, the most important counterparts of a journalist and fixes the principles of collaboration between journalist and other ac-tors. All these aspects influence the professional realization of a journal-ist, the conditions of professional activity, and will be taken into consid-eration in this article.

Before speaking about the figure of a journalist in different historical, social, political and economic conditions it is worth describing briefly some methodological questions that give a kind of general frame of dis-

cussion and assist in proper understanding of former and contemporary journalistic cultures.

During the decades of media system and media studies development in Russia solid arsenal of information was collected. The base of sociological tools and methods used in order to define journalist and journalists' practices and cultures was gradually cultivated. Nowadays it is possible to name diverse research methods and techniques from expert polls, phone, face-to-face, online, e-mail interviews with practicing journalists to diaries and cards, etc. Thereby the information about profession and professionals is gathered from a huge variety of sources and according to existing experience the main of them are so-called "ordinary" journalists, media managers and future (or young) journalist graduates.

Contemporary general scheme of sociological analysis takes existing Western approaches and could be presented as a three-part scheme. The first is the societal level which provides the analysis of social, economic and political conditions, cultural and historical context and takes into account global trends seen in "local" dimension. The second — the organizational level — offers the view of concrete structure (editorial office, newsroom, medium, etc.). The third — the individual level of analysis enables us to speak about the personality of a journalist. The media systems and journalist's cultures are seen from viewpoints of senior managers responsible for strategic planning and general running of a medium, junior managers who make concrete decisions concerning concrete problems or functioning of proper desk and non-management staff (journalists themselves).

Modern research practices (Weaver, 1998; Hallin, Mancini, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2010; The Global Journalist in the 21st century, 2012) provide detailed description of societal and media industry aspect, and pay serious attention to political culture in which a media system is constructed and functions. In Russian situation these aspects are also important, since the country has recently come through social and political transformations. This leads to the analysis of social types of media, acute roles of mass media in general and concrete journalists in particular, to the

search of diverse influential factors, possible interventions, the freedom of journalist's work and existing limits, etc.

The journalist in the USSR and in Russia: historical and sociological perspective

In the 1920s the first attempts of journalist's research were made. At that time the need for studying the newspaper staff was rooted in the necessity to provide the editorial boards with qualified journalists. Two types of the study were realized in that decade. In the early 1920s registration and statistical data collection on two levels took place – one on the level of the Central Communist Party committee, and the other on the level of professional journalists' institutions. In the late 1920s the sociological polls were conducted. The aims of those research projects were to elaborate recommendations for editorial boards in order to improve professional qualification of journalists and to offer the typology of journalistic professions (such as journalists themselves, those who edited materials, those who worked in publishing houses, etc.) At that period scholars' activities concentrated, on the one hand, on media contents studies and on the other hand, on defining of the subject under investigation and on its deeper description.

In the 1930s sociological research in the USSR – in general and in the field of media in particular – was almost frozen. The statistic data on media professionals were being collected but they were closed for the public.

The revival of sociological research and public discussions took place *in the 1960s*. The first significant step in the development of media sociology in Russia was the establishing of The Institute of Public Opinion of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. It was the unique department of the popular newspaper opened by a famous Russian sociologist and philosopher Boris Grushin. As he wrote, "it was really the first wide attempt of the establishing of the institution of publicity, the establishing of civil society.

Its basic characteristic feature was the appearance of people independent from the state. They began to express their opinions" (Otkryvaya Grushina, 2011). This phenomenon is very interesting and it was important for the sphere of media sociology at that time, and that is the reason why it is mentioned in this article. But of course it dealt with the figure of a journalist to a lesser extent than other research initiatives.

During the 1960s the research projects dedicated to journalistic staff in different regions and towns were realized – in Leningrad it was one of the research groups led by Kuzin, in Novosibirsk the study of the same type was made by scholars headed by Parfenov, in the Estonian republic lo Vooglaig conducted such a study.

Sociological interest in the field of journalism and mass media also touched upon precise types of periodicals, e.g. local press (Committee for Press financed the project "Functioning of Local Press" in Ryazan region) or concrete newspapers (e.g., central ones – *Literaturnaya Gazeta, Pravda,* etc.). Results of the research were made public – the book "*Literaturnaya Gazeta* and its audience" was published in 1978. During these projects the social and demographic characteristics, educational level and specialization, professional orientations, ideas on journalist's mission, tasks and functions, creative skills of media people, their social and professional status, personal characteristics, etc. were searched through methods which combined filling in of so-called registration cards and traditional questionnaires.

One of the biggest projects was constructed and realized in 1969–1971. It was a complex sociological research that combined media audience poll, publishers' poll, content-analysis of materials and correspondence and journalists' poll. This project dedicated to the studying of mass media in a big industrial town (Taganrog) was conducted by the Faculty of Journalism, Lomonosov Moscow State University. Its author and the main organizer was also Boris Grushin. The studies of the journalists – "Activity of Mass Communications as a Source of Information" (B. Grushin and A. Shiryaeva) (47 Pyatnic, 1972) and "Mass Communications as the Channel of Forming and Expression of Public Opinion"

(B. Grushin and V. Kazantsev) – represented journalists from diverse points (Teoriya i sociologiya SMI, 2010).

One of the conclusions of this project connected with media professionals was that the journalists' opinion about the most important part of information activity was characterized as incomplete and contradictory. That gave the reason to think about professional consciousness of journalists not only in historic perspective but also as a whole, as one of significant regulators of professional activity.

The poll also exposed that in the late 1960s journalists did not think seriously about mass media as the channel for public opinion expression. One of possible explanations of that fact was deep orientation to ideological influencing and forming opinion in accordance with existed ideology. With the social and political transformations in the Soviet Union and then in Russia the situation changed insignificantly – the shifts became more evident in the 1990s and 2000s, but even in modern conditions this role of mass media is not the main one according to media professionals' studies.

In the 1970s the portrait of a journalist was supplemented with new features linked to the future perspective of a media professional and education of journalists. At that time it was not the discussion about media education in modern interpretation of this term but only the discussion concerning the education for future professionals. The areas covered by researches of that period were the status, professional specialization and mobility of graduates, supply and demand in the Soviet media system. The main directions of the study were the tasks and principles of journalistic education, the stages of professional education, the directions and forms of education depending on specific features of a concrete medium, the relations between education institutions and editorial boards.

The Faculty of Journalism, Lomonosov Moscow State University organized educational programs for practicing journalists, which included lectures that discussed obtained results and conclusions of the studies, seminars where necessary methodological information and research approaches were taught in order to make journalists skilled and prepared

for using sociological methods in journalistic work − e.g. techniques of analysis of audience letters, usage of press questionnaire forms, etc.

In the 1980s work with editorial correspondence, relations with the audience and freelancers, the role of sociological research in editorial practice, effectiveness of media materials and texts became the topics of research in the Soviet media sociology. The Union of Journalists of the USSR and the Faculty of Journalism organized postal poll of managers represented by regional parties, youth and town papers, TV and radio stations. It is worth mentioning that at that time the result of methodological development was the functional card "Journalists' Model" (that indicated social and psychological features of media professional) and a diary for respondents.

The 1990s began with fundamental changes in social and political life followed by shifts in media system. Social transformations and media development led to the appearance of new conditions of professional journalist work and − further − new spheres of research. Diverse media channels were studied − in 1990 TV and radio research "Perspective of Television and Radio Development" was conducted. One fourth of all the journalists working in information and social political departments of editorial offices of TV and radio stations, and experts representing civil organizations were examined. Taking into consideration the acute social and political situation, research reports made recommendations concerning the ways of development of TV and radio segments of media system.

From that poll the question about professional freedom and independence as the most important condition of activity became the central one. In the early 1990s only one fifth of respondents considered themselves quite independent, half of participants mentioned certain limitations, and another one fifth spoke about the absence of necessary freedom. These data became the evidence of the shift in professional consciousness from dominating tasks of ideological propaganda towards fast informing of the society about happening events (Teoriya i sociologiya SMI, 2010).

The increase of local media significance inspired the new wave of lo-

cal press research projects. New phenomena in modern Russian media sphere with new forms of media establishing, etc. were to be searched. In 1991 the profile Ministry approved a regional complex study "Local Press and Perspective of Its Development" in Yaroslavl region where media audience and journalists working in municipal and regional newspapers were examined. It also covered the figure of a new for Russian media system activist – the founder. This type of respondents was included into the sample for the first time in Russia.

The first international comparative studies of journalists became the feature of new realities at that time.

In 1992 the first Russian-American research of professional orientation of journalists in two countries was conducted. In was partly continued in 1995-1996 in collaboration with the research center of *Middle Tennessee State University* and had the main focus on media freedom.

It clarified the high actuality of ethic and law responsibility of Russian journalists and found certain grade of instability of their professional orientation in comparison to the American respondents. The typical feature for Russian representatives of media became dominant for the external limitations, law requirements, etc. This distinguished Russian and American journalistic practices – for instance, in the USA journalists rely more often upon self-regulation and traditions. This statement is just also for modern reality in Russia.

International research activity and collaboration with scholars form was continued in the new millennium (see further).

In the early 2000s several polls of local journalists took place. In 2002 research team appealed to 150 representatives of the biggest Moscow media, graduates of Faculty of Journalism, Lomonosov Moscow State University, who were asked mostly about the professional journalistic education but also about the problems of routine journalistic work. Another research project conducted by the Institute of Regional Press, involved only professionals from the local media, which narrowed the scope of project. But it was important as a pilot – preliminary – study useful for obtaining valid data for possible comparisons.

The results of that polls showed that the grade of influencing and

the list of actors having certain influence on journalistic practices had changed. The pressure of owners, different financial structures were named among other actors such as power and administrative sources. Dependence from the local authorities appeared to be very strong, especially it was seen in the situations of media established by the structures affiliated with the local powers.

Some recent studies were aimed at describing relations between media and audience. In 2002 the Commission for Freedom of Information Access asked local media professionals about the satisfaction of audience information needs. About 37% of the respondents pointed that local media complied the audience needs and more than a half did not agree with this statement. Despite this fact fixed in polls of active journalists the level of trust to mass media still remains relatively high in the Russian society.

Making small digression, let us glance at the general Russian media system analysis that shows: TV is still the agenda setting medium in Russia, and it has the highest level of trust among Russian citizens. 79% of Russians chose television when they were asked about the kind of communication medium, which was of greatest importance in shaping political discourse and setting the political agenda for them. Radio is at the second place (23%), newspapers are at the third (16%), the Internet media have 7% of trust (Obsshestvennoe mnenie – 2009, 2009). Such high rate of trust to television could be partly explained by so-called technical reason – it is the channel with the biggest coverage which is used by most of people (94% of Russian citizens get information on current events in Russia and abroad from the TV programs) (Televidenie v nashei zhizni, 2010). But it is necessary to note that the question of trust does not have direct connection with the problem of meeting the needs in information of audience. The question of satisfaction of hunger for information is asked very rarely along with the block of questions concerning evaluations of modern media and reflections on them. That is why reliable information could be obtained only from one source – from journalists.

Journalistic cultures in 2000s:

Russia in the international context

Trying to define the place of Russian journalist's professional culture in a general context it is worth using generalized research frame in which, for instance, "diversity is modeled in terms of three constituents: the domain of **institutional roles** refers to the normative and actual functions of journalism in the society, while **epistemologies** are concerned with the accessibility of reality and the nature of acceptable evidence. **Ethical ideologies**, as the third domain, point to the question of how journalists respond to ethical dilemmas. The three constituents can be further divided into seven principal dimensions: Institutional roles are made up of the three components interventionism, power distance and market orientation, epistemologies are marked by the dimensions objectivism and empiricism, and ethical ideologies consist of relativism and idealism" (Hanitzsch, 2007).

Evaluating the data of Russian poll of journalists conducted within the international project "The Worlds of Journalism", it is possible to consider Russian journalists young professionals. Professional experience in Russia according to the data in a significant part of cases is less than 10 years (63% of the respondents). This gives us the right to mention here some findings of other international Russian-Swedish study where future journalists — universities' graduates — express their opinions about the profession as follows: "Many students are pessimistic about the future and fear that journalism will be transformed into entertainment, PR, propaganda and "bloggization". This confirms that social and moral ideals are increasingly running the gauntlet; information ersatz can angle a real story. The answers from the Russian students show clearly that they understand the tendency towards instrumentalization that limits the autonomy of the profession in Russia, and how political and economic powers outside journalism use the media for their own purposes (Nygren, Degtereva, Pavlikova, 2010).

Turning back to the Russian journalists' poll, we can say that generally such a perception of profession leads to spreading of so-called "universal journalist" idea. This statement is proved by the data —

75% of the respondents cover different types of stories in their media. This situation is partly supported by the tendency of thematic universalization which was typical for Russia for several years and still remains quite serious in spite of activation of other contradictory tendencies.

The third interesting feature of a Russian journalist is his/her professional devotion and strict affiliation to a concrete medium. Almost 90% declared that "do not work for other media". Of course this could mean better financial and social conditions for journalists in comparison with the situation of their colleagues one or two decades ago. This could also point to the implementation of new business models and strict commercial agreements between journalists and employers. But also it is necessary to make some corrections on the level of sincerity of responses which could influence the results. Nevertheless, we may conclude that Russian media professionals in their practices repeat some general trends at the same time reflecting national specifics connected with media development and social changes happened in last decades.

The following table presents the results of "The Worlds of Journalism"[32] project concerning the main functions of media professionals shown by the respondents from different countries. Here national specifics influence the data as well. Stronger intention to form public opinion typical for certain period of media system in Russia is evident, along with a quite low intention to control government activity, or to advocate social changes, or to motivate people (which, to our mind, is linked to weak traditions of civil society and its institutions in Russia). At the same time, the urge towards attracting the audience could be estimated as positive in some cases.

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[32] URL: http://www.worldsofjournalism.org/public.htm

Table 1

	AUS	BRA	BUL	GER	IND	ISR	ROM	RUS	SPA	SWI	TUR	UGA
set the political agenda	25	24	21	21	41	39	27	35	18	24	55	51
influence public opinion	25	24	57	17	48	42	13	62	30	20	73	67
advocate for social change	37	53	28	23	61	49	49	29	44	31	80	87
be detached observer	71	86	40	89	63	58	85	70	82	89	90	79
be watchdog of government	76	89	70	88	81	58	47	57	58	64	91	87
be watchdog of business	67	51	36	72	60	40	25	32	44	55	74	57
support official policies	15	43	18	18	22	10	27	27	29	13	21	78
convey positive image	6	14	4	5	13	9	6	31	6	9	8	30
attract widest audience	40	19	43	36	71	44	31	53	30	38	53	61
provide interesting information	62	67	73	84	72	68	72	64	74	82	55	56
provide political information	79	99	86	98	79	77	79	71	71	95	90	94
motivate people	52	60	63	72	64	50	62	46	61	64	80	77

Percent of respondents saying "extremely" and "very important", N=1185

Social roles typical for the Russian media in general, according to the journalists' viewpoint, are educating, culture shaping, which is realized in the dissemination of values (85%) and in the dissemination of knowledge (65–75%), the role of psychological support for people (60–70%) and a group of social functions – social development (60–65%), channel for social communication (55%), expression of public opinion (40–45%), public criticism (35–40%).

Answering the open question about the significant and important professional standards, Russian journalists most often named:
- objectivity;
- impartiality;
- honesty;
- efficiency;
- responsibility;
- reliability;
- accuracy;
- precision

If all the journalists followed this list and chose these standards for themselves in practice, the situation in Russian journalism would be almost ideal. But it is necessary to take into consideration existing obstacles and discuss the limiting factors.

Another open question presented the most serious factors of influence, such as:

- editorial policy and unofficial censorship;
- time;
- specific of medium (channel);
- policy (in general);
- inner limits

Making an overview of data concerning factors influencing freedom of journalism obtained from the Russian media professionals, it is possible to make several accents.

It is important that the audience has a significant influence upon Russian journalists (Anikina, 2012). More than a half of respondents in Russia estimate that readers, viewers and listeners are very influential, or somewhat influential in terms of professional journalistic freedom. Moreover, the audience studies and the market research are the factors of influence for the journalists. It is notable in contemporary period of Russian media system development, when commercial logic and commercial interests strongly define the situation, and at the same time, when the media market faces deep segmentation based — among other criteria — on concrete and specific audience interests and consumers' demand.

Respect to the source of information is still a characteristic feature of the contemporary Russian media sphere. To obtain the complete picture it would be necessary to find out proper reasons and conditions of this; probably one of them is rooted in the sphere of media law, which, in its turn, also puts some limits on the journalistic freedom, as polls show. Nevertheless, now the source of information appears quite an important actor, which could impose limit of journalists' freedom.

At the same time, society in general does not attract journalists very much. Two thirds of respondents are not concerned about the reaction of

the communities covered. This marks the weakness and vulnerability of the journalistic professional position, on the one hand, and contradicts the perception of the audience, on the other one.

It could be named a remarkable fact and be defined as a positive characteristic of the Russian reality that professional ethics and company standards are the factors of extreme importance, or are considered very influential in the daily journalistic practice. At the same time — as data show — general principles today are more important for wider circles of media persons than the agreements and norms implemented at concrete editorial office.

Typical feature of modern Russian media reality is a strict limitation of daily practice caused by pressing news deadlines — this factor provokes the complaints of the majority of the respondents. Great information flows, strong competition in media market make journalists produce their texts in a shorter time period and causes some tension.

The fact that company management and senior colleagues and editors still remain influential actors seems to be explicable. Looking at the Russian situation in the international context we may fix that media professionals in Russia quite often consider censorship an important source of influence — as their colleagues from Chile, Egypt, Uganda and Israel do (The Global Journalist in the 21st century, 2012).

Among the factors of less influence for the Russian journalists is a low interference of friends and relatives or peer colleagues, etc. New technologies also do not create serious barriers for media professionals today. The weak and low influence of professional journalistic associations marked by the respondents in several respects reflects the current situation, when participation in the professional organization sometimes has just a formal character.

It is worth pointing that journalists express no obvious unity concerning censorship — the groups of those whose daily practice is limited by censorship, and those who do not feel its influence are represented quite well according to the data. It is necessary to search for the additional

criteria to clarify the picture. Almost the same situation appears in cases of advertisers' influence. Some respondents do not face any limitation on their side, some point them very influential.

During this poll 14% of Russian journalists mentioned the absence of limits for their professional activity. This level is not very high but could become good starting point for further development of independent journalism, of course only if multiply external factors will facilitate these positive transformations.

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JOURNALISM IN RUSSIA:
WHY ITS FUTURE LOOKS UNCERTAIN

ЖУРНАЛИСТИКА В РОССИИ:
ПОЧЕМУ ЕЕ БУДУЩЕЕ ВЫГЛЯДИТ НЕОПРЕДЕЛЕННЫМ

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The diversity of media processes in the modern society makes them very difficult to study. Contemporary changes in the information space, through the development of computer technologies, put on the agenda issues related to media professional guidelines. These prerequisites stimulate debates within the academic community on various aspects of mass communication theory. One of the most important of these issues circulates around a clear identification of such kind of mass communication as journalism.

The political evolution in Russia has always prevented the development of the journalism process. It occurred due to many limitations imposed on the media. The modern political context keeps provoking Russian journalism which seems to be more than before absorbed by other types of mass communications, such as PR and advertising. Does this situation threaten society in general, and the media community in particular? What are the prospects for journalism in Russia? These issues look pivotal in relation to the theory of mass communication. Paying attention to the possibilities of Russian journalism to survive in current conditions, the author tends, to some extent, to anticipate its

future, which is important for building an optimal model of training of journalists.

Key words: *mass communication; information space; journalism; objectivity of information; political relations.*

Многообразие масс-медийных процессов в современном обществе влечет за собой сложности их восприятия. Качественные изменения информационного пространства, посредством развития современных компьютерных технологий ставят на повестку дня вопросы, связанные с профессиональными ориентирами масс-медиа. Эти условия активизируют полемику в академической среде по поводу различных аспектов теории массовых коммуникаций. На общем фоне одним из важнейших остается вопрос о возможности идентификации такого вида массово-информационной деятельности как журналистика.

Оценивая эволюцию медиапроцесса в России с момента возникновения печатных СМИ, становится очевидным, что политическая среда, складывавшаяся на всех исторических этапах, мешала развитию журналистского процесса. В нынешних политических условиях отечественная журналистика продолжает терять свои традиционные очертания, «вымывается» из СМИ, «поглощается» другими видами массово-информационной деятельности. Является ли эта ситуация ущербной для общества вообще и медиасообщества в частности? Какова перспектива существования журналистской профессии в России? Эти вопросы, являясь предметом рассмотрения в данной статье, выглядят важными применительно к теории массовых коммуникаций. Акцентируя внимание на возможностях журналистики в условиях нынешнего развития информационной сферы, автор стремится в какой-то мере предвосхитить ее будущее, что немаловажно для выстраивания оптимальной модели подготовки журналистских кадров.

Ключевые слова: *массовые коммуникации; информационное пространство; журналистика; объективность информации; политические отношения.*

Introduction

The transformation of the information space in Russia over the recent years has undergone significant changes. On the one hand, partisanship of the media became more obvious than before following the fundamental transformation of the political spectrum of society and, correspondingly, of the media content. On the other hand, the make up of the information space seriously affected the development of new technology, which led to the prevalence of social media. Nowadays millions of people create blogs, webpages, live journals, and become simultaneously their own authors, editors, and designers. This provokes a totally new media reality being incompatible with its previous legacy inherited from not further than 15—20 years ago.

New circuits of information space amplify debates on different aspects of the theory of mass communication. It actively concerns Russian humanity science. With regard to communications new concepts appear in sociology (Lazutina, 2004; Mel'nik, 2006; Korkonosenko, 2010), politics (Prokhorov, 2007; Uchenova, 2009), psychology (Oleshko, 2006), history (Kovaleva, 2000; Strovsky, 2001), economics (Gurevich, 2004; Ivanitsky, 2010), etc. It is already impossible to speak about a static media system in contemporary conditions; the system itself is changing due to an increasing number of public needs and interests stimulating a growing number of media trends. Speaking about it Svitich raises an issue concerning the integration of media processes (Svitich, 2002). Along with it, tough debates continue on classifying the blogosphere given its convergence in terms of modern development. Diverse media practices in modern society make their theoretical frameworks and professional perceptions more complex and contradictory.

New media trends have fundamentally diversified the media landscape and led to the formation of a unique information space. In these conditions, many media actors start feeling a new identity. In addition, unique content based on illustrative and technological possibilities of the new information environment made media sphere pervasive and break-

ing formal borders. Thanks to the modern practice of collecting, processing and delivery of information, the world itself has finally become a "global village", as Canadian sociologist Marshall McLuhan noted (McLuhan, 1964) following research investigations of many of his followers (Galtung, 1971; Toffler, 1990; Stehr, 1994; Castells, 2000, 2004; Thussu, 2006).

The current changes of information space while confirming the rapid development of technological progress, put on the agenda issues related to professional media guidelines. They concern, in particular, media freedom and responsibility as well as the relationship between journalists and the audience. A creation of new information space has also drawn attention to specifics of main communication trends: journalism, public relations and advertising.

One of the questions being envisaged as extremely important not only for the media theory, but also for its practice is identification of one of these trends: journalism. In modern conditions journalism seems to lose its traditional background and jeopardizes to be "absorbed" by other types of mass communication. Does this situation look detrimental for the society as a whole, and media community in particular? What is the future of journalism in Russia? Does it have a chance to prosper? These issues are strongly applicable to the theory of mass communication. Paying attention to the possibilities of journalism to exist in terms of the renewed information space, the author tends at some point to anticipate the future of the profession of journalism, which is important for working out a suitable model of its new mode of functioning.

Journalism as a type of mass information activity: content priorities

Before one would assess the prospects of journalism in Russia, they should define its specificities within mass communication activity (which, as noted above, also includes advertising and PR). Many media practi-

tioners still do not understand the fundamental differences between the above types of communication. Meanwhile, without this understanding, ethical principles of the journalistic profession become gravely undermined and this originates from a lack of public trust to the media as such (Korochensky, 2005).

Both journalism and other information spheres are focused on gathering, processing and the dissemination of socially-oriented information. By coincidence, over many years this definition has applied only to journalism, without referring to PR and advertising, which, in fact, are also centered on fulfillment of these functions. Consequently, the essence of journalism cannot be defined only to these limited things. Journalism as a specific form of knowledge is aimed at the full cognition of life. The object of journalism perception is centered on the entire social system (Korkonosenko, 2001), and the focus of this activity is a comprehensive social environment generating diverse problems and contradictions but being investigated on principles of fairness, accuracy and completeness of information (Kovaleva, 2000). Thus, a dominant mission of journalism is to draw attention to the issues of public interest which can be reached, first of all, through discussions initiated by journalists and shared by the audience. Thereby, views of ordinary citizens and experts can be represented in the media content providing the audience with all pros and cons which look as a prerequisite of a journalistic objectivity. This defines the essential difference between journalism and other types of mass communication.

In practice this difference between journalism and other types seems to be conditional, because a wish of any actor to cover facts and events objectively can not avoid subjectivity as such. However, by its origins, journalism stimulates the development of civic interests, under which all actors have equal access to information and discussion. Against this background, the essence of the PR and advertising is mostly defined by corporate interests that inevitably reduce the social significance of these activities in their implementation in practice. According to Kovaleva, journalism is not only public but also a creative domain, while the oth-

ers represent, at some point, a set of information technologies, based on modeling reality (Kovaleva, 2001). Therefore, journalism as a whole seems to be less partisan, when compared to other types of mass communication and information promoted by them.

All this makes the genre differences in relation to journalism and the other types. Partisanship, as their integral feature, leads to a deficiency of analytical genres aimed at problematic knowledge of reality (which, in turn, becomes a main component of journalism). PR and advertising texts tend to be more trivial and predictable, which to some extent, illustrates a "technological" approach that is much less obvious while looking at journalism. The creation of PR and advertising information also requires creativity, however, it is less demanded compared to the journalistic stuff due to collective interests of texts being produced.

On the basis of the above mentioned parameters of journalism it is obvious that the implementation of this profession is difficult in any society. In addition, its evolution depends on a number of specific factors: national frameworks of social and political life, traditions of media culture, state priorities of the media sphere and others. Therefore, the role and place of journalism in modern countries are different. What are the possibilities of its functioning in Russia? In order to understand this it is necessary to apply to historical regularities of the media evolution as a backbone of contemporary media tendencies.

Journalism evolution as a reflection of the political tradition in Russia

Journalism in Russia has always been at a disadvantage in comparison to other types of mass communication. This was due to the entire tenor of political life, which, in turn, in any country depends on the relationship between the government and society. By tradition as such, the author understands a long-term evolution of public priorities, worked out by everyday practices and diverse forms of cooperation between state

institutions and major social groups. These relationships in Russia have traditionally been developed on the basis of the hard-coded authoritarian rule being imprinted by state priorities and the behavior of society.

Authoritarianism of political relations manifested itself, in particular, in suppression of the individual. This factor stimulated the distinction between Russian reality and that one which progressed in Western European countries, where the idea of individual liberation laid deep roots as early as in the XVIII century. In Russia, the government was not naturally growing from civic society being recognized as an important element of the political system (as it was in the leading Western countries), but the society itself made very weak and often even clumsy attempts to escape from the vigilant care of the state. These attempts were constantly thwarted from "above". Hence, various forms of social solidarity in Russia for many centuries could be developed only with great complexity, and those that did occur, were thoroughly patronized by the state.

The political background was forming the "nature" of the Russians being distinctly servile to government. At the same time it gradually matured protests that led to massive riots, uprisings and later terror. This stimulated eagerness of the authorities to *centralism* as the type of state management. The idea of centralism, on the one hand, kept the country from separatist sentiments, and, on the other one, formed a comprehensive dependence of society on the authorities. According to Russian émigré philosopher Leontovich, throughout its entire history Russia showed the world "a sample of a police state", that limited the rights of an individual and informal organizations. Even after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, writes Leontovich, the nature of social relations in the country has not changed significantly: the monarchy remained intact, and this initiated the development of the absolutist state (Leontovich, 1995).

It is noteworthy that the Soviet regime, for all its specificity, produced quite similar forms of interaction between the government and society. It has found itself in the nature of power that looked like a complete result of the Russian tradition (Berdyaev, 1990; Obolonsky, 1994). Authoritarianism manifested itself, in particular, in the formation of the cult of the

Communist Party and in brutal suppression of dissent which intensified already existing archetypes of mass consciousness and behavior, albeit in a different social environment. Those ones included laudatory rhetoric and an emphasis on political symbols which generated transformation of human behavior (Pocheptsov, 1994). A set of archetypes of consciousness was making perception of the world more simplistic which originally could be fruitful for the development of journalism.

A brief excursion into the evolution of cooperation between Russian government and society makes possible to see feasibility of this type of communication. The authoritarian development in the socio-political system led to media dependence on the government. The appearance of the first-printed newspaper *Vedomosti* in December 1702, edited for nearly a quarter century by Peter the Great and a long-term absence of private press as well as numerous censorship regulations confirmed the close relationship between the existing political structure and capabilities of the written word. As a result, Russia has actively developed the state press, which never existed in other European countries. The subordination of the media to the powers determined the realization of their managerial functions through active publication of various government documents. However, it is worth noting that a formation in the second half of the XIX century of the private press, and then, already in early XX century, of the outlets of political parties. However, the main media vector was determined by the interests of the state and government institutions.

Under these conditions journalism suffered severe hardships, it often was substituted by propaganda and PR actions initiated by the authorities. Journalistic guidelines were shaken even more after the establishment of the Soviet regime. The overwhelming majority of the domestic media have become the party bodies, putting them at the mercy of decisions "from above" and determining the lack of criticism towards the state and party decisions. In those circumstances it was impossible to speak about an objective perception of life as the main priority of journalism. Although editorial staffs tended to encourage a feedback from the

audience, discursive issues could not go beyond officially permitted limits which were strictly controlled by the political system. True, the years of Khrushchev's "thaw" and Brezhnev's "stagnation" saw the examples of more real journalism which for the first time since 1917 commenced to be absorbed with investigative priorities. However, these approaches did not determine the main information trend at that time. As a result, journalism as a profession aimed at objectivity and active involvement in diverse interests of people was still in short supply. Editorial staff, for the most part, readily complied with the party instructions and demonstrated political servility, which historically evolved in our society. The situation began to change overwhelmingly only under Gorbachev's glasnost, when party levers of media management began to gradually weaken.

Assessing the evolution of the Russian media process over the last three centuries, albeit very briefly, it is worth emphasizing that the political environment in all historical periods prevented personal opinions, which seems to have been a reflection of collective mentality. It was elaborating weakness of civil society and a specific media role being supportive to the "collective" principles of management. In these circumstances Russian society could not consume culture of independent dialogue and to elaborate respect to discussion as the main form of reaching truth. Brought up on the authoritarian tradition, Russian media could actively duplicate habitual algorithms of mass behavior.

Content tendencies of the contemporary Russian media as antipodes of journalistic realization

The long-term authoritarian relationships between government, society and an individual have significantly influenced media in post-Soviet Russia. Journalistic implementation was still hampered. Despite an overall transformation of the administrative system and, apparently, a departure from the Communist ideology, familiar political counterparts were left almost untouched.

This applies primarily to the system of governance and control. Attempts to distort this system in the early 1990s gave birth to chaos in various spheres of public life, that in the future, already during the presidency of Vladimir Putin, led to a desire of apparatchiks to centralize power. In the 2000 the Russian political system started to get modified. The country was divided into federal regions and subjected to radical changes including the transformation of the current electoral system, which made bodies of government fully controlled by the Russian President and his administration. Simultaneously, the government tried to limit growing of political activity of population, through organizational and legal measures. The first half of 2012 was marked with police dispersals of protest marches (mostly in Moscow) organized by the opposition. Along with it, two Federal Laws – "On Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences" and "On Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches and Pickets" were adopted. Its content was prohibitive to any civil initiatives.

These factors have had a significant impact on the content of the Russian media. We should mention three key points which affected the national information space, due to the growing influence of the state apparatus and the restriction of rights and freedoms in Russian society.

Firstly, concentration of media capital in the interests of the ruling powers became more obvious. Nowadays, pluralism in the field of mass information almost faded away, which became totally different to the situation of the 1990s when media rigidly competed with each other. Besides, the process of media redistribution in favor of pro-governmental structures (such as Gazprom) was actively developed. Along with an administrative pressure on the media took place the process of unequal funding. Today only media founded by the authorities have stable financial support unlike those ones founded as private enterprises. This process is especially noticeable in the regions. For instance, except for *Novaya Gazeta na Urale*, all regional and city outlets in Ekaterinburg, Tumen, Kurgan are firmly controlled by officials regularly instructing editorial offices what and how to write. A similar situation affects many regional TV-channels, too which is leading to information distribution in favor

of state structures. Thereby the audience is absorbed with one-sided and streamlined coverage of the most discursive issues, and this contradicts key principles of the formation of civil society.

Secondly, media partisanship of the media became more noticeable following the above dependence of editorial staffs from the powers. It was especially evident while evaluating how Russian media covered most important incident, such as sinking of the Kursk submarine and the motor ship "Bulgaria" (2000 and 2011), seizure of hundreds of hostages in the Moscow theater on Dubrovka and at Beslan school (2002 and 2004), flooding of the town of Krymsk in the Krasnodar Krai (2012) and many others. The coverage of these events was somehow chaotic and constantly filled up with incomplete and therefore contradictory information on a number of victims and measures made by the authorities towards the tragic situations. A lack of objective information became evident regarding not only extreme situations but everyday life. The Russian media almost ceased to analyze the situation in Chechnya and became less investigative on facts of theft, corruption and lawlessness as feeling themselves unsafe in disclosing these situations. All this is still leading to the loss of a "responsible" information and media status as a public institution.

Thirdly, under the impact of current policies media keep changing quality of information being fulfilled now, to the very much extent, by PR-technologies instead of the journalistic stuff. This process mainly occurs due to media dependence on power structures and a lack of a stable ethic between the mass media and their founders. Although the existing Russian Media Law does not enable someone to interfere in the editorial policy, this principle is not respected in practice. Under these circumstances the media often distribute so-called "ordered" materials which look like the journalistic stuff but in fact have nothing to do with it. This situation is most evident during the electoral periods. It is remarkable that the current Election Law strongly prohibits journalists from expressing their opinions on officially registered candidates, although it is in conflict with the Media Law, which advocates freedom of speech. As a result, Russian society has a limited access to the pivotal information about the current political process.

In analyzing this situation many Russian media researchers note the manipulative influence of various political institutions interested in achieving narrow goals. There are a lot of manipulative methods being used by the powers against "disobedient" editorial staffs. These methods are extremely diverse and include both open pressures and restrictions including the closure of media as well as the telephone "right" (following direct instructions given by officials or owners to editors by telephone), and personnel policy towards media from a founder or proprietor, etc. Sometimes the Russian authorities resort to even forms of repressions which were repeatedly demonstrated during the 2000s, particularly against NTV broadcasting company and some other editorial staffs.

It indisputably undermines media responsibility to society and the existence of civically oriented media (Dzyaloshinky, 2001; Rusakova & Spassky, 2004; Lozovsky, 2011). For this reason the media themselves can not become full-fledged actors in addressing social issues. This originates a special media language functioning everywhere which is looks detrimental for social environment (Chepkina, 2000; Babenko, 2004; Kazarin, 2008). The current environment in turn, does not provide room for the full development of the journalistic process. Although the latter does not cease to exist but makes modern media space more detrimental and disintegrates editorial activity. Contemporary social conditions in Russia significantly infringe the journalistic profession compared to other types of mass communication. This wholly penetrates into the "nature of things" and is being reflected on the most important manifestations of everyday life.

Conclusion

The contemporary situation in modern Russia appears critical for society in general and the media community in particular. As has been stressed, certain political limitations shrink objectivity of information, without which it is impossible to hold meaningful social and econom-

ic policies and to overcome Russia's backwardness from the developed countries. This can only be achieved through open and informed debate concerning those challenges facing Russia and Russians to enable a chance for the best informed decisions to appear as well as an informed populace. It is unlikely to happen as long as the state regards information as a possible threat to its existence, and is something to be controlled in order to prevent this scenario from happening, and that the Russian people continue to passively accept the status quo.

At least two reasons should be called for to explain the complexity of the development of Russian journalism. One of them is a historical tradition of the relationship between the state and the media, which initiated a certain level of professional journalistic culture. Many generations of journalists were growing up within a certain perception of life, without regard to its conflicts. Many media still continue to limit debates, and this is reducing public reflections on main social and political issues being covered by the media.

The second reason emasculating journalism can be explained by limited media pluralism. Most media are strongly dependent on power structures affecting them administratively and financially. The Media Law does not restrict monopoly on media ownership. As a result, a limited number of owners (usually close to the state structures) have a massive impact on the audience. Finally, it is necessary to develop measures that ensure an access of journalists to information. Because of their absence, the thesis of responsible journalism to society still looks rhetorical and complicates the feasibility and moral status of the journalistic profession.

The above mentioned reasons make media objectivity difficult. Russian media's dependence on the powers makes impossible to see them (at least, now) as non-partisan public institution. In this connection, the term "journalism" relating to native media market should be mentioned cautiously, and not be used as a synonym of such definitions as mass media and mass communication.

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PHOTOGRAPHY AND PHOTOJOURNALISM IN RUSSIA: CURRENT TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT

ФОТОГРАФИЯ И ФОТОЖУРНАЛИСТИКА В РОССИИ: СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ТЕНДЕНЦИИ РАЗВИТИЯ

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Photography was invented when printed Guttenberg culture could not represent the whole diversity of quickly changing world. Being "an evidence of a fact", photography possessed complete advantage in comparison with painted pictures or written sources. It could also transmit a huge amount of information during the shortest period. And in this respect photography exceeded radio and cinema. But in fact photography has become an effective tool of communication when two key problems were solved at last — relative ease of reproduction and possibility of mass copying (first of all thanks to periodicals). When both of them were solved — photography became indispensable part of mass media, effective element of propaganda in conflicts and World wars.

As well as abroad, photography was rather popular in pre-revolutionary Russia but the most dynamic period of its development is connected with the Soviet epoch. Photography and photojournalism in the USSR was under the state control along with other media, but after the Soviet system collapse Russian photography and especially it's such important direction as photojournalism began to develop under the influ-

ence of new factors — absence of the Soviet ideology and developing market economy, digital technologies' development etc. — to identify and analyze the most significant ones is the main purpose of the work.

Key words: *photography; photojournalism; Russia; communication; trends.*

Фотография была изобретена, когда печатная культура Гуттенберга уже не могла отражать быстро меняющийся мир во всем его многообразии. Будучи "доказательством события", фотография обладала большими преимуществами по сравнению с картинами или письменными источниками, а также могла передать огромный объем информации за кратчайший период. И в этом смысле она превосходила радио и кинематограф. Но по-настоящему эффективным средством коммуникации фотография стала, когда были решены две ключевые проблемы: стало возможным относительно легко воспроизводить фотоснимки и публиковать их в больших количествах (прежде всего, благодаря периодической печати). Когда в начале XX в. обе проблемы были решены, фотография стала незаменимой часть масс медиа, эффективным элементом пропаганды в конфликтах и мировых войнах.

Так же, как и за границей, фотография была достаточно популярна в дореволюционной России, однако ее наиболее динамичный период развития связан с советской историей. Фотография и фотожурналистика в СССР находилась под государственным контролем. Однако после распада Советского Союза, российская фотография и фотожурналистика стали развиваться под влиянием новых факторов — отсутствия советской идеологии и развивающихся рыночных отношений, развития цифровых технологий, возрождения массовой фотографической культуры и проч. Выявить и проанализировать наиболее важные из этих тенденций — главная задача данной работы.

Ключевые слова: *фотография; фотожурналистика; Россия; коммуникация; тенденции.*

From the first years of the Soviet rule the Bolshevik leaders paid much attention to the development of photography. They seriously considered photography an effective tool of propaganda of "revolutionary accomplishments" and "peaceful creation" suggested by the governing party. It was important to represent the "fairy-tale transformation to reality" and "tomorrow's bright future". In this respect photography was an irreplaceable tool of visualization of unprecedented social experiment in global history, as it was almost impossible to describe the full scale of transformation, which took place in the Soviet Union in 1920–1930s, if you did not see it (Orlova, 2006). As a documentary evidence of the "brilliant future", photography had a capability "to speak using the language that is understood by the wide masses and in addition to conviction, which is typical in photographic picture" (Podluzskiy, 1927). As for the Soviet photographer who worked in periodicals, he (she) should "transform reality using the class approach relying on a high level of class consciousness".

In other words, the value of published photographs was determined not only by their artistic significance or aesthetics, but also by their compliance with the ideological assumptions which were determined from the top, "social significance" in the form in which it was determined by the power.

In the system of the Soviet periodicals the photographs very often played a representational and additional role in relation to the text (with the exception of such illustrated magazines as *Ogonyok*, *SSSR na Stroike/ Sovetskiy Souz* and some others). Nevertheless, even in this case, photographs published in the Soviet periodicals acquired a special status, meaning and significance, even though a possible touch-up or staging "proved" that the event actually took place and emphasized its importance. Thus, the absence of photos in mass media could mean that the event was not so significant, or it simply did not happen at all. During this period a limited number of professional photographers and editors of the state-own editions were working within the framework defined by the official ideology. At the same time, millions of Soviet amateurs had lit-

tle opportunity to publish their works. Thus, the boundary between professional photographers and amateurs was fairly clear (Kostykov, 2011).

Published in the Soviet media, photographers until the mid-1980s should take into consideration the official requirements of the "party perception of life around them" (Satukov, 1961). Only after the social and political transformations, which started in the Soviet Union photojournalism and photography in general got free from state control, and began to cover recently officially embarrassing or even strictly forbidden topics.

Modern Russian photography is under influence of several factors. First of all, a published photograph does not fall under ideological censorship. At the same time, photographers and photojournalists can face a number of restrictions on shooting imposed by the owners of private property, security guards, etc. Such restrictions apply not only to the internal arrangement of the private property, but also to its appearance. Svetlana Balashova, employee of the Center for Media Law at the Faculty of Journalism, Lomonosov Moscow State University, considers that these prohibitions are related to the fact that photographers can find something "to dig" (Balashova, 2011; also: Morozova, 2011; Basharova, 2011). In other words, restrictions on shooting are very often irrational, arbitrarily treated and in most cases do not correspond to the Russian legislation.

Another trend is closely connected with the growing influence of digital technology and developing Russian market economy. Thanks to the "digital revolution", photography in Russia is undoubtedly experiencing a new stage. In our opinion, the best reflection of this trend is the Russian market of education in sphere of photography. Today it is represented by a huge number of different academies, private schools and short-term courses of different levels and quality. Getting profession of a photographer as the second one has become a trend among students of at least several recent years. This trend could be partly illustrated by the data presented by the *Head Hunter*, the agency working in the market of Internet-recruitment. According to this data, approximately 12% of

Russian white-collar workers would like to be photographers. In other words, profession of a photographer is considered along with four other most desirable professions, such as designer, artist and office employee (Media Trendy, 2011). In recent years one can observe an increase among female students who want to be photographers or photojournalists. This is not surprising, if we bear in mind the fact that Russia has an increasing number of women who want to be journalists as such. We also note that the profession of a photographer is among the most asked-for creative professions in Russia closing the top-10 of such professions.

It is no coincidence that Russian job search websites propose large number of such vacancies. According to the statistics for April, 2010, there were 278 relevant vacancies for the profession. Moreover, average salary per month accounts for about 26 thousand roubles (the first three positions in the index are such professions as web-designer, animator and model) (Prytin, 2010). Meanwhile, it is not absolutely clear what the notion "photographer" means according to this rating. Does it imply to the popular wedding or corporative photographers, or anything else? For example, some employers want to hire photographers with complementary competencies – photographer and designer, photographer and PR-manager, photographer and driver, etc.

Photography is well represented in advertising and glossy magazines dedicated to the contemporary fashion, automobiles, travel and other spheres of modern life. As a reflection of public interest to the problems of photography, we can estimate the appearance and development of special periodical editions dedicated to the history, actual problems and prospects for photos both in Russia and abroad. First of all, we mean such magazines as *Digital Photo*, *Foto&Video* and *Photomasterskaya*. The relative lack of sources on the photography is partially compensated by the specialized websites[33], forums and groups in social networks, books on different aspects of shooting and digital processing of photographs, technical features of still cameras and photograph albums. Unfortunately, the number of scientific studies devoted to various aspects of photog-

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[33] URL: www.photographer.ru; URL: http://www.a-photo.net, etc.

raphy is not that big. To some extent, the problem of access to such literature is solved thanks to the studies published by the representatives of the Soviet school, whose works have not lost their importance up to the present day. Meanwhile in recent years a number of interesting studies on philosophical reflection on the phenomenon of photography, books on photojournalism, history of photography in the Soviet period were published (Savchuk, 2005; Berezin, 2006; Stigneev, 2009).

Photo exhibitions and galleries have become an inalienable part of cultural life in many Russian cities, and Moscow and St-Petersburg above all. The target audience of these exhibitions usually consists of rather young people of 20–30 years old. The public interest in photography can be well illustrated, if we look at the increasing number of *The Best of Russia,* the All-Russian photo competition attracting participants of all ages and levels of professionalism[34]. In 2008 there were 16675 images from 312 Russian cities and towns that were sent to take part in the contest and 43213 visitors came to have a look at the exhibition. A year later 25234 images were sent from 569 Russian regions and 71018 people visited the gallery. The youngest participant of the competition was 7 years old, and the oldest one was 86 years old. As organizers of the contest say, in 2010 there were more than 27000 participants from 570 cities and towns of Russia. At last, approximately 30000 photographs were sent in 2011. Totally for the 4th year more than 700000 people visited *The Best of Russia* in Moscow, St-Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Novosibirsk and Perm[35].

Speaking about widespread development of digital technology, first of all we mean the appearance of digital cameras of different types with technical characteristics, which made it possible to change long procedures of processing and printing photographs, to shoot more photographs in high quality, and to have a look at the result at once, to work with the pictures using built-in image editing programs. The growth in popularity of photography was also connected with the development of

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[34] The organizers' aim was to present the life of Russia in 365 photographs.
[35] URL: http://thebestofrussia.ru/about; URL: http://thebestofrussia. ru/news/7; URL: http://thebestofrussia.ru/news/18

such a perfect channel of distribution as Internet, which made it possible to send pictures in just a couple of seconds, publish them for the widest audience all over the world, and even to earn money. Not surprisingly, both technological factors have visibly erased the verge between professional photographers and amateurs.

The coming of amateurs into the profession made an illusion of its "simplicity" and "clarity" as such. As a result, the amateurs' pictures published via Internet in social networks, blogosphere and other recourses are interpreted as "the model" of mastership in photography. Sometimes amateurs are equipped with rather expensive professional digital cameras and have an opportunity to travel not only in Russia but also abroad. They can also present the results of their work and probably sell them. Meanwhile, they are not restricted by any demands of professional ethics in shooting, technical processing of their photographs, which could change content and meaning of the photo at all, etc. (Kostykov, 2011). In other words, the amateurs' coming makes a new competitive environment and professionals have to face the competition (Markin, 2010).

An important result of the Internet development is the appearance of a huge number of different pictures which are copied and distributed via Internet by the private persons and even mass media without the authors' permission (Balashova, 2010). Unfortunately, the piracy in this field is a widespread phenomenon in Russia, but in some experts' opinion the situation is gradually changing for the better (Shachidzhanian, 2010).

An important trend is the appearance of Russian photo banks that allows us to speak about the origin of civilized market of photographs' purchase – sale in Russia. Today there are about fifty companies in Russia purchasing and selling pictures first of all of Russian and foreign photographs, previously from the former Soviet republics. For example, *photobank.ru* is an exclusive Russian partner of the *Getty Images* – one of the greatest Western players in photo bank market in the world. The significant player at the Russian market collecting its own bank of still images and video is the *LORI* photo bank. The sphere of its interests is not only images' selling but also organization

of photo-and video shooting[36]. The *LORI* photo bank was able to collect more than 2,8 million images and to create the biggest collection of its own images in Russia. Estimated by Svetlana Terent'eva, the head of the *LORI* agency, the necessity in photographs is growing first of all thanks to the periodicals (40%), advertisement (25%) and Internet resources (30%) (Biznes fotostokov, 2012). Another feature visible in Russia is connected with not so enthusiastic attitude towards photojournalism, as it exists towards photography as such. The rating of professions published by the *RBC.Rating* agency confirms this conclusion. In September 2009 photojournalism was not even a part of top-30, including the most popular professions among Russians (Kostykov, 2011). The profession of photojournalist hardly applies to the most prestigious and perspective, and the salary is not so high. However, as we have said in this situation Russian case not so unique. For example, according to the rating of the 200 best and worst professions for 2010, published in the United States, profession "photojournalist" was almost at the end of the list, at the 185th place, having lifted on 4 positions in comparison with the previous year (Media Trendy, 2011). But photojournalism is not only an unpaid and sometimes very dangerous profession demanding significant physiological, physical and professional costs. Some experts do not see any perspectives for the development of photojournalism in the future — coming of amateurs, and their competition with professionals are not just the only dimension of the problem.

Today the system of educational institutions in Russia teaching professional photojournalists and picture editors is not so well developed. But even those graduates who have become professionals do not always have a chance to find a well-paid job. The editors of many Russian central and regional periodicals prefer to buy pictures using the services of photo banks or to supply their "writing" journalists with camera. Photography is very often just in the capacity of illustrated supplement to a text. In that way, in most cases photographs play the role of "confirma-

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[36] URL: http://lori.ru/doc/

tion" for the text propositions. Sometimes staged photographs are used, and it is being not clear that they are staged.

According to Andrey Policanov's point of view, the former *Time* magazine picture editor and the director of photography of the *Russkiy Reporter* magazine, photo illustration in Russia is not well developed, and the reasons are connected with the policy of the most part of Russian media who do not have their own vision of photo materials' presentation. He suggests that another reason is concealed in the "diaphoretic" methods used in work with the photographers, and in their unnecessary overwork. As a result, the editors get half-done and template material. The low level of picture editors' professionalism is also very important. But the reasons that were mentioned above are just the result of disdainful attitude regarding photo services activity in general (Polikanov, 2005). The rare exclusion at the Russian market of periodicals is presented in the *Kommersant* publishing house[37]. One of the basic principles of the *Kommersant* photo service is connected with rather clear differentiation of the work. So, after an everyday planning meeting a bild editor provides instructions to the photographers. When shooting is done and gets into the archive, a picture editor works with it and chooses the images he needs. The selected images are signed and put into the electronic archive. The other images are written down on the electronic medium and marked to make it possible to find the necessary image in several minutes (Shachidzhanian, 2010).

In addition to the *Kommersant* publishing house such socio-political magazines as *Itogi* and *The New Times* pay much attention to photographs (Kostykov, 2011). The *Russkiy Reporter* magazine holds one of the leading positions among Russian weekly magazines devoted to socio-political spheres. Andrey Polikanov was recognized the best picture editor in the world. But in general, the amount of periodicals in Russian market that pay attention to photography as an important and at least equal in rights with the texts media, isn't that big.

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[37] *Kommersant* is Russian publishing house. Kommersant publishes, i.e. newspaper *Kommersant*, such magazines as *Den'gi*, *Vlast'*, *Ogonyok*, and owns the *Kommersant FM* radio station.

Professionals talk about several ways of photojournalism surviving. According to the point of view of Eddy Opp, the director of photo service of the *Kommersant* publishing house, the future of professional photojournalism in Russia is closely connected with the development of qualitative liberal periodicals – the main consumer of the high level photographs (Opp, 2006). Some specialists connect survival of the profession with the growth of photographs' artistic level and others with the personal projects' creation. Some of them supporting their Western colleagues suppose "photojournalism is dead" (Greenslade, 2011; Kraus, 2009). It's partly true if we mean "traditional" photojournalism existed in "paper" media – newspapers and magazines that endure not the best times. But we tend to share the views of those representatives of expert community who suggest that the future of photojournalism depends not only on development of qualitative editions but previously on multimedia space. Therefore, such development requires new competences from photojournalists, who should be professionals of multimedia culture. And in this respect prospects of development of Russian photography look promising.

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CULTURAL PLURALISM IN RUSSIAN PRESS: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT

КУЛЬТУРНЫЙ ПЛЮРАЛИЗМ В РОССИЙСКИХ ПЕЧАТНЫХ СМИ: ПРОБЛЕМЫ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ РАЗВИТИЯ

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The article considers the role of cultural pluralism in the Russian society today, and dwells on a set of challenges and prospects it is facing in multiethnic, culturally and linguistically diverse country. Special attention has been given to exploring phenomenon of cultural pluralism in the media, in particular print media, and highlighting governmental initiatives aimed at developing pluralistic media landscape in Russia.

Key words: *cultural pluralism; minorities; inter-ethnic relations; multiculturalism.*

В статье рассматривается роль культурного плюрализма в современном российском обществе, освещаются основные трудности, с которыми сталкивается общество при попытке реализовать идею плюралистического медиаландшафта в условиях мультиэтнической и мультикультурной реальности, а также определяются перспективы развития культурного плюрализма в современной России. Особенное внимание в статье уделяется

изучению особенностей культурного плюрализма в российских медиа, в частности в печатных СМИ. Рассматриваются законопроекты и государственные инициативы, направленные на обеспечение культурного многообразия в сфере массовой информации.

Ключевые слова: *культурный плюрализм; меньшинства; межэтнические отношения; мультикультурализм.*

Cultural pluralism in the media is defined as a concept referring to a fair and diverse representation of various cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious, gender groups, and expression of their values, standpoints and opinions through the media (Valcke, Picard, Sükösd et al, 2010). Generally, cultural pluralism can be perceived as one of dimensions of a broader notion − media pluralism, which includes also pluralism of media ownership, pluralism of types and genres, political pluralism and geographical pluralism (ibid). Today, when multiculturalism and policies aimed at developing public openness towards diversity in the society are being promoted and implemented in many countries, leaving aside pessimistic views of some European politicians about the future of multiculturalism (Anisimov, 2011), case of Russia is becoming more and more interesting. The way the country, which underwent fundamental political transformations in the XX century, and takes nowadays the 8th place in the world among the countries with the biggest population, cultural and linguistic minorities, is building a multicultural society, undoubtedly deserves a thorough consideration.

To start with, safeguarding pluralistic media landscape is important due to a number of reasons. Firstly, providing all cultural minorities access to media platforms means providing them equal opportunities for development, for reaching their target audience and airing their diverse views and interests in public. Secondly, pluralism in media supports access of all citizens to a wide spectrum of cultural representations, values and opinions of diverse communities, thus broadening one's cultural ho-

rizons and encouraging people to approach things in a different way. Last but not least is that pluralistic media landscape is one of fundamental contributors to building a multicultural society, where interests and cultural identities of all members of the society are equally respected and protected.

As mentioned above, an important factor in forming cultural pluralism in Russia was transformation of the political landscape after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which was followed by a change in national identity, namely a shift from a "multiple" identity − the "Soviet people" − towards a more personalized one. In the Soviet times interests of minority groups were not ignored in a sense that they were not respected or taken on board. However, the commonly accepted point of view was that Russian majority's interests and expectations are similar to those of non-Russians, so they would rarely come into conflict with the latter (Antonova, 2007). The ethnic Russians were perceived as "first among equal", meaning by "equals" all nationalities of the USSR, and they were supposed to express the united Soviet people's interests (ibid).

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there occurred raise of the self-consciousness of ethnic minority groups living at the territory of the 83 subjects of the Russian Federation. In order to minimize and prevent ethnic tensions between them, the issue of securing pluralism in the society, i.e. providing equal opportunities for all citizens, regardless of their descent and cultural belonging, and making sure there is a proportional representation of all cultural communities in social sphere, including the media, was brought forward.

The Russian census of 2010 revealed that the number of ethnic groups living at the territory of the Russian Federation is 193, and the number of languages spoken in Russia is 171 (Putin, 2012). The biggest ethnic groups, according to the data of 2010, are Tatars (3,87%), Ukrainians (1,41%), Bashkir (1,15%), Chuvash (1,05%) and Chechens (1,04%) (Ob itogakh Vserossiskoi perepisi naselenia 2010 goda, 2012). Out of 142,9 million people living at the territory of Russia, 138 million speak Rus-

sian. Other popular languages are English, Tatar, German, Chechen, Bashkir, Ukrainian and Chuvash (ibid).

Such broad representation of diverse ethnical and cultural minorities in the country makes Russian government face various challenges: difficulties in reducing ethnic conflicts, which may arise, for example, due to the existence of xenophobic sentiment among the natives and lack of sense of belonging among newly coming migrants, protecting languages and cultures of minor ethnic groups and making sure interests and values of such minorities are respected, etc. In this sense developing cultural pluralism in Russian media can be one of the ways to reduce these tensions. One can assume that in a society where freedom of expression is equally protected, and all communities have right and possibility to bring their views, needs, interests, perspectives into the public debate, is less likely to develop ethnic conflicts and ethnocentrism among its members. The role of mass media in forming value systems of citizens, their moral standards and norms, perceptions of reality is becoming very essential (Vartanova, 2008), which also proves that in order to move forward towards multicultural society, Russian media need to become more pluralism-oriented, making content more culturally and linguistically diverse.

Nowadays among all newspapers published in Russia, 9,157 are in the Russian language, and 498 are in other languages; 6,742 magazines and other periodicals are published in Russian, and 307 are in other languages (Vypusk knig i broshur, zhurnalov i gazet, 2012). Some newspapers provide content in the minorities' language only, such as one of the oldest non-Russian newspaper *Khypar* (established in 1906), which is published in the Chuvash language, or *Kyzyl Tan*, a Tatar-language newspaper. Others are issued both in Russian and the minorities' language, for example, *Niiso-Dagestan,* which is available in Russian and Chechen. There are also newspapers in less widespread languages, for example *Tabasarandin Nurar*, published in Tabasaran — a language spoken in the Republic of Dagestan (according to the census of 2010, the number of Russian citizens who can speak this language is 126,136 only).

Although the number of newspapers in the languages of the minorities seems to be quite high, the press in non-Russian languages is indisputably facing a number of challenges today. Among them is the lack of journalists willing to work for the non-Russian media outlets. As Said Suleimanov, journalist of the Dagestan newspaper *Nur* (published in the Tsakhur and Russian languages), puts it: "Young journalists choose those media where they see possibilities for themselves: Internet-media, newspapers in the Russian language. The salary there is higher, and one can make a good career in such media outlets" (V Dagestane zhurnalisty kritikuut gosudarstvennuu politiku v oblasti podderzhki nacionalnykh SMI, 2012). Other problems are a limited number of original materials written in the minorities' languages (most of publications are translated from Russian) and a lack of initiative from the minorities themselves. The latter challenge, according to the editor-in-chief of Dagestan's *Novoe Delo* newspaper, Marko Shakhbanov, deals with the state support of non-Russian media: due to the sufficient financing from federal budget, newspapers' owners do not wish to seek for other funding opportunities (ibid). A possible solution in this case, supposes Shakhbanov, can be reducing state support and stimulating grants allocation. This will make newspapers develop more rapidly in order to remain competitive and attract readership.

Developing cultural pluralism in Russian media can be perceived also in a broader sense: it is a factor contributing to the implementation of the policy of integration in Russia. This policy must focus on stimulating cultural, linguistic, ethnic diversity, on the one hand, and fostering the integration of the Russian population by adopting the national identity, the same set of norms and the values needed for the stable society, on the other one (Tishkov, 2012). Issuing newspapers and launching TV and radio programmes in the minorities' languages can help harmonize inter-ethnic relations and stabilize social and cultural environment of the country by encouraging all residents having different nationalities to actively participate in the cultural, spiritual, social, economic life of multicultural Russia.

A question, that certainly arises when speaking about the policy of integration is whether the Russian citizens support it or not. Research conducted in 2011 in 9 Moscow schools (Omelchenko, 2012) showed that the majority of newcomers support the policy of integration, if it allows them to retain their own culture as well. Answering the question about the way of living in Russia, 16% of migrants claimed that they existed within their diasporas and had never made attempts to integrate into the Russian culture, 24% said they were trying to absorb Russian traditions and norms as much as they could, 56% marked they didn't mind getting integrated provided that they can retain their culture as well, and 4% found it difficult to answer (ibid).

The survey conducted by Levada-center in October 2012 (Nacionalnaya politika i otnoshenie k migrantam, 2012) among indigenous Russians showed similar results: 11,1% said migrants should keep their own culture and traditions and should not integrate into the Russian society, 14,4% support complete integration of newcomers into the Russian society with abandonment of their culture, and 74,4% claimed they did not mind living in a society where ethnic and cultural minorities hold on to their traditions and norms provided that they absorb Russian culture as well. Thus, both surveys demonstrated that the majority of ethnic Russians and the majority of migrants support the policy of integration and harmonious co-existence in the society.

Since the idea of implementing in Russia the policy of integration appears quite promising, there should be more governmental initiatives aimed at developing pluralism in multiethnic Russian society in general, and in the Russian media in particular. Let us have a brief overview of what has been done already in this respect.

Important steps that have been made in this direction since 1991 include ratification of Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1998, and signing European Charter for Regional or Minorities Languages in 2001. Although the latter document has not been ratified yet, a number of initiatives suggested by the Russian government make us believe protection of cultural pluralism in the society is one of key tasks today.

In 2003 the Moscow House of Nationalities was opened. Its main priorities include promoting stable and harmonious inter-ethnic relations, enhancing mutual penetration of cultures and stimulating international cooperation. In order to attain these goals, the Moscow House of Nationalities regularly initiates diverse cultural activities, festivals, competitions aimed at bringing people from different cultural and linguistic communities closer to each other, supports publishing books by national authors and issues an almanac *Vestnik*, which reflects information about the ongoing events. Besides, the Moscow House of Nationalities has its own monthly newspaper *StoLICHNOST* that covers urgent problems of inter-ethnic relations, helps set up dialogues with young people belonging to diverse cultural groups and involves citizens in the ethno-cultural life of the city.

In the years 2009–2011 a Joint Program of The Council of Europe, the Ministry for Regional Development of the Russian Federation and the European Commission "Minorities in Russia: Developing Languages, Culture, Media and Civil Society" was implemented. Significant results of this initiative include fostering a better expression of cultural and ethnic communities through media, creation and support of new print, audio-visual and electronic media outlets of the minorities (e.g., TV portal "Finnougrovidenie"[38] implemented by the Finno-Urgic Center of the Russian Federation), developing training courses for journalists and establishing communication between minorities and majority of the Russian population. The latter initiative includes, for instance, opening a summer camp for children where they can get acquainted with traditions and everyday reality of the Kumandins ethnic minority living in the Altai Republic. Another interesting example is summer school of Mari language and culture in Yoshkar-Ola, the principal purpose of which is exploring traditional Mari culture incorporated in the study process.

In June 2012 Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations was established in Russia. Its main task is serving as an effective mechanism for cooperation between the state authorities and the public in the area of interethnic relations (Meeting of Council for Interethnic Relations,

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[38] URL: http://fusee.tv/

2012). At the end of 2012 the Council's Working Group suggested a new strategy of national politics in the sphere of interethnic relations. The program includes, besides other initiatives, constant monitoring of mass media and social networks in order to prevent the propaganda of extremist ideas and the rise of ethnic conflicts. The Guild of Inter-ethnic Journalism, which introduced an Internet project Nacionalniy Akzent[39] (National Accent), is also oriented at developing tolerance towards other cultural groups, stimulating cultural awareness of Russians by publishing news about various cultural events going on in Russia, interviews with politicians, representatives of national minorities. Besides, the Guild is also aimed at increasing the professionalism of journalists specializing on ethnic issues, helping them to get grants and organizing seminars on how to cover the inter-ethnic relations.

One cannot argue that cultural pluralism in Russia, despite all afore-mentioned initiatives, has not reached the height of its development yet. It seems reasonable to increase the number of newspapers and magazines covering ethnic issues and cross-cultural communication, foster public interest towards exploring other cultural and linguistic communities, organize more joint activities in order to bring people from different cultural groups closer to each other (like, for example, annual festival in Pskov region Setomaa, devoted to the culture of Setos — linguistic and cultural minority living in an area covering South-Eastern Estonia and North-Western Russia). Developing periodicals that highlight recent academic researches of cultural and ethnic minorities is also important. The academic journal *Finno-ugrovedenie* published by Mari Research Institute of Language, Literature and History in the Republic of Mari El, for instance, highlights various themes related to the history of Finno-Ugric ethnos, their language, culture and mentality. Increase of number of scholarly publications on diverse cultural communities can also contribute to developing pluralism in the Russian media and expanding cultural awareness of citizens.

Developing cultural pluralism in Russia today is impossible without promoting the general integration policy. Since the main factor of inte-

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[39] URL: http://nazaccent.ru/

gration in any society is the language, there should be more educational institutions aimed at providing those who do not speak Russian fluently, an opportunity to study it. In 2000s a number of schools of Russian language for the children of migrants were opened in Moscow. These school function at regular educational institutions, and provide a one-year study program focused on developing speaking, reading, writing skills and introducing children to Russian realities and culture codes.

Along with that, there should appear more schools for children of the Russian descent, which support the idea of polycultural education. In multi-ethnic, culturally and linguistically diverse country introducing children to a broad sweep of various cultural traditions, ways of thought, modes of expression is exceedingly important, as it will contribute to forming values of tolerance and objectivity. In other words, polycultural education will help younger generation realize that no particular culture is superior, and, therefore, it cannot trump the worldview of others. Other cultures should not be judged or perceived solely by values, standards and beliefs of one's own culture, otherwise there arises so-called cultural centrism (Sadokhin, 2010), which presupposes a foreign culture is indisputably worse that one's own one.

Let us stress again that today cultural pluralism in Russia is still far from being ideal. At the same time, a number of activities and initiatives aimed at promoting tolerance towards persons from diverse cultural and social backgrounds, fostering further development of regional media in the languages of the minorities and safeguarding equal access to media of all cultural and ethnic communities let us believe that the future of pluralism in Russia is promising.

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